Green hue - same sentences
Red hue - different sentences

pysbd	spacy
framework of EU-Russia JLS cooperation.Second, it analyses the implementation of the main policy areas in JLS cooperation, including such crosscutting challenges as asylum and ensuring data protection standards.Third, it assesses the intersection of the Road Map with the cooperation on human rights, democracy and the rule of law.In this sense, the EU and Russia have established that cooperation on human rights would be the basis of EU-Russia JLS cooperation.Finally, the study summarises the main conclusions of the analysis and presents policy recommendations.The first document to set out a JLS agenda between the EU and Russia was the PCA, (Council of the European Union, 1997) .The PCA established a 'strategic partnership' between the EU and Russia.In this sense, the Stockholm Programme, the multiannual programme that sets out the EU's priorities for action in the JLS sphere for 2010-2014, states that Russia is a strategic partner of the Union (European Council, 2010, p. 35) .The PCA includes a special title VIII devoted to counteracting unlawful activities.First, it mentions the prevention of "illegal activities", 5 by readmitting irregular migrants to their countries of origin, fighting forgery, corruption and drug trafficking.Second, it makes reference to assistance in "drafting national legislation" against unlawful activities, which is a rather ambiguous provision given that it does not clarify the contents of this legislation.Third, the PCA includes socialisation measures, such as the training of staff from both parties working mainly in law enforcement authorities.It is worth mentioning that both parties opted for socialisation as a policy instrument to step up their cooperation.Lastly, the agreement foresees a provision on visa policy, targeted at businessmen, key personnel and cross-border sellers, stipulating that when issuing their visas, more favourable conditions should apply.At the EU-Russia Saint Petersburg Summit in 2003, both actors designed a new institutional and also nonlegally binding setting to reinforce their cooperation, with the launch of four Common Spaces (EU-Russia Saint Petersburg Summit, 2003) .Among them were the Common Space on Freedom, Security and Justice, with specific measures to be found in a Road Map agreed two years later at the EU-Russia Moscow Summit in 2005 (EU-Russia Moscow Summit, 2005 .6 Regardless of its non-legally binding nature, it has so far been the main document setting out the EU-Russia JLS agenda.The New Agreement, which will include a whole chapter devoted to JLS issues, will be the reference document in EU-Russia JLS cooperation.After this overview of the normative basis of EU-Russia JLS cooperation, a few considerations on the institutional framework of EU-Russia relations are highlighted.The EU-Russia New Basic Agreement, which the EU and Russia have been negotiating since 2007 with eleven rounds of negotiations, should provide an enhanced legal basis for cooperation in the JLS sphere.The JLS chapter has already been agreed, but the parties have not reached an agreement on trade and investments, which prevents the New Agreement from being signed.7 Once it comes into force, the New Agreement will be the first comprehensive legal basis to regulate EU-Russia JLS cooperation, setting out legally binding commitments that will most likely enhance cooperation in the field.A major aspect that the New Agreement will regulate is a new institutional framework.Neither the EU-Russia cooperation councils foreseen in the PCA, nor the sub-committees on JLS have taken place in practice.Instead, the PPC has been institutionalised as the framework to cooperate on JLS.Although the EU-Russia PCAs on JLS issues have counted with the participation of the Ministries of the Interior and Justice of Russia, as well as Commissioners Viviane Reding and Cecilia Malmström from the EU side, the subcommittee format would provide for a more structured venue where the relevant ministerial representatives could meet on a regular basis.In addition, the Nicosia JLS PPC in October 2012 went a step further from the current situation, stating that " [t] he Parties agreed to hold one PPC on Freedom, Security and Justice per year. To ensure continuity of the work between PPC meetings, the Parties agreed to hold an SOM in line with the implementation of the EU-Russia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement" (Council of the European Union, 2012a, p. 3) .The initiative consists of setting up SOM meetings that cover all of JLS cooperation, with the participation of the highest non-political representatives.Such general SOM meetings take place in the framework of EU-US JLS cooperation.SOM meetings already take place in specific policy areas, such as the EU-Russia visa dialogue, which from the EU side are chaired by the Commission Directorate-General for Home Affairs and from the Russian side by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Joint Readmission and Visa Facilitation Committees.At this point, it is important to recall that as a consequence of the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the EU is adjusting at the internal level those institutions responsible for external action in the field of JLS.The actors involved are the new body responsible for overall external action, the European External Action Service (EEAS), the Commission services in charge of the external dimensions of home affairs and justice, the Presidency of the Council and the EU member states.Home affairs agencies, such as FRONTEX, Europol and Eurojust, also have their own external relations officers who deal with Russia.The EU faces the challenge of inter-service coordination and more time is needed so that the new institutional structures of the Treaty of Lisbon become fully operational.All in all, according to an official from the EEAS, the challenge of the New Agreement is to set up new structures that allow for more effective cooperation between Brussels and Moscow.Main Issues and Challenges Underlying the Implementation of the EU-Russia Common Space on Freedom, Security and Justice  The visa-free dialogue has become a crucial issue in EU-Russia JLS cooperation, overshadowing other significant spheres of the common space, as it can be considered 'a litmus test' for the level of mutual trust. The Common Steps towards visa-free short-term travel consist of actions in four key areas covering all the main aspects of JLS policy and connecting the loose patchwork of JLS cooperation. The state of play reveals the difference in the approaches of the EU and Russia towards visa liberalisation: while Brussels insists on the technical character of the existing obstacles to a visa-free regime, Moscow states that the technical requirements have been met and stresses the political component of the EU decision not to lift short-term visas in the nearest future. The implementation of the EU-Russia Readmission Agreement can be regarded as a success story and among the less problematic issues in EU-Russia cooperation. EU-Russia cooperation on drugs is assessed as more problematic than successful.In spite of intensive activities against illicit drug trafficking, no steps have been taken in exerting joint consolidated pressure upon the trafficking of drugs from Afghanistan. The lack of an independent body to control information exchange in Russia is slowing down the progress of negotiations on the operational Working Arrangements with Europol and Eurojust, which is a precondition for the liberalisation of the visa regime.This section analyses the degree of implementation of the Road Map, its main results, challenges and failures.The last publicly available Progress Report on the Road Map is for 2010 (European Union-Russia, 2011), although an evaluation in 2011 was also issued.8 The structure is developed in accordance with the importance of the issues under examination and their place on the EU-Russia political agenda, starting from the dialogue towards visa-free short-term travel, which is crucial in EU-Russia JLS relations, and ending with judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters, which despite its relevance lacks momentum.The section looks at the main issues at stake, which are logically interlinked, by examining the most recent developments in EU-Russia JLS consultations and meetings at the different levels.The analysis shows the uneven progress in fulfilling the commitments set in the Road Map.It is important to understand why a number of the commitments in the Road Map are being implemented rather smoothly, while others stagnate, in spite of the fact that the main preparations for achieving the results have been accomplished.The objective and subjective reasons for the success and failure of the implementation of the Road Map are exposed, as well as the reasons for (mis)communications and (dis)trust between the parties.It is obvious that the lack of trust at the level of EU-Russia political contacts constrains the enhancement of cooperation in JLS issues.The Joint Statement of the Saint Petersburg Summit reaffirmed the importance of people-to-people contacts and a "Europe without dividing lines", which was translated into a specific measure in the Road Map: the establishment of a visa-free regime in the long-term.The Road Map explicitly states that "it was also decided to examine the conditions for visa-free travel as a long-term perspective" (EU-Russia Moscow Summit, 2005, p. 20) .Actually, visa liberalisation was one of the main issues during the Saint Petersburg Summit, since Russia asked the EU for a clear and tangible incentive to go further with the negotiations on a Readmission Agreement.To be sufficiently persuasive, this incentive had to be necessarily related to the facilitation of the movement of people between the EU and Russia.In this sense, it must be recalled that Russia, unlike the EU, was eager to abolish the visa regime at the time of the negotiations.Therefore, in the absence doing so in the short term, the incentive proposed was a facilitation of the issuance of visas.This section delves into the implementation of and prospects for the common steps towards visa-free short-term travel, the renegotiation of the VFA and the Kaliningrad regime for local border traffic (LBT).The EU-Russia visa dialogue SOMs were launched in September 2007 as a framework for the visa liberalisation process.Regarding the grounds on which the visa regime should be abolished, the EU and Russia have opted for an approach whereby technical requirements should be adopted by both parties.At the EU-Russia Summit in December 2011, the list of mutual commitments or Common Steps towards visa-free short-term travel was adopted and regrettably not made publicly available.It seems that the EU will seek publication of the commitments set out in the Common Steps at the EU-Russia Summit on 21 December 2012 if member states agree to do so in the Council.Russia presumably has no objections to the publication of the Common Steps.9 The Common Steps, unlike the existing Road Maps on Visa Liberalisation that the EU unilaterally adopted for the Eastern Partnership countries (Ukraine and Moldova to date), are expected to commit both sides on the basis of reciprocity.Concerning the legal form the reciprocal abolition of the visa regime should adopt once the Common Steps are fulfilled, the parties will sign an international Visa Waiver Agreement, which will also provide more legal certainty on compliance with their obligations.Ambassador Vladimir Chizhov, Permanent Representative of the Russia to the EU, called the visa-free dialogue "a touchstone determining the faithfulness of the partners' intention to develop a strategic partnership for modernisation", as visa-free travel concerns the interests of many citizens: 2.5 million Russians visit the Schengen Area annually and 1.5 million citizens from the Schengen Area go to Russia.10 The statistics show the extensive travel exchange between Russia and the Schengen Area.According to data from the European Commission, in 2011 Russia was among the countries where most short-stay visa applications were lodged (5.2 million, 39% of the total), with the highest rate of multi-entry visas issued (47%) and a very low refusal rate (2%).11 The statistics of the Federal Migration Service (FMS) of Russia show that in 2011 Germany was second (after China) in the list of states whose citizens received Russian visas (10%), followed by France (5%), Finland (4%), Italy (4%) the UK (3%) and Lithuania (3%).12 For the purpose of preparing the report on the implementation of the Common Steps for the EU-Russia Summit on 21 December 2012, the visa dialogue SOM in January 2012 agreed on a monthly schedule to monitor progress in the implementation.According to the agreed schedule, the first expert meeting took place in April 2012, where the parties discussed the necessary arrangements for the fulfilment of the Common Steps, including the legal base and measures to be implemented in every element of the Common Steps: "documents security, including biometric passports", "irregular migration, including readmission", "public order protection, law enforcement and legal cooperation", including the Russia-Europol Strategic and Operational Agreement, and finally "external relations and fundamental rights".In addition, the exchange of expert missions was agreed as well as the reports on implementation.Russia submitted its report (219 pages) in April 2012 and the EU did so in June 2012.The reports were discussed during the SOM in June 2012 in Brussels.The first expert field mission on document security went to Moscow on 24-28 September.The second EU mission inspected the Russian-Belarusian border and cross-border points between Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan.Russian experts plan a return visit to the EU on 10-20 December.A number of issues had already been tackled in summer 2012, such as the issuance of biometric passports that are compliant with the standards of the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO).These contain a chip with information as well as a procedure of information transfer for stolen or lost documents.In addition, the EU's concern about the obligation of foreigners' registration in Russia would be addressed by Russia with the following proposal: once the Visa Waiver Agreement enters into force, registration for short visits will be cancelled in both Russia and the EU member states where it is required.In October 2012, the EU-Russia PPC in Nicosia welcomed the continuing implementation of the Common Steps in its joint conclusions (see Council of the European Union, 2012a).At the same time, Alexander Konovalov, the head of the Russian delegation at the PPC, noted that the negotiations returned to the results that had been already achieved four years ago.13 The visa-free regime became the key issue during the EU-Russia Summit on 21 December 2012.The situation seemed rather strained and controversial on the eve of the summit.Russia, being dissatisfied with the slow pace of implementing the Common Steps, offered a Road Map for quicker progress: to implement measures fulfilling the first and the second elements of the Common Steps (on document security and irregular migration) by the end of 2012 and to continue work on the third and the fourth ones in 2013 with the aim of finalising them by the EU-Russia summit in June 2013, in order to proceed with the drafting of the Visa Waiver Agreement.According to this schedule, the Agreement might be signed at the end of 2013 and a visa-free regime enacted before the winter 2014 Sochi Olympics.As for the EU, Brussels has several technical problems with the implementation of the Common Steps, which have not been addressed by Russia: border management (technical capabilities at checkpoints) and corruption, which are connected with document security.With serious doubts on the EU side that the problems could be solved during a year, the "visa lifting process is at the very beginning" and it is "untimely to speak about any dates".14 The state of play reveals the difference in the approaches of the two sides: while Brussels insists on the technical character of the obstacles to a visa-free regime, Moscow believes that the technical requirements have been met, and the real reasons of the EU are mainly political.In this regard, Anwar Asimov, Ambassador at Large, cited the intention of several EU member states to first lift visas with the Eastern Partnership countries, 15 the opposition by certain Central European and Baltic member states to the liberalisation and the EU's persistence in emphasising the human rights component of the visa liberalisation process.16 At the same time, Ambassador Azimov mentioned that Moscow may take measures if there is no breakthrough in the visa-free dialogue with the EU before the end of 2013."It is hard to put Russians under a yoke -and then the strike [back] will be adequate and asymmetric", he added, according to Interfax.17 The EU-Russia Summit on 21 December 2012 brought no positive results to the urgent issues under discussion.It is clear that the implementation of the Common Steps has not facilitated the level of trust needed to lift visas yet.Nevertheless, Russia has at the moment no intention of unilaterally stopping the adoption of the Common Steps.Actually, the Russian Ministry of Culture is engaged in drafting legislation to liberalise visas for participants and spectators of business, cultural, sport and other official events, who come to Russia for no more than ten days.The decision on the further development of the visa dialogue might be taken during the EU-Russia summit in June 2013.To sum up, mixed results have been achieved so far in the EU-Russia visa dialogue.Two elements of the Common Steps have been implemented by the EU-Russia summit on 21 December: document security and irregular migration.Russia is indicating its willingness to address the EU's concerns on border management, corruption and foreigners' registration.The following six months will be devoted to addressing the most critical problems.The EU's reluctance to fix a date for starting the negotiations on a Visa Waiver Agreement causes disappointment and irritation on the Russian side and decreases significantly the progress of the visafree dialogue.By contrast, a fixed date would be a great incentive and encouragement for Russia to overcome problems and shortcomings.In this context, the implementation of technical preconditions to which the parties committed in the Common Steps should be separated from political conditionality, which puts human rights as the main aspect for progress towards visa liberalisation.Russia shows readiness to implement all the technical requirements under the respected list, but rejects progress in human rights and democracy as the key precondition for establishing visa-free travel and insists on including human rights issues in the implementation process only to the extent they directly touch on the liberalisation of visas, such as anti-discrimination laws.Why may conditionality not only turn out to be ineffective but also counterproductive?Conditionality is a policy instrument that is most plausible when there is an EU membership prospect and when sanctions are justified in relation to a repressive political regime.In the Russian case, unlike the Eastern Partnership states, Russia does not emphasise 'the European choice'; it agrees to accept acquis communautaire 'where appropriate', and positions itself as an equal partner vis-à-vis the Union.Thus the golden carrot of EU membership does not attract Russia.As for the possible sanctions, Russia does not consider them a serious threat and speaks regularly about an asymmetrical response.Consequently, the most effective policy instrument in EU-Russian relations appears to be that of socialisation, as opposed to that of conditionality.Visa liberalisation and increasing youth exchanges would foster people-to-people contacts, which can become the motor of socialisation, increase the knowledge and deeper understanding of both sides and finally support EU-Russian common values.Increasing business and professional contacts through meetings and consultations and joint training programmes inter alia for judges, police officers and border guards are another means of socialisation, which contribute to building mutual trust among the parties.These would be the most effective countermeasures to boost the modernisation and democratising pressures within Russia.Meanwhile, visa restrictions are generally felt to be humiliating by virtue of their intrusiveness, heavy bureaucratic delays, costs and uncertain outcomes.The current visa obligations and the EU's reluctance to lift Schengen visas give way to an increase of anti-European sentiments in Russia, thus feeding nationalistic rhetoric.The Visa Facilitation Agreement between the EU and Russia entered into force in 2007 (Council of the European Union, 2007a) and was the first one to be negotiated and signed in parallel with the Readmission Agreement, in what has been coined as the readmission-visa facilitation nexus (Hernández i Sagrera, 2009, p. 578) .The VFA entailed the exemption of visa fees for certain categories of visa applicants, such as researchers and lorry drivers, a reduced, fixed visa fee for the rest of the applicants and a shorter period for the issuance along with the possibility to lodge applications for multiple entry visas.The assessment of the visa facilitation regime is rather positive, according to officials from both the EU and Russia, but rather negative in the opinion of visa applicants, who encounter problems in the visa issuance procedure.Nonetheless, with the enactment of the so-called 'EU Visa Code', the EU Regulation regarding the issuance of Schengen visas, the VFA would need to be amended accordingly.The European Commission has the mandate from the Council to renegotiate the Agreement.The amended VFA, which has almost been agreed at the end of 2012, foresees the liberalisation of visas for additional categories of citizens, the extension of long-term multiple-entry visas for more citizens as well as the facilitation of the visa procedure for the remaining applicants subject to the regime.At the beginning of the negotiations, the Russian side proposed to include a provision extending the liberalisation of visas to holders of service passports.In this sense, similar provisions are included in the VFAs with Ukraine and Moldova.The proposal was not backed by the EU, however.When preparing the Nicosia PPC in October 2012, the sides started discussing compromise solutions, which could overcome a deadlock to the negotiations on an amended VFA.One proposed solution was to limit the scope of service passport holders to those who possess passports with an electronic data carrier and to reduce the number of passport holders by excluding the military and the administrative staff from diplomatic representations.Although Russia agreed to accept both, the compromise was not reached and the Agreement has not been amended yet.The lack of a compromise solution on the Agreement had direct repercussions on airline crew members, who used to benefit from visa liberalisation under the current VFA.The respective moratorium was not prolonged by Moscow on 1 November 2012 as a response to the refusal of the EU to include service passport holders in the amended VFA.Instead, Russia can sign bilateral agreements with certain member states on visa liberalisation for airline crew members.Still, failure to sign the amended VFA is symbolic in EU-Russia JLS relations, as it demonstrates the lack of flexibility even in a specific policy area.The EU distrust of even a relatively small group -service passports holders -makes the very prospect of a visa-free regime questionable and slows down progress in implementing the Road Map.The EU should assess how to address this obstacle to the signature of an amended VFA.A similar Russian-Norwegian agreement on LBT entered into force in May 2012 and was signed by the ministers for foreign affairs of the two countries in November 2010.The Russian-Norwegian Agreement covered the small border area foreseen in the EU Local Border Traffic Regulation.Actually, the prescribed radius of the local traffic zone proved quite convenient for travellers.But in the case of Kaliningrad, the Polish initiative proposed the extension of the area to the entire oblast.Therefore, it required the revision of the EU LBT Regulation.Given that Kaliningrad's geographical location is unique, the EU showed flexibility in extending Poland and Russia's proposal from a radius of 30 km (50 km in exceptional cases) to stretch the LBT area to up to 60-100 km for both Russian and Polish border areas with the goal "to prevent an artificial division of the Kaliningrad oblast, whereby some inhabitants would enjoy facilitations for local border traffic while the majority (including the inhabitants of the city of Kaliningrad) would not" ( The Polish initiative was perceived in Russia as one of a few visible results of cooperation under the Road Map and across all EU-Russia relations.Furthermore, it gave an impetus to Polish-Russian bilateral relations.The LBT "will noticeably facilitate human contacts between the residents of these regions and will considerably expand opportunities for developing business ties, inter-regional cooperation, youth exchanges and tourist trips", the Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov commented.20 Thus, the political value of the Agreement appears to be even more significant than its practical content.Regarding whether the inhabitants of the border region benefited from the Agreement, the statistical data gives evidence that this has been the case.In August 2012, 3,699 Poles crossed the border with local border traffic permits (LBTPs).21 The number of Kaliningrad oblast inhabitants applying for permits was initially lower, but by October 2012 it had increased by 6,000.The number of those wishing to obtain an LBTPalmost 200 per day -exceeds the consulates' capabilities.Therefore, an outsourcing centre was opened in Kaliningrad in November 2012 in charge of issuing the permits.22 Nevertheless, the Agreement was criticised even before it came into force.Experts cast doubt about the smooth functioning of the new regime, pointing out shortcomings at checkpoints, which were not ready to cope with the increased number of crossings.23 One needs to remember that differences in prices have always motivated and stimulated border crossings (chelnok business).LBT has triggered an increase in the prospects of petty traders, who bring cheap fuel and cigarettes from Kaliningrad and spirits back from Poland.Their activities cannot be qualified as smuggling, if they carry their goods in permitted quantities.But the increasing scale of chelnok trade raises concerns among the Kaliningrad business community; moreover, sometimes people need to wait for seven hours to cross the border.The current situation prompted the members of Kaliningrad regional Duma to address the deputies of the Sejm of Poland, and ask for their assistance in accelerating the check procedures at the Polish-Russian border.The launch of LBT at the Polish-Russian border might have given impetus to negotiations on a similar agreement with Lithuania, which have stalled since 2009.The text of the agreement was agreed, but the Lithuanian side showed no enthusiasm for widening the radius of the border zone.According to Arūnas Plikšnys, Director of the Regional Policy Department of the Lithuanian Ministry of the Interior, Lithuania has the intention of advancing the decision on LBT.24 But the Polish-Russian LBT is regarded by the Commission as exceptional and will hardly set a precedent for the Lithuanian case.25 Two other Russian initiatives regarding visa issues in the Kaliningrad oblast are worth mentioning.First, in 2003 the Kaliningrad regional Duma put forward a proposal to amend federal legislation with the purpose of lifting visa requirements for foreigners coming to Kaliningrad.Yet, this initiative was doomed to failure and has never been appreciated in Moscow because of the reciprocity issue in visa liberalisation between the EU and Russia.The regional deputies' idea was not supported by Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev during his visit to Kaliningrad in October 2012.Second, the Russian initiative of '72 hours visa-free' was proposed by the participants of the 21 st Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference held in Saint Petersburg on 28 August 2012 as a small step towards establishing a visa-free regime.In 2008, the Russian government took the unilateral decision to allow foreign tourists who arrived by ferry to stay in Russia for 72 hours visa-free.This regime was applied to Kaliningrad after the new checkpoint was established in Baltyisk.The Russian delegation at the Conference expressed their intention to ask the European Parliament to examine the possibilities for establishing a 72-hour visa-free regime, although the initiative was not reflected in the Conference's final resolution.To conclude, the establishment of the Polish-Russian LBT can be regarded as a positive small step in EU-Russia cooperation.Its significance is more political than practical, as it demonstrated the EU's flexibility in solving an issue of common interest, which was highly appreciated by Russia.20 ITAR-TASS News Agency, 26.07.2012.21 Kaliningrad news (http://kaliningrad.net/news/69409/).22 Polish cultural centre in Kaliningrad (http://polska-kaliningrad.ru/ru/2012-10-20-10-36-42/news/398-pleasure).23 V. Balobaev, "Small border traffic risks to go down in history as a project of 'great border traffic jams'", 2012 (http://news.rambler.ru/12273264/photos/).24 See Rugrad.eu, "Head of Department of the Ministry of Interior of Lithuania: The question of small border traffic with Lithuania can be resolved within six months", 13.09.2012 (http://rugrad.eu/news/527656/).25 Based on an interview with an official of the European Commission.Readmission policy constitutes one of the main provisions in the Road Map.The readmission of one country's nationals irregularly staying in another country is a principle of international public law.Yet, the EU sought to include a clause in the agreement whereby irregular migrants who entered the EU via Russia coming from a third country or stateless persons would also be subject to readmission.In other words, the clause stipulates that Moscow had to be responsible for the readmission procedure of an irregular migrant who transited through Russia before entering the EU.This clause was accepted by Russia after Brussels offered a tempting incentive at the time of negotiations of the Readmission Agreement: the VFA with a prospect of a visa-free regime.The EU-Russia Readmission Agreement entered into force in June 2007 (Council of the European Union, 2007b) .The leverage of Russia vis-à-vis the Union translated into a three-year delay before the clause of readmitting transit migrants and stateless persons became operational in the second half of 2010, when Russia had to take the heavy burden and responsibility for the transit migrants entering the EU from Russia's territory.26 Nevertheless, the five years of implementing the EU-Russia Readmission Agreement demonstrated that the burden proved not to be so heavy.Three centres were constructed in the Moscovskaya and Permskaya oblasts as well as in the Krasnodarskiy krai.They have an occupancy rate of approximately 70% and very few requests for readmission of transit migrants (see Table A1 in the Annex).In addition, the EU asked for the signature of implementing protocols of the agreement with Russia, to give more certainty to the obligations emanating from it.This process is still underway and has been included as one of the commitments in the Common Steps, in an attempt to give stimulus to the signature of the Protocols.By mid-December 2012, only two EU member states had not signed the protocols with Russia: Greece and Portugal.Russia had to reform its legal basis since the term 'readmission' was not included in the federal legislation until 2006.The normative basis is being developed to divide powers in implementing the readmission procedure among the interested authorities -the FMS, the Ministry of Interior and the Federal Security Service.The EU-Russia Joint Readmission Committee is an SOM that discusses any matters related to the implementation of the Readmission Agreement, including data on readmitted persons.There have been no major complaints about the implementation of the Agreement, which was confirmed at the Nicosia PPC in October 2012 (Council of the European Union, 2012a).The number of requests received by Russia for readmission of its own citizens has been increasing but the readmission procedure has been smooth.The improvement of the border management systems together with the border guards' cooperation played a positive role (Jaroszewicz, 2012, p. 15) .But there is a problem with the identification of migrants with no documents, which is common to all Readmission Agreements.The Joint Readmission Committee approved a Special Protocol on Identification, laying down the structure of interviews to identify the country of origin.27 A statistical analysis shows that since 2007, Russia has received requests mainly from Germany (57%), Norway and Sweden (9%), and Austria (6%).In its turn, since 2007 Russia has deported 53 irregular migrants and revealed 48 wanted persons.28 Several persons, whose asylum applications were rejected in the EU, were re-admitted in the North Caucasus and, being wanted for various crimes, were transferred to the Ministry of Interior.29 One of the main preconditions for visa liberalisation is the conclusion of Readmission Agreements between Russia and non-EU states.Negotiations with a number of countries were launched several years ago.They have reached successful conclusions with Armenia, Iceland, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova (to be signed), Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, Uzbekistan and Vietnam.The Agreement with Ukraine is expected to play a key role in fighting irregular migration.It was signed on 22 October 2012 together with the Implementation Protocol.The progress in fighting irregular migration would be much more far-reaching if the agreement had been concluded with countries of origin of irregular migration, such as India, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Lebanon, Mongolia and North Korea.In this sense, the FMS suggests the inclusion of a readmission clause in any bilateral agreement signed by Russia.The implementation of the Readmission Agreement can be regarded as one of a few spheres of the Road Map and the Common Steps where progress is not called into question.Russia implemented this EU technical condition and the progress in concluding the relevant agreements with Russia's neighbours to the east strengthens the security of the EU borders and contributes to reducing the EU's fears of irregular migration as a consequence of visa liberalisation.Russia became the first country to sign the Working Arrangement (WA) with FRONTEX in February 2006, the main content of which entails capacity building for border guards, the deployment of joint actions at the border and exchange of data on irregular migration flows.Two cooperation plans between the EU agency and the Russian Federal Border Service (FBS) followed for the periods 2007-2010 and 2011-2014, aimed at further developing contacts.These included the organisation of activities in risk analysis and information exchange, irregular immigration and joint operations, training, participation in multilateral symposiums linked to border guard activities, and finally joint operative actions.All of them constitute socialisation measures.On the basis of the WA, Russia participated as an observer in the operations that were organised in the context of the Euro 2008 and Euro 2012 football tournaments.In 2009, two joint operations were held at the EU-Russia borders -"Mercury" and "Good Will" -to enhance interaction, including information exchanges among the FBS, FRONTEX and the relevant member states' authorities.During the two-week "Mercury" operation, about 50 refusals of entry were registered, one irregular migrant apprehended, two cases of falsified documents were uncovered and one stolen car was detected.30 The smuggling of cigarettes was identified as one of the common illegal activities.In the meantime, the border demarcation process with Estonia has been deadlocked owing to the lack of a border treaty.As a consequence, the border was being demarcated unilaterally.Russian-Estonian consultations started in October 2012, however, which are aimed at renegotiating and signing a treaty.Border management cooperation is another success story for the implementation of the Road Map.The next step and the future challenge is to widen cooperation, including Russia's participation in the irregular migration programmes of the Eastern Partnership and FRONTEX involvement in operations across the Eurasian space, which could contribute to strengthening regional security.The development of an agreed drugs policy based on the United Nations Conventions and the legal system for bilateral (Russia-EU) and multilateral (Russia and the EU member states) cooperation meets the strategic interests of both Russia and the EU.International operational cooperation is becoming the most essential element, including the Paris Pact format, the Pompidou Group of the Council of Europe and controlled precursor deliveries under Europol's coordination.The deeper involvement of EU member states in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and the CSTO programmes is fully supported by Russia.The SCO undertakes a number of initiatives against organised crime and drugs trafficking, and for many years the CSTO has carried out the "Channel Operation" to capture drugs convoys on their way from Afghanistan to Central Asia.Observers from more than half of NATO's members participate.Regarding drug trafficking, Russia has now become more a destination than a transit area.Indeed, there appears to be very limited heroin trafficking to Europe, only 3.8% of the entire amount.31 Nowadays, Russia can rather be considered the main target on the heroin route from Afghanistan, because heroine from Afghanistan does not reach Europe, but remains in Russia.This situation makes international support and cooperation vital.Against this background, Victor Ivanov, Chairman of the Russian State Anti-Drug Committee and Director of the Federal Service for Narcotics Traffic Control (FSKN), proposed in June 2011 a joint five-year Russia-EU plan to be elaborated on the basis of the Russian "Rainbow-2" plan and the anti-drug provisions of the report on a New Strategy for Afghanistan, approved by the European Parliament in December 2010 (European Parliament, 2010) .He believes that the consolidation of these two plans into a single operational plan could provide for a synergic effect.Ivanov called upon Russia and the EU to set up a joint agency that could contribute, in cooperation with the UN, the CSTO and other international organisations, to creating a stable system of Eurasian anti-drug security.Yet so far, there have been no signs of the EU supporting this initiative by Russia.Moreover, drug trafficking has increasingly developed in the reverse direction, from West to East: synthetic drugs -amphetamine and related drugs -are brought to Russia and the other members of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) from the EU member states (mainly Portugal, the UK and the Netherlands).The Commission and Europol reports provide documentary evidence that the increase in illicit production and turnover of synthetics is becoming more and more pressing.The EU-Russia drugs cooperation is developing positively in consultations between EMCDDA and the RF FSKN on prevention and on treatment of those addicted to drugs.Both parties show interest in exchanging experience and best practices, which once again constitute socialisation measures.Cooperation against drug trafficking has not brought any significant results because the EU is more focused on other drug routes, such as the Balkans.Still, stopping drug trafficking is a global challenge, in which both Russia and the EU should participate in full.To fulfil this task, Russia's bilateral cooperation with the EU member states, which has already been fruitful, could be further developed, as well as the EU-Russia involvement in international fora and the other common initiatives.The dialogue on migration and asylum was launched on 27 June 2011 with fairly developed workshops and seminars at the expert level.EU-Russia JLS cooperation had been lacking in such dialogue, which is why it was qualified as a "historical event" by Konstantin Romodanovsy, who heads the FMS.32 The migration dialogue covers all aspects of migration, including support of legal migration, the regulation of migratory flows, the fight against irregular migration, international protection and migrants' integration.The first thematic working session took place in December 2011 in Moscow.It was devoted to cooperation on asylum, including statistics and data exchange, the role of international organisations and civil society, and the conditions and procedures associated with reception.According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), "a number of Eastern European countries often prioritise irregular migration control over asylum", which might apply to Russia, as the scale of the irregular migration problem exceeds that of asylum significantly.Since 2007, the FMS has examined more than 13,000 applications and only 10% on average annually are deemed satisfactory.According to FMS official statistics, by October 2012, 801 refugees had been registered.In 2012, 3,370 have received temporary protection compared with 3,996 in 2011.33 Traditionally, the number of refugees has not been very high (500-800 a year), but it increased in 2008 after the armed conflict in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.Georgians still make up the majority of refugees, followed by Afghans, and a fewer number of Uzbeks.As regards the integration of refugees, according to Ekaterina Egorova, the FMS Deputy Head, their small number is explained by the fact that they become Russian citizens in the course of a year.34 Still, 127,000 stateless persons are reported by the UNHCR, and the problem is recognised by both the FMS and human rights organisations, 35 but certain achievements can be noted in the reduction of statelessness.Between 2003 and 2010, more than 600,000 formerly stateless persons were naturalised.36 Large-scale internal displacement remains a challenge in Russia too -up to a million people are still displaced in the Caucasus region.Yet the UNHCR closed its sub-office in Vladikavkaz in 2011, and ended direct assistance for internally displaced persons, most likely because the vulnerable population benefits from a Russian fund for investment and development.Many constraints remain: limited access to asylum procedures in border-transit zones in airports, readmission and detention centres together with ill treatment and deportation before the final decisions on asylum claims are taken.Overall, however, the UNHCR's assessment shows that "both national and regional partnerships with the Russian Federation on asylum and statelessness issues have been strengthened, contributing to the renewal and updating of the country's legislative instruments and processes. In Russia there have also been improvements in the reception of asylum seekers and the determination of their claims. Yet, a number of urgent issues could be solved by the EU and Russia in the framework of the dialogue. The number of asylum seekers in the EU of Russian origin remains high (18,200 in 2011) , and that is seen as a serious obstacle for visa liberalisation. Still, 80% of the applications are rejected, 38 which makes the case very ambiguous. Among those who are really in need of international protection, there are many pretending to receive international protection for quite different reasons -from economic motivations to fleeing from justice. Finally, they join the figures of irregular migrants in the EU. Most of the asylum seekers come from the North Caucasus. To improve the situation, in addition to readmission, in 2011 the FMS and the International Organisation for Migration launched the project on "Voluntary Return and Reintegration Assistance for Russian Citizens", in particular for those returning to the Chechen republic. That notwithstanding, the influx of asylum seekers from the North Caucasus remains an issue of concern and further mechanisms to protect the rights of asylum seekers could be developed in the framework of the dialogue. The meeting on the "Fight against Irregular Migration", held on 30 March 2012, was devoted to the causes and effects of irregular migration, the models of risk analysis, preventive measures against irregular migration (increasing document security, including biometrics and tracing false documents). Russia and the EU exchanged information and statistics on migration flows and routes as well as the results of operational cooperation. In the following meeting, the dialogue on "Migration and Development" held on 26 October 2012 in Saint Petersburg, the sides exchanged their views and best practices on the key correlated issues (migration, remittances and integration). In addition, Russia noted the priority of favouring the return of highly skilled specialists. According to Ekaterina Egorova, the FMS Deputy Head, "Russia considers this issue from the position of a dual advantage: returning migrants satisfy the requirements of the national labour market and stimulates the [economy's] growth". 39 The migration dialogue runs smoothly because it covers more topics of mutual interest than contradictions. Both sides possess rich experience, both positive and negative. The participants hope to move from the exchange of best practices to an operational phase and spot elements. 40 The dialogue might play a positive role in strengthening cooperation in the post-Soviet space. Despite Russia's rather reticent attitude to the Eastern Partnership initiative, it is very interested in a number of its programmes. The EU, which is rather cautious about the EurAsEC, might be more engaged in the fight against irregular migration. What is more, the EU's experience in anti-discrimination legislation, which forbids discrimination on the grounds of race and nationality, might be much needed to promote freedom of movement in the framework of EurAsEC. EU-Russia cooperation in the field of organised crime constitutes another element of cooperation in light of the Road Map. The Cooperation Agreement between Europol and Russia has been the legal basis for cooperation on transnational organised crime. It was signed in Rome on 6 th November 2003 and has consisted in the exchange of information, experience and best practices, pieces of legislation and other documents, as well as the organisation of study visits, expert workshops and seminars. From the Russian side, the Ministry of the Interior is competent for cooperation with Europol. In addition, a Russian National Contact Point for Europol was created to carry out specific tasks such as operational activities and workshops and seminars. The information shared by Russia is used in the publication of the Europol Organised Crime Threat Assessment. The ongoing negotiations on a Europol-Russia Operational Agreement will provide with an enhanced legal basis for cooperation on organised crime between law-enforcement authorities. Regarding cooperation on cyber crime, it was included in the EU-Russia JLS agenda in 2008. The programme of the experts' meetings was approved to discuss measures for stopping the distribution of video materials containing scenes of violence towards children. Russia suggested supplying law enforcement bodies with full information on IT transborder crimes so that they could arrest criminals and bring them to trial. An exchange of requests has already been organised on addressing cyber crime. Russia proposed to work out the typology of transborder cybercrimes, so that any relevant information about their commitment could be immediately sent to the law enforcement bodies of the aggrieved party through the channels of the international network of the national contact points. To achieve this aim, it seems very significant to compare the existing Russian and European practices in this field. In this sense, the EU should adopt a Cyber Security Strategy in January 2013, a joint exercise by EEAS, the Commission, which should be the basis for an upcoming EU Cyber Security directive. EU-Russia cooperation could be supplemented by a new task of creating a cyber space, where the new common definition of 'cyber security' can be developed. In 2008, the sides started discussing the possibilities of such cooperation. The Cooperation Agreement between Europol and Russia in force 2003, as well as the upcoming operational one, might form the legal basis for this kind of interaction. To achieve results in fighting cyber terrorism, Russia could participate in the Europol project 'Check the web', which is aimed at disclosure of Islamist terrorist websites. However, cooperation in this extremely important sphere is complicated by the same factors that hinder the entire EU-Russia counter-terrorist cooperation: the lack of a common perception on the basis of which websites can be considered terrorist. A single criterion could hardly be established without a single approach to the terrorist lists. In the same way as cutting off financing of terrorism, the websites which belong to the organisations included both in Russia's and the EU's terrorist lists could be currently suppressed. In January 2011, the EU Member States and Russia's operational police units decided at a meeting in the Hague to include a Russian representative in the Europol Expert Group -the European Cyber Crime platform. The sides also agreed on studying possibilities of information exchange on harmful virus programmes, which are used for criminal purposes. The Europol-Russia negotiations on the agreement concerning the exchange of personal data, which would considerably strengthen cooperation on transnational crime, were finally launched on 21-22 October 2010 after several years of preparations. The meeting was preceded by the EU-Russia Conference on personal data protection. In spite of the Presidential Order, issued in 2006 for the signature of the Additional Protocol, the creation of the independent supervisory body is still under examination. In May 2012, the Russian Federation Council's special commission on information started examining the possibility of creating a supervisory authority. Still, at the PPC meeting on 3 October 2012 in Nikosia, Alexandr Konovalov, who headed the Russian delegation, called it "a stumbling block" in the negotiations on the agreement. 43 However, the prospects for the signature of the operational agreement remain unclear. The same applies to the discussion on the operational agreement with Eurojust, whose negotiations started in 2007 with four rounds. It should be mentioned that the EU faced a similar challenge when negotiating Europol and Eurojust's operational agreements with the US. In spite of the absence of appropriate legislation in the US and an independent supervisory body, the agreements were finally signed. The EU-US JLS cooperation covers the same issue areas as the EU-Russia one, without the legal basis provided by an international agreement between the parties, such as the EU-Russia PCA. The cooperation is framed in a more flexible manner, in the format of SOMs. A high level of trust and commitments to fight against organised crime allowed partners to overcome controversies. Nowadays, bilateral agreements with EU member states as well as cooperation with the liaison officers have allowed Russia to exchange information in the process of joint operations under Europol's coordination. Yet, Alexander Prokopchuk, the head of Russia's Central Interpol bureau, believes that the conclusion of the operational agreement would surely increase the effectiveness of joint activities. 44 The negotiations on operational agreements between Russia and Europol and Eurojust have resulted in partial success. Russia's efforts in reforming the domestic legal basis in order to sign and ratify the relevant Council of Europe Convention should be appreciated. Still, the absence of an independent body to control information exchange is slowing down progress. The prospect of signing the operational agreements does not seem tempting enough for Russia to change the institutional structure in this sphere. But given that the operational agreements with Europol and Eurojust are a precondition for visa liberalisation under the Common Steps element on internal security, Russia will be encouraged to implement the necessary reforms. Counter-terrorism cooperation has been traditionally fruitful in the context of Russia's bilateral relations with the EU Member states. However, the EU and Russia established it a key element in both the Road map on AFSJ and the external security. In March 2006, the State Duma adopted the Federal Law on Ratification of the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, and it was regarded as a significant step in implementing the Road Map. Russia has become party of more than 20 counter-terrorist international legal acts under the auspices of the UN, the Council of Europe, the CIS and the SCO. The agenda of the EU-Russia summit in December 2012 included an assessment of the counter-terrorism political dialogue and especially the meeting, which took place in Moscow in November 2012. The sides expressed their endeavor "to give further impetus to counter-terrorism cooperation and strengthen cooperation on the prevention of terrorism, in particular radicalisation, the promotion of criminal justice and rule of law, combating of terrorist financing as well as bilateral cooperation in multilateral fora such as the UN and the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum (GCTF)". 45 To sum up, significant potential has been accumulated in Russia-EU counter-terrorism cooperation. Nowadays, further efforts are needed to bring cooperation to a new level and fill it with concrete substance. In the framework of experts' consultations, preconditions have been discussed for signing the Agreement between the Russian Ministry of Justice and the European Judicial Network in Civil and Commercial Matters. The sides are expected to negotiate the spheres that could be covered by the Agreement as well as the principles of recognition and implementation of court decisions. The official negotiations are to start as soon as the Commission receives the respective mandate and would constitute another measure of socialisation. The process has slowed down because of mixed positions within Russia and in the State Duma regarding the reasonability of joining a number of The Hague Conventions, such the Convention on the Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption. In the framework of consultations, Russia's position has been put forward. It was only in 2001 that Russia became a full Conference participant, so joining The Hague Conventions requires the adoption of legislation and financial costs. Actually, Russia prefers bilateral international agreements on the adoption of children. Moreover, there is no common support in Russia for either inter-country adoption or juvenile justice, which is rejected by a large segment of Russian society. Nevertheless, Russia participates in a number of Hague Conventions, notably those concerning jurisdiction, recognition, enforcement and in respect of parental responsibility and the protection of children (since June 2012) and on Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (since June 2011). They were both adopted with certain derogations, fixing inter alia the Russian authorities' jurisdiction on protecting children's property rights. The EU has a distrust of the judiciary system in Russia, shared by many Russians, which remains a challenge for Russian authorities. The participation of Russian judges in the common training programmes, including their visits to the relevant European bodies, can be seen as additional socialisation measures.  The EU and Russia have assessed in a negative and politicised way the human rights situation in each other's territory. The Council of Europe and independent organisations claim that there are challenges in the protection of human rights in both the EU and in Russia.  EU-Russia consultations on human rights, which have been held biannually since 2005, have been severely criticised by independent organisations. The European Parliament has called for an enhancement of the consultations so that they are more effective and results-oriented.  The Nicosia PPC in October 2012 included a reference to the principle of independence of the judiciary as well as a clear commitment that links the respect for human rights and rule of law with cooperation in the AFSJ, but made no reference to the promotion of democracy. This section focuses on the linkage between the Common Space on Freedom, Security and Justice and the promotion of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. First, the section looks at the assessment of human rights situations in Russia from a Brussels-based perspective and in the EU from a Moscow-based perspective, as well from the viewpoints of the Council of Europe and independent organisations. Second, the section looks at the formulation in the PCA and the Road Map of cooperation in JLS and the promotion of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, as well as the human rights consultations as an instrument for human rights discussions between the EU and Russia. It explains the reasons underlying the limited results of the human rights consultations in addressing situations where human rights are not protected. Third, the section looks at the prospects for EU-Russia cooperation in the field of human rights in the New Basic Agreement, as well as in the Common Steps towards visa-free short-term travel. The Road Map refers to the "common commitments to democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms" as the basis for EU-Russia JLS cooperation (EU-Russia, 2011, p. 45). Regarding the human rights situation in Russia from an EU perspective, in 2011 the Council of the European Union gave a negative assessment, in which it claimed that there has been "little improvement" in this respect (Council of the European Union, 2011, p. 23). It presents among others reports of violence by law enforcement authorities in the North Caucasus, no progress in media pluralism, difficulties in holding public demonstrations, torture and ill treatment in detention centres and increased racism, xenophobia and homophobia. As for the rule of law, the Council raises concerns about the situation of human rights defenders and independent journalists. Finally, the document also claims that Russia fails to comply with judgments by the European Court of Human Rights and the ratification of Protocol 6 of the ECHR on the abolition of the death penalty, although Russia applies a moratorium in this case. For its part, the European Parliament adopted resolutions on the rule of law in Russia in February 2011, and on the political use of justice in Russia in September 2012, in which it reaffirmed the belief that Russia remains an important partner for the EU in building sustainable cooperation based on democracy and the rule of law (European Parliament, 2011, point 1), but mentions that the human rights situation in Russia has deteriorated because of "intimidation, harassment and arrests of the representatives of opposition forces and non-governmental organisations, the recent adoption of a law on the financing of NGOs, on the right of assembly, the law on defamation, the law on the internet restrictions as well as the increasing pressure on free and independent media and minorities in sexual orientation and religious belief". The Parliament reminds Russia that as a member of the Council of Europe it has signed up to all the human rights acquis and calls on Russia to comply with the rulings of the European Court of Human Rights (European Parliament, 2011, point 13 ). An individual case that attracted considerable attention in the EU as regards the human rights situation in Russia and the independence of the judiciary is the 'Pussy Riot' case. In Russia, the experts, media community and citizens perceived the performance of the band in the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour in different ways. In any case, it must be taken into account that it is an individual case that had exceptional media coverage, which many other cases do not experience. The whole situation, including the media campaign, has profoundly deepened popular distrust in Russia and the EU and revived discussion on the compatibility of liberal and traditional values. The EU's concerns about the imprisonment of the Pussy Riot members were expressed by the German Bundestag as well as German Chancellor Angela Merkel in the framework of then Russia-Germany intergovernmental consultations in Saint Petersburg in November 2012. The German criticism did not prevent the sides from signing ten bilateral agreements, including one on facilitating youth exchanges. Thus, Germany has opted for socialisation instead of conditionality in its relations with Russia. As for the assessment of the human rights situation in the EU from a Russian angle, Moscow has criticised Brussels for not respecting the rights of the Russian-speaking minorities in Estonia and Latvia. The EU has referred to this as politicised criticism. Moscow finds the EU's criticism politicised as well, and does not accept the European Parliament's resolutions. As for the resolution on the political use of justice in Russia, it was considered "one-sided" and "based on improbable sources". The Russian Ministry for Foreign Affairs mentioned that "the EU Parliament did not take into account the explanations given by [the] Russian side during the meeting of the working groups of the EU-Russia Parliamentary Cooperation Committee". 46 According to the State Duma, by reason of its bias the resolution will have "a zero effect in Russia". The State Duma deputies added the reminder that "the European experience was used for developing the new legislation in Russia on violation of order during the actions of protests and others", and expressed regret that the Members of the European Parliament emphasised all the negative aspects, with the distortions and ignored the positive changes in Russian legislation and the political situation. 47 Russia's will to establish symmetry in the human rights sphere was evident in two reports by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, which were published in December 2011 and 2012. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs analysed in detail "the situation of non-citizens in the Baltic countries, Roma people, migrants and refugees, and manifestations of racism and xenophobia", calling them "particularly troublesome human rights issues in the EU". Furthermore, the reports included cases of infringements in privacy and personal data protection, the rights of detainees, freedom of mass media, a lack of separation of powers and politicisation in criminal proceedings, freedom of assembly and speech in member states. The reports were mainly aimed at drawing the attention of EU member states as well as EU supranational bodies to serious internal challenges before applying conditionality in external relations. In its second 2012 report, which was published amidst increased criticism from the EU side, Russia expressed a desire "for a constructive dialogue of equals with the European Union on human rights and democratic development, which would to the full extent correspond to the relations of strategic partnership with the EU". 48 The report was presented in Brussels on 6 December during consultations between Ambassador Konstantin Dolgov (the Russian Ministry for Foreign Affairs' Commissioner for Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law) and Stavros Lambrinidis (EU Special Representative for Human Rights), at a press conference for Russian and foreign media and at a meeting with representatives of international human rights NGOs. The initiative was supported by the State Duma Committee on International Affairs, which organised hearings on the basis of the report by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in May 2012. The head and the other officials of the EU delegation participated; the representatives of international organisations and the European Parliament were invited but did not attend. The head of the EU delegation welcomed the initiative of the State Duma, as did the Director of Russian Amnesty International, who noted that he considers such hearings 'normal practice'. The hearings did not appear to be a dialogue, however, but rather a continuation of reciprocal claims about human rights violations. Apart from the position taken by EU and Russian institutions, independent evidence coming from international organisations and independent civil society actors (e.g. the Council of Europe, Human Rights Watch, the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), Amnesty International and the EU-Russia Civil Forum) show recent and profound challenges relating to the rule of law in Russia. For example, the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly called on Russia "to respect the obligations incumbent upon every Member State…with regard to pluralist democracy, the rule of law and human rights". 49 Similarly, the EU-Russia Civil Forum at the same time outlined "a decreased perceptiveness of the European governments to the civil society voice in times of economic and financial crisis". 50 Thus, the protection of human rights constitutes a challenge to both Russian and EU Member States. Against these assessments of the human rights situation in the EU and Russia, the PCA establishes in Art. 2 that "[r]espect for democratic principles and human rights as defined in particular in the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, underpins the internal and external policies of the Parties and constitutes an essential element of partnership and of this Agreement" (Council of the European Union, 1997). Since 2005, both parties have held consultations on human rights 51 twice a year, which do not take place in parallel with the EU Summits. So far, the consultations have only been held in Brussels. The EU has proposed a rotation of the consultations between Moscow and Brussels so that members of the Russian Ministries of the Interior and Justice can also participate. The EU reports on human rights violations and exerts pressure on Russia to adhere to international standards on human rights. Russian experts stated that the EU lacks supranational mechanisms of promotion and protection of human rights by its member states and that the European Commission is mainly focused on assessment of the human rights situation in third countries. In this context they noted the importance of the EU's prompt accession to the ECHR on equal conditions with other participants. 52 From Russia's side, concerns are expressed about the rights of the Russian-speaking population in the Baltic States, excessive use of force when breaking up peaceful demonstrations, the rights of migrants as well as infringements of the right to privacy. During consultations the EU's support of Russian NGOs is also analysed. Thus, the partial results of the consultations should not been denied. In 2011, the human rights consultations incorporated a civil society dimension -the Civil Society Forum (CSF). During the third CSF General Assembly in Saint Petersburg on 9-10 October 2012, the participants expressed their concerns about a "visible cooling down of relations between Russia and EU", which "may have long-term consequences, including for civil society on both sides". The Forum noted an element of confusion on the side of the EU in regards to the processes happening in Russia and "a lack of understanding on how to further develop dialogue and cooperation with Russia in Brussels and other European capitals". Consequently, the EU-Russia Civil Society Forum sees its mission as influencing Moscow and Brussels to modulate the cooling of relations for constructive dialogue. 53 At the same time, civil society organisations such as the FIDH have heavily criticised the EU-Russia human rights consultations and even advocated their suspension, stating that they "have neither contributed to an improvement of the human rights situation in Russia, nor increased the level of support to human rights defenders" (FIDH, 2010, p. 2) . The European Parliament also made reference to the shortcomings of the human rights consultations and called for the "human rights consultations to be stepped up and made more effective and results-oriented, with the Russian Ministries of Justice, the Interior and Foreign Affairs taking part in the meetings in both Brussels and Moscow and with the full involvement of the European Parliament at all levels" (European Parliament, 2011, point 14) . The Road Map Progress Report 2010 foresaw improvements in the human rights consultations by stating that the "EU aims to ensure that the discussion on these issues is not confined only to the bi-annual Human Rights Consultations but is addressed to the extent possible also in the PPC meetings and other meetings taking place within the Space on Freedom, Security and Justice" (EU-Russia 2011, p. 45) . In other words, the approach advocates the extension of EU-Russia human rights cooperation beyond the framework of the human rights consultations. Actually, the prospects for enhanced cooperation between the EU and Russia on human rights were put forward in the conclusions of the Nicosia PPC in October 2012: "The Parties reiterated the importance of and respect for commitments in the area of human rights and rule of law, including the independence of the judiciary, which underpin cooperation in the area of freedom, security and justice.They also expressed the necessity to prevent discrimination, protect minorities and combat hate crimes.They noted the importance of EU's prompt accession to the ECHR and Fundamental Freedoms" (Council of the European Union, 2012a, p. 1). Here, for the first time, the principle of the independence of the judiciary is included in an EU-Russia document, as well as a clear commitment that links the respect for human rights and rule of law with cooperation in the AFSJ. In addition, the EU's objective to accede to the ECHR, of which Russia is a party, will put the EU and Russia on equal footing as members of the ECHR and may stimulate EU-Russia human rights relations through the Council of Europe's human rights acquis. 54 Notably, however, the promotion of democracy is not included in this statement from the Nicosia PPC. Alexander Konovalov, the Minister of Justice who chaired the meeting from Russia's side, emphasised at the subsequent press conference "the issues of real significance, which should be put on the top of agendaminimising and excluding completely the risks of new possibilities for international criminal activity, excluding factors of irregular migration, technical management of passengers' flows -both tourists and migrants". Furthermore, "[a]s for the issues, which our partners bring to the first plan", the Minister added, "they might be discussed endlessly.Absolute satisfaction [about] how they will look in 10-20 years might never be reached." 55 Thus, the existence of a common view on the effectiveness of extending human rights beyond the framework of the human rights consultations still provokes doubt. The framework that can stimulate EU-Russia cooperation on human rights is the Common Steps towards visa-free short-term travel. The fourth building block of the set of commitments that the EU and Russia have agreed to fulfil contains a set of measures in the field of human rights, including consultations and discussions on the protection of migrants' rights and anti-discrimination laws. Use of human rights as a tool of conditionality in EU-Russia relations is regarded in the EU as an opportunity to promote change, given that the incentive of visa liberalisation is very tempting. From Russia's side, however, prioritising human rights issues in every sphere of cooperation is considered counterproductive. Unlike the human rights consultations, the provisions under the Common Steps are clearly formulated and will be monitored regularly. The ongoing implementation of the Action Plans on visa liberalisation in Ukraine and Moldova has shown the effectiveness of conditionality to promote reforms on human rights, with the adoption of legislation on anti-discrimination law. But the rhetoric of symmetry in EU-Russia human rights cooperation prevents the conditionality mechanism from being effective. The more pressure the EU exercises, the more resistance from Russia it triggers, unless human rights issues are discussed symmetrically. In any case, both sides have committed to the protection of fundamental rights in the framework of the Common Steps. Finally, according to an official from the EEAS, the New Agreement will have a significant and far-reaching human rights component in the political dialogue and the JLS chapters. The European Parliament confirmed the EEAS position by adopting the resolution of 13 December 2012, which contains the EP's recommendations to the Council, the Commission and the EEAS on the negotiations of the new EU-Russia Agreement and in particular the paragraphs dealing with the respect for democratic principles, human rights and the rule of law and considers this respect "as an absolute prerequisite for the signature of an EU-Russia agreement".56 Russia, however, has never expressed the intention to include conditionality provisions in the New Agreement.Thus, it is still unclear whether the EU's intention of an enhanced EU-Russia human rights cooperation as analysed above will gain in legal certainty in EU-Russia relations.Until now, the developments analysed in this section signal that there are strains in EU-Russia relations, and that a renewed format for cooperation in human rights is needed.This study has provided a thorough analysis of EU-Russia JLS cooperation in light of the Common Space on Freedom, Security and Justice, adopting an approach that integrates both EU and Russian perspectives.Analysis of the implementation of the different JLS policy areas shows that there has been actual cooperation, but a main conclusion could be drawn: the cooperation has been uneven and has not led to the same outcomes in all the JLS policy areas.Progress has been observed in the following policy areas: 1) Technical security of passports.In the framework of the Common Steps, Russia launched biometric passports that are compliant with the standards of the ICAO.The biometric passports contain a chip with information, as well as parameters to transfer information in case of stolen or lost documents.It must be taken into account that most EU member states are in the process of introducing biometric passports.Fight against irregular migration.The EU-Russia Readmission Agreement has been effectively implemented since 2007, including readmission of transit migrants since 2010.Despite the difficulties in identifying the nationality of transit migrants, the assessment of the implementation of the Agreement is generally positive.In addition, most implementing protocols with EU member states have been ratified.Border management.A Working Arrangement was agreed between FRONTEX and the Border Guard Service of Russia in 2006, enabling information exchange and capacity building for border guards.Furthermore, Russian border guards have participated in several FRONTEX Joint Operations.Cooperation follows the prescribed plans and could deepen with intensified exchanges.Border demarcation.The demarcation processes on the Russian-Latvian and the Russian-Lithuanian borders have been completed, with the entry into force of Demarcation Agreements.The negotiations between Russia and Estonia, which had been deadlocked since 2005, have been resumed with a view to demarcating the common border.Counter-terrorism cooperation and fight with organised crime.A significant potential has been accumulated in Russia-EU counter-terrorism cooperation as well as in fighting organised crime.Nowadays, further efforts are needed to bring cooperation to a new level and fill it with concrete substance.In the following policy areas, however, progress has been limited: 6) Common Steps towards visa-free short-term travel: Two aspects of the Common Steps could be approved by the EU-Russia summit on 21 December.Yet Russia is dissatisfied with the slow speed of the implementation process and proposes a quicker road map with a fixed date of starting negotiations on a Visa Waiver Agreement.The EU finds the obstacles to visa-free travel to be technical rather than political and views visa liberalisation in a longer-term perspective.The failure of the negotiations to conclude an amended Visa Facilitation Agreement (VFA) shows the lack of flexibility even in a small particular sphere of EU-Russia relations.Moreover, the EU's lack of trust in service passports and concerns about corruption in Russia put into question the recognised progress in the technical security of passports and the very prospects for the liberalisation of visas.Kaliningrad border traffic.The Polish-Russian agreement on LBT is deemed a positive achievement, at least from a political standpoint.Still, it will hardly be possible to reach a similar Lithuanian-Russian LBT agreement covering the entire Kaliningrad oblast.Dialogue on migration and asylum.Four thematic sessions took place with a positive outcome.The participants hope to move on from the exchange of best practices to an operational phase and spot elements.Yet a high number of asylum seekers from Russia causes concern for the EU and remains a challenge in EU-Russia JLS relations.The problem is being discussed in the framework of the migration dialogue, but no clear prospect for improving the situation is foreseen.10) Drugs cooperation has been developing positively in relation to consultations between the EMCDDA and the FSKN on prevention and on the treatment of drug addicts.The EU-Russia Agreement on Drug Precursors is ready for signing in 2013.However, there is no progress in joint initiatives against drug trafficking originating in Afghanistan.11) Operational Agreements between Russia and Europol/Eurojust.Russia signed and ratified the Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data and signed the Adjacent Protocol to the Convention.In addition, Russia reformed the domestic legal basis for data protection.Nevertheless, the absence of an independent supervisory authority to control information exchange has brought the negotiations to a standstill.12) Judicial cooperation.Expert discussions are underway on preconditions for the signature of the Agreement between the Russian Ministry of Justice and the European Judicial Network in Civil and Commercial Matters.The process has slowed down owing to rather mixed views in Russia about the reasonability of joining some of The Hague Conventions.In addition, the EU is showing distrust of Russia's judicial system.Human rights remain the most controversial issue in EU-Russia relations.The consultations take place twice a year with a very limited outcome.The Civil Society Forum was created in 2011, which is a positive step but with limited influence so far.The EU and Russia negatively assess each other's human rights situations.Russia insists on the symmetrical treatment of human rights issues.To sum up, the EU and Russia have made obvious progress in implementing five policy areas of the EU-Russia Road Map, while there are limited achievements in the other eight most relevant issue areas, with slow progress on visa liberalisation, judicial cooperation and human rights.This study concludes that there is a lack of balance between security, on the one hand, and freedom and justice, on the other in EU-Russia cooperation in the Road Map.The analysis gives evidence of how security issues are the cornerstone of EU-Russia JLS cooperation and account for a number of the outcomes of the Road Map, namely the implementation of a Readmission Agreement and the signature of a Working Arrangement between FRONTEX and the Russian Federal Border Service, among others.The Common Steps towards visa-free short-term travel use security measures as a precondition for visa liberalisation and this approach has proven to be effective so far for further implementation of the Readmission Agreement -with the signature of most of the implementing protocols with member states, among other security-related policy areas.Meanwhile, cooperation on freedom-related areas has not lived up to expectations.Although the local border regime was established on the Polish-Russian border, the negotiations on an amended VFA have not been successful to date and progress on the visa liberalisation dialogue has been limited.Actually, most of the outcomes of EU-Russia cooperation in the AFSJ have been in the security realm.In addition, freedom measures encapsulate the notion of mobility from a comprehensive point of view, which includes not only the liberalisation of short-term visas, but also fostering labour migration, student exchanges and other measures aimed at promoting mobility.Nevertheless, the Road Map Progress Report 2010 uses the concept of a balance between freedom, security and justice when assessing the outcomes of the Road Map.Under the label "freedom", the report covers the areas of readmission, visa policy, local border traffic and border management.The concept of "justice" in the Progress Report encapsulates negotiations on an Arrangement with Eurojust and Russia acceding to international conventions.As for "security", this label covers the areas of counter-terrorism, negotiations on a Europol Arrangement and drugs cooperation.As mentioned above, it is our understanding that the issues of readmission and border management also fall within the security realm.As a result, there is not a balance between freedom, security and justice in EU-Russia JLS cooperation.This assessment challenges the usefulness of systematising the JLS policy areas under this concept and shows that this is not a valid approach to framing EU-Russia JLS cooperation.57 Another contribution of the study is the analysis of the current and future institutional structures in EU-Russia JLS cooperation.On the one hand, the EU faces internal coordination challenges between the EEAS, the Commission and also the EU agency services in external relations since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon.On the other hand, the proposal at the Nicosia PPC meeting in October 2012 to set up a senior officials' meeting once a year covering the full spectrum of EU-Russia JLS cooperation would provide for a better institutional setting for such cooperation.There are several reasons why progress on the EU-Russia Common Space on Freedom, Security and Justice is stagnating, in spite of the obviously increasing network of experts' consultations and professional contacts between the parties.While good trustful relations have been observed at the professional and expert level in the process of consultations and dialogues, there is lack of trust at the political level.This problem is common across all EU-Russia relations.As soon as the contacts and consultations reach their final stage, in which a norm has to be adopted, the cooperation becomes much more difficult -neither side is ready for significant concessions.In many cases, there is no flexibility when the contacts pass from the expert/professional to the political level.Meanwhile, the Road Map has not materialised in clear, tangible outcomes, such as the signature of the operational agreements with Europol/Eurojust or the EU-Russia VFA.In addition, the differences between Russian and European legal and administrative practices have been slowing down progress, as legal reform is costly and requires time, effort and consensus.Examples here are the Council of Europe Convention on Information Protection and The Hague Conventions.In drawing up the list of Common Steps with the four building blocks of preconditions for visa liberalisation, EU-Russia JLS cooperation is closely interlinked and mainly focused on security.Thus, the lack of progress in certain directions minimises achievements in the others.For example, the absence of operational agreements with Europol and Eurojust prevents the visa liberalisation process from going further.As a result, the general progress is very limited.While showing readiness in complying with the technical preconditions for visa liberalisation, Russia has demonstrated strong opposition to political conditionality, which the EU uses as a tool for promoting human rights.Russia insists on a symmetrical, equal partnership not only in declarations, but also in practice.Therefore, this study has shown how socialisation can be an efficient alternative to conditionality and help to step up cooperation in the Road Map.The visa liberalisation process and increasing youth exchanges seem to be the best methods of socialisation: more people would be able to come to the EU and become supporters of the shared values; more visitors to Russia would provide for the better understanding of the parties.Furthermore, as agreed in the Road Map, joint training programmes for civil servants who are involved in the implementation of the Common Steps, as well as seminars, exchanges of experience and best practices, promote socialisation and confidence building, which is vitally needed to face security challenges and build a Europe without dividing lines.Bearing in mind the uneven progress in the Common Space policy areas, it is recommended that the LIBE Committee should undertake the following steps:  Monitor the further implementation of the EU-Russia Readmission Agreement and complete the necessary procedure for and signature of the remaining Protocols.For this objective, the contacts on joint readmission should be established. Implementation of the local border traffic regime should also be closely monitored in cooperation with colleagues from the Russian State Duma, Polish Sejm and Kaliningrad regional Duma.Special attention should be paid to areas where limited progress is observed:  In the framework of the dialogue on migration and asylum, the problem of asylum seekers from the North Caucasus should be analysed from all aspects.The LIBE Committee should follow developments concerning asylum seekers who are apprehended at the border as irregular migrants and subject to an accelerated return procedure to Russia as well as those who stay at detention camps, in both the member states and in Russia. Give consent to the VFA once the negotiations are finalised, so that a new tool fostering mobility between the EU and Russia enters into force.Implementation of Common Steps elements should be monitored with the aim of their timely and effective completion.For this purpose the relevant implementation reports should be analysed by the LIBE Committee.The LIBE Committee should analyse possibilities for developing the five-year Russia-EU plan on the basis of the Russian "Rainbow-2" plan and anti-drug provisions of the report on a New Strategy for Afghanistan, approved by the European Parliament in December 2010.Attention should be given to Russia's proposal for establishing the EU-Russia joint anti-drug agency.In the framework of the Inter-Parliamentary Cooperation Committee, meetings and contacts should be established with the Information Commission of the Russian Federation Council, aimed at exploring the possibilities to create an independent supervisory authority, with a view to a quicker signature of the operational agreements between Russia and Europol/Eurojust.A number of recommendations of a procedural character can be suggested:  The LIBE Committee should cooperate with the members of the EU-Russia Parliamentary Cooperation Committee to promote in its agenda issues related to EU-Russia JLS cooperation.More intensive cooperation in the framework of the Parliamentary Cooperation Committee would promote better understanding of each side's position.Regular inter-parliamentary meetings and consultations help to prevent misunderstanding, soften rhetoric and continue constructive dialogue.The LIBE Committee should promote more democratic accountability of the EU-Russia JLS cooperation and pay attention to the consistency of the EU's external action in the field of JLS and in particular in EU-Russia JLS relations, following the work of the different actors involved.The LIBE Committee should evaluate and contribute to the strengthening of the rule of law, the promotion of democracy and the protection of fundamental rights not only in Russia, but also in the EU AFSJ, by ensuring a better evaluation of the basis upon which cooperation in JLS issues has been built so far.For this purpose the special provisions on human rights should be included in every international treaty with Russia, solely provided that both sides accept an equal obligation to respect them.Hereafter referred to as 'Russia'.On the general framework of EU-Russia relations, see Averre(2005)and Haukkala (2010).2Hereafter referred to as the 'Road Map'.3 SeeWolff, Wichmann and Mounier (2009) for a comprehensive overview of the external dimension of the EU policies on justice, freedom and security.The term 'illegal migration' was widely used by the EU institutions at the time the PCA entered into force.However, the neutral term 'irregular migration' has progressively replaced it.The contribution of civil society and academia has been key to changing the use of one term for the other.6 SeePotemkina (2010) for an assessment of the implementation of the Road Map.7Based on an interview with an official from the European External Action Service.It must be recalled that access to documents on EU-Russia relations is not fully transparent, as numerous documents are not publicly available and many of them are only partially accessible to the public.Based on an interview with an EEAS official.10 SeeChizhov (2012).It is very significant that Russia speaks about "visa-free dialogue" in official documents and rhetoric, while the EU calls it "visa dialogue".11 European Commission, "Overview of Schengen Visa statistics 2009-2011", Directorate-General Home Affairs, Directorate B: Immigration and asylum, Unit B.3: Visa Policy, Brussels (2012), p. 4.12 RF FMS (2012), p. 8.ITAR-TASS News Agency, 03.10.2012.14 See Ambassador Azimov's interview by the Interfax News Agency,Kommersant-daily, 28.11.2012.15 Given that the EU has been developing the visa dialogue in parallel with Ukraine and Moldova, Russia is against an eventual earlier lifting of the visas in Ukraine and Moldova, as it considers that this would be a political decision.However, Moscow accepts the possibility of reaching the visa-free regime at the same time.16PNA/Itar-Tass News Agency, 29.11.2012.17 Moscow Times, "Russia threatens EU with retaliation", 27 November 2012.Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Legal Department, Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Poland and the Government of the Russian Federation on the Rules of Local Border Traffic, 14 December 2011 (2012).19 European Border Dialogues Forum at Kaliningrad and Elblag, 17-18 November 2011; Barents Observer, 21 November 2011.Russia most likely advocated a delay in the entry into force of the clause because of it expected visa liberalisation would be established by 2010.27 Based on an interview with an official of the European Commission.28Expert group on updating the "Strategy 2020" (strategy2020.rian.ru/load/366063053).29 See ECRE (2011), p. 6.UN Office on Drugs and Crime, Addiction, Crime and Insurgency (2009), pp. 13, 40-44.Eurostat, Data in Focus, No. 8/2012, p. 11.39 RIA Novosti news agency, Federal portal, 29.10.2012.40 Based on an interview with an official of the European Commission.Federal Service for Supervision in the Sphere of Telecom, Information Technologies and Mass Communications (2012).42 "Protection of personal data: New demands", Internet Interview of Roman Sheredin, the Deputy Head of the Federal service for supervision, 28 December 2011 (http://www.garant.ru/action/interview/373047/).43ITAR-TASS News Agency, 03.10.2012.44 Rossiyskaya gazeta, 25.01.2010.European External Action Service.Factsheet EU-Russia summit, Brussels, 20-21 December 2012, pp. 1-2.RIA Novosti news agency (http://ria.ru/politics/20120914/750230456.html).47RIA Novosti news agency, 13 September 2012 (http://ria.ru/politics/20120913/749400761.html).48Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (2012).The Council issued the EU Strategic Framework and Action on Human Rights and Democracy, which sets out the objectives of the Union regarding human rights and reaffirms the human rights component of the EU external action.See Council of the European Union (2012b).European Parliament resolution of 13 December 2012 on the annual report on Human Rights and Democracy in the World 2011 and the European Union's policy on the matter (2012/2145(INI).At the end of the day, the 'balance' between freedom, security and justice is a notion created by the EU in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, whose usefulness has been contested not only by academia(Bigo et al., 2010), but also by the EU itself.The Stockholm Programme states that "[i]t is of paramount importance that law-enforcement measures, on the one hand, and measures to safeguard individual rights, the rule of law and international protection rules, on the other, go hand in hand in the same direction and are mutually reinforced" (EuropeanCouncil, 2010, p. 4).This represents a shift from the balance approach to a conception of freedom and security on equal footing.	framework of EU-Russia JLS cooperation.Second, it analyses the implementation of the main policy areas in JLS cooperation, including such crosscutting challenges as asylum and ensuring data protection standards.Third, it assesses the intersection of the Road Map with the cooperation on human rights, democracy and the rule of law.In this sense, the EU and Russia have established that cooperation on human rights would be the basis of EU-Russia JLS cooperation.Finally, the study summarises the main conclusions of the analysis and presents policy recommendations.The first document to set out a JLS agenda between the EU and Russia was the PCA, (Council of the European Union, 1997) .The PCA established a 'strategic partnership' between the EU and Russia.In this sense, the Stockholm Programme, the multiannual programme that sets out the EU's priorities for action in the JLS sphere for 2010-2014, states that Russia is a strategic partner of the Union (European Council, 2010, p. 35) .The PCA includes a special title VIII devoted to counteracting unlawful activities.First, it mentions the prevention of "illegal activities", 5 by readmitting irregular migrants to their countries of origin, fighting forgery, corruption and drug trafficking.Second, it makes reference to assistance in "drafting national legislation" against unlawful activities, which is a rather ambiguous provision given that it does not clarify the contents of this legislation.Third, the PCA includes socialisation measures, such as the training of staff from both parties working mainly in law enforcement authorities.It is worth mentioning that both parties opted for socialisation as a policy instrument to step up their cooperation.Lastly, the agreement foresees a provision on visa policy, targeted at businessmen, key personnel and cross-border sellers, stipulating that when issuing their visas, more favourable conditions should apply.At the EU-Russia Saint Petersburg Summit in 2003, both actors designed a new institutional and also nonlegally binding setting to reinforce their cooperation, with the launch of four Common Spaces (EU-Russia Saint Petersburg Summit, 2003) .Among them were the Common Space on Freedom, Security and Justice, with specific measures to be found in a Road Map agreed two years later at the EU-Russia Moscow Summit in 2005 (EU-Russia Moscow Summit, 2005 .6 Regardless of its non-legally binding nature, it has so far been the main document setting out the EU-Russia JLS agenda.The New Agreement, which will include a whole chapter devoted to JLS issues, will be the reference document in EU-Russia JLS cooperation.After this overview of the normative basis of EU-Russia JLS cooperation, a few considerations on the institutional framework of EU-Russia relations are highlighted.The EU-Russia New Basic Agreement, which the EU and Russia have been negotiating since 2007 with eleven rounds of negotiations, should provide an enhanced legal basis for cooperation in the JLS sphere.The JLS chapter has already been agreed, but the parties have not reached an agreement on trade and investments, which prevents the New Agreement from being signed.7 Once it comes into force, the New Agreement will be the first comprehensive legal basis to regulate EU-Russia JLS cooperation, setting out legally binding commitments that will most likely enhance cooperation in the field.A major aspect that the New Agreement will regulate is a new institutional framework.Neither the EU-Russia cooperation councils foreseen in the PCA, nor the sub-committees on JLS have taken place in practice.Instead, the PPC has been institutionalised as the framework to cooperate on JLS.Although the EU-Russia PCAs on JLS issues have counted with the participation of the Ministries of the Interior and Justice of Russia, as well as Commissioners Viviane Reding and Cecilia Malmström from the EU side, the subcommittee format would provide for a more structured venue where the relevant ministerial representatives could meet on a regular basis.In addition, the Nicosia JLS PPC in October 2012 went a step further from the current situation, stating that " [t] he Parties agreed to hold one PPC on Freedom, Security and Justice per year.To ensure continuity of the work between PPC meetings, the Parties agreed to hold an SOM in line with the implementation of the EU-Russia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement" (Council of the European Union, 2012a, p. 3) .The initiative consists of setting up SOM meetings that cover all of JLS cooperation, with the participation of the highest non-political representatives.Such general SOM meetings take place in the framework of EU-US JLS cooperation.SOM meetings already take place in specific policy areas, such as the EU-Russia visa dialogue, which from the EU side are chaired by the Commission Directorate-General for Home Affairs and from the Russian side by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Joint Readmission and Visa Facilitation Committees.At this point, it is important to recall that as a consequence of the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the EU is adjusting at the internal level those institutions responsible for external action in the field of JLS.The actors involved are the new body responsible for overall external action, the European External Action Service (EEAS), the Commission services in charge of the external dimensions of home affairs and justice, the Presidency of the Council and the EU member states.Home affairs agencies, such as FRONTEX, Europol and Eurojust, also have their own external relations officers who deal with Russia.The EU faces the challenge of inter-service coordination and more time is needed so that the new institutional structures of the Treaty of Lisbon become fully operational.All in all, according to an official from the EEAS, the challenge of the New Agreement is to set up new structures that allow for more effective cooperation between Brussels and Moscow.Main Issues and Challenges Underlying the Implementation of the EU-Russia Common Space on Freedom, Security and Justice  The visa-free dialogue has become a crucial issue in EU-Russia JLS cooperation, overshadowing other significant spheres of the common space, as it can be considered 'a litmus test' for the level of mutual trust. The Common Steps towards visa-free short-term travel consist of actions in four key areas covering all the main aspects of JLS policy and connecting the loose patchwork of JLS cooperation. The state of play reveals the difference in the approaches of the EU and Russia towards visa liberalisation: while Brussels insists on the technical character of the existing obstacles to a visa-free regime, Moscow states that the technical requirements have been met and stresses the political component of the EU decision not to lift short-term visas in the nearest future. The implementation of the EU-Russia Readmission Agreement can be regarded as a success story and among the less problematic issues in EU-Russia cooperation. EU-Russia cooperation on drugs is assessed as more problematic than successful.In spite of intensive activities against illicit drug trafficking, no steps have been taken in exerting joint consolidated pressure upon the trafficking of drugs from Afghanistan. The lack of an independent body to control information exchange in Russia is slowing down the progress of negotiations on the operational Working Arrangements with Europol and Eurojust, which is a precondition for the liberalisation of the visa regime.This section analyses the degree of implementation of the Road Map, its main results, challenges and failures.The last publicly available Progress Report on the Road Map is for 2010 (European Union-Russia, 2011), although an evaluation in 2011 was also issued.8 The structure is developed in accordance with the importance of the issues under examination and their place on the EU-Russia political agenda, starting from the dialogue towards visa-free short-term travel, which is crucial in EU-Russia JLS relations, and ending with judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters, which despite its relevance lacks momentum.The section looks at the main issues at stake, which are logically interlinked, by examining the most recent developments in EU-Russia JLS consultations and meetings at the different levels.The analysis shows the uneven progress in fulfilling the commitments set in the Road Map.It is important to understand why a number of the commitments in the Road Map are being implemented rather smoothly, while others stagnate, in spite of the fact that the main preparations for achieving the results have been accomplished.The objective and subjective reasons for the success and failure of the implementation of the Road Map are exposed, as well as the reasons for (mis)communications and (dis)trust between the parties.It is obvious that the lack of trust at the level of EU-Russia political contacts constrains the enhancement of cooperation in JLS issues.The Joint Statement of the Saint Petersburg Summit reaffirmed the importance of people-to-people contacts and a "Europe without dividing lines", which was translated into a specific measure in the Road Map: the establishment of a visa-free regime in the long-term.The Road Map explicitly states that "it was also decided to examine the conditions for visa-free travel as a long-term perspective" (EU-Russia Moscow Summit, 2005, p. 20) .Actually, visa liberalisation was one of the main issues during the Saint Petersburg Summit, since Russia asked the EU for a clear and tangible incentive to go further with the negotiations on a Readmission Agreement.To be sufficiently persuasive, this incentive had to be necessarily related to the facilitation of the movement of people between the EU and Russia.In this sense, it must be recalled that Russia, unlike the EU, was eager to abolish the visa regime at the time of the negotiations.Therefore, in the absence doing so in the short term, the incentive proposed was a facilitation of the issuance of visas.This section delves into the implementation of and prospects for the common steps towards visa-free short-term travel, the renegotiation of the VFA and the Kaliningrad regime for local border traffic (LBT).The EU-Russia visa dialogue SOMs were launched in September 2007 as a framework for the visa liberalisation process.Regarding the grounds on which the visa regime should be abolished, the EU and Russia have opted for an approach whereby technical requirements should be adopted by both parties.At the EU-Russia Summit in December 2011, the list of mutual commitments or Common Steps towards visa-free short-term travel was adopted and regrettably not made publicly available.It seems that the EU will seek publication of the commitments set out in the Common Steps at the EU-Russia Summit on 21 December 2012 if member states agree to do so in the Council.Russia presumably has no objections to the publication of the Common Steps.9 The Common Steps, unlike the existing Road Maps on Visa Liberalisation that the EU unilaterally adopted for the Eastern Partnership countries (Ukraine and Moldova to date), are expected to commit both sides on the basis of reciprocity.Concerning the legal form the reciprocal abolition of the visa regime should adopt once the Common Steps are fulfilled, the parties will sign an international Visa Waiver Agreement, which will also provide more legal certainty on compliance with their obligations.Ambassador Vladimir Chizhov, Permanent Representative of the Russia to the EU, called the visa-free dialogue "a touchstone determining the faithfulness of the partners' intention to develop a strategic partnership for modernisation", as visa-free travel concerns the interests of many citizens: 2.5 million Russians visit the Schengen Area annually and 1.5 million citizens from the Schengen Area go to Russia.10 The statistics show the extensive travel exchange between Russia and the Schengen Area.According to data from the European Commission, in 2011 Russia was among the countries where most short-stay visa applications were lodged (5.2 million, 39% of the total), with the highest rate of multi-entry visas issued (47%) and a very low refusal rate (2%).11 The statistics of the Federal Migration Service (FMS) of Russia show that in 2011 Germany was second (after China) in the list of states whose citizens received Russian visas (10%), followed by France (5%), Finland (4%), Italy (4%) the UK (3%) and Lithuania (3%).12 For the purpose of preparing the report on the implementation of the Common Steps for the EU-Russia Summit on 21 December 2012, the visa dialogue SOM in January 2012 agreed on a monthly schedule to monitor progress in the implementation.According to the agreed schedule, the first expert meeting took place in April 2012, where the parties discussed the necessary arrangements for the fulfilment of the Common Steps, including the legal base and measures to be implemented in every element of the Common Steps: "documents security, including biometric passports", "irregular migration, including readmission", "public order protection, law enforcement and legal cooperation", including the Russia-Europol Strategic and Operational Agreement, and finally "external relations and fundamental rights".In addition, the exchange of expert missions was agreed as well as the reports on implementation.Russia submitted its report (219 pages) in April 2012 and the EU did so in June 2012.The reports were discussed during the SOM in June 2012 in Brussels.The first expert field mission on document security went to Moscow on 24-28 September.The second EU mission inspected the Russian-Belarusian border and cross-border points between Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan.Russian experts plan a return visit to the EU on 10-20 December.A number of issues had already been tackled in summer 2012, such as the issuance of biometric passports that are compliant with the standards of the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO).These contain a chip with information as well as a procedure of information transfer for stolen or lost documents.In addition, the EU's concern about the obligation of foreigners' registration in Russia would be addressed by Russia with the following proposal: once the Visa Waiver Agreement enters into force, registration for short visits will be cancelled in both Russia and the EU member states where it is required.In October 2012, the EU-Russia PPC in Nicosia welcomed the continuing implementation of the Common Steps in its joint conclusions (see Council of the European Union, 2012a).At the same time, Alexander Konovalov, the head of the Russian delegation at the PPC, noted that the negotiations returned to the results that had been already achieved four years ago.13 The visa-free regime became the key issue during the EU-Russia Summit on 21 December 2012.The situation seemed rather strained and controversial on the eve of the summit.Russia, being dissatisfied with the slow pace of implementing the Common Steps, offered a Road Map for quicker progress: to implement measures fulfilling the first and the second elements of the Common Steps (on document security and irregular migration) by the end of 2012 and to continue work on the third and the fourth ones in 2013 with the aim of finalising them by the EU-Russia summit in June 2013, in order to proceed with the drafting of the Visa Waiver Agreement.According to this schedule, the Agreement might be signed at the end of 2013 and a visa-free regime enacted before the winter 2014 Sochi Olympics.As for the EU, Brussels has several technical problems with the implementation of the Common Steps, which have not been addressed by Russia: border management (technical capabilities at checkpoints) and corruption, which are connected with document security.With serious doubts on the EU side that the problems could be solved during a year, the "visa lifting process is at the very beginning" and it is "untimely to speak about any dates".14 The state of play reveals the difference in the approaches of the two sides: while Brussels insists on the technical character of the obstacles to a visa-free regime, Moscow believes that the technical requirements have been met, and the real reasons of the EU are mainly political.In this regard, Anwar Asimov, Ambassador at Large, cited the intention of several EU member states to first lift visas with the Eastern Partnership countries, 15 the opposition by certain Central European and Baltic member states to the liberalisation and the EU's persistence in emphasising the human rights component of the visa liberalisation process.16 At the same time, Ambassador Azimov mentioned that Moscow may take measures if there is no breakthrough in the visa-free dialogue with the EU before the end of 2013. "It is hard to put Russians under a yoke -and then the strike [back] will be adequate and asymmetric", he added, according to Interfax.17 The EU-Russia Summit on 21 December 2012 brought no positive results to the urgent issues under discussion.It is clear that the implementation of the Common Steps has not facilitated the level of trust needed to lift visas yet.Nevertheless, Russia has at the moment no intention of unilaterally stopping the adoption of the Common Steps.Actually, the Russian Ministry of Culture is engaged in drafting legislation to liberalise visas for participants and spectators of business, cultural, sport and other official events, who come to Russia for no more than ten days.The decision on the further development of the visa dialogue might be taken during the EU-Russia summit in June 2013.To sum up, mixed results have been achieved so far in the EU-Russia visa dialogue.Two elements of the Common Steps have been implemented by the EU-Russia summit on 21 December: document security and irregular migration.Russia is indicating its willingness to address the EU's concerns on border management, corruption and foreigners' registration.The following six months will be devoted to addressing the most critical problems.The EU's reluctance to fix a date for starting the negotiations on a Visa Waiver Agreement causes disappointment and irritation on the Russian side and decreases significantly the progress of the visafree dialogue.By contrast, a fixed date would be a great incentive and encouragement for Russia to overcome problems and shortcomings.In this context, the implementation of technical preconditions to which the parties committed in the Common Steps should be separated from political conditionality, which puts human rights as the main aspect for progress towards visa liberalisation.Russia shows readiness to implement all the technical requirements under the respected list, but rejects progress in human rights and democracy as the key precondition for establishing visa-free travel and insists on including human rights issues in the implementation process only to the extent they directly touch on the liberalisation of visas, such as anti-discrimination laws.Why may conditionality not only turn out to be ineffective but also counterproductive?Conditionality is a policy instrument that is most plausible when there is an EU membership prospect and when sanctions are justified in relation to a repressive political regime.In the Russian case, unlike the Eastern Partnership states, Russia does not emphasise 'the European choice'; it agrees to accept acquis communautaire 'where appropriate', and positions itself as an equal partner vis-à-vis the Union.Thus the golden carrot of EU membership does not attract Russia.As for the possible sanctions, Russia does not consider them a serious threat and speaks regularly about an asymmetrical response.Consequently, the most effective policy instrument in EU-Russian relations appears to be that of socialisation, as opposed to that of conditionality.Visa liberalisation and increasing youth exchanges would foster people-to-people contacts, which can become the motor of socialisation, increase the knowledge and deeper understanding of both sides and finally support EU-Russian common values.Increasing business and professional contacts through meetings and consultations and joint training programmes inter alia for judges, police officers and border guards are another means of socialisation, which contribute to building mutual trust among the parties.These would be the most effective countermeasures to boost the modernisation and democratising pressures within Russia.Meanwhile, visa restrictions are generally felt to be humiliating by virtue of their intrusiveness, heavy bureaucratic delays, costs and uncertain outcomes.The current visa obligations and the EU's reluctance to lift Schengen visas give way to an increase of anti-European sentiments in Russia, thus feeding nationalistic rhetoric.The Visa Facilitation Agreement between the EU and Russia entered into force in 2007 (Council of the European Union, 2007a) and was the first one to be negotiated and signed in parallel with the Readmission Agreement, in what has been coined as the readmission-visa facilitation nexus (Hernández i Sagrera, 2009, p. 578) .The VFA entailed the exemption of visa fees for certain categories of visa applicants, such as researchers and lorry drivers, a reduced, fixed visa fee for the rest of the applicants and a shorter period for the issuance along with the possibility to lodge applications for multiple entry visas.The assessment of the visa facilitation regime is rather positive, according to officials from both the EU and Russia, but rather negative in the opinion of visa applicants, who encounter problems in the visa issuance procedure.Nonetheless, with the enactment of the so-called 'EU Visa Code', the EU Regulation regarding the issuance of Schengen visas, the VFA would need to be amended accordingly.The European Commission has the mandate from the Council to renegotiate the Agreement.The amended VFA, which has almost been agreed at the end of 2012, foresees the liberalisation of visas for additional categories of citizens, the extension of long-term multiple-entry visas for more citizens as well as the facilitation of the visa procedure for the remaining applicants subject to the regime.At the beginning of the negotiations, the Russian side proposed to include a provision extending the liberalisation of visas to holders of service passports.In this sense, similar provisions are included in the VFAs with Ukraine and Moldova.The proposal was not backed by the EU, however.When preparing the Nicosia PPC in October 2012, the sides started discussing compromise solutions, which could overcome a deadlock to the negotiations on an amended VFA.One proposed solution was to limit the scope of service passport holders to those who possess passports with an electronic data carrier and to reduce the number of passport holders by excluding the military and the administrative staff from diplomatic representations.Although Russia agreed to accept both, the compromise was not reached and the Agreement has not been amended yet.The lack of a compromise solution on the Agreement had direct repercussions on airline crew members, who used to benefit from visa liberalisation under the current VFA.The respective moratorium was not prolonged by Moscow on 1 November 2012 as a response to the refusal of the EU to include service passport holders in the amended VFA.Instead, Russia can sign bilateral agreements with certain member states on visa liberalisation for airline crew members.Still, failure to sign the amended VFA is symbolic in EU-Russia JLS relations, as it demonstrates the lack of flexibility even in a specific policy area.The EU distrust of even a relatively small group -service passports holders -makes the very prospect of a visa-free regime questionable and slows down progress in implementing the Road Map.The EU should assess how to address this obstacle to the signature of an amended VFA.A similar Russian-Norwegian agreement on LBT entered into force in May 2012 and was signed by the ministers for foreign affairs of the two countries in November 2010.The Russian-Norwegian Agreement covered the small border area foreseen in the EU Local Border Traffic Regulation.Actually, the prescribed radius of the local traffic zone proved quite convenient for travellers.But in the case of Kaliningrad, the Polish initiative proposed the extension of the area to the entire oblast.Therefore, it required the revision of the EU LBT Regulation.Given that Kaliningrad's geographical location is unique, the EU showed flexibility in extending Poland and Russia's proposal from a radius of 30 km (50 km in exceptional cases) to stretch the LBT area to up to 60-100 km for both Russian and Polish border areas with the goal "to prevent an artificial division of the Kaliningrad oblast, whereby some inhabitants would enjoy facilitations for local border traffic while the majority (including the inhabitants of the city of Kaliningrad) would not" ( The Polish initiative was perceived in Russia as one of a few visible results of cooperation under the Road Map and across all EU-Russia relations.Furthermore, it gave an impetus to Polish-Russian bilateral relations.The LBT "will noticeably facilitate human contacts between the residents of these regions and will considerably expand opportunities for developing business ties, inter-regional cooperation, youth exchanges and tourist trips", the Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov commented.20 Thus, the political value of the Agreement appears to be even more significant than its practical content.Regarding whether the inhabitants of the border region benefited from the Agreement, the statistical data gives evidence that this has been the case.In August 2012, 3,699 Poles crossed the border with local border traffic permits (LBTPs).21 The number of Kaliningrad oblast inhabitants applying for permits was initially lower, but by October 2012 it had increased by 6,000.The number of those wishing to obtain an LBTPalmost 200 per day -exceeds the consulates' capabilities.Therefore, an outsourcing centre was opened in Kaliningrad in November 2012 in charge of issuing the permits.22 Nevertheless, the Agreement was criticised even before it came into force.Experts cast doubt about the smooth functioning of the new regime, pointing out shortcomings at checkpoints, which were not ready to cope with the increased number of crossings.23 One needs to remember that differences in prices have always motivated and stimulated border crossings (chelnok business).LBT has triggered an increase in the prospects of petty traders, who bring cheap fuel and cigarettes from Kaliningrad and spirits back from Poland.Their activities cannot be qualified as smuggling, if they carry their goods in permitted quantities.But the increasing scale of chelnok trade raises concerns among the Kaliningrad business community; moreover, sometimes people need to wait for seven hours to cross the border.The current situation prompted the members of Kaliningrad regional Duma to address the deputies of the Sejm of Poland, and ask for their assistance in accelerating the check procedures at the Polish-Russian border.The launch of LBT at the Polish-Russian border might have given impetus to negotiations on a similar agreement with Lithuania, which have stalled since 2009.The text of the agreement was agreed, but the Lithuanian side showed no enthusiasm for widening the radius of the border zone.According to Arūnas Plikšnys, Director of the Regional Policy Department of the Lithuanian Ministry of the Interior, Lithuania has the intention of advancing the decision on LBT.24 But the Polish-Russian LBT is regarded by the Commission as exceptional and will hardly set a precedent for the Lithuanian case.25 Two other Russian initiatives regarding visa issues in the Kaliningrad oblast are worth mentioning.First, in 2003 the Kaliningrad regional Duma put forward a proposal to amend federal legislation with the purpose of lifting visa requirements for foreigners coming to Kaliningrad.Yet, this initiative was doomed to failure and has never been appreciated in Moscow because of the reciprocity issue in visa liberalisation between the EU and Russia.The regional deputies' idea was not supported by Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev during his visit to Kaliningrad in October 2012.Second, the Russian initiative of '72 hours visa-free' was proposed by the participants of the 21 st Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference held in Saint Petersburg on 28 August 2012 as a small step towards establishing a visa-free regime.In 2008, the Russian government took the unilateral decision to allow foreign tourists who arrived by ferry to stay in Russia for 72 hours visa-free.This regime was applied to Kaliningrad after the new checkpoint was established in Baltyisk.The Russian delegation at the Conference expressed their intention to ask the European Parliament to examine the possibilities for establishing a 72-hour visa-free regime, although the initiative was not reflected in the Conference's final resolution.To conclude, the establishment of the Polish-Russian LBT can be regarded as a positive small step in EU-Russia cooperation.Its significance is more political than practical, as it demonstrated the EU's flexibility in solving an issue of common interest, which was highly appreciated by Russia.20 ITAR-TASS News Agency, 26.07.2012.21 Kaliningrad news (http://kaliningrad.net/news/69409/).22 Polish cultural centre in Kaliningrad (http://polska-kaliningrad.ru/ru/2012-10-20-10-36-42/news/398-pleasure).23 V. Balobaev, "Small border traffic risks to go down in history as a project of 'great border traffic jams'", 2012 (http://news.rambler.ru/12273264/photos/).24 See Rugrad.eu, "Head of Department of the Ministry of Interior of Lithuania: The question of small border traffic with Lithuania can be resolved within six months", 13.09.2012 (http://rugrad.eu/news/527656/).25 Based on an interview with an official of the European Commission.Readmission policy constitutes one of the main provisions in the Road Map.The readmission of one country's nationals irregularly staying in another country is a principle of international public law.Yet, the EU sought to include a clause in the agreement whereby irregular migrants who entered the EU via Russia coming from a third country or stateless persons would also be subject to readmission.In other words, the clause stipulates that Moscow had to be responsible for the readmission procedure of an irregular migrant who transited through Russia before entering the EU.This clause was accepted by Russia after Brussels offered a tempting incentive at the time of negotiations of the Readmission Agreement: the VFA with a prospect of a visa-free regime.The EU-Russia Readmission Agreement entered into force in June 2007 (Council of the European Union, 2007b) .The leverage of Russia vis-à-vis the Union translated into a three-year delay before the clause of readmitting transit migrants and stateless persons became operational in the second half of 2010, when Russia had to take the heavy burden and responsibility for the transit migrants entering the EU from Russia's territory.26 Nevertheless, the five years of implementing the EU-Russia Readmission Agreement demonstrated that the burden proved not to be so heavy.Three centres were constructed in the Moscovskaya and Permskaya oblasts as well as in the Krasnodarskiy krai.They have an occupancy rate of approximately 70% and very few requests for readmission of transit migrants (see Table A1 in the Annex).In addition, the EU asked for the signature of implementing protocols of the agreement with Russia, to give more certainty to the obligations emanating from it.This process is still underway and has been included as one of the commitments in the Common Steps, in an attempt to give stimulus to the signature of the Protocols.By mid-December 2012, only two EU member states had not signed the protocols with Russia: Greece and Portugal.Russia had to reform its legal basis since the term 'readmission' was not included in the federal legislation until 2006.The normative basis is being developed to divide powers in implementing the readmission procedure among the interested authorities -the FMS, the Ministry of Interior and the Federal Security Service.The EU-Russia Joint Readmission Committee is an SOM that discusses any matters related to the implementation of the Readmission Agreement, including data on readmitted persons.There have been no major complaints about the implementation of the Agreement, which was confirmed at the Nicosia PPC in October 2012 (Council of the European Union, 2012a).The number of requests received by Russia for readmission of its own citizens has been increasing but the readmission procedure has been smooth.The improvement of the border management systems together with the border guards' cooperation played a positive role (Jaroszewicz, 2012, p. 15) .But there is a problem with the identification of migrants with no documents, which is common to all Readmission Agreements.The Joint Readmission Committee approved a Special Protocol on Identification, laying down the structure of interviews to identify the country of origin.27 A statistical analysis shows that since 2007, Russia has received requests mainly from Germany (57%), Norway and Sweden (9%), and Austria (6%).In its turn, since 2007 Russia has deported 53 irregular migrants and revealed 48 wanted persons.28 Several persons, whose asylum applications were rejected in the EU, were re-admitted in the North Caucasus and, being wanted for various crimes, were transferred to the Ministry of Interior.29 One of the main preconditions for visa liberalisation is the conclusion of Readmission Agreements between Russia and non-EU states.Negotiations with a number of countries were launched several years ago.They have reached successful conclusions with Armenia, Iceland, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova (to be signed), Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, Uzbekistan and Vietnam.The Agreement with Ukraine is expected to play a key role in fighting irregular migration.It was signed on 22 October 2012 together with the Implementation Protocol.The progress in fighting irregular migration would be much more far-reaching if the agreement had been concluded with countries of origin of irregular migration, such as India, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Lebanon, Mongolia and North Korea.In this sense, the FMS suggests the inclusion of a readmission clause in any bilateral agreement signed by Russia.The implementation of the Readmission Agreement can be regarded as one of a few spheres of the Road Map and the Common Steps where progress is not called into question.Russia implemented this EU technical condition and the progress in concluding the relevant agreements with Russia's neighbours to the east strengthens the security of the EU borders and contributes to reducing the EU's fears of irregular migration as a consequence of visa liberalisation.Russia became the first country to sign the Working Arrangement (WA) with FRONTEX in February 2006, the main content of which entails capacity building for border guards, the deployment of joint actions at the border and exchange of data on irregular migration flows.Two cooperation plans between the EU agency and the Russian Federal Border Service (FBS) followed for the periods 2007-2010 and 2011-2014, aimed at further developing contacts.These included the organisation of activities in risk analysis and information exchange, irregular immigration and joint operations, training, participation in multilateral symposiums linked to border guard activities, and finally joint operative actions.All of them constitute socialisation measures.On the basis of the WA, Russia participated as an observer in the operations that were organised in the context of the Euro 2008 and Euro 2012 football tournaments.In 2009, two joint operations were held at the EU-Russia borders -"Mercury" and "Good Will" -to enhance interaction, including information exchanges among the FBS, FRONTEX and the relevant member states' authorities.During the two-week "Mercury" operation, about 50 refusals of entry were registered, one irregular migrant apprehended, two cases of falsified documents were uncovered and one stolen car was detected.30 The smuggling of cigarettes was identified as one of the common illegal activities.In the meantime, the border demarcation process with Estonia has been deadlocked owing to the lack of a border treaty.As a consequence, the border was being demarcated unilaterally.Russian-Estonian consultations started in October 2012, however, which are aimed at renegotiating and signing a treaty.Border management cooperation is another success story for the implementation of the Road Map.The next step and the future challenge is to widen cooperation, including Russia's participation in the irregular migration programmes of the Eastern Partnership and FRONTEX involvement in operations across the Eurasian space, which could contribute to strengthening regional security.The development of an agreed drugs policy based on the United Nations Conventions and the legal system for bilateral (Russia-EU) and multilateral (Russia and the EU member states) cooperation meets the strategic interests of both Russia and the EU.International operational cooperation is becoming the most essential element, including the Paris Pact format, the Pompidou Group of the Council of Europe and controlled precursor deliveries under Europol's coordination.The deeper involvement of EU member states in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and the CSTO programmes is fully supported by Russia.The SCO undertakes a number of initiatives against organised crime and drugs trafficking, and for many years the CSTO has carried out the "Channel Operation" to capture drugs convoys on their way from Afghanistan to Central Asia.Observers from more than half of NATO's members participate.Regarding drug trafficking, Russia has now become more a destination than a transit area.Indeed, there appears to be very limited heroin trafficking to Europe, only 3.8% of the entire amount.31 Nowadays, Russia can rather be considered the main target on the heroin route from Afghanistan, because heroine from Afghanistan does not reach Europe, but remains in Russia.This situation makes international support and cooperation vital.Against this background, Victor Ivanov, Chairman of the Russian State Anti-Drug Committee and Director of the Federal Service for Narcotics Traffic Control (FSKN), proposed in June 2011 a joint five-year Russia-EU plan to be elaborated on the basis of the Russian "Rainbow-2" plan and the anti-drug provisions of the report on a New Strategy for Afghanistan, approved by the European Parliament in December 2010 (European Parliament, 2010) .He believes that the consolidation of these two plans into a single operational plan could provide for a synergic effect.Ivanov called upon Russia and the EU to set up a joint agency that could contribute, in cooperation with the UN, the CSTO and other international organisations, to creating a stable system of Eurasian anti-drug security.Yet so far, there have been no signs of the EU supporting this initiative by Russia.Moreover, drug trafficking has increasingly developed in the reverse direction, from West to East: synthetic drugs -amphetamine and related drugs -are brought to Russia and the other members of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) from the EU member states (mainly Portugal, the UK and the Netherlands).The Commission and Europol reports provide documentary evidence that the increase in illicit production and turnover of synthetics is becoming more and more pressing.The EU-Russia drugs cooperation is developing positively in consultations between EMCDDA and the RF FSKN on prevention and on treatment of those addicted to drugs.Both parties show interest in exchanging experience and best practices, which once again constitute socialisation measures.Cooperation against drug trafficking has not brought any significant results because the EU is more focused on other drug routes, such as the Balkans.Still, stopping drug trafficking is a global challenge, in which both Russia and the EU should participate in full.To fulfil this task, Russia's bilateral cooperation with the EU member states, which has already been fruitful, could be further developed, as well as the EU-Russia involvement in international fora and the other common initiatives.The dialogue on migration and asylum was launched on 27 June 2011 with fairly developed workshops and seminars at the expert level.EU-Russia JLS cooperation had been lacking in such dialogue, which is why it was qualified as a "historical event" by Konstantin Romodanovsy, who heads the FMS.32 The migration dialogue covers all aspects of migration, including support of legal migration, the regulation of migratory flows, the fight against irregular migration, international protection and migrants' integration.The first thematic working session took place in December 2011 in Moscow.It was devoted to cooperation on asylum, including statistics and data exchange, the role of international organisations and civil society, and the conditions and procedures associated with reception.According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), "a number of Eastern European countries often prioritise irregular migration control over asylum", which might apply to Russia, as the scale of the irregular migration problem exceeds that of asylum significantly.Since 2007, the FMS has examined more than 13,000 applications and only 10% on average annually are deemed satisfactory.According to FMS official statistics, by October 2012, 801 refugees had been registered.In 2012, 3,370 have received temporary protection compared with 3,996 in 2011.33 Traditionally, the number of refugees has not been very high (500-800 a year), but it increased in 2008 after the armed conflict in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.Georgians still make up the majority of refugees, followed by Afghans, and a fewer number of Uzbeks.As regards the integration of refugees, according to Ekaterina Egorova, the FMS Deputy Head, their small number is explained by the fact that they become Russian citizens in the course of a year.34 Still, 127,000 stateless persons are reported by the UNHCR, and the problem is recognised by both the FMS and human rights organisations, 35 but certain achievements can be noted in the reduction of statelessness.Between 2003 and 2010, more than 600,000 formerly stateless persons were naturalised.36 Large-scale internal displacement remains a challenge in Russia too -up to a million people are still displaced in the Caucasus region.Yet the UNHCR closed its sub-office in Vladikavkaz in 2011, and ended direct assistance for internally displaced persons, most likely because the vulnerable population benefits from a Russian fund for investment and development.Many constraints remain: limited access to asylum procedures in border-transit zones in airports, readmission and detention centres together with ill treatment and deportation before the final decisions on asylum claims are taken.Overall, however, the UNHCR's assessment shows that "both national and regional partnerships with the Russian Federation on asylum and statelessness issues have been strengthened, contributing to the renewal and updating of the country's legislative instruments and processes.In Russia there have also been improvements in the reception of asylum seekers and the determination of their claims.Yet, a number of urgent issues could be solved by the EU and Russia in the framework of the dialogue.The number of asylum seekers in the EU of Russian origin remains high (18,200 in 2011) , and that is seen as a serious obstacle for visa liberalisation.Still, 80% of the applications are rejected, 38 which makes the case very ambiguous.Among those who are really in need of international protection, there are many pretending to receive international protection for quite different reasons -from economic motivations to fleeing from justice.Finally, they join the figures of irregular migrants in the EU.Most of the asylum seekers come from the North Caucasus.To improve the situation, in addition to readmission, in 2011 the FMS and the International Organisation for Migration launched the project on "Voluntary Return and Reintegration Assistance for Russian Citizens", in particular for those returning to the Chechen republic.That notwithstanding, the influx of asylum seekers from the North Caucasus remains an issue of concern and further mechanisms to protect the rights of asylum seekers could be developed in the framework of the dialogue.The meeting on the "Fight against Irregular Migration", held on 30 March 2012, was devoted to the causes and effects of irregular migration, the models of risk analysis, preventive measures against irregular migration (increasing document security, including biometrics and tracing false documents).Russia and the EU exchanged information and statistics on migration flows and routes as well as the results of operational cooperation.In the following meeting, the dialogue on "Migration and Development" held on 26 October 2012 in Saint Petersburg, the sides exchanged their views and best practices on the key correlated issues (migration, remittances and integration).In addition, Russia noted the priority of favouring the return of highly skilled specialists.According to Ekaterina Egorova, the FMS Deputy Head, "Russia considers this issue from the position of a dual advantage: returning migrants satisfy the requirements of the national labour market and stimulates the [economy's] growth".39 The migration dialogue runs smoothly because it covers more topics of mutual interest than contradictions.Both sides possess rich experience, both positive and negative.The participants hope to move from the exchange of best practices to an operational phase and spot elements.40 The dialogue might play a positive role in strengthening cooperation in the post-Soviet space.Despite Russia's rather reticent attitude to the Eastern Partnership initiative, it is very interested in a number of its programmes.The EU, which is rather cautious about the EurAsEC, might be more engaged in the fight against irregular migration.What is more, the EU's experience in anti-discrimination legislation, which forbids discrimination on the grounds of race and nationality, might be much needed to promote freedom of movement in the framework of EurAsEC.EU-Russia cooperation in the field of organised crime constitutes another element of cooperation in light of the Road Map.The Cooperation Agreement between Europol and Russia has been the legal basis for cooperation on transnational organised crime.It was signed in Rome on 6 th November 2003 and has consisted in the exchange of information, experience and best practices, pieces of legislation and other documents, as well as the organisation of study visits, expert workshops and seminars.From the Russian side, the Ministry of the Interior is competent for cooperation with Europol.In addition, a Russian National Contact Point for Europol was created to carry out specific tasks such as operational activities and workshops and seminars.The information shared by Russia is used in the publication of the Europol Organised Crime Threat Assessment.The ongoing negotiations on a Europol-Russia Operational Agreement will provide with an enhanced legal basis for cooperation on organised crime between law-enforcement authorities.Regarding cooperation on cyber crime, it was included in the EU-Russia JLS agenda in 2008.The programme of the experts' meetings was approved to discuss measures for stopping the distribution of video materials containing scenes of violence towards children.Russia suggested supplying law enforcement bodies with full information on IT transborder crimes so that they could arrest criminals and bring them to trial.An exchange of requests has already been organised on addressing cyber crime.Russia proposed to work out the typology of transborder cybercrimes, so that any relevant information about their commitment could be immediately sent to the law enforcement bodies of the aggrieved party through the channels of the international network of the national contact points.To achieve this aim, it seems very significant to compare the existing Russian and European practices in this field.In this sense, the EU should adopt a Cyber Security Strategy in January 2013, a joint exercise by EEAS, the Commission, which should be the basis for an upcoming EU Cyber Security directive.EU-Russia cooperation could be supplemented by a new task of creating a cyber space, where the new common definition of 'cyber security' can be developed.In 2008, the sides started discussing the possibilities of such cooperation.The Cooperation Agreement between Europol and Russia in force 2003, as well as the upcoming operational one, might form the legal basis for this kind of interaction.To achieve results in fighting cyber terrorism, Russia could participate in the Europol project 'Check the web', which is aimed at disclosure of Islamist terrorist websites.However, cooperation in this extremely important sphere is complicated by the same factors that hinder the entire EU-Russia counter-terrorist cooperation: the lack of a common perception on the basis of which websites can be considered terrorist.A single criterion could hardly be established without a single approach to the terrorist lists.In the same way as cutting off financing of terrorism, the websites which belong to the organisations included both in Russia's and the EU's terrorist lists could be currently suppressed.In January 2011, the EU Member States and Russia's operational police units decided at a meeting in the Hague to include a Russian representative in the Europol Expert Group -the European Cyber Crime platform.The sides also agreed on studying possibilities of information exchange on harmful virus programmes, which are used for criminal purposes.The Europol-Russia negotiations on the agreement concerning the exchange of personal data, which would considerably strengthen cooperation on transnational crime, were finally launched on 21-22 October 2010 after several years of preparations.The meeting was preceded by the EU-Russia Conference on personal data protection.In spite of the Presidential Order, issued in 2006 for the signature of the Additional Protocol, the creation of the independent supervisory body is still under examination.In May 2012, the Russian Federation Council's special commission on information started examining the possibility of creating a supervisory authority.Still, at the PPC meeting on 3 October 2012 in Nikosia, Alexandr Konovalov, who headed the Russian delegation, called it "a stumbling block" in the negotiations on the agreement.43 However, the prospects for the signature of the operational agreement remain unclear.The same applies to the discussion on the operational agreement with Eurojust, whose negotiations started in 2007 with four rounds.It should be mentioned that the EU faced a similar challenge when negotiating Europol and Eurojust's operational agreements with the US.In spite of the absence of appropriate legislation in the US and an independent supervisory body, the agreements were finally signed.The EU-US JLS cooperation covers the same issue areas as the EU-Russia one, without the legal basis provided by an international agreement between the parties, such as the EU-Russia PCA.The cooperation is framed in a more flexible manner, in the format of SOMs.A high level of trust and commitments to fight against organised crime allowed partners to overcome controversies.Nowadays, bilateral agreements with EU member states as well as cooperation with the liaison officers have allowed Russia to exchange information in the process of joint operations under Europol's coordination.Yet, Alexander Prokopchuk, the head of Russia's Central Interpol bureau, believes that the conclusion of the operational agreement would surely increase the effectiveness of joint activities.44 The negotiations on operational agreements between Russia and Europol and Eurojust have resulted in partial success.Russia's efforts in reforming the domestic legal basis in order to sign and ratify the relevant Council of Europe Convention should be appreciated.Still, the absence of an independent body to control information exchange is slowing down progress.The prospect of signing the operational agreements does not seem tempting enough for Russia to change the institutional structure in this sphere.But given that the operational agreements with Europol and Eurojust are a precondition for visa liberalisation under the Common Steps element on internal security, Russia will be encouraged to implement the necessary reforms.Counter-terrorism cooperation has been traditionally fruitful in the context of Russia's bilateral relations with the EU Member states.However, the EU and Russia established it a key element in both the Road map on AFSJ and the external security.In March 2006, the State Duma adopted the Federal Law on Ratification of the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, and it was regarded as a significant step in implementing the Road Map.Russia has become party of more than 20 counter-terrorist international legal acts under the auspices of the UN, the Council of Europe, the CIS and the SCO.The agenda of the EU-Russia summit in December 2012 included an assessment of the counter-terrorism political dialogue and especially the meeting, which took place in Moscow in November 2012.The sides expressed their endeavor "to give further impetus to counter-terrorism cooperation and strengthen cooperation on the prevention of terrorism, in particular radicalisation, the promotion of criminal justice and rule of law, combating of terrorist financing as well as bilateral cooperation in multilateral fora such as the UN and the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum (GCTF)".45 To sum up, significant potential has been accumulated in Russia-EU counter-terrorism cooperation.Nowadays, further efforts are needed to bring cooperation to a new level and fill it with concrete substance.In the framework of experts' consultations, preconditions have been discussed for signing the Agreement between the Russian Ministry of Justice and the European Judicial Network in Civil and Commercial Matters.The sides are expected to negotiate the spheres that could be covered by the Agreement as well as the principles of recognition and implementation of court decisions.The official negotiations are to start as soon as the Commission receives the respective mandate and would constitute another measure of socialisation.The process has slowed down because of mixed positions within Russia and in the State Duma regarding the reasonability of joining a number of The Hague Conventions, such the Convention on the Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption.In the framework of consultations, Russia's position has been put forward.It was only in 2001 that Russia became a full Conference participant, so joining The Hague Conventions requires the adoption of legislation and financial costs.Actually, Russia prefers bilateral international agreements on the adoption of children.Moreover, there is no common support in Russia for either inter-country adoption or juvenile justice, which is rejected by a large segment of Russian society.Nevertheless, Russia participates in a number of Hague Conventions, notably those concerning jurisdiction, recognition, enforcement and in respect of parental responsibility and the protection of children (since June 2012) and on Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (since June 2011).They were both adopted with certain derogations, fixing inter alia the Russian authorities' jurisdiction on protecting children's property rights.The EU has a distrust of the judiciary system in Russia, shared by many Russians, which remains a challenge for Russian authorities.The participation of Russian judges in the common training programmes, including their visits to the relevant European bodies, can be seen as additional socialisation measures. The EU and Russia have assessed in a negative and politicised way the human rights situation in each other's territory.The Council of Europe and independent organisations claim that there are challenges in the protection of human rights in both the EU and in Russia. EU-Russia consultations on human rights, which have been held biannually since 2005, have been severely criticised by independent organisations.The European Parliament has called for an enhancement of the consultations so that they are more effective and results-oriented. The Nicosia PPC in October 2012 included a reference to the principle of independence of the judiciary as well as a clear commitment that links the respect for human rights and rule of law with cooperation in the AFSJ, but made no reference to the promotion of democracy.This section focuses on the linkage between the Common Space on Freedom, Security and Justice and the promotion of democracy, human rights and the rule of law.First, the section looks at the assessment of human rights situations in Russia from a Brussels-based perspective and in the EU from a Moscow-based perspective, as well from the viewpoints of the Council of Europe and independent organisations.Second, the section looks at the formulation in the PCA and the Road Map of cooperation in JLS and the promotion of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, as well as the human rights consultations as an instrument for human rights discussions between the EU and Russia.It explains the reasons underlying the limited results of the human rights consultations in addressing situations where human rights are not protected.Third, the section looks at the prospects for EU-Russia cooperation in the field of human rights in the New Basic Agreement, as well as in the Common Steps towards visa-free short-term travel.The Road Map refers to the "common commitments to democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms" as the basis for EU-Russia JLS cooperation (EU-Russia, 2011, p. 45).Regarding the human rights situation in Russia from an EU perspective, in 2011 the Council of the European Union gave a negative assessment, in which it claimed that there has been "little improvement" in this respect (Council of the European Union, 2011, p. 23).It presents among others reports of violence by law enforcement authorities in the North Caucasus, no progress in media pluralism, difficulties in holding public demonstrations, torture and ill treatment in detention centres and increased racism, xenophobia and homophobia.As for the rule of law, the Council raises concerns about the situation of human rights defenders and independent journalists.Finally, the document also claims that Russia fails to comply with judgments by the European Court of Human Rights and the ratification of Protocol 6 of the ECHR on the abolition of the death penalty, although Russia applies a moratorium in this case.For its part, the European Parliament adopted resolutions on the rule of law in Russia in February 2011, and on the political use of justice in Russia in September 2012, in which it reaffirmed the belief that Russia remains an important partner for the EU in building sustainable cooperation based on democracy and the rule of law (European Parliament, 2011, point 1), but mentions that the human rights situation in Russia has deteriorated because of "intimidation, harassment and arrests of the representatives of opposition forces and non-governmental organisations, the recent adoption of a law on the financing of NGOs, on the right of assembly, the law on defamation, the law on the internet restrictions as well as the increasing pressure on free and independent media and minorities in sexual orientation and religious belief".The Parliament reminds Russia that as a member of the Council of Europe it has signed up to all the human rights acquis and calls on Russia to comply with the rulings of the European Court of Human Rights (European Parliament, 2011, point 13 ).An individual case that attracted considerable attention in the EU as regards the human rights situation in Russia and the independence of the judiciary is the 'Pussy Riot' case.In Russia, the experts, media community and citizens perceived the performance of the band in the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour in different ways.In any case, it must be taken into account that it is an individual case that had exceptional media coverage, which many other cases do not experience.The whole situation, including the media campaign, has profoundly deepened popular distrust in Russia and the EU and revived discussion on the compatibility of liberal and traditional values.The EU's concerns about the imprisonment of the Pussy Riot members were expressed by the German Bundestag as well as German Chancellor Angela Merkel in the framework of then Russia-Germany intergovernmental consultations in Saint Petersburg in November 2012.The German criticism did not prevent the sides from signing ten bilateral agreements, including one on facilitating youth exchanges.Thus, Germany has opted for socialisation instead of conditionality in its relations with Russia.As for the assessment of the human rights situation in the EU from a Russian angle, Moscow has criticised Brussels for not respecting the rights of the Russian-speaking minorities in Estonia and Latvia.The EU has referred to this as politicised criticism.Moscow finds the EU's criticism politicised as well, and does not accept the European Parliament's resolutions.As for the resolution on the political use of justice in Russia, it was considered "one-sided" and "based on improbable sources".The Russian Ministry for Foreign Affairs mentioned that "the EU Parliament did not take into account the explanations given by [the] Russian side during the meeting of the working groups of the EU-Russia Parliamentary Cooperation Committee".46 According to the State Duma, by reason of its bias the resolution will have "a zero effect in Russia".The State Duma deputies added the reminder that "the European experience was used for developing the new legislation in Russia on violation of order during the actions of protests and others", and expressed regret that the Members of the European Parliament emphasised all the negative aspects, with the distortions and ignored the positive changes in Russian legislation and the political situation.47 Russia's will to establish symmetry in the human rights sphere was evident in two reports by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, which were published in December 2011 and 2012.The Ministry for Foreign Affairs analysed in detail "the situation of non-citizens in the Baltic countries, Roma people, migrants and refugees, and manifestations of racism and xenophobia", calling them "particularly troublesome human rights issues in the EU".Furthermore, the reports included cases of infringements in privacy and personal data protection, the rights of detainees, freedom of mass media, a lack of separation of powers and politicisation in criminal proceedings, freedom of assembly and speech in member states.The reports were mainly aimed at drawing the attention of EU member states as well as EU supranational bodies to serious internal challenges before applying conditionality in external relations.In its second 2012 report, which was published amidst increased criticism from the EU side, Russia expressed a desire "for a constructive dialogue of equals with the European Union on human rights and democratic development, which would to the full extent correspond to the relations of strategic partnership with the EU".48 The report was presented in Brussels on 6 December during consultations between Ambassador Konstantin Dolgov (the Russian Ministry for Foreign Affairs' Commissioner for Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law) and Stavros Lambrinidis (EU Special Representative for Human Rights), at a press conference for Russian and foreign media and at a meeting with representatives of international human rights NGOs.The initiative was supported by the State Duma Committee on International Affairs, which organised hearings on the basis of the report by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in May 2012.The head and the other officials of the EU delegation participated; the representatives of international organisations and the European Parliament were invited but did not attend.The head of the EU delegation welcomed the initiative of the State Duma, as did the Director of Russian Amnesty International, who noted that he considers such hearings 'normal practice'.The hearings did not appear to be a dialogue, however, but rather a continuation of reciprocal claims about human rights violations.Apart from the position taken by EU and Russian institutions, independent evidence coming from international organisations and independent civil society actors (e.g. the Council of Europe, Human Rights Watch, the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), Amnesty International and the EU-Russia Civil Forum) show recent and profound challenges relating to the rule of law in Russia.For example, the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly called on Russia "to respect the obligations incumbent upon every Member State…with regard to pluralist democracy, the rule of law and human rights".49 Similarly, the EU-Russia Civil Forum at the same time outlined "a decreased perceptiveness of the European governments to the civil society voice in times of economic and financial crisis".50 Thus, the protection of human rights constitutes a challenge to both Russian and EU Member States.Against these assessments of the human rights situation in the EU and Russia, the PCA establishes in Art.2 that "[r]espect for democratic principles and human rights as defined in particular in the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, underpins the internal and external policies of the Parties and constitutes an essential element of partnership and of this Agreement" (Council of the European Union, 1997).Since 2005, both parties have held consultations on human rights 51 twice a year, which do not take place in parallel with the EU Summits.So far, the consultations have only been held in Brussels.The EU has proposed a rotation of the consultations between Moscow and Brussels so that members of the Russian Ministries of the Interior and Justice can also participate.The EU reports on human rights violations and exerts pressure on Russia to adhere to international standards on human rights.Russian experts stated that the EU lacks supranational mechanisms of promotion and protection of human rights by its member states and that the European Commission is mainly focused on assessment of the human rights situation in third countries.In this context they noted the importance of the EU's prompt accession to the ECHR on equal conditions with other participants.52 From Russia's side, concerns are expressed about the rights of the Russian-speaking population in the Baltic States, excessive use of force when breaking up peaceful demonstrations, the rights of migrants as well as infringements of the right to privacy.During consultations the EU's support of Russian NGOs is also analysed.Thus, the partial results of the consultations should not been denied.In 2011, the human rights consultations incorporated a civil society dimension -the Civil Society Forum (CSF).During the third CSF General Assembly in Saint Petersburg on 9-10 October 2012, the participants expressed their concerns about a "visible cooling down of relations between Russia and EU", which "may have long-term consequences, including for civil society on both sides".The Forum noted an element of confusion on the side of the EU in regards to the processes happening in Russia and "a lack of understanding on how to further develop dialogue and cooperation with Russia in Brussels and other European capitals".Consequently, the EU-Russia Civil Society Forum sees its mission as influencing Moscow and Brussels to modulate the cooling of relations for constructive dialogue.53 At the same time, civil society organisations such as the FIDH have heavily criticised the EU-Russia human rights consultations and even advocated their suspension, stating that they "have neither contributed to an improvement of the human rights situation in Russia, nor increased the level of support to human rights defenders" (FIDH, 2010, p. 2) .The European Parliament also made reference to the shortcomings of the human rights consultations and called for the "human rights consultations to be stepped up and made more effective and results-oriented, with the Russian Ministries of Justice, the Interior and Foreign Affairs taking part in the meetings in both Brussels and Moscow and with the full involvement of the European Parliament at all levels" (European Parliament, 2011, point 14) .The Road Map Progress Report 2010 foresaw improvements in the human rights consultations by stating that the "EU aims to ensure that the discussion on these issues is not confined only to the bi-annual Human Rights Consultations but is addressed to the extent possible also in the PPC meetings and other meetings taking place within the Space on Freedom, Security and Justice" (EU-Russia 2011, p. 45) .In other words, the approach advocates the extension of EU-Russia human rights cooperation beyond the framework of the human rights consultations.Actually, the prospects for enhanced cooperation between the EU and Russia on human rights were put forward in the conclusions of the Nicosia PPC in October 2012: "The Parties reiterated the importance of and respect for commitments in the area of human rights and rule of law, including the independence of the judiciary, which underpin cooperation in the area of freedom, security and justice.They also expressed the necessity to prevent discrimination, protect minorities and combat hate crimes.They noted the importance of EU's prompt accession to the ECHR and Fundamental Freedoms" (Council of the European Union, 2012a, p. 1).Here, for the first time, the principle of the independence of the judiciary is included in an EU-Russia document, as well as a clear commitment that links the respect for human rights and rule of law with cooperation in the AFSJ.In addition, the EU's objective to accede to the ECHR, of which Russia is a party, will put the EU and Russia on equal footing as members of the ECHR and may stimulate EU-Russia human rights relations through the Council of Europe's human rights acquis.54 Notably, however, the promotion of democracy is not included in this statement from the Nicosia PPC.Alexander Konovalov, the Minister of Justice who chaired the meeting from Russia's side, emphasised at the subsequent press conference "the issues of real significance, which should be put on the top of agendaminimising and excluding completely the risks of new possibilities for international criminal activity, excluding factors of irregular migration, technical management of passengers' flows -both tourists and migrants".Furthermore, "[a]s for the issues, which our partners bring to the first plan", the Minister added, "they might be discussed endlessly.Absolute satisfaction [about] how they will look in 10-20 years might never be reached."55 Thus, the existence of a common view on the effectiveness of extending human rights beyond the framework of the human rights consultations still provokes doubt.The framework that can stimulate EU-Russia cooperation on human rights is the Common Steps towards visa-free short-term travel.The fourth building block of the set of commitments that the EU and Russia have agreed to fulfil contains a set of measures in the field of human rights, including consultations and discussions on the protection of migrants' rights and anti-discrimination laws.Use of human rights as a tool of conditionality in EU-Russia relations is regarded in the EU as an opportunity to promote change, given that the incentive of visa liberalisation is very tempting.From Russia's side, however, prioritising human rights issues in every sphere of cooperation is considered counterproductive.Unlike the human rights consultations, the provisions under the Common Steps are clearly formulated and will be monitored regularly.The ongoing implementation of the Action Plans on visa liberalisation in Ukraine and Moldova has shown the effectiveness of conditionality to promote reforms on human rights, with the adoption of legislation on anti-discrimination law.But the rhetoric of symmetry in EU-Russia human rights cooperation prevents the conditionality mechanism from being effective.The more pressure the EU exercises, the more resistance from Russia it triggers, unless human rights issues are discussed symmetrically.In any case, both sides have committed to the protection of fundamental rights in the framework of the Common Steps.Finally, according to an official from the EEAS, the New Agreement will have a significant and far-reaching human rights component in the political dialogue and the JLS chapters.The European Parliament confirmed the EEAS position by adopting the resolution of 13 December 2012, which contains the EP's recommendations to the Council, the Commission and the EEAS on the negotiations of the new EU-Russia Agreement and in particular the paragraphs dealing with the respect for democratic principles, human rights and the rule of law and considers this respect "as an absolute prerequisite for the signature of an EU-Russia agreement".56 Russia, however, has never expressed the intention to include conditionality provisions in the New Agreement.Thus, it is still unclear whether the EU's intention of an enhanced EU-Russia human rights cooperation as analysed above will gain in legal certainty in EU-Russia relations.Until now, the developments analysed in this section signal that there are strains in EU-Russia relations, and that a renewed format for cooperation in human rights is needed.This study has provided a thorough analysis of EU-Russia JLS cooperation in light of the Common Space on Freedom, Security and Justice, adopting an approach that integrates both EU and Russian perspectives.Analysis of the implementation of the different JLS policy areas shows that there has been actual cooperation, but a main conclusion could be drawn: the cooperation has been uneven and has not led to the same outcomes in all the JLS policy areas.Progress has been observed in the following policy areas: 1) Technical security of passports.In the framework of the Common Steps, Russia launched biometric passports that are compliant with the standards of the ICAO.The biometric passports contain a chip with information, as well as parameters to transfer information in case of stolen or lost documents.It must be taken into account that most EU member states are in the process of introducing biometric passports.Fight against irregular migration.The EU-Russia Readmission Agreement has been effectively implemented since 2007, including readmission of transit migrants since 2010.Despite the difficulties in identifying the nationality of transit migrants, the assessment of the implementation of the Agreement is generally positive.In addition, most implementing protocols with EU member states have been ratified.Border management.A Working Arrangement was agreed between FRONTEX and the Border Guard Service of Russia in 2006, enabling information exchange and capacity building for border guards.Furthermore, Russian border guards have participated in several FRONTEX Joint Operations.Cooperation follows the prescribed plans and could deepen with intensified exchanges.Border demarcation.The demarcation processes on the Russian-Latvian and the Russian-Lithuanian borders have been completed, with the entry into force of Demarcation Agreements.The negotiations between Russia and Estonia, which had been deadlocked since 2005, have been resumed with a view to demarcating the common border.Counter-terrorism cooperation and fight with organised crime.A significant potential has been accumulated in Russia-EU counter-terrorism cooperation as well as in fighting organised crime.Nowadays, further efforts are needed to bring cooperation to a new level and fill it with concrete substance.In the following policy areas, however, progress has been limited: 6) Common Steps towards visa-free short-term travel: Two aspects of the Common Steps could be approved by the EU-Russia summit on 21 December.Yet Russia is dissatisfied with the slow speed of the implementation process and proposes a quicker road map with a fixed date of starting negotiations on a Visa Waiver Agreement.The EU finds the obstacles to visa-free travel to be technical rather than political and views visa liberalisation in a longer-term perspective.The failure of the negotiations to conclude an amended Visa Facilitation Agreement (VFA) shows the lack of flexibility even in a small particular sphere of EU-Russia relations.Moreover, the EU's lack of trust in service passports and concerns about corruption in Russia put into question the recognised progress in the technical security of passports and the very prospects for the liberalisation of visas.Kaliningrad border traffic.The Polish-Russian agreement on LBT is deemed a positive achievement, at least from a political standpoint.Still, it will hardly be possible to reach a similar Lithuanian-Russian LBT agreement covering the entire Kaliningrad oblast.Dialogue on migration and asylum.Four thematic sessions took place with a positive outcome.The participants hope to move on from the exchange of best practices to an operational phase and spot elements.Yet a high number of asylum seekers from Russia causes concern for the EU and remains a challenge in EU-Russia JLS relations.The problem is being discussed in the framework of the migration dialogue, but no clear prospect for improving the situation is foreseen.10) Drugs cooperation has been developing positively in relation to consultations between the EMCDDA and the FSKN on prevention and on the treatment of drug addicts.The EU-Russia Agreement on Drug Precursors is ready for signing in 2013.However, there is no progress in joint initiatives against drug trafficking originating in Afghanistan.11) Operational Agreements between Russia and Europol/Eurojust.Russia signed and ratified the Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data and signed the Adjacent Protocol to the Convention.In addition, Russia reformed the domestic legal basis for data protection.Nevertheless, the absence of an independent supervisory authority to control information exchange has brought the negotiations to a standstill.12) Judicial cooperation.Expert discussions are underway on preconditions for the signature of the Agreement between the Russian Ministry of Justice and the European Judicial Network in Civil and Commercial Matters.The process has slowed down owing to rather mixed views in Russia about the reasonability of joining some of The Hague Conventions.In addition, the EU is showing distrust of Russia's judicial system.Human rights remain the most controversial issue in EU-Russia relations.The consultations take place twice a year with a very limited outcome.The Civil Society Forum was created in 2011, which is a positive step but with limited influence so far.The EU and Russia negatively assess each other's human rights situations.Russia insists on the symmetrical treatment of human rights issues.To sum up, the EU and Russia have made obvious progress in implementing five policy areas of the EU-Russia Road Map, while there are limited achievements in the other eight most relevant issue areas, with slow progress on visa liberalisation, judicial cooperation and human rights.This study concludes that there is a lack of balance between security, on the one hand, and freedom and justice, on the other in EU-Russia cooperation in the Road Map.The analysis gives evidence of how security issues are the cornerstone of EU-Russia JLS cooperation and account for a number of the outcomes of the Road Map, namely the implementation of a Readmission Agreement and the signature of a Working Arrangement between FRONTEX and the Russian Federal Border Service, among others.The Common Steps towards visa-free short-term travel use security measures as a precondition for visa liberalisation and this approach has proven to be effective so far for further implementation of the Readmission Agreement -with the signature of most of the implementing protocols with member states, among other security-related policy areas.Meanwhile, cooperation on freedom-related areas has not lived up to expectations.Although the local border regime was established on the Polish-Russian border, the negotiations on an amended VFA have not been successful to date and progress on the visa liberalisation dialogue has been limited.Actually, most of the outcomes of EU-Russia cooperation in the AFSJ have been in the security realm.In addition, freedom measures encapsulate the notion of mobility from a comprehensive point of view, which includes not only the liberalisation of short-term visas, but also fostering labour migration, student exchanges and other measures aimed at promoting mobility.Nevertheless, the Road Map Progress Report 2010 uses the concept of a balance between freedom, security and justice when assessing the outcomes of the Road Map.Under the label "freedom", the report covers the areas of readmission, visa policy, local border traffic and border management.The concept of "justice" in the Progress Report encapsulates negotiations on an Arrangement with Eurojust and Russia acceding to international conventions.As for "security", this label covers the areas of counter-terrorism, negotiations on a Europol Arrangement and drugs cooperation.As mentioned above, it is our understanding that the issues of readmission and border management also fall within the security realm.As a result, there is not a balance between freedom, security and justice in EU-Russia JLS cooperation.This assessment challenges the usefulness of systematising the JLS policy areas under this concept and shows that this is not a valid approach to framing EU-Russia JLS cooperation.57 Another contribution of the study is the analysis of the current and future institutional structures in EU-Russia JLS cooperation.On the one hand, the EU faces internal coordination challenges between the EEAS, the Commission and also the EU agency services in external relations since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon.On the other hand, the proposal at the Nicosia PPC meeting in October 2012 to set up a senior officials' meeting once a year covering the full spectrum of EU-Russia JLS cooperation would provide for a better institutional setting for such cooperation.There are several reasons why progress on the EU-Russia Common Space on Freedom, Security and Justice is stagnating, in spite of the obviously increasing network of experts' consultations and professional contacts between the parties.While good trustful relations have been observed at the professional and expert level in the process of consultations and dialogues, there is lack of trust at the political level.This problem is common across all EU-Russia relations.As soon as the contacts and consultations reach their final stage, in which a norm has to be adopted, the cooperation becomes much more difficult -neither side is ready for significant concessions.In many cases, there is no flexibility when the contacts pass from the expert/professional to the political level.Meanwhile, the Road Map has not materialised in clear, tangible outcomes, such as the signature of the operational agreements with Europol/Eurojust or the EU-Russia VFA.In addition, the differences between Russian and European legal and administrative practices have been slowing down progress, as legal reform is costly and requires time, effort and consensus.Examples here are the Council of Europe Convention on Information Protection and The Hague Conventions.In drawing up the list of Common Steps with the four building blocks of preconditions for visa liberalisation, EU-Russia JLS cooperation is closely interlinked and mainly focused on security.Thus, the lack of progress in certain directions minimises achievements in the others.For example, the absence of operational agreements with Europol and Eurojust prevents the visa liberalisation process from going further.As a result, the general progress is very limited.While showing readiness in complying with the technical preconditions for visa liberalisation, Russia has demonstrated strong opposition to political conditionality, which the EU uses as a tool for promoting human rights.Russia insists on a symmetrical, equal partnership not only in declarations, but also in practice.Therefore, this study has shown how socialisation can be an efficient alternative to conditionality and help to step up cooperation in the Road Map.The visa liberalisation process and increasing youth exchanges seem to be the best methods of socialisation: more people would be able to come to the EU and become supporters of the shared values; more visitors to Russia would provide for the better understanding of the parties.Furthermore, as agreed in the Road Map, joint training programmes for civil servants who are involved in the implementation of the Common Steps, as well as seminars, exchanges of experience and best practices, promote socialisation and confidence building, which is vitally needed to face security challenges and build a Europe without dividing lines.Bearing in mind the uneven progress in the Common Space policy areas, it is recommended that the LIBE Committee should undertake the following steps:  Monitor the further implementation of the EU-Russia Readmission Agreement and complete the necessary procedure for and signature of the remaining Protocols.For this objective, the contacts on joint readmission should be established. Implementation of the local border traffic regime should also be closely monitored in cooperation with colleagues from the Russian State Duma, Polish Sejm and Kaliningrad regional Duma.Special attention should be paid to areas where limited progress is observed:  In the framework of the dialogue on migration and asylum, the problem of asylum seekers from the North Caucasus should be analysed from all aspects.The LIBE Committee should follow developments concerning asylum seekers who are apprehended at the border as irregular migrants and subject to an accelerated return procedure to Russia as well as those who stay at detention camps, in both the member states and in Russia. Give consent to the VFA once the negotiations are finalised, so that a new tool fostering mobility between the EU and Russia enters into force.Implementation of Common Steps elements should be monitored with the aim of their timely and effective completion.For this purpose the relevant implementation reports should be analysed by the LIBE Committee.The LIBE Committee should analyse possibilities for developing the five-year Russia-EU plan on the basis of the Russian "Rainbow-2" plan and anti-drug provisions of the report on a New Strategy for Afghanistan, approved by the European Parliament in December 2010.Attention should be given to Russia's proposal for establishing the EU-Russia joint anti-drug agency.In the framework of the Inter-Parliamentary Cooperation Committee, meetings and contacts should be established with the Information Commission of the Russian Federation Council, aimed at exploring the possibilities to create an independent supervisory authority, with a view to a quicker signature of the operational agreements between Russia and Europol/Eurojust.A number of recommendations of a procedural character can be suggested:  The LIBE Committee should cooperate with the members of the EU-Russia Parliamentary Cooperation Committee to promote in its agenda issues related to EU-Russia JLS cooperation.More intensive cooperation in the framework of the Parliamentary Cooperation Committee would promote better understanding of each side's position.Regular inter-parliamentary meetings and consultations help to prevent misunderstanding, soften rhetoric and continue constructive dialogue.The LIBE Committee should promote more democratic accountability of the EU-Russia JLS cooperation and pay attention to the consistency of the EU's external action in the field of JLS and in particular in EU-Russia JLS relations, following the work of the different actors involved.The LIBE Committee should evaluate and contribute to the strengthening of the rule of law, the promotion of democracy and the protection of fundamental rights not only in Russia, but also in the EU AFSJ, by ensuring a better evaluation of the basis upon which cooperation in JLS issues has been built so far.For this purpose the special provisions on human rights should be included in every international treaty with Russia, solely provided that both sides accept an equal obligation to respect them.Hereafter referred to as 'Russia'.On the general framework of EU-Russia relations, see Averre(2005)and Haukkala (2010).2 Hereafter referred to as the 'Road Map'.3 SeeWolff, Wichmann and Mounier (2009) for a comprehensive overview of the external dimension of the EU policies on justice, freedom and security.The term 'illegal migration' was widely used by the EU institutions at the time the PCA entered into force.However, the neutral term 'irregular migration' has progressively replaced it.The contribution of civil society and academia has been key to changing the use of one term for the other.6 SeePotemkina (2010) for an assessment of the implementation of the Road Map.7 Based on an interview with an official from the European External Action Service.It must be recalled that access to documents on EU-Russia relations is not fully transparent, as numerous documents are not publicly available and many of them are only partially accessible to the public.Based on an interview with an EEAS official.10 SeeChizhov (2012).It is very significant that Russia speaks about "visa-free dialogue" in official documents and rhetoric, while the EU calls it "visa dialogue".11 European Commission, "Overview of Schengen Visa statistics 2009-2011", Directorate-General Home Affairs, Directorate B: Immigration and asylum, Unit B.3: Visa Policy, Brussels (2012), p. 4.12 RF FMS (2012), p. 8.ITAR-TASS News Agency, 03.10.2012.14 See Ambassador Azimov's interview by the Interfax News Agency,Kommersant-daily, 28.11.2012.15 Given that the EU has been developing the visa dialogue in parallel with Ukraine and Moldova, Russia is against an eventual earlier lifting of the visas in Ukraine and Moldova, as it considers that this would be a political decision.However, Moscow accepts the possibility of reaching the visa-free regime at the same time.16 PNA/Itar-Tass News Agency, 29.11.2012.17 Moscow Times, "Russia threatens EU with retaliation", 27 November 2012.Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Legal Department, Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Poland and the Government of the Russian Federation on the Rules of Local Border Traffic, 14 December 2011 (2012).19 European Border Dialogues Forum at Kaliningrad and Elblag, 17-18 November 2011; Barents Observer, 21 November 2011.Russia most likely advocated a delay in the entry into force of the clause because of it expected visa liberalisation would be established by 2010.27 Based on an interview with an official of the European Commission.28 Expert group on updating the "Strategy 2020" (strategy2020.rian.ru/load/366063053).29 See ECRE (2011), p. 6.UN Office on Drugs and Crime, Addiction, Crime and Insurgency (2009), pp.13, 40-44.Eurostat, Data in Focus, No.8/2012, p. 11.39 RIA Novosti news agency, Federal portal, 29.10.2012.40 Based on an interview with an official of the European Commission.Federal Service for Supervision in the Sphere of Telecom, Information Technologies and Mass Communications (2012).42 "Protection of personal data: New demands", Internet Interview of Roman Sheredin, the Deputy Head of the Federal service for supervision, 28 December 2011 (http://www.garant.ru/action/interview/373047/).43 ITAR-TASS News Agency, 03.10.2012.44 Rossiyskaya gazeta, 25.01.2010.European External Action Service.Factsheet EU-Russia summit, Brussels, 20-21 December 2012, pp.1-2.RIA Novosti news agency (http://ria.ru/politics/20120914/750230456.html).47 RIA Novosti news agency, 13 September 2012 (http://ria.ru/politics/20120913/749400761.html).48 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (2012).The Council issued the EU Strategic Framework and Action on Human Rights and Democracy, which sets out the objectives of the Union regarding human rights and reaffirms the human rights component of the EU external action.See Council of the European Union (2012b).European Parliament resolution of 13 December 2012 on the annual report on Human Rights and Democracy in the World 2011 and the European Union's policy on the matter (2012/2145(INI).At the end of the day, the 'balance' between freedom, security and justice is a notion created by the EU in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, whose usefulness has been contested not only by academia(Bigo et al.,2010), but also by the EU itself.The Stockholm Programme states that "[i]t is of paramount importance that law-enforcement measures, on the one hand, and measures to safeguard individual rights, the rule of law and international protection rules, on the other, go hand in hand in the same direction and are mutually reinforced" (EuropeanCouncil, 2010, p. 4).This represents a shift from the balance approach to a conception of freedom and security on equal footing.
There are philosophical theories of mentality [5, 6, 7] .Our task is to give a measure for inductive mathematical theory.Similar results are unknown yet.Note.In this paper, if we say "let X be something" we always mean that X is represented by any description.Thus we always identify "something X" with corresponding set D X = { numbers / words / image(s) / articles / figures / data base(s) / model(s) / and so on }, and consider X as D X .Definition.We say that two persons (or, in general, rational creatures) have different mentalities if they make essentially different decisions in the identical conditions.Related notions are: pattern of thought, behavioural pattern, mental inclination, one's principles etc.Our first purpose is to find some approaches of the measure of difference between various mentalities.For this aim, we define and examine the electoral matrix.Indeed, voters under nearly the same conditions make different decisions.What is important for our aim, electoral decisions are very dependable, strictly documentary and easily measurable.The second purpose is the visualization of inner differences of national (or, in general, group) mentality.These two topics are quite simple, meanwhile fundamental.At third, we discover that there exist some invariants of the visual configuration of national (group) mentality, so called mentality portrait.Next purposes are far more complicated.We begin research dynamics of mentalities and possibilities of mentality cybernetics, i.e. optimal control to avoid conflicts induced by inner contradictions in the national (group) mentality.In the fourth place, we find that the rough distortion ("grimace") of mentality portrait is predeccesor of political conflict, and that divergence / convergence of national mentality portrait may regarded as one of national unity indeces.In the fifth place, we find that mentality may be shifted (e.g. see Sec. 5 about Counter Reformation), but, as a rule, difference between mentalities is unremovable by neither conviction and persuasion, nor compulsion and violence.In common circumstances certain difference may be latent over thousand years, and suddenly break out as religious or national movement, rebellion, revolution, civil or holy war etc.Some of results were formerly published and presented [8, 9, 10, 11] 1 Theory Let us remind that we identify "something X" with its description, X = D X .Notion of the mentality in this paper.Let S be some social entity (e.g. individual, group, organization, party, nation and so on), E(S) is the environment of S, A(S) is the conscious behaviour (i.e. decisions, conscious actions) of S. We say that S 1 and S 2 have different mentalities, if they demonstrate substantially different behaviour (actions) in the similar conditions (environments).Let T (S) be the lifetime of S. Mentality forms the unique path (way, track, trajectory) of S in E(S) × A(S): EQUATION This path is the most exact manifestation of mentality, thus, M (S) may be identified with P (S).Sometimes (but not always; e.g., if S is a "person of constant principles") we can consider mentality M (S) simply as the function F (S) from E(S) to A(S).Then P (S) is the graphic of function F (S).Symbolically, measure of difference between mentalities: EQUATION It is well-known definition of the norm of linear operator [12] .Constructing the general notion (or image) of distance between mentalities, we consider (2) as preimage (prototype, pattern) for generalizations and/or approximations.Let us research a matrix [12] • columns j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} correspond to competitors; more exactly, each column corresponds to some check box in the voting ballot; sometimes column n is computed (3); V = v ij , i = 1..k, j = 1..n • v ij denote a percent of votes in i-th district for j-th competitor; but if j = n, sometimes we compute EQUATION As example, on tab.1, each row corresponds to one of 27 high level administrative regions of Ukraine: 1 autonomy republic (AR Crimea), 24 oblasti and 2 cities of special status (misto Kyiv and misto Sevastopol); Each of columns B, Kr, Ku, L, M, P, T corresponds to one of 7 candidates in the ballot: Valeriy Babych, Leonid Kravchuk, Leonid Kuchma, Volodymyr Lanovyi, Olexandr Moroz, Ivan Pliusch, Petro Talanchuk.Column "rest" is obtained by (3).We shall consider k rows of V as vectors v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v k of a real n-dimensional space R n .We want to see on a plane R 2 such configuration of the set of electoral vectors {v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v k }, that be maximally similar to their initial configuration in a real n-dimensional space R n .Thus we could involve for data perception the most powerful tools, namely visual analyzers."We discover unimagined effects, and we challenge imagined ones" [14] .We can use manifold techniques for data analysis [14] − [18] , in particular variety ways of visualization [14, 17] .In a first approximation, it is sufficient to use the factor analysis [16, 17] .In section 5 we concisely mention about one of more complicated methods.v i , v j , (1 ≤ i < j ≤ k) distance dist (a, b) .Ad initium, in this paper we assume that all coordinates are linear and independent, i.e. metric is Euclidean, metric tensor is the identity matrix, dist (a, b) = |a − b|.Note, that representation [12] of mentality by electoral matrix in general is not exact.So, this distance is barely an approximation of the measure of difference between mentalities (2).Thus we can consider the problem more precisely.In a certain class of functions C to find such function f V (•) : R n → R 2 to obtain a configuration which is maximal similar to n-dimensional.We solve this problem under criterion: EQUATION Assuming criterion (4), there is valid a statement, that required optimal function f V is a linear orthogonal projection to the space of two main components, which are received by factor analysis of vectors {v i }.Denote EQUATION Obviously, ∀i, j : x i − x j = v i − v j .Let's reduce the Gramian matrix XX T by orthogonal transformation S = S(V) to such diagonal form SXX T S T = D, that d 11 ≥ d 22 ≥ • • • ≥ d kk .Then mutual orthogonal vectors (rows) of the matrix SX = Z = {z 1 , z 2 , . . . , z k } are named as factors of V. Theorem.Let q be an integer, 1 ≤ q < k.Denote by I q an orthogonal projection operator of space {z 1 , . . . , z k } onto subspace of q first factors {z 1 , . . . , z q }.Then EQUATION where G(R; k, q) is the Grassmanian manifold of all q-dimensional subspaces of a real Euclidean k-dimensional space, P L − orthogonal projection operator onto subspace L. Note.Remind that trace is invariant, i.e. ∀ B, det B = 0 : Tr (BAB −1 ) = Tr (A).The value d ii Tr (XX T ) , where EQUATION is interpreting as part of information about distances between vectors {x i } carried by the factor z i .We have analized all presidential and parliamentary elections in Ukraine from 1991 to 2007 year.Note, that corresponding electoral matrices, as a rule, have no common columns.But their plane images are very similar, as different portraits of the same latent invisible reality.As examples, let us compare three plane portraits: Fig. 1 Matrices V 1 and {V 2 , V 3 } have no common column, matrices V 2 and {V 1 , V 3 } have no common row.But plane images of all these matrices (with the exception of anomalies) seem as several portraits of the same reality.There is a plenty of facts from history of world mentalities, especially European, e.g. [1, 2, 5, 19, 20, 21, 22] .We concisely mention about one of new methods to mine from these facts a new knowledge as scientific models and laws.It is a method of boundary modeling [8] .This method may be regarded as development of maps comparison below (Sec. 6) of Ukrainian election maps or portraits ( fig. 1, 2, 3 ) with native Ukrainian language map ( fig. 6 ) (see [10] , [4] ).Since Reformation (XVI century) we can see Roman limes of I-V centuries as first approximation to the boundary between Protestant and Catholic confessions in Europe.Note that this boundary intersects states and nations, namely, in XVI−XVIII centures it intersects Holy Roman Empire, and since XIX it intersects single national Germany.This boundary between mentalities on current historical maps is invisible in a period more than thousand years, from the fall of Roman Empire in V century to Reformation in XVI.During the Thirty Years' War (1618−48) in some protestant areas less than quarter of all inhabitants were survivor.Eventually, the confessional boundary since XVII century substantially approximates by the ancient Celtic−German boundary.So, difference between mentalities (DBM) was unremovable by neither conviction and persuasion, nor compulsion and violence.In history, DBM changes practically parallel to changes of the ethnic composition of the population.Main conclusions.First.There is an invariant latent reality, which portrait is visible as a result of factor analysis.Second.It should be observed that this portrait has high conformity with structure of corresponding district by native language, see fig. 6 .This fact was observed in [10] , and now is well known [4] : "all preferences of voters are laying on the distribution map of Russian or Ukrainian language".This similarity may be explained by ethnolinguistic Sapir−Whorf hypothesis: we see and perceive the world through our language.Third.Exceptional divergence of electoral configuration in the electoral space (portrait deformation) is a predecessor of political crisis.Local divergence is a predecessor of local crisis, global divergence is a predecessor of global crisis: Fourth.Now the way is opened to compute indices (both exact and fuzzy) for political and social forecasting and management.First of all, they are indices of national unity.It seems ineffective to build the Ukrainian state until we structure (harmonize, order) whole Babylon of unconsonant Ukrainian mentalities.It is necessary to compute and supervise the corresponding indices.• Fifth.We find that (in common circumstances) difference between mentalities may be latent over thousand years, and suddenly break out as religious or national movement, rebellion, revolution, holy war etc.This difference is unremovable by neither conviction and persuasion, nor compulsion and violence.The same ideas and similar methods we apply to research a group mentality.Let's we have a table of election (tab. 3).After an instant we obtain a plane graph of this group structure ( fig. 7) .We see two antipodal subgroups.Of course, we obtain only moment portrait from this election viewpoint.	There are philosophical theories of mentality [5, 6, 7] .Our task is to give a measure for inductive mathematical theory.Similar results are unknown yet.Note.In this paper, if we say "let X be something" we always mean that X is represented by any description.Thus we always identify "something X" with corresponding set D X = { numbers / words / image(s) / articles / figures / data base(s) / model(s) / and so on }, and consider X as D X .Definition.We say that two persons (or, in general, rational creatures) have different mentalities if they make essentially different decisions in the identical conditions.Related notions are: pattern of thought, behavioural pattern, mental inclination, one's principles etc.Our first purpose is to find some approaches of the measure of difference between various mentalities.For this aim, we define and examine the electoral matrix.Indeed, voters under nearly the same conditions make different decisions.What is important for our aim, electoral decisions are very dependable, strictly documentary and easily measurable.The second purpose is the visualization of inner differences of national (or, in general, group) mentality.These two topics are quite simple, meanwhile fundamental.At third, we discover that there exist some invariants of the visual configuration of national (group) mentality, so called mentality portrait.Next purposes are far more complicated.We begin research dynamics of mentalities and possibilities of mentality cybernetics, i.e. optimal control to avoid conflicts induced by inner contradictions in the national (group) mentality.In the fourth place, we find that the rough distortion ("grimace") of mentality portrait is predeccesor of political conflict, and that divergence / convergence of national mentality portrait may regarded as one of national unity indeces.In the fifth place, we find that mentality may be shifted (e.g. see Sec.5 about Counter Reformation), but, as a rule, difference between mentalities is unremovable by neither conviction and persuasion, nor compulsion and violence.In common circumstances certain difference may be latent over thousand years, and suddenly break out as religious or national movement, rebellion, revolution, civil or holy war etc.Some of results were formerly published and presented [8, 9, 10, 11] 1 Theory Let us remind that we identify "something X" with its description, X = D X .Notion of the mentality in this paper.Let S be some social entity (e.g. individual, group, organization, party, nation and so on), E(S) is the environment of S, A(S) is the conscious behaviour (i.e. decisions, conscious actions) of S. We say that S 1 and S 2 have different mentalities, if they demonstrate substantially different behaviour (actions) in the similar conditions (environments).Let T (S) be the lifetime of S. Mentality forms the unique path (way, track, trajectory) of S in E(S) × A(S): EQUATION This path is the most exact manifestation of mentality, thus, M (S) may be identified with P (S).Sometimes (but not always; e.g., if S is a "person of constant principles") we can consider mentality M (S) simply as the function F (S) from E(S) to A(S).Then P (S) is the graphic of function F (S).Symbolically, measure of difference between mentalities: EQUATION It is well-known definition of the norm of linear operator [12] .Constructing the general notion (or image) of distance between mentalities, we consider (2) as preimage (prototype, pattern) for generalizations and/or approximations.Let us research a matrix [12] • columns j ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,n} correspond to competitors; more exactly, each column corresponds to some check box in the voting ballot; sometimes column n is computed (3); V = v ij , i = 1..k, j = 1..n • v ij denote a percent of votes in i-th district for j-th competitor; but if j = n, sometimes we compute EQUATION As example, on tab.1, each row corresponds to one of 27 high level administrative regions of Ukraine: 1 autonomy republic (AR Crimea), 24 oblasti and 2 cities of special status (misto Kyiv and misto Sevastopol); Each of columns B, Kr, Ku, L, M, P, T corresponds to one of 7 candidates in the ballot: Valeriy Babych, Leonid Kravchuk, Leonid Kuchma, Volodymyr Lanovyi, Olexandr Moroz, Ivan Pliusch, Petro Talanchuk.Column "rest" is obtained by (3).We shall consider k rows of V as vectors v 1 , v 2 , . . . ,v k of a real n-dimensional space R n .We want to see on a plane R 2 such configuration of the set of electoral vectors {v 1 , v 2 , . . . ,v k }, that be maximally similar to their initial configuration in a real n-dimensional space R n .Thus we could involve for data perception the most powerful tools, namely visual analyzers. "We discover unimagined effects, and we challenge imagined ones" [14] .We can use manifold techniques for data analysis [14] − [18] , in particular variety ways of visualization [14, 17] .In a first approximation, it is sufficient to use the factor analysis [16, 17] .In section 5 we concisely mention about one of more complicated methods.v i , v j , (1 ≤ i < j ≤ k) distance dist (a, b) .Ad initium, in this paper we assume that all coordinates are linear and independent, i.e. metric is Euclidean, metric tensor is the identity matrix, dist (a, b) = |a − b|.Note, that representation [12] of mentality by electoral matrix in general is not exact.So, this distance is barely an approximation of the measure of difference between mentalities (2).Thus we can consider the problem more precisely.In a certain class of functions C to find such function f V (•) : R n → R 2 to obtain a configuration which is maximal similar to n-dimensional.We solve this problem under criterion: EQUATION Assuming criterion (4), there is valid a statement, that required optimal function f V is a linear orthogonal projection to the space of two main components, which are received by factor analysis of vectors {v i }.Denote EQUATION Obviously, ∀i, j : x i − x j = v i − v j .Let's reduce the Gramian matrix XX T by orthogonal transformation S = S(V) to such diagonal form SXX T S T = D, that d 11 ≥ d 22 ≥ • • • ≥ d kk .Then mutual orthogonal vectors (rows) of the matrix SX = Z = {z 1 , z 2 , . . . ,z k } are named as factors of V. Theorem.Let q be an integer, 1 ≤ q < k. Denote by I q an orthogonal projection operator of space {z 1 , . . . ,z k } onto subspace of q first factors {z 1 , . . . ,z q }.Then EQUATION where G(R; k, q) is the Grassmanian manifold of all q-dimensional subspaces of a real Euclidean k-dimensional space, P L − orthogonal projection operator onto subspace L. Note.Remind that trace is invariant, i.e. ∀ B, det B = 0 : Tr (BAB −1 ) = Tr (A).The value d ii Tr (XX T ) , where EQUATION is interpreting as part of information about distances between vectors {x i } carried by the factor z i .We have analized all presidential and parliamentary elections in Ukraine from 1991 to 2007 year.Note, that corresponding electoral matrices, as a rule, have no common columns.But their plane images are very similar, as different portraits of the same latent invisible reality.As examples, let us compare three plane portraits: Fig.1 Matrices V 1 and {V 2 , V 3 } have no common column, matrices V 2 and {V 1 , V 3 } have no common row.But plane images of all these matrices (with the exception of anomalies) seem as several portraits of the same reality.There is a plenty of facts from history of world mentalities, especially European, e.g. [1, 2, 5, 19, 20, 21, 22] .We concisely mention about one of new methods to mine from these facts a new knowledge as scientific models and laws.It is a method of boundary modeling [8] .This method may be regarded as development of maps comparison below (Sec.6) of Ukrainian election maps or portraits ( fig.1, 2, 3 ) with native Ukrainian language map ( fig.6 ) (see [10] , [4] ).Since Reformation (XVI century) we can see Roman limes of I-V centuries as first approximation to the boundary between Protestant and Catholic confessions in Europe.Note that this boundary intersects states and nations, namely, in XVI−XVIII centures it intersects Holy Roman Empire, and since XIX it intersects single national Germany.This boundary between mentalities on current historical maps is invisible in a period more than thousand years, from the fall of Roman Empire in V century to Reformation in XVI.During the Thirty Years' War (1618−48) in some protestant areas less than quarter of all inhabitants were survivor.Eventually, the confessional boundary since XVII century substantially approximates by the ancient Celtic−German boundary.So, difference between mentalities (DBM) was unremovable by neither conviction and persuasion, nor compulsion and violence.In history, DBM changes practically parallel to changes of the ethnic composition of the population.Main conclusions.First.There is an invariant latent reality, which portrait is visible as a result of factor analysis.Second.It should be observed that this portrait has high conformity with structure of corresponding district by native language, see fig.6 .This fact was observed in [10] , and now is well known [4] : "all preferences of voters are laying on the distribution map of Russian or Ukrainian language".This similarity may be explained by ethnolinguistic Sapir−Whorf hypothesis: we see and perceive the world through our language.Third.Exceptional divergence of electoral configuration in the electoral space (portrait deformation) is a predecessor of political crisis.Local divergence is a predecessor of local crisis, global divergence is a predecessor of global crisis: Fourth.Now the way is opened to compute indices (both exact and fuzzy) for political and social forecasting and management.First of all, they are indices of national unity.It seems ineffective to build the Ukrainian state until we structure (harmonize, order) whole Babylon of unconsonant Ukrainian mentalities.It is necessary to compute and supervise the corresponding indices. •Fifth.We find that (in common circumstances) difference between mentalities may be latent over thousand years, and suddenly break out as religious or national movement, rebellion, revolution, holy war etc.This difference is unremovable by neither conviction and persuasion, nor compulsion and violence.The same ideas and similar methods we apply to research a group mentality.Let's we have a table of election (tab.3).After an instant we obtain a plane graph of this group structure ( fig.7) .We see two antipodal subgroups.Of course, we obtain only moment portrait from this election viewpoint.
extensive use of economic sanctions to influence political decisions in the New Independent States (NIS) in the 2000s but that the sanctions were considerably less effective than they had been in the 1990s.The analysis makes clear that Russia's sanctions successes in the 1990s created a strong desire in many of the NIS to reduce Russia's economic leverage over them by diversifying their trade and energy links.It is possible that a less aggressive Russian strategy in the 1990sthough it might have brought smaller short term gains -could have better served Russian's long term interests.The paper also suggests that the Drezner model might have improved predictive ability if it included some measure of repetition and/or duration of sanctions.It is paradoxical that the economic sanctions literature, especially the debate between Hufbauer and Pape 2 is so pessimistic about the utility of sanctions (even Hufbauer says they have utility in only about a third of the cases) but policy-makers still seem to turn to them with great hope and enterprise when faced with difficult foreign policy issues.Indeed, the world community has spent an enormous amount of effort sanctioning Iran in the last few years seeking to dissuade the rulers of that country from pursuing nuclear weapons.The academic community has contributed a large amount of literature analyzing the case 3 .One strain of the sanctions literature, revolving around Daniel Drezner's The Sanctions Paradox 4 , is not only more optimistic about the utility of economic sanctions, it provides a framework for both predicting the imposition of economic sanctions and for gauging their effectiveness if implemented.Drezner tested the model in several ways in his 1999 book and continues to use the framework in foreign policy analysis 5 .In the most compelling test of his theory, Drezner examined how the newly created Russian state used economic sanctions 39 times in the 1990s to extract concessions and to influence important policy decisions in the newly independent states (NIS 6 ) formed after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.These sanctions, he claims, were successful 38% of the time, a proportion far higher than Pape's view of the historical record (less than 5% success rate) and somewhat higher than Hufbauer's estimate of a success rate around 34%.More importantly, his analysis shows that his gametheoretic model was both a good predictor of the imposition of economic sanctions on particular targets and the magnitude of concessions (if any) likely to be offered.Russia's aims in the NIS were more diverse than the current US aims in Iran, but the stakes were nonetheless high for Russia.Ariel Cohen 7 asserts that Boris Yeltsin "demanded a sphere of influence in the CIS in 1993" and that goal "has been the driving force of Russian foreign policy." "Moscow," according to Drezner "wanted the NIS to be subservient to Russia and to no other great power": Nominal independence of the NIS gave Russia the best of both worlds.It could scavenge these states for valuable assets and concessions, but avoid incurring any of the costs associated with subsidizing their regimes or economies.8 Drezner quotes Sergei Karaganov, head of Russia's Foreign Defense Policy Council, who said in 1995: "Russia is becoming an imperial power of the 20 th century; we no longer need physical control over territory, we can have economic influence" 9 .Drezner documents 39 uses of economic coercion toward the NIS states in 1992-1997.The overall goals of the efforts were to gain control of Soviet strategic military assets (weapons and bases), dominate each new state's energy resources, and minimize the influence of outside powers in the region-and to achieve all this without military intervention.Russia had varying targets in each of the NIS depending on their military and industrial assets, and had varying degrees of economic leverage over the several states depending on their degree of dependence on Moscow for markets, subsidies, energy supplies, and transit routes.Favored tools of coercion involved raising tariffs on exports to Russia (Azerbaijan), reduced energy subsidies and/or supplies to energy importers (Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, and the Baltics), and reduced access to and/or higher costs for using energy pipelines across Russian soil (Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan).Drezner reports that 15 of the 39 Russia coercion attempts met with significant concessions from the target countries.His contribution to the literature, however, is greater than the narrative; it lies in the construction of his "Conflict Expectations Model" in which he sets up a two-dimensional framework based on the degree of opportunity costs involved in the coercion attempt and the degree of expectations of further conflict.In Drezner's methodology, if the sender country (Russia) bears small 5 costs ( in relation to GDP) in imposing the sanctions while the target country suffers large economic costs, there is a large gap in opportunity costs that both makes the sender country more likely to impose sanctions and the target country more likely to offer concessions.Also important, however, is the state of relations between the two states and expectations about future discord.If the target country fears that the current coercion attempt is but one effort in a potentially long and discordant relationship it will be much less likely to make concessions.10 Table 1 lays out the prediction model constructed by Drezner.Economic sanctions are expected to be much more effective when the target country is not particularly fearful of the sender country and can be forced to bear higher costs than the sender.Sanctions are much less likely to yield significant results if the target country is wary of the sender and the gap in costs is small.The model also predicts that the sender will rarely use sanctions against relatively friendly states where the gap in costs is small.The reader is referred to the Drezner book for details.11 Drezner tests this theoretical construction against actual Russian behavior in the 1990s.He presents detailed case studies of Russian coercion efforts against the other 14 new states that were formed after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.He describes what Russia did in each of 39 efforts and what its goals were.He judges where Russia and the target country fit in the above table, and evaluates the success or failure of the sanctions' efforts.He rates each attempt as yielding significant concessions from the target country, moderate concessions, minor concessions, or no concessions.For comparison purposes we have ascribed unit values to each of these four possible results (a significant concession counts as 3 points, a moderate concession gets 2 points, etc.).Using this scoring perfect model forecasting would result in an average Box 1 score of 3, an average Box 2 score of 2, an average score Box 3 score of 0, and an average Box 4 score of 1.Table 5 .9 in Drezner presents his judgment about the magnitude of concessions, if any, for each of the 39 coercion attempts.Table 2 below shows the results of the predictions for each box.We consider that the scores in boxes 1 and 2 are quite good--the model had considerable predictive success--while the score for box 3 suggests some problems.The percentages in the outer column and row show the success rate for only significant concessions, a somewhat different consideration more in keeping with the discussion in Hufbauer and Pape.By this measure, it seems that sanctions against allies (countries with low conflict expectations) resulted in significant concessions 73 percent of the time, while sanctions against countries with high conflict expectations had a very low success rate (16 percent).We regard these results as important because they suggest that economic sanctions can and have been successful, far more successful than Pape, for one, suggested.We also regard the results as positive in terms of the model, the Drezner Conflict Expectations Model did a reasonably good job of predicting the outcomes of the sanctions.Despite these successful examples of economic coercion, Russia fell far short of achieving its broader foreign policy goals in the 1990s, it simply didn't have the power.As Trenin puts it, " Russia had no resources to back up its ritual claims that the CIS constituted a prime interest of its foreign policy." 12 During the 90s, after all, Russia was coping with high inflation, economic restructuring, a debt crisis, and an oil shock.13 The new states were able to establish sovereignty and "entered into all sorts of relations with both their neighbors and outside powers" 14 much to the annoyance of Russia.Drezner stopped his record of Russia's economic coercion in 1997, but Russia's foreign policy goals in the NIS did not diminish and coercion efforts did not stop.By the end of the 1990s, according to Adam Stulberg, "even pro-Western reform minded Russian politicians looked to energy diplomacy as the crutch for forcibly reintegrating the former Soviet space under the aegis of a 'liberal Russian empire.'" 15 From his election in 2000, President Vladimir Putin aggressively sought to centralize the Russian energy industry and to influence if not acquire energy resources and infrastructure in the NIS.16 17 Russia, in the first 13 years of the new century used its economic power over the NIS for several purposes including (1) to create a sphere of "influence" or "interests", and (2) to extract the maximum amount of economic rent possible from the production and transportation of energy resources within Eurasia.By 2003, with soaring world oil prices and a strong global economy, it was in a more powerful economic position than it had been in the 1990s.In addition, Russia's ability to influence the NIS through remittances had also increased since the 1990s 18 .On the other hand, many of the NIS had sharply cut their trade and/or energy dependence (Table3) of decreased trade and energy dependence, but we decided that that change came after the sanctions attempts and the brief war, rather than before it.19 Drezner said that, in the 1990s, 7 of the 14 countries had high conflict expectations and could be considered adversaries rather than allies.We don't think things changed much in the 2000s.Kyrgyzstan briefly became less friendly to Russia, as noted above, but we would judge that it has since moved back to the low conflict expectations camp.The Drezner model predicts the pattern of coercion attempts as well as the success of coercion.It suggests that fewer coercion attempts will be made against allies than adversaries, and fewest against allies with whom there is only a small gap in opportunity costs.In the 1990s, Drezner's results conformed to those expectations and that result was repeated in the 2000s (Table 4 ).In the 1990s there were 2.1 coercion attempts per country against 7 allied countries vs. 3.4 coercion attempts per country against 7 adversary countries.The 2000s showed fewer attempts over a longer period, but much the same pattern as in the 1990s: more attempts against adversaries than allies.More importantly, the Drezner model also predicts the extent of concessions based on conflict expectations and the gap in opportunity costs.We have characterized the results of the 27 coercion attempts in terms of their success or failure in achieving Russia's objectives (see Table 5 ).The country studies in the appendix discuss the individual coercion attempts, Russia's apparent objectives, and the results.We have decided, on We know from the debates between Pape and Hufbauer and Knorr and Baldwin that interpretations of causes and results of coercion attempts can vary widely among analysts.In this work we accept the Drezner analysis and interpretation of events in Russia in the 1990s and try as closely as possible to use the same framework in the 2000s.were overall less effective than they were in the 1990s.How did the Drezner methodology perform in helping predict the imposition and effectiveness of economic sanctions?Remember that, in the 1990s, the conflict expectations model did quite well in predicting the relative success of coercion efforts separated into the 4 categories of the model.In Table 2 we compared the actual to the average predicted success in each of the four boxes, and showed that only in Box 3 were the results off the mark.The model did quite a good job of predicting the relative success of the sanctions effort depending on the two conditioning factors stressed by Drezner.The model did less well in the 2000s.In the cases where Russia had substantial economic leverage (Boxes 1 and 2, Table 6 ), sanctions efforts met with significant success only 14.3% of the time, and the average result per box was much lower than expected.In the 1990s, against adversarial countries in a weak bargaining position (Box 2 countries), Russian success almost matched model expectations (an average score of 1.73 vs. expected score of 2.0).But in the 2000s, while Russia made the same number of coercion attempts against Box 2 countries, the success score was only 0.45.The success score against Box 2 countries in the 2000s was actually the lowest of the four categories, instead of the model-predicted 2 nd highest ( Table 7) .Box 1, where a combination of large gap in opportunity costs and a low expectation of conflict should lead, according to the model, to the greatest likelihood of significant concessions had only a one-in-three (33%) success rate, far lower than the 75% success rate noted by Drezner in the 1990s.In Drezner's coding, Belarus and Kazakhstan were in Box 1, and they received 8 attempts in the 1990s.We have shifted Kazakhstan to correctly predicted that Russian sanctions efforts would be frequent but it overestimated the degree of concessions Georgia would offer.Overall these results suggest that Drezner's Conflict Expectations Model, which worked quite well in the period when it was developed in the 1990s, was less successful in the next decade but still offered some useful insights into the imposition and effectiveness of economic sanctions.Our results suggest that a two-period or dynamic game yields much different results than the first period game.In fact, in this case, the gains to Russia were about half as large as in the first round.This result really isn't very surprising.In the 1990s, Russia came after the NIS with a series of demands and an array of sanctions to coerce the target countries to acquiesce.Since the 1990s, Lithuania has joined the EU and NATO and largely become integrated with Europe's economy, diversifying its trading partners while doing so.However, Russia is still its biggest trading partner, accounting for 30-40% of Latvia's imports and consuming 17% of its exports in 2011.36 Although much has changed in the two countries' relations over the past decade, Russia's main goal in Lithuania has remained the same: gaining control of strategic Lithuanian industries.Russia's push for control of Lithuania's energy industries continued into the twenty first century.In 1999, Lithuania decided to privatize its primary oil refinery, Mazeikiai Nafta, for financial reasons.For lack of willing buyers in the West, Lithuania was forced to sell to Yukos, a then-privatized In accordance with EU bylaws, in 2004 Lithuania was required to privatize Kaunas, one of its largest power plants, and Lietuvos Dujos, a major natural gas producer, selling a 34% stake of both companies to Gazprom.38 Lithuania also was required to shut down its nuclear power plant, Ignalina, since it lacked the proper safety measures for EU standards.Both these developments have reduced Lithuania's energy supply diversity and caused it to rely much more on Russia's energy sources than it did in the 1990s.Interestingly, Lithuania seems to be the only Baltic country that is more vulnerable to Russia now than it was in the previous decade.In 2011, Lithuania passed legislation prohibiting any natural gas supplier from owning or operating gas pipelines.This is in accordance with the EU's energy security plans, though Lithuania is the first country to put this law into effect.39 After passing this resolution, the Lithuanian government seized control of Gazprom's gas pipeline in order to de-monopolize Russia's gas network.Russia responded by using price discrimination to drive a wedge between Lithuania and its Baltic neighbors, offering Estonia and Latvia price discounts.40 Developments of this feud continue to unfold, with Lithuania bringing a lawsuit against Gazprom in October 2012 for its monopolistic behavior violating Lithuanian and EU law.41 Since joining the EU, Lithuania has had to give up an enormous amount of energy security due to the shutting down of its Ignalina nuclear plant and forced privatization of its oil production sector.Three years later, in 2007, Russia demanded an increase in transit fees and prices of gas for Belarus, from 47 to 105 dollars per 1,000 cubic meters, due to the latter's accumulated debt of 456 million dollars.46 In addition, it offered to purchase a 50% share Beltransgaz, this time for 2.5 billion dollars.Belarus once again balked at Gazprom's initial offer.Tensions escalated between the two sides so much that Russia once again cut off gas exports to Belarus for three days, from January 8 to 10, until a deal was agreed upon.Belarus eventually agreed to sell a 50% stake of Beltransgaz, but showed considerable resolve to resist Russia's coercion attempts and was able to get more out of its deal with Gazprom than it would have in 2004.The remaining 50% stake was sold to Russia in 2011 in exchange for lower gas prices.47 In response to Gazprom reducing gas supplies to Belarus in an effort to collect $200 million of debt in 2010, Lukashenko declared that Belarus would shut down all gas transit routes from Russia to Europe, claiming that Gazprom had not paid approximately $260 million of transit fees in over six months.48 The situation was quickly resolved, with Belarus agreeing to pay a fraction of its debt to by Russia, which claimed that it had found traces of metals and pesticides in Moldovan wine (this corresponded with the Georgian wine ban of the same year).49 In addition, Moldova was forced to accept an increase in gas prices along with the rest of the CIS.The wine embargo was a retaliatory attempt by Russia against Moldova's plans for EU accession.50 Like in Georgia, Russia's wine embargo was particularly devastating to Moldova's economy, as approximately 20% of GDP was made up by wine production, half of which was sold to Russia.51 Although the ban on wine exports and higher gas prices really hurt its economy, Moldova resisted Russia's efforts to pull them back into its area of influence.though this led to a decline in his popularity back home.As a result, Kuchma began to rely on Russia for political support, and in so doing became involved in several corruption scandals which drew the outrage of Ukrainian citizens.54 In late 2004, thousands of Ukrainians began to protest against run-off elections which were claimed to be marred by corruption and voter intimidation.These protests, which demanded the resignation of Kuchma, lasted for months and came to be known as the Orange Revolution.In early 2005, the movement succeeded in removing Kuchma from power as Victor Yushchenko, a Western-leaning politician, assumed the presidency.Russia has used economic coercion against Ukraine three times since this monumental change in Ukrainian politics.The first instance came in late 2005, when Gazprom announced that it would raise the price of gas sold to Ukraine from $50 to $230/1,000 cubic meters.55 Such a large rise in prices was expectedly rejected by Ukraine, which failed to reach a compromise with Gazprom on future gas prices.As a result, Russia stopped supplying Ukraine with gas on January 1, 2006 in an attempt to pressure Ukraine to sign a new deal for higher prices.The timing of Russia's demand is not coincidental.Russia likely tried to deter Ukraine from pursuing Western alliances under the new government leadership.56 To the dismay of European countries, it was reported that Ukraine was illegally siphoning its available gas supplies in order to mitigate some of its losses.57 Gas shipment returned four days later, as Russia and Ukraine agreed to a deal that would raise prices to 150 dollars/1,000 cubic meters.A similar row arose in 2008-09, as Russia once again stopped gas shipments to Ukraine after the two countries could not come to terms with a new pricing agreement.This time, Russia halted shipments through Ukraine for over two weeks, during which period Ukraine lost approximately $100 million in potential transit fees.58 Continuing gas disputes with Russia throughout the year and a downturn in the economy caused by these disputes also played a part in the election of current president Victor Yanukovych, who proved to be much friendlier to Russia than the previous administration.Within his first few months in office, Yanukovych signed an agreement which gave Ukraine a discount of $100/1,000 cubic meters of gas from a new price of $330 in exchange for renewing Russia's rights to the Sevastopol naval base 25 years after 2017.59 Relations between the two countries have greatly improved since Yanukovych took office, consequently distancing Ukraine further from the West.As recently as 2012, Russia has attempted to take control of Ukraine's transit network, Naftogaz.Gazprom offered to reduce gas prices in order to balance Ukraine's budgets, but this deal would require selling Naftogaz, which Ukraine is unwilling to do.60 For now, the Armenian economy is still largely dependent on trade with Russia, which currently totals over 1 billion dollars.69 A very low expectation of conflict with Armenia and moderate to high opportunity costs for Armenia suggests, according to the CEM, that Russia continue to use economic coercion against Armenia infrequently.The lack of diversity in Armenia's trading partners and the amount of its debt to Russia indicates that Armenia will give minor to significant concessions to Russia in the coming years.Azerbaijan 67 Ibid.68 Anonymous, "Armenia, Iran to Build $240 Million Oil Pipeline," Oil and Gas Eurasia, February 1, 2010.http://www.oilandgaseurasia.com/news/p/0/news/10490.69 Anonymous, "Volume of trade between Armenia and Russia grew in 2011 by 15.8% totaling about 1 billion US dollars," EURASEC Anti-Crisis Fund, February 7.2012.http://acf.eabr.org/e/about_acf_eng/countries_acf_e/russia_acf_e/news_russia_acf_e/index.php?id_35=17 090 The years immediate following independence of the Azerbaijani state were consumed by fighting with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh.Russia supported Armenian troops during the war, consequently creating a high expectation of conflict with Azerbaijan.Despite Azerbaijan's abundant gas and oil reserves, it was still dependent on Russia for the transportation of its oil via pipelines to Europe, so there was a moderate gap in opportunity costs of coercion between it and Russia.Azerbaijan was coded in the "minor concessions" table of the CEM, which accurately reflected the success of Russia's economic coercion.Drezner states five instances of coercion from 1991 to 1999, two of which resulted in minor concessions and two others resulting in no concessions whatsoever.According to Drezner, in only one attempt did Russia fully achieve its intended goal.Having already learned its lesson in the 1990s, Russia realized that Heydar Aliyev, then-current President of Azerbaijan, would not give Russia any significant economic or political concessions which might be used as leverage against his state in the future.Relations between Azerbaijan and Russia have largely improved since the 1990s, which has lowered the expectation of conflict and, in turn, led Russia to use coercion against Azerbaijan less frequently.Drezner's model would suggest that Russia continue to rarely use economic coercion and that Azerbaijan resist its demands or only give minor concessions in return.Since 2003, current President Ilham Aliyev has continued to pursue strong relations with the West and Russia, maintaining a lower expectation of conflict with Russia than in the 1990s.However, since 2000, major changes have taken place, which have boosted Azerbaijan's geopolitical standing and economic leverage against Russia.The Baku-Supsa oil pipeline, constructed in 1999, provides Azerbaijan with its first transportation route which bypasses Russian territory.The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline and South Caucasus gas pipeline, constructed in 2006, have helped Azerbaijan break its dependence on Russian pipelines.Russia tried to prevent these pipelines from coming into existence by putting pressure on Kazakhstan to not supply oil to the project realizing that it would lose an enormous amount of leverage over Azerbaijan.70 Largely because of this realization, Russia has not attempted to use economic coercion against Azerbaijan in the twenty first century.Plans to construct the Nabucco Pipeline, which would extend the South Caucasus Pipeline to Eastern Europe and significantly decrease Europe's energy dependence on Russia, emerged in the early 2000s.However, the plan was only perceived as a realistic possibility following the Russia-Ukraine gas rows of 2006 and 2009 and the Russian-Georgian War in 2008, from which Europe's dependency on Russian gas pipelines was greatly exposed.71 Russia has attempted to block the construction of this project as well, which would depend on gas supplies from Turkmenistan, Iraq and possibly Iran, by buying up gas from Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan at above-market prices.72 It has also proposed a competing project of its own, Southstream, which would run from the North Caucasus through the Black Sea and into Greece.The current situation in Azerbaijan is indeed unique for the post-Soviet space.Russia has not only realized that economic coercion will be resisted by Azerbaijan, but also understands that it needs Azerbaijan's cooperation more than Azerbaijan needs cooperation with Russia.Construction of Nabucco would be a massive blow to Russia's economic leverage over Europe, which currently supplies 30% of Europe's gas and could supply up to 55% by 2030.73 Azerbaijan's strategic importance at the center of the pipeline controversy between Russia and Europe likely will protect it from any sort of economic coercion from Russia in the near future.No other country in the former Soviet Union had a high expectation of conflict with Russia than Georgia at the turn of the century.Added to this, according to Drezner, Russia had a large gap in opportunity costs of economic coercion against Georgia, placing Georgia in the "moderate concessions" table of the CEM.Although Georgia itself is not a significant producer of oil and gas, it serves as a vital transit route for energy being transported from Azerbaijan.Drezner states that Russia's two goals regarding Georgia, CIS membership and military basing rights in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, were fully achieved through coercive means.When economic coercion failed, military force was applied (through support to break-away regions), resulting in large concessions given up by Georgia.Georgian politics in the beginning of the twenty first century was marked by the Rose Revolution of 2003, a peaceful demonstration against the results of parliamentary elections that were claimed to be fraudulent.74 After weeks of protests and negotiations, Eduard Shavardnadze was forced to step down from the presidency.As his successor, Mikheil Saakashvili, has pursued stronger relations with the U.S. and Europe, publicly claiming that Georgia is intent on becoming a member of NATO.75 This reorientation in Georgia's foreign led to an increased expectation of conflict with Russia because Georgia is gravitating toward the Western sphere, but more importantly, because the boundaries of NATO could be extended to Russia's borders.Georgia holds valuable leverage over Russia in the sense that is has the say whether the extension of NATO to Russia's borders becomes a reality.A series of coercion and retaliation attempts known as the Russian-Georgian Crisis arose between Russian and Georgia in 2006.In January of that year, two explosions occurred on the Mozdok-Tbilisi Pipeline, which supplies gas to Georgia.According to Georgian officials, Russia was behind the explosions, attempting to force Georgia to surrender its pipeline to Gazprom.76 This can be understood as an act of economic coercion, since Russia tried to disrupt Georgia's economic exchange in order to get Georgia to acquiesce to its demands.Georgia, in this case, retained possession of the pipeline and continued to improve relations with the West, thereby resisting Russia's demands.Two months later, Russia placed a ban on all Georgian wine imports, citing that it was contaminated with heavy metals and pesticides.This proved to be devastating for the Georgian economy, as Russian consumption made up approximately 70% of its wine exports, which constituted 10% of Georgia's total exports.77 Many observers speculate that this trade embargo was an attempt by Russia to condemn Georgia's Western-oriented foreign policy, as these events happened just weeks after Georgia and NATO agreed to hold talks on closer relations.78 This embargo has been held up for the past six years, significantly hurting Georgia's economy, but Georgia has resisted Russia's desire for it to stop its reorientation toward the West.Since its independence, Kazakhstan had leased its Baikonur Cosmodrone to Russia at an annual rate of $115 million.84 In 2004, however, the Kazakhstan Parliament refused to ratify a new extension of the lease to Russia, trying to increase the rate which Russian paid for it.In response, Russia threatened to cut all space projects at Baikonur, which employs close to 3,000 Kazakh workers.85 In the first years of the twenty first century, Akayev was viewed more and more by his people as corrupt and authoritative.93 Facing the threat of losing shipments to its two major export markets, Russia and Kazakhstan, and losing Russian investment in its hydroelectric energy sector, Kyrgyzstan agreed to step up its efforts to join the EurAsEC's Customs Union at Russia's behest in 2011.Many analysts posit that accession to the Customs Union will lead to steep price increases and hurt domestic production within Kyrgyzstan.However, among the benefits of joining are the promise of free flow of labor (very important for Kyrgyzstan's migrant worker force in Russia) and an agreement for Russia to help clean its nuclear waste sites.96 Kyrgyzstan plans to become a member in 2015 which will make Kyrgyzstan more reliant on In the 1990s, Turkmenistan was considered a strategic partner of Russia, having a large ethnic Russian population and energy supplies which were transported through Russian pipelines.Russia had three objectives in coercing Turkmenistan: securing citizenship rights for ethnic Russians, acquiring basing rights for its military, and gaining majority stakes in key Turkmen energy industries.Russia fully achieved its goals in Turkmenistan in each of its three coercion attempts.This seems to go slightly against Drezner's CEM predictions, which state that a country in Box 3 would be subject to few coercion attempts.A partial explanation for the deviation from the norm is that Turkmenistan relied so heavily on cooperation with Russia that it could not afford to worsen their relations.Russia historically has proved to be willing and able to shut down energy exports from former Soviet countries when coercing them.Along with cotton, gas made up over 40% of Turkmenistan's GDP, all of which was transported through Russian pipelines.Added to this, President Niyazov had developed strong relations with Russia and was content to rely on Russia's pipeline "monopoly."In the following decade, Russia continued to try to dominate Turkmenistan by barring it from direct trade with European markets and purchasing Turkmen gas at well below world market price to sell to other countries at a substantially higher price.Suspicious of foreigners undermining his rule, Niyazov made a controversial decision in 2003 to overturn the dual citizenship concession to ethnic increased its Turkmen gas imports to 40 bcm annually, helping Turkmenistan offset its losses to In 2008, Russia used its only coercion measure against Tajikistan.Having suffered through a cold winter exacerbated by an inability to pay for energy supplies a year before, Tajikistan agreed to hand over its Okno space tracking station in exchange for a $242 million write-off of debt to Russia.105 The two countries have continued to work on investment projects in Tajikistan's energy sector, most notably in the Rogun Dam project and other hydroelectric plants.This comes as a major relief to Tajik citizens, who were subject to as much as a 40% increase in electricity prices in early 2008.106 Over twenty years since independence, Tajikistan still heavily relies on Russian military and economic assistance.Russia has taken advantage of opportunities to invest in Tajikistan's energy sector, though a low rate of coercion attempts is likely due to the fact that Tajikistan does not have much to give to Russia in return.Economic coercion could be also be counterproductive to Russia, since it would create further instability in that is struggling to keep Islamist opposition groups at bay.Maintaining stability in Tajikistan, rather than political gains through coercion, seems to be a more important objective for Russia.Tajikistan is still a country whose economy relies largely on worker remittances.Over 40 percent of Tajikistan's working-age population is employed in Russia, with the rest of the population relying heavily on their remittances.107 With such dire economic conditions, Tajikistan will continue to cooperate with Russia to increase the amount of capital which flows into the country, though this is not to say that relations will be very strong between the two countries.In 2012, Tajikistan demanded that Russia start paying 250 million annually for military bases which it has rented practically for free since 2004.Though Tajikistan had no leverage to force Russia to pay, this behavior shows that it will not always be content with whatever assistance Russia offers.Due to a low expectation of future conflict and moderate gap in opportunity costs with Russia, Tajikistan will remain in Box 3 of the CEM.Therefore, it will likely be subject to few coercion attempts, as it has been in the past.However, it will assuredly comply with most of Russia's demands, such as the recent attempt to persuade Tajikistan to join the Customs Union with Belarus and Kazakhstan.Google Scholar, 1 May, 2013.See Adam N. Stulberg, Well-Oiled Diplomacy (Albany: State University of New York, 2007) for an alternative discussion of many of these same cases.11 Before turning to Russia, Drezner tested his Conflict Expectations against alternative explanations of sanctions behavior, such as the "signaling model" and the "domestic politics model" by using regression analysis to explain the results of the Hufbauer database of 114 sanctions cases (see, Chapter 4).Fahad Alturki, Jaime Espinosa-Bowen, and Nadeem Illahi, "How Russia Affects the Neighborhood: Trade, Financial and Remittance Channels".(Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, Working Paper, WP/09/277, December, 2009.Such as coercing Japan to withdraw in 1941 from its recent conquests in southeast Asia.24Georgia, in 2008.Steven Eke, "Views diverge on Estonia's history," BBC News,April 27, 2007.Vladislav Vorotnikov, "Latvia could face pork crisis due to Russian import ban," GlobalMeatNews, April 12, 2012.http://www.globalmeatnews.com/Industry-Markets/Latvia-could-face-pork-crisis-due-to-Russian-import-ban36 Anonymous, "External trade of Lithuania," BalticExport.com, http://balticexport.com/?article=lietuvas-areja-tirdznieciba&lang=en (no date given, data shown through 2011).Valeria Korchagina and Catherine Belton, "Belarus agrees to pay more after gas cut off," St. Petersburg Times, February 20, 2004.http://www.sptimesrussia.com/index.php?action_id=2&story_id=12344 Anonymous, "Russia sets Moldova gas ultimatum amid EU price row," EU Business online, September 12, 2012.http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/russia-moldova-gas.ic0 Gulnoza Saidazimova "Is Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan Really Back?"Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, February 2, 2006.http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1065364.html Kambiz Arman, "President Attempts to Give Tajikistan a Cultural Makeover," Refworld, April 10, 2007.http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/publisher,EURASIANET,,TJK,46f36fda1f,0.html	extensive use of economic sanctions to influence political decisions in the New Independent States (NIS) in the 2000s but that the sanctions were considerably less effective than they had been in the 1990s.The analysis makes clear that Russia's sanctions successes in the 1990s created a strong desire in many of the NIS to reduce Russia's economic leverage over them by diversifying their trade and energy links.It is possible that a less aggressive Russian strategy in the 1990sthough it might have brought smaller short term gains -could have better served Russian's long term interests.The paper also suggests that the Drezner model might have improved predictive ability if it included some measure of repetition and/or duration of sanctions.It is paradoxical that the economic sanctions literature, especially the debate between Hufbauer and Pape 2 is so pessimistic about the utility of sanctions (even Hufbauer says they have utility in only about a third of the cases) but policy-makers still seem to turn to them with great hope and enterprise when faced with difficult foreign policy issues.Indeed, the world community has spent an enormous amount of effort sanctioning Iran in the last few years seeking to dissuade the rulers of that country from pursuing nuclear weapons.The academic community has contributed a large amount of literature analyzing the case 3 .One strain of the sanctions literature, revolving around Daniel Drezner's The Sanctions Paradox 4 , is not only more optimistic about the utility of economic sanctions, it provides a framework for both predicting the imposition of economic sanctions and for gauging their effectiveness if implemented.Drezner tested the model in several ways in his 1999 book and continues to use the framework in foreign policy analysis 5 .In the most compelling test of his theory, Drezner examined how the newly created Russian state used economic sanctions 39 times in the 1990s to extract concessions and to influence important policy decisions in the newly independent states (NIS 6 ) formed after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.These sanctions, he claims, were successful 38% of the time, a proportion far higher than Pape's view of the historical record (less than 5% success rate) and somewhat higher than Hufbauer's estimate of a success rate around 34%.More importantly, his analysis shows that his gametheoretic model was both a good predictor of the imposition of economic sanctions on particular targets and the magnitude of concessions (if any) likely to be offered.Russia's aims in the NIS were more diverse than the current US aims in Iran, but the stakes were nonetheless high for Russia.Ariel Cohen 7 asserts that Boris Yeltsin "demanded a sphere of influence in the CIS in 1993" and that goal "has been the driving force of Russian foreign policy." "Moscow," according to Drezner "wanted the NIS to be subservient to Russia and to no other great power": Nominal independence of the NIS gave Russia the best of both worlds.It could scavenge these states for valuable assets and concessions, but avoid incurring any of the costs associated with subsidizing their regimes or economies.8 Drezner quotes Sergei Karaganov, head of Russia's Foreign Defense Policy Council, who said in 1995: "Russia is becoming an imperial power of the 20 th century; we no longer need physical control over territory, we can have economic influence" 9 .Drezner documents 39 uses of economic coercion toward the NIS states in 1992-1997.The overall goals of the efforts were to gain control of Soviet strategic military assets (weapons and bases), dominate each new state's energy resources, and minimize the influence of outside powers in the region-and to achieve all this without military intervention.Russia had varying targets in each of the NIS depending on their military and industrial assets, and had varying degrees of economic leverage over the several states depending on their degree of dependence on Moscow for markets, subsidies, energy supplies, and transit routes.Favored tools of coercion involved raising tariffs on exports to Russia (Azerbaijan), reduced energy subsidies and/or supplies to energy importers (Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, and the Baltics), and reduced access to and/or higher costs for using energy pipelines across Russian soil (Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan).Drezner reports that 15 of the 39 Russia coercion attempts met with significant concessions from the target countries.His contribution to the literature, however, is greater than the narrative; it lies in the construction of his "Conflict Expectations Model" in which he sets up a two-dimensional framework based on the degree of opportunity costs involved in the coercion attempt and the degree of expectations of further conflict.In Drezner's methodology, if the sender country (Russia) bears small 5 costs ( in relation to GDP) in imposing the sanctions while the target country suffers large economic costs, there is a large gap in opportunity costs that both makes the sender country more likely to impose sanctions and the target country more likely to offer concessions.Also important, however, is the state of relations between the two states and expectations about future discord.If the target country fears that the current coercion attempt is but one effort in a potentially long and discordant relationship it will be much less likely to make concessions.10 Table 1 lays out the prediction model constructed by Drezner.Economic sanctions are expected to be much more effective when the target country is not particularly fearful of the sender country and can be forced to bear higher costs than the sender.Sanctions are much less likely to yield significant results if the target country is wary of the sender and the gap in costs is small.The model also predicts that the sender will rarely use sanctions against relatively friendly states where the gap in costs is small.The reader is referred to the Drezner book for details.11 Drezner tests this theoretical construction against actual Russian behavior in the 1990s.He presents detailed case studies of Russian coercion efforts against the other 14 new states that were formed after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.He describes what Russia did in each of 39 efforts and what its goals were.He judges where Russia and the target country fit in the above table, and evaluates the success or failure of the sanctions' efforts.He rates each attempt as yielding significant concessions from the target country, moderate concessions, minor concessions, or no concessions.For comparison purposes we have ascribed unit values to each of these four possible results (a significant concession counts as 3 points, a moderate concession gets 2 points, etc.).Using this scoring perfect model forecasting would result in an average Box 1 score of 3, an average Box 2 score of 2, an average score Box 3 score of 0, and an average Box 4 score of 1.Table 5 .9 in Drezner presents his judgment about the magnitude of concessions, if any, for each of the 39 coercion attempts.Table 2 below shows the results of the predictions for each box.We consider that the scores in boxes 1 and 2 are quite good--the model had considerable predictive success--while the score for box 3 suggests some problems.The percentages in the outer column and row show the success rate for only significant concessions, a somewhat different consideration more in keeping with the discussion in Hufbauer and Pape.By this measure, it seems that sanctions against allies (countries with low conflict expectations) resulted in significant concessions 73 percent of the time, while sanctions against countries with high conflict expectations had a very low success rate (16 percent).We regard these results as important because they suggest that economic sanctions can and have been successful, far more successful than Pape, for one, suggested.We also regard the results as positive in terms of the model, the Drezner Conflict Expectations Model did a reasonably good job of predicting the outcomes of the sanctions.Despite these successful examples of economic coercion, Russia fell far short of achieving its broader foreign policy goals in the 1990s, it simply didn't have the power.As Trenin puts it, " Russia had no resources to back up its ritual claims that the CIS constituted a prime interest of its foreign policy."12 During the 90s, after all, Russia was coping with high inflation, economic restructuring, a debt crisis, and an oil shock.13 The new states were able to establish sovereignty and "entered into all sorts of relations with both their neighbors and outside powers" 14 much to the annoyance of Russia.Drezner stopped his record of Russia's economic coercion in 1997, but Russia's foreign policy goals in the NIS did not diminish and coercion efforts did not stop.By the end of the 1990s, according to Adam Stulberg, "even pro-Western reform minded Russian politicians looked to energy diplomacy as the crutch for forcibly reintegrating the former Soviet space under the aegis of a 'liberal Russian empire.'"15 From his election in 2000, President Vladimir Putin aggressively sought to centralize the Russian energy industry and to influence if not acquire energy resources and infrastructure in the NIS.16 17 Russia, in the first 13 years of the new century used its economic power over the NIS for several purposes including (1) to create a sphere of "influence" or "interests", and (2) to extract the maximum amount of economic rent possible from the production and transportation of energy resources within Eurasia.By 2003, with soaring world oil prices and a strong global economy, it was in a more powerful economic position than it had been in the 1990s.In addition, Russia's ability to influence the NIS through remittances had also increased since the 1990s 18 .On the other hand, many of the NIS had sharply cut their trade and/or energy dependence (Table 3) of decreased trade and energy dependence, but we decided that that change came after the sanctions attempts and the brief war, rather than before it.19 Drezner said that, in the 1990s, 7 of the 14 countries had high conflict expectations and could be considered adversaries rather than allies.We don't think things changed much in the 2000s.Kyrgyzstan briefly became less friendly to Russia, as noted above, but we would judge that it has since moved back to the low conflict expectations camp.The Drezner model predicts the pattern of coercion attempts as well as the success of coercion.It suggests that fewer coercion attempts will be made against allies than adversaries, and fewest against allies with whom there is only a small gap in opportunity costs.In the 1990s, Drezner's results conformed to those expectations and that result was repeated in the 2000s (Table 4 ).In the 1990s there were 2.1 coercion attempts per country against 7 allied countries vs. 3.4 coercion attempts per country against 7 adversary countries.The 2000s showed fewer attempts over a longer period, but much the same pattern as in the 1990s: more attempts against adversaries than allies.More importantly, the Drezner model also predicts the extent of concessions based on conflict expectations and the gap in opportunity costs.We have characterized the results of the 27 coercion attempts in terms of their success or failure in achieving Russia's objectives (see Table 5 ).The country studies in the appendix discuss the individual coercion attempts, Russia's apparent objectives, and the results.We have decided, on We know from the debates between Pape and Hufbauer and Knorr and Baldwin that interpretations of causes and results of coercion attempts can vary widely among analysts.In this work we accept the Drezner analysis and interpretation of events in Russia in the 1990s and try as closely as possible to use the same framework in the 2000s.were overall less effective than they were in the 1990s.How did the Drezner methodology perform in helping predict the imposition and effectiveness of economic sanctions?Remember that, in the 1990s, the conflict expectations model did quite well in predicting the relative success of coercion efforts separated into the 4 categories of the model.In Table 2 we compared the actual to the average predicted success in each of the four boxes, and showed that only in Box 3 were the results off the mark.The model did quite a good job of predicting the relative success of the sanctions effort depending on the two conditioning factors stressed by Drezner.The model did less well in the 2000s.In the cases where Russia had substantial economic leverage (Boxes 1 and 2, Table 6 ), sanctions efforts met with significant success only 14.3% of the time, and the average result per box was much lower than expected.In the 1990s, against adversarial countries in a weak bargaining position (Box 2 countries), Russian success almost matched model expectations (an average score of 1.73 vs. expected score of 2.0).But in the 2000s, while Russia made the same number of coercion attempts against Box 2 countries, the success score was only 0.45.The success score against Box 2 countries in the 2000s was actually the lowest of the four categories, instead of the model-predicted 2 nd highest ( Table 7) .Box 1, where a combination of large gap in opportunity costs and a low expectation of conflict should lead, according to the model, to the greatest likelihood of significant concessions had only a one-in-three (33%) success rate, far lower than the 75% success rate noted by Drezner in the 1990s.In Drezner's coding, Belarus and Kazakhstan were in Box 1, and they received 8 attempts in the 1990s.We have shifted Kazakhstan to correctly predicted that Russian sanctions efforts would be frequent but it overestimated the degree of concessions Georgia would offer.Overall these results suggest that Drezner's Conflict Expectations Model, which worked quite well in the period when it was developed in the 1990s, was less successful in the next decade but still offered some useful insights into the imposition and effectiveness of economic sanctions.Our results suggest that a two-period or dynamic game yields much different results than the first period game.In fact, in this case, the gains to Russia were about half as large as in the first round.This result really isn't very surprising.In the 1990s, Russia came after the NIS with a series of demands and an array of sanctions to coerce the target countries to acquiesce.Since the 1990s, Lithuania has joined the EU and NATO and largely become integrated with Europe's economy, diversifying its trading partners while doing so.However, Russia is still its biggest trading partner, accounting for 30-40% of Latvia's imports and consuming 17% of its exports in 2011.36 Although much has changed in the two countries' relations over the past decade, Russia's main goal in Lithuania has remained the same: gaining control of strategic Lithuanian industries.Russia's push for control of Lithuania's energy industries continued into the twenty first century.In 1999, Lithuania decided to privatize its primary oil refinery, Mazeikiai Nafta, for financial reasons.For lack of willing buyers in the West, Lithuania was forced to sell to Yukos, a then-privatized In accordance with EU bylaws, in 2004 Lithuania was required to privatize Kaunas, one of its largest power plants, and Lietuvos Dujos, a major natural gas producer, selling a 34% stake of both companies to Gazprom.38 Lithuania also was required to shut down its nuclear power plant, Ignalina, since it lacked the proper safety measures for EU standards.Both these developments have reduced Lithuania's energy supply diversity and caused it to rely much more on Russia's energy sources than it did in the 1990s.Interestingly, Lithuania seems to be the only Baltic country that is more vulnerable to Russia now than it was in the previous decade.In 2011, Lithuania passed legislation prohibiting any natural gas supplier from owning or operating gas pipelines.This is in accordance with the EU's energy security plans, though Lithuania is the first country to put this law into effect.39 After passing this resolution, the Lithuanian government seized control of Gazprom's gas pipeline in order to de-monopolize Russia's gas network.Russia responded by using price discrimination to drive a wedge between Lithuania and its Baltic neighbors, offering Estonia and Latvia price discounts.40 Developments of this feud continue to unfold, with Lithuania bringing a lawsuit against Gazprom in October 2012 for its monopolistic behavior violating Lithuanian and EU law.41 Since joining the EU, Lithuania has had to give up an enormous amount of energy security due to the shutting down of its Ignalina nuclear plant and forced privatization of its oil production sector.Three years later, in 2007, Russia demanded an increase in transit fees and prices of gas for Belarus, from 47 to 105 dollars per 1,000 cubic meters, due to the latter's accumulated debt of 456 million dollars.46 In addition, it offered to purchase a 50% share Beltransgaz, this time for 2.5 billion dollars.Belarus once again balked at Gazprom's initial offer.Tensions escalated between the two sides so much that Russia once again cut off gas exports to Belarus for three days, from January 8 to 10, until a deal was agreed upon.Belarus eventually agreed to sell a 50% stake of Beltransgaz, but showed considerable resolve to resist Russia's coercion attempts and was able to get more out of its deal with Gazprom than it would have in 2004.The remaining 50% stake was sold to Russia in 2011 in exchange for lower gas prices.47 In response to Gazprom reducing gas supplies to Belarus in an effort to collect $200 million of debt in 2010, Lukashenko declared that Belarus would shut down all gas transit routes from Russia to Europe, claiming that Gazprom had not paid approximately $260 million of transit fees in over six months.48 The situation was quickly resolved, with Belarus agreeing to pay a fraction of its debt to by Russia, which claimed that it had found traces of metals and pesticides in Moldovan wine (this corresponded with the Georgian wine ban of the same year).49 In addition, Moldova was forced to accept an increase in gas prices along with the rest of the CIS.The wine embargo was a retaliatory attempt by Russia against Moldova's plans for EU accession.50 Like in Georgia, Russia's wine embargo was particularly devastating to Moldova's economy, as approximately 20% of GDP was made up by wine production, half of which was sold to Russia.51 Although the ban on wine exports and higher gas prices really hurt its economy, Moldova resisted Russia's efforts to pull them back into its area of influence.though this led to a decline in his popularity back home.As a result, Kuchma began to rely on Russia for political support, and in so doing became involved in several corruption scandals which drew the outrage of Ukrainian citizens.54 In late 2004, thousands of Ukrainians began to protest against run-off elections which were claimed to be marred by corruption and voter intimidation.These protests, which demanded the resignation of Kuchma, lasted for months and came to be known as the Orange Revolution.In early 2005, the movement succeeded in removing Kuchma from power as Victor Yushchenko, a Western-leaning politician, assumed the presidency.Russia has used economic coercion against Ukraine three times since this monumental change in Ukrainian politics.The first instance came in late 2005, when Gazprom announced that it would raise the price of gas sold to Ukraine from $50 to $230/1,000 cubic meters.55 Such a large rise in prices was expectedly rejected by Ukraine, which failed to reach a compromise with Gazprom on future gas prices.As a result, Russia stopped supplying Ukraine with gas on January 1, 2006 in an attempt to pressure Ukraine to sign a new deal for higher prices.The timing of Russia's demand is not coincidental.Russia likely tried to deter Ukraine from pursuing Western alliances under the new government leadership.56 To the dismay of European countries, it was reported that Ukraine was illegally siphoning its available gas supplies in order to mitigate some of its losses.57 Gas shipment returned four days later, as Russia and Ukraine agreed to a deal that would raise prices to 150 dollars/1,000 cubic meters.A similar row arose in 2008-09, as Russia once again stopped gas shipments to Ukraine after the two countries could not come to terms with a new pricing agreement.This time, Russia halted shipments through Ukraine for over two weeks, during which period Ukraine lost approximately $100 million in potential transit fees.58 Continuing gas disputes with Russia throughout the year and a downturn in the economy caused by these disputes also played a part in the election of current president Victor Yanukovych, who proved to be much friendlier to Russia than the previous administration.Within his first few months in office, Yanukovych signed an agreement which gave Ukraine a discount of $100/1,000 cubic meters of gas from a new price of $330 in exchange for renewing Russia's rights to the Sevastopol naval base 25 years after 2017.59 Relations between the two countries have greatly improved since Yanukovych took office, consequently distancing Ukraine further from the West.As recently as 2012, Russia has attempted to take control of Ukraine's transit network, Naftogaz.Gazprom offered to reduce gas prices in order to balance Ukraine's budgets, but this deal would require selling Naftogaz, which Ukraine is unwilling to do.60 For now, the Armenian economy is still largely dependent on trade with Russia, which currently totals over 1 billion dollars.69 A very low expectation of conflict with Armenia and moderate to high opportunity costs for Armenia suggests, according to the CEM, that Russia continue to use economic coercion against Armenia infrequently.The lack of diversity in Armenia's trading partners and the amount of its debt to Russia indicates that Armenia will give minor to significant concessions to Russia in the coming years.Azerbaijan 67 Ibid.68 Anonymous, "Armenia, Iran to Build $240 Million Oil Pipeline," Oil and Gas Eurasia, February 1, 2010.http://www.oilandgaseurasia.com/news/p/0/news/10490.69 Anonymous, "Volume of trade between Armenia and Russia grew in 2011 by 15.8% totaling about 1 billion US dollars," EURASEC Anti-Crisis Fund, February 7.2012.http://acf.eabr.org/e/about_acf_eng/countries_acf_e/russia_acf_e/news_russia_acf_e/index.php?id_35=17 090 The years immediate following independence of the Azerbaijani state were consumed by fighting with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh.Russia supported Armenian troops during the war, consequently creating a high expectation of conflict with Azerbaijan.Despite Azerbaijan's abundant gas and oil reserves, it was still dependent on Russia for the transportation of its oil via pipelines to Europe, so there was a moderate gap in opportunity costs of coercion between it and Russia.Azerbaijan was coded in the "minor concessions" table of the CEM, which accurately reflected the success of Russia's economic coercion.Drezner states five instances of coercion from 1991 to 1999, two of which resulted in minor concessions and two others resulting in no concessions whatsoever.According to Drezner, in only one attempt did Russia fully achieve its intended goal.Having already learned its lesson in the 1990s, Russia realized that Heydar Aliyev, then-current President of Azerbaijan, would not give Russia any significant economic or political concessions which might be used as leverage against his state in the future.Relations between Azerbaijan and Russia have largely improved since the 1990s, which has lowered the expectation of conflict and, in turn, led Russia to use coercion against Azerbaijan less frequently.Drezner's model would suggest that Russia continue to rarely use economic coercion and that Azerbaijan resist its demands or only give minor concessions in return.Since 2003, current President Ilham Aliyev has continued to pursue strong relations with the West and Russia, maintaining a lower expectation of conflict with Russia than in the 1990s.However, since 2000, major changes have taken place, which have boosted Azerbaijan's geopolitical standing and economic leverage against Russia.The Baku-Supsa oil pipeline, constructed in 1999, provides Azerbaijan with its first transportation route which bypasses Russian territory.The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline and South Caucasus gas pipeline, constructed in 2006, have helped Azerbaijan break its dependence on Russian pipelines.Russia tried to prevent these pipelines from coming into existence by putting pressure on Kazakhstan to not supply oil to the project realizing that it would lose an enormous amount of leverage over Azerbaijan.70 Largely because of this realization, Russia has not attempted to use economic coercion against Azerbaijan in the twenty first century.Plans to construct the Nabucco Pipeline, which would extend the South Caucasus Pipeline to Eastern Europe and significantly decrease Europe's energy dependence on Russia, emerged in the early 2000s.However, the plan was only perceived as a realistic possibility following the Russia-Ukraine gas rows of 2006 and 2009 and the Russian-Georgian War in 2008, from which Europe's dependency on Russian gas pipelines was greatly exposed.71 Russia has attempted to block the construction of this project as well, which would depend on gas supplies from Turkmenistan, Iraq and possibly Iran, by buying up gas from Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan at above-market prices.72 It has also proposed a competing project of its own, Southstream, which would run from the North Caucasus through the Black Sea and into Greece.The current situation in Azerbaijan is indeed unique for the post-Soviet space.Russia has not only realized that economic coercion will be resisted by Azerbaijan, but also understands that it needs Azerbaijan's cooperation more than Azerbaijan needs cooperation with Russia.Construction of Nabucco would be a massive blow to Russia's economic leverage over Europe, which currently supplies 30% of Europe's gas and could supply up to 55% by 2030.73 Azerbaijan's strategic importance at the center of the pipeline controversy between Russia and Europe likely will protect it from any sort of economic coercion from Russia in the near future.No other country in the former Soviet Union had a high expectation of conflict with Russia than Georgia at the turn of the century.Added to this, according to Drezner, Russia had a large gap in opportunity costs of economic coercion against Georgia, placing Georgia in the "moderate concessions" table of the CEM.Although Georgia itself is not a significant producer of oil and gas, it serves as a vital transit route for energy being transported from Azerbaijan.Drezner states that Russia's two goals regarding Georgia, CIS membership and military basing rights in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, were fully achieved through coercive means.When economic coercion failed, military force was applied (through support to break-away regions), resulting in large concessions given up by Georgia.Georgian politics in the beginning of the twenty first century was marked by the Rose Revolution of 2003, a peaceful demonstration against the results of parliamentary elections that were claimed to be fraudulent.74 After weeks of protests and negotiations, Eduard Shavardnadze was forced to step down from the presidency.As his successor, Mikheil Saakashvili, has pursued stronger relations with the U.S. and Europe, publicly claiming that Georgia is intent on becoming a member of NATO.75 This reorientation in Georgia's foreign led to an increased expectation of conflict with Russia because Georgia is gravitating toward the Western sphere, but more importantly, because the boundaries of NATO could be extended to Russia's borders.Georgia holds valuable leverage over Russia in the sense that is has the say whether the extension of NATO to Russia's borders becomes a reality.A series of coercion and retaliation attempts known as the Russian-Georgian Crisis arose between Russian and Georgia in 2006.In January of that year, two explosions occurred on the Mozdok-Tbilisi Pipeline, which supplies gas to Georgia.According to Georgian officials, Russia was behind the explosions, attempting to force Georgia to surrender its pipeline to Gazprom.76 This can be understood as an act of economic coercion, since Russia tried to disrupt Georgia's economic exchange in order to get Georgia to acquiesce to its demands.Georgia, in this case, retained possession of the pipeline and continued to improve relations with the West, thereby resisting Russia's demands.Two months later, Russia placed a ban on all Georgian wine imports, citing that it was contaminated with heavy metals and pesticides.This proved to be devastating for the Georgian economy, as Russian consumption made up approximately 70% of its wine exports, which constituted 10% of Georgia's total exports.77 Many observers speculate that this trade embargo was an attempt by Russia to condemn Georgia's Western-oriented foreign policy, as these events happened just weeks after Georgia and NATO agreed to hold talks on closer relations.78 This embargo has been held up for the past six years, significantly hurting Georgia's economy, but Georgia has resisted Russia's desire for it to stop its reorientation toward the West.Since its independence, Kazakhstan had leased its Baikonur Cosmodrone to Russia at an annual rate of $115 million.84 In 2004, however, the Kazakhstan Parliament refused to ratify a new extension of the lease to Russia, trying to increase the rate which Russian paid for it.In response, Russia threatened to cut all space projects at Baikonur, which employs close to 3,000 Kazakh workers.85 In the first years of the twenty first century, Akayev was viewed more and more by his people as corrupt and authoritative.93 Facing the threat of losing shipments to its two major export markets, Russia and Kazakhstan, and losing Russian investment in its hydroelectric energy sector, Kyrgyzstan agreed to step up its efforts to join the EurAsEC's Customs Union at Russia's behest in 2011.Many analysts posit that accession to the Customs Union will lead to steep price increases and hurt domestic production within Kyrgyzstan.However, among the benefits of joining are the promise of free flow of labor (very important for Kyrgyzstan's migrant worker force in Russia) and an agreement for Russia to help clean its nuclear waste sites.96 Kyrgyzstan plans to become a member in 2015 which will make Kyrgyzstan more reliant on In the 1990s, Turkmenistan was considered a strategic partner of Russia, having a large ethnic Russian population and energy supplies which were transported through Russian pipelines.Russia had three objectives in coercing Turkmenistan: securing citizenship rights for ethnic Russians, acquiring basing rights for its military, and gaining majority stakes in key Turkmen energy industries.Russia fully achieved its goals in Turkmenistan in each of its three coercion attempts.This seems to go slightly against Drezner's CEM predictions, which state that a country in Box 3 would be subject to few coercion attempts.A partial explanation for the deviation from the norm is that Turkmenistan relied so heavily on cooperation with Russia that it could not afford to worsen their relations.Russia historically has proved to be willing and able to shut down energy exports from former Soviet countries when coercing them.Along with cotton, gas made up over 40% of Turkmenistan's GDP, all of which was transported through Russian pipelines.Added to this, President Niyazov had developed strong relations with Russia and was content to rely on Russia's pipeline "monopoly."In the following decade, Russia continued to try to dominate Turkmenistan by barring it from direct trade with European markets and purchasing Turkmen gas at well below world market price to sell to other countries at a substantially higher price.Suspicious of foreigners undermining his rule, Niyazov made a controversial decision in 2003 to overturn the dual citizenship concession to ethnic increased its Turkmen gas imports to 40 bcm annually, helping Turkmenistan offset its losses to In 2008, Russia used its only coercion measure against Tajikistan.Having suffered through a cold winter exacerbated by an inability to pay for energy supplies a year before, Tajikistan agreed to hand over its Okno space tracking station in exchange for a $242 million write-off of debt to Russia.105 The two countries have continued to work on investment projects in Tajikistan's energy sector, most notably in the Rogun Dam project and other hydroelectric plants.This comes as a major relief to Tajik citizens, who were subject to as much as a 40% increase in electricity prices in early 2008.106 Over twenty years since independence, Tajikistan still heavily relies on Russian military and economic assistance.Russia has taken advantage of opportunities to invest in Tajikistan's energy sector, though a low rate of coercion attempts is likely due to the fact that Tajikistan does not have much to give to Russia in return.Economic coercion could be also be counterproductive to Russia, since it would create further instability in that is struggling to keep Islamist opposition groups at bay.Maintaining stability in Tajikistan, rather than political gains through coercion, seems to be a more important objective for Russia.Tajikistan is still a country whose economy relies largely on worker remittances.Over 40 percent of Tajikistan's working-age population is employed in Russia, with the rest of the population relying heavily on their remittances.107 With such dire economic conditions, Tajikistan will continue to cooperate with Russia to increase the amount of capital which flows into the country, though this is not to say that relations will be very strong between the two countries.In 2012, Tajikistan demanded that Russia start paying 250 million annually for military bases which it has rented practically for free since 2004.Though Tajikistan had no leverage to force Russia to pay, this behavior shows that it will not always be content with whatever assistance Russia offers.Due to a low expectation of future conflict and moderate gap in opportunity costs with Russia, Tajikistan will remain in Box 3 of the CEM.Therefore, it will likely be subject to few coercion attempts, as it has been in the past.However, it will assuredly comply with most of Russia's demands, such as the recent attempt to persuade Tajikistan to join the Customs Union with Belarus and Kazakhstan.Google Scholar, 1 May, 2013.See Adam N. Stulberg, Well-Oiled Diplomacy (Albany: State University of New York, 2007) for an alternative discussion of many of these same cases.11 Before turning to Russia, Drezner tested his Conflict Expectations against alternative explanations of sanctions behavior, such as the "signaling model" and the "domestic politics model" by using regression analysis to explain the results of the Hufbauer database of 114 sanctions cases (see, Chapter 4).Fahad Alturki, Jaime Espinosa-Bowen, and Nadeem Illahi, "How Russia Affects the Neighborhood: Trade, Financial and Remittance Channels". (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, Working Paper, WP/09/277, December, 2009.Such as coercing Japan to withdraw in 1941 from its recent conquests in southeast Asia.24 Georgia, in 2008.Steven Eke, "Views diverge on Estonia's history," BBC News,April 27, 2007.Vladislav Vorotnikov, "Latvia could face pork crisis due to Russian import ban," GlobalMeatNews, April 12, 2012.http://www.globalmeatnews.com/Industry-Markets/Latvia-could-face-pork-crisis-due-to-Russian-import-ban36 Anonymous, "External trade of Lithuania," BalticExport.com, http://balticexport.com/?article=lietuvas-areja-tirdznieciba&lang=en (no date given, data shown through 2011).Valeria Korchagina and Catherine Belton, "Belarus agrees to pay more after gas cut off," St. Petersburg Times, February 20, 2004.http://www.sptimesrussia.com/index.php?action_id=2&story_id=12344 Anonymous, "Russia sets Moldova gas ultimatum amid EU price row," EU Business online, September 12, 2012.http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/russia-moldova-gas.ic0 Gulnoza Saidazimova "Is Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan Really Back?"Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, February 2, 2006.http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1065364.html Kambiz Arman, "President Attempts to Give Tajikistan a Cultural Makeover," Refworld, April 10, 2007.http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/publisher,EURASIANET,,TJK,46f36fda1f,0.html
reference to this paper should be made as follows: Čepėnaitė, A.; Kavaliūnaitė, S.2013 .Soft security for sustainable development: Eastern Dimension of European Neighbourhood Policy, Journal of Security and Sustainability Issues 2(3): 29-42.http://dx.doi.org/10.9770/jssi.2013.2.3(3) jel classifications: f5, f6, O1 States and international organizations have developed different approaches in order to mitigate insecurity problems.A long-standing debate related to those approaches usually raises the issues of effectiveness of particular approach, complementarities of those approaches or, on the contrary, risks of circumscribing one another.The process of formulating and implementing European union (Eu) policies related to managing international risks and enhancing influence schemes in the Eu neighbourhood requires constant identification and re-examination of routes and instruments for meeting challenges to peace and security.A permanently expanding spectrum of security risks, threats and factual disruptions resulted by globalisation which creates environment of increasing complexity and interoperability outside Eu borders, as well as a number of unresolved conflicts, which emerged during the dissolution of the Soviet union, demand innovative solutions and increased attention to regional security issues.Prevailing Eu approach to regional security challenges on European level focuses on so-called "soft security".findings, insights and statements of a number of re-A n g e l ė Č e p ė n a i t ė , S i g i t a K a v a l i ū n a i t ė Soft Security for Sustainable Development: Eastern Dimension of European Neighbourhood Policy searchers as well as policy makers are used for analysis of soft security in this paper, e.g. Stańczyk (2011) , Lankauskienė and Tvaronavičienė (2012) .The view that "the current policies and security measures cannot guarantee effective counteraction against potential challenges and threats. Now we know that their character is diversified and non-military to a high degree. Therefore, the relevant responses require corresponding non-military measures"(Stańczyk 2011:8)is supported in this paper.Building on the insights related to the significance of security to sustainability for today's globalized society as well as to common dimensions of security and sustainable development: "social, economic, environmental"(Lankauskienė and Tvaronavičienė 2012:28), this paper suggests a different angle of the approach to security: i.e. to differentiate security in terms of instruments used against risks and threats and to categorise them as "soft", "economic" and "hard".Highlighting the role of soft security instruments which are defined as purposely organised social practices which focus and rely mainly on sharing, congruence and development of values and competences of those involved in the process of dealing with security issues, the paper briefly reviews existing Eu policies and related project management related to EaP states and Russian federation(which is neither part of EaP nor among 16 Eu partners addressed by the European Neighbourhood Policy but is also included in the overview as an important factor of influence in respect of regional security and relations between EaP states and Eu), suggesting to expand soft security component by further engaging selected participants from this region in the processes related to sharing, congruence and development of their competences which are necessary for effective dealing with insecurities on a larger scale, and thus to pave a way for extension of Eu practices of sustainable development on regional level.The concepts of security and power in international relations have a number of different aspects, since they reflect a number of closely interrelated phenomena and processes.for defining soft security as a component of external policy and joint project management, the following observations made by Buzan(1984)in respect of abstract concepts such as peace, power and security, are taken into account."Con-cepts like peace, power and security lack precise, agreed definitions: they identify broad issues or conditions clearly enough to serve as important frameworks for discussion, but at the empirical level they cannot be, or have not yet been, reduced to standard formulas"(Buzan 1984:118).In addition, the "security perspective rejects the notion that the problem of insecurity can be solved. It tries instead to develop a management approach which is equally sensitive to both the national and the international dynamics of the insecurity problem"(Buzan 1984:112).The tendency to look at soft security issues as a secondary avenue of international relations is affected by a dominating view on the level of "high politics" which, while dealing with security issues, usually focuses on hard security concept.The concept of "soft security" in political literature is associated by Becher(2001)and Lomagin(2001)with non-military dimension, a secondary role within the system of international relations and a common denominator featuring a very wide and pluralistic coverage of different issues.The latter feature poses a risk of losing practical value and proceeding within pluralistic trend.The following citation captures the main features singled out from the processes and phenomena that are usually attributed to soft security: "The term "soft security", at the time of East-West detente, was originally used to distinguish military issues from other relevant security issues, including such military-related issues as confidence-building measures and arms control. The subsequent widening of the notion of security has added environmental themes, transnational risks and security challenges, plus a wide spectrum of economic, social and political factors that affect the prospects for enhanced security through "stability export" and transformation. "Soft security" is thus apparently about almost everything except defence proper. In this sense, it is not really a term of practical value"(Becher 2001:1).In addition, Becher(2001:1)points out: "A different distinction may be more significant: that between those issues that can be properly dealt with between governments; and those issues, often of a technical nature, that need also to be effectively addressed on a local and regional level across national borders. When I speak of soft security, I therefore mean those issues that involve mainly technical, organisational, administrative or informational interaction on the working level and are not in essence elements of the 'high' politics best addressed in formal diplomatic channels. In this sense, the soft-security agenda opens up a decentralised secondary avenue for international cooperation that in certain circumstances is easier, although not necessarily simple, to pursue".Similar approach is used by Lomagin(2001:1)in relation to soft security issues with non-military origin of threats: "Soft security threats are those of non-military origin. Hard security concerns are considered more important in Russia, to the extent that some members of the political elite do not even know what soft security threats are. Because of the region's proximity, soft security problems in northwest Russia receive more attention from the Eu than other issues, although these problems are in no way limited to this region".However, such tendency to regard soft security organisations as secondary players in the system of international relations has been questioned by a number of analysts.As Pop(2000:1)mentions, "subregional frameworks of cooperation were perceived, due to their "soft" security issue approach, as "the Cinderellas of European security". However, throughout the last couple of years, there has been a growing awareness, both politically and institutionally, of the value of these groupings. Consequently, subregional arrangements have begun to gain their rightful place within the new evolving, institutionally comprehensive and complementary European security architecture".Vrey(2005:1)points out: "Proponents of soft security strive to ensure the goal of individual security without resorting to armed coercion. Given the extended scope of security sectors falling within the ambit of soft security regional co-operation is indispensable -a phenomenon most visible in European security architecture and that of Northern Europe in particular. Not only European decision-makers, however, pursue the soft security option".According to Lindley -french(2004), dividing lines between hard and soft, military and civil security are dissolving and more flexibility as well as new sets of relationships are required to cope with new problems and manage new complexities associated with security issues.This is partly attributed to comprehensive approach to security underlying the European Security Strategy, which, according to Biscop(2005), aims to integrate different dimensions of the Eu's external policies: the military, economic, political and social.In order to work out an instrumental approach in respect of management of security risks and to define factors of effectiveness of soft security instruments, it is important to take into account observations and conclusions of analysts in respect of the Eu security governance and increasing scope of its reliance on soft instruments.Those aspects are explored by Hegemann(2012); Van Kersbergen and Van Waarden(2004); Dingwerth and Pattberg(2006); Trubek, D.M. and Trubek, L.G.(2007), Rhinard et al.(2007), Bossong(2011), Hix(1998), Kohler-Koch and Eising(1999), Caparini(2006), Webber et al.(2004), Krahmann(2003)and Chayes, A. and Chayes, A.H.(1995).Hegemann(2012:2)provides useful insights on the Eu security governance and increasing scope of its reliance on soft instruments.His analysis highlights a shift towards informal arrangements.According to Hegemann(2012:2)"an ambiguous and multifaceted system of security governance has emerged that aims to reconcile the need for more integration with national prerogatives and sensitivities. This system leaves most formal competences to member states but incorporates a growing number of actors, issues, modes of cooperation, and compliance mechanisms that vary in their degree of formality and informality."The development of the concept of security governance is related to transnationalization of security risks(Kahl 2010)and the widening of the concept of security(Buzan et al.1998)."Security governance thus highlights the rise of increasingly transnational security risks emanating from non-state actors, the mounting importance of various public and private actors for the provision of security under these circumstances, and the proliferation of networked forms of coordination to facilitate flexible solutions among a growing bulk of national and international actors"(Hegemann 2012:4).Evolving modes of governance encompass public and private actors, rely on horizontal networks and soft instruments such as exchanging best practices and others(Hix 1998; Kohler-Koch and Eising 1999).According to Hegemann(2012:5), "security governance can encompass informal and decentralized networks or formal integration and centralization".In addition, "Eu crisis management capacity is to a large extent ultimately relying on the willingness and 'know-how' of the multitude of European actors and levels to pool resources and assist each other"(Ekengren 2006: 91).Another important soft instrument which is being increasingly used in the framework of security gov-A n g e l ė Č e p ė n a i t ė , S i g i t a K a v a l i ū n a i t ė Soft Security for Sustainable Development: Eastern Dimension of European Neighbourhood Policy ernance is peer reviews(Bossong 2011 ).Hegemann(2012)points out both potentially positive and negative outcomes of the increasing scope of the Eu security governance's reliance on soft instruments.According to him, member states and Eu institutions created new and more informal mechanisms that produce some results and to some extend can rely on funding and coordinative platforms.However, it is not known "much about the long-term impact of incremental exercises such as peer reviews or security research on the development of actual national policies and the Eu's comparative advantage remains fragile with a view to the much larger national budgets and institutional infrastructures. Eventually, the plethora of informal networks and projects might be a problem itself and spread more confusion than coordination and coherence"(Hegemann 2012:18).Taking into account that security issues are a top priority for the Eu when dealing with states addressed by Eastern Dimension of European Neighbourhood Policy because of such security issues as a number of unresolved conflicts which lead to crime acceleration and complicate management of other security risks resulted by globalisation, it is considered within this paper that the process of the design and implementation of Eu initiated policies and related projects is regarded by Eu through the lenses of regional security.In this relation it is important to overview analysis of soft social instruments in a wider scope disregarding weather they are used as directly related to "soft security" or in association with to concepts of "soft power" or "soft law."Having overall understanding that security, defence and promotion of a desired order heavily depend in one way or another on the possession and use of power, scholars and politicians often differ in describing what is implied as "power".Approach based on the understanding of power in international relations as military power operating on the basis of destruction/threats of destruction is frequently found in the literature on international relations.for example, Burton(1972:45)provides a statement that "Communications, and not power, are the main organising influence in world society."However, descriptions of organizing, integrative or aggregative capability of social phenomenon to produce effects(desirable or as a side-effect)have led to indications of the existence of another kind of power of non-military(non-coercive)character, referred to as "civilian power"(Maull 1990; Smith 2000).While some states often demonstrate preference of engagement in coercive(including military)power politics, others(like European union)are keen to solve insecurity and international influence problems by paying more attention to construction of loose socio-economic networks and partnerships, operating on the basis of "positive conditionality", using wide range of potential civilian instruments of conflict prevention, strengthening cooperation relations with other states and organisations, etc. formation and implementation of different strategic policies and their combinations have gradually widened definition of power in international relations moving away from identification of power with military power.Boldvin(1979)has shown power's dependence on the context in which the relationship exists and its interrelation with such characteristics as behaviour and motivation or possession of capabilities or resources that can influence desired outcomes.A number of studies(e.g. Mansbridge 1990, Vedrine and Moisi 2001)provide description of non-coercive motivation tools used by politicians.Through contrasting two models of power -domination and cooperation, francis(2011)argues that the dominant concept of "power over" has led to a damaging militarism and suggests to focus on a "power with" using an "interdependence approach"(francis 2011: 507)to life.Dichotomist approach to power and security is often detected in the broader context of "conflict transformation" concept introduced by Lederach in the 1980s when he began exploring "how do we transform those things that damage and tear apart human relationships to those that protect and build healthy communities"(Lederach 2010: 7).The conceptual framework of "conflict transformation" is oriented towards addressing the root causes of violent conflict and focuses on both structures and processes of interaction in protracted social conflicts.Conflict transformation is regarded as a complex process of changing a number of relationships, attitudes, interests, discourses and underlying structures that encourage and condition violent political conflict.Reimann(2004: 6 )mentions such non-coercive measures used in the framework of conflict management(including conflict transformation)as "facilitation, negotiation, mediation, fact-finding missions, "good offices", consultation in the form of problemsolving, workshops and round tables, capacity building, trauma work, grassroots training, development and human rights work".In his thesis "Power plays in a de facto state: Russian hard and soft power in Abkhazia", Jonston(2011: 1)claims: "The conceptual divide between "hard power" and "soft power," and the resources that constitute the basis of each, remain hotly debated topics among International Relations theorists as well as foreign policy advisors and analysts.Two developments in the last decade that have greatly influenced the study of the hardpower/soft-power dichotomy are:(1)the pursuit by many single-state actors of foreign policy strategies identifying and actively incorporating soft-power instruments, and(2)the realization by political theorists that individual policy instruments often exhibit unexpected hard and soft-power characteristics and effects, sometimes resulting in hard power acting soft and soft power acting hard". Concept of soft law within dichotomy of "hard/soft" also has been explored in the different branches of social sciences. Almost two decades ago, in the article "Soft Law and Institutional Practice in the European Community", Snyder(1999)noted that rules of conduct that may have no legally binding instruments/force can have practical effects for European integration.In relation to the debate over the relative value of hard and soft law, Buzan(2004)provides the argument "that soft and hard legalisations do not necessarily correlate with soft = bad/weak and hard = good/strong"(Buzan 2004:56, referring to Abbott and Snidal(2000).In the article "Hard and Soft Law in the Construction of Social Europe: the Role of the Open Method of Co-ordination", Trubek, D.M. and Trubek, L.G.(2005)provide observations in respect of the relative value of hard and soft law in Eu social policy "which should help us as we seek to move past dichotomous thinking and fully engage hybrid constellations. Once we understand the limits of approaches that stress one mode at the expense of the other, recognise that every judgement must be comparative and look at relative capacity for specific objectives in varied contexts, see that there are ways these approaches can be combined, and recognise that such combinations may be essential to accomplish specific goals, we should be able to transcend the terms of the hard/soft debate. And in doing that we will find ourselves with a new and richer understanding of what we mean both by "law" and "European integration."(Trubek and Trubek, 2005: 346).Consequently, the conceptual divide between hard and soft instruments which is used by some theorists for stressing necessity to transform social interactions, is questioned by others, who urge to transcend such divide and find innovative combinations for accomplishing desired goals in specific contexts.The concept of "soft power" was defined in the context of international relations theory as a specific kind of power differing from "hard power" and "economic power" by Joseph Nye and further developed in a systemic manner in by him in his study "Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics"(Nye 2004).In his comprehensive analysis of the concept "soft power" as power of attraction which "often leads to acquiescence"(Nye 2004: 6), and its role in world politics, Nye describes in a detailed manner three types of power:(1)Military power which is associated with such kinds of behaviour as "coercion, deterrence, protection", features such sources of motivation as "threats, force", and is related with government policies using "coercive diplomacy, war, alliance";(2)Economic power which is associated with "inducement, coercion", features "payments, sanctions" as motivation sources and is related with government policies using "aid, bribes, sanctions", and(3)Soft power which is associated with "attraction, agenda setting", features "values, culture, policies, institutions" as sources of motivation and is related with government policies using "public diplomacy, bilateral and multilateral diplomacy"(Nye 2004: 18).Thus the term of "soft power" and its definition coined by Nye during several past decades has widely spread in political discourse.focusing on one of the main characteristics of soft power: "getting others to want the outcomes you want"(Nye 2004 : 4), Nye defines soft power as a power of attraction, which "co-opts people rather that coerces them" and "rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others"(Nye 2004: 4)and thus influences political outcomes.Soft power has high degree of independence and in some cases its direction of influence can A n g e l ė Č e p ė n a i t ė , S i g i t a K a v a l i ū n a i t ė Soft Security for Sustainable Development: Eastern Dimension of European Neighbourhood Policy either coincide with governmental political goals and policy line or contradict/undermine them and even become a factor of deep changes in politics and social developments.According to Nye, if compared to two other kinds of power: military power and economic power, soft power works in different way -it engenders cooperation through "attraction to shared values and the justness and duty of contributing to the achievement of those values"(Nye 2004: 7)and therefore soft power should be taken into account while formulating policies.Nye notes that "The soft power that is becoming more important in the information age is in part a social and economic by-product rather than solely a result of official government action"(Nye 2004: 32).Soft power can "work" selectively: "Attraction does not always determine others' preferences, but this gap between power measured as resources and power judged as the outcomes of behaviour is not unique to soft power. It occurs with all forms of power"(Nye 2004: 6).Resources of soft power have different sources: "In international politics, the resources that produce soft power arise in large part from the values an organization or country expresses in its culture, in the examples it sets by its internal practices and policies, and in the way it handles its relations with others"(Nye 2004: 8)and they depend significantly on governmental policies: "Government policies can reinforce or squander a country's soft power"(Nye 2004: 14).Similar approach based on threefold taxonomy in respect of power is used by Boulding(1989)who describes the nature of power as a social structure which can be described in three categories based on the consequences: destructive power, power of exchange and integrative power.According to Boulding(1989), one type of power may be predominant in some behaviours or organizations; however, generally the elements of each power are present.Threefold taxonomy approach is also used by Bonoma(1976)in description of interrelation between certain types of power-conflict dynamics.In this relation Bonoma(1976)outlines "three different prototypical power systems [...] : the unilateral power system, in which a strong source imposes influence on a weak target; the mixed power system, in which partially equivalent interactants bargain to agreement or deadlock; and the bilateral power system, in which interactants are in unit relation and formulate joint policy programs"(Bonoma 1976: 499).Threefold taxonomy approach in used also by Wendt when he describes three kinds of macro-level systemic structures, "each based on the kind of roles that dominate the system"(Wendt 1999: 247): Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian.They are based, respectively, on such property as states viewing each other as enemies, rivals or friends as a fundamental determinant.According to Buzan(2004: 222), "The triumph of European power meant not only that a sharp and apparently permanent rise in the level of interaction(and thus density and interdependence)took place, but also that Western norms and values and institutions dominated the whole system," using a mixture of coercion, copying and persuasion.underlying forces influencing systemic changes and continuations on international level and related to both: the mode of influence and durability of effects are described by Buzan(2004: 103), who integrates insights of Wendt(1999: 247-50 ), Kratochwil's(1989: 97), Hurd(1999)and March and Olsen(1998: 948-54)in his version of threefold taxonomy of those underlying forces: coercion, calculation and belief.Overview of concepts of soft instruments suggests an approach which is useful for further research:(1)soft social instruments could be better suited for some circumstances, hard instruments could be more beneficial for others,(2)there is a possibility to engage in constructing hybrid constellations for accomplishment of specific goals(3)the process of Eu security governance and sustaining stability on European level by non-coercive means which are associated with soft law and soft power, and which rely on shared values, can be also attributed to and captured by the concept of soft security,(4)soft instruments in the context of security governance are regarded by analysts as(a)being in opposition to coercive(hard)instruments in the framework of transformation and conflict management,(b)being in interplay/interrelation/ interoperability with hard instruments,(c)being in interplay with coercive(hard)and economic instruments in the framework of influence enhancement.The approach preferred by the European union for security governance in its Neighbourhood is to proceed with European integration through legal harmonization, which translates into binding commitments by each Eu Party to implement the acquis communautaire.One of the examples of joint projects based on such approach to regional security and stability is an initiative to create Energy Community as a response to the conflicts of the 1990s which, as it is stated in the website home page of Energy Community, "led to the disintegration of a unified energy system that stretched from the Adriatic to the Black and Aegean Seas"(Energy Community 2012 a: 1).Transforming Eu power in this case into desirable external socio-economic and socio-cultural changes through intertwining security and economic goals with cultural aspects within the process of designing policies and implementing joint projects has been positively evaluated by the European Commission: "Energy Community is about investments, economic development, security of energy supply and social stability; but -more than this -the Energy Community is also about solidarity, mutual trust and peace. The very existence of the Energy Community, only ten years after the end of the Balkan conflict, is a success in itself, as it stands as the first common institutional project undertaken by the non-European union countries of South East Europe"(European Commission 2011: 2).Eu policy targeted at creation and supporting of the Energy Community resulted in binding commitments by non-Eu member Parties to incorporate relevant Eu-originated acquis communautaire: "By extending the internal market for network energy beyond the boundaries of the European union, the Energy Community carries forward the success story of European integration. Just as the European union's, the approach taken by the Energy Community is one of legal harmonization, which translates into binding commitments by each Party to implement the acquis communautaire as set out in the provisions of the Treaty and the measures adopted by the Ministerial Council of the Energy Community"(Energy Community 2012 b: 7).However in those fields where Eu neighbours are not willing to accept this approach the Eu is initiating cooperative projects acquainting with Eu style of governance, spreading best practices, monitoring social and economic processes, encourages proactive reforms and shared problem-solving in the economic and social field, relying mainly on soft instruments and economic measures in order to prevent appearance and escalation of conflicts.Competence of finding solutions for "best fit" of "best practices" in the context of security governance becomes one of the major factors of achieving desired outcomes.Thus, Eu combines transformational approach highlighted in dichotomist analysis framework and combinatory approach reflected in the analysis within threefold taxonomy based on interaction and congruence of soft, normative hard(relying on multilaterally acceptable legislation)and economic instruments.understanding by Eu policy makers of the features associated with soft security and soft power has been revealed by analysis(Kavaliūnaitė 2011)of Eu documentation containing notions of "soft security" and "soft power" which has shown the variety of terms in numerous Eu cultural -linguistic contexts and their broad scope of descriptions.There is an overall shared understanding that the concepts of "soft security" and "soft power" are associated with sets of certain non -military social practices.One set of those practices is regarded as international policy issues and external instability management targets embedding certain risks and threats, which are supposed to be countervailed by "soft measures".Another is viewed as particular set of instruments for countervailing, minimizing and elimination of those risks and threats.function of "soft"(security or power)related instruments of international policies and management is attributed to certain non-military forms and patterns of social practices which also are described as an extensive list of examples.As far as the scientific perceptions and findings related to soft security that have been highlighted in the previous sections are concerned, the overview of the concepts "soft security" and "soft power" in Eu legislation in the framework of discourses of politicians who design Eu external policy has to some extend confirmed some of the earlier described features of soft security in terms of attributing soft security with particular social practices, expanded a list of social practices attributed to soft security, and questioned ability of soft security to function as effective tool of security governance.The aggregated list of features associated with soft security instruments includes such social practices of non-military character as confidence-building measures, arms control development, reconstruction, long-term peace building, training in relation to conflict prevention/ peace-keeping, reconciliation process, humanitarian assistance, good governance, human rights, joint exercises, best practices exchange, capacity-building, mutual learning, security research, peer reviews, cre-A n g e l ė Č e p ė n a i t ė , S i g i t a K a v a l i ū n a i t ė Soft Security for Sustainable Development: Eastern Dimension of European Neighbourhood Policy ating networks for the coordination of local authorities and the private sector development, external assistance; European development NGOs' initiatives, diplomacy, trade, development aid; Eu enlargement; spreading Eu norms and values such as human dignity, solidarity, tolerance, freedom of expression, respect for diversity and intercultural dialogue; facilitation, negotiation, mediation, fact-finding missions, "good offices", consultation focused on problem-solving, workshops, round tables, trauma work, grassroots training, analysis, planning, training in relation to conflict prevention/peace-keeping, reconciliation process and humanitarian assistance, which are purposefully organised for addressing needs and concerns in respect of maintaining and increasing security on international level within increasingly complicated international environment: i.e. needs to mitigate environmental and nuclear hazards, drugs, arms, human trafficking, cross-border organised crime, the spread of infectious diseases, environmental degradation and global warming.Summing up the main insights related to the features of soft instruments it can be concluded that it is possible to define soft security instruments as various purposefully organised social practices focussing and relying on sharing, congruence and development of values and competences of initiators and participants of the process of security governance.Effective functioning of soft security instruments depends on the level of competences of participants of security governance and the schemes of combination soft security instruments with economic(focussing and relying on providing or withholding economic values)and hard normative(in the framework of Eu policies -legally binding multilateral arrangements, preferably -on the basis of acquis communautaire, articulating, inter alia, boundaries beyond which the socially imposed punishments are applied)instruments.The need to share and develop, as well as to increase a level of security related competences of professionals within new members(after 2004 and further enlargements)in both Eu and/or NATO contexts in order to achieve coherence with competences and values with other members' professionals within transatlantic community, a number of security competence related institutions or specific structures within existing institutions have been established.As one of the examples of such emergence of new institutions, a number of security oriented centres of excellence(COE)either independent of under umbrella of NATO(presenting soft dimension of this organisation)could be mentioned: Cooperative Cyber Defence(CCD)COE, Estonia; Energy Security(ENSEC)COE, Lithuania; Nuclear Security COE, Lithuania; Explosive Ordnance Disposal(EOD)COE, Slovakia; Mountain Warfare(MW)COE, Slovenia; Human Intelligence(HuMINT)COE, Romania; BIPAI's Romanian Clinical COE, Romania; Joint Chemical, Biological, Radiation and Nuclear Defence(JCBRN Defence)COE, Check Republic; Military Medical(MILMED)COE, Hungary; Crisis Management for Disaster Response(CMDR)COE, Bulgaria; Military Police(MP)COE, Poland.Lithuania and Romania stand out in this row as states having established two security issues oriented COEs each.Effective functioning of those centers would result in spill over of positive effects and elevating a level of professional response to regional security risks and threats.Taking into account widening of the concept of sustainable development "from a near exclusive concern with the environmental predicament, to an integrated conception of environmental, economic and social determinants of the human future, in which the former is by no means dominant"(Vogler 2007: 430)and referring to sustainable development as "preventing of too much damage to the earth and to humans for contemporary and future generations"(De Tombe 2006: 69)it can be indicated that enhanced Eu approach to regional security is closely related to the process captured by the concept "sustainable development".Through establishment of a social interactive process based on shared values in the spirit of acquis communautaire for joint regional security gain, the Eu is simultaneously transferring some elements of governance which have been developed by the Eu institutions with focus on sustainable development determinants.Soft security instruments are used in the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy(ENP)and related projects for implementation of this Eu initiative and function as a component of the process of joint management of those projects.Taking into account theoretical insights provided by Buzan(2004)in respect of types of interstate society, as well as his interpretation of the concepts of "pluralism and "solidarism", as assumptions for an overview of Eu policies in respect of the region of concern, the following logics for separating two modes of Eu approaches:(1)proactive: transformational or enhanced approach and(2)reactive: preventive or limited approach to regional security is suggested: The Eu has reached the development stage featured in higher or lower degree by cooperative, convergence and confederative types presenting thick layer of institutions, norms and shared liberal values that constitute comparatively high level of solidarism which ensures comparatively high level of stability and security.The regional security dimension of its external policies is focused on neighbouring states that feature coexistence and partly cooperative(mainly its pluralist side)types of interstate society presenting thinner layer institutions and norms with weak or without sufficient adherence to shared liberal values.from the point of view of the Eu politicians, the latter is seen as more vulnerable to changes of circumstance and less stable than international society of the Eu itself.As a long-term solution for enhancing regional security and stability within its neighbouring states a number of sets of various Eu external policies and joint projects are used to encourage and assist those states to gradually transform their social and economic relationships in a variety of ways: innovative, imitative, continuative or restorative(Šaulauskas 2000)as well as(in the long run)their socio-cultural contexts and collective identities enabling movement towards convergence type based on shared liberal values in the spirit of acquis communautaire since this model is seen as an advanced option in stability, security and economic terms, as it has been proved by Eu historic development since its interception.Trying to avoid unnecessary confrontation, the Eu, according to this logics, should be keen to rely mainly on non-coercive means featuring attractiveness of the projects' offer suggested to the Eu partner state(s)leading to establishment of a social interactive process of the pursue of joint regional security gain.The coercive instruments(mainly in the form of conditionality and binding legislation)are seen as means playing complimentary role and introduced on the basis of mutual consent.Eu initiative illustrating above mentioned logics is Eastern Partnership within European Neighbour-hood Policy which is described in the following way: "What happens in the countries in Eastern Europe and the Southern Caucasus affects the European union. Successive Eu enlargements have brought these countries closer to the Eu and their security, stability and prosperity increasingly impact on the Eu's. The potential these countries offer for diversifying the Eu's energy supplies is one example. All these countries, to varying degrees, are carrying out political, social and economic reforms, and have stated their wish to come closer to the Eu. The conflict in Georgia in August 2008 confirmed how vulnerable they can be, and how the Eu's security begins outside our borders. The European Commission put forward concrete ideas for enhancing our relationship with: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and ukraine. This would imply new association agreements including deep and comprehensive free trade agreements with those countries willing and able to enter into a deeper engagement and gradual integration in the Eu economy. It would also allow for easier travel to the Eu through gradual visa liberalisation, accompanied by measures to tackle illegal immigration. The Partnership will also promote democracy and good governance, strengthen energy security, promote sector reform and environment protection, encourage people to people contacts, support economic and social development and offer additional funding for projects to reduce socio-economic imbalances and increase stability"(European External Action Service 2012).The objective of the ENP which was developed in 2004 is "to share the benefits of the Eu's 2004 enlargement with neighbouring countries in strengthening stability, security and well-being for all concerned. It is designed to prevent the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged Eu and its neighbours and to offer them the chance to participate in various Eu activities, through greater political, security, economic and cultural co-operation. [...] The privileged relationship with neighbours will build on mutual commitment to common values principally within the fields of the rule of law, good governance, the respect for human rights, including minority rights, the promotion of good neighbourly relations, and the principles of market economy and sustainable development"(European Commission 2004: 3).Regarding the Common foreign and Security Policy(CfSP)and European Security and Defence Policy(ESDP)as security governance instruments the "Eu and partner countries should also work together on effective multilateralism, so as to reinforce global governance, strengthen coordination in combating security threats and address related development issues. Improved co-ordination within the established political dialogue formats should be explored, as well as the possible involvement of partner countries in aspects of CfSP and ESDP, conflict prevention, crisis management, the exchange of information, joint training and exercises and possible participation in Eu-led crisis management operations. Another important priority will be the further development of a shared responsibility between the Eu and partners for security and stability in the neighbourhood region"(European Commission 2004: 13).The ENP's initially bilateral format was further enriched with regional and multilateral co-operation initiatives, the EaP being one of them.According to European Commission, the "Eu and Russia have decided to develop their strategic partnership through the creation of four common spaces as agreed at the St Petersburg Summit in May 2003. Russia and the enlarged European union form part of each other's neighbourhood. It is in our common interest to draw on elements of the ENP to enrich work on the common spaces, notably in the areas of cross-border and sub-regional co-operation. The Eu and Russia need to work together, as neighbours, on common concerns"(European Commission 2004: 6).The long term four "common spaces" were created in the framework of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement and on the basis of common values and shared interests.These cover the following issues:(1)Common Economic Space, covering economic issues and the environment; Monitoring Mission in Georgia, started in 2008)are being carried out in this policy context(European External Action Service 2011).The first mission focuses on prevention of smuggling, trafficking, and customs fraud by the job training and advice by professionals of border management services in Eu Member States to Moldovan and ukrainian officials providing Eu support for capacity building for border management, including customs, on the Moldova-ukraine border.The second is an unarmed and non-executive civilian ceasefire(after 2008 South Ossetia war)Eu monitoring mission for stabilisation, normalisation and confidence building, as well as reporting to the Eu in order to inform European policy-making and thus contribute to the future Eu engagement in the region.In addition, Moldova and ukraine are members of Energy Community, while Georgia has an observer status in this organisation.Another important direction of using soft security instruments is a broadened and deepened scope of Eu participation in political forums for regional intergovernmental cooperation such as the Council of the Baltic Sea States, Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe and others.However, existing socio-cultural barriers and national prerogatives result in higher or lower levels of motivation to engage in the cooperative projects suggested by the Eu.As Sergunin(2010)points out, "Although Russia has embraced a growing number of cooperative projects with the Eu, there have also been some limitations restricting both Russia's engagement and the success of different projects. These include residual mistrust and prejudice, bureaucratic resistance in both Brussels and Moscow, authoritarian trends in Russia's domestic policies, uneasy relations between "old" and "new" Eu members, conflicting interests in the post-Soviet space and(as mentioned)the lack of an updated and revised Partnership & Cooperation Agreement".Moscow reacted, according to Sergunin(2010)"to the EaP with both caution and scepticism, because the Russian leadership was not sure about its real goals: is the Eu serious about making its new neighbourhood a stable and safe place or is it some kind of geopolitical drive to undermine Russia's positions in the area? Moscow is particularly sensitive about the EaP programme because Russia has fundamental interests in the region that range from strategic and political (confederation with Belarus, military-technical cooperation with Belarus and Armenia, military conflict with Georgia, support of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia) to economic (investments, trade, energy supply, etc.) issues. It seems that the lack of a sound Russian strategy towards the EaP is one of the sources of misunderstanding in Eu-Russia bilateral cooperation, a misunderstanding that sometimes contributes to derailing the Brussels-Moscow dialogue. As a result of this, both Eu and Russian policies often give the impression of muddling on rather than a sound and forward-looking strategy".As a result of various overviewed above Eu initiated policies and related projects which are each other complementing and reinforcing within Eu and Eastern Dimension of European Neighbourhood Policy related states the two emerging subsystems can be differentiated: integration subsystem between the Eu and those states which are more open to Eu initiatives and its transformational approach, and subsystem with those states that are reserved (e.g. Rf and Belarus) in respect of Eu strategies.The sub system which is developing on the basis of Eu enhanced transformational approach has prospects of gradually turning into quasi organisation suitable for application of insights and methods developed by governance and organizational theories focussing on competence enhancement, such as Responsive/ Good Governance concept (OECD 2005; united Nations 2005) , strategic approach to Human Resource Development developed and promoted by Garavan et al. (1999) , Buyens et al. (2001) , Hockey et al. (2005) , Luoma (2000) , Šiugždinienė (2008) and others, and Organizational Theory (Schout 2009) with focus on organizational learning processes and change through the establishment of a learning organization.This gradual formation of such quasi organisation includes most open and expressing interest in deeper European integration states: Moldova, ukraine and Georgia.Additional privileges for participants from those countries in regional security governance, focused on competence development using different formats, could lead to higher level of regional security as precondition for sustainable development.They could include: privileged access of particular Eu partner's citizens to educational programmes and training schemes focusing on Eu studies and regional security issues (e.g. energy security, social stability and others) combined with acquiring project management, team building skills as well as qualities of effective teamwork; privilege of participation in the joint projects for graduates from men-tioned above educational programmes; privilege of participation in the joint policy making frameworks featuring possible extension of some of Eu inherent modern forms of security governance, and others.Suggested instrumental approach to soft security based on defining soft security instruments as sets of various purposefully organised social practices focussing and relying on sharing, congruence and development of values and competences of regional security governance initiators and participants revealed capacity of soft security instruments to contribute to both regional security and sustainable development as well as to foster the European integration in Eu neighbourhood.Raising effectiveness of soft security instruments in the process of joint project management in the region of concern would imply considering special treatment of most open and expressing interest in deeper integration with the Eu states addressed by Eastern Dimension of European Neighbourhood Policy and proposing them a number of privileges for their representatives in the form of opportunities to develop their security governance related competences through participation in specific educational programmes and training schemes, Eu initiated joint cooperative project management and relevant joint security policy formation on gradually expanding scale.	reference to this paper should be made as follows: Čepėnaitė, A.; Kavaliūnaitė, S.2013 .Soft security for sustainable development: Eastern Dimension of European Neighbourhood Policy, Journal of Security and Sustainability Issues 2(3): 29-42.http://dx.doi.org/10.9770/jssi.2013.2.3(3) jel classifications: f5, f6, O1 States and international organizations have developed different approaches in order to mitigate insecurity problems.A long-standing debate related to those approaches usually raises the issues of effectiveness of particular approach, complementarities of those approaches or, on the contrary, risks of circumscribing one another.The process of formulating and implementing European union (Eu) policies related to managing international risks and enhancing influence schemes in the Eu neighbourhood requires constant identification and re-examination of routes and instruments for meeting challenges to peace and security.A permanently expanding spectrum of security risks, threats and factual disruptions resulted by globalisation which creates environment of increasing complexity and interoperability outside Eu borders, as well as a number of unresolved conflicts, which emerged during the dissolution of the Soviet union, demand innovative solutions and increased attention to regional security issues.Prevailing Eu approach to regional security challenges on European level focuses on so-called "soft security".findings, insights and statements of a number of re-A n g e l ė Č e p ė n a i t ė , S i g i t a K a v a l i ū n a i t ė Soft Security for Sustainable Development: Eastern Dimension of European Neighbourhood Policy searchers as well as policy makers are used for analysis of soft security in this paper, e.g. Stańczyk (2011) , Lankauskienė and Tvaronavičienė (2012) .The view that "the current policies and security measures cannot guarantee effective counteraction against potential challenges and threats.Now we know that their character is diversified and non-military to a high degree.Therefore, the relevant responses require corresponding non-military measures" (Stańczyk 2011:8) is supported in this paper.Building on the insights related to the significance of security to sustainability for today's globalized society as well as to common dimensions of security and sustainable development: "social, economic, environmental" (Lankauskienė and Tvaronavičienė 2012:28) , this paper suggests a different angle of the approach to security: i.e. to differentiate security in terms of instruments used against risks and threats and to categorise them as "soft", "economic" and "hard".Highlighting the role of soft security instruments which are defined as purposely organised social practices which focus and rely mainly on sharing, congruence and development of values and competences of those involved in the process of dealing with security issues, the paper briefly reviews existing Eu policies and related project management related to EaP states and Russian federation (which is neither part of EaP nor among 16 Eu partners addressed by the European Neighbourhood Policy but is also included in the overview as an important factor of influence in respect of regional security and relations between EaP states and Eu), suggesting to expand soft security component by further engaging selected participants from this region in the processes related to sharing, congruence and development of their competences which are necessary for effective dealing with insecurities on a larger scale, and thus to pave a way for extension of Eu practices of sustainable development on regional level.The concepts of security and power in international relations have a number of different aspects, since they reflect a number of closely interrelated phenomena and processes.for defining soft security as a component of external policy and joint project management, the following observations made by Buzan (1984) in respect of abstract concepts such as peace, power and security, are taken into account. "Con-cepts like peace, power and security lack precise, agreed definitions: they identify broad issues or conditions clearly enough to serve as important frameworks for discussion, but at the empirical level they cannot be, or have not yet been, reduced to standard formulas" (Buzan 1984:118) .In addition, the "security perspective rejects the notion that the problem of insecurity can be solved.It tries instead to develop a management approach which is equally sensitive to both the national and the international dynamics of the insecurity problem" (Buzan 1984:112) .The tendency to look at soft security issues as a secondary avenue of international relations is affected by a dominating view on the level of "high politics" which, while dealing with security issues, usually focuses on hard security concept.The concept of "soft security" in political literature is associated by Becher (2001) and Lomagin (2001) with non-military dimension, a secondary role within the system of international relations and a common denominator featuring a very wide and pluralistic coverage of different issues.The latter feature poses a risk of losing practical value and proceeding within pluralistic trend.The following citation captures the main features singled out from the processes and phenomena that are usually attributed to soft security: "The term "soft security", at the time of East-West detente, was originally used to distinguish military issues from other relevant security issues, including such military-related issues as confidence-building measures and arms control.The subsequent widening of the notion of security has added environmental themes, transnational risks and security challenges, plus a wide spectrum of economic, social and political factors that affect the prospects for enhanced security through "stability export" and transformation. "Soft security" is thus apparently about almost everything except defence proper.In this sense, it is not really a term of practical value" (Becher 2001:1) .In addition, Becher (2001:1) points out: "A different distinction may be more significant: that between those issues that can be properly dealt with between governments; and those issues, often of a technical nature, that need also to be effectively addressed on a local and regional level across national borders.When I speak of soft security, I therefore mean those issues that involve mainly technical, organisational, administrative or informational interaction on the working level and are not in essence elements of the 'high' politics best addressed in formal diplomatic channels.In this sense, the soft-security agenda opens up a decentralised secondary avenue for international cooperation that in certain circumstances is easier, although not necessarily simple, to pursue".Similar approach is used by Lomagin (2001:1) in relation to soft security issues with non-military origin of threats: "Soft security threats are those of non-military origin.Hard security concerns are considered more important in Russia, to the extent that some members of the political elite do not even know what soft security threats are.Because of the region's proximity, soft security problems in northwest Russia receive more attention from the Eu than other issues, although these problems are in no way limited to this region".However, such tendency to regard soft security organisations as secondary players in the system of international relations has been questioned by a number of analysts.As Pop (2000:1) mentions, "subregional frameworks of cooperation were perceived, due to their "soft" security issue approach, as "the Cinderellas of European security".However, throughout the last couple of years, there has been a growing awareness, both politically and institutionally, of the value of these groupings.Consequently, subregional arrangements have begun to gain their rightful place within the new evolving, institutionally comprehensive and complementary European security architecture".Vrey (2005:1) points out: "Proponents of soft security strive to ensure the goal of individual security without resorting to armed coercion.Given the extended scope of security sectors falling within the ambit of soft security regional co-operation is indispensable -a phenomenon most visible in European security architecture and that of Northern Europe in particular.Not only European decision-makers, however, pursue the soft security option".According to Lindley -french (2004) , dividing lines between hard and soft, military and civil security are dissolving and more flexibility as well as new sets of relationships are required to cope with new problems and manage new complexities associated with security issues.This is partly attributed to comprehensive approach to security underlying the European Security Strategy, which, according to Biscop (2005) , aims to integrate different dimensions of the Eu's external policies: the military, economic, political and social.In order to work out an instrumental approach in respect of management of security risks and to define factors of effectiveness of soft security instruments, it is important to take into account observations and conclusions of analysts in respect of the Eu security governance and increasing scope of its reliance on soft instruments.Those aspects are explored by Hegemann (2012) ; Van Kersbergen and Van Waarden (2004); Dingwerth and Pattberg (2006) ; Trubek, D.M. and Trubek, L.G. (2007) , Rhinard et al. (2007) , Bossong (2011) , Hix (1998) , Kohler-Koch and Eising (1999) , Caparini (2006) , Webber et al. (2004) , Krahmann (2003) and Chayes, A. and Chayes, A.H. (1995) .Hegemann (2012:2) provides useful insights on the Eu security governance and increasing scope of its reliance on soft instruments.His analysis highlights a shift towards informal arrangements.According to Hegemann (2012:2) "an ambiguous and multifaceted system of security governance has emerged that aims to reconcile the need for more integration with national prerogatives and sensitivities.This system leaves most formal competences to member states but incorporates a growing number of actors, issues, modes of cooperation, and compliance mechanisms that vary in their degree of formality and informality."The development of the concept of security governance is related to transnationalization of security risks (Kahl 2010) and the widening of the concept of security (Buzan et al.1998) . "Security governance thus highlights the rise of increasingly transnational security risks emanating from non-state actors, the mounting importance of various public and private actors for the provision of security under these circumstances, and the proliferation of networked forms of coordination to facilitate flexible solutions among a growing bulk of national and international actors" (Hegemann 2012:4) .Evolving modes of governance encompass public and private actors, rely on horizontal networks and soft instruments such as exchanging best practices and others (Hix 1998; Kohler-Koch and Eising 1999) .According to Hegemann (2012:5), "security governance can encompass informal and decentralized networks or formal integration and centralization".In addition, "Eu crisis management capacity is to a large extent ultimately relying on the willingness and 'know-how' of the multitude of European actors and levels to pool resources and assist each other" (Ekengren 2006: 91) .Another important soft instrument which is being increasingly used in the framework of security gov-A n g e l ė Č e p ė n a i t ė , S i g i t a K a v a l i ū n a i t ė Soft Security for Sustainable Development: Eastern Dimension of European Neighbourhood Policy ernance is peer reviews (Bossong 2011 ).Hegemann (2012) points out both potentially positive and negative outcomes of the increasing scope of the Eu security governance's reliance on soft instruments.According to him, member states and Eu institutions created new and more informal mechanisms that produce some results and to some extend can rely on funding and coordinative platforms.However, it is not known "much about the long-term impact of incremental exercises such as peer reviews or security research on the development of actual national policies and the Eu's comparative advantage remains fragile with a view to the much larger national budgets and institutional infrastructures.Eventually, the plethora of informal networks and projects might be a problem itself and spread more confusion than coordination and coherence" (Hegemann 2012:18) .Taking into account that security issues are a top priority for the Eu when dealing with states addressed by Eastern Dimension of European Neighbourhood Policy because of such security issues as a number of unresolved conflicts which lead to crime acceleration and complicate management of other security risks resulted by globalisation, it is considered within this paper that the process of the design and implementation of Eu initiated policies and related projects is regarded by Eu through the lenses of regional security.In this relation it is important to overview analysis of soft social instruments in a wider scope disregarding weather they are used as directly related to "soft security" or in association with to concepts of "soft power" or "soft law."Having overall understanding that security, defence and promotion of a desired order heavily depend in one way or another on the possession and use of power, scholars and politicians often differ in describing what is implied as "power".Approach based on the understanding of power in international relations as military power operating on the basis of destruction/threats of destruction is frequently found in the literature on international relations.for example, Burton (1972:45) provides a statement that "Communications, and not power, are the main organising influence in world society."However, descriptions of organizing, integrative or aggregative capability of social phenomenon to produce effects (desirable or as a side-effect) have led to indications of the existence of another kind of power of non-military (non-coercive) character, referred to as "civilian power" (Maull 1990; Smith 2000) .While some states often demonstrate preference of engagement in coercive (including military) power politics, others (like European union) are keen to solve insecurity and international influence problems by paying more attention to construction of loose socio-economic networks and partnerships, operating on the basis of "positive conditionality", using wide range of potential civilian instruments of conflict prevention, strengthening cooperation relations with other states and organisations, etc.formation and implementation of different strategic policies and their combinations have gradually widened definition of power in international relations moving away from identification of power with military power.Boldvin (1979) has shown power's dependence on the context in which the relationship exists and its interrelation with such characteristics as behaviour and motivation or possession of capabilities or resources that can influence desired outcomes.A number of studies (e.g. Mansbridge 1990, Vedrine and Moisi 2001) provide description of non-coercive motivation tools used by politicians.Through contrasting two models of power -domination and cooperation, francis (2011) argues that the dominant concept of "power over" has led to a damaging militarism and suggests to focus on a "power with" using an "interdependence approach" (francis 2011: 507) to life.Dichotomist approach to power and security is often detected in the broader context of "conflict transformation" concept introduced by Lederach in the 1980s when he began exploring "how do we transform those things that damage and tear apart human relationships to those that protect and build healthy communities" (Lederach 2010: 7).The conceptual framework of "conflict transformation" is oriented towards addressing the root causes of violent conflict and focuses on both structures and processes of interaction in protracted social conflicts.Conflict transformation is regarded as a complex process of changing a number of relationships, attitudes, interests, discourses and underlying structures that encourage and condition violent political conflict.Reimann (2004: 6 ) mentions such non-coercive measures used in the framework of conflict management (including conflict transformation) as "facilitation, negotiation, mediation, fact-finding missions, "good offices", consultation in the form of problemsolving, workshops and round tables, capacity building, trauma work, grassroots training, development and human rights work".In his thesis "Power plays in a de facto state: Russian hard and soft power in Abkhazia", Jonston (2011: 1) claims: "The conceptual divide between "hard power" and "soft power," and the resources that constitute the basis of each, remain hotly debated topics among International Relations theorists as well as foreign policy advisors and analysts.Two developments in the last decade that have greatly influenced the study of the hardpower/soft-power dichotomy are: (1) the pursuit by many single-state actors of foreign policy strategies identifying and actively incorporating soft-power instruments, and (2) the realization by political theorists that individual policy instruments often exhibit unexpected hard and soft-power characteristics and effects, sometimes resulting in hard power acting soft and soft power acting hard".Concept of soft law within dichotomy of "hard/soft" also has been explored in the different branches of social sciences.Almost two decades ago, in the article "Soft Law and Institutional Practice in the European Community", Snyder (1999) noted that rules of conduct that may have no legally binding instruments/force can have practical effects for European integration.In relation to the debate over the relative value of hard and soft law, Buzan (2004) provides the argument "that soft and hard legalisations do not necessarily correlate with soft = bad/weak and hard = good/strong" (Buzan 2004:56, referring to Abbott and Snidal (2000) .In the article "Hard and Soft Law in the Construction of Social Europe: the Role of the Open Method of Co-ordination", Trubek, D.M. and Trubek, L.G. (2005) provide observations in respect of the relative value of hard and soft law in Eu social policy "which should help us as we seek to move past dichotomous thinking and fully engage hybrid constellations.Once we understand the limits of approaches that stress one mode at the expense of the other, recognise that every judgement must be comparative and look at relative capacity for specific objectives in varied contexts, see that there are ways these approaches can be combined, and recognise that such combinations may be essential to accomplish specific goals, we should be able to transcend the terms of the hard/soft debate.And in doing that we will find ourselves with a new and richer understanding of what we mean both by "law" and "European integration." (Trubek and Trubek, 2005: 346) .Consequently, the conceptual divide between hard and soft instruments which is used by some theorists for stressing necessity to transform social interactions, is questioned by others, who urge to transcend such divide and find innovative combinations for accomplishing desired goals in specific contexts.The concept of "soft power" was defined in the context of international relations theory as a specific kind of power differing from "hard power" and "economic power" by Joseph Nye and further developed in a systemic manner in by him in his study "Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics" (Nye 2004) .In his comprehensive analysis of the concept "soft power" as power of attraction which "often leads to acquiescence" (Nye 2004: 6) , and its role in world politics, Nye describes in a detailed manner three types of power: (1) Military power which is associated with such kinds of behaviour as "coercion, deterrence, protection", features such sources of motivation as "threats, force", and is related with government policies using "coercive diplomacy, war, alliance"; (2) Economic power which is associated with "inducement, coercion", features "payments, sanctions" as motivation sources and is related with government policies using "aid, bribes, sanctions", and (3) Soft power which is associated with "attraction, agenda setting", features "values, culture, policies, institutions" as sources of motivation and is related with government policies using "public diplomacy, bilateral and multilateral diplomacy" (Nye 2004: 18) .Thus the term of "soft power" and its definition coined by Nye during several past decades has widely spread in political discourse.focusing on one of the main characteristics of soft power: "getting others to want the outcomes you want" (Nye 2004 : 4), Nye defines soft power as a power of attraction, which "co-opts people rather that coerces them" and "rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others" (Nye 2004: 4) and thus influences political outcomes.Soft power has high degree of independence and in some cases its direction of influence can A n g e l ė Č e p ė n a i t ė , S i g i t a K a v a l i ū n a i t ė Soft Security for Sustainable Development: Eastern Dimension of European Neighbourhood Policy either coincide with governmental political goals and policy line or contradict/undermine them and even become a factor of deep changes in politics and social developments.According to Nye, if compared to two other kinds of power: military power and economic power, soft power works in different way -it engenders cooperation through "attraction to shared values and the justness and duty of contributing to the achievement of those values" (Nye 2004: 7) and therefore soft power should be taken into account while formulating policies.Nye notes that "The soft power that is becoming more important in the information age is in part a social and economic by-product rather than solely a result of official government action" (Nye 2004: 32) .Soft power can "work" selectively: "Attraction does not always determine others' preferences, but this gap between power measured as resources and power judged as the outcomes of behaviour is not unique to soft power.It occurs with all forms of power" (Nye 2004: 6) .Resources of soft power have different sources: "In international politics, the resources that produce soft power arise in large part from the values an organization or country expresses in its culture, in the examples it sets by its internal practices and policies, and in the way it handles its relations with others" (Nye 2004: 8) and they depend significantly on governmental policies: "Government policies can reinforce or squander a country's soft power" (Nye 2004: 14) .Similar approach based on threefold taxonomy in respect of power is used by Boulding (1989) who describes the nature of power as a social structure which can be described in three categories based on the consequences: destructive power, power of exchange and integrative power.According to Boulding (1989) , one type of power may be predominant in some behaviours or organizations; however, generally the elements of each power are present.Threefold taxonomy approach is also used by Bonoma (1976) in description of interrelation between certain types of power-conflict dynamics.In this relation Bonoma (1976) outlines "three different prototypical power systems [...] : the unilateral power system, in which a strong source imposes influence on a weak target; the mixed power system, in which partially equivalent interactants bargain to agreement or deadlock; and the bilateral power system, in which interactants are in unit relation and formulate joint policy programs" (Bonoma 1976: 499) .Threefold taxonomy approach in used also by Wendt when he describes three kinds of macro-level systemic structures, "each based on the kind of roles that dominate the system" (Wendt 1999: 247) : Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian.They are based, respectively, on such property as states viewing each other as enemies, rivals or friends as a fundamental determinant.According to Buzan (2004: 222) , "The triumph of European power meant not only that a sharp and apparently permanent rise in the level of interaction (and thus density and interdependence) took place, but also that Western norms and values and institutions dominated the whole system," using a mixture of coercion, copying and persuasion.underlying forces influencing systemic changes and continuations on international level and related to both: the mode of influence and durability of effects are described by Buzan (2004: 103) , who integrates insights of Wendt (1999: 247-50 ), Kratochwil's (1989: 97) , Hurd (1999) and March and Olsen (1998: 948-54) in his version of threefold taxonomy of those underlying forces: coercion, calculation and belief.Overview of concepts of soft instruments suggests an approach which is useful for further research: (1) soft social instruments could be better suited for some circumstances, hard instruments could be more beneficial for others, (2) there is a possibility to engage in constructing hybrid constellations for accomplishment of specific goals (3) the process of Eu security governance and sustaining stability on European level by non-coercive means which are associated with soft law and soft power, and which rely on shared values, can be also attributed to and captured by the concept of soft security, (4) soft instruments in the context of security governance are regarded by analysts as (a) being in opposition to coercive (hard) instruments in the framework of transformation and conflict management, (b) being in interplay/interrelation/ interoperability with hard instruments, (c) being in interplay with coercive (hard) and economic instruments in the framework of influence enhancement.The approach preferred by the European union for security governance in its Neighbourhood is to proceed with European integration through legal harmonization, which translates into binding commitments by each Eu Party to implement the acquis communautaire.One of the examples of joint projects based on such approach to regional security and stability is an initiative to create Energy Community as a response to the conflicts of the 1990s which, as it is stated in the website home page of Energy Community, "led to the disintegration of a unified energy system that stretched from the Adriatic to the Black and Aegean Seas" (Energy Community 2012 a: 1).Transforming Eu power in this case into desirable external socio-economic and socio-cultural changes through intertwining security and economic goals with cultural aspects within the process of designing policies and implementing joint projects has been positively evaluated by the European Commission: "Energy Community is about investments, economic development, security of energy supply and social stability; but -more than this -the Energy Community is also about solidarity, mutual trust and peace.The very existence of the Energy Community, only ten years after the end of the Balkan conflict, is a success in itself, as it stands as the first common institutional project undertaken by the non-European union countries of South East Europe" (European Commission 2011: 2).Eu policy targeted at creation and supporting of the Energy Community resulted in binding commitments by non-Eu member Parties to incorporate relevant Eu-originated acquis communautaire: "By extending the internal market for network energy beyond the boundaries of the European union, the Energy Community carries forward the success story of European integration.Just as the European union's, the approach taken by the Energy Community is one of legal harmonization, which translates into binding commitments by each Party to implement the acquis communautaire as set out in the provisions of the Treaty and the measures adopted by the Ministerial Council of the Energy Community" (Energy Community 2012 b: 7).However in those fields where Eu neighbours are not willing to accept this approach the Eu is initiating cooperative projects acquainting with Eu style of governance, spreading best practices, monitoring social and economic processes, encourages proactive reforms and shared problem-solving in the economic and social field, relying mainly on soft instruments and economic measures in order to prevent appearance and escalation of conflicts.Competence of finding solutions for "best fit" of "best practices" in the context of security governance becomes one of the major factors of achieving desired outcomes.Thus, Eu combines transformational approach highlighted in dichotomist analysis framework and combinatory approach reflected in the analysis within threefold taxonomy based on interaction and congruence of soft, normative hard (relying on multilaterally acceptable legislation) and economic instruments.understanding by Eu policy makers of the features associated with soft security and soft power has been revealed by analysis (Kavaliūnaitė 2011) of Eu documentation containing notions of "soft security" and "soft power" which has shown the variety of terms in numerous Eu cultural -linguistic contexts and their broad scope of descriptions.There is an overall shared understanding that the concepts of "soft security" and "soft power" are associated with sets of certain non -military social practices.One set of those practices is regarded as international policy issues and external instability management targets embedding certain risks and threats, which are supposed to be countervailed by "soft measures".Another is viewed as particular set of instruments for countervailing, minimizing and elimination of those risks and threats.function of "soft" (security or power) related instruments of international policies and management is attributed to certain non-military forms and patterns of social practices which also are described as an extensive list of examples.As far as the scientific perceptions and findings related to soft security that have been highlighted in the previous sections are concerned, the overview of the concepts "soft security" and "soft power" in Eu legislation in the framework of discourses of politicians who design Eu external policy has to some extend confirmed some of the earlier described features of soft security in terms of attributing soft security with particular social practices, expanded a list of social practices attributed to soft security, and questioned ability of soft security to function as effective tool of security governance.The aggregated list of features associated with soft security instruments includes such social practices of non-military character as confidence-building measures, arms control development, reconstruction, long-term peace building, training in relation to conflict prevention/ peace-keeping, reconciliation process, humanitarian assistance, good governance, human rights, joint exercises, best practices exchange, capacity-building, mutual learning, security research, peer reviews, cre-A n g e l ė Č e p ė n a i t ė , S i g i t a K a v a l i ū n a i t ė Soft Security for Sustainable Development: Eastern Dimension of European Neighbourhood Policy ating networks for the coordination of local authorities and the private sector development, external assistance; European development NGOs' initiatives, diplomacy, trade, development aid; Eu enlargement; spreading Eu norms and values such as human dignity, solidarity, tolerance, freedom of expression, respect for diversity and intercultural dialogue; facilitation, negotiation, mediation, fact-finding missions, "good offices", consultation focused on problem-solving, workshops, round tables, trauma work, grassroots training, analysis, planning, training in relation to conflict prevention/peace-keeping, reconciliation process and humanitarian assistance, which are purposefully organised for addressing needs and concerns in respect of maintaining and increasing security on international level within increasingly complicated international environment: i.e. needs to mitigate environmental and nuclear hazards, drugs, arms, human trafficking, cross-border organised crime, the spread of infectious diseases, environmental degradation and global warming.Summing up the main insights related to the features of soft instruments it can be concluded that it is possible to define soft security instruments as various purposefully organised social practices focussing and relying on sharing, congruence and development of values and competences of initiators and participants of the process of security governance.Effective functioning of soft security instruments depends on the level of competences of participants of security governance and the schemes of combination soft security instruments with economic (focussing and relying on providing or withholding economic values) and hard normative (in the framework of Eu policies -legally binding multilateral arrangements, preferably -on the basis of acquis communautaire, articulating, inter alia, boundaries beyond which the socially imposed punishments are applied) instruments.The need to share and develop, as well as to increase a level of security related competences of professionals within new members (after 2004 and further enlargements) in both Eu and/or NATO contexts in order to achieve coherence with competences and values with other members' professionals within transatlantic community, a number of security competence related institutions or specific structures within existing institutions have been established.As one of the examples of such emergence of new institutions, a number of security oriented centres of excellence (COE) either independent of under umbrella of NATO (presenting soft dimension of this organisation) could be mentioned: Cooperative Cyber Defence (CCD) COE, Estonia; Energy Security (ENSEC) COE, Lithuania; Nuclear Security COE, Lithuania; Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) COE, Slovakia; Mountain Warfare (MW) COE, Slovenia; Human Intelligence (HuMINT) COE, Romania; BIPAI's Romanian Clinical COE, Romania; Joint Chemical, Biological, Radiation and Nuclear Defence (JCBRN Defence) COE, Check Republic; Military Medical (MILMED) COE, Hungary; Crisis Management for Disaster Response (CMDR) COE, Bulgaria; Military Police (MP) COE, Poland.Lithuania and Romania stand out in this row as states having established two security issues oriented COEs each.Effective functioning of those centers would result in spill over of positive effects and elevating a level of professional response to regional security risks and threats.Taking into account widening of the concept of sustainable development "from a near exclusive concern with the environmental predicament, to an integrated conception of environmental, economic and social determinants of the human future, in which the former is by no means dominant" (Vogler 2007: 430) and referring to sustainable development as "preventing of too much damage to the earth and to humans for contemporary and future generations" (De Tombe 2006: 69) it can be indicated that enhanced Eu approach to regional security is closely related to the process captured by the concept "sustainable development".Through establishment of a social interactive process based on shared values in the spirit of acquis communautaire for joint regional security gain, the Eu is simultaneously transferring some elements of governance which have been developed by the Eu institutions with focus on sustainable development determinants.Soft security instruments are used in the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and related projects for implementation of this Eu initiative and function as a component of the process of joint management of those projects.Taking into account theoretical insights provided by Buzan (2004) in respect of types of interstate society, as well as his interpretation of the concepts of "pluralism and "solidarism", as assumptions for an overview of Eu policies in respect of the region of concern, the following logics for separating two modes of Eu approaches: (1) proactive: transformational or enhanced approach and (2) reactive: preventive or limited approach to regional security is suggested: The Eu has reached the development stage featured in higher or lower degree by cooperative, convergence and confederative types presenting thick layer of institutions, norms and shared liberal values that constitute comparatively high level of solidarism which ensures comparatively high level of stability and security.The regional security dimension of its external policies is focused on neighbouring states that feature coexistence and partly cooperative (mainly its pluralist side) types of interstate society presenting thinner layer institutions and norms with weak or without sufficient adherence to shared liberal values.from the point of view of the Eu politicians, the latter is seen as more vulnerable to changes of circumstance and less stable than international society of the Eu itself.As a long-term solution for enhancing regional security and stability within its neighbouring states a number of sets of various Eu external policies and joint projects are used to encourage and assist those states to gradually transform their social and economic relationships in a variety of ways: innovative, imitative, continuative or restorative (Šaulauskas 2000) as well as (in the long run) their socio-cultural contexts and collective identities enabling movement towards convergence type based on shared liberal values in the spirit of acquis communautaire since this model is seen as an advanced option in stability, security and economic terms, as it has been proved by Eu historic development since its interception.Trying to avoid unnecessary confrontation, the Eu, according to this logics, should be keen to rely mainly on non-coercive means featuring attractiveness of the projects' offer suggested to the Eu partner state(s) leading to establishment of a social interactive process of the pursue of joint regional security gain.The coercive instruments (mainly in the form of conditionality and binding legislation) are seen as means playing complimentary role and introduced on the basis of mutual consent.Eu initiative illustrating above mentioned logics is Eastern Partnership within European Neighbour-hood Policy which is described in the following way: "What happens in the countries in Eastern Europe and the Southern Caucasus affects the European union.Successive Eu enlargements have brought these countries closer to the Eu and their security, stability and prosperity increasingly impact on the Eu's.The potential these countries offer for diversifying the Eu's energy supplies is one example.All these countries, to varying degrees, are carrying out political, social and economic reforms, and have stated their wish to come closer to the Eu.The conflict in Georgia in August 2008 confirmed how vulnerable they can be, and how the Eu's security begins outside our borders.The European Commission put forward concrete ideas for enhancing our relationship with: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and ukraine.This would imply new association agreements including deep and comprehensive free trade agreements with those countries willing and able to enter into a deeper engagement and gradual integration in the Eu economy.It would also allow for easier travel to the Eu through gradual visa liberalisation, accompanied by measures to tackle illegal immigration.The Partnership will also promote democracy and good governance, strengthen energy security, promote sector reform and environment protection, encourage people to people contacts, support economic and social development and offer additional funding for projects to reduce socio-economic imbalances and increase stability" (European External Action Service 2012).The objective of the ENP which was developed in 2004 is "to share the benefits of the Eu's 2004 enlargement with neighbouring countries in strengthening stability, security and well-being for all concerned.It is designed to prevent the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged Eu and its neighbours and to offer them the chance to participate in various Eu activities, through greater political, security, economic and cultural co-operation. [...]The privileged relationship with neighbours will build on mutual commitment to common values principally within the fields of the rule of law, good governance, the respect for human rights, including minority rights, the promotion of good neighbourly relations, and the principles of market economy and sustainable development" (European Commission 2004: 3) .Regarding the Common foreign and Security Policy (CfSP) and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) as security governance instruments the "Eu and partner countries should also work together on effective multilateralism, so as to reinforce global governance, strengthen coordination in combating security threats and address related development issues.Improved co-ordination within the established political dialogue formats should be explored, as well as the possible involvement of partner countries in aspects of CfSP and ESDP, conflict prevention, crisis management, the exchange of information, joint training and exercises and possible participation in Eu-led crisis management operations.Another important priority will be the further development of a shared responsibility between the Eu and partners for security and stability in the neighbourhood region" (European Commission 2004: 13).The ENP's initially bilateral format was further enriched with regional and multilateral co-operation initiatives, the EaP being one of them.According to European Commission, the "Eu and Russia have decided to develop their strategic partnership through the creation of four common spaces as agreed at the St Petersburg Summit in May 2003.Russia and the enlarged European union form part of each other's neighbourhood.It is in our common interest to draw on elements of the ENP to enrich work on the common spaces, notably in the areas of cross-border and sub-regional co-operation.The Eu and Russia need to work together, as neighbours, on common concerns" (European Commission 2004: 6).The long term four "common spaces" were created in the framework of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement and on the basis of common values and shared interests.These cover the following issues: (1) Common Economic Space, covering economic issues and the environment; Monitoring Mission in Georgia, started in 2008) are being carried out in this policy context (European External Action Service 2011).The first mission focuses on prevention of smuggling, trafficking, and customs fraud by the job training and advice by professionals of border management services in Eu Member States to Moldovan and ukrainian officials providing Eu support for capacity building for border management, including customs, on the Moldova-ukraine border.The second is an unarmed and non-executive civilian ceasefire (after 2008 South Ossetia war) Eu monitoring mission for stabilisation, normalisation and confidence building, as well as reporting to the Eu in order to inform European policy-making and thus contribute to the future Eu engagement in the region.In addition, Moldova and ukraine are members of Energy Community, while Georgia has an observer status in this organisation.Another important direction of using soft security instruments is a broadened and deepened scope of Eu participation in political forums for regional intergovernmental cooperation such as the Council of the Baltic Sea States, Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe and others.However, existing socio-cultural barriers and national prerogatives result in higher or lower levels of motivation to engage in the cooperative projects suggested by the Eu.As Sergunin (2010) points out, "Although Russia has embraced a growing number of cooperative projects with the Eu, there have also been some limitations restricting both Russia's engagement and the success of different projects.These include residual mistrust and prejudice, bureaucratic resistance in both Brussels and Moscow, authoritarian trends in Russia's domestic policies, uneasy relations between "old" and "new" Eu members, conflicting interests in the post-Soviet space and (as mentioned) the lack of an updated and revised Partnership & Cooperation Agreement".Moscow reacted, according to Sergunin (2010) "to the EaP with both caution and scepticism, because the Russian leadership was not sure about its real goals: is the Eu serious about making its new neighbourhood a stable and safe place or is it some kind of geopolitical drive to undermine Russia's positions in the area?Moscow is particularly sensitive about the EaP programme because Russia has fundamental interests in the region that range from strategic and political (confederation with Belarus, military-technical cooperation with Belarus and Armenia, military conflict with Georgia, support of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia) to economic (investments, trade, energy supply, etc.)issues.It seems that the lack of a sound Russian strategy towards the EaP is one of the sources of misunderstanding in Eu-Russia bilateral cooperation, a misunderstanding that sometimes contributes to derailing the Brussels-Moscow dialogue.As a result of this, both Eu and Russian policies often give the impression of muddling on rather than a sound and forward-looking strategy".As a result of various overviewed above Eu initiated policies and related projects which are each other complementing and reinforcing within Eu and Eastern Dimension of European Neighbourhood Policy related states the two emerging subsystems can be differentiated: integration subsystem between the Eu and those states which are more open to Eu initiatives and its transformational approach, and subsystem with those states that are reserved (e.g. Rf and Belarus) in respect of Eu strategies.The sub system which is developing on the basis of Eu enhanced transformational approach has prospects of gradually turning into quasi organisation suitable for application of insights and methods developed by governance and organizational theories focussing on competence enhancement, such as Responsive/ Good Governance concept (OECD 2005; united Nations 2005) , strategic approach to Human Resource Development developed and promoted by Garavan et al. (1999) , Buyens et al. (2001) , Hockey et al. (2005) , Luoma (2000) , Šiugždinienė (2008) and others, and Organizational Theory (Schout 2009) with focus on organizational learning processes and change through the establishment of a learning organization.This gradual formation of such quasi organisation includes most open and expressing interest in deeper European integration states: Moldova, ukraine and Georgia.Additional privileges for participants from those countries in regional security governance, focused on competence development using different formats, could lead to higher level of regional security as precondition for sustainable development.They could include: privileged access of particular Eu partner's citizens to educational programmes and training schemes focusing on Eu studies and regional security issues (e.g. energy security, social stability and others) combined with acquiring project management, team building skills as well as qualities of effective teamwork; privilege of participation in the joint projects for graduates from men-tioned above educational programmes; privilege of participation in the joint policy making frameworks featuring possible extension of some of Eu inherent modern forms of security governance, and others.Suggested instrumental approach to soft security based on defining soft security instruments as sets of various purposefully organised social practices focussing and relying on sharing, congruence and development of values and competences of regional security governance initiators and participants revealed capacity of soft security instruments to contribute to both regional security and sustainable development as well as to foster the European integration in Eu neighbourhood.Raising effectiveness of soft security instruments in the process of joint project management in the region of concern would imply considering special treatment of most open and expressing interest in deeper integration with the Eu states addressed by Eastern Dimension of European Neighbourhood Policy and proposing them a number of privileges for their representatives in the form of opportunities to develop their security governance related competences through participation in specific educational programmes and training schemes, Eu initiated joint cooperative project management and relevant joint security policy formation on gradually expanding scale.
Cybercrime exploits cross-national differences in the capacity to prevent, detect, investigate, and prosecute such crime, and is fast becoming a growing global concern (United Nations, 2004) .This transnational character provides cybercriminals, whether operating as individuals or as organized crime groups, with the potential to evade counter-measures, even when these are designed and implemented by the most capable actors (Brenner, 2006; Council of Europe, 2005; Broadhurst & Choo, 2011) .Cybercrime has evolved in parallel with the opportunities afforded by the rapid increase in the use of the Internet for e-commerce and its take-up in the developing world.In February 2013, 2.7 billion people, nearly 40% of the world population, had access to the Internet.The rate was higher in the developed world (77%) than in the developing world (31%).While Africa had the lowest Internet penetration rate (16%), between 2009 and 2013 Internet penetration has grown fastest in Africa (annual growth of 27%) followed by Asia-Pacific, the former Soviet Union, and the Arab states (15% annual growth rate).Around onequarter of all Internet users used English (27%) on the web, and another quarter (24%) used Chinese (International Telecommunication Union, 2013) .This increasingly diffuse and interdependent market will attract a diverse range of criminal actors.The growth in scale and scope of cybercrime since 2005 has been attributed to the proliferation of 'botnets' 1 as mass tools for computer misuse aided by 'exploit kits' (e.g., Blackhole Exploit Kit) that compromise systems and 'botnet kits' (e.g., ZeuS) that subsequently provide control of the compromised computers to cybercriminals for nefarious purposes..Spam and malicious websites are still the usual vectors for deceptive intrusion and widespread distribution of 'malware' such as 'bots'.2 Various forms of social engineering are also common means of compromising computers.Botnet operators or 'herders' provide such services for fees that reflect the number and likely value of 'zombie' (or infected) computers in the botnet.These activities operate like criminal services in other domains of crime, for example, those of forgers or money launderers.Crimeware toolkit users also adopt the 'software as a service' approach by renting out malicious software from their creators or owners for a specified period of time during which they are then used to commit crime.A more basic service is that of a stolen-data supplier, who allows others to download stolen data, such as credit card details, for a fee (Ben-Itzhak, 2009) .In short, cybercrime has gradually evolved from a relatively low volume crime committed by an individual specialist offender to a mainstream or common high volume crime 'organized and industrial like'(see Moore, Clayton, & Anderson, 2009; Anderson et al., 2012) .While many types of cybercrime require a high degree of organization and specialization, there is insufficient empirical evidence to ascertain if cybercrime is now dominated by organized crime groups and what form or structure such groups may take (Lusthaus, 2013) .Digital technology has empowered individuals as never before.Teenagers acting alone have succeeded in disabling air traffic control systems, shutting down major e-retailers, and manipulating trades on the NASDAQ stock exchange (US Securities and Exchange Commission, 2000) .What individuals can do, organizations can also do, and often better.It is apparent that many if not all types of criminal organization are capable of engaging in cybercrime.The Internet and related technologies lend themselves perfectly to coordination across a dispersed area.Thus, an organized crime group may be a highly structured traditional mafia like group that engages delinquent IT professionals.Alternatively, it could be a short-lived project driven by a group that undertakes a specific online crime and/or targets a particular victim or group.Rather than groups, it may involve a wider community that is exclusively based online and dealing in digital property (e.g. trading in 'cracked' software or distributing obscene images of children).3 It may also consist of individuals who operate alone but are linked to a macro-criminal network (Spapens, 2010) as may be found in the 'darknet' and underground Tor 4 sites.Many cybercrimes begin with unauthorized access to a computer system.Information systems may be targeted for the data they contain, including banking and credit card details, commercial trade secrets, or classified information held by governments.Theft of personal financial details has provided the basis for thriving markets in such data, which enable fraud on a significant scale (Glenny, 2011) .The Internet has also been used as a vehicle for fraud.Spurious investment solicitations, marriage proposals, and a variety of other fraudulent overtures are made daily by the hundreds of millions.A recent estimate showed that of approximately 183 billion emails sent every day in the first quarter of 2013 alone, 6 billion contained malicious attachments.Such volume indicates the scale of the problem in this common vector for acquiring unauthorised access to a computer (Kaspersky Lab 2013).In recent years, insurgent and extremist groups have used Internet technology as an instrument of theft in order to enhance their resource base.Imam Samudra, convicted architect of the 2002 Bali bombings, reportedly called upon his followers to commit credit card fraud in order to finance militant activities (Sipress, 2004) .As digital technology pervades modern society, we have become increasingly dependent upon it to manage our lives.Much of our ordinary communications and record keeping rely on the Internet and related technologies.Just as digital technology enhances the efficiency of our ordinary legitimate activities, so too does it enhance the efficiency of criminal activities.Conventional criminals and terrorists use the Internet as a medium of communication in furtherance of criminal conspiracies.And, as is the case with law-abiding citizens, digital technology enhances the capacity for storing records and other information, and for performing financial transactions.In the case of criminals, such transactions may be part of money laundering activities.Manufacturers of illicit drugs advertise and trade recipes over the Internet (Schneider, 2003 ; See also United States of America v Ross William Ulbricht 2013).Governments, law enforcement, academic researchers, and the cyber-security industry speculate that 'conventional' organized crime groups have become increasingly involved in digital crime.The available empirical data suggest that criminals, operating online or on the ground, are more likely to be involved in loosely associated illicit networks rather than formal organizations (Décary-Hétu & Dupont, 2012).McGuire's (2012) review found that up to 80% of cybercrime could be the result of some form of organized activity.This does not mean, however, that these groups take the form of traditional, hierarchical organized crime groups or that these groups commit exclusively digital crime.Rather, the study suggests that traditional organized crime groups are extending their activities to the digital world alongside newer, looser types of crime networks.Crime groups show various levels of organization, depending on whether their activity is purely aimed at online targets, uses online tools to enable crimes in the 'real' world, or combine online and offline targets.McGuire's review estimated that half the cybercrime groups in his sample comprised six or more people, with one-quarter of groups comprising over 10 individuals.One-quarter of cybercrime groups had operated for less than 6 months.However, the size of the group or the duration of their activities did not predict the scale of offending, as small groups can cause significant damage in a short time.Cybercriminals may operate as loose networks, but evidence suggests that members are still located in close geographic proximity even when their attacks are cross-national.For example, small local networks, as well as groups centred on relatives and friends, remain significant actors.Cybercrime hot spots with potential links to organized crime groups are found in countries of the former Soviet Union (Kshetri, 2013a ; see also Microsoft Security Blog, 2010).Hackers from Russia and Ukraine are regarded as skilful innovators.For example, the cybercrime hub in the small town of Rmnicu Vicea in Romania is one of a number of such hubs widely reported in Eastern Europe (Bhattacharjee, 2011) .There is also increasing concern about cybercrime in China (China Daily 2010; Pauli, 2012) .The source and extent of malware attacks (whether of domestic or foreign origin) and the scale of malware/botnet activity remain unclear, but a substantial proportion of Chinese computers are compromised and it is likely that local crime groups play a crucial role (Kshetri, 2013a; Chang, 2012; Kshetri, 2013b; Broadhurst & Chang, 2013) .A recent study of spam and phishing sources found that these originated from a small number of ISPs (20 of 42,201 observed), which the author dubbed 'Internet bad neighbourhoods.'One in particular, Spectranet (Nigeria), was host to 62% of IP addresses that were spam related.Phishing hosts were mostly located in the United States, while spam originated from ISPs located in India, Brazil and Vietnam (Moura, 2013) .Given the diversity of the types and sources of cybercrime, it is important to avoid stereotypical images of cybercriminals or spreading an alarmist or 'moral panic' narrative.Popular images include the menacing Russian hacker in pursuit of profit, or more recently the Chinese 'hacker patriot.'Such offender images offer a specific type of 'folk devil;' David Wall (2012) regards them as inherently misleading about the assumptions of offender action and sources of cybercrime.Despite the media image, offenders come from many nations and motivations are diverse, although financial goals appear to dominate.5 The standard definition of organized crime contained in the UN Palermo Convention, 6 based on the participation of three or more persons acting in concert, does not extend to certain highly sophisticated forms of organization such as the mobilization of robot networks that may be operated by a single person.So-called botnets involve an offender using malicious software to acquire control over a large number of computers (the largest including more than a million separate machines).Even though the individual and institutional custodians of compromised computers may be unwitting participants in a criminal enterprise, some commentators maintain that botnets mobilized by a sole offender should be considered a form of organized crime (Chang, 2012) .The absence of evidence about the extent, role, and nature of organized crime groups in cyberspace impedes the development of sound countermeasures.While a growing number of experts consider that cybercrime has become the domain of organized groups and the days of the lone hacker are past, little is yet known about the preferred structures and longevity of groups, how trust is assured, and the relationship with other forms of crime.There is an absence of evidence-based research about offender behaviour and recruitment in cyberspace, although learning and imitation play important roles (Broadhurst & Grabosky, 2005) .Hence, organized crime groups cannot be understood from their functional (illicit) activities alone, that is -as rational profit-driven networks of criminal actors-since socio-cultural forces also play an important role in the genesis and sustainability of such groups.In some cases obsessivecompulsive behaviour is evident; in others, a sense of impunity (born of over-confidence in anonymity) is apparent.Greed may be only one of many motives: lust, excitement, rebellion, technological challenge, and the desire for notoriety or celebrity status may be present to varying degrees, depending on the types of crime.McGuire (2012) has suggested a typology of cybercrime groups, which comprises six types of group structure.He emphasized that 'these basic organizational patterns often cross-cut in highly fluid and confusing ways' and the typology represents a 'best guess,' based on what we currently know about cyber offenders.He notes that the typology is likely to change as the digital environment evolves.McGuire's typology includes three main group types, each divided into two subgroups depending on the strength of association between members: Type I groups operate essentially online and can be further divided into swarms and hubs.They are mostly 'virtual' and trust is assessed via reputation in online illicit activities.o Swarms share many of the features of networks and are described as 'disorganized organizations [with] common purpose without leadership.'Typically swarms have minimal chains of command and may operate in viral forms in ways reminiscent of earlier 'hacktivist' groups.Swarms seem to be most active in ideologically driven online activities such as hate crimes and political resistance.The group Anonymous illustrates a typical swarm-type group (Olson, 2012 Type II groups combine online and offline offending and are described as 'hybrids', which in turn are said to be 'clustered' or 'extended.' o In a clustered hybrid, offending is articulated around a small group of individuals and focused around specific activities or methods.They are somewhat similar in structure to hubs, but move seamlessly between online and offline offending.A typical group will skim credit cards, then use the data for online purchases or on-sell the data through carding networks (McGuire, 2012, 50; Soudijn & Zegers, 2012) .Groups of the extended hybrid form operate in similar ways to the clustered hybrids but are a lot less centralized.They typically include many associates and subgroups and carry out a variety of criminal activities, but still retain a level of coordination sufficient to ensure the success of their operations.Type III groups operate mainly offline but use online technology to facilitate their offline activities.McGuire argues that this type of group needs to be considered because they are increasingly contributing to digital crime.Like the previous group-types, Type III groups can be subdivided into 'hierarchies' and 'aggregates', according to their degree of cohesion and organization.o Hierarchies are best described as traditional criminal groups (e.g. crime families), which export some of their activities online.For example, the traditional interest of some mafia groups in prostitution now extends to pornography websites; other examples include online gambling, extortion, and blackmail through threats of shutting down systems or accessing private records via malware attacks or hacking.(US v Fiore et al (2009) ; United States Attorney, Eastern District of New York, 2003) o Aggregate groups are loosely organized, temporary, and often without clear purpose.They make use of digital technologies in an ad hoc manner, which nevertheless can inflict harm.Examples include the use of Blackberry or mobile phones to coordinate gang activity or public disorder, as occurred during the 2011 UK riots or the Sydney riots in September 2012 (Cubby & McNeilage, 2012) .The most sophisticated cybercrime organizations are characterized by substantial functional specialization and division of labor.The following roles, outlined in a speech by a representative of the US Federal Bureau of Investigation's Cyber Division, illustrate the kind of roles that a major fraud conspiracy may entail (Chabinsky, 2010):1. Coders or programmers write the malware, exploits, and other tools necessary to commit the crime.2. Distributors or vendors trade and sell stolen data, and vouch for the goods provided by the other specialties.3. Technicians maintain the criminal infrastructure and supporting technologies, such as servers, ISPs, and encryption.4. Hackers search for and exploit vulnerabilities in applications, systems, and networks in order to gain administrator or payroll access.5. Fraud specialists develop and employ social engineering schemes, including phishing, spamming, and domain squatting.6. Hosts provide "safe" facilities of illicit content servers and sites, often through elaborate botnet and proxy networks.7. Cashers control drop accounts and provide those names and accounts to other criminals for a fee; they also typically manage individual cash couriers, or "money mules."8. Money mules transfer the proceeds of frauds which they have committed to a third party for further transfer to a secure location.9. Tellers assist in transferring and laundering illicit proceeds through digital currency services and between different national currencies.10. Executives of the organization select the targets, and recruit and assign members to the above tasks, in addition to managing the distribution of criminal proceeds.This ideal type is not necessarily limited to a formal, fixed organization.Some functions may be outsourced, as was the case with the Koobface group discussed below.The organization of cybercrime may also occur at a wider level involving networks of individuals that meet and interact within online discussion forums and chat rooms.Some discussion forums function as 'virtual' black markets that advertise, for example, stolen credit card numbers (Holt and Lampke, 2010) .Among Chinese cybercriminals, QQ is a popular instant messaging and chat service, as well as the preferred choice for private contact linked to 'carding' -the market in stolen credit cards and their acquisition (Yip, 2011) .Given the ephemeral nature of many of the interactions, such networks operate as criminal macro-networks rather than closely knit groups.The first set of illustrative cases involves individual offenders.All these offenders were male; four were under 30 when they committed their offences, the other two were in their mid-30s.Only one of these cases had a financial motive, although Pearson, the offender, denied this.Cleary and Auernheimer claimed that the reason for their offending was, at least in part, altruistic.They wanted to demonstrate that despite claims to the contrary, the data repository of large corporations and organizations, which kept important confidential information on their clients, was not secure.It is likely that the desire for fame and recognition of their skills also played a part in their actions.Swartz was also motivated by ideology and believed that information should be freely accessible.The two other hackers were pushed by emotional reasons: Chaney by his obsession with celebrities, and Yin, by his desire for revenge after losing his job.Pearson benefited financially from hacking, but he could potentially have stolen much more.The final case illustrates the potential harm that just one cybercriminal might cause.All faced the risk of long prison sentences.Police in the UK arrested 19-year-old Ryan Cleary for allegedly orchestrating a distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack against the website of the British Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) website in 2011, and the websites of the International Federation of the Phonographic Industry and the British Phonographic Industry during the previous year.Cleary allegedly rented and sublet a large botnet to conduct the attack.He was associated with the hacking group LulzSec, although the group itself denied that he was a member, claiming that he was merely a loose associate.Cleary's arrest followed his exposure by Anonymous who published his name, address, and phone number as retaliation for his hacking into the group AnonOps' website and exposing over 600 nicknames and IP addresses.Cleary was reported as stating that AnonOps was 'publicity hungry.'He pleaded guilty to most of the charges, and in May 2013 was sentenced to imprisonment for 32 months (The Guardian 2013; see also Olson, 2012) .In June 2010, 25-year-old Andrew Auernheimer managed to obtain the email addresses of 114,000 iPad users including celebrities and politicians, by hacking the website of the telecommunication company AT&T.Auernheimer was a member of the group Goatse Security, that specializes in uncovering security flaws.The attack was carried out when Auernheimer and other hackers realized they could trick the AT&T site into offering up the email address of iPad users if they sent an HTTP request that included the SIM card serial number for the corresponding device.Simply guessing serial numbers, a task made easy by the fact that they were generated sequentially during manufacturing, allowed access to a large number of addresses.Auernheimer and Goatse released details about the attacks to Gawker Media.Shortly after, the FBI arrested Auernheimer in connection with the breach.In March 2013, he was sentenced to 3 ½ years in prison for exploiting an AT&T security flaw (Chickowski, 2011 ; "Goatse Security," 2013; Thomas, 2013).A programmer and fellow at Harvard University's Safra Center for Ethics, 24-year-old Aaron Swartz was indicted in 2011 after he downloaded more than 4 million academic articles through the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) network connection to JSTOR, an online academic repository.Swartz used anonymous log-ins on the network in September 2010 and actively worked to mask his log-ins when MIT and JSTOR tried to stop the massive drain of copyrighted material.After JSTOR shut down the access to its database from the entire MIT network, Swartz went on campus, directly plugged his laptop in the information infrastructure of a MIT networking room, and left it hidden as it downloaded more content.However, an IT administrator reported the laptop to the authorities.A hidden webcam was installed and when Swartz came and picked up his laptop, he was identified and arrested.Swartz did not steal any confidential data and, once the content of the site had been secured, JSTOR did not wish to initiate legal action; however, federal prosecutors went ahead and charged Swartz with 13 felony counts (United States of America v Aaron Swartz, 2012).Swartz was known as 'a freedom-ofinformation activist' who called for civil disobedience against copyright laws, particularly in relation to the dissemination of publicly funded research.Swartz said he was protesting how JSTOR stifled academic research and that he had planned to make the articles he downloaded publicly and freely available.Swartz committed suicide in early 2013, before his court case was finalised.His family accused the government of having some responsibility for his death because of the overzealous prosecution of what they described as a non-violent victimless crime.In March 2013 he was posthumously awarded the James Madison Award by the American Library Association, a prize to acknowledge those who champion public access to information (Bort, 2013; Cohen, 2013) .In what amounted to 'cyberstalking', celebrity-obsessed Christopher Chaney, 35 years, used publicly available information from celebrity blog sites to guess the passwords to Google and Yahoo email accounts owned by over 50 stars, including Scarlett Johansson, Mila Kunis, and Christina Aguilera.He successfully managed to hack into the accounts and set up an emailforwarding system to send himself a copy of all emails received by the stars.From November 2010 to October 2011, Chaney had access to emails, photos, and confidential documents.He was responsible for the release of nude photos of Scarlett Johansson that subsequently circulated on the Internet.He was also accused of circulating nude photos of two (non-celebrity) women but he denied this.FBI investigators did not give details of how they tracked Chaney, who was sentenced to 10 years jail in December 2012.Chaney apologized for his actions; he said that he empathized with the victims but could not stop what he was doing (Eimiller, 2011; Chickowski, 2011) .Fired after being accused of selling stolen Gucci shoes and bags on the Asian grey market, a former Gucci IT employee, Sam Yin, 34 years, managed to hack into the company's system using a secret account he had created while working, and a bogus employee's name.He shut down the whole operation's computers, cutting off employee access to files and emails for nearly an entire business day.During that day he deleted servers, destroyed storage set-ups and wiped out mailboxes.Gucci estimated the cost of the intrusion at $200,000.Yin was sentenced to prison for a minimum of 2 years and a maximum of 6 years in September 2012 (Italiano, 2012) .Originally from York, Northern England, 23-year old Edward Pearson stole 8 million identities, 200,000 PayPal account details, and 2,700 bank card numbers between January 2010 and August 2011.Using the malware ZeuS and SpyEye, which he rewrote to suit his purpose, he managed to not only hack into the PayPal website but also into the networks of AOL and Nokia, which remained down for two weeks.Pearson finally got caught after his girlfriend tried to use forged credit cards to pay hotel bills.He was described as 'incredibly talented' and a clever computer coder, who had been active in cybercrime forums for several years prior to his hacking spree.His lawyer, however, argued that Pearson was not so interested in making money but that hacking was 'an intellectual challenge'.A prosecutor estimated that based on the information he had stolen, he could potentially have stolen $13 million; yet, before his arrest, he had only stolen around $3,700, which he had spent on takeaway meals and mobile phone bills.Pearson was sentenced to 26 months jail in April 2012 (Liebowitz, 2012) .The next set of cases involves small groups or networks of offenders, and illustrates the diversity of criminal organizations operating across crime types.LulzSec was a loose network of likeminded hackers responsible for infiltrating the systems of high profile organizations, supposedly to draw attention to potential security failures.Dreamboard was a members-only group that exchanged illicit images of children.DrinkOrDie was an organization devoted to piracy and the dissemination of pirated content.The four other organizations were motivated by financial profit.Each organization was the target of successful law enforcement action, and, as such, they may not be representative of other organisations whose members managed to avoid prosecution.One common characteristic of these groups was their trans-national reach.Each was comprised of members from different countries and was active across borders.Some members of these groups have been convicted for their cybercrimes.Cody Kretsinger (nicknamed Recursion) was arrested for allegedly carrying out an attack against Sony Pictures on behalf of LulzSec in September 2011.Kretsinger, aged 25, was arrested when the UK-based proxy server HideMyAss, a service that disguises the online identity of its customers, provided logs to police.These allowed them to match time-stamps with IP addresses and identify Kretsinger (Chickowski, 2011; Olson, 2012) .In April 2012, Kretsinger pleaded guilty to unauthorised access, conspiracy and attempting to break into computers, and he was later sentenced to one year in jail and 1,000 hours community service.Kretsinger, along with other members of LulzSec, obtained confidential information from the computer systems of Sony Pictures by using an SQL injection attack against the website.They disseminated the stolen data on the Internet.The stolen data contained confidential information such as names, addresses, phone numbers, and e-mail addresses for thousands of Sony customers.Dreamboard was a members-only group that exchanged illicit images of children under the age of twelve, until its interdiction by a multi-national police investigation begun in 2009.The operation resulted in charges against 72 people in 14 countries across five continents.Servers were situated in the United States, and the group's top administrators were located in France and Canada.Rules of conduct on the site's bulletin board were printed in English, Russian, Japanese and Spanish.It was a very sophisticated operation that vetted prospective members, required continuing contributions of illicit material as a condition of membership, and rewarded those who produced and shared their own content.Members achieved status levels reflecting the quantity and quality of their contributions.The group used aliases rather than their actual names.Links to illicit content were encrypted and password-protected.Access to the group's bulletin board was through proxy servers.These routed traffic through other computers in order to mask a member's true location, thereby impeding investigators from tracing the member's online activity (US Department of Homeland Security, 2011).DrinkOrDie, founded in Moscow in 1993, was a group of copyright pirates who illegally reproduced and distributed software, games, and movies over the Internet.Within three years the group expanded internationally and counted around 65 members in 12 countries including Britain, Australia, Finland, Norway, Sweden, and the US.The membership included a relatively large proportion of undergraduate university students who were technologically sophisticated and skilled in security, programming, and internet communication.The group was highly organized, hierarchical in form, and entailed a division of labour.A new program was often obtained through employees of software companies; 'crackers' stripped the content of its electronic protection; 'testers' made sure the unprotected version worked; and 'packers' distributed the pirated version to around 10,000 publicly accessible sites around the Internet.The content was available to casual users and to other criminal enterprises for commercial distribution.Members were not motivated by profit but by their desire to compete with other pirates and to achieve recognition as the first group to distribute a perfect copy of a newly pirated product.DrinkOrDie's most prominent achievement was its illegal distribution of Windows 95 two weeks prior to the official release by Microsoft.The group was dismantled by authorities in 2001 and 20 members were convicted worldwide.Eleven people were prosecuted in the US in 2002 including one woman.They were between 20 and 34 years.Two of the leaders were sentenced to 46 and 33 months jail respectively (US Department of Justice, 2001 Justice, , 2002 .Dark Market, founded in 2005, was a website providing the infrastructure for an online bazaar where buyers and sellers of credit card and banking details could meet, and illicit material such as malicious software could be purchased.Banking and card details were illicitly obtained by various means, including surreptitious recording at ATMs using 'skimming' devices, unauthorized access to personal or business information systems, or techniques of 'social engineering' where victims were persuaded to part with the details.Initially trading in stolen information occurred on a one-to-one basis, but given the sheer volume of such material, using a forum where prospective parties could interact collectively was much more efficient.At its peak, Dark Market was the world's pre-eminent English language 'carding' site, with over 2500 members from a number of countries around the world, including the UK, Canada, the US, Russia, Turkey, Germany and France.The group was highly organized.Prospective vendors had to prove that they were able to provide useable credit card information, which was assessed for its validity.Members were nominated and vetted.A maximum of four administrators ran the site at any time.They ensured the security of the site, provided an escrow service, and patrolled the site for 'illicit' activity such as dealing in drugs or child pornography.It seemed that reputation and status was more important for these VIP members than was self-enrichment.Ordinary members, who traded in information and used the information they bought to make money, generally sought to keep a low profile.The forum was infiltrated by an FBI agent and the investigation resulted in 60 arrests worldwide.One of the most prominent members, a 33-yearold Sri-Lankan born British man, was sentenced to 5years imprisonment in March 2010 (Glenny, 2011; Davies, 2010) .Six Estonian men, posing as the legitimate company Rove Digital, were arrested in November 2011 for creating and operating the DNSChanger malware, which allowed them to control Domain Name System (DNS) servers.DNS is an Internet service that converts domain names into numerical data that computers understand.Without DNS and DNS servers, Internet browsing, access to websites, and emails would be impossible.The group was running an Internet fraud operation that enabled them to manipulate Internet advertising.The malware was propagated using social engineering techniques; in one instance, the malware was offered as a video code that was supposedly required to watch adult movies.At its peak, an estimated four million computers worldwide were infected with the malware.DNSChanger worked by substituting advertising on websites with advertising sold by Rove Digital and by redirecting users of infected computers to rogue servers controlled by affiliates of the group.When users clicked on the links to a licit official website, they were in fact taken to a fake website that resembled the legitimate website but promoted counterfeit, and sometimes dangerous, products.The group allegedly netted $14 million in stolen advertising views.Operation Ghost Click, a five-year collaboration between the FBI and private corporations, began after Trend Micro researchers identified the gang's botnet.The six offenders were aged between 26 and 31 years.It is likely they will all be extradited to the US for trial.A seventh member of the group, a 31-yearold Russian man, has not yet been arrested (US Federal Bureau of Investigation 2011; Krebs on Security 2011).Carberp is malicious software designed to steal banking information.When it first appeared in 2009, Carberp was used exclusively by a small, closed group operating only in Russian-speaking countries.In 2011 the malware's creators started selling it to a few customers in the former Soviet Union.In March 2012, following a joint investigation with Group-IB, a Russian cyber security firm, Russian authorities arrested eight Carberp operators.The group was led by two brothers in their late 20s.One of them was already a known criminal with a record related to real estate fraud.The group demonstrated a high level of collaboration.Carberp's group members were working remotely from different cities in Ukraine.Using stolen banking data, they illegally transferred large sums of money into accounts controlled by the group.The money was then withdrawn from a variety of ATM machines in the Moscow area.It is estimated the group had stolen around $2 million from over 90 victims (Warner, 2012) .Despite the arrests, Carberp continued to evolve with added functionality.It has worked with three different cybercrime groups (Matrosov, 2012) .The first group had a direct association with the creator of the malware.In 2010 Carberp source code was sold to the organizer of the second group and they worked in parallel to develop a second version.The third group was already engaged in online bank fraud with the botnet Origami Hodprot but switched to using Carberp in 2011.As the botnet grew, the group's operations became increasingly organised and members of the group were highly coordinated.They had command-and-control servers in several European countries and the US, and attacked Russian as well as foreign banks.In December 2012, members from the Carberp team posted messages on underground Russian cybercrime forums, offering a new version of Carberp for rent.At US$40,000 per month, this was one of the most expensive kits thus far advertised.Carberp is said to be more effective and more dangerous than ZeuS and SpyEye, and might soon be able to target US and Australian banks (Constantin, 2012) .With various reports of the Carberp source code being available online in mid-2013, there are fears that improved 'copycat' variants may be developed and released in the near future.On 9 May 2013 eight men were charged in New York with stealing US$2.8 million in cash from a number of ATM machines.These men formed the New York cell of an international cybercrime ring running 'unlimited operations'.The headquarters of the cyber gang is located outside of the US, but there may be other cells in the US.The masterminds of the group had hacked the network of global financial institutions to steal prepaid debit card data.They managed to eliminate the withdrawing limit on these cards.Using fake cards manufactured from the stolen data, 'casher crews' were able to withdraw virtually unlimited funds from ATMs around the world.The individuals charged in New York comprised one of these 'casher crews.'It was later found that the leader of the gang had been murdered in April.Six of the seven suspects were under 25 years, and all were US citizens.Two worked as bus drivers for a private company.7 The New York gang conducted two successful operations.During the first one, in December 2012, a total of US$5 million was withdrawn in 20 countries.In New York City, the group scoured 140 ATMs, and stole US$400,000 in just 2 hours and 25 minutes.The second operation went for just over 10 hours on 19-20 February 2013.Worldwide, over US$40 million was taken; in New York City, the defendants withdrew US$2.4 million from around 3,000 ATMs.The success of such attacks was attributed to the speed and meticulous planning of these 'unlimited operations'.The New York prosecutor remarked: 'Unlimited operations' are marked by three characteristics: 1) the surgical precision of the hackers carrying out the cyber-attacks, 2) the global nature of the cybercrime organization, and 3) the speed and coordination with which the organization executes its operations on the ground.These attacks rely upon both highly sophisticated hackers and organized criminal cells whole role is to withdraw the cash as quickly as possible.' (US Attorney's Office, 2013) Koobface is a worm-based malware that targets Web 2.0 social networks such as Facebook (the name of the malware is an anagram of Facebook).Koobface spread by sending messages to 'friends' of an infected Facebook account user.The message directed the recipient to a fake website where they were prompted to download what was presented as an update to Adobe Flash Player.Once the fake program was installed, Koobface controlled the computer's search engine and directed the user toaffiliated illicit websites offering various scams such as false investments, fake AV programs, fake dating services, etc.The Koobface botnet made money through pay-per-install and pay-per-click fees from these other websites.Sophos identified five potential members of the Koobface gang, also referred to as 'Ali Baba & 4' who operated from Russian and Czech locations.One member was older than the others and possibly the leader, but the structure of the group was not fully understood.Members of the group had previously worked in online pornography, spyware, and also attempted to conduct a legitimate mobile software and services business, MobSoft Ltd (Richmond 2012) .The Koobface crime group was able to regularly upgrade and adapt the botnet, which included an effective Traffic Direction System that managed the activity on affiliate sites and boosted the Internet traffic to the botnet (e.g. targeting showbiz fans, online daters, casual porn surfers, and car enthusiasts).The overall structure of the botnet was resilient; it survived takedown attempts and countermeasures by targets such as Facebook, Google, and other social networks.Data found in the botnet's command-and-control system suggested the group has earned around $2 million a year.One of the more significant developments in cybercrime over the past decade has been an apparent increase in the volume of illegal activity committed by governments or their proxies.Because of the sensitive nature of such activities, their nature and extent tend to be obscured from public view.Nevertheless, recent disclosures, some noted below, have been informative.One might envisage a continuum of state-private interaction, from state monopoly of criminal activity at one extreme, to state ignorance of private criminal activity at the other.In between these polar extremes, one might find formal collaboration between state and non-state entities; loose cooperation between state authorities and private criminal actors; active sponsorship by the state; tacit encouragement of non-state crime; the state turning a "blind eye" to the activity in question; and state incapacity to control private illegality.(Stohl, 2014)PLA (Mandiant, 2013; Sanger, Barboza, & Perlroth, 2013) .Operation Olympic Games is reportedly a collaboration between the US National Security Agency and its Israeli counterpart, Unit 8200, intended to disrupt the Iranian nuclear enrichment program.It allegedly involved the clandestine insertion of an extremely complex and sophisticated set of software into communications and control systems at the Natanz nuclear facility.The software reportedly includes a capacity to monitor communications and processing activity, as well as the ability to corrupt control systems at the facility.The operation succeeded in delaying the progress of uranium enrichment through remote controlled destruction of a number of centrifuges used in the process.The secrecy surrounding the operation was compromised in part when the malicious software escaped because of a programming error.Neither the United States nor the Israeli governments have yet to acknowledge the existence of the operation (Sanger, 2012) .The above discussion raises two basic questions.The first is whether organizations and individual offenders pursue similar goals.The second is the degree to which the McGuire and Chabinsky typologies fit with the cases we have summarized, and the relationship, if any, between crime type and organizational form.Since the cases in question were not randomly chosen, our conclusions cannot be regarded as definitive.Rather, they are tentative judgments that may serve as the basis for further inquiry.Although they may not be representative of cybercriminals generally, the individual offenders discussed above appeared less preoccupied with financial gain than with libertarian ideology, technological challenge, celebrity obsession, and revenge against a former employer.This is not to suggest that money doesn't matter to solo cybercriminals.Rather, the observed variation enhances our appreciation of the range and diversity of individual motivations.Organizations, too, reflected a variety of goals, including defiance of authority, freedom of information, sexual gratification of members, and technological challenge.The profit motive was more apparent in the organization cases than with individual offenders.One notes the activities undertaken by organizations operating under state auspices, specifically those involving espionage and offensive cyber operations.These have explicit economic and political goals, which most certainly do not include the desire for publicity and notoriety.A comparison of individual offenders and criminal organizations reveals that both possessed impressive skills.Despite the formidable capacities of some individual offenders, the skills and resources of some organizations were truly extraordinary.This was particularly evident in the cases of state cyber activity, although the work of Drink or Die, Dreamboard and 'Unlimited Operation' all showed considerable complexity and sophistication.As discussed above, the organizational structure depicted in Chabinsky's model appears more characteristic of a sophisticated, enterprise-like fraud than of other crime types.The "Unlimited Operation" and Koobface cases would appear to provide the best fit.To a lesser extent, the "Drink or Die" group had a division of labor, involving at least six of the ten roles specified in Chabinsky's model.The group's lack of a significant financial motive precluded the need for "cashers" "tellers" and "money mules."McGuire's typology would also appear reliable in light of the cases we have discussed.The state crime cases appeared to consistent with hierarchy, or, to the extent that non-state actors are involved, with the extended hybrid form.Complex frauds, such as 'Unlimited Operation' are also the work of hierarchies.As we have noted, "annoyance crime" and relatively complex protest activity such as that involving denial of service, seem most suited to swarm; the work of Anonymous is illustrative.Protest activity of a more ad hoc, short term nature, is done by aggregate groups.Illicit markets and organized paedophile activity resemble hubs.To the extent that pedophile activity entails offline offending, it will take the clustered hybrid form.The study of organized cybercriminal activity is in its infancy.Every new technology and every new application will create an opportunity that criminals will soon seek to exploit.In order to keep abreast of cybercrime it will be important to track the evolution of the organizational forms that these criminal activities will take.This essay has taken a small step in this direction.2 Malware stands for 'malicious software' such as worms, viruses, and trojans.Bots or web robots allow a malicious user to control remotely computers infected by malware.3 The Internet has been used to communicate a wide variety of content deemed offensive to the point of criminal prohibition in one or more jurisdictions.Such material includes child pornography, neo Nazi propaganda, and advocacy of Tibetan independence, to list but a few.Jihadist propaganda and incitement messages also abound in cyberspace.4 Tor is an encrypted re-routing service designed to obscure the original source of an email or website on the Internet, sometimes known as The Onion Router.Law enforcement concerns about the widespread misuse of Tor recently led Japanese police to recommended blocking access to the service to those that misuse it (BBC Technology, 'Japanese police target users of Tor anonymous network', 22 April 2013, .5 The 2012 Verizon Data Breach Investigation Report identified that 75% of 621 confirmed breaches of data were financially motivated, .6 Article 2(a) of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime defines an 'organized criminal group [as] a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences established in accordance with this Convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit'.Article 2(c) clarifies that 'a structured group shall mean a group that is not randomly formed for the immediate commission of an offence and that does not need to have formally defined roles for its members, continuity of its membership or a developed structure'.A botnet is a network of individual computers, which have been compromised by malicious software and are controlled by a third-party, usually for the purpose of criminal activities (e.g. sending spam).	Cybercrime exploits cross-national differences in the capacity to prevent, detect, investigate, and prosecute such crime, and is fast becoming a growing global concern (United Nations, 2004) .This transnational character provides cybercriminals, whether operating as individuals or as organized crime groups, with the potential to evade counter-measures, even when these are designed and implemented by the most capable actors (Brenner, 2006; Council of Europe, 2005; Broadhurst & Choo, 2011) .Cybercrime has evolved in parallel with the opportunities afforded by the rapid increase in the use of the Internet for e-commerce and its take-up in the developing world.In February 2013, 2.7 billion people, nearly 40% of the world population, had access to the Internet.The rate was higher in the developed world (77%) than in the developing world (31%).While Africa had the lowest Internet penetration rate (16%), between 2009 and 2013 Internet penetration has grown fastest in Africa (annual growth of 27%) followed by Asia-Pacific, the former Soviet Union, and the Arab states (15% annual growth rate).Around onequarter of all Internet users used English (27%) on the web, and another quarter (24%) used Chinese (International Telecommunication Union, 2013) .This increasingly diffuse and interdependent market will attract a diverse range of criminal actors.The growth in scale and scope of cybercrime since 2005 has been attributed to the proliferation of 'botnets' 1 as mass tools for computer misuse aided by 'exploit kits' (e.g., Blackhole Exploit Kit) that compromise systems and 'botnet kits' (e.g., ZeuS) that subsequently provide control of the compromised computers to cybercriminals for nefarious purposes.. Spam and malicious websites are still the usual vectors for deceptive intrusion and widespread distribution of 'malware' such as 'bots'.2 Various forms of social engineering are also common means of compromising computers.Botnet operators or 'herders' provide such services for fees that reflect the number and likely value of 'zombie' (or infected) computers in the botnet.These activities operate like criminal services in other domains of crime, for example, those of forgers or money launderers.Crimeware toolkit users also adopt the 'software as a service' approach by renting out malicious software from their creators or owners for a specified period of time during which they are then used to commit crime.A more basic service is that of a stolen-data supplier, who allows others to download stolen data, such as credit card details, for a fee (Ben-Itzhak, 2009) .In short, cybercrime has gradually evolved from a relatively low volume crime committed by an individual specialist offender to a mainstream or common high volume crime 'organized and industrial like'(see Moore, Clayton, & Anderson, 2009; Anderson et al.,2012) .While many types of cybercrime require a high degree of organization and specialization, there is insufficient empirical evidence to ascertain if cybercrime is now dominated by organized crime groups and what form or structure such groups may take (Lusthaus, 2013) .Digital technology has empowered individuals as never before.Teenagers acting alone have succeeded in disabling air traffic control systems, shutting down major e-retailers, and manipulating trades on the NASDAQ stock exchange (US Securities and Exchange Commission, 2000) .What individuals can do, organizations can also do, and often better.It is apparent that many if not all types of criminal organization are capable of engaging in cybercrime.The Internet and related technologies lend themselves perfectly to coordination across a dispersed area.Thus, an organized crime group may be a highly structured traditional mafia like group that engages delinquent IT professionals.Alternatively, it could be a short-lived project driven by a group that undertakes a specific online crime and/or targets a particular victim or group.Rather than groups, it may involve a wider community that is exclusively based online and dealing in digital property (e.g. trading in 'cracked' software or distributing obscene images of children).3 It may also consist of individuals who operate alone but are linked to a macro-criminal network (Spapens, 2010) as may be found in the 'darknet' and underground Tor 4 sites.Many cybercrimes begin with unauthorized access to a computer system.Information systems may be targeted for the data they contain, including banking and credit card details, commercial trade secrets, or classified information held by governments.Theft of personal financial details has provided the basis for thriving markets in such data, which enable fraud on a significant scale (Glenny, 2011) .The Internet has also been used as a vehicle for fraud.Spurious investment solicitations, marriage proposals, and a variety of other fraudulent overtures are made daily by the hundreds of millions.A recent estimate showed that of approximately 183 billion emails sent every day in the first quarter of 2013 alone, 6 billion contained malicious attachments.Such volume indicates the scale of the problem in this common vector for acquiring unauthorised access to a computer (Kaspersky Lab 2013).In recent years, insurgent and extremist groups have used Internet technology as an instrument of theft in order to enhance their resource base.Imam Samudra, convicted architect of the 2002 Bali bombings, reportedly called upon his followers to commit credit card fraud in order to finance militant activities (Sipress, 2004) .As digital technology pervades modern society, we have become increasingly dependent upon it to manage our lives.Much of our ordinary communications and record keeping rely on the Internet and related technologies.Just as digital technology enhances the efficiency of our ordinary legitimate activities, so too does it enhance the efficiency of criminal activities.Conventional criminals and terrorists use the Internet as a medium of communication in furtherance of criminal conspiracies.And, as is the case with law-abiding citizens, digital technology enhances the capacity for storing records and other information, and for performing financial transactions.In the case of criminals, such transactions may be part of money laundering activities.Manufacturers of illicit drugs advertise and trade recipes over the Internet (Schneider, 2003 ; See also United States of America v Ross William Ulbricht 2013).Governments, law enforcement, academic researchers, and the cyber-security industry speculate that 'conventional' organized crime groups have become increasingly involved in digital crime.The available empirical data suggest that criminals, operating online or on the ground, are more likely to be involved in loosely associated illicit networks rather than formal organizations (Décary-Hétu & Dupont, 2012).McGuire's (2012) review found that up to 80% of cybercrime could be the result of some form of organized activity.This does not mean, however, that these groups take the form of traditional, hierarchical organized crime groups or that these groups commit exclusively digital crime.Rather, the study suggests that traditional organized crime groups are extending their activities to the digital world alongside newer, looser types of crime networks.Crime groups show various levels of organization, depending on whether their activity is purely aimed at online targets, uses online tools to enable crimes in the 'real' world, or combine online and offline targets.McGuire's review estimated that half the cybercrime groups in his sample comprised six or more people, with one-quarter of groups comprising over 10 individuals.One-quarter of cybercrime groups had operated for less than 6 months.However, the size of the group or the duration of their activities did not predict the scale of offending, as small groups can cause significant damage in a short time.Cybercriminals may operate as loose networks, but evidence suggests that members are still located in close geographic proximity even when their attacks are cross-national.For example, small local networks, as well as groups centred on relatives and friends, remain significant actors.Cybercrime hot spots with potential links to organized crime groups are found in countries of the former Soviet Union (Kshetri, 2013a ; see also Microsoft Security Blog, 2010).Hackers from Russia and Ukraine are regarded as skilful innovators.For example, the cybercrime hub in the small town of Rmnicu Vicea in Romania is one of a number of such hubs widely reported in Eastern Europe (Bhattacharjee, 2011) .There is also increasing concern about cybercrime in China (China Daily 2010; Pauli, 2012) .The source and extent of malware attacks (whether of domestic or foreign origin) and the scale of malware/botnet activity remain unclear, but a substantial proportion of Chinese computers are compromised and it is likely that local crime groups play a crucial role (Kshetri, 2013a; Chang, 2012; Kshetri, 2013b; Broadhurst & Chang, 2013) .A recent study of spam and phishing sources found that these originated from a small number of ISPs (20 of 42,201 observed), which the author dubbed 'Internet bad neighbourhoods.'One in particular, Spectranet (Nigeria), was host to 62% of IP addresses that were spam related.Phishing hosts were mostly located in the United States, while spam originated from ISPs located in India, Brazil and Vietnam (Moura, 2013) .Given the diversity of the types and sources of cybercrime, it is important to avoid stereotypical images of cybercriminals or spreading an alarmist or 'moral panic' narrative.Popular images include the menacing Russian hacker in pursuit of profit, or more recently the Chinese 'hacker patriot.'Such offender images offer a specific type of 'folk devil;' David Wall (2012) regards them as inherently misleading about the assumptions of offender action and sources of cybercrime.Despite the media image, offenders come from many nations and motivations are diverse, although financial goals appear to dominate.5 The standard definition of organized crime contained in the UN Palermo Convention, 6 based on the participation of three or more persons acting in concert, does not extend to certain highly sophisticated forms of organization such as the mobilization of robot networks that may be operated by a single person.So-called botnets involve an offender using malicious software to acquire control over a large number of computers (the largest including more than a million separate machines).Even though the individual and institutional custodians of compromised computers may be unwitting participants in a criminal enterprise, some commentators maintain that botnets mobilized by a sole offender should be considered a form of organized crime (Chang, 2012) .The absence of evidence about the extent, role, and nature of organized crime groups in cyberspace impedes the development of sound countermeasures.While a growing number of experts consider that cybercrime has become the domain of organized groups and the days of the lone hacker are past, little is yet known about the preferred structures and longevity of groups, how trust is assured, and the relationship with other forms of crime.There is an absence of evidence-based research about offender behaviour and recruitment in cyberspace, although learning and imitation play important roles (Broadhurst & Grabosky, 2005) .Hence, organized crime groups cannot be understood from their functional (illicit) activities alone, that is -as rational profit-driven networks of criminal actors-since socio-cultural forces also play an important role in the genesis and sustainability of such groups.In some cases obsessivecompulsive behaviour is evident; in others, a sense of impunity (born of over-confidence in anonymity) is apparent.Greed may be only one of many motives: lust, excitement, rebellion, technological challenge, and the desire for notoriety or celebrity status may be present to varying degrees, depending on the types of crime.McGuire (2012) has suggested a typology of cybercrime groups, which comprises six types of group structure.He emphasized that 'these basic organizational patterns often cross-cut in highly fluid and confusing ways' and the typology represents a 'best guess,' based on what we currently know about cyber offenders.He notes that the typology is likely to change as the digital environment evolves.McGuire's typology includes three main group types, each divided into two subgroups depending on the strength of association between members: Type I groups operate essentially online and can be further divided into swarms and hubs.They are mostly 'virtual' and trust is assessed via reputation in online illicit activities.o Swarms share many of the features of networks and are described as 'disorganized organizations [with] common purpose without leadership.'Typically swarms have minimal chains of command and may operate in viral forms in ways reminiscent of earlier 'hacktivist' groups.Swarms seem to be most active in ideologically driven online activities such as hate crimes and political resistance.The group Anonymous illustrates a typical swarm-type group (Olson, 2012 Type II groups combine online and offline offending and are described as 'hybrids', which in turn are said to be 'clustered' or 'extended.'o In a clustered hybrid, offending is articulated around a small group of individuals and focused around specific activities or methods.They are somewhat similar in structure to hubs, but move seamlessly between online and offline offending.A typical group will skim credit cards, then use the data for online purchases or on-sell the data through carding networks (McGuire, 2012, 50; Soudijn & Zegers, 2012) .Groups of the extended hybrid form operate in similar ways to the clustered hybrids but are a lot less centralized.They typically include many associates and subgroups and carry out a variety of criminal activities, but still retain a level of coordination sufficient to ensure the success of their operations.Type III groups operate mainly offline but use online technology to facilitate their offline activities.McGuire argues that this type of group needs to be considered because they are increasingly contributing to digital crime.Like the previous group-types, Type III groups can be subdivided into 'hierarchies' and 'aggregates', according to their degree of cohesion and organization.o Hierarchies are best described as traditional criminal groups (e.g. crime families), which export some of their activities online.For example, the traditional interest of some mafia groups in prostitution now extends to pornography websites; other examples include online gambling, extortion, and blackmail through threats of shutting down systems or accessing private records via malware attacks or hacking. (US v Fiore et al (2009) ; United States Attorney, Eastern District of New York, 2003) o Aggregate groups are loosely organized, temporary, and often without clear purpose.They make use of digital technologies in an ad hoc manner, which nevertheless can inflict harm.Examples include the use of Blackberry or mobile phones to coordinate gang activity or public disorder, as occurred during the 2011 UK riots or the Sydney riots in September 2012 (Cubby & McNeilage, 2012) .The most sophisticated cybercrime organizations are characterized by substantial functional specialization and division of labor.The following roles, outlined in a speech by a representative of the US Federal Bureau of Investigation's Cyber Division, illustrate the kind of roles that a major fraud conspiracy may entail (Chabinsky, 2010): 1.Coders or programmers write the malware, exploits, and other tools necessary to commit the crime.2.Distributors or vendors trade and sell stolen data, and vouch for the goods provided by the other specialties.3.Technicians maintain the criminal infrastructure and supporting technologies, such as servers, ISPs, and encryption.4.Hackers search for and exploit vulnerabilities in applications, systems, and networks in order to gain administrator or payroll access.5.Fraud specialists develop and employ social engineering schemes, including phishing, spamming, and domain squatting.6.Hosts provide "safe" facilities of illicit content servers and sites, often through elaborate botnet and proxy networks.7.Cashers control drop accounts and provide those names and accounts to other criminals for a fee; they also typically manage individual cash couriers, or "money mules."8.Money mules transfer the proceeds of frauds which they have committed to a third party for further transfer to a secure location.9.Tellers assist in transferring and laundering illicit proceeds through digital currency services and between different national currencies.10.Executives of the organization select the targets, and recruit and assign members to the above tasks, in addition to managing the distribution of criminal proceeds.This ideal type is not necessarily limited to a formal, fixed organization.Some functions may be outsourced, as was the case with the Koobface group discussed below.The organization of cybercrime may also occur at a wider level involving networks of individuals that meet and interact within online discussion forums and chat rooms.Some discussion forums function as 'virtual' black markets that advertise, for example, stolen credit card numbers (Holt and Lampke, 2010) .Among Chinese cybercriminals, QQ is a popular instant messaging and chat service, as well as the preferred choice for private contact linked to 'carding' -the market in stolen credit cards and their acquisition (Yip, 2011) .Given the ephemeral nature of many of the interactions, such networks operate as criminal macro-networks rather than closely knit groups.The first set of illustrative cases involves individual offenders.All these offenders were male; four were under 30 when they committed their offences, the other two were in their mid-30s.Only one of these cases had a financial motive, although Pearson, the offender, denied this.Cleary and Auernheimer claimed that the reason for their offending was, at least in part, altruistic.They wanted to demonstrate that despite claims to the contrary, the data repository of large corporations and organizations, which kept important confidential information on their clients, was not secure.It is likely that the desire for fame and recognition of their skills also played a part in their actions.Swartz was also motivated by ideology and believed that information should be freely accessible.The two other hackers were pushed by emotional reasons: Chaney by his obsession with celebrities, and Yin, by his desire for revenge after losing his job.Pearson benefited financially from hacking, but he could potentially have stolen much more.The final case illustrates the potential harm that just one cybercriminal might cause.All faced the risk of long prison sentences.Police in the UK arrested 19-year-old Ryan Cleary for allegedly orchestrating a distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack against the website of the British Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) website in 2011, and the websites of the International Federation of the Phonographic Industry and the British Phonographic Industry during the previous year.Cleary allegedly rented and sublet a large botnet to conduct the attack.He was associated with the hacking group LulzSec, although the group itself denied that he was a member, claiming that he was merely a loose associate.Cleary's arrest followed his exposure by Anonymous who published his name, address, and phone number as retaliation for his hacking into the group AnonOps' website and exposing over 600 nicknames and IP addresses.Cleary was reported as stating that AnonOps was 'publicity hungry.'He pleaded guilty to most of the charges, and in May 2013 was sentenced to imprisonment for 32 months (The Guardian 2013; see also Olson, 2012) .In June 2010, 25-year-old Andrew Auernheimer managed to obtain the email addresses of 114,000 iPad users including celebrities and politicians, by hacking the website of the telecommunication company AT&T. Auernheimer was a member of the group Goatse Security, that specializes in uncovering security flaws.The attack was carried out when Auernheimer and other hackers realized they could trick the AT&T site into offering up the email address of iPad users if they sent an HTTP request that included the SIM card serial number for the corresponding device.Simply guessing serial numbers, a task made easy by the fact that they were generated sequentially during manufacturing, allowed access to a large number of addresses.Auernheimer and Goatse released details about the attacks to Gawker Media.Shortly after, the FBI arrested Auernheimer in connection with the breach.In March 2013, he was sentenced to 3 ½ years in prison for exploiting an AT&T security flaw (Chickowski, 2011 ; "Goatse Security," 2013; Thomas, 2013).A programmer and fellow at Harvard University's Safra Center for Ethics, 24-year-old Aaron Swartz was indicted in 2011 after he downloaded more than 4 million academic articles through the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) network connection to JSTOR, an online academic repository.Swartz used anonymous log-ins on the network in September 2010 and actively worked to mask his log-ins when MIT and JSTOR tried to stop the massive drain of copyrighted material.After JSTOR shut down the access to its database from the entire MIT network, Swartz went on campus, directly plugged his laptop in the information infrastructure of a MIT networking room, and left it hidden as it downloaded more content.However, an IT administrator reported the laptop to the authorities.A hidden webcam was installed and when Swartz came and picked up his laptop, he was identified and arrested.Swartz did not steal any confidential data and, once the content of the site had been secured, JSTOR did not wish to initiate legal action; however, federal prosecutors went ahead and charged Swartz with 13 felony counts (United States of America v Aaron Swartz, 2012).Swartz was known as 'a freedom-ofinformation activist' who called for civil disobedience against copyright laws, particularly in relation to the dissemination of publicly funded research.Swartz said he was protesting how JSTOR stifled academic research and that he had planned to make the articles he downloaded publicly and freely available.Swartz committed suicide in early 2013, before his court case was finalised.His family accused the government of having some responsibility for his death because of the overzealous prosecution of what they described as a non-violent victimless crime.In March 2013 he was posthumously awarded the James Madison Award by the American Library Association, a prize to acknowledge those who champion public access to information (Bort, 2013; Cohen, 2013) .In what amounted to 'cyberstalking', celebrity-obsessed Christopher Chaney, 35 years, used publicly available information from celebrity blog sites to guess the passwords to Google and Yahoo email accounts owned by over 50 stars, including Scarlett Johansson, Mila Kunis, and Christina Aguilera.He successfully managed to hack into the accounts and set up an emailforwarding system to send himself a copy of all emails received by the stars.From November 2010 to October 2011, Chaney had access to emails, photos, and confidential documents.He was responsible for the release of nude photos of Scarlett Johansson that subsequently circulated on the Internet.He was also accused of circulating nude photos of two (non-celebrity) women but he denied this.FBI investigators did not give details of how they tracked Chaney, who was sentenced to 10 years jail in December 2012.Chaney apologized for his actions; he said that he empathized with the victims but could not stop what he was doing (Eimiller, 2011; Chickowski, 2011) .Fired after being accused of selling stolen Gucci shoes and bags on the Asian grey market, a former Gucci IT employee, Sam Yin, 34 years, managed to hack into the company's system using a secret account he had created while working, and a bogus employee's name.He shut down the whole operation's computers, cutting off employee access to files and emails for nearly an entire business day.During that day he deleted servers, destroyed storage set-ups and wiped out mailboxes.Gucci estimated the cost of the intrusion at $200,000.Yin was sentenced to prison for a minimum of 2 years and a maximum of 6 years in September 2012 (Italiano, 2012) .Originally from York, Northern England, 23-year old Edward Pearson stole 8 million identities, 200,000 PayPal account details, and 2,700 bank card numbers between January 2010 and August 2011.Using the malware ZeuS and SpyEye, which he rewrote to suit his purpose, he managed to not only hack into the PayPal website but also into the networks of AOL and Nokia, which remained down for two weeks.Pearson finally got caught after his girlfriend tried to use forged credit cards to pay hotel bills.He was described as 'incredibly talented' and a clever computer coder, who had been active in cybercrime forums for several years prior to his hacking spree.His lawyer, however, argued that Pearson was not so interested in making money but that hacking was 'an intellectual challenge'.A prosecutor estimated that based on the information he had stolen, he could potentially have stolen $13 million; yet, before his arrest, he had only stolen around $3,700, which he had spent on takeaway meals and mobile phone bills.Pearson was sentenced to 26 months jail in April 2012 (Liebowitz, 2012) .The next set of cases involves small groups or networks of offenders, and illustrates the diversity of criminal organizations operating across crime types.LulzSec was a loose network of likeminded hackers responsible for infiltrating the systems of high profile organizations, supposedly to draw attention to potential security failures.Dreamboard was a members-only group that exchanged illicit images of children.DrinkOrDie was an organization devoted to piracy and the dissemination of pirated content.The four other organizations were motivated by financial profit.Each organization was the target of successful law enforcement action, and, as such, they may not be representative of other organisations whose members managed to avoid prosecution.One common characteristic of these groups was their trans-national reach.Each was comprised of members from different countries and was active across borders.Some members of these groups have been convicted for their cybercrimes.Cody Kretsinger (nicknamed Recursion) was arrested for allegedly carrying out an attack against Sony Pictures on behalf of LulzSec in September 2011.Kretsinger, aged 25, was arrested when the UK-based proxy server HideMyAss, a service that disguises the online identity of its customers, provided logs to police.These allowed them to match time-stamps with IP addresses and identify Kretsinger (Chickowski, 2011; Olson, 2012) .In April 2012, Kretsinger pleaded guilty to unauthorised access, conspiracy and attempting to break into computers, and he was later sentenced to one year in jail and 1,000 hours community service.Kretsinger, along with other members of LulzSec, obtained confidential information from the computer systems of Sony Pictures by using an SQL injection attack against the website.They disseminated the stolen data on the Internet.The stolen data contained confidential information such as names, addresses, phone numbers, and e-mail addresses for thousands of Sony customers.Dreamboard was a members-only group that exchanged illicit images of children under the age of twelve, until its interdiction by a multi-national police investigation begun in 2009.The operation resulted in charges against 72 people in 14 countries across five continents.Servers were situated in the United States, and the group's top administrators were located in France and Canada.Rules of conduct on the site's bulletin board were printed in English, Russian, Japanese and Spanish.It was a very sophisticated operation that vetted prospective members, required continuing contributions of illicit material as a condition of membership, and rewarded those who produced and shared their own content.Members achieved status levels reflecting the quantity and quality of their contributions.The group used aliases rather than their actual names.Links to illicit content were encrypted and password-protected.Access to the group's bulletin board was through proxy servers.These routed traffic through other computers in order to mask a member's true location, thereby impeding investigators from tracing the member's online activity (US Department of Homeland Security, 2011).DrinkOrDie, founded in Moscow in 1993, was a group of copyright pirates who illegally reproduced and distributed software, games, and movies over the Internet.Within three years the group expanded internationally and counted around 65 members in 12 countries including Britain, Australia, Finland, Norway, Sweden, and the US.The membership included a relatively large proportion of undergraduate university students who were technologically sophisticated and skilled in security, programming, and internet communication.The group was highly organized, hierarchical in form, and entailed a division of labour.A new program was often obtained through employees of software companies; 'crackers' stripped the content of its electronic protection; 'testers' made sure the unprotected version worked; and 'packers' distributed the pirated version to around 10,000 publicly accessible sites around the Internet.The content was available to casual users and to other criminal enterprises for commercial distribution.Members were not motivated by profit but by their desire to compete with other pirates and to achieve recognition as the first group to distribute a perfect copy of a newly pirated product.DrinkOrDie's most prominent achievement was its illegal distribution of Windows 95 two weeks prior to the official release by Microsoft.The group was dismantled by authorities in 2001 and 20 members were convicted worldwide.Eleven people were prosecuted in the US in 2002 including one woman.They were between 20 and 34 years.Two of the leaders were sentenced to 46 and 33 months jail respectively (US Department of Justice, 2001 Justice, , 2002 .Dark Market, founded in 2005, was a website providing the infrastructure for an online bazaar where buyers and sellers of credit card and banking details could meet, and illicit material such as malicious software could be purchased.Banking and card details were illicitly obtained by various means, including surreptitious recording at ATMs using 'skimming' devices, unauthorized access to personal or business information systems, or techniques of 'social engineering' where victims were persuaded to part with the details.Initially trading in stolen information occurred on a one-to-one basis, but given the sheer volume of such material, using a forum where prospective parties could interact collectively was much more efficient.At its peak, Dark Market was the world's pre-eminent English language 'carding' site, with over 2500 members from a number of countries around the world, including the UK, Canada, the US, Russia, Turkey, Germany and France.The group was highly organized.Prospective vendors had to prove that they were able to provide useable credit card information, which was assessed for its validity.Members were nominated and vetted.A maximum of four administrators ran the site at any time.They ensured the security of the site, provided an escrow service, and patrolled the site for 'illicit' activity such as dealing in drugs or child pornography.It seemed that reputation and status was more important for these VIP members than was self-enrichment.Ordinary members, who traded in information and used the information they bought to make money, generally sought to keep a low profile.The forum was infiltrated by an FBI agent and the investigation resulted in 60 arrests worldwide.One of the most prominent members, a 33-yearold Sri-Lankan born British man, was sentenced to 5years imprisonment in March 2010 (Glenny, 2011; Davies, 2010) .Six Estonian men, posing as the legitimate company Rove Digital, were arrested in November 2011 for creating and operating the DNSChanger malware, which allowed them to control Domain Name System (DNS) servers.DNS is an Internet service that converts domain names into numerical data that computers understand.Without DNS and DNS servers, Internet browsing, access to websites, and emails would be impossible.The group was running an Internet fraud operation that enabled them to manipulate Internet advertising.The malware was propagated using social engineering techniques; in one instance, the malware was offered as a video code that was supposedly required to watch adult movies.At its peak, an estimated four million computers worldwide were infected with the malware.DNSChanger worked by substituting advertising on websites with advertising sold by Rove Digital and by redirecting users of infected computers to rogue servers controlled by affiliates of the group.When users clicked on the links to a licit official website, they were in fact taken to a fake website that resembled the legitimate website but promoted counterfeit, and sometimes dangerous, products.The group allegedly netted $14 million in stolen advertising views.Operation Ghost Click, a five-year collaboration between the FBI and private corporations, began after Trend Micro researchers identified the gang's botnet.The six offenders were aged between 26 and 31 years.It is likely they will all be extradited to the US for trial.A seventh member of the group, a 31-yearold Russian man, has not yet been arrested (US Federal Bureau of Investigation 2011; Krebs on Security 2011).Carberp is malicious software designed to steal banking information.When it first appeared in 2009, Carberp was used exclusively by a small, closed group operating only in Russian-speaking countries.In 2011 the malware's creators started selling it to a few customers in the former Soviet Union.In March 2012, following a joint investigation with Group-IB, a Russian cyber security firm, Russian authorities arrested eight Carberp operators.The group was led by two brothers in their late 20s.One of them was already a known criminal with a record related to real estate fraud.The group demonstrated a high level of collaboration.Carberp's group members were working remotely from different cities in Ukraine.Using stolen banking data, they illegally transferred large sums of money into accounts controlled by the group.The money was then withdrawn from a variety of ATM machines in the Moscow area.It is estimated the group had stolen around $2 million from over 90 victims (Warner, 2012) .Despite the arrests, Carberp continued to evolve with added functionality.It has worked with three different cybercrime groups (Matrosov, 2012) .The first group had a direct association with the creator of the malware.In 2010 Carberp source code was sold to the organizer of the second group and they worked in parallel to develop a second version.The third group was already engaged in online bank fraud with the botnet Origami Hodprot but switched to using Carberp in 2011.As the botnet grew, the group's operations became increasingly organised and members of the group were highly coordinated.They had command-and-control servers in several European countries and the US, and attacked Russian as well as foreign banks.In December 2012, members from the Carberp team posted messages on underground Russian cybercrime forums, offering a new version of Carberp for rent.At US$40,000 per month, this was one of the most expensive kits thus far advertised.Carberp is said to be more effective and more dangerous than ZeuS and SpyEye, and might soon be able to target US and Australian banks (Constantin, 2012) .With various reports of the Carberp source code being available online in mid-2013, there are fears that improved 'copycat' variants may be developed and released in the near future.On 9 May 2013 eight men were charged in New York with stealing US$2.8 million in cash from a number of ATM machines.These men formed the New York cell of an international cybercrime ring running 'unlimited operations'.The headquarters of the cyber gang is located outside of the US, but there may be other cells in the US.The masterminds of the group had hacked the network of global financial institutions to steal prepaid debit card data.They managed to eliminate the withdrawing limit on these cards.Using fake cards manufactured from the stolen data, 'casher crews' were able to withdraw virtually unlimited funds from ATMs around the world.The individuals charged in New York comprised one of these 'casher crews.'It was later found that the leader of the gang had been murdered in April.Six of the seven suspects were under 25 years, and all were US citizens.Two worked as bus drivers for a private company.7 The New York gang conducted two successful operations.During the first one, in December 2012, a total of US$5 million was withdrawn in 20 countries.In New York City, the group scoured 140 ATMs, and stole US$400,000 in just 2 hours and 25 minutes.The second operation went for just over 10 hours on 19-20 February 2013.Worldwide, over US$40 million was taken; in New York City, the defendants withdrew US$2.4 million from around 3,000 ATMs.The success of such attacks was attributed to the speed and meticulous planning of these 'unlimited operations'.The New York prosecutor remarked: 'Unlimited operations' are marked by three characteristics: 1) the surgical precision of the hackers carrying out the cyber-attacks, 2) the global nature of the cybercrime organization, and 3) the speed and coordination with which the organization executes its operations on the ground.These attacks rely upon both highly sophisticated hackers and organized criminal cells whole role is to withdraw the cash as quickly as possible.' (US Attorney's Office, 2013) Koobface is a worm-based malware that targets Web 2.0 social networks such as Facebook (the name of the malware is an anagram of Facebook).Koobface spread by sending messages to 'friends' of an infected Facebook account user.The message directed the recipient to a fake website where they were prompted to download what was presented as an update to Adobe Flash Player.Once the fake program was installed, Koobface controlled the computer's search engine and directed the user toaffiliated illicit websites offering various scams such as false investments, fake AV programs, fake dating services, etc.The Koobface botnet made money through pay-per-install and pay-per-click fees from these other websites.Sophos identified five potential members of the Koobface gang, also referred to as 'Ali Baba & 4' who operated from Russian and Czech locations.One member was older than the others and possibly the leader, but the structure of the group was not fully understood.Members of the group had previously worked in online pornography, spyware, and also attempted to conduct a legitimate mobile software and services business, MobSoft Ltd (Richmond 2012) .The Koobface crime group was able to regularly upgrade and adapt the botnet, which included an effective Traffic Direction System that managed the activity on affiliate sites and boosted the Internet traffic to the botnet (e.g. targeting showbiz fans, online daters, casual porn surfers, and car enthusiasts).The overall structure of the botnet was resilient; it survived takedown attempts and countermeasures by targets such as Facebook, Google, and other social networks.Data found in the botnet's command-and-control system suggested the group has earned around $2 million a year.One of the more significant developments in cybercrime over the past decade has been an apparent increase in the volume of illegal activity committed by governments or their proxies.Because of the sensitive nature of such activities, their nature and extent tend to be obscured from public view.Nevertheless, recent disclosures, some noted below, have been informative.One might envisage a continuum of state-private interaction, from state monopoly of criminal activity at one extreme, to state ignorance of private criminal activity at the other.In between these polar extremes, one might find formal collaboration between state and non-state entities; loose cooperation between state authorities and private criminal actors; active sponsorship by the state; tacit encouragement of non-state crime; the state turning a "blind eye" to the activity in question; and state incapacity to control private illegality. (Stohl, 2014) PLA (Mandiant, 2013; Sanger, Barboza, & Perlroth, 2013) .Operation Olympic Games is reportedly a collaboration between the US National Security Agency and its Israeli counterpart, Unit 8200, intended to disrupt the Iranian nuclear enrichment program.It allegedly involved the clandestine insertion of an extremely complex and sophisticated set of software into communications and control systems at the Natanz nuclear facility.The software reportedly includes a capacity to monitor communications and processing activity, as well as the ability to corrupt control systems at the facility.The operation succeeded in delaying the progress of uranium enrichment through remote controlled destruction of a number of centrifuges used in the process.The secrecy surrounding the operation was compromised in part when the malicious software escaped because of a programming error.Neither the United States nor the Israeli governments have yet to acknowledge the existence of the operation (Sanger, 2012) .The above discussion raises two basic questions.The first is whether organizations and individual offenders pursue similar goals.The second is the degree to which the McGuire and Chabinsky typologies fit with the cases we have summarized, and the relationship, if any, between crime type and organizational form.Since the cases in question were not randomly chosen, our conclusions cannot be regarded as definitive.Rather, they are tentative judgments that may serve as the basis for further inquiry.Although they may not be representative of cybercriminals generally, the individual offenders discussed above appeared less preoccupied with financial gain than with libertarian ideology, technological challenge, celebrity obsession, and revenge against a former employer.This is not to suggest that money doesn't matter to solo cybercriminals.Rather, the observed variation enhances our appreciation of the range and diversity of individual motivations.Organizations, too, reflected a variety of goals, including defiance of authority, freedom of information, sexual gratification of members, and technological challenge.The profit motive was more apparent in the organization cases than with individual offenders.One notes the activities undertaken by organizations operating under state auspices, specifically those involving espionage and offensive cyber operations.These have explicit economic and political goals, which most certainly do not include the desire for publicity and notoriety.A comparison of individual offenders and criminal organizations reveals that both possessed impressive skills.Despite the formidable capacities of some individual offenders, the skills and resources of some organizations were truly extraordinary.This was particularly evident in the cases of state cyber activity, although the work of Drink or Die, Dreamboard and 'Unlimited Operation' all showed considerable complexity and sophistication.As discussed above, the organizational structure depicted in Chabinsky's model appears more characteristic of a sophisticated, enterprise-like fraud than of other crime types.The "Unlimited Operation" and Koobface cases would appear to provide the best fit.To a lesser extent, the "Drink or Die" group had a division of labor, involving at least six of the ten roles specified in Chabinsky's model.The group's lack of a significant financial motive precluded the need for "cashers" "tellers" and "money mules."McGuire's typology would also appear reliable in light of the cases we have discussed.The state crime cases appeared to consistent with hierarchy, or, to the extent that non-state actors are involved, with the extended hybrid form.Complex frauds, such as 'Unlimited Operation' are also the work of hierarchies.As we have noted, "annoyance crime" and relatively complex protest activity such as that involving denial of service, seem most suited to swarm; the work of Anonymous is illustrative.Protest activity of a more ad hoc, short term nature, is done by aggregate groups.Illicit markets and organized paedophile activity resemble hubs.To the extent that pedophile activity entails offline offending, it will take the clustered hybrid form.The study of organized cybercriminal activity is in its infancy.Every new technology and every new application will create an opportunity that criminals will soon seek to exploit.In order to keep abreast of cybercrime it will be important to track the evolution of the organizational forms that these criminal activities will take.This essay has taken a small step in this direction.2 Malware stands for 'malicious software' such as worms, viruses, and trojans.Bots or web robots allow a malicious user to control remotely computers infected by malware.3 The Internet has been used to communicate a wide variety of content deemed offensive to the point of criminal prohibition in one or more jurisdictions.Such material includes child pornography, neo Nazi propaganda, and advocacy of Tibetan independence, to list but a few.Jihadist propaganda and incitement messages also abound in cyberspace.4 Tor is an encrypted re-routing service designed to obscure the original source of an email or website on the Internet, sometimes known as The Onion Router.Law enforcement concerns about the widespread misuse of Tor recently led Japanese police to recommended blocking access to the service to those that misuse it (BBC Technology, 'Japanese police target users of Tor anonymous network', 22 April 2013, .5 The 2012 Verizon Data Breach Investigation Report identified that 75% of 621 confirmed breaches of data were financially motivated, .6 Article 2(a) of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime defines an 'organized criminal group [as] a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences established in accordance with this Convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit'.Article 2(c) clarifies that 'a structured group shall mean a group that is not randomly formed for the immediate commission of an offence and that does not need to have formally defined roles for its members, continuity of its membership or a developed structure'.A botnet is a network of individual computers, which have been compromised by malicious software and are controlled by a third-party, usually for the purpose of criminal activities (e.g. sending spam).
Alexei Galuza, Ivan Kolenov, Alla Belyaeva The problem of laboratory experiment automation, encountered by almost every experimenter, was considered in the paper.A great range of solutions is proposed by the industry.However, these solutions are rather sophisticated, expensive and do not offer a comprehensive approach to the problem solution.Therefore, the issue of developing software and hardware platform for laboratory experiment automation with minimum time, force and means expenditures is topical nowadays.The ultimate objective of the paper is development and implementation of software and hardware platform for experiment control and data gathering and processing.The principle requirements for the platform include simplicity of design and use, portability and low cost.The platform developed consists of three main blocks: an interface of stepper motors, data gathering system and software for digital signal processing and creation of client application for PC.The interface of stepper motors includes control unit for stepper motors drivers, which is connected to PC via COM port, and stepper motors drivers themselves, which allow implementing a micro step up to 1/32 of nominal step of stepper motor.Any analog-to-digital converter can be used as measuring instrument.In this case, standard PC audio card was chosen as the most affordable and cheap device for measuring signals with admissible metrological characteristics.Software synchronous detector was applied for reducing the influence of background noise on the measured signal.It allows measuring signals with error not exceeding 1% and signal-to-noise ratio 10dB Keywords: automation of experiment, control, signal measuring, laboratory experiment, synchronous detecting Iana Savitskaya, Nina Chichikalo Despite the existing automation level of processes in coal mines, the uniform displacement of slaughtering line solution is still not under con-trol.In the article proposed methods of optimal or suboptimal decision of this question.It is based on coal mining management system quality requirements.The aim of this development is to provide the achievement of the optimal level of productivity of the coal mining process at the expense of layup minimization.The cause of layup is convergence of the deads.Given virtual inaccuracy displacement control model of the shore sections overlap based on the proposed methods.The need for compensating delays in many technological processes, which are controlled by feedback systems, was justified.For ensuring discrete astatic control over such processes, the object was divided into active and passive parts.This simplifies the automation of control systems synthesis.According to the desired characteristic equation, using the Ackermann formula, the astatic control loop was synthesized.Based on the duality principle, the astatic state observer was constructed, which includes not only denominator coefficients, but also numerator coefficients of the object transfer function.The proposed system was studied under noise perturbations in the load sensing passage, as well as under divergence of parameters of control object.The studies of the synthesized system proved its better functioning as compared to the existing one Keywords: modal control, delay, object model, astatic regulator, state observer We consider the study results directed to creation in Ukraine of postlaunch metrological assurance of remote sensing systems based on developed evidence-based techniques, deployed land-based infrastructure of control and calibration polygon (CCP) systems with the test objects (TO) and measuring instruments and created software and hardware systems.The CCP infrastructure in the area of National Space Facilities Control and Test Center (NSFCTC) (Yevpatoriya-19) is ground, using as the standard template for describing the CCP approved by the Working Group on Calibration and Validation of the CEOS Committee.Based on the results of experiments to determine the spectral reflectance characteristics of the selected TO on ground-based measurements which are synchronous with satellite imagery of the space system (SS) "Sich-2", GIS database is created.It contains the vector layers of polygonal natural and man-made objects of NSFCTC, layers of the spectral characteristics measurement points, satellite images of the SS "Quick Bird-2" and "Sich-2", the digital terrain model of CCP.Such devices for ground-based measurements are analyzed, which must be equipped the test plots of polygon for control and calibration activities:1) as the number of available to researchers: the digital weather station, spectrometers ASP-100F, ASD FieldSpec 3FR, equipment for precision measurements of the geodetic reference mark coordinates,2) and the instruments used at the polygons of the LANDNET Sites System of CEOS Committee: CIMEL sun photometers in the AERONET CIMEL network, portable sun photometers MICROTOPS II, gonio radiometric spectrometer systems Keywords: Test and calibration site, Postlaunch calibration, Space system "Sich", Space monitoring The use of tracking antenna installations (AI) in mobile satellite telecommunications systems (STS) was discussed in the paper.The main purpose of the study is an analytical overview of the methods of positioning and tracking of artificial Earth satellites (AES) and ways of their implementation in AI control systems (CS), meant for working during transport vehicle (TV) movement.The methods of step-tracking (MST), conical scanning and program tracking in terms of their applicability in AI of mobile STS are discussed in the paper.Based on the analysis of parameters of commercial mobile AI, extreme ranges of their parameters for different types of TV were defined.The features of application of open-loop and closed-loop CS of tracking AI were studied.It is shown that open-loop CS provide three or four times higher velocity of angular displacement of AI compared to conventional closed-loop CS, making them more preferable for use in high-speed TV.On the other hand, open-loop CS require highly accurate determining of TV current position, they are susceptible to disturbances from buildings and tend to accumulate errors.Systems with PID and fuzzy controllers are the most widely used in closed-loop CS of tracking AI.Their use allows expanding the control range, improving the performance, enhancing the effectiveness of CS as a whole.The results of the study can be used by experts in the field of control systems for improvement of existing and construction of new mobile AI of STS Keywords: control system, tracking antenna systems, fuzzy logic, satellite communications, telecommunications The paper describes further development of the methods of artificial orthogonalization of passive experiment designs describing the experimental values of the output function in a multidimensional factor space of a small sample of fuzzy data.This allows fuzzy clustering for the formation of subspaces and further local description of the response function; building local regression equations in the subspaces of full factorial space; calculating the values of the response function at the points of the orthogonalized design of experiment.The methods for processing the asymmetrical design of factorial experiment based on the use of procedure of forming a truncated orthogonal response design for elimination of insignificant factors and interactions in a small sample of fuzzy data, allowing the formation of the orthogonal design to calculate the coefficients of the regression equation, which describes the output parameters of the system in the space of fuzzy values of input variables; ability to select the most representative designs that minimize the maximum estimate of the variance of the output variable; obtaining of fuzzy data of adequate mathematical models on the multifactor space, relating the components of the output parameters of the system and parameters used in the description of the states of the system, are described.The example of the application of the proposed methods of artificial orthogonalization for solving scientific and practical problems of creating the methodology for determining the structure and parameters of the models describing the processes of electrosmelting under uncertainty conditions, which allows finding the optimal technological process control in terms of the end state, is shown	Alexei Galuza, Ivan Kolenov, Alla Belyaeva The problem of laboratory experiment automation, encountered by almost every experimenter, was considered in the paper.A great range of solutions is proposed by the industry.However, these solutions are rather sophisticated, expensive and do not offer a comprehensive approach to the problem solution.Therefore, the issue of developing software and hardware platform for laboratory experiment automation with minimum time, force and means expenditures is topical nowadays.The ultimate objective of the paper is development and implementation of software and hardware platform for experiment control and data gathering and processing.The principle requirements for the platform include simplicity of design and use, portability and low cost.The platform developed consists of three main blocks: an interface of stepper motors, data gathering system and software for digital signal processing and creation of client application for PC.The interface of stepper motors includes control unit for stepper motors drivers, which is connected to PC via COM port, and stepper motors drivers themselves, which allow implementing a micro step up to 1/32 of nominal step of stepper motor.Any analog-to-digital converter can be used as measuring instrument.In this case, standard PC audio card was chosen as the most affordable and cheap device for measuring signals with admissible metrological characteristics.Software synchronous detector was applied for reducing the influence of background noise on the measured signal.It allows measuring signals with error not exceeding 1% and signal-to-noise ratio 10dB Keywords: automation of experiment, control, signal measuring, laboratory experiment, synchronous detecting Iana Savitskaya, Nina Chichikalo Despite the existing automation level of processes in coal mines, the uniform displacement of slaughtering line solution is still not under con-trol.In the article proposed methods of optimal or suboptimal decision of this question.It is based on coal mining management system quality requirements.The aim of this development is to provide the achievement of the optimal level of productivity of the coal mining process at the expense of layup minimization.The cause of layup is convergence of the deads.Given virtual inaccuracy displacement control model of the shore sections overlap based on the proposed methods.The need for compensating delays in many technological processes, which are controlled by feedback systems, was justified.For ensuring discrete astatic control over such processes, the object was divided into active and passive parts.This simplifies the automation of control systems synthesis.According to the desired characteristic equation, using the Ackermann formula, the astatic control loop was synthesized.Based on the duality principle, the astatic state observer was constructed, which includes not only denominator coefficients, but also numerator coefficients of the object transfer function.The proposed system was studied under noise perturbations in the load sensing passage, as well as under divergence of parameters of control object.The studies of the synthesized system proved its better functioning as compared to the existing one Keywords: modal control, delay, object model, astatic regulator, state observer We consider the study results directed to creation in Ukraine of postlaunch metrological assurance of remote sensing systems based on developed evidence-based techniques, deployed land-based infrastructure of control and calibration polygon (CCP) systems with the test objects (TO) and measuring instruments and created software and hardware systems.The CCP infrastructure in the area of National Space Facilities Control and Test Center (NSFCTC) (Yevpatoriya-19) is ground, using as the standard template for describing the CCP approved by the Working Group on Calibration and Validation of the CEOS Committee.Based on the results of experiments to determine the spectral reflectance characteristics of the selected TO on ground-based measurements which are synchronous with satellite imagery of the space system (SS) "Sich-2", GIS database is created.It contains the vector layers of polygonal natural and man-made objects of NSFCTC, layers of the spectral characteristics measurement points, satellite images of the SS "Quick Bird-2" and "Sich-2", the digital terrain model of CCP.Such devices for ground-based measurements are analyzed, which must be equipped the test plots of polygon for control and calibration activities: 1) as the number of available to researchers: the digital weather station, spectrometers ASP-100F, ASD FieldSpec 3FR, equipment for precision measurements of the geodetic reference mark coordinates, 2) and the instruments used at the polygons of the LANDNET Sites System of CEOS Committee: CIMEL sun photometers in the AERONET CIMEL network, portable sun photometers MICROTOPS II, gonio radiometric spectrometer systems Keywords: Test and calibration site, Postlaunch calibration, Space system "Sich", Space monitoring The use of tracking antenna installations (AI) in mobile satellite telecommunications systems (STS) was discussed in the paper.The main purpose of the study is an analytical overview of the methods of positioning and tracking of artificial Earth satellites (AES) and ways of their implementation in AI control systems (CS), meant for working during transport vehicle (TV) movement.The methods of step-tracking (MST), conical scanning and program tracking in terms of their applicability in AI of mobile STS are discussed in the paper.Based on the analysis of parameters of commercial mobile AI, extreme ranges of their parameters for different types of TV were defined.The features of application of open-loop and closed-loop CS of tracking AI were studied.It is shown that open-loop CS provide three or four times higher velocity of angular displacement of AI compared to conventional closed-loop CS, making them more preferable for use in high-speed TV.On the other hand, open-loop CS require highly accurate determining of TV current position, they are susceptible to disturbances from buildings and tend to accumulate errors.Systems with PID and fuzzy controllers are the most widely used in closed-loop CS of tracking AI.Their use allows expanding the control range, improving the performance, enhancing the effectiveness of CS as a whole.The results of the study can be used by experts in the field of control systems for improvement of existing and construction of new mobile AI of STS Keywords: control system, tracking antenna systems, fuzzy logic, satellite communications, telecommunications The paper describes further development of the methods of artificial orthogonalization of passive experiment designs describing the experimental values of the output function in a multidimensional factor space of a small sample of fuzzy data.This allows fuzzy clustering for the formation of subspaces and further local description of the response function; building local regression equations in the subspaces of full factorial space; calculating the values of the response function at the points of the orthogonalized design of experiment.The methods for processing the asymmetrical design of factorial experiment based on the use of procedure of forming a truncated orthogonal response design for elimination of insignificant factors and interactions in a small sample of fuzzy data, allowing the formation of the orthogonal design to calculate the coefficients of the regression equation, which describes the output parameters of the system in the space of fuzzy values of input variables; ability to select the most representative designs that minimize the maximum estimate of the variance of the output variable; obtaining of fuzzy data of adequate mathematical models on the multifactor space, relating the components of the output parameters of the system and parameters used in the description of the states of the system, are described.The example of the application of the proposed methods of artificial orthogonalization for solving scientific and practical problems of creating the methodology for determining the structure and parameters of the models describing the processes of electrosmelting under uncertainty conditions, which allows finding the optimal technological process control in terms of the end state, is shown
The 2 nd International Conference on Linguistic and Cultural Diversity in Cyberspace took place on 12-14 July, 2011, in Yakutsk, Russian Federation.It became one of the key events within the framework of the Russian chairmanship in the UNESCO Information for All Programme.The event was organized by the Russian Committee of the UNESCO Information for All Programme, the North-Eastern Federal University, the Interregional Library Cooperation Centre, the MAAYA World Network for Linguistic Diversity, and Latin Union with the support of the Ministry of Culture of the Russian Federation, the Commission of the Russian Federation for UNESCO, and UNESCO.The conference gathered about 100 experts from about 30 countries of all continents, including Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, China, Dominican Republic, Egypt, France, India, Japan, Kazakhstan, Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Mali, Mexico, Moldova, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Russia, South Africa, Thailand, UK, Ukraine, USA.The First Conference on Linguistic and Cultural Diversity in Cyberspace, held in Yakutsk in 2008, was our first step in raising public awareness of the problems of multilingualism preservation and its development in cyberspace.It strengthened and developed professional relations and gave birth to continuous friendly contacts.Three years after the First conference heads and leading experts of intergovernmental and international organizations; governmental authorities; institutions of culture, education, science, information and communication; representatives of business entities; civil society; media gathered again in Yakutsk to discuss political, cultural, educational, ideological, philosophical, social, ethical, technological and other aspects of the activities aimed at supporting and preserving languages and cultures and promoting them in cyberspace.While the First Conference was organized by the Russian team only, the Second Conference was prepared with the active participation of the MAAYA and Latin Union.Thematic coverage of the Second Conference's professional programme was even broader than that of the First Conference and highlighted three decisive factors for the development of languages in cyberspace, namely: instruments for language promotion in cyberspace; institutions that are actively involved in the promotion of these instruments; and creation of favorable environment.The Second International Conference on Linguistic and Cultural Diversity in Cyberspace was significant for the entire world and for Russia in particular because our country is one of the most multiethnic, multilingual, multicultural and multiconfessional countries of the world.The conference final document -Yakutsk Call for Action: a Roadmap towards the World Summit on Multilingualism (2017) -was unanimously adopted at the closing session.The conference was a real success thanks to the active support by the Commission of the Russian Federation for UNESCO and its leaders -Sergei Lavrov, Chairman of the Commission and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, and Grigory Orjonikidze, Executive Secretary of the Commission; by the Ministry of Culture and especially Andrei Busygin, Deputy Minister, as well as Tatyana Manilova, Head of the Division of Libraries and Archives, and by the Government of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia).We are extremely grateful for the invaluable contribution to the preparation of this conference to a new partner of the Russian Committee of the UNESCO Information for All Programme, the North-Eastern Federal University (NEFU), which is being managed nowadays by our old friend Evgenia Mikhailova, former Vice-President of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia).If not for her good will and patronage we would not have been able to hold our First Conference in 2008 either in Yakutsk or in any other city of Russia.Consequently, the Second conference could not have been convened either.Special thanks go to Adama Samassekou and Daniel Prado, whose achievements, commitment to the honorable cause of language preservation, and global vision of the problem of multilingualism have been inspiring us over the recent years.And, last but not least, I thank our friends from the NEFU -Vice-Rector Nadezhda Zaikova; a young Head of the recently established Centre to Advance Multilingualism in Cyberspace Liudmila Zhirkova, for whom participating in the Conference preparation turned out to be a real trial by fire; a new Director of the University Library Tatiana Maximova and all Yakut colleagues who contributed to the organization of this conference.We believe that this collection of conference materials will be valuable for all those who face the necessity to tackle the essential problems of preserving linguistic and cultural diversity, and developing it in cyberspace at the contemporary level.All languages are linked through their origins and borrowing, but each is a unique source of meaning for understanding and expressing reality.As wellsprings of knowledge, languages are essential for the transmission of knowledge and information, they are of vital importance to manage the cultural diversity of our world and achieve the internationally agreed development goals.This is even more important this year, in 2011, as we celebrate the 10th anniversary of UNESCO's universal declaration on cultural diversity.The digital revolution is providing us with new frontiers for innovation, creativity and development.Increased access to knowledge and information provides new possibilities for individuals and societies.Having the necessary literacies and means to participate in these digital spaces is key to improve the quality of our lives.Such possibilities must be effectively shared by all, in all languages.The globalization process is very much facilitated by new technologies and the Internet.The success of the online edition of UNESCO's Atlas of the World's Languages in Danger shows the power of the Internet to track the state of languages and multilingualism, and to raise awareness with a global audience.Globalization is also coupled with a tendency towards standardization, which jeopardizes the presence of many languages in cyberspace and weakens cultural diversity.In a few generations, more than half of the approximately 7,000 languages spoken today in the world could disappear.UNESCO is committed to promoting multilingualism on the Internet.A plural linguistic cyberspace allows the wealth of diversity to put in common.By elaborating and implementing policies that address constraints to linguistic diversity, including in cyberspace, UNESCO contributes to fostering linguistic and cultural diversity and improve the conditions for promoting sustainable development and peace.These goals guide UNESCO in its work with the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers.Strong initiatives aimed at reinforcing linguistic and cultural diversity online as well as off-line are being undertaken.UNESCO's Member States adopted in 2003, the "Recommendation Concerning the Promotion and Use of Multilingualism and Universal Access to Cyberspace", and the "Charter on the Preservation of Digital Heritage".Both instruments provide guidance on steps that are to be taken to advance multilingualism in cyberspace.This second edition of the international conference "Linguistic and Cultural Diversity in Cyberspace", is an important step in consolidating and advancing the progress to date.Your endeavours are vital to find appropriate solutions to pressing concerns such as: elaborating public policies on languages in cyberspace; identifying techniques to ensure the presence of absent and under-represented languages; supporting the implementation of UNESCO's normative instruments.I greatly welcome these actions and encourage you in your efforts to facilitate cooperation and exchange at the national, regional and international levels.Let us all harness the power of progress to protect diverse visions of the world and to promote all sources of knowledge and forms of expression.I wish you fruitful discussions and look forward with great interest to the outcomes of your conference.Message from Grigory Ordzhonikidze, Executive Secretary of the Commission of the Russian Federation for UNESCO, to the participants of the 2 nd International Conference "Linguistic and Cultural Diversity in Cyberspace" I cordially greet the organizers and participants of the 2 nd International Conference "Linguistic and Cultural Diversity in Cyberspace".The topic of the first conference held three years ago has proved its relevance: the rapid processes of building a global society, on the one hand, increase the unification of cultures, and on the other hand, offer opportunities for preserving and developing cultural diversity, in particular in such a universal, cross-border field as cyberspace.I believe that a way to eliminate this dialectic contradiction can be found in preventing the negative effects of globalization, in the collaborative search for ways to achieve sustainable development for everybody, in harmonizing relations among nations and civilizations, encouraging cultural diversity and identity of the peoples of our planet.UNESCO as the world's most influential organization can and should make a serious contribution in these activities.It is no coincidence that this organization has developed the concept of "World culture" built upon the idea of forming a new type of international relations, based on tolerance, non-violence, respect for human rights, mutual respect of cultures, traditions and religions.The problem of linguistic and cultural diversity preservation is topical for all countries, particularly for such multinational ones as Russia populated by over 180 peoples speaking more than 100 languages.No wonder that in 2008 here, on the Yakut land, where the climate is harsh, but people are kind and responsive to current problems of mankind, an international conference which became a contribution to the International Year of Languages, adopted a document of great importance known as "Lena resolution."What is extremely valuable about this appeal to the world is that it offers ways to implement some of the recommendations of the World Summit on the Information Society, and launches initiatives to provide universal access to information and knowledge, in particular the idea of holding a world summit on linguistic diversity in cyberspace under the aegis of UNESCO and MAAYA Network.I am confident that this conference will further support these initiatives and give participants an excellent opportunity to exchange ideas and experiences, while facilitating the preservation and development of cultural and linguistic diversity.I would like to thank the Government of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) and the Russian Committee of the UNESCO Information for All Programme for organizing such a representative and useful forum.I wish you successful and fruitful work, vivid impressions of staying on the unique land of Yakutia and all the best.Message from Alexander Avdeyev, Minister of Culture of the Russian Federation, to the participants of the 2 nd International Conference "Linguistic and Cultural Diversity in Cyberspace" On behalf of Russia's Culture Ministry, I extend a warm welcome to all delegates attending our second "Linguistic and Cultural Diversity in Cyberspace" conference.In UNESCO's 2001 Universal Declaration, cultural diversity is viewed as part of the humankind's heritage.Linguistic diversity is what forms the basis of cultural diversity.Languages are crucial to progressing toward sustainable development, given their key role in providing quality education, spreading knowledge, and stimulating social integration and economic development.This is why the theme of this conference is of so much relevance to the world community as a whole and particularly to Russia, which is one of the most multi-ethnic, multi-faith and multilingual countries, with as many as 180 languages spoken here and nearly 40 indigenous languages enjoying official language status.The Russian Constitution proclaims that the languages spoken by the country's constituent communities are all part of the national cultural heritage.This forum is being held within the framework of Russia's chairmanship in the Intergovernmental Council of the UNESCO Information for All Programme.features as many as 33 nations.The agenda is rich and interesting, with a whole array of topical issues to be discussed.We hope the forthcoming discussions will effect meaningful change, enabling us to find new efficient ways of preserving endangered languages and promoting language diversity in cyberspace with the help of innovative information technology.I wish you all an enjoyable and productive forum.I am certain that the conference will represent significant cultural initiatives in the field of multilingualism preservation in cyberspace; lay the foundation and open prospects for further activities in this sphere in Russia; provide an opportunity to discuss various aspects of the preservation and development of linguistic diversity in the information space.I wish you creative achievements, success in all undertakings, inexhaustible energy and new ideas!Message from Abulfas Karayev, Minister of Culture and Tourism of the Azerbaijan Republic, to the participants of the 2 nd International Conference "Linguistic and Cultural Diversity in Cyberspace" Esteemed conference participants, dear friends, On behalf of Azerbaijan's Ministry of Culture and Tourism and my fellow countrymen working in culture and the arts, I would like to greet all the organizers, participants and guests of the 2 nd conference "Linguistic and Cultural Diversity in Cyberspace".Computer information systems have become part and parcel of modern life while cultural and linguistic diversity, which makes our life so much richer, is a top priority on today's agenda.Linguistic and cultural diversity on the Web gives us a better understanding of the problems and interests of the presentday world.Our mission is to preserve countries' national identity along with their cultural and language diversity, crucial to ensuring the sustainable development of society and intercommunal harmony.We seek to attain modern cultural standards based on universal human values while also remaining loyal to our own distinctive traditions.We should evolve as a community by enhancing our spiritual capacity and social cohesion.The international context is currently characterized by the globalization of markets, which leads to losing the connection with the Other, the non acceptance of the Other, with more and more exclusion and violence in the relation to the Other.The world crisis today which, far from being financial or economic, is rather a societal one, a values crisis, leads to the fall of the economic model and system linked to a profit making culture, the culture of consumption and gain.Our world basically needs more humanness.Our world needs to develop another culture, the one of human being that is able to guarantee more humanness in people's relations and less mercantilism!There is a saying in Mali: Mogotigiya ka fisa nin fentigiya ye!("Human relations are more valuable than money").We find the same in the Russian tradition: Не имей сто рублей, а имей сто друзей!("Better to have 100 friends than 100 roubles!")That's why there is an urgent need to preserve and promote world cultures that put human being in the centre of their concerns, to promote those societies characterised by a vision of the world based on the permanent search of harmony between human beings and nature, and friendly relations as the cornerstone of our human existence.That's what we mean when we refer to linguistic and cultural diversity: we confront the rampant process of uniformizing cultures, the development of global common thinking and utopian monolingualism.As a matter of fact, linguistic diversity is as necessary for humankind as biodiversity is for nature: it is the breath that guarantees its vitality.Nature without biodiversity is nothing more than a nature morte and to suppress the diversity of the society is the same as to create soulless robots.'The beauty of a carpet lies in its different colours", said Amadou Hampâté Bâ, a philosopher, writer and wise man. Dear friends, this advocacy for diversity is well known; even more, being militants for social transformation you know quite well that multilingualism is to culture what multilateralism is to politics: the frame that guarantees an equitable relation to others and the equilibrium of powers. Our purpose here is not to convince those present, but rather to turn from advocacy to action, that is to walk the talk. We should offer the world the means and ways of this action. This is the raison d'être of our MAAYA network! Our concern today is to be all committed to the development of institutional and legal instruments, that would enable preserving and promoting multilingualism worldwide. Although multilingualism is in the world a norm rather than an exception, very few countries are now using institutional instruments to support it. Certainly, it is partially due to the historical process of a monolingual Nation State development, but, what is more important, it is also a consequence of certain nations being dominated by others, in particular in different regions of the world, at different levels of the evolution of human societies. The experience of multilingual countries and regions (except for those where linguistic conflicts have separated peoples) shows that numerous languages can co-exist together, in harmony, in the same space, national or regional. How can we learn from these positive experiences today and develop instruments necessary to strengthen multilingual practice? From the very beginning we should realize that this is first and foremost a political question, linked to the philosophical conviction in the necessity of supporting diversity. It presupposes being mentally open to the Other and respect for fundamental human rights. Our approach should be implemented at three levels. The first institution to support multilingualism is the school (in the broadest sense, i.e. the educational system), which should be refounded in all countries in order to develop a mother tongue-based multilingual education (mother tongue understood as the most familiar language). The development of multilingualism is the best guarantee for the development of a society that is open to others and that respects linguistic and cultural diversity! Besides, it is vital to create, where they do not exist, institutions of research and promotion of the country's various languages. And those countries where such institutions are already established, should develop and reorient them towards the enhancement of multilingualism. An appropriate legal framework, with legislative and regulatory instruments should be elaborated, in the context of an explicit language policy aimed at promoting multilingualism and supporting every language of the country, both in public life and in the private sphere, according to the strategic approach we used to call «convivial functional multilingualism». All the institutions promoting book, reading and literary creativity (libraries, publishers, and associations of writers) should contribute to supporting multilingualism, particularly through proper usage of ICTs, including multimedia. At this level there are two complementary trends. On the one hand, at the level of each region of the world (according to the definition of the United Nations), it is necessary to encourage the creation of a structure similar to what African Academy of Languages (ACALAN) is for Africa, that is to say an intergovernmental scientific institution responsible for the enhancement and promotion of the languages of the continent, in the context of a continental language policy encouraging multilingualism and convivial partnership between all the existing languages. This institutional innovation could be reinforced with a more or less restricting legal instrument, inspired by the «European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages», yet with a permanent concern for equity between all the languages. On the other hand, at the level of each organization engaged in the promotion of one or several languages spoken in several regions in the world (OIF, Commonwealth, Latin Union, Arab League, CPLP, etc.), it is necessary to encourage them to leave the logic of defending a specific language or a group of languages in order to resolutely commit themselves to the promotion of languages co-existence and multilingualism. The MAAYA World Network for Linguistic Diversity was established to constitute a kind of international platform for a multistakeholder partnership in order to safeguard linguistic diversity and promote multilingualism. The existence of such organizations should make it possible to federate the initiatives taken at the international level, both from the point of implementing all the various declarations, resolutions and conventions dealing with multilingualism and cultural and linguistic diversity (UNESCO,WSIS, UN, various regional and interregional organizations, Lena Resolution, Bamako International Forum on Multilingualism, etc.), and from the point of establishing a kind of monitor structure, a world observatory for multilingualism. The MAAYA Network and its founding organizations initiated the process of the preparation for the World Summit on Multilingualism and this second Yakutsk conference is seen as a preparatory step for it. The Summit should permit to make concrete propositions at the highest level of the international community, in order to promote multilingualism in the world both from institutional and legal points of view, thus contributing to the global realization of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) and to the event of a World of Peace based on the dialogue of cultures and civilizations. It Is Time to Place Multilingualism and Linguistic Diversity at the Heart of the International Debate Our world is not the same as it was after the Second World War, when two different ways of seeing the world faced up to each other, when international relations were based on military, political and economic criteria and no thought at all was given to valuing culture as the basis of society. It is not the same either as the world we knew from the late 1990s, with a single dominant culture becoming more hegemonic. By 2011 the world has become multipolar, supranational alliances based on respect for culture have become stronger, alliances between regions of different nations sharing a language or a culture are being born every day. And although political and economic issues are still present in international relations, cultural aspects are taking a larger place. Religion, ethnicity, customs and language now play a part in the formulation of international policies, and even though they can be, unfortunately, a factor of discord, culture is increasingly perceived as a major vector in sustainable development and fair growth facilitating harmony among peoples and respect for their dignity. The adoption of the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions was the very symbol of culture's changing place in international relations. It emphasized that culture should be seen not as a mere economic value but above all as an essential condition of human beings' existence and the best motor for development that respects the future of the planet. The Convention is an opening that activists working for multilingualism and respect for linguistic diversity have seized upon as it is high time to consider language as closely associated to free expression and self-development, equal opportunities and promotion of understanding among peoples on fair and balanced foundations. Language does have an implicit place in the Convention but implicit is not obvious to everyone. The Millennium Development Goals, having omitted to include culture as a goal in its own right, also failed to refer to the language of individuals. The Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Heritage does make a careful reference and, then, both the Recommendation concerning the Promotion and Use of Multilingualism and Universal Access to Cyberspace, and the World Summit on the Information Society gave body to the idea of respect for linguistic diversity and multilingualism, but these instruments must be really followed by practical achievements. And we know that we are nowhere near being able to give all individuals the opportunity to develop freely in their own language. Since the beginning of the millennium, and in a surprising turnaround after decades of linguistic hegemony, language has become more present in both political and commercial issues. The main languages of communication that are official languages alongside English in international forums (French, Spanish, Russian, Chinese and Arabic at the United Nations; 22 other languages in the European Union; Portuguese, French, Arabic and Swahili in the African Union; French, Spanish and Portuguese in the organizations on the American continent, etc.) demand respect for balance in the way they are treated. Other languages which are not official (Portuguese at the United Nations, regional languages in the European Union, Guarani in South America, etc.) demand the right to be official too, and many initiatives (Council of Europe, Linguapax, UNESCO, etc.) are giving an increasingly significant role to languages that do not have an official national or regional status. Given the absence of international conventions concerning language, however, given the lack of reliable indicators on its impact on global development, given the probable death of almost half the world's languages, given the (still too high) level of injustice owing to the fact of speaking an unrecognized or a marginalized language, a large number of measures are called for in the field of indicators, policies and promotion, without forgetting the legal instruments. With such a wide-ranging debate, I shall emphasize only what the World Network for Linguistic Diversity MAAYA can propose in terms of promoting and enhancing (sometimes re-enhancing) languages, in particular in cyberspace. Although it is true to say that scarcely one individual in three today has access to the Internet, we can see constant movement towards the universal spread of the phenomenon. We also know that cyberspace and related technologies are tending to gradually replace our old ways of communicating, expressing ourselves, transmitting information and sharing knowledge. If languages cannot ensure the circulation of this information, knowledge or dialogue, they are in danger of losing value in the eyes of their speakers, since migration and urbanization and universal access generate confrontations between languages in which only those which are held in high esteem by their speakers can survive. Accordingly, MAAYA endeavours to inform those who can take decisions about policies to vitalize or revitalize languages of the full implications of cyberspace. MAAYA's meetings like the World Congress on Specialized Translation (Havana, 2008) , the Bamako International Forum on Multilingualism However, promotion and research are not enough. MAAYA is present in international forums trying to regulate and encourage the flourishing of all languages in the shared knowledge society, particularly those that came out of the World Summit on the Information Society, as sub-moderator for Action Line C8 (Cultural diversity and identity, linguistic diversity and local content) and lead moderator for the Dynamic Coalition for Linguistic Diversity in the context of the Internet Governance Forum. MAAYA will be present in these major undertakings ahead of us so as to ensure that every of the world's languages occupies its rightful place and guarantee the right of its speakers to use it fully. We are also glad to participate in the 2 nd International Conference on Linguistic and Cultural Diversity in Cyberspace in Yakutsk. We hope that any resolutions adopted here will help us make a reality of the idea of a world that is fairer, better balanced and more harmonious. Our Common Goal is to Preserve Not Only Our Language, but also Our Culture, Environment and People The First International Conference on Linguistic and Cultural Diversity held three years ago in Yakutsk was extremely informative and enlightening for many of us. Earlier, I have already tried to take real actions within the scope of my powers to create conditions for studying native languages at preschool educational institutions and at schools in order to preserve and promote cultural and linguistic diversity in the republic, expand the social base of native languages and the scope of their application and to publish works of writers and poets representing all the peoples living in Yakutia. After the conference in 2008, the preservation and promotion of cultural and linguistic diversity of our peoples became my highest priority. Our republic is multinational. The Yakuts (Sakha) are the most northern of stock-raising peoples, they have a particular economic structure, material and spiritual culture, as well as unique methods of education of their children and youth. People of Sakha familiarize their children with monuments of national culture from an early age. Conditions for the formation of linguistic competence and development of individuals, capable of using the system of global communication and familiar with information technology, have been created in educational institutions of the republic. In Yakutia, great importance is attached to the linguistic background, because it is viewed as a basis for cross-cultural communication that shapes the consciousness of a person, determines their world views, promotes readiness for dialogue, respect for their own culture and traditions, tolerance of other languages and cultures. In 1996-1997, which were declared by M. Nikolaev, President of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), the years of youth and education, content priorities of the courses of Russian, native and foreign languages were revised. The main focus was on the communicative aspect of language education, on free speech activity and communicational culture. Familiarizing students with the nation's cultural heritage and culture of modern society and teaching them to use their native language freely in all public areas of its application were announced priority tasks of language education. In the academic year 1996/1997, it was made possible in schools to study and to get education in six languages, namely in Russian, Yakut, Evenk, Even, Yukaghir and Chukchi languages. Following results were achieved during those years: 1,099 Evens (47.7% of all Even children), 907 Evenks (27.1%), 96 (58.5%) Yukaghirs and 95 Chukchis (78,5%) were studying their native language. These figures were due to the lack of trained teachers, as well as parents' reluctance to educate their children in their native language. At our first conference in 2008 As Minister of Education, I ensured in 1997 that Even, Evenk, Yukaghir, Chukchi and Dolgan children were no longer obliged to study Yakut language (according to the then-existing curriculum, these children had to be polyglots, as they had to study two official languages, Russian and Yakut, their native language and a foreign one, e.g. English). Being in charge of education, I saw my task in helping to create the best conditions for the development of each language and gradual formation of the need to use both official languages in full compliance with rights of a citizen to choose the language of study and understanding that nothing should be mandatory when it comes to human rights. We clearly understood that the state is obliged to create conditions for efficient pre-primary education and in 1997 the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) obliged pre-school educational institutions to admit children from the age of 5. Within a limited time, all preschool teachers were trained to teach reading (from the age of 5). Already in 1999, 93% of all five-year old children in the republic (100% in some areas) were attending preschool educational institutions. And in 2000, children who started their first grade were already able to read, and, most importantly, had the ability to learn in a group and live in the society. In 2000, through the personal efforts by Vyacheslav Shtyrov, President of OJSC ALROSA, computer equipment worth $2 million was donated by ALROSA to schools of the republic. Sakhatelecom company, then led by Nikolai Nikolaev, granted schools with a 3 year long "guest" Internet access. Such support helped to make a breakthrough in the education system of Yakutia. One of the major indications of the progress achieved by all school teachers and officials of the Ministry of Education was the fact that in 2003 Yakutia ranked third (after Moscow and St. Petersburg) in the federal competition "The best region of Russia in terms of ICT" within the programme of "Electronic Russia" for the use of ICT in education. The republic has made such a breakthrough in providing educational institutions with computers, because it recognized the priority of computerization and distance learning, given the remoteness of its educational institutions not only from Russian and foreign but even from Yakutsk research and methodological centers, and their significant information isolation by force of circumstances. Today, thanks to the implementation of National Priority Projects, initiated in 2006 by Russian President Vladimir Putin, all educational institutions of the republic have access to broadband Internet. All secondary school graduates speak Russian, native, foreign languages and are active users of ICT. The generations born after the advent of computers and information technology, are familiar with modern technologies. Today, the teacher is not the only source of information and knowledge. Instant communication technologies provide access to all relevant data. Nowadays through Internet people can always get the most effective courses by the best teachers. Modern school and college students no longer believe the myths that used to exist before the Internet: 1. School is the best place for learning. 2. Intelligence is unchangeable. 3. The level of education is the result of teaching. 4 . We all learn in the same way. Even now, people sometimes confuse education with schooling, their health with disease treatment and hospitals, law with lawyers. Earlier, some people profited from this situation, as it helped to make people less self-reliant and less eager to make decisions about their life. But the society is undergoing huge changes, the transition from the old system to the new one is under way. Parents wonder why children are being prepared for life in the past, and not for the life in the future. Recent polls in Yakutia confirm a positive attitude of people of the republic towards changes in its educational system, particularly in the sphere of higher professional education. According to the federal educational policy of the country, establishment and development of federal universities is regarded as an instrument of social and economic advancement of the regions within federal districts and development of an innovative economy in Russia in general. For the period up to 2030, the Government of the Russian Federation expects Yakutia and its surrounding areas to meet a number of challenging social and economic objectives requiring a new quality of economic growth and exploration of new ways of development based on modern approaches. Major investment projects in the Far East provide for large-scale transformations aimed at accelerating economic development of the north-eastern part of Russia, increasing concentration of available resources and developing more effective management. This is precisely why Egor Borisov, President of the Republic, and the Yakut government place so much emphasis on creation of a new talent pool able to generate ideas and bring them into life. In this regard, the North-Eastern Federal University named after Maxim Ammosov (NEFU) becomes a major resource for the development of the republic and the north-east of the country. The NEFU has quite recently celebrated the first year of its new status in a new organizational form, the form of an autonomous institution. Systemic changes has started in all the spheres of the university life. Actions taken in accordance with the development priorities approved by the Government of the Russian Federation define and shape the establishment and development of the leading scientific, educational, methodological and cultural centre in the north-east of Russia. The implementation of the NEFU Development Programme provides for the establishment of a strong research and innovative entrepreneurial university that will contribute to the development of regional technologically innovative economy. The NEFU doesn't seek to become the largest regional university, its goal is to be the best, high-demand and useful for the region, to support new technologies' development and promotion, combine efforts to improve cross-cultural ties and corporate services in partnership with the public, businesses, academic institutions and state authorities. The university drives the expansion of the domestic market. It creates and ensures the development of human capital, which will contribute to the viability and competitiveness of the regional economy. In comparison with the programmes of other federal universities, that of the NEFU has a stronger humanitarian component. The innovative project, titled "Preservation and Development of the Languages and Cultures of the Peoples of the North-East of Russia", was launched immediately after the Decree had been signed by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and the programme had been approved. The NEFU has established its branch in the Chukotka Autonomous District (in the city of Anadyr). The following institutions were also created: • the Institute of Alexei Kulakovskiy, founder of Yakut literature; • the Olonkho Research Institute (Olohkho was declared by the UNESCO to be a Masterpiece of the Oral and Intangible Heritage of Humanity); • the Institute of Languages and Culture of the Peoples of the North-East of the Russian Federation; • the Institute of Foreign Philology and Regional Studies. The NEFU attaches great importance to language education and study of language processes. There are three philological divisions in the University. In July 2010, the Centre to Advance Multilingualism in Cyberspace was established in the NEFU, which contributed greatly to organizing the Second Conference on Linguistic and Cultural Diversity in Cyberspace. Problems and prospects of the Centre were discussed at the seminar held at the NEFU with participation of Evgeny Kuzmin, Chairman of the Intergovernmental Council and Russian Committee of the UNESCO Information for All Programme. In November 2010, Yakutsk hosted an offsite meeting of the Committee of the Federation Council of the Russian Federation on the North and Indigenous Peoples "On the use of modern information technologies for preservation and development of the languages, culture and spirituality of the peoples of the North (the case of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia))." The NEFU played an active part in the event and organized a special round-table discussion on November 17, 2010. All suggestions made by the NEFU were supported and included in the recommendations of the offsite meeting, and eventually an official policy document on the subject was adopted. Together with the Siberian Federal University, we launched a «Foresight» project («Foresight» -Study of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia)). The Yakut people are the main participants of this study aimed at defining a possible future of the peoples of the republic on the basis of expert assessments of social and economic spheres, utilizing the method of long-term regional development forecasting. Its main peculiarity is the focus on the development of practical measures for rapid achievement of the selected strategic objectives that guide the medium and long term development of the republic. A programme for the preservation and development of the Yukaghir language and culture in digital media and cyberspace for 2011-2014 was launched. The results achieved during the first six months of 2011 include five educational DVD-based courses on the Yukaghir language, a basis for the web-portal of the indigenous small peoples of the North, www.arctic-megapedia.ru , where materials on the language and culture of Yukaghirs are already available. Measures are being taken to further develop the ways for operational communication, interaction and bringing people together. Modern information technology shortens the distance, helps to overcome the language barrier and does indeed change the world. Within the NEFU Development Programme, a number of steps are being taken to advance information and communication technologies.The main goal is to build an IT system to support research and education process and achieve full automatization of university work. A Wi-Fi network provides a wireless Internet access to students within the University buildings and will soon be extended to cover the entire campus. The biggest university building of the Natural Sciences Department offers free Wi-Fi mobile working areas which are also helpful to our guests -foreign students from Norway, Finland, Sweden, who come here in the framework of the North-North exchange programmes, and South Korean students, who participate in the NEFU Summer School. The University works to integrate cutting-edge technologies. There is a wellknown expert estimate of ten information technologies that will change the world. Cloud Computing technology comes first among them: it enables small computers to process information using the potential of big datacenters located across the world. In this area, we explore ways to use cloud computing to build an innovative platform for a virtual electronic university -"the Yakutsk INTER-University." A student may enter a service cloud anytime and anywhere provided that he has an Internet connection. Any lecture room or classroom can turn into a laboratory or a computer classroom. The NEFU Development Programme includes elaborating a hardware and software system in 2011 that will be used to provide both high-performance computing and secure storage of large volumes of information resources and their prompt accessibility. It will also serve as a basis to create a NEFU repository of information and educational digital resources in the languages of small peoples of the North-East of Russia, including digitized copies of books and documents, electronic manuals and teaching aids, cinema and video films, audio recordings, etc. It will also allow free downloading of digitized copies of text and multimedia materials for those owners who would like to provide a free access to their resources but do not have sufficient technical capacities. We plan to put in place a free and open repository of information and educational digital resources in the languages of small peoples of the North-East of Russia and the Arctic regions transmitted by their authors and owners for secure storage and non-commercial use for educational purposes; to form an integrated catalogue of Internet resources; an to organize off-campus education projects with the help of the integrated catalogue and repository to boost interest in and use of Internet resources in the languages of small peoples of the North-East of Russia among speakers themselves, particularly among the youth. On June 9, 2011 UNESCO and the NEFU signed a treaty to establish the University-based UNESCO Chair "Adaptation of Society and Man in Arctic Regions in the Context of Climate Change and Globalization." The Chair is inter-departmental and aims at addressing issues of adaptation of both the society and man in Arctic regions by establishing international scientific and educational collaboration, raising awareness of the population by means of modern information and telecommunications technologies and forming an Internet information environment on the issues of Arctic regions. The Chair will promote cooperation between the outstanding scientists of the NEFU and other universities of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) and the Russian Federation, as well as foreign countries. The Constitution of the Russian Federation begins with the following words: "We, the multinational people of the Russian Federation…", and we must constantly bear in mind that Russia is a poly-ethnic State.According to the 2002 population census there are 180 ethnic communities living in Russia.Over the last decade, focus has been on the language policy.The Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) could be considered polylingual.We understand that, with all the importance of bilingual motivation, it is linguo-ecological motivation that has a crucial role to play, which implies preserving and developing languages of all peoples, expanding their application and use.I am convinced that our conference will contribute to the further development of linguistic and cultural diversity in cyberspace.Co-Chair, Conference Organizing Committee (Moscow, Russian Federation) Most nations in the contemporary world enjoy neither statehood nor sovereignty.Their languages are not state languages because a majority of countries are multiethnic and multilingual.Even in the best possible scenarios, when governments and dominant ethnic groups are rigorously protective of ethnic and linguistic minorities, most of their languages are still marginalised to varying extents.They exist and develop (or decline) in the shadow of the country's dominant language, which is used in all spheres of influencepolitical, economic, educational, cultural, scientific, etc.Globalisation, various possibilities for migration in a context of high mobility, and the rapid pace of urbanisation have made many ethnic minorities undervalue their native language.Learning native language to talk with fewer and fewer people on a decreasing number of topics is regarded as a blind alley.Meanwhile, state and international languages garner a wealth of attention and research.No language develops outside the context of its corresponding ethnos.At the same time, urbanisation and globalisation encourage smaller cultures to merge with the majority, and marginalize themselves.The knowledge and historical and cultural experience stored within these cultures gradually vanish, as well as the culture's/language's potential.Cultural and linguistic marginalisation is thus an interrelated and multifaceted process; with the death of a language, its unique carrier culture vanishes 1 .All these and other factors lead to a dramatic decrease in the number of active speakers of minority languages resulting in further marginalization (and extinction -in extreme cases) of the less equipped languages with the smallest number of speakers.These issues are salient for nearly every country where two or more languages cohabit.What can we do to stop or at last to hinder the process of language marginalisation, and to enhance the fitness of endangered languages?Who can do it, and whose duty is it?Let us examine how Russia, one of the most multiethnic, multilingual and multi-religious countries of the world; tackles these issues, and to what extent it solves them.180 world languages are spoken in Russia belonging to the Indo-European, Altaic, and Ural language families, the Caucasian and Paleo-Siberian language groups.Those are not languages of new immigrants; various Russian population groups have been speaking them for centuries.Over a hundred of these languages belong to indigenous ethnic entities historically formed within the present-day Russian borders or living there for centuries.The Constitution of the Russian Federation declares all languages of Russia to be common cultural assets.Almost all languages use graphic systems, even if some have acquired them somewhat recently.There are four most widely used languages except Russian with between 1.5 and 5.5 million speakers: Tatar, Chuvash, Bashkir, and Chechen.A further nine languages have between four hundred thousand and a million speakers -Yakut language belongs to this group.A further fifteen are spoken by between fifty thousand to four hundred thousand people.Intensive cultural dialog, mutual exchange and enrichment that took place on the territory of the Russian Empire and Soviet Union feature modern Russia as well.Respect for other peoples' cultures has been intrinsic to Russian policies allowing to preserve the richest cultural and linguistic diversity we are justifiably proud of.Unlike many other multilingual countries, Russia offers education (primary and even higher for certain fields of humanities education), television and radio broadcasting, internet resources, books and newspapers in nearly all of its languages.These activities find financial support by the state.Russia is unique in another respect as well: close to forty of its indigenous languages enjoy official status.All languages except Russian are minority languages, and all are marginalized to varying extents.Future perspectives are limited for representatives of indigenous peoples speaking their native language only.Proficiency in Russian is required for building a career or realizing one's potential, especially in the intellectual sphere.Problems and issues for concern are still numerous.Out of a hundred indigenous languages of Russia nearly thirty are minority languages of the peoples of the Far North, Siberia and the Far East less than fifty thousand speakers strong.Some of the languages have less than 100 speakers.Despite official efforts at every level of Russian bureaucracy to nurture these languages (especially those with less than two thousand speakers) and their corresponding cultures, the risk of extinction remains high due to globalization, urbanization and active migration processes leading to the rapid assimilation of these peoples.It is reasonable that Russia's top priority is protecting, preserving and developing the major state language -Russian -as the language of interethnic communication within the country, an instrument of transnational communication and an official language of international organizations.At the same time Russia advocates for linguistic and cultural diversity.While actively supporting this concept at the international level, Russia makes it a point to implement it consistently in home politics and everyday life -despite the tremendous complexity of this cost-demanding problem, especially in the context of numerous burning challenges and systemic problems our country is facing in the course of drastic changes in all spheres of life.Support for multilingualism is of great importance for modern Russia.Aside from preserving and developing languages as the basis for the cultural heritage of our country, i.e. the heritage of the Russian people and all other peoples living here, it has always been relevant for tackling political, economic, social and cultural problems, in particular those dealing with interethnical communication in polyethnic environments.In order to maintain and develop in our modern world languages should be indemand in cyberspace and get representation there.ICTs open possibilities to decelerate languages' extinction, preserve and even develop them.This chance should not be lost.Three years ago here, in Yakutsk, I talked on the measures taken in Russia to preserve languages and on the ways of organizing these activities on political and practical levels.This communication is included in the proceedings of the first conference.Our Yakut colleagues can describe in details the problems they are facing and the exemplary ethnolinguistic and sociocultural policies implemented in the Republic of Sakha.On the basis of Russian political and practical experience, I would like to define the roles and tasks of social institutions that can -and should -hold responsibility for languages' preservation and development in cyberspace.To develop in cyberspace languages should first of all get development in real life.Three more factors are important, however.First, tools for multilingualism promotion in cyberspace are required.Second, institutes are needed toa) elaborate and implement these tools creating attractive and useful content in minority languages andb) teach others to develop, create and use their own content.Information literacy is crucial for both representatives of language support institutions and ordinary users.Third, positive environment should be created to allow institutes and users work on the elaboration of instruments, creation and preservation of content and on providing proper training.As we analyse the experience (both positive and negative) of the Russian Federation and one of its entities, the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), we can attempt to draw out some more general conjectures regarding the question of how to guarantee the continued functioning of minority languages in the shadow of a dominant language in a national context.Potential contributors to the promotion and development of a language are manifold and diverse, and include: • national authorities; • local authorities; • educative systems; • research establishments (universities and institutes for scientific research); • memory institutions (libraries, archives, museums); • artistic establishments (theatres, philharmonic halls, musical and folk groups, art galleries working in close contact with local painters, sculptors and architects); • film studios; • cultural centres, principally in remote settlements, which unite the functions of memory institutions and art and educational centres; • book publishers and traders; • media outlets, including digital media; • the ICT industry; • public organisations and private persons; and • businesses.Let us now consider each of the above-listed contributors, and their corresponding targets and lines of action.National and local official policies and activities are prime.Effective policies include a combination of active, consistent, complementary steps to stimulate and add value to the activities by all major stakeholders.They should be allocated a duty to facilitate the preservation, free expression and development of linguistic, ethno-cultural and religious identity of ethnic communities, their cultural values, traditions, folklore, as well as the expansion of the domains of national languages' use via the practical application of principles of cultural pluralism, bilingualism and multilingualism.This goal demands the enactment of special laws (and/or update of the already existing ones) creating favorable environment for the preservation and equitable and authentic development of a country's languages.Monitoring and ensuring compliance with these laws is also essential.They can provide a basis for the formation of a broad system of statutory regulation of activities by legal entities and individuals, and for the elaboration of by-laws.Constitutions of many countries affirm bilingualism and multilingualism, stressing the equality of languages.Education in the state's official languages is guaranteed, and citizens are often free to choose the main language of education.Federal and regional language laws should stipulate that the acquisition of the state status by certain languages must not encroach on the linguistic rights and expression by all ethnic entities historically inhabiting a particular territory.Programmes of socio-economic, national and cultural development should be elaborated based on a set of measures to preserve and develop minority languages and cultures, to extend cooperation of all peoples for mutual intellectual and spiritual enrichment.Respect for customs, traditions, values, and institutions reflecting ethnic cultural specificity is a prerequisite for such programmes.Authorities should contribute to systemic language studies and multilingualism promotion in education, administration, law, cultural education, news media and cyberspace.The attainment of those goals can be facilitated by: • establishing a regulatory framework for the development of languages at the national level (the national constitution and federal laws, along with constituent entities' constitutions, statutes and laws); • forming and implementing cultural and educational strategies, policies and programmes explicitly aiming to promote minority cultures and languages; • targeting federal funding and soft taxation of both governmental and non-governmental programmes for language preservation and development; • granting state or official status to the largest minority languages either at the national level, or within regions densely inhabited by speakers of those languages; whenever possible, language equality must be affirmed in law; • affirming a given minority language's official status in the records of government and municipal authorities: using the language in governmental work, publishing federal and republican legal acts in it (and guaranteeing their equal legal force), and granting the language equal standing with the principal state language during elections, referendums and industrial, office and administrative activities; • creating official document databases in the language; • establishing councils on language policy within central and/or regional governments, and determining their rights and duties; • guaranteeing social, economic and legal protection of the language in legislative, executive and judicial bodies; • providing material incentives for experts to use both national and minority languages in their work; • signing (or lobbying for signing) and ratifying international acts promoting multilingualism; • promoting ethnic entities' interest in the development of their languages; • establishing targeted regional programmes to preserve culture and language; • helping and legally assisting the development of the language's body of literature through financial and other support of book publication and media dissemination, particularly that which is oriented to children and youth; • forming and implementing strategies and programmes promoting reading in the native language; • partnering with ethnic cultural associations outside the administrative territorial boundaries that are historically densely populated with members of the given ethnie; • supporting libraries, museums, archives and other cultural agencies in the preservation and development of minority cultures and languages; • establishing ethnic schools to intergenerationally transmit experiences, traditions, culture and ethics; • promoting the ethno-cultural component of education and extending it wherever necessary and possible; • equipping public schools with minority language and literature classrooms; • contracting the governments of other regions densely inhabited by speakers of a particular language to assist in measures to preserve that language, for example by supplying literature to public and school libraries to enable the study of a given language, and participating in the graduate and postgraduate training of teachers for ethnic minorities; and • creating graphic systems for non-literate languages.Securing languages representation and development in cyberspace gains in importance in the context of rapid Internet penetration in all spheres of modern life.Use of ICT has both positive and negative consequences.On the one hand, it may decrease linguistic and cultural diversity, on the other hand, it opens new prospects for preserving and even developing languages and cultures in cyberspace.Promoting linguistic and cultural diversity in cyberspace is a new field of action, expanding our opportunities for preserving languages and cultures and for extending the sphere of influence of under resourced languages rather promptly and efficiently.That is exactly why the Declaration of Principles of the World Summit on the Information Society stresses that the Information Society should be founded on and stimulate respect for cultural identity, cultural and linguistic diversity, traditions and religions, and foster dialogue among cultures and civilizations.The creation, dissemination and preservation of content in diverse languages and formats must be accorded high priority in building an inclusive Information Society.The development of local content suited to domestic or regional needs will encourage social and economic development and will stimulate participation of all stakeholders, including people living in rural, remote and marginal areas.To promote multilingualism in cyberspace, authorities can take both general and goal-oriented measures to create a multilingualism-friendly environment: • designing and implementing ICT penetration programmes; • drawing up action plans to promote public use of the Internet, including information literacy programmes for both dominant and minority languages; • providing telecommunication networks to remote areas; • elaborating information resource development programmes in minority languages; • promoting training in ICTs and information, especially in local languages; • promoting the creation of local content, translation and adaptation; • promoting the translation of world literary classics into minority languages, and of minority speakers into other languages, and posting these translations online; • establishing integrated multilingual information resource networks; • introducing electronic documentation and record management in at least two languages; and • promoting the research and development of operating systems, search engines and internet browsers, online dictionaries and term reference books, and their adaptation to local demands.Research centres provide the theoretical basis for governmental and nongovernmental efforts on multilingualism promotion and make fundamental and relevant applied research.Their duties may comprise: • studies of ethnic cultures, traditions and quotidian life; • studies of languages and their history; • studies of the current linguistic situation and related issues; • studies of language-promoting policy and practice in other parts of the country/world, display and dissemination of pioneer experience; • elaboration of proposals on adapting cutting edge experience; • elaboration and implementation of permanent monitoring tools to measure language use by social groups; • elaboration and implementation of permanent monitoring tools to qualify and quantify the work of language-promoting institutions; • proposals to the government for draft regulatory legislation on language protection and promotion; • initiation and organization of theoretical and applied conferences addressing the various aspects of minority language preservation and development; • establishment of research, education and information centres of minority languages and cultures, aimed at conducting research and training for relevant experts; • popularization of minority languages and cultures; • elaboration of national reading promotion programmes, in particular for minority languages, in cooperation with libraries, educational institutions, media outlets, and book publishers/traders; • elaboration of best practices guidelines for relevant offices and organisations, charged with the task of languages and cultures support; • publication of bilingual dictionaries that include audio recordings of words; • establishment of terminology and orthography commissions; • creation of text corpora and phonetic databases; • linguistic and folklore field studies and expeditions; • establishment of centralised archives, including electronic archives, for minority languages; • acquisition of private archives of researchers and community activists (including foreign) engaged in minority language support, and entrusting those archives to state memory institutions; • establishment of clear standards and guidelines for recording and representing texts, alphabets and graphic systems for non-literate languages -this is of particular importance for oral languages and languages having recently acquired a graphic system; • establishment of a unified literary language, if absent; • documentation of minority languages; • research and development of operating systems, search engines and information scanning systems; and • development of fonts in cooperation with relevant experts.Primary, secondary and higher educational establishments should cooperate with federal and regional executive and legislative bodies, as well as research and cultural institutions, to support and develop minority languages and multilingualism.Their sphere of activity includes: • participating in writing the regional/local component of national educational standards; • training minority language teachers for schools and universities; • training experts on languages, history and traditional culture of ethnic minorities; • implementing postgraduate teacher training programmes; • elaborating basic curricula; • elaborating academic curricula and learning packages; • elaborating language teaching and speech improvement methods; • making recommendations to implement new language teaching technologies; • establishing university classes in minority languages; • using minority languages as educational tools in all places of learning, including pre-school institutions, secondary schools and universities; • teaching minority language as part of core curricula for students who speak it as a second language in all educational establishments in areas where an ethnic minority makes up a considerable section of the population; • organising specialist language and literature classes; • organising educational competitions on minority languages and literature; • organising conferences and events on linguo-cultural and ethnocultural issues; • organising off-campus minority language courses, especially on interregional and international levels (including e-learning in higher education institutions); • organising summer camps conducted in minority languages; and • organising online conferences in minority languages (on diverse topics).Cultural institutions and activists are tremendously important in language support, not only those directly connected with preserving written cultures, but also theatres and conservatories, art schools, folklore performers, cultural centres in remote areas, and individual artists and cultural workers.It is the duty of these institutions to preserve, store, popularise and offer for public use all essential testimonies of a particular people's history; to elaborate all possible ways and forms of accessing its cultural and written heritage, intellectual and artistic products; to contribute to saturating public spaceboth real and virtual -with them.Libraries and archives must search, acquire, describe, study, popularise and store all printed matter, sound and video recordings emanating from a language, both in the geographical area that is densely inhabited by its users, and other areas (even foreign countries) where those languages are used.Not only materials in minority languages but all information about them published in other languages is important.The activities of memory institutions include: • gathering, preserving and extending comprehensive and thematic collections of all published and unpublished materials in a minority language; • creating full-text databases of periodicals in the given language; • constructing an exhaustive bibliography of printed and written resources in the language; • making available centralized catalogues of publications in the language (especially important for languages that have recently acquired a graphic system); • including bibliographic descriptions of works reflecting the history and culture of an ethnic minority in electronic national catalogues of all libraries at both national and international levels; • popularising these works, especially by organising readers' conferences, reader clubs, and meetings with writers, critics, publishers, illustrators, and others; • digitising documents and museum exhibits that reflect an ethnic entity's history and culture, establishing corresponding electronic libraries, museums and archives, and granting public access to them; • establishing electronic and other museum expositions in the given language or bilingual exhibitions using that language; • creating electronic catalogues in museum systems in the given language; and • preparing archives of electronic publications and exhibitions on cultural and linguistic diversity and memorable dates and events.Together with other cultural, research and educational establishments, libraries, museums and archives can launch multimedia projects pertaining to the founders of ethnic cultures, folklore collectors, writers, artists, composers and performing musicians to be applied in various fields.Texts, photographs, digital copies of paintings and sketches, sound and video recordings can be recorded on discs for broad circulation, and their online versions be posted on the websites of cultural, research and educational institutions with due respect for copyright.Today mass media tend to become most important and efficient tools for influencing public opinion, their effect being even stronger than that of education.Federal, regional and municipal media outlets can be purveyors of cultural and linguistic diversity and promote spiritual values exchange.The contemporary mass media should focus on: • preserving and developing periodicals in minority languages and sections in those languages in other periodicals; • organising television and radio broadcasting in minority languages, especially the release of programmes entirely or partly conducted in those languages and dedicated to the areas of their active use and the original ethnic culture of their speakers; • organising internet broadcasting in minority languages; and • establishing information portals.Book publishers and traders can make a tremendous contribution to the support of minority languages and development of multilingualism: a language without access to the book industry is a language excluded from intellectual community life.UNESCO says that "books are in fact a means of expression which live through language and in language" and stresses the importance of translation in strengthening multilingualism, and the urgent need to "give languages broader access to publishing, so as to promote the exchange of books and editorial content, and thus the free flow of ideas by word and image".Publishers can contribute to the promotion of minority languages through: • printing research, popular science and fiction books, periodicals and translations in a minority language; • promoting literary work in a minority language and its emerging authors; • assuring that libraries of educational institutions include books in minority languages; and • helping minority language speakers to acquire books, especially in remote areas that are historically densely populated by the given ethnie, and the diaspora outside the traditional settlement areas.Non-governmental language promotion activities include: • establishing weekend schools, clubs and ethno-cultural associations to provide supplemental linguistic and literary education; • organising competitions, festivals and creative events to promote cultural and linguistic traditions; • participating in language and culture days in and outside the traditional settlement areas of a given ethnie; • participating in folk festivals; and • communicating with and supporting a language's expatriate population.Individuals and groups of individuals can also participate in language preservation and promotion by: • establishing and supporting Wikipedia in minority languages; • establishing and supporting websites, blogs, Twitter and other social networks.Issues of linguistic diversity in global information networks and universal access to information in cyberspace dominate the agenda of the discussions on information society.The ICT industry should therefore become a crucial participant in supporting and enhancing a language's status.The ICT industry can channel its energy into the following areas: • articulating and promoting technical standards, taking into account ethnic minorities' demands; • creating complete computer fonts for minority languages; • participating in the establishment of international UNICODE standards and the implementation of the unified keyboard layout; • localising existing software and creating free software to support local languages; • elaborating computer language models and machine translation systems; • supporting minority languages in e-mail, chat and other messaging utilities; • uploading electronic study books and dictionaries in minority languages; • establishing multilingual domains and e-mail addresses; • creating software for multilingual internet domain names and content; • establishing localised, minority language retrieval systems; • creating information and other websites and portals in bilingual versions; • making information resources available electronically; and • developing the non-textual sphere of the internet (such as voice over IP, data streaming, and video on demand).The above measures can be efficient and bring about their desired results only when the entire ethnos -not only its cultural, intellectual and ruling elite -makes major intellectual and emotional efforts, and displays goodwill, desire and interest in the survival and development of its unique culture and linguistic identity.The Language Observatory [1] Project was founded in 2003.The main objective of the project is to observe the real state of language use on the web.When the first workshop of the project was held on 21 February 2004, the Russian Committee of the UNESCO Information for All Programme kindly reported it in Russian.Then we received several responses from various language communities around the world.This really encouraged us.The Language Observatory is designed to measure the use of each language on the World Wide Web.Measurement is done by counting the number of written pages on the Web in each language.The observatory consists of two major components.The first is a data collection instrument from the Web, a crawler robot developed at the University of Milan.It can collect millions of Web pages per day.The second component is a language identification instrument.We have developed software to identify language, script and encoding properties of Web pages with high accuracy and maximum coverage.The first version of the identification algorithm LIM (Language Identification Module) was developed in 2002 [2] and implemented in 2004.The most recent updated version is called G2LI.You can use it on the Web.According to a recent verification examination G2LI is capable of identifying 184 languages in ISO Language Code (ISO 639-1) with an average accuracy of 94%.In addition to a wide coverage of languages, it can identify various types of legacy encodings 2 , which are still extensively used by many non-Latin-script user communities.Hidden inside the language identification instrument is a set of training texts for the software.Considering that the richness and quality of training texts is the most critical in language identification task we used a set of translated texts from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) provided by the UN Higher Commission for Human Rights (UNHCHR).Of note is that not all translated UDHR texts are provided with encoding; some are available only as image files.Image files can be read by humans but not directly by computers, necessitating that we transform images into text data.Table 1 illustrates how many transformed texts are given in image format (322 languages were available at the date of the first search, in early 2004).More than two hundred languages use Latin script, with or without diacritics, and only three of them were given in PDF or GIF file format.In contrast to this, among languages using so-called Abugida script 3 , not a single language was presented in the form of encoded text.This fact might itself point to the existence of a digital language divide, or in this particular case, a "digital script divide".Around the same time as we launched the Language Observatory Project, Eric Miller launched UDHR-in-Unicode project.The objective of this project was to demonstrate the use of Unicode for a wide variety of languages, using the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) as a representative text.Currently, UDHR-in-Unicode is housed on the Unicode Consortium website and the texts are used in the study of natural language processing.The The first complete observation report was published in 2008.It was the first article on language distribution on the Asian Web providing an overview of web pages collected from Asian domains.The authors concluded that there is a serious digital language divide in the region.English was very widely used especially in South Asian countries and in the majority of South East Asian countries (60% of the web pages were in English).In West Asia, English dominance was less outstanding, and in some countries Arabic was the most widely used language.In Central Asia, Russian was the most widely used language except for Turkmenistan where English was used at 90% of the web pages.It is also important to notice that some of the indigenous languages, Turkish, Hebrew, Thai, Indonesian, Vietnamese and Mongolian were the most used languages in their country domains.Lieberson's Diversity Index (LDI) [4] is a widely used index of linguistic diversity that is defined by the following formula, where P i represents the share of i-th language speakers in a community: LDI = 1 -∑ P i 2 If anyone in a community speaks the same language, then P 1 = 1 and for the speakers of other languages, P i = 0. Thus the LDI of a completely monolingual community is zero.If four languages are spoken by an equal number of people, then P 1 = P 2 = P 3 = P 4 = 0.25 and the LDI can be calculated as LDI = 1 -(0.25) 2 * 4 = 0.75.Thus a higher LDI means larger linguistic diversity and a lower LDI means lower diversity.The basic idea of LDI can be explained by the illustration in Figure 1 .A square of P i means the probability that the i-th language speaker meets with a speaker of the same language.And the sum of P i squares represents the combined probability of any speaker meeting with a speaker of the same language in the community.Then the sum of P i squares is subtracted from 1, indicating the probability that any speaker will encounter different language speakers in a society.The darkcolored areas of the square in Figure 1 correspond to this probability.Ethnologue provides a complete list of LDI data for each country or region, together with population size and the number of indigenous and immigrant languages.Based on this data 4 , Figure 2 was prepared to show how LDI changes across countries and across continents.Each circle represents a country in this chart.The circle's size corresponds to the country's population, and its vertical axis represents the country's LDI.The two large circles on the axis of Asia correspond to India (LDI = 0.94) and China (LDI = 0.51).As the chart illustrates, countries in the African continent have the highest language diversity among the continents, followed by Asia, Europe, America (North and South America included) and Oceania.In the previous section, we reviewed the overall condition of linguistic diversity of the world based on data by Ethnologue that reflects the situation in the real world.And what about language diversity in the cyber world?Since being launched, the Language Observatory has focused its attention on two continents, Asia and Africa.The first observation results were reported during a workshop organized at UNESCO headquarter in February 2005; they are fully documented in an article published in 2008 [3] .Recently, the project has completed another round of surveys of Asia, Africa and the Caribbean region based on 2009 data.The following sections will introduce an overview of this most recent study.Here we propose a two-dimensional chart, which is tentatively named the LLchart, because the chart has the Local Language Ratio on the horizontal axis and the LDI on the vertical axis.The purpose of this chart is to solve a problem we encountered when preparing an LDI chart based on data from cyberspace.It often happens that languages used on the Web are completely different from languages spoken in the real world.In many cases, the latter consists of local languages while the former mainly consists of global languages like English, French or Russian.And in those cases, the LDI of languages in cyberspace and that in the real world are not considered to be the same.We have to take into account some measurements about the presence of local languages, as presented in Figure 3 .Notice that all countries with a local language ratio P fall within the area between the two curves 1−[P 2 +(1−P) 2 ], Lieberson's index in the case of two languages, and 1−P 2 , which gives the maximum value of Lieberson's index 5 .When P becomes larger than 0.5, the LDI becomes smaller and the plotted point will move towards the bottom-right corner.When P is small, there are two possibilities: either the vacancy of local language is filled by a dominant foreign language, in which case the LDI shrinks and the point moves down and to the left; or the vacancy of local language is filled with multiple foreign languages, in which case the LDI grows and the point moves up and to the left.Based on data collected in November 2009, the LDI and local language ratio were calculated for all country domains in Asia and Africa.As we do not have data for European countries, we used Google's page count by language.On the other hand, web contents in the Indian subcontinent have a nearly negligible local language presence on the Web.More than 70 % of these Web contents are written in English.Worth mentioning here is the case of Laos.According to Ethnologue, the country's LDI is only 0.674.Why then does it have such a high LDI on the Web?The major reason for this is that the ".la" domain is actively marketed to foreigners, including customers connected to Los Angeles.As the domain is sold mainly to foreign industries and peoples, only 8% of web pages of ".la" domain are written in Lao.LDIs of African domains are plotted in Figure 5 .The presence of local languages in African domains is far rarer than in Asian domains.The local language claims the majority only in Sudan and Libya.However, several countries show high Web LDIs.The LDIs of European and some Anglophone country domains are plotted in Figure 6 .Local language presence is above 50% with the exception of Slovenia and Denmark (those countries' web spaces are dominated by English), which results in a lower LDI.At the opposite extreme is the United Kingdom, which joins other Anglophone countries (USA, Australia and New Zealand) in displaying a characteristically low LDI.Though we have managed the project since 2003, the survey of the Web is becoming difficult year by year.The most serious challenge to the surveys comes from the sheer size of the growing Web.Nobody knows exactly how many web pages exist on the entire Web.In 1997, the number was estimated at only 320 million.In 2008, Google announced 1 trillion URLs on the Web, but it has since stopped providing data.Also we need a deeper analysis of the Web, not just a language-wise counting.The Web and its hyperlink structure can tell a lot about who and how is using the Webs, and what content is written there.Currently my friend Daniel Pimienta is preparing a new, ambitious project to achieve these goals.(Saint Domingue, Dominican Republic)The theme of linguistic diversity, in the broader frame of cultural diversity, is transversal to many society matters (from education to business) and is emerging at the center of many actual debates.Do languages -as assets of humanity -require public policies to be preserved, promoted or supported?Is English the accepted lingua franca for international research collaboration and business?To what extent has the business globalization opened inescapable requirements for marketing in other languages?These questions, that are essential for the development of information societies, gain even more relevance when they are referred to the Internet, a space which has seen the initial dominance of English getting more balanced, both in terms of users and contents, in the last years, as a consequence of the intense spread of the Net in many regions.Is the "digital divide" a simple issue of access or shall the content divide and subsequent linguistic divide also be addressed?Will translation of contents be a workable and acceptable panacea for multilingualism?The theme of linguistic diversity on the Internet, which has been for a long period dealt by a small group of specialists, is gaining now the attention it deserves among policy makers and many stakeholders.As a side effect from the recent development of internationalized domain names (IDNs) more public awareness has been gained and the theme is becoming a central topic in international agendas as seen in the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) and in the main organizations in the field of the information society, such as UNESCO and the International Telecommunication Union (ITU).Furthermore, the issue is also rising in the agenda of business, and calls for a clear policy framework for the virtual world.As for indicators, a recent publication by UNESCO [1] reports on the current situation and evaluates future perspectives: the situation it describes is indeed paradoxical and quite alarming.Until the late 90s, this field was marked by a lack of serious indicators; this period was followed by the preliminary work of a handful of pioneers, which provided some indicators, most of them limited to number of users and the split of the World Wide Web per language.However, now that interest in the theme is becoming visible, the existing works aiming at measuring the linguistic diversity in the Internet are being undermined by the almost infinite size of the web as well as by the evolution of search engines.Accordingly, no reliable indicators have been produced since 2007, when the Language Observatory Project (LOP) 6 and Funredes/ Union Latina, the two most visible actors in producing indicators, published their most recent results.In this context, and starting from the fact that it is hardly possible to formulate policies in any field without a clear vision of the situation, only obtained from reliable and frequently produced indicators, it is urgent to mobilize existing actors and to encourage new ones to engage in an ambitious, serious and collective research effort of building indicators for linguistic diversity in the Digital World.This effort should both build on existing approaches and explore new methods rather than those involving a static vision of supplied linguistic resources, thus also informing on the demand side (user behavior).DILINET will also introduce the first attempt to measure automatically content characteristics while recognizing languages and use conceptual maps and visual analytics to extract meaning to statistical data on languages in the digital world.In response to this context, the DILINET project aims to develop a set of methods for producing indicators of linguistic diversity on the Internet which will therefore support informed public policies in all fields related to the Information Society, at national and global level.DILINET will adopt an exploratory research approach, taking into account existing measuring methods and adding innovative approaches, including users-based measuring systems.To overcome the limitations created by the size of the Web, the project will develop crawling optimization methods based on non sequential mathematical or statistical approaches and use both distributed and super computing resources while opening new avenues such as recognition techniques for voice or automatic content characterization.Given the transversal relevance of the theme, the project will devote effort in engaging all the relevant stakeholders from the policy field (at regional, national, European and international level) and from the research field (both with public and private background).Specific attention will be paid to raising awareness and disseminating project results among users' communities and organizations working in the sphere of linguistic technologies.The project stems from the motivation of a group of key international organizations such as UNESCO, ITU, Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie (OIF) and Union Latina and will be built on the professional experience of some MAAYA (the World Network for Linguistic Diversity) members such as Funredes or the Language Observatory Project.DILINET will provide the crosschecked and validated values for a set of indicators of linguistic diversity in cyberspace, as well as trustable and sustained methods and processes to maintain a frequent production allowing perceiving the trends and being able to gauge the results of policy actions.Additionally, DILINET will provide effective awareness raising and training activities for policy and research stakeholders on the matter of linguistic diversity on cyberspace.DILINET will represent a historic breakthrough for the issue of linguistic diversity in the Digital World opening the floor for a professional approach to this emerging theme and, as a side effect, contributing to the change of paradigm of the vision of the digital divide, switching the perspective from access to content.Indirectly, DILINET will also open new promising avenues for the production of Information Society Impact Indicators and create opportunities for the professional consideration of languages as a key parameter of the digital economy.We also have these moments of truth in language, we might not be aware of them, but they do exist.The moment a child decided to forget their mother tongue and speak only a dominant language, that is a moment of truth.Thinking back on your own life there are these moments, good and bad.Some examples that Translate.org.za has seen out in the field: • A teacher telling a passionate Afrikaans linguist that they should choose another career as there is no money in languages; • Reading a novel that switches on love for your language; • A praise singer singing the praises of a president in Xhosa; • Walking into a library to see an empty Zulu shelf, confirming that your language really is only for conversing at home; • Writing a Xhosa poem and seeing every word underlined in red.This paper covers a number of activities that Translate.org.za, as well as other members of ANLoc (The African Network for Localisation), have undertaken that try to change these moments of truth into positive moments for multilingualism.Translate.org.za is a South African non-profit organization focused on removing the barriers that exist in technology that prevent people from working in their mother tongue.The organisation also works to increase the volume of content and content platforms that allow mother tongue speakers to produce local language content.Dipping your toe into the sea is not immersion.Dipping into language is not immersion.Immersion is where you take your whole body and submerge it into the sea.Immersion in language is the ability to do everything in your language.At Translate immersion is our vision, while for most languages it might not be a reality it is a goal for which we strive.For a language that is fully immersed this would mean: you switch on your computer and it boots in your language, your emails are written in your language and spell checked correctly, your keyboard works for your language.Your cellphone, TV, ATM are all in your language.When you surf the web you can get content: news, wikipedia, facebook in your language.You look for books online and you find ones written in your language.That is a fully immersed language.Moving from a dream to reality.We often hear talk of the 6000 languages of the world, often that figure is used to indicate how fast our languages are dying.We achieve this with a keyboard, to type in content; fonts, to see the content and a locale to store the information correctly on a computer.With these things in place it is possible to do all the other language interventions that are needed.You can't translate any application without a locale, you can't enter content into a blog or wikipedia without a keyboard and you can't see any of this content in documents or on the web without a font for your language.All the exotic language applications such as automatic speech recognition (ASR), text-to-speech (TTS) and machine translation (MT) cannot proceed without these basics.In the ANLoc project we created almost 100 locales, 12 keyboard layouts and a font to cover all of the latin characters used in African languages.For a large number of languages we can capture, see and store content -we applied first aid for these languages.And it can be applied to any marginalised language across the globe.Marginalised languages often have limited resources, but one resource that they do have is a community of speakers.For marginalised and under resourced languages to prosper is really about empowering these communities because then the community can take our work to new heights and in fact take over our work.Within the scope of limited resources this often means that there are no funds to pay contributors so there needs to be a body of committed volunteers.But scarce resources also means that good skills are in limited supply.Thus it is important that these scarce skills are used optimally.What that means is that those skills are deployed to important tasks while volunteers assist in other areas.Empowered communities in this case are assisting in optimising resources allocation for the benefit of the language.The following are examples that we have used to empower communities: 1. Translate@thons -Translate.org.za adopted this approach to community translation for working on various pieces of software.Google now uses a similar approach to use communities to translate the Google interface.3. Books scanning -many African language resources are locked away on the shelves of libraries.These public domain works are critical resources for speakers of the language to be able to read and be inspired by works in their language.They are not easily available as they are often in rare collections or out of print.These resources in digital format are also critical for the creation of linguistic resources such as spell checkers.Translate has begun a project in South Africa to recover African language books through scanning and digitisation.Children love to read and they don't need encouragement to read.What they do need are exciting books in a medium that they enjoy.For young readers to find exciting books we need lots of books and the medium is most likely the cellphone.Thanks to the m4lit project for having this quote demonstrating the value of content on mobile phones: It's great ...We hope that by scanning the books found in marginalised languages we can provide a resource: firstly, lead to someone discovering their first exciting book.Secondly, but more importantly, it should create a reading culture and produce new creative works in the language.Where do we get large volumes of books?From the public domain, which contains books whose copyright term has expired and thus have been returned to the people.In our project we are scanning books in order to make them available at low cost.In this way anyone can own a collection of Tswana classic literature.Our primary objective is of course reading, the secondary being linguistic resources.It is these linguistic resources that can lead to some exciting language tools.The linguistic data present in public domain works allows us to create spell checkers, grammar checkers, text-to-speech engines and machine translation.Other sources of public domain data that we are interested in and in which Translate is developing solutions include: 1. Assisting with the capture and dissemination of Hansard (the verbatim transcripts of parliamentary debates produced in a number of commonwealth nations) 2. Government website translation -in countries where translations of government resources is regularly performed or mandated by law these translations are a valuable linguistic resource for the language.These sources of open linguistic data are critical for the advancement of marginalised languages.Thus it is important that marginalised languages are active in ensuring that linguistic resources such as these are made available for the advancement of the language.In making these resources available it is critical that their availability be judged not by access to the resources, but by what new resources can be produced from them.Thus licensing that allows academic use but prevents the creation of a commercial spell checker are not in the best interests of the language or the community.In a similar vein the ongoing extension of copyright is problematic for marginalised languages.By extension we mean the move from the current international norms of 50 years of copyright to terms in excess of 70 years.Each extension means that more works are not available to the language.If we consider that copyright approximately 100 years ago was anything from 14 to 28 years and that now it ranges from 50 to 70+years we realise that marginalised languages have lost much of their public domain content.For marginal languages it is important to consider what benefit copyright extension has to the overall health of the language.Of interest to these languages is the championing of terms such as those found in the Egyptian copyright law that give authors 3 years in which to exercise their right to translate.If they fail to translate their work into Arabic within that time then anyone may translate their work into Arabic.This simple clause could dramatically stimulate the production of content in local languages.Linguistically speaking English is very far from either of the languages, Xhosa and Zulu.Xhosa and Zulu are both part of the Nguni language group in South Africa and are therefore linguistically closely related.Many efforts to use machine translation focus on the long distance translation of English to Zulu, French to Zulu or similar.While we won't discount the value of these it is worth considering that by machine translating from Zulu to Xhosa we grow a 10 million strong community into an 18 million strong community.There is an unexploited strength in these close communities that goes beyond machine translation.Zulu is a Bantu language and so is Swahili.Swahili has an estimated 140 million speakers.It is much easier to translate content from Swahili to Zulu.And by translation in this case we don't only mean machine translation, we mean human translation as well as the fact that the closer alignment of the cultures makes translation of cultural metaphors so much easier.For marginalised and minority language we really should be examining how we can exploit the closer relationships to grow the language speaking community, grow the financial viability of languages and grow the limited resources by the pooling of resources.Our efforts are part of a journey.Travellers share their meager possessions, but we in the language community are not very good at sharing our resources.Thus it is important that we create a common ground on how resources should be shared.As we said earlier this should not be defined by the act of sharing but by the outputs that can be created from the resources.As an example, in South Africa, we estimate there are four Zulu morphological analysers.This is clearly a waste of scarce resources in a language with limited access to funds to advance the language.The reason there are four is that there is no framework for sharing these resources.But ultimately it is because there is no clear objective on how these resources and tools should impact on the lives of real people.When it comes to tools for processing linguistic data, the same logic applies.We really do need to learn how to share so that we can focus on the work that impacts language speakers.If you look at the wave that is marginalised languages, those 6000 all crashing down on us at once, then we all want to run away.But if we focus on riding the wave then it could actually be quite fun.We at Translate have realised that it is in some ways about changing our thinking.We want to build solutions that meet the needs of language speakers.But we've realised that sometimes we need to address other people languages needs, and in so doing we create linguistic resources that we can employ to address the needs of our marginalised languages.For resource poor languages using modern technology to give oral literates the resources and tools to be active e-literate participants is the type of thinking, or wave riding, that is required.SIL International is a faith-based, non-profit organization committed to building the capacity of language communities worldwide for sustainable language development.We define language development as the series of ongoing planned actions that a language community takes to ensure that its language continues to serve its changing social, cultural, political, economic, and spiritual needs and goals.From its beginnings in 1934, SIL has had the privilege of working with over 2,590 language communities representing more than 1.7 billion people in nearly 100 countries.SIL's staff see their work as an outgrowth of their Christian commitment, valuing service, academic excellence, sharing of knowledge and partnership as we serve language communities in linguistics, literacy, translation and other language-centered development activities.In addition to language development activities undertaken with individual language communities, SIL takes an active role in advocacy for minority languages at the local, national and international level.Please see our web site at for more information.The increase in global collaboration on the Internet in recent years has opened significant opportunities for minority language communities.We are witnessing an increased visibility of and support for the needs of these communities from the governmental, commercial and non-profit sectors.Collaborative efforts to facilitate the use of all the world's languages in cyberspace are growing.This report highlights several significant efforts and SIL's participation in them.It reflects the work of many SIL colleagues and partners worldwide 7 .In order to facilitate the use of all languages in cyberspace equally, members of the language communities themselves and other interested parties need to be able to collect, organize and share information in and about all languages accurately and consistently.Multiple organizations, including the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), the Unicode Consortium and others, develop and support standards that facilitate this work.SIL International supports these efforts to enhance data sharing based on these standards.The following paragraphs will provide information on some recent developments.In June 2011, SIL International released a powerful web-based resource called ScriptSource.ScriptSource is a dynamic, collaborative reference to the writing systems of the world, with detailed information on scripts, characters and languages.A writing system for an individual language is composed of several elements including the script and individual characters.A language may be supported by several writing systems based on historic, political, educational or other reasons.Scripts, characters and language names are all currently codified by international standards, however the complex relationships between these elements are often not well understood or well documented.ScriptSource seeks to bring together authoritative information from standards and other recognized resources with contributions from the global community to document the writing systems of the world.We hope this resource will help bring visibility to the richness of languages and writing systems, as well as to help researchers, designers, linguists and software developers with the complex task of supporting the world's languages in different information and communication technologies.While almost 7000 living languages are spoken in the world today, only around 130 scripts are used to write them-if they have a written form.An individual script, such as Latin, Arabic or Cyrillic, is thus used to write many different languages.The set of characters used to write a specific language within a script is based on the linguistic characteristics of the language.These, and other elements, go into defining a writing system for a language.For minority languages that use a majority language script, documenting the elements of the writing system makes it possible to develop computing solutions that support the language.As an example, while the use of Cyrillic script for major languages is well documented, its use for some minority languages is not consistently documented or well understood, and that use continues to evolve and change.SIL is investigating the possibility of an extended Cyrillic documentation project that would bring together information from a wide variety of sources to catalog and describe the use of Cyrillic script by all languages that use it.We believe that ScriptSource can be a resource to facilitate that global discussion, and would like to see all interested parties included in the process.Please contact us if you feel this would be a useful project or if you would like to be involved.Comprehensive font development work is already underway.We acknowledge and appreciate the work of the font foundry, ParaType, in developing and releasing the PTSans and PTSerif fonts.These free/libre fonts are designed to support minority-language use of Cyrillic and Latin scripts in the Russian Federation.This development represents a strong partnership between government, non-government and commercial organizations to benefit the minority language communities.The fonts are licensed for the widest possible sharing and use.SIL also supports a wide range of extended Cyrillic characters with the Gentium, Charis, Doulos, and now Andika free/libre fonts.We intend to improve and broaden that support as more information becomes available.Beyond font development is a need to document which specific characters are used in a given language and to develop the standard locale information and other components for a complete writing system reference.Commercial and open source software developers use this information to support a specific language in computing applications.We hope to simplify the complex process of documenting the information needed for an individual language to be used in cyberspace and telecommunications.Once the information is clearly organized, we hope the process for submitting it to the appropriate standardssetting bodies will be clearer and more accessible.The ISO 639 family of standards was expanded in February 2007 with the formal adoption of ISO 639-3.This standard seeks to provide a comprehensive list of human languages, including living, extinct, ancient, and constructed languages, whether major or minor, written or unwritten.It provides a unique three-letter code for each language along with limited meta-data about the language.As the Registration Authority (RA) for Part 3 of the standard, SIL processes requests for changes to the language codes.We receive and review requests for adding new language codes and for changing existing ones according to criteria defined in the standard.All update requests undergo a period of public review before being acted upon in a yearly review cycle.In 2010, thirty-seven requests were considered, recommending fifty explicit changes in the code set.After a public review and comment process, 32 were fully approved and 5 were rejected: • 4 new language codes were created: 3 for living languages and 1 for an extinct language.• 19 language names were either changed, or additional name forms added.• 1 language had another language variety merged into it.• 8 language codes were retired: 2 language codes were merged and 4 language codes were split.A grave concern for many in the world is the large number of minority languages that are endangered or at risk of extinction.SIL shares this concern and is partnering with many organizations to determine ways to document and share information about these languages before they become extinct, with the prospect that these languages can be preserved.We believe that every language has inherent value, and that speakers of minority languages and other interested parties should have the tools and techniques available to protect and enhance their cultural and linguistic heritage.In many cases around the world, we have witnessed renewed language vitality as members of a language community are equipped with the capacity to use their language in new and different areas of life.In addition, we are now working on solutions to publish dictionaries from FLEx on the web for further collaboration and knowledge sharing.With the advances in Unicode and web typography, complex scripts can now be utilized on the web, thus enhancing the language situation for minority languages.We have also developed software that helps non-linguists build a dictionary in their own language.WeSay has various ways to help indigenous speakers to think of words in their language and enter some basic data about them.The program is customizable and task-oriented, giving the advisor the ability to turn on or off tasks as needed and as the user receives training for those tasks.WeSay uses a standard XML format, so data can be exchanged with linguistoriented tools like FieldWorks.Community-level collaborative dictionary development can be a rallying point for language communities.It's something they can get involved in and it opens their eyes to a brighter future for their language.For further information on the FieldWorks suite of software applications, and to download the latest version, please visit the website at http://fieldworks.sil.org/.For an example of a multi-script lexicon with more than 6,600 entries created using FLEx, see the Nuosu Yi-Chinese-English glossary at http://www.yihanyingcihui.net/?lang=en.To learn more about WeSay and download a copy, visit http://www.wesay.org/.Governments around the world are increasingly aware of the difficulties that children face if the language of instruction at school is not the language the children speak at home.As more education systems seek to use the mother tongue of the children in the early years, demand is increasing for local language documentation and educational resources such as schoolbooks and multilingual dictionaries.SIL is developing software to help create early stage reading materials.SIL's long history in supporting language development activities with minority language communities around the world has given us the unique opportunity to develop and contribute technical expertise from the local to the international level.We are grateful for the privilege and are at the same time aware of the responsibility to share what we have learned.The growth of the Internet and the increase in global opportunities for collaboration, information sharing, and standardization on behalf of all language communities provide significant benefits for enhancing multilingualism in cyberspace.SIL continues to seek to be a valuable partner to support the particular needs of minority language communities.We are grateful for the significant progress being made.It is often said that using a language for professional, administrative, educational, legal and other purposes helps it stay alive, because speakers who are forced to switch language according to context tend gradually to use the language that allows them the widest variety of expression.In our knowledge society, a language loses value in the eyes of its speakers if they cannot find knowledge or access to the rest of the world through it.As we said here, in Yakutsk, in 2008, with communication playing a growing role in the balance of power between two competing languages, in the information age this phenomenon favours the languages that are the best equipped or the most "prestigious" to the detriment of the others.We know that the day is not far off when all, or at least the great majority of humanity will have access to cyberspace.In this context, if a language is absent from cyberspace, its speakers might, eventually, turn to other languages.There is a high risk of the disappearance of more than nine out of ten languages which are not represented in cyberspace, because their speakers will have to use other languages for information, education, making purchases, administrative procedures, offering services, connecting to the rest of the world and so on.Furthermore, of the minority of languages that do have access, that is, between 300 and 500 according to different estimates, very few are really well equipped and have a relevant presence on the Internet.Despite some clear progress in multilingualism in recent years, only a handful of the world's languages have a noteworthy presence on the Web.English is still the language most in use on the Internet, but, as all serious studies show, 8 its relative presence is falling.Corbeil told us back in 2000 that "very soon the presence of English should fall to about 40% when sites are created in different countries as they connect to the network" 9 , although we do not have scientific confirmation of this data.We should recall that most of the world's languages are represented in an essentially symbolic way with a few pages dedicated to them, and only a minority of languages are genuinely present.Given that Facebook, Google and Wikipedia are strong trends on the Internet, it is by no means trivial to note that the famous social network has menus in less than 1% of the world's languages, that the almost global search engine only provides at present language recognition for about 50 languages, and that only 5% of languages are represented in the famous encyclopaedia, which nevertheless seems to be the virtual location that is the most open to languages.In fact, there is at present no system of language recognition for any language of American or Oceanian origin on Google 10 .We said it in 2008, but it is worth repeating, that the phenomenon of the disappearance of languages, caused by several factors in the near past (colonization, genocide, epidemics, war, displacement of populations, prohibition on the use of the language, etc.), has grown as globalization has gathered pace, with its technological, political, and socio-economic consequences, in particular migration and urbanization.As a general rule, languages that used to play an important role in the past have experienced a significant decline in sectors linked to knowledge, to the benefit of English.All languages of European origin, apart from some minority or sidelined languages that have been able to make a come-back in recent years, have been affected: German, French, Spanish, Russian, Italian, Portuguese, and so on.Among these European languages, the Neo-Latin languages are also affected.Despite the fact that the main Romance languages played a major role for nearly 1,000 years, in particular French, Spanish, Portuguese and Italian (without forgetting the historic, and literary and lexical mark made by Occitan, Catalan, Norman, Venetian and many other Romance languages), they are today diminished, and the action of languages as vectors of knowledge and international negotiation is reduced.Of course, we understand that concerns about the ground lost by the Romance languages might seem misplaced when 99% of the world's languages have an uncertain future.However, the Romance languages are losing ground in international organizations, scientific and technical expression, international governance, higher education and international negotiations.They are certainly gaining in terms of demography and education as second languages (particular Spanish, Portuguese and French), but their use is above all related to tourism, culture, migration and owing to new populations becoming literate, and less and less to the sectors reserved for knowledge and negotiation.The outlook is not disastrous, as for a few years now speakers of French, Italian, Spanish and Portuguese have been working hard in many international bodies either to give their language specific status or to ensure that it is used as provided for in the rules and regulations.However all these languages are in decline in science and higher education, with our own research institutes preferring to publish their discoveries directly in English without providing a translation into the national language, and our higher education institutions proposing more and more courses in English only.The risk of "domain loss", well known in Nordic countries, leading to the disappearance of whole segments of the language and meaning that engineers will no longer be able to talk among themselves other than in English, is on the way to becoming a reality.We lack an accurate vision of the situation of languages that could help us propose actions for a readjustment in favour of linguistic diversity.No, it is a series of characteristics in which demographic weight is important, as is official status, and whether the language is easy to learn.But it also includes other parameters such as history (we should not forget that the official languages of the United Nations are the languages of the winners of the Second World War), politics, economics, tourism, science and technology, standard of living, literacy, cultural industries, migration and so on and so forth, and today, without a shadow of a doubt, presence on the Internet.Of course, these parameters are not sufficient without political determination behind them.Churchill paved the way followed by the numerous and powerful political and economic interests of the English-speaking world when he said that the widespread use of English would be "a gain to us far more durable and fruitful than the annexation of great provinces".As a result, the English languages is the main source of income for the United Kingdom, and Grin has reminded us that it thereby saves between 10 and 17 billion euros a year in translation costs owing the predominance of English in the drafting of European Union documents.Political will has also enabled societies such as those in Quebec and Catalonia to recover a professional, institutional and educational use for their languages, and has even enabled the restoration to life of dead languages like Hebrew.Access policies for all languages are needed, but especially what is needed is for their speakers to feel ownership.In order to formulate a policy though, reliable indicators are required as well as substantial written or audiovisual material.From the outset we have lacked any kind of indicator on languages and we still lack such indicators on the presence of languages in cyberspace at present, but when we do have some, for written languages in particular, we see that the virtual world seems to reflect the dynamic of languages in the real world.In 2008, we compared the first 30 languages to have a language recognition system in Google, and we noted that they were, roughly speaking, the most productive languages in terms of traditional literature.Recent public and private initiatives to digitize library holdings might only serve to reaffirm the status quo of linguistic diversity on the Web.Should we then conclude that the Web can only be added to when publishing comes first?Probably not really, because of the 50-odd languages with a language recognition system under Google, four fifths of them are the most productive of literature and translations and the remaining dozen might have far lower productivity but do have a larger quantity of articles on Wikipedia and are well represented on Facebook.As far as we know, there is no global study giving us an oversight of the place of languages at the world level on social networks.We have however noted, through an increase in the number of specialized studies and an accumulation of various statistics, that written production through these means is far higher than the production of web pages, even if it is often ephemeral 13 .The studies carried out by Semiocast 14 in 2010 for Twitter, for example, showed that Malay and Portuguese were used far more than Spanish, German, Russian and Italian, for instance, with a greater presence on the traditional Web and far more robust policies on the translation and digitization of works.The research has not been repeated since, but the languages spoken in Indonesia might be far more present today as it is the country with the third highest Generation 140 15 in the world.Do social networks represent a second chance for languages?Probably, because cyberspace actually opens the door to forms of expression of no interest to traditional publishing circuits.After all, science publishing in languages other than English has found a place, albeit a modest one, thanks to the ease and low cost of publishing on the Web, and traditional publishers do not want to run the risk of publishing articles that would be of concern to a very small number of readers.The Internet has undoubtedly enabled minorities absent from traditional publishing to express themselves, but we should not think that this is enough.There is still an inversely proportional relation between Internet access and global linguistic diversity as we showed in 2008; the language divide corresponds only too closely at the moment to the digital divide.That is why it is important to stress aspects relating to infrastructure as much as the ownership of technologies and content (text and multimedia) production.13 The observatory site Promoting the use of a language must take place at every level: educational, administrative, scientific and technical, even for leisure, and in the regional or national bodies concerned.It must take place basically at the level of the access of languages to technology.Of all the language technologies, those whose evolution has been followed most closely are those related to machine translation.As language is perceived to be what sets the human species apart, the thought that a machine might replace us -or even go further than us -in the major linguistic and cognitive exercise that is translation cannot fail to awaken deep-seated fears.And yet, after many years of failure, we are apparently not so far off the goal … at least, for a few pairs of privileged languages and still in the field of specialized translation which, we must recall, concerns between eight and nine of every ten pages translated in the world.If new public programmes do emerge with the aim of democratizing the use of machine translation and favouring language pairs that have not been studied in any depth until now, it is also at the root of competition between businesses.Thus, the United States administration sees it more as a way of making businesses more competitive 16 , on the grounds that on average 52 % of consumers would not buy a product not described in their own language, according to a study carried out in 2006 in eight developed countries.However, although everything seems to indicate that machine translation will be de facto integrated into all our applications, and although the quality seems to be quite satisfactory for some language pairs and the outlook broader in terms of the languages concerned, when it comes to most of the pairs treated, quality is lacking, and in any case concerns barely 60 of the world's languages.The geo-linguistic imbalance is clearly visible in machine translation.Although it is reaching maturity, although it is effective, although it is profitable, it only concerns very few languages, mostly used in North America and Europe, and to a lesser extent China and Japan, and the rest of the world is disregarded.As the most effective systems derive their performance from the corpora already existing (thanks to "translation memories" and systems that process statistics) we can see the challenges that persist for languages with small written corpora.To return to the Romance languages, although they are suitably equipped 17 , developments are still needed to give full satisfaction both to machine translators and to human translators working with these languages.For instance, in addition to overdue spelling reform for Portuguese, and a lack of public resources to automatize Italian, Portuguese and Romanian 18 other than those provided by the European Commission, there is a blatant lack of terminology policies for all these languages, other than French and Catalan.This latter situation is moreover the reason civil society initiatives have been launched, notably that of the Pan-Latin Terminology Network (Realiter) 19 , which brings together the main actors in the terminology of seven Romance languages, and which despite some remarkable work, is, clearly, far from being able to meet the needs of all these languages.The Three Linguistic Spaces 20 are preparing an interoperability project for Spanish, French and Portuguese terminological data banks, which might give strong impetus to the terminological vitality of the three languages, but the road ahead is long.Let us hope that a similar project on language technologies for all the Romance languages can follow on from it.We are striving today to give effect to Action Line C8 of the World Summit on the Information Society Action Plan "Cultural diversity and identity, linguistic diversity and local content", to recommendations of international meetings.Documents that came out of the MAAYA seminars in Bamako, Havana and Barcelona, and those that came out of the 2008 Conference in Yakutsk should be applied for equitable representativeness of languages and cultures in cyberspace 21 .The World Network for Linguistic Diversity MAAYA is well on the way to this goal, with constant support from the Latin Union.Today subject to the policy of preservation, promotion and modernization should be not only the Romance languages descended from Latin, but also all those with which they share spaces and concerns for the future.The Latin Union is convinced that supporting MAAYA ideas is essential, in particular the idea of holding a summit on linguistic diversity and multilingualism, because we are sure that the political will exists today more than ever before to renew most of the world's languages.This paper takes a holistic approach to the language issue in cyberspace.Specifically, on the one hand, it calls for fair language and regulatory policies that take into account the African Linguistic Mosaic and, on the other, it argues that ACALAN, as the sole language agency of the African Union entrusted with the task of fostering the development of African languages in collaboration with the member states, should play a pivotal role in the process of allocating proper space to African languages in cyberspace.The lighter area of the diagram represents mainly the urban areas dominated by the former colonial languages, i.e. English, French, Portuguese and Spanish.These languages, though spoken by small minority elite, were retained as official languages, when African countries achieved their independencies in the early sixties.As a result, they are associated with power, access to socioeconomic privileges, including education, justice and well-remunerated jobs.In other words, they dominate the socio-economic mainstream.As a result, these former colonial languages are regarded as passports for upward social mobility and, as such, given preference at the expenses of African languages, which occupy the darker area of the diagram, representing the rural areas where the vast majority of Africans live and communicate solely in these languages.As Negash 23 points out, while discussing globalization and the role African languages can play in the development of Africa, African governments and the elite still continue to channel away their resources and energies into learning 'imperial' languages that are used by a tiny minority of the population.The preference for former colonial languages has not only resulted in maintaining the status quo, but has also led to the exclusion and marginalisation of the vast majority of Africans keeping them on the periphery of the socio-economic mainstream.In this regard, while discussing language, dominance and control in Africa, Wolff 24 expresses a similar view, when he states that: Post- There are many factors militating against the presence of African languages in cyberspace.Major of them include: • The lack of political will to put in place effective language policies in Africa; • The lack of proper regulations favouring African languages; • The lack of human and financial resources; • The lack of effective training programmes that are informed by the African linguistic mosaic referred to above; • The lack of incentives, user-friendly as well as practical programmes offered in the institutions of higher learning; • The work to foster the presence of African languages in cyberspace is generally inspired by business interests, including competition that neither leaves space for experience sharing and cross-fertilization of ideas nor properly takes into account the African linguistic mosaic; and • The content of the African languages present in cyberspace tends to be confined to non-standardised translation engines and programmes.African decision makers have not yet gone beyond making ambiguous statements on language policies to which very often they pay leap service.This may explain why most constitutions of African countries contain varied clauses on the status of African languages.The constitution of the newly independent South Sudan is the very epitome of what is stated here.In its Part 1, article 6, clauses 1 and 2 on languages 26 it states that: (1) All indigenous languages of South Sudan are national languages and shall be respected, developed and promoted.(2) English shall be the official working language in the Republic of South Sudan, as well as the language of instruction at all levels of education.As is well know there is no better way to foster the development of a language than using it as a medium of instruction.The exclusion of African languages from the education system makes it difficult to pass regulations in favour of developing African languages and to accord them a proper place in cyberspace.Returning to the training aspect, apart from lucking lustre, most programmes on computational linguistics institutions of higher learning offer across Africa do not take into account the African linguistic mosaic and they are mostly concerned with theoretical issues with little impact on the development of African languages.Furthermore, work directly linked to African languages in cyberspace is generally informed by business imperatives and, as such, is broadly limited to developing spell checkers and online dictionaries while taking into account the number of speakers of the targeted language.Last but not least, is the lack of resources.The lack of funds to support research and training is another challenge facing the presence of African languages in cyberspace.This is exacerbated by the absence of clear language policies and regulations, as described above.Language is a cross-cutting issue and, as such, there is no single solution to the problems facing the presence of African languages in cyberspace.We therefore require a paradigm shift that will not only take into account the African linguistic mosaic, but will also allow a holistic approach, which takes into account various initiatives and resolutions taken at various forums.As the African proverb cited above reminds us "one thumb alone cannot crush a louse".Researchers on matters related to African languages and cyberspace tend to work on silos.It is therefore necessary to broaden the research agenda on Human Language Technology, while strengthening macro and micro cooperation across various disciplines and stakeholders as well as creating synergies.The African Academy of Languages (ACALAN) can play a vital role, particularly in lobbying for the support of African decision makers, urging them to put in place effective language policies that favour the development of African languages.It can also facilitate the mobilization of resources at national and international levels.As we all know ACALAN is the official language agency of the African Union whose statutes were approved during the Summit of the Heads of State and Governments that took place in Khartoum in 2006.Its mandate is to work in collaboration with the member states of the African Union towards the development, promotion of African languages so that they are used in all domains of the society in partnership with the languages inherited from Africa's colonial past; i.e. English, French, Portuguese and Spanish.The partnership component is vital as the minority elite referred to earlier always see the efforts to develop African languages as an attempt to replace former colonial languages with African languages.Far from it, all that is required is a linguistic equity in the same way Africa has been calling for gender equity.However, for all that to materialize, the quest for creating space for African languages in cyberspace should be part and parcel of the quest for developing African languages in particular and for poverty eradication in Africa in general.Taking into account the work on the harmonization of the orthographic systems of the Cinyanja/Chichewa, Fulfulde, Hausa, Mandenkan, Kiswahili, Setswana, Vehicular Cross-Border languages, ACALAN organized a workshop on African languages and cyberspace in Niamey from 14 to 15 in December 2011.The workshop brought together researchers working on African languages and cyberspace from Botswana, Djibouti, Kenya, and Nigeria.It took stock of current work on African languages and cyberspace with special reference to the vehicular cross-border languages mentioned here.One of the recommendations of the workshop was that ACALAN should create space on its website where researchers on African languages and cyberspace could post information on current work.This would allow ACALAN to consolidate the information and clearly define priority areas on which to focus its activities.As of the outcomes of the workshop, ACALAN has commissioned the development of spellcheckers to some of the researchers who participated in the workshop.Apart from contributing towards according equitable space to African languages in cyberspace, the spellchecker will allow to disseminate the harmonized orthographic systems of the vehicular cross-border languages mentioned above.As mentioned above, it is also necessary to take into account the various decisions, plans of actions and resolutions which directly and indirectly have bearing on the efforts to develop, promote and use African languages in all spheres of society, in particular: • The Language Plan of Action for Africa; • The Second Decade of Education for Africa; • The Charter for African Cultural Renaissance; • The Khartoum decision on the linkage between education and culture.The use of African languages has been one of the major preoccupations of the Organization of African Unity (now African Union) since its creation in 1963 in Addis Ababa, as indicated in Article XXIX of its founding charter stating that "The working languages of the organization and all its institutions shall be, if possible, African languages".• To encourage the increased use of African languages as vehicles of instruction at all educational levels; • To ensure that all the sectors of the political and socio-economic systems of each Member State is mobilised in such a manner that they play their due part in ensuring that the African language(s) prescribed as official language(s) assume their intended role in the shortest time possible; • To foster and promote national, regional and continental linguistic unity in Africa, in the context of the multilingualism prevailing in most African countries.The Language Plan of Action for Africa addresses some of the challenges described above, which need to be addressed so that African languages attain a significant position in cyberspace.First and foremost, the need for the member states to define clear language policies.There is also a list of priorities in the Language Plan of Action for Africa, including modernisation that has bearing on the research whose output will pave the way for African languages to enter cyberspace.As was the case with the resolutions referred to above, the Charter for African Cultural Renaissance also underlines the role African languages play in propelling Africa to economic and social development and the need to adopt and implement policies conducive to developing these languages.Furthermore, Article 19 of the charter urge African member states to effect reforms to integrate African languages in their education systems.In order for the objectives of the charter related to African languages to be attained, African languages should be accorded a proper place in cyberspace.Another decision taken during the Khartoum summit in 2006 relates to the linkage between education and culture.According to this decision, when African Union Member States undertake the reforms in their curriculum, within the ambit of the Second Decade of Education for Africa, they should ensure that the content of the curriculum is informed and inspired by African culture.ACALAN has been assigned the task of monitoring the process and regularly report to the African Union Commission.A holistic approach to the efforts to put African languages in cyberspace is therefore required.This approach will not only take into account the various decisions and resolutions pertaining to the development, promotion and use of African languages, but will also broaden the research agenda on Human Language Technology, as it would be difficult for African languages to gain an equitable place in cyberspace without strengthening applied research in that domain.In other words, in order to address the various challenges facing the efforts to accord equitable space to African languages in cyberspace a collective effort is required.Such effort should go beyond the concerns of linguists, language practitioners, teachers of African languages and other stakeholders whose work involve African languages regularly.As is well known, language is not everything; but it is in everything.This implies that according equitable space to African languages in cyberspace should be part and parcel of the search for viable strategies to bring about sustainable development that would change the lives of the vast majority of Africans for the better.Once again, we can remind ourselves of the African proverb cited above "one thumb alone cannot crush a louse."The CPLP, an international organization founded in 2000, brings together all Portuguese-speaking countries, covering a territory of 10.7 million km 2 in America, Africa, Europe and Asia, and a population of about 241 million.The member countries are: Angola, Brazil, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, Portugal, Sao Tome and Principe and East Timor.The degree of proficiency in Portuguese language in different countries varies from almost 100% in Portugal to less than 10% in Guinea Bissau and East Timor, as other 339 languages are also spoken in the CPLP, of which 215 languages in Brazil, which accounts for 5% of the number of languages in the world, set in roughly 6500.Although the CPLP is the attempt of construction of an international parity and democratic block, the expansion of Portuguese language was due to the construction of a colonial empire in the same way as European commercial colonialism in the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries.The Portuguese colonial empire was the last of this tradition to disappear, and this only occurred with the independence of African countries and East Timor in 1975.The process of independence was achieved through armed struggle, called the Colonial War (1961) (1962) (1963) (1964) (1965) (1966) (1967) (1968) (1969) (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) (1975) , a conflict that lasted in some countries, in new forms, till the late 1990's or even the early 2000's.The colonial situation left two main by-products when it comes to languages.On the one hand there was the impossibility of building the modern concept of citizenship and the consequent lack of interest in schooling of the population called "native", with a low participation in the Portuguese language community, low penetration of the Portuguese language, and very low level of literacy -the monarchical Brazil becomes Republic in 1889 with 98% of illiterates, a figure similar to that of Mozambique at the time of independence in 1975.On the other hand, colonial language policies or those already independent States, as in the case of Brazil, led to the exclusion of the other languages of virtually every prestigious areas of circulation, which meant that, at best, its use continued in oral language, out of institutions without building standards or instruments related to writing.The era of digitization of the languages found the world of Portuguese languages unprepared for the challenges of the Millennium Goals and the conformation of the Information Society in relation to the corpus of the languages, but also with regard to Internet access and to the necessary schooling of populations to participate in virtual communities.Nevertheless, the Portuguese is the fifth most used language on the Internet, with 87 million users, a figure growing rapidly, following the rapid growth of school population in the last 15 years and the improvement of logistics for the provision of access, as the supply of electricity.The Portuguese on the Internet is currently treated as two languages: Portuguese and Brazilian Portuguese, which results from the fact that we are facing a pluricentric language (rather bicentric), presenting two very different standards (Portuguese and Brazilian), particularly with regard to spelling: Portugal followed for decades the established spelling Orthographic Agreement of 1945, while Brazil was ruled by the Orthographic Form of 1943.This treatment of the Portuguese on the Internet as if it were two different languages weakens its position and international exposure, so it would be desirable that this situation should be reversed.The Orthographic Agreement of the Portuguese language in 1990, which was ratified by six of the CPLP countries, which is already in force in Brazil and Portugal (although in this country the transition phase between the two spellings is still on going until 2015) opens the prospect that Portuguese might come to be treated in a unified way on the Internet, as in this context, the spelling issues are very important to the weight they have in the construction of computational tools of production and recovery of contents.One of the aspects relevant to evaluate the weight of an international language and its vitality is its ability to respond to the challenges posed by science and technology in terms of scientific output in that language.As such, the presence of scientific texts in Portuguese is one of the parameters to consider when trying to portray the presence of this language on the Internet.In this particular aspect the Portuguese position on the Internet is clearly different from the two centers which so far have determined the bicentric character of this language: Portugal and Brazil.When comparing the scientific productions in Portuguese language available on the Internet, there is a clear imbalance between the two standards: the presence of scientific texts in Brazilian Portuguese on the internet is many times superior to the presence of Portuguese texts.To explain this, some data have to be taken into account, which go beyond the geographical and demographic differences between the two countries: Portugal has a total area of 92,389 km 2 and about 10 million inhabitants, while Brazil has 8,514,876 km 2 and approximately 191 million inhabitants.Portugal is a European country, which is part of the European Union since 1986.As such, since then the parameters of evaluation and funding of science and technology in this country have been marked by certain standards by the European Commission, who value scientific publication in English, at the expense of publication in Portuguese.Furthermore, in Portugal, given its size, geographic location, emigration (which has always been a constant) and bet on tourism since the 60's, the teaching of foreign languages not only has been encouraged but also has had very positive results: the literate population can express in one or two foreign languages, often acquired outside the formal school system.Currently English is the language preferred by young students and with more support at the level of government structures.It is to be noted that the implementation of compulsory teaching of English in schools from the third grade occurred in 2005 (Order 14753 / 2005 by the Minister of Education), to the detriment of other languages so far studied in the education system, French and German.All these factors contribute to the fact that a lot of scientific literature in Portugal, especially in the areas of the hard sciences and technologies, is produced primarily in English: this case is all the more visible when even in areas in which Portugal was once a pioneer, as the nautical and ship construction, the Portuguese language has ceased to be practically used and has been replaced by English in a professional context.In turn, the Brazilian government has not adopted policies of scientific literature in the English language in the same way, valuing, also, the scientific literature in Portuguese at the level of science funding agencies.On the other hand, Brazil, an emerging country, has structural problems at the level of basic education that are reflected in teaching and learning of foreign languages, very deficient when compared with the case of Portugal.If we add to this, economic power and the number of universities and research centers in Brazil, as well as the impact of areas in which Brazil is currently a leading producer of science and technology (note for example the case of biofuels), it is easily understood that the Brazilian scientific production in the Portuguese language is truly thriving.All these data have a direct impact on the amount of scientific texts (theses, reports, scientific articles) available on the Internet in Portuguese, and it is mostly ensured by Brazil -and in some subjects almost exclusively.Added to this framework, policies such as the universal availability of master's dissertations and doctoral theses of all Brazilian universities on the Internet, existing since 2000, which enhance the circulation of knowledge in Portuguese.Furthermore, we call attention to the SciELO Network, which indexes the scientific literature in Portuguese and Spanish, creating a broad scientific area in two very close languages, and which together are spoken by 580 million people in 30 countries.This last argument shows the opportunity for Portuguese-Spanish bilingualism, already adopted as communication policy of the MERCOSUR (Southern Common Market) in South America, and is seen increasingly as a strategy to promote the use of these two major languages as an alternative to the exclusive use of English.Within CPLP there are between 300 and 340 spoken languages, according to the way of counting, 215 languages being spoken in Brazil, including indigenous languages, languages of immigration, sign languages, Creole and Afro-Brazilian languages.The twenty-first century presents a more purposeful framework for the presence and promotion of minority languages in public compared with previous centuries, when this set of languages was ignored by the public power, or at various times, was largely suppressed by the colonial Portuguese or Brazilian power .The process of affirmation of linguistic diversity is very recent throughout the Portuguese speaking states, but practically all are moving to create new laws and practices in this field.Thus, we find cases of: • Officialization of minority languages in Timor, Portugal and Brazil; • Actions of heritage language valorization in Angola, Brazil, Cape Verde, Portugal, Timor and Sao Tome and Principe; • Bilingual education programmes involving minority languages, although experimentally, in Brazil, Portugal, Timor and Mozambique; • Corpus Development actions in Cape Verde, East Timor, Angola, Sao Tome and Principe, Mozambique and Brazil; • Inclusion Actions of minority languages in Internet instruments in Cape Verde, Brazil and East Timor.The very initial degree of preparation of corpus of the CPLP languages (scripturalization, standardization and regulation), as well as the incipient literacy of speakers in their own mother tongue, given the exclusion of these languages in most education systems, have been an impediment to further their presence in cyberspace.However, it is expected that soon changes will be experienced in this field.We can cite the example of Nheengatu in the Brazilian Amazon: a language that until the early twentieth century was spoken in much of the 4 million square kilometers of this territory, and now is spoken in an area of about 35,000 km ² by no more than 7 000 people.Nevertheless, it was favored by the legislation emanated from the 1988 Federal Constitution, so it was possible to iniciate in 1997 the Intercultural Bilingual Schools Programme and a teacher training programme.It was made official at the municipal level in São Gabriel da Cachoeira, along with the Tucano and Baniwa, by ordinary law of the City Council in 2002, in a process unprecedented in Brazil, and the law was legislated in 2006.It has been a year since the first Indigenous Language Degree, offered by the Federal University of Amazonas (UFAM) was established in the country; this programme selected 40 students of Nheengatu.Currently, the students are busy in the Cucuí community, Alto Rio Negro, on the border between Brazil and Venezuela, with the support of IILP, creating a Wikipedia in their language, virtual encyclopedia that will receive, in the form of entries, the knowledge researched and produced by them in the course.This path taken by Nheengatu can be followed soon by many other languages.In other words, this is a time of preparation of logistic conditions for the access of speakers and languages from CPLP into Cyberspace, and if the current trend continues we will have visibility of our major languages on the Internet very soon.For this reason the International Institute for Portuguese Language will hold The Maputo Colloquium on the Linguistic Diversity of the CPLP, from 12th to 14th September of the current year, which will assemble for the first time, in Mozambique, programme managers in linguistic diversity of the eight member countries.On that occasion there will be an exchange of experiences on the modus operandi of the institutions responsible for language rights, bi or multilingual education, the promotion of Portuguese in complex sociolinguistic contexts and other aspects related to the field.Also, and in a complementary way, the International Institute for Portuguese Language will hold at the end of January 2012, in the Brazilian state of Ceará, The Fortaleza Colloquium on the Portuguese Language in the Digital World and the Internet, in order to, also, establish contact between internet managers of the eight countries to think collectively about the future of our language in this medium.Both colloquia will have the opportunity to benefit from the knowledge conveyed here in this extraordinary conference in Yakutsk.The Maputo and the Fortaleza Charter will contain experts and managers advice to the II International Conference on the Future of Portuguese in the world system, which will take place in Lisbon, Portugal, in 2012, and shall prepare the Lisbon Action Plan for the Promotion, Diffusion and Projection of the Portuguese Language (2012-2014); this plan needs to strongly consider the global movement for language rights, the ecology of knowledge and the building of the future by all our citizens, speakers of many languages in which solidarity in diversity should be built up within the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries.(Mexico City, Mexico)The 2 nd International Conference Linguistic and Cultural Diversity in Cyberspace gives a unique opportunity to share information on some projects aimed at making a better use of the opportunities that cyberspace is offering to the global society in the 21 st century.These are particularly important for us, who lead and manage public institutions responsible for the revitalization, strengthening and development of national languages, working for the recognition and diffusion of cultural and linguistic diversity in our countries and regions, as well as the elimination of social practices of exclusion and discrimination.Although these issues have been ignored, I will discuss the importance of carrying on investment in infrastructure, equipment and human capital necessary to ensure the access of indigenous communities in cyberspace, promoting their incorporation with linguistic and cultural relevance to the intensive use of the Information and Communication Technologies (ICT).I propose the implementation of inter-institutional agreements, for carrying out joint actions, gathering global resources and using ICT in the revitalization, strengthening and development of indigenous languages.Nowadays, biodiversity and cultural diversity are facts that globalization and the use of ICT have made us more evident.Thus, linguistic diversity is as important for the cultural world development as biodiversity is for the sustainability of the planet.The mother tongue is an essential mechanism for our species to pass on knowledge and ways of seeing the world from generation to generation.According to the latest report from Ethnologue (2009) According to the latest XIII Censo General de Población y Vivienda (2010) nearly 7 million representatives of 62 indigenous peoples residing in the country speak national indigenous languages.However, migratory movements have prompted the dispersal of speakers of indigenous languages (SIL) on the length and width of the country, without considering the significant presence in the United States of America.It should be noted that the SIL live mainly in the States of Oaxaca, Chiapas, Veracruz and Yucatán, a million of them are still monolingual.Náhuatl, Maya, Mixtec, Zapotec, Tseltal and Tsotzil are linguistic groupings which "concentrate" 54% of SIL, although it should be mentioned that only these 6 groups add in total 184 linguistic variants, many of them as close as it can be Spanish with other Romance languages such as French, Italian or Portuguese.In an international level, Mexico has signed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights It is up to the INALI to promote knowledge, recognition, evaluation and appreciation of the national indigenous languages by the approach to multilingualism and interculturalism.This institution has the following strategic lines of action: 1. To promote public policies for indigenous languages, encouraging the participation of all social agents (indigenous peoples, public and private institutions, universities, research centers, experts, etc.), usage of different means of communication and inter-institutional linkages and coordination of efforts with the federation, states and municipalities.2. To encourage the use of the national languages in governmental practice and daily life, and 3. To ensure linguistic planning at national level with focus on the formalization of the national indigenous languages (cataloguing) and the standardization of writing, grammars and dictionaries and specialized lexicons.However, it should be noted that while the indigenous population is not able to seize the institutional framework that has been described, it is harder to reach more ambitious development goals.The only way out is organizing intensive diffusion campaigns to show that it is possible to break the cycle of poverty and discrimination, historically associated with the use and preservation of indigenous languages.In addition, jointly defining objectives and working out clear strategies international agencies, developers, and users of cyberspace would be able to: 1. Establish leadership to promote awareness, respect and the strengthening of the global, regional and local cultural and linguistic diversity.2. Reinforce support programmes to install infrastructure and equipment, as well as develop focused applications to revitalize and fortify linguistic diversity.Today the options that cyberspace and public media provide are essential to make visible and to spread knowledge about the social and regional realities of minority groups, traditionally excluded and isolated.The expansion of coverage and the accelerated growth of cyberspace and its applications, offer new opportunities to developers and users for revitalizing, strengthening and developing the cultural and linguistic diversity at all levels.At the same time, cyberspace is an "ideal place" where respect, freedom and democracy prevail, representing a real and huge "window of opportunity", allowing "the others" to be "visible and audible", to communicate among themselves and to share their ideas and creations with others.According to a recent United Nations report by Frank La Rue (UN Human Rights Council, 2011) Internet is a medium where the right to freedom of expression can be exercised; and that access should be included by the Member States as a human right to develop effective policies to achieve universal access.While this is a fast access medium even from remote places, members of indigenous peoples and their communities immediately get engaged in online communications in a very active and creative way due to the similarity of such activities to traditional forms of participation in community work, where information and results are freely shared.Since 2005 the INALI produces and promotes among the indigenous peoples and their communities multimedia, which are mostly available for free downloading at the official website: http://www.inali.gob.mx.There are music and audio CD's with testimonies and letters of speakers in their indigenous languages; as well as books of poetry, stories and riddles, dictionaries, vocabularies, and alphabets.Also, there have been animated productions from the presentations of the General Law of Linguistic Rights of Indigenous Peoples in order to spread linguistic diversity among the children, radio programmes and the ongoing campaign of "Los Guardavoces"; as well as DVD's with video in indigenous languages subtitled in Spanish.In the middle term INALI will look for opportunities to produce some TV shows.On the other hand, the cooperative model to develop free software has been used for generating some applications such as: Efforts in the diffusion and teaching of indigenous languages are also taken by other Mexican institutions such as the Autonomous University of Querétaro "YAAK".In conclusion, once again I want to insist that a joint definition of objectives and clear strategies would make it possible for those who are active in cyberspace and the ICT: 1. To establish a leadership to promote and strengthen cultural and linguistic diversity; and, 2. To reinforce investments on infrastructure for ensuring indigenous peoples and their communities' access to cyberspace and ICTs as a priority human right.The following proposals for action represent new possibilities for international cooperation in the construction of space enabling intercultural and multilingual dialog with due respect and tolerance, and the dismantling of stereotypical social representations which generate discrimination, racism and social exclusion: • Speeding up the installation of essential infrastructure and equipment so that more indigenous people have access to cyberspace.• Promotion of spaces which foster respectful intercultural and multilingual dialogues.• Providing technological support to the standardization of the writing of indigenous languages, particularly with regard to the handling of special characters.• Developing thematic agendas and inter-institutional agreements of international cooperation.• Promoting the opening of new markets, from approaches to intercultural and multilingual communication.• Recognizing leadership and granting awards for projects aimed at the dissemination and reassessment of linguistic and cultural diversity ("giving visibility and audibility").In the 21 st century equality depends on our ability to recognize that we are different, and in this regard, citing Delors, to bet for a real ethics of alterity we must learn to live among different people (Delors, 2001) .And one of the biggest challenges for us, users and developers of cyberspace, is to be able to recognize and to assume social responsibilities in multicultural and multilingual societies.University of Hyderabad (Hyderabad, India) Recent years have witnessed a number of significant changes in language management.For instance, largely as a result of globalization and scientific and technological advancements, there has been a considerable focus on frequency and intensity of use of languages in cyberspace.However, cyberspace is vastly available in developed and in some of the fast developing economics like India, China, Brazil, South Africa, etc.The reasons are obvious -qualified human resources, free capital movements, transcontinental trade resulting in consumption identical products, etc.Besides, the distribution of population and big improvement in the level of communication access (telephony, mobile phones, Internet, etc.) during last five years have given boost in these countries for designing tools and implementing them vigorously for effective use of tremendous huge size of cyberspace.The paper is divided into two parts.The first part deals with the background for multilingualism and its development.The second part concentrates on various governmental initiatives to promote multilingualism using information technology.Multilingualism represents a historical phenomenon in the Indian subcontinent.It began with the migration of Dravidians and then contact of Aryans with Dravidians.It is important to note that 'Dravidians' and ' Aryan' are not racial terms.As Krishnamurti (2003:3) observes, "still there is no archeological or linguistic evidence to show actually when the people who spoke the Dravidian languages entered India. But we know that they were already in northwest India by the time Rigvedic Aryans entered India by the fifteenth Century BC E.11".Scholars still debate on this issue and "a truly convincing hypothesis has not even been formulated yet" (Zvelebil, 1990:123) .However, this situation had provided basis for the birth of multilingualism in the Indian subcontinent.Multilingualism flourished with the spread of both the tribes across India and their contact with local austroloid tribes (a hypothesis yet to be established).In later centuries, Sanskrit which was the language of rituals became archaic and new forms of Sanskrit such as Pali, Prakrits came into existence (Deshpande 1979) .When Buddhism came into existence, it played an important role in consolidating multilingualism.It encouraged to write all its scriptures in Prakrit and Pali.Sanskrit gradually remained as a language of rituals when Buddhism began spreading over central and southern Dravidian territories.The Buddhist scripts and Official Orders were written in both Pali and regional language.This explains further development and maintenance of multilingualism in the Indian subcontinent.Cultural fusion between Aryan and Dravidian tribes which has taken place almost since beginning of the contact was further intensified.This resulted in the formation of the unique Indian culture in which these two cultures occupy major part.The extensive linguistic borrowing among languages and cultural amalgamation of different tribes in India have continued in subsequent centuries.For instance, Emeneau (1956) highlighted that many features shared between Dravidian and Aryan at linguistic level allow formulating the concept of 'India as a linguistic area'.My aim of looking briefly into the linguistic and cultural history of India is to draw attention on the fact that 1) multilinguality and multiculturality are being unconsciously maintained in the Indian society; 2) despite amalgamation of different cultures, each linguistic community in India preserved its specific cultural characteristics; 3) India represents a linguistic area, where local languages exist along with the national languages.The unconscious existence and maintenance of multilingualism has resulted in coexistence of diverse languages in Indian society.They can genetically be classified into four groups; 1) Indo-Aryan; 2) Dravidian; 3) Munda; 4) Tibeto-Burman.Due to their co-existence over thousands of years in one geographic area, these language groups share common areal features, while preserving their distinctiveness and identity.It should also be noted that because of 'peaceful' coexistence for long period, Aryan group of languages even altered their entire grammatical system under the influence of Dravidian and became similar to that of Dravidian (Prabhakara Rao, 2000) .To put it in typological linguistic terms, after getting in contact with Dravidian languages which are agglutinative in type, Aryan languages which were inflectional in type slowly converted into agglutinative type.The typological balance between the major group of languages has contributed to maintenance of multilingualism in Indian society.As it was mentioned, despite the fact that there is an amalgamation of cultures among different groups in India, cultural diversity is well maintained.Hence, scholars sometimes speak about 'pan-Indian language' and 'pan-Indian culture'.Therefore, India represents an illustration for the dialectical principle of unity in diversity and diversity in unity, which has to be thoroughly studied.Cyberspace provides a unique opportunity to procure information about everything.India which possess a large quantity of English-speaking and technical human resources, can utilize and implement information technologies in all fields of life.Today India is one of the biggest software services providers and software developers in the world.UNESCO Recommendations concerning the Promotion of Multilingualism clearly enunciates that "… linguistic diversity in the global information networks and universal access to information in cyberspace are at the core of contemporary debates and can be a determining factor in the development of knowledge-based society".It also underlines that "basic education and literacy are prerequisites for universal access to cyberspace".Recently India has enacted the Right to Information Act (2005) and the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act (2009).Now it is contemplating with the idea to encompass preprimary education also in these acts.Government of India is spending huge amount of money through Rajeev Sarwa Siksha Abhiyan ("Education for All" programme) on primary education and literacy.To give free access to information on all Acts, Bills, Decisions of various committees, Judgments, etc, the government made it mandatory to make them available on the Net.The information that is not available on the Net shall be provided to citizens with 5 days of applying for such information.India is not only a multilingual and multicultural, but also a multiscript country.The 22 official languages are written in 10 different scripts.Hence, it is a real challenge for specialists to design tools for information processing in local languages at low cost to bring 'Digital Unity' and to make 'knowledge available for all'.To build knowledge societies, it is essential to store, to transfer and to transmit that knowledge in a multilingual form and make it easily and freely accessible to people.This enables to build inclusive knowledge society with rapid economic growth.It seems government of India is totally convinced with this fact and initiated accordingly large number of measures to implement it (Vikas Om, 2001 ; Report by India to UNESCO, 2007).Preservation of linguistic diversity is one of the global problems and challenges of cultural ecology.At the end of the twentieth century humanity faced a complex of socio-natural acute contradictions that affect the world in general as well as particular regions and countries.Under generally accepted classification developed in the early 1980s three main groups of global problems are distinguished: • problems associated with basic human social communities (prevention of global nuclear catastrophe, closing the gap in the levels of socio-economic development between developed and developing countries, etc.); • issues concerning the relationship between man and environment (environmental, energy, raw materials and food, space exploration, etc.); • problems requiring special attention to the relationship between man and society (profiting from scientific and technological progress, elimination of dangerous diseases, health care improvement, eradication of illiteracy, etc.).There are other classifications of global problems, but any of them is arbitrary, since all problems are closely related, have no clear boundaries and overlap each other.One of the global problems is the rapid loss of linguistic diversity of mankind.Hundreds of languages are endangered: languages with a small number of speakers that have no writing and other signs of high social status, the so-called "small" or "minority" languages.This process can be compared to a decrease in the Earth's natural diversity.Environmentalists around the world precisely estimate the loss of biodiversity as a catastrophe.However, socio-cultural consequences of language extinction and decreasing linguistic diversity is hardly less dangerous than those of the decline of biodiversity.Like any other global challenge, the problem of linguistic diversity preservation is characterized by a number of criteria: • manifestations of magnitude that go beyond the limits of a single state or group of countries; • topicality; • complexity: all problems are intertwined with each other; • universal character of the problem, understandable and relevant to all countries and peoples; • requiring solution by the entire international community, all countries and ethnic groups.Preservation of linguistic diversity can justifiably be classified as an essential problem of cultural ecology.Surge and exacerbation of global problems of mankind requires for developing a complex understanding and choosing best solution methods.UNESCO has long been playing a leading role in coordinating international efforts to preserve linguistic diversity.In recent years the preparation of a number of important events (8) and documents (5; 6; 11; 13) has been initiated.In the Russian Federation the idea of preserving linguistic diversity is being actively promoted by the Russian Committee of the UNESCO Information for All Programme.Thanks to its efforts information on the ways of solving the problem of the linguistic diversity preservation in the modern world is collected, analysed and interpreted in Russia.The analysis of papers published by the Russian Committee (9; 10; 14) reveals the following set of measures, as well as forms and methods used in Russia to preserve multilingualism in cyberspace.Analysis of these data suggests that a system of measures, forms and methods of work of various institutions, from government to private individuals, is being developed in Russia to preserve linguistic diversity.However, this system does not explicitly mark one of the tools without which the preservation of multilingualism in cyberspace and digital environment is not feasible.Such an important and essential tool, in our view, is information literacy.The term "information literacy" was adopted by the international community to refer to a wide range of competences and skills related to the ability of individuals to use information and communication technology (ICT), in order to confidently navigate the huge flows of information, be able to locate, evaluate and effectively use this information to solve various problems of the modern world.UNESCO and IFLA were the leading international organizations to initiate the promotion of the idea of information literacy.As a result the concept of information literacy has been formed.The following steps have been taken by IFLA and UNESCO to promote information literacy in the world: According to the Alexandria Proclamation, information literacy: • creation • comprises the competencies to recognize information needs and to locate, evaluate, apply and create information within cultural and social contexts; • is crucial to the competitive advantage of individuals, enterprises (especially small and medium enterprises), regions and nations; • provides the key to effective access, use and creation of content to support economic development, education, health and human services, and all other aspects of contemporary societies, and thereby provides the vital foundation for fulfilling the goals of the Millennium Declaration and the World Summit on the Information Society; and • extends beyond current technologies to encompass learning, critical thinking and interpretative skills across professional boundaries and empowers individuals and communities (1).Based on this interpretation, we emphasize the role and importance of information literacy as an essential means of facilitating the task of linguistic diversity preservation in cyberspace.If you re-examine the above table showing the main action lines for social institutions, organizations and establishments to preserve multilingualism in cyberspace, almost all of them require for citizens' proficiency in information literacy.The most important functions of information literacy as a means of preserving multilingualism in cyberspace are connected with accessing information and communication.The "key" function of information literacy is its being a kind of a key that opens the door to information storages.We emphasize that this can be both traditional (libraries, archives, museums), and electronic information storages.Mastering information literacy allows individuals to get access to socially important information contained in the electronic environment, including the Internet.Without information literacy one cannot be provided with public access to modern digital resources: online newspapers and magazines, databases, Web sites and portals containing a wealth of legal, linguistic, educational and scientific information that reflects the rich traditions and culture of the peoples of the world, including small and indigenous nations.Another important function of information literacy is giving people an opportunity to communicate in digital environment.It expands opportunities for communication and interaction in cyberspace for native speakers and people studying a certain language, facilitates integrating the efforts of all those interested in the preservation and promotion of multilingualism, regardless of their location and distance from each other, through the use of ICT.The major benefits of ICT in this regard are: • openness -ability to access necessary information resources and communicate with all those interested in the preservation and promotion of multilingualism; • interactivity -active interaction of all stakeholders and usage of network information resources with feedback provided; • efficiency -high-speed information exchange, ability to regularly update and promptly amend information; • convenience -usability of the digital information environment and the possibility of access for remote users at any time convenient to them.In our view, the role of information literacy in the preservation of linguistic diversity in cyberspace is not limited to the above-described two functions.Information literacy surely performs the adaptive function as well ensuring individuals' adaptation to the new challenges of a rapidly changing information society.Moreover, information literacy is also an important factor of development, as it is aimed at enriching one's mental capacity and inner world.Information literacy is the foundation of any cognitive process, including education, and scientific research.It is a tool for tackling practical vital tasks requiring for the use of appropriate information and relevant knowledge and skills.The protective or preventive role of information literacy should be emphasized, allowing individual to protect himself from the negative effects of computerization and ICT development.Mastery of information literacy skills gives people a tool for protection from risks and challenges of the information society, connected with the huge volume of information, often unreliable and contradictory, from ICT penetration into all spheres of life and danger of manipulation of human consciousness.In this regard, developing critical thinking is essential for current training programmes on information literacy.Critical thinking allows to select, analyze and interpret information, draw one's own conclusions and form own point of view on various social, cultural, political, and other aspects of life instead of blindly trusting other's opinion.In conclusion, we want to emphasize once again the complexity of the problem of multilingualism preservation in cyberspace in the context of globalization.Its solution lies outside the scope of simple and unambiguous decisions, and requires for the integration of efforts by national and local governments, education, science, memory institutions (libraries, archives, museums), art institutions, both traditional and electronic media, public organizations and private individuals.It involves large-scale, long term and, most importantly, systemic activities including raising the level of information literacy of citizens.Information literacy development for preserving multilingualism, in turn, requires for state support and provision of the following conditions: 1) organizing citizens' training in information literacy through educational institutions and libraries of all kinds and types; 2) organizing professional training for specialists to teach information literacy to different categories of learners, including native speakers of various languages, representatives of small and indigenous peoples.This problem might be solved by using the potential of teachers and librarians (information specialists) mastering the technologies of information literacy development with due account for ethnicity, age and type of activities of students; 3) creating and using distributed information and learning environment, including specialized information resources (primarily documents in different languages, including small and indigenous peoples' languages, information publications and guides to electronic resources reflecting the culture and traditions of various nations, traditional and electronic library catalogs), computer equipment, means of access to remote domestic and world information resources."Distributed" information and learning environment presupposes that its constituent components are concentrated in educational, library and information institutions; Preserving linguistic and cultural diversity is a need no one calls into question these days, with its importance consolidated in a whole number of international documents and intergovernmental agreements.Yet, small indigenous languages are still facing the risk of extinction, and that risk may be exacerbated by the ongoing process of information globalization.It is not unlikely that the expansion of information and communications technology and the emergence of global cyberspace will lead to a narrow group of major languages taking over the world, with smaller ones pushed to the sidelines.The extinction of minor languages was an issue prominent on the agenda of the first international conference "Linguistic and Cultural Diversity," held in Yakutsk in 2008 The proportion of native speakers routinely using their mother tongue in daily life had shrunk over the period to 3% (grandchildren's generation), up from 65% (great-grandparents).The disappearance of minor languages is a disastrous process, which in some cases may happen over just two or three generations.A survey undertaken that same year on the Yakut language, though, showed its high degree of sustainability, with a fluent command demonstrated by 100% in great-grandparents' generation and by 86% in grandchildren's.The decrease in native speaker numbers is more pronounced with urban dwellers.In rural areas, 100% of the ethnic Yakut born between 1910 and 1930 and 79% of those born in 1990-2010 demonstrate fluency in their native language.In cities, meanwhile, the figures are 93% and 61%, respectively.In ethnic Yakut inhabitants, aged 15-19 and 20-29, the willingness to preserve their cultural identity is much harder to come by than in older community members, aged between 30 and 65.To gauge the pace of processes related to native language and culture transmission, we have split the ethnic Yakut population into two categories depending on whether the original identity is neglected or preserved.In the former category, people attach little importance to their traditional culture; they are reluctant to cultivate ethnic traits in themselves, and have no willingness to use their mother tongue, nor teach it to their children (only 48% of the respondents intend to teach it, as compared with 95% in the latter category).The survey's findings show a deformation in the mechanisms of value, language and culture reproduction in the ethnic Yakut during their industrial and postindustrial transition.The limited amount of proven natural reserves and the industrial boom of major Asian economies (such as China and India) are likely to prompt major world powers' political, economic and socio-cultural expansion into the Arctic and circumpolar areas in the next two decades or so.Countries like the United States, Russia, Canada, and Norway are expected to step up their industrial activity in those territories.This will dramatically increase the migrant inflow in the sub-Arctic, along with bringing in different lifestyles, value systems, and socio-cultural standards.Faced with cultural and economic occupation in their ancestral lands, the region's indigenous communities may find themselves on the brink of cultural extinction within two or three generations.In the next two decades, the Republic of Sakha will be the scene of ambitious socio-economic and socio-cultural transformations, which may drastically change the living conditions of the local indigenous communities.In keeping with the federal government's Strategy for Socio-Economic Development of Russia's Far East and the Baikal Region through 2025, the gross regional product is expected to grow 8.5-fold on the year 2005.That growth could be provided primarily by large mining and transportation projects --the driving force behind the republic's future industrial advancement.The potential threat to the reproduction and existence of sub-Arctic indigenous communities is determined by three "waves" in Yakutia's cultural and economic development in the years to come: 1) New industrialization, that is, operations in the republic's territory of large Russian, foreign and transnational corporations (predominantly companies involved in mining); 2) Innovative progress, that is, high-tech projects to be launched by the government and the business community, and the introduction of new production lines and services relevant to the post-industrial stage; 3) Acculturation on the part of major world players, such as the United States and the Eurozone countries, who have a strong influence on global media and the Internet.They will try to impose their culture and value systems on the indigenous population, making extensive use of postmodernist humanitarian techniques, aimed at destroying traditional cultures and building a globalist, consumption-driven society.In these conditions, the very vitality of the indigenous communities' traditional economic patterns and their mechanisms for intergenerational transfer of cultural heritage and value systems will be put to test.The related problems include: • dilution of indigenous communities' livelihoods against the backdrop of large-scale development of local natural resources by large corporations; • exacerbation of social and environmental problems arising from the narrower spread of traditional occupations and the impossibility of the native population's full-fledged integration into the emerging industrial and postindustrial realities; • young people's loss of ethnic identity and breakaway from their native culture (including language, communication and conduct patterns, as well as value systems, under the pressure of mass culture and consumerism); • destruction of the genetic fund as a result of migrations and birth rate decline amidst growing urbanization and the emergence of new medical and socio-medical problems.Life shows indigenous communities' high sensitivity to aggressive industrial and postindustrial development and the likelihood of their consequent marginalization.Their role in humanity evolution risks being brought down to that of conserved and protected "relics," eventually.Having said that, the prospective expansion of mining operations in Yakutia and the advancement of high-tech sectors, with the North-Eastern Federal University among the major R&D contributors, will provide indigenous communities with vast opportunities for breakthrough.There is a possibility of creating an economic model that would enhance the financial and economic foundation for their sustenance and development.A broader scale and variety of products, services and socio-cultural activities would create a window of opportunity for expanding the competency range of Yakutia's indigenous inhabitants, thereby enriching its social and human resources.International documents 32 adopted on the issue in the past few decades recognize indigenous communities' political, economic, and cultural rights to the preservation of their social, cultural, religious and spiritual values and economic practices, as well as the rights of property and ownership of their ancestral lands.All this may be instrumental in helping preserve such communities' cultures and languages.Cyberspace and ICT have created an additional communications dimension and a new form of existence for languages and cultures.The international community and Russian authorities should do more to overcome the digital gap and to expand the use of cyberspace in efforts to preserve indigenous cultures and languages.However, such efforts alone will not be enough to counter the processes of Western culture, values, activities and lifestyles conquering the world.The domination in the information landscape of major languages, such as English, Chinese and Spanish, ensures the spread of world powers' value systems globally, depreciating the significance of minor languages to their native speakers.The presence of indigenous cultures and languages on the Web cannot guarantee their wider use by speaker communities in real life.There is also a risk of turning living indigenous cultures into a mouthballed heritage for museum conservation and display.The preservation of cultures and languages is no easy task, and there are still no established managerial practices to implement it.The problems of culture and language preservation management arise from a need for long-term commitment (50-100 years), the difficulty of foreseeing economic and socio-cultural scenarios, and the complexity of the object to be preserved.The Foresight Yakutia project is being run by two leading higher education establishments: the Siberian Federal University and the North-Eastern Federal University.Launched in 2010, it follows up on the republican government's policy toward preserving cultural and linguistic diversity.This project is a complex and multidisciplinary one.Its research and planning groups are comprised of methodology specialists, economics, sociologists, demographers, medical doctors, cultural anthropologists, specialists in culture studies, ethnographers, teachers, historians, and philosophers.The research and development work involves more than 50 scientists and scholars, many of whom hold high academic degrees.As a new tool for "working with the future," Foresight includes the following dimensions: • foreseeing the future (identifying basic trends in the development of large socio-economic systems, countries, regions, corporations, etc.); • managing the future (comparing forecasts by key players and coordinating their strategic goals); • promoting the future (drawing roadmaps that would show possible routes, bifurcation points, and windows of opportunity).Foresight is to be rerun every five years for verifying the findings, carrying out a critical analysis of the practical results, and updating the tasks set.A modern centre will be set up on the North-Eastern Federal University grounds to perform the following tasks: conducting research and monitoring sociocultural processes in circumpolar areas; elaborating modern sociohumanitarian techniques; and implementing pilot projects in socio-humanitarian practices for the preservation and development of northern ethnicities.The project has no analogues in Russia's cultural policy practices.Activities: • arranging comprehensive study and systemic planning of a longterm future for the indigenous communities of Yakutia; pushing the foresight boundaries to 40-50 years through the engagement of a broad range of competent Russian and foreign experts; • forming a public consensus, creating a broad-based public coalition for translating the most preferable of scenarios into reality, organizing and supporting the processes of long-term preservation and reproduction of Yakutia's cultures and languages; • elaborating principles of socio-cultural policy, building strategies and programmes for the preservation and promotion of Yakutia's languages and cultures within the format of strategic partnership between the government, the business community, and the general public.Aims and goals: 8. determining a 'scenario field' and describing major scenarios for the development of Yakutia's ethnicities, to cover the entire range from best-case through worst-case; selecting the 'basic scenario,' based on key players' consensus and vision for the future.Making an economic assessment of the scenarios, including the amount of investments required, the possibility of recouping the costs, etc. 9. developing project proposals in major areas of activity: healthcare (type of treatment, the desired profile of medicine, medications, and diet; defining the notion 'healthy lifestyle' in reference to the indigenous communities of the North); education (socialization for integration into industrial and postindustrial formats of activity; transmission of traditional culture; specificity of childhood as an institution and the logic behind growing up into adulthood; result-oriented education); cultural practices (transmission of mentality specifics, systems of values, methods of identification, patterns of early-age and matureage socialization, etc.); 10. Drawing a roadmap that would allow to coordinate efforts by the authorities, members of the business community and the public, and welfare organizations involved in the implementation of the basic scenario; 11. Developing guidelines for a policy of sociocultural development in the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) through the year 2025.A web site is a prominent and very important tool for promoting any given language in cyberspace.Therefore, it is worth using it to support less-diffused languages.Let us start with a brief recall of what is a web site.Basically a web site is a page of a document written in HTML or XML language in order to be published on the Web.This page may include different elements such as texts, pictures, movies and sounds.In the early age of the Web, only the webmaster could modify his website by adding to it or withdrawing from it any element of information.Interaction with the visitors of the site was limited to specific devices such as a guestbook, a forum or newsgroup.Since then, the Web technology has undergone a very deep evolution leading to what is known as "web 2.0", a thoroughly interactive kind of web site that allows a fast development of social networks.In this new model of web sites, every visitor may sign up and then is given a personal page with her/his profile.Users can access a large set of tools to act like a webmaster, post any document they want, and interact with an endless number of people individually, selectively or collectively.So, it becomes possible to organize all kinds of collaborative activities directly on the web site in real time.Now, the most important question is not "how to do?" but "what to do?"Indeed, the structure of your web site depends on what you want to do with it!That is where the content issue comes in.There is no limitation to the diversity of the content that can be included in a web site.Yet, as we are interested in web sites designed to support any less-diffused language, let us draw the outlines of some of the content which may be expected on this kind of web sites.On such a site information should be found on the language itself, on the language's situation, e.g. on where and when it is spoken and on the people who speak it, the way they live and their culture.One of the first decisions to make is whether the site should be written in the less-diffused language or in some more widely diffused one.The first option gives a good visibility to the supported language as it makes it become a working language on the web site.But only those who speak it can read and appreciate the web site's content.The second option reveals the less-diffused language to much more people in the world, but let it remain an object one can talk about instead of becoming a mean of communication.The best approach is likely to be a bilingual web site making use of the less-diffused language as well as a more widely spread one.Information about the less-diffused language encompasses phonetic and phonology data, morphology and syntax data, orthography and writing systems, all kinds of literary texts (proverbs, tales, poetry, short stories, novels, songs, mail and CV models, advertisements, and so on.) Each of these items can be developed on several pages and where it is suitable video files can be included and lessons can be designed for learners of the language.We'll come back on this last point further down.One of the most important language data which might deserve a whole separate website is the language lexicon.The technical approach to online dictionaries much depends on how they are intended to be used.It may be a word reference with a search field and a browser that lays out the result for each looked-up word.It may be presented as a full page of a dictionary with several entries in an alphabetic list.Multilingual dictionaries are usually based on semantic links that emphasize both similarities and differences between languages.The growth of a language entails the enrichment of its vocabulary.As a lessdiffused language becomes a working tool in cyberspace, it will necessarily need a technical terminology to talk about the Web site itself and activities carried online.A new way of speaking will come out and it is a good practice to talk about it and discuss it on a wiki space.The need of a series of specialized technical vocabulary will soon come up leading to a growing terminological activity in a variety of knowledge fields, which deserves a dedicated web site.Linguists love classifying languages.So, one of the basic kinds of information looked for about a less-diffused language is its classification amongst its cognates.In which language kinship and typology does it fit?In which country or countries is it spoken?What can be learned about its history?What is its social status?In a multilingual situation, which are the other languages spoken in the same area?All these questions can be answered in series of articles that fill several pages of a web site dedicated to the less-diffused language.As mentioned above, in order to increase the number of its speakers, a whole e-learning system can be built featuring sets of lessons for beginners, and other sets for advanced learners.Beginners' lessons include phonetic exercises, and common sentences used in everyday life or typical social conversations, while advanced lessons introduce more to the people's culture and literature aiming at a better mastership of the language.E-learning requires an important online interactivity between a local staff and a growing number of faraway students, each of whom should have a profile, a personal page and follow-up.Because everybody has different reasons to take lessons in any given language, it is a good practice to design the architecture of the whole course as a tree that allows different ways to progress through the lessons.Thus, each student can choose the better way for her/him, eventually with the advice of their teacher or mentor.How many people speak the less-diffused language, either as native speakers or as second language speakers?Do all the speakers share the same cultural area, way of life and custom?A good description of these features provides content of a high interest.This includes all aspects of the society's life such as social organization, administration, justice, labour, education, religion, philosophy, arts, food, architecture, transport, leisure and entertainment, and so forth.It is very common throughout the world that traditional communities develop a close relationship with specific animals they depend on for their life.For instance, a seal for the Inuits, a horse for the Mongolians, a cow for the Fulani, the Tutsi or the Texan cowboys, a sleigh dog for the Greenlanders, a reindeer for the Sami of northern Europe, a camel for the Sahara Tuaregs, a llama for the Indians in the Andes, a yak for the highlanders of Himalaya and neighboring regions, and so on.This special relationship between a specific animal and a human being community generates a very rich diversity in culture and civilization that all deserve being known to the whole mankind as a global human heritage.Who else can reveal them better than representatives of those traditional communities whose languages are usually less-diffused?Finally, a social network web site would give the opportunity to the most committed supporters of the less-diffused language to enhance the language's life on cyberspace by using it to chat and exchange all kind of messages and private data.By so doing, they automatically strengthen the vitality of the language that will thus become more and more used and diffused.Most of the time, people who are really committed to promote a language organize themselves into a legal cultural association.In this case, it is a good practice to give news of the association's activities on a web site in the supported language.Beside of this, a real online newspaper can be created on the same web site to inform and comment on current events in the supported language.News, comments, points of view, debates are the ingredients of these web site pages.But some items like calendar, horoscope, crosswords and similar games, meteorology information, sports, lottery and different polls can be added to make the page even more attractive.Since Olympic and global competitions are regularly organized, some sports like soccer and rugby have become popular all over the world.During these competitions that take a huge place in the news, comments are usually given only in widespread languages, never in a less-diffused one.So, it is a good idea to find a way of talking about these games in every native language, and this can be done on a web site.On the other hand, very few is said, if any, about games, sports and leisure practiced only in local communities.Since they are part of the local culture, it may be easier to talk about them in the less-diffused language.Here again, a multilingual presentation can help disclosing them to the rest of the world.As I said it right from the beginning, there is no limitation to the topics which can be addressed on a web site.I simply outlined here some of the most obvious ones that I would expect from a supportive web site dedicated to the promotion of a less-diffused language in cyberspace.The multilingual dimension is also useful to allow sharing knowledge worldwide.In the modern globalised world, being informed is, of course, very important for taking decisions and acting, but it is even more important to share knowledge and learn from each other in order to build a better world locally.Social network plays an important role in establishing an online collaborative society.Being seen in current occurrence, it provides a great impact in social, political, educational, and many other movements.Such a way of the change in the way of people collaboration can be promoted in developing humanity resources to enrich our linguistic and cultural knowledge.We developed a platform for Asian WordNet (AWN) (Sornlertlamvanich et al. 2009) co-creation.It is prepared by connecting the existing bi-lingual dictionaries to the core Princeton WordNet (Fellbum, 1998 ) based on the degree of English equivalent list (Charoenporn et al., 2008) .WordNet is one of the most semantically rich English lexical banks and widely used as a resource in many aspects of research and development.Word knowledge can be logically represented by a set of synonyms called synset.Currently, there are 13 Asian languages semantically connected via Princeton WordNet, and the WordNet Management System (WNMS) is prepared for cross language access and additional term co-creation (Sornlertlamvanich et al., 2010) .Under the collaboration between Ministry of Culture and Ministry of Science and Technology by National Electronics and Computer Technology Center (NECTEC), a collection of cultural knowledge has been embodied since 2010.We did not start the work from scratch.Actually the work has been done some years ago by forming a set of servers individually operated by each province.Each province has to take care of their own contents about their responsible area.The initiative has been carried out for the purpose of creating a reference site of the local cultural knowledge.The distributed ssystem's aim is to decentralize the management and to maintain the uniqueness of each specific area.However, there is a trade-off between the independent design and cost of maintenance that covers the service operation, interoperability and integrity.There are currently 77 provinces in Thailand, and each province is allocated an office for provincial cultural center.With the approach of the above-mentioned distributed system, it is too costly to maintain the service and the standard for data interchange.The newly designed platform-based approach for digital cultural communication has been introduced.It is to build a co-creative relationship between the cultural institution and the community by using new media to produce audience-focused cultural interactive experience (Russo and Watkins 2005) .First, we collected the existing provincial cultural knowledge and convert them to conform to a standardized set of metadata.This is to prepare the cultural knowledge for an open data schema and interoperability.The metadata is defined to follow the Dublin Core Metadata Element Set with some additional elements to fulfill the requirements for the information during the recording process.Second, we assign representatives from each province and train them to be a core cultural content development team for community co-creation.The contributed content needs to be approved by the core team before public visibility.Third, the cultural knowledge will be put on service to the audience of such scholars, who may be interested in the cultural practice, or business developers who may benefit from attaching the cultural knowledge to their products, or tourists who may seek for cultural tourism.This cultural media assets will be linked and annotated by a governed conceptual scheme such as Asian WordNet (Sornlertlamvanich et al. 2009 ).The semantic annotated and linked data will be serviced as a fine-grained cultural knowledge for higher-level applications.The new media for recording the cultural knowledge is in the form of narrative, photo, video, animation, image incorporated with GPS data for visualization on the map.The existing cultural data has been collected and cleaned up to conform to the designated standard metadata.The absent data are supposed to be revised and augmented by the experts from the Ministry of Culture.A few tens of thousands of records have been collected but most of them are captured in a coarse-grained image.Narratives and images are revised by a group of trained experts to create a seed of standardized annotated cultural knowledge base.Some new records have been added together with animation, video, panoramic photograph, etc.New technique in capturing the cultural image is aggressively introduced to create value added and gain more interest from the audience.The standardized annotated cultural knowledge base is presented through a set of viewing utilities to the audience.Filter according to the location and province is prepared for customizing to page for each province.This is to allow the unique presentation of each province.The administration of each province will be responsible for its content correctness and coverage.Actually, the attractive presentation and narrative are required to attract the audience.It is significant that the provided framework can encourage the data accumulation and fulfill the needs from the audience.Community co-creation will feedback the actual requirement that can improve the quality of the content.Institution plays an important role in mediating between community and the audience.As a result, the multiple types of content are generated on a designated standard.The annotated metadata can be used as a guideline for higher level of data manipulation such as semantic annotation, cross language and link analysis.In this report, we present a web-based participation model to support linguistic and cultural diversity, and discuss alternatives to design the model in some crucial aspects.The participation model includes key features to deal with linguistic and cultural assets: collection, review, and publication.It is designed to ultimately promote users' participation, and to embrace a diversity of linguistic and cultural information in terms of information characteristics and sources.Especially, such design consideration is required in the circumstance where diverse and heterogeneous devices including mobile systems are getting popular, and with parallel, the representation of linguistic and cultural data would be also diverse and complicated.For the purpose, our model is designed to allow a self-defined data representation in which a user can provide his/her own data.It has no doubt that such data representations should be effectively handled by computers as well as humans.Furthermore, the participation model plays as an open service platform which enables easy creation and launch of another new applications and services.Based on an open dictionary service, for instance, a phrase translation service or another dictionary with more specific interests can be built by others than original authors.In summary, such a participation model is expected to provide a ground to wider sharing and use their linguistic skills of the small ethnic groups, and further efficiently build up new challenging works as well as glue to naturally linked individual's thoughts.As we know, earlier web services had focused on how to publish and share their information which is mostly static and unchanged over time.But, since the advent of web 2.0, it has become a true communication space far beyond information sharing.Such new web features support collective collaboration, active social networking, and component integration.Collective collaboration is achieved by participatory creation and sharing.Active social networking enables users to dynamically interact to each other, based on personal profiles, their social links, and additional services.All the social media including blogs, twitters are enabled by this feature.Component integration combines data, presentation, and functionalities from multiple sources to create a new service or application.For example, Google opens their own map service as public APIs which other developers can freely use.In such circumstances, we are facing two barriers in supporting minority languages in cyberspace.First, sometimes their computing environments would be less developed.For instance, we need operating system supports with character codes, fonts, and input methods.It is also true for language supports in some major applications or services from Microsoft and Google.Also, the gap in leading technologies is getting larger.Secondly, the most important problem I think is the less participation in using a minority language in cyberspace.Especially, the cyberspace is not familiar with agro-typed rural residents and senior citizens who have much experience in their languages.In addition, younger generation prefers using official languages which are strongly recommended and advantageous in their community.Of the barriers just mentioned, the eager participation into the cyber community is the biggest challenge we have to address.In essence, it is not a problem linked to technology only, rather it is strongly related to social and cultural surroundings.In terms of technology, we have to support a communication model which satisfies the following requirements.Firstly, the model should encourage language users within a minority community.We expect that it will reinforce the solidarity among the indigenous people, and make a positive cycle to use their languages.But, we have to be very careful as a closed society is subject to threaten creativity or diversity in communication, and in the end, it may lose motivation to participate.So, the communication model should be able to bridge their local community and global world.Such mutual exchange could facilitate their linguistic, cultural, and creative activities.The Korean pop entertainment is a good example which has made huge achievements by such exchange.As shown in Figure 1 , we may have two separate systems for local and global communities.Also, the local systems may be proprietary and incompatible with the global systems.In that case, those could work for local community, but cannot interact with the global systems.By any means, we have to develop how to exploit global systems for the both.As an approach to support such a model, we need to design a gateway service between local and global communities on the Web.It consists of 4 components, such as directory of the minority users, interface localization, language translation, and contents analysis.We emphasize that the main purpose of this approach is to efficiently unite minority people while helping them play in the global space.Looking closer, the first one, directory service helps the indigenous people find out their colleagues or relevant contents with ease.It needs to maintain a directory for each web activity such as blogging and social media.Eventually, it acts as a contact point for someone to get into their local community.Two screen shots of Figure 2 show a simple case which is developed by Dr. Kevin Scannell at St. Louise University in America.The site is named indigenoustwitters.com.The left one shows a list of indigenous languages he found from the Twitter.And, the right one shows a list of active users in a specific language.So, you can easily find who stars in your language Twitter, and get into your community.Next, we need to localize some major applications such as Google, YouTube, and Twitter.Mostly, menus, popup messages, and on-line help are major targets to localize.For instance, Google is running the Google Technology User Group (GTUG) which officially supports language problem of each country.In another way, we can personally contribute to the localization through the Google In Your Language service.For example, we can put into the system a set of localized messages.The language translation is strongly required to interact with global community.It should automatically translate user's texts into a common language such as Russian or English.In case of Google, they provide a general translation service for about 50 languages.They also provide open translation APIs which can be employed by another application.In the above mentioned example users' twits are translated in Twitter by the Google APIs (it is also a typical example of component integration mentioned prior).For a language they do not support, you should develop a translation module which can be plugged into a Web browser.It is not easy, but it is worth it.Even though translation accuracy is not quite good, it is strongly required to link the indigenous community into global community.Lastly, we need to collect and analyze statistics on the web content.It can be conducted by crawling web data, and after analyzing, it can be used to rebuild a directory of minority users.It can be used to build a corpus and linguistic resources for minority languages including multimedia.Crubadan is an example module designed for this purpose by Dr. Scannell.It acts as a web crawler which gets a small set of seed texts, and forwards a query including these seeds to Google.Then, Google returns a list of documents potentially written in the same language.It is also performed by Google open APIs for web search.You may refer to this URL, http://borel.slu.edu/crubadan/ index.html.We need to provide a communication model which can support solidarity within local community as well as mutual exchange with global community.At present, web-based participation is definitely a feasible option option, and gateway service with following features may be considerable.I would like to finish with this saying by Nancy Hornberger from the University Of Pennsylvania, "Language revitalization is not about bringing a language back, but bringing it forward."I believe that our efforts and trials for minority languages will strengthen their future.Multilingualism, Multimedia and Orature in the Information Age: One of the advantages of digital technology is that it facilitates access to information in various forms and modes.This could be in the form of sounds such as speech or music and in the visual forms such as written texts as well as static images and motion pictures.The presentation of information in these various forms is what we now refer to collectively as multimedia.The relevance of digital technology to modern use of multimedia stems from the fact that the digital approach to the representation of natural reality offers uniformity in the storage, processing and retrieval of information on the same hardware by the use of appropriate software.This leads to economy of scale and many other benefits.The development of writing is a great mile stone in human civilization.Writing as a means of documenting human thought offers efficiency, portability and permanence.Writing is efficient in the sense that large volumes of information can be stored within relatively small volumes of media space, hence offering great advantages in the storage space of written ideas.It is portable in the sense that written texts can be moved to locations other than the one occupied by the producer of the idea and it can be at more than one location at the same time.Finally, written texts are said to be permanent in the sense that spoken words, fizzling into thin air after they have been uttered, when written, remain available for consultation for as long as the media on which they are written survive.Writing has enhanced the production and management of information and knowledge, providing means for productive storage, retrieval, transfer and dissemination.From the humble beginnings of the documentation of human experiences in cave drawings, totem poles and other semiotic endeavors to the precursors of the present information revolution facilitated by Gutenberg's printing technology, mankind has benefited immensely from the improved capacity for the storage, retrieval, transfer and dissemination of information and knowledge.Unfortunately however, not all the languages spoken in the world today have been reduced to writing.Furthermore, writing present a steep learning curve particularly for adult learners who did not get the opportunity to learn to read and write as children.Hence there are many segments of our so-called global information society in which a significant number of people still do not have the capacity to read and write.Worse still, there are whole communities that speak languages that are still unwritten languages.People in these sorts of situations are disadvantaged as they are pushed to the fringes of the information society.Their inability to read and write excludes them from many vital aspects of the life of the wider communities they live in.Consequently therefore, such people are systematically excluded from active participation in the development processes of both their local and global communities and their communities are the worst for it since these people cannot fully contribute their own required quota to development processes.To alleviate this exclusionary condition, multilateral agencies such as UNESCO as well as national governments and various NGOs put a lot of efforts into improving literacy levels in various communities around the world.They organize programs in developing writing systems for languages that remain yet unwritten and adult literacy programs for adults who live within literate cultures but did not manage to acquire literacy skill as children.Despite the best of these efforts however, there are still a lot of illiterate people in our world of the information age.It may be quite depressing but we must admit that it would appear that the death of illiterates is still one of the primary ways by which we are able to improve literacy in the world today.Despite the efficiency, portability and permanence of written text as discussed above, it must be noted that speech still remains the preferred mode of human communication.It is the most natural way by which humans communicate.This is easily demonstrated by the lengths to which we as humans still go in organizing conferences, seminars and workshops to sit together and consider issues of paramount importance based on the use of speech.These we still do despite the near ubiquity of written text.Given this reality, we need to pause and ask a pertinent question: if sound recording had been developed before writing, would writing still have developed in the same direction?Would it have still grown to acquire the importance it now has in our global society of today?Yet, our present bias for writing seems to manifest as a distraction in the ways we treat other media and modes of communication.The historical exploits of writing and the vibrant cultures and industries that have grown around it tend to ascribe an overrated importance to writing.For this reason, cyberspace has so far been developed based on the importance we attached to writing.This direction of growth of cyberspace is not inevitable and there are viable alternatives to the heavy demand of reading and writing that cyberspace as we now know it presents.Cultures using languages that yet do not have writing systems and many more that are shaped strongly by oral forms of information and knowledge sharing would not benefit maximally from cyberspace it we do not provide alternatives to the heavy dependence on reading and writing as we have now grown cyberspace.In such cultures, teaching and learning are still based primarily on memorization and recitation.People share knowledge by telling stories, proverbs, riddles, etc.In many of such cultures, the collective memory of society resides with Griots who memorize the history and tell it when required.Hence, the history is accessed primarily by performance.In some other cultures the collective memory is held within society at large based on an elaborate system of cognomens in which people are named and described according to the lives and times of their forbearers.These cognomens are usually stories of both valiance and villainy.Among the Zulu of southern Africa it is called Izithakazelo and among the Yoruba of West Africa it is called Oriki.In the Yoruba culture for example, children get some parts of their oriki recited to them at least once a day.Parents and other elders in the homestead, particularly mothers would go into a session of recitation of a child's oriki in response to a simple good morning greeting from the child.The oriki is also freely recited, both to children and adults during ceremonies and sometimes, just in acknowledgement of important achievements or in a bid to encourage prosperity.This way, various portions of the collective memory of the whole community is held in the brains of individual members of the community and is regularly rehearsed in performance for the purposes of retrieval whenever needed.Despite the known weaknesses of the human brain as a store of information, the sacred texts of the Ifa divination system of the Yoruba still remains largely in oral form.Even though some portions have been written, the bulk of it still resides mainly in the brains of Ifa scholars as an oral scripture.These sacred texts contain the knowledge of Yoruba philosophy, medicine and many other relevant sciences in elaborate poetry.The knowledge contained in these poems is organized in an equally elaborate system of information look-up based on binary mathematics and probability theory.How then do we accommodate such traditions that are based mainly on orature in cyberspace?How do we use multimedia to assist such cultures with documenting their histories and their knowledge of their environment in media that are more appropriate than the human brain?If we are to develop cyberspace as a truly multilingual knowledge space, is it pertinent to ensure that cultures that still learn by memorization and recitation also have access to the information superhighway?Apart from giving such cultures access to cyberspace, it is also necessary to offer modern technology as a means of documenting and mobilizing the knowledge that is otherwise held in the brains of mere mortals.To accommodate orature in cyberspace we need to consciously and deliberately reassess the role of multimedia as a means of information and knowledge sharing.Multimedia allows for the documentation of human thought, ideas and knowledge without literacy.It does not necessarily require the development of a system of orthography and therefore does not present the steep learning curve that literacy presents to adult illiterates.Modern digital technology has facilitated multimedia in unprecedented ways.By virtue of this development, it is now possible to document information in different forms and in various modes, be it in the form of sounds in speech and music or in the form of images in writing, still images and motion picture.Information in various forms and modes can now be stored and retrieved uniformly in various media on the same hardware.This diversified access to information through multimedia should be better exploited to include cultures that are still based primarily on orality in cyberspace.So far, multimedia has been used primarily as enhancement to written texts in cyberspace.Even though such use is welcomed, multimedia needs to be seen as valid and productive in its own right and should therefore not be used merely to enhance written texts.Literacy is defined as the ability to read and write.It must be noted, however, that the value of literacy is not really in the process of reading and writing but in the results we get from reading and writing; the sharing of information and knowledge.Hence, literacy is valuable only because it provides an efficient means for the documentation and reproduction of human thoughts, ideas and knowledge.If it is possible to achieve the same results without reading and writing, the value of the process of reading and writing becomes diminished and the result of reading and writing takes the full value.Multimedia offers the capacity to document human thought, ideas and knowledge beyond reading and writing and therefore offers the possibility of redefining literacy, changing it from 'the ability to read and write' to 'the capacity to engage literature'.Replacing the notion of ability with that of capacity moves the definition of literacy away from excluding those that are not able to including those that can be capacitated.The fight against illiteracy is a major preoccupation the world over, but as was observed earlier, death of illiterates still seems to be one of the most effective tools used in this fight.This is not to say that illiterates are deliberately killed in the fight, but the intrinsic link between illiteracy and ignorance weakens the chances of survival of an illiterate person, manifesting as a vicious cycle in which illiteracy breeds poverty and poverty weakens a person's capacity to become literate.Modern digital information communication technology can be used to break this vicious cycle by introducing multimedia as a means of productive information sharing without the ability to read and write.Such intervention is bound to lend a hand to the fight against illiteracy by producing e-literates out of illiterates.We may therefore be able to redefine literacy, changing its definition from 'the ability to read and write' to 'the capacity to engage literature'.The use of multimedia in the fight against illiteracy should be approached at two main levels.The first level involves the basic application of multimedia for documentation.This entails the use of audio recordings to document spoken information as well as the use of static images and motion picture to provide visual complements to such audio recordings.At a more advanced level we can use speech technologies such as Automatic Speech recognition (ASR) and Text-to-speech (TTS) Synthesis to turn speech into written text and written text in to speech respectively.This way we can derive all the advantages of written texts even without the ability to read and write.The use of hand-held devices such as Mobile Phones and Tablets is widening access to multimedia-enabled devices.Unfortunately however, the applications built for these devices still reflect a clear bias for written texts.As the popularity of these hand-held devices continues to grow, there is a need to reassess this bias for written texts in order to empower that large population of people who still live in oral societies to benefit from the cyberspace.To grow a truly multi-lingual cyberspace, we need to carefully reevaluate the importance of writing within the context of new developments in digital technologies and thereby make deliberate efforts to elevate the status of multimedia.We should not continue to overrate the importance of writing while there are other information media and modes that offer advantage we cannot afford to overlook.Supporting small languages can take many forms.A key to long term access to information about most of the world's languages is in the curation of existing records and the proper creation of records now.The network of language archives that exist in the world have been developing standards and have also been training practitioners (linguists, speakers or language workers) in good methods for language documentation.Websites can deliver accessible information, but the risk is that unique records will be placed only into websites and will not survive in the longer term.Archival forms of the records should be properly described using standard metadata terms and be created and stored at the highest possible quality, for later delivery in compressed formats suitable to web delivery.In this paper I outline the Pacific and Regional Archive for Digital Sources in Endangered Cultures (PARADISEC) (http://paradisec.org.au) as an example of a new kind of archive that is emerging, one that is not only a repository of curated material, but one that is involved in training, adopting standard formats for primary records and creating workflows that will result in multiple outputs from linguistic fieldwork.We have also developed a method for presenting interlinear text and media online (http://www.eopas.org) in order to encourage the creation of language records in reusable formats and to work towards a language museum in which samples of language in performance can be viewed on the internet.I suggest that we need to provide a service of advice and data conversion for those for whom it is simply too difficult to do this work themselves.An example of such a service is the Resource Network for Linguistic Diversity (http://www.rnld.org).It should always have been part of the discipline to produce good research data, but the use of digital recorders, storage and archives, together with the development of suitable standards for data and metadata construction, have all combined to refocus our efforts in this direction.At the turn of this century, a group of Australian linguistic and musicological researchers recognised that a number of small collections of unique and often irreplaceable field recordings mainly from the Southeast Asian and Pacific regions were not being properly housed and that there was no institution in Australia which would take responsibility for them.The recordings were not held in appropriate conditions and so were deteriorating and in need of digitisation.Further, there was no catalogue of their contents or their location so their existence was only known to a few people, typically colleagues of the collector.These researchers designed the Pacific and Regional Archive for Digital Sources in Endangered Cultures (PARADISEC 34 ), a digital archive based on internationally accepted standards (DC/OAI-PMH metadata, IASA audio standards and so on) and obtained Australian Research Council Infrastructure funding to develop an audio digitisation suite in 2003.Researchers working with speakers of small languages (those with few speakers) typically conduct fieldwork to learn how aspects of these societies function, how the languages are structured, or how musicological knowledge is constituted, in addition to recording life stories, ethnobiological and other information.Typically these are minority endangered languages for which no prior documentation exists.This is vitally important work which often records language structures and knowledge of the culture and physical environment that would otherwise be lost (see e.g., Evans 2010 , Maffi 2001 , Harrison 2007 ).However, while it is typical for the interpretation and analysis of this data to be published, the raw data is rarely made available.The data -tapes, field notes, photographs, and video -are often not properly described, catalogued, or made accessible, especially in the absence of a dedicated repository.This means that enormous amounts of data -often the only information we have on disappearing languages -remain inaccessible both to the language community itself, and to ongoing linguistic research.The data that we create as part of our research endeavour should be reusable, both by ourselves and by others.First because any claims that we make based on that data must themselves be replicable and testable by others, and second, because the effort of creating the data should not be duplicated later by others,but be used as a foundation that can be built on (cf. Thieberger 2009) .In order to be made accessible, the data recorded by researchers must be properly collated and indexed for public presentation and archiving (see Austin 2006 , Himmelmann 1998 , Woodbury 1998 .However, until recently there has been no simple means for doing this and access to physical analog records can be difficult, if not virtually impossible, when they are stored in a single location.This issue is being faced by scholars in many disciplines and is being addressed under the rubric of cyber infrastructure or e-humanities -how to build on existing knowledge and how to add new data that is being created in the course of various research projects so that the broader research community can benefit from it.This is all the more important when a linguist makes the only recordings for an endangered language-one that may no longer be spoken in the near future.Australia and its immediate neighbours are home to a third of the world's languages, most of which may never be recorded.In the initial phase of the PARADISEC project we established a steering committee with representatives of each of the partner universities (initially the University of Sydney, the University of Melbourne, and the Australian National University (ANU).The director of the project is Linda Barwick at the University of Sydney.With invaluable technical support from both the National Library of Australia and the National Film and Sound Archive and with funds from the Australian Research Council we bought a Quadriga digitisation suite and employed an audio engineer and administrative assistant, based at the University of Sydney.We also built a vacuum chamber and low-temperature oven to allow us to treat mouldy tapes that required special care before being playable.Tapes stored at the ANU were identified and located and then permission was sought from the collectors or their agents to digitise and accession them into the collection.In the first year of funding we had to come up with outcomes that would justify further funding grants and we aimed for 500 hours of digitised tapes in that first year (we achieved this goal in ten months).We wrote a catalog database in Filemaker Pro, aware that it would provide us with an immediately usable tool that would ultimately have to be converted to an online database.This database allowed us to refine data entry forms and controlled vocabularies without relying on a programmer.This first catalogue worked well and exported to the XML files required for inclusion as headers in Broadcast Wave Format (BWF) files, and also exported to a static repository for Open Archives Initiative harvesting via the Open Language Archives Community 35 harvester.Files generated by this system (at 96khz/24 bit) are large, around 1.5 Gb per 45-minute side of a cassette, and so require dedicated storage facilities.We established a tape backup system which ran periodically to copy files from the hard disk to storage tapes, but were fortunate when the National Computational Infrastructure 36 (NCI) designated PARADISEC a 'Project of National Significance', allowing us to use their mass data storage system, with considerable storage space provided to support our work.They further provided programming support by writing specialized software (called 'Babble') which provides weekly, monthly and quarterly reports on the state of the collection, as well as nightly querying the server in Sydney and copying files that are ready for archiving.Data is organized by collector, but also by the internal logic of the collections (the same collector working on two different languages will have two collections, or a collection of video may be distinct from a collection of still images).The collection-level also speeds up a user's typing into the catalog as common fields from the collection level can be inherited down to the item level.Our naming convention is rather simple 37 ('CollectionID'-'ItemID'-'FileID'.'extension') and it also provides the hierarchical file structure into which files are placed and stored on the server (with directories corresponding to the collection level and subdirectories corresponding to the item level).Subsequently and with funds from the ARC, we built digitisation suites in Melbourne and Canberra, allowing us to preserve important heritage tape collections.The primary aim of the project to date has been on preservation of unique cultural records.Including a licence, or information about how each item can be used, is critical to the establishment of a properly curated collection because without it there is no way of providing access.Each depositor must fill out a deposit form specifying any conditions that may apply to the material.We provide a default set of access conditions which any user must agree to prior to being given access to data, and depositors can choose to allow this set of conditions to govern their collection, or to determine their own conditions.We are presently investigating the use of Creative Commons 38 licences as a less restrictive and more standardised form of agreement.We provide material from the collection to those authorized to receive it, typically in the form of downloadable files, however we have also worked on specific methods for the online delivery of two kinds of material -page images and time-coded media.We made available images of 14,000 pages of fieldnotes (see Figure 1 ) from three deceased researchers using the Heritage Document Management System 39 with a digital camera rig that we took to the home of the estate's executor, or to the office in which the papers were stored.These notes from deceased researchers would otherwise have only been available in a single physical location.As we do not have the resources to keyboard all of these manuscripts the images are stored in the collection with sufficient contextual metadata to make them discoverable on the web.As noted earlier, the archival version of each image is stored separately from the representational version.While building a method for working with our own data we consider it important to create generalisable models and structures for others to use, and to engage in discussions and training sessions both in order to refine our methodologies and to impart new ideas.An example of such development is our work on the online presentation of interlinear glossed text together with recorded media (EOPAS 40 ), allowing material from any language to be heard in concert with its transcript and translation (Schroeter and Thieberger 2006) .A number of tools for annotating language data have been produced recently 41 and it is clear that more are envisaged now that several large projects are engaging with these issues in the USA, UK 42 , Germany and the Netherlands 43 .Annotation is a basic task that is undertaken following recording, and can take several forms, the most common of which, for linguists, is interlinear text.These texts are analysed and parsed by a glossing tool that produces parallel lines of text, word translation and grammatical information, together with a free translation.These texts are then the input into EOPAS, a schema-based XML system for making explicit the relationship between parts of interlinear texts together with links to the source media, streamed using HTML5 (see Figure 2 ) which allows searching and concordancing linked directly to the media.EOPAS is portable (the source code is freely available 44 ), allowing other initiatives to capitalise on the work and potentially develop it in different directions.The ultimate aim of this approach is to allow new perspectives on the data itself, provided by contextualised access to primary data, and then to allow new research questions to be asked, and richer answers to be provided, all in a fraction of the time that it would have taken with analogue data.the image itself (bottom) (http://paradisec.org.au/fieldnotes/SAW2/SAW2.htm).Currently (mid-2011) PARADISEC contains 7,220 items made up of 48,555 files totaling 5.3 TB, with just over 3,020 hours of audio data 45 .Digital video already makes up an increasingly significant part of the collection.We hold data representing 676 languages from 60 countries (see examples of the kinds of collections in Table 1 ) which is organized into 260 collections, some 85 of which represent new fieldworkers who have deposited material on their return from fieldwork (and one during the course of her fieldwork), thus providing a citable form of their data for their own research.Here are some examples of collections digitised and described by the PARADISEC project: The remaining collections are digitised from recordings made since the 1950s.The provision of this service requires ongoing support and negotiation with depositors and we have found that a key to establishing the collection has been the depositors' perception of the benefit accruing to them and to their data in having it well described.In addition, there are collections we know about and would dearly love to digitise but we do not have the resources to do this work.These include large audiotape collections at radio stations around the Pacific, many in local languages, and collections in regional cultural centres that do not have any local equipment to digitise their collections.Further, we are regularly approached by former colonial patrol officers or missionaries who have recordings, notes or photographs that they want to preserve.• We have published on our website 46 a detailed description of our workflow, developed over seven years of operation, that describes the various processes involved in locating tapes and then assessing, accessioning, digitising and describing them, managing the resulting data and metadata, and the return of original tapes.PARADISEC has been cited as an exemplary system for audiovisual archiving using digital mass storage systems by the International Association of Sound and Audiovisual Archives 47 and, in 2008, won the Victorian Eresearch Strategic Initiative prize for humanities eresearch.Once we built the infrastructure for a research repository, including the catalog, file system and naming conventions, it has been taken up by those researchers who are aware of the need to describe and preserve their research material.Often it is only in the process of depositing with PARADISEC that a collection is first described in a systematic way -one that then allows the description to be searched by Open Archives Initiative search engines (and also google).Every eight hours the PARADISEC catalog is queried by a service run by the Open Language Archives Community (OLAC) and any new or edited catalog entries are copied and made available to their aggregated search mechanism.Similarly, because the catalog complies with relevant standards, the Australian National Data Service (ANDS) has been able to incorporate our collections into its national search mechanism.The quality of the metadata we provide ensures that targeted searches by language name can be resolved without locating similar but irrelevant forms.While the initial focus for our collection was the region around Australia (as suggested by the name we chose at the outset of the project), it has become clear that we need to accept material that has no other place to be archived.Typically, this means supporting Australian researchers whose research is outside of Australia, with the geographic spread of material we house now extending from India, into China, and across to Rapanui (Easter Island).With limited resources PARADISEC has nevertheless established working relationships with cultural centres in the Pacific region (e.g., the Vanuatu Kaljoral Senta, or the Institute of PNG Studies) which have involved providing CD copies of relevant material and, in the case of the University of New Caledonia, cleaning and digitising old reel-to-reel tapes in Drehu.A serious concern for many such agencies in the region is the lack of continuity in funding and in staffing, with the potential result that collections established and curated over time may be at risk.We would like to be able to digitise the many hours of tapes held, often in less than ideal conditions, in countries of the region.We have begun an occasional mass backup of significant collections of digital material from the Vanuatu Kaljoral Senta and would like to extend this as a service to other agencies.We regularly offer training workshops in linguistic research methods, including the use of appropriate tools and recording methods and in data management for ethnographic field material.This is extremely important, as the more informed the research community can become about the need for reuse of primary data, the more likely they are to be creating well-formed data that needs no extra handling by PARADISEC to be accessioned into the collection.Such training has been offered at community language centres as well as in academic settings.We cooperate in two further initiatives for disseminating information.The first is a blog (Endangered Languages and Cultures 48 ) and the second a resource website with FAQs and a mailing list (the Resource Network for Linguistic Diversity 49 ).Because of the rapid changes in methods for recording, transcribing, and analysing human performance no one can keep completely up to date, so these web-based resources are widely quoted and appreciated by the community of researchers.PARADISEC is a practice-based archive, arising from a community of practice who recognised that it was part of our professional responsibility to ensure that the records we create are properly curated into the future.This is a new conception of a data repository, built into workflows and research methods of particular disciplines, but recognising the need to adhere to broader international standards.It is unique in its links on the one hand to fieldworkers and to speakers of Indigenous languages and on the other hand to the cuttingedge technologies of Web 2.0 and HTML5.Vice Chair, Intergovernmental Council, UNESCO Information for All Programme (Vienna, Austria) It is almost trivial to state that written text documents are inadequate tools to represent acoustical phenomena such as spoken language, dialect, and music, or optical manifestations of rituals, dances, etc.This applies specifically for orally transmitted cultures where no traditional relations are in place between texts and spoken language, or traditional forms of notations, e.g. for music and/ or dance.Verbal descriptions and written texts are insufficient and subjective, and this makes historical studies in ethnolinguistics, ethnomusicology, and social anthropology at large, cumbersome and rudimentary.However, this situation has changed with advent of audiovisual documentation technology in the 19 th century: photography was available since 1839, the phonograph was invented in 1877 and cinematography emerged in the 1880s and 1890s.The development of the phonograph was specifically associated with the scientific interest to understand the physics and physiology of human speech.Consequently, the phonograph has attracted linguists and anthropologists immediately since its practical availability in 1889/90.Systematic language and music recordings were at the cradle of emerging disciplines like phonetics, ethnolinguistics and dialectology, as well as ethnomusicology.Their histories are closely associated with the history of sound recording.Consequently, this led to the systematic establishment of sound archives, namely so-called "Phonogram Archives", the first in Vienna in 1899, followed by Berlin in 1900, and in 1908 by St. Petersburg.Cinematography was also introduced to anthropological fieldwork, but, because of the technical complexity and the costs of this technology, not systematically employed to considerable extent.Over the following decades the phonograph remained in use until the 1940s, as gramophone recording, though technically superior, was hardly applicable under field conditions.Audio field recording became only widespread with advent of battery operated tape recorders in the mid-1950s, which permitted uninterrupted recording of considerable lengths and quality everywhere in the world.Similarly, video recording became popular with the advent of "handy cams" since the 1980s.Though technically inferior to cinematography, even to 8mm amateur film, this was affordable even for private researchers which made "videotaping" a widespread documentary tool in fieldwork.More recently video documents became an important factor even in linguistics, to permit research into gestures and mimics.As a result of this technological development audiovisual collections mushroomed and became irreplaceable stocks of primary sources of linguistic and cultural diversity of human kind.This mushrooming was supported by the relative affordability of audio and video recording equipment, which lead to the establishment of collections as part of research institutions, museums, and even in the possession of private researches.Generally, however, these collections remained without specific custodial infrastructure, or any preservation strategy, let alone budgetary provisions.It is estimated that the greater part, possibly 80% of these primary sources, which are the basis of our present knowledge in many disciplines, are outside archival custody in the narrower sense.Only 20% of this heritage are professionally preserved.This system of relative anarchy has worked until recently somehow.However, audio and video recordings are prone to deterioration and threatened by format obsolescence.More dangerous than the instability of carriers is meanwhile the inescapable unavailability of replay equipment, as traditional analogue, and also single carrier based digital formats, became obsolete.As a consequence, the industry ceases production of equipment, spare parts and provision of service.This situation was anticipated already in 1989/1990 which had lead to shift of paradigm for audiovisual archiving; first for audio, followed since the late 1990s by video, and presently also applied for film archiving: The new strategy is to preserve the content, not the carrier, by transferring contents to digital files and migrate these files from one IT preservation platform to the next 51 .There is unanimous agreement that the time window left for transferring audiovisual carriers into safe digital repositories is only 15 years, if at all.After that even well preserved originals will be useless, because of unavailability of dedicated replay equipment.Feeding analogue and digital single carriers into digital repositories is in demand of time, modern format-specific and regularly maintained replay equipment, and specialised experts in fading technologies, to keep operations running.It is important to understand that autonomous transfer operation can only viably be performed if critical masses are available, which must amount to several thousands of items per format.However, transfer is the first step only.Professional IT repositories must be in place to take up digitised contents, which have to be migrated into the future from one technical preservation generation to the next.Long-term preservation of digital files calls for permanent engagement in terms of logistics, personnel, and financial means in previously inexperienced dimensions.Critical masses are again crucial for viable installations.Present costs are in the order 1-2 USD/GB/year for great repositories.Prices are further decreasing, but the slope will eventually flatten out.Over the past 15 years we have seen many audiovisual digitisation projects that had suffered from a bundle of typical insufficiencies or mistakes: Most concern inadequate equipment for signal extraction from original tapes.Latest generation of equipment shall be used, because only this would capture the originally recorded quality.Mediocre or badly maintained equipment would distort original quality.Typical mistakes made in the production of digital files are the use of non-precision AD converters (as parts of cheap sound cards), the choice of streaming instead of file formats as digital target formats (CD audio instead of Wave), inadequate digital resolution (44.1kHz /16 bit instead of at least 48kHz /24 bits), the use of data reduced ("compressed") target formats for analogue originals -e.g. DVD for analogue video originals or MP3 for audio, and, finally, the use of optical recordable discs as sole digital preservation media.Radio and television archives as well as national archives of wealthy countries will solve preservation problems professionally by -possibly selective -transfer of holdings within next 15 years and by providing sufficient funds to keep digital files alive.But what can be done to safeguard the small and hidden collections, which are outside custodial care, reflecting the greater part -estimated 80% -of the documents of linguistic and cultural diversity of human kind?The first and foremost action to be taken is awareness raising.Poor standards of basic knowledge about audiovisual preservation principles are widespread, even amongst librarians and (paper) archivists, let alone amongst the specialists in the contents of the audiovisual carriers.Most efficient, therefore, are tutorials and workshops organised at the fringe of discipline oriented conferences of specialists, such as linguistics, musicology or anthropology gatherings.A typical barrier against safeguarding audiovisual research materials in the West is that excellence, and therewith budgetary allocations, are measured on the academic output of institutions and individuals.Optimisation in terms of publications is in higher esteem than safeguarding primary source material for systematic restudies and new interpretation by other (schools of) researchers or by later generations.This frequently leads to sub-optimal archiving standards, and to a further neglect of audiovisual preservation in case of budgetary problems of academic institutions.Typical problems in Russia and post-soviet countries are mainly due to particular research traditions.Relatively small research units worked in separation of each other, often (part of) institutes of academies of sciences, and often even under one roof, generally without sharing archival infrastructures.In this manner great amounts of audio recording collections have been accumulated, significantly more than in the respective disciplines in the West.A specific widespread problem is the use of acetate cellulose tape of East-German origin, produced in the 1950s and 1960s, which was used all over the region until Vietnam.These tapes become very brittle with age and their replay is often a veritable challenge 52 .As typical small collections of cultural and academic institutions are below critical masses to allow for economic viable preservation, cooperative solutions have to be organised and financed to rescue the accumulated holdings.Cooperative models can be organised at different levels: Institutional: Universities, academies of sciences, and other institutions holding several audiovisual collections in their sub-units, join efforts by establishing a common preservation strategy.Digitisation and long-term preservation of digital contents is often organised separately.Typically, the strongest unit sets up a central transfer laboratory, while the digital files are often kept in a digital repository as part of the computer centre.A recent prominent example is the central organisation of the preservation of 560.000 audiovisual carriers at the Indiana University Bloomington, USA 53 .A smaller, but structurally identical project is under preparation at the University of the Philippines 54 , National: Other successful, although yet not wide spread models work on a national level.One example is the Vienna Phonogrammarchiv 55 , which holds a considerable part, probably 40-50% of audiovisual primary sources produced by Austrian scholars, which had made their field recordings with methodological advice and technological support by the archive.Over the past years, however, many institutions and scholars that had made their recording autonomously, without depositing their originals in the archive, offer now their collections, as they understand that their precious sources would otherwise be lost.The archive tries to raise sufficient funds over the coming years to safeguard at least the most important collections yet outside proper archival care.The major problem of many of these and similar projects is the uncertainty of continued funding to keep digitised files available in the long-term.Significant support has to come from disciplines themselves, which are challenged to enhance recognition of primary sources by promoting systematic re-studies of archive materials, by promoting diachronic and comparative studies, and by intensifying study of respective archival materials before new field work is started.The European Science Foundation as well as national research funding agencies are increasingly recognising the importance of research infrastructures, specifically in digital age, which will lead to a significant rise of financial means within the 8 th European Framework Programme.On national levels, research funding should limit autonomy of researchers by enforcing and financing the deposit of raw research materials in archives for further (and alternative) evaluation, and, additionally, by earmarking a percentage of research budgets for infrastructure, e.g. for archiving.Failure to preserve audiovisual primary sources will lead to their swift and total loss, which undermines fundamental research principles, invalidates modern research results, and diminishes considerably the resources for linguistic and cultural diversity in the cyberspace.Although 2010-2011 will enter the history as the two years of dramatic change in the Middle East and North Africa, revolutions in Arab countries didn't start in 2010.One should say the revolutions culminated and succeeded mainly in Tunisia and Egypt in 2011, after several attempts during the first years of the 21 st century.Revolts continue in several countries and are transforming in some others into massacres (Syria), into civil war and international intervention (Libya), and into a hidden repression (Bahrain).In fact, the young population is uprising on all the continents.And what about language?What about its usage during the uprising in MENA countries?Studying language and revolution is a very large domain which could be tackled from different perspectives.I had the opportunity to witness the revolution in Egypt and I was particularly interested by the role of language in that event.I studied the role of social media in Egypt mainly, and tried to explain how users/protestors and political movements used the Internet and the social media to communicate, mobilize the demonstrators, organize activities, and document and share the revolution events, repression, success and celebration.I came to ask the question about the impact of the revolution time on the presence of Arabic language on the net and in social media.Based on that experience, I am making the hypothesis that since the revolution started in Arab countries, more content in Arabic language is being produced and shared on the Internet and social media.This content is created by individuals, organisations and media, and is contributing to enhancing the rank of Arabic language on the Internet.Some research is corroborating my observations, but a lot is still to be done on that matter.Social media like Facebook, Twitter and YouTube are among the most used tools of the Internet in Arab countries.Facebook was blocked and unblocked several times in different countries from Tunisia to Syria during the last 3 to 4 years for political and social reasons.Although the e-Government applications are very well developed in these two countries, and each ministry and organisation have web sites, they created pages on Facebook, YouTube and opened accounts on Twitter to communicate their messages and try to engage the population in discussion and interaction inside the country and abroad.Even in a non-conflict situation, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) government built its profile on Facebook due to the presence of 45% of its population on that network.The government of the UAE is encouraging its employees to use social media to interact with citizens.It has trained some of them on the responsible usage and risk of Facebook, and offered a policy guidelines document for government entities 66 .Given the demographic of the population of the Arab countries (around 30% are young people between 19 and 25 years old), the political and economic situations, Facebook is being used in a wide variety of ways: "whether to rally people around social causes and political campaigns, boost citizen journalism and civic participation, create a forum for debate and interaction between governments and their communities, or to enhance innovation and collaboration within government." 67 However, the main usage of Facebook was and is still the social networking among individuals and groups of buddies as intended by its creators.Despite the censorship and blocking by authorities, Facebook is the networking tool by excellence for those young people who want to communicate, meet each other, share hobbies and dreams, and endorse celebrities.The first quarter of 2011 witnessed a dramatic change in the role and perception of Facebook in Arab countries, due to the cyber-activism and the revolts in the streets.Curiously, blocking Facebook and Internet in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Syria, gave these tools more credibility and impact, and increased demand, then their usage.As quickly observed in Egypt since January 2011, social media are used by cyber-activists for mobilising people and demonstrators, preparing political activities and movements, sharing instructions and hints, and informing the international communities about the local events.YouTube and similar networks are used to document and share the events, ranging from calls for meetings to demonstrations, attacks and massacres.Dated videos permitted the protestors to prove the pacifist character of their actions and the brutality of the authorities such as in Syria (April 2011), Libya or Bahrain.Twitter is the communication channel for rally, SOS, quick instructions, feeding and receiving news, among others.The very nature of Twitter resides in the short messages or micro blogging, which make its integration on mobile phones seamless.Moreover, The Arab Social Media Report surveyed 126 people in Egypt and 105 in Tunisia that were asked about the main usage of Facebook during the civil movement and events in early 2011.As represented in the figure below: "In both countries, Facebook users were of the opinion that Facebook had been used primarily to raise awareness within their countries about the ongoing civil movements (31% in both Tunisia and Egypt), spread information to the world about the movements (33% and 24% in Tunisia and Egypt respectively), and organize activists and actions (22% and 30% in Tunisia and Egypt respectively). Less than 15% in either country believed Facebook was primarily being used for entertainment or social reasons" 68 .Facebook offers its interface in tens of languages most of them localised by users themselves.Users in Arab countries surveyed for the Arab Social Media Report "vary in their preference of language interface" 69 .Three main languages used on Facebook with no surprise are Arabic, French and English.The survey showed net preference for English in the Gulf countries, except for Saudi Arabia, and net preference for French in the three Maghreb countries and the Comoros.Egypt and Tunisia are worth observing because of the changes we will see later during the revolution.In terms of preference of language interface, users in Egypt split evenly between the use of Arabic (49.88%) and English (48.98%) interfaces (similar to Jordan, Libya and Iraq).Tunisian users showed a net preference for French interface (94.60%), then English (2.72%) and finally Arabic (1.56%).However, the language of the interface setting (only one language at a time) doesn't say much about the languages in which users are actually interacting on Facebook or other social media 70 .In fact, thank to HTML and UNICODE, browsers are now able to display text in virtually all the world languages."Facebookers practice a diversity" or a mix of languages which "challenges conventional notions of multilingualism as a combination of two or more monolingualisms" 71 .It is not a surprise that language played an important role during the social and political uprising in Tunisia and Egypt, as well as in other countries of MENA.Some slogans chanted by demonstrators made the tour of the planet and became symbols or songs and are repeated by demonstrators around the world.Remember: "Ben Ali, dégage!" in Tunisia, or "The people want the regime to fall" ‫بعشلا(‬ ‫ديري‬ ‫طاقسا‬ ‫,)ماظنلا‬ repeated in Tunis, Cairo, Damascus, Benghazi, and Sana'a.Signs made and handled by protestors in Cairo streets were in Arabic mainly, but also in English, French, and Hebrew 72 .On the social media front, linguistic creativity was positively impacted by the uprising.We are making the hypothesis here that due to the revolution and the need to reach out to a larger community on burning issues social media users used local languages (Arabic), increasing the quantity of Arabic content published online both on social media like Facebook and Twitter, and on regular websites.This hypothesis is based on our observation of 1) the number of new websites published in Arabic by newspapers, social movements, and government entities; 2) the number of social media users who are now writing in Arabic.This hypothesis is corroborated by the results of the Arab Social Media Report updated in the 2 nd issue of May 2011.If we compare the language of the interface, and the language used by users in Egypt and in Tunisia to communicate during the civil movement of the first quarter of 2011, we see a huge difference.We have signals that social uprising, political and social unrest are making social media one of preferred tools to communicate, mobilize, demonstrate and voice the concerns of the population around the world.MENA countries showed a serious increase in the number of users of social media that are mainly communicating in their mother tongue, despite their interface preferences and the software offers.More research is still needed if we want to better document this phenomenon and build on it to enhance the quality of the content and, more important, the quality of the citizens' participation and engagement in the cyberspace, leading to more interaction and more benefits from the knowledge society.While specifying the most pressing challenges of enlarging access to the world's documentary heritage, the Lena Resolution adopted in 2008 at the International Conference on Linguistic and Cultural Diversity in Cyberspace has offered ways of efficiently tackling these challenges by means of developing multilingualism in digital environment.For the last three years after the dissemination of this essential document strenuous efforts have been made in the Republic of Dagestan by government agencies and civil society organizations to increase the volume of digital content in local languages in response to the growing marginalization of languages of numerous Dagestan ethnic groups.Given that marginality implies a shift towards monoculture, activities aimed at overcoming this negative trend in our specific linguistically diverse region should have a special focus on the preservation of languages and cultural openness of the peoples of Dagestan.Today the use of regional languages is drastically reduced to family and household communications in very limited areas, mainly rural, while cultural requirements and linguistic interests of Dagestan's peoples go far beyond ethnic borders.Emerging digital resources of various kinds has become the means of defining sociocultural profile of modern Dagestanis and their glorious forefathers.Full-text collections of fiction and local literature account for a sizable proportion of the Dagestan segment of the Internet.At this stage they cannot be considered full-fledged digital libraries, as the documents displayed are of medium quality, lack metadata, navigation and search tools.However the demand for such publications in traditional libraries makes us positive about their popularity in digital environment.This is proved by constant additions to these collections and an increase in the number of resources providing relevant content.Affecting sensory perception, digital products of that kind provide for a better and deeper understanding of one's affiliation not only to a certain ethnos, but to the whole mankind.The Lena resolution highlights inter alia the necessity of further support for the creation of multilingual dictionaries and thesauruses.Dagestan can boast of successful activities in this field.Over the past two years institutions of the Russian Academy of Sciences prepared and published for the first time ever a 18,000 Avakh-Russian dictionary and a Tsakhur-Russian dictionary comprising over 10,000 native and adopted words.The dictionaries are currently being digitized by one of the enthusiasts of Dagestan web resources development with the agreement of the copyright holders.Digital versions will be accessible online in addition to the 14 Dagestan-Russian dictionaries available there.In terms of the problem at hand, how mass media define the role and time to be provided for regional languages is of vital importance.Today a language can maintain its position as long as it actively penetrates into new communication modes.Despite new opportunities for regional languages emerging due to the development of broadcast techniques, active support by the state is required for Dagestanian languages to find a niche in digital media.A web portal for various Dagestanian newspapers in 13 local languages has been running since 2009, providing information on social, political, economic, academic, cultural and sports life of the republic.The Dagestan State TV and Radio Company broadcasts in six local languages, and two state radio companies broadcast over four hours daily in 13 languages.Almost every town and district has its own TV production companies funded by local budgets and broadcasting for the most part in one of the local languages.The number of private radio companies has increased significantly, that include national programmes in their line-up.Some of these channels have already created their own web pages with access to valuable archives of ethno-cultural materials.However these costly measures are not always efficient for tackling the pressing problems that regional languages are facing today due to a lack of qualified experts and the passivity of management unable to keep pace with the rapid changes of media environment.The just-completed educational project supported by the Council of Europe and European Commission was aimed at the elimination of these two problems.The results are yet to be summarized, but for now it is obvious that the project has equipped the republic's leading digital media with powerful tools for preserving and developing local languages.Russia is a vast and polyethnic country, perhaps the vastest and most polyethnic in the world.More than two hundred languages are used in its territory, belonging mainly to four language families: Indo-European, Altaic, North Caucasian and Ural.For the most part, the languages of peoples of Russia are based on the Cyrillic alphabet, but there are languages that use Latin and other writings, as well as oral languages.Russia as a multinational country has accumulated a solid experience of friendly coexistence of various nations.In such a country, the most obvious integrating element is not the territory and certainly not the language.All of us, the people of the Russian Federation, are united by our writing and its graphic tools, the fonts.Therefore, in 2009 while initiating a project to develop a nationwide font typeface for the title languages of subjects of the Russian Federation the ParaType Inc. set the following goals: • creating enhanced language support fonts for the languages of Russia, • replacement commercial fonts with free/libre fonts, • replacing western design with domestic for Cyrillic fonts, • creating a set of fonts for a wide range of applications.These goals conform to the Federal Law "On languages of the peoples of the Russian Federation" granting all languages of the peoples of our country equal rights for preservation and development, guaranteeing the right for education in native languages, and fixing the Cyrillic as the writing system.At present the process of formation and regulation of national languages' use is gaining momentum both in our country and throughout the world, regional laws on languages are being elaborated and adopted.This process should be accompanied by the creation of high-quality national fonts to be freely available.However in order to develop fonts supporting national characters knowledge of both the composition of national alphabets and the form of these glyphs' representation is required.Today, the Unicode standard determines most of them.We collaborate with the Unicode Consortium and a number of specialised agencies of Russian entities responsible for the issues of national languages to monitor the current linguistic situation.To provide feedback we created a special page on our site www.fonts.ru/public, representing all titular languages of the RF subjects and their characters.As a rule, regional laws on languages require duplicating texts and inscriptions in national languages in official documents, on road signs, signboards, etc.In addition, even without special legislation literature in national language should exist, in particular, textbooks and dictionaries.Therefore, major requirements for a national font are multilinguality, i.e., ability to support character sets of national alphabets, and accessibility.These are indispensable conditions for tackling a wide range of national fonts' issues.In order to solve these problems efficiently within regions professional communities and local authorities should cooperate to settle the national characters set and forms of these characters.The elaboration of regional language laws, cooperation with local institutions and authorities, as well as public debates in the media are essential in this regard.Free/libre fonts are those included in operating systems or put on the Web for free access.Existing national fonts do not meet certain requirements.Fonts put on the Internet for public access are usually of very poor quality both in terms of design and technical execution.Those few fonts with an extended set of characters included with Windows, support only a very limited number of Cyrillic-based languages.Paradoxically, the population of a huge country mostly uses fonts designed by a private American company.With all due respect for Microsoft, even knowing their careful and thougfhtful approach to national traditions, we cannot expect them to be able to embrace the boundless and solve the problems of preservation and development of writing of small peoples of Russia.The following decision is logical in this situation.The State may order a set of national fonts to be developed and made available for free downloading online.In addition, it is desirable that these fonts are included in the localized operating systems distributed on the territory of Russia (Apple Macintosh and Microsoft Windows).These fonts should support all titular languages of the entities of the Russian Federation.These considerations and the desire to get universal modern fonts, consistent with the idea of good Cyrillic became the basis of work on the design of the PT Sans -PT Serif typeface system by the ParaType Inc. in 2009-2011with support by the Federal Agency for Press and Mass Communications 76 .In 2009, ParaType developed and presented PT Sans, the first typeface of the project.In 2010 an antique font PT Serif was developed in the same proportions.PT Sans is a grotesque font of modern humanistic design intended for widespread use.The font is based on classical designs, but includes very distinctive features fulfilling present day aesthetic and functional requirements and making it usable for large-size headlines.The family consists of 8 styles: 4 basic styles; 2 caption styles for small sizes and 2 narrow styles for economic setting and is primarily intended for both printed and e-document flow.PT Serif is transitional serif face with humanistic terminals designed for use together with PT Sans and harmonized with PT Sans on metrics, proportions, weights and design.PT Serif consists of six styles: regular and bold weights with corresponding italics form a standard computer font family for basic text setting; two caption styles (regular and italic) are for texts of small point sizes.The PT Sans -PT Serif typeface system has quickly gained popularity with designers all over the world.Google Web Fonts API Stats monitors the demand for fonts analysing the number of users viewing websites using the above fonts.To date, more than 13 million users viewed sites where PT Serif is used (it is over 5 million a month!).The demand for PT Sans is even more significantmore than 210 million users per month!It is ranked fourth in a huge list of the most used fonts.We hope to enter the top three in the nearest future.PT Sans and PT Serif as free/libre fonts are freely available and distributed.They can be used, copied, modified, embedded in documents, etc. provided that both the original fonts and their derivatives or parts thereof are not used for commercial purposes, except for their usage as part of other commercial products.Fonts are available at www.fonts.ru/public and will be included with operating systems.So why were Mozilla Firefox and OpenOffice, of all, chosen for localization?The main pro is that both software products are distributed under free, non-commercial licenses; moreover, it is possible to use (optionally) their source codes.The first Mozilla Firefox localization (of version 1.0.3) financed through the grant of the Soros Foundation -Kyrgyzstan, appeared in February, 2005.But due to the lack of understanding of problems and their solutions throughout the working process, the localization product became highly outdated by the time of issue; and localization updating is one of the key elements in the comprehensive approach.The work was probably discontinued because of the low spread (at the time) of the browser across Kyrgyzstan as compared to Internet Explorer and Opera.The situation changed dramatically by 2009 when Firefox became more popular than its competitors.By the summer of 2009, the browser was upgraded to version 3.5 which underwent a final localization process.The basic and central distinction of version 3.5 and later versions lies in the fact that our Firefox build has become multilingual; this means that it allows switching between Kyrgyz and English or Russian.All other existing localized Firefox builds were monolingual, which led to certain difficulties: since it was impossible to use two versions in different languages simultaneously, you had to choose in favor of an English, Russian or Kyrgyz version.The appearance of the multilingual build offered a solution to this dilemma, and the build itself got widely spread in the Firefox user community in Kyrgyzstan.Today, the user may choose between two versions: typical installation and portable editions.The Tamga-KIT software product (to be described below) contains the Firefox 3.6 browser portable version as a mandatory item.OpenOffice The instrumental and term bases developed during the work on the OpenOffice and Firefox localizations made a very prompt localization of an enormous bulk of both free and proprietary software possible.Before starting work on the localization, we had to address the following general issues: 5. Developing common ICT terminology and special terminology for word-processing units and web browsers.We consider items 1, 2 and 5 of the above essential for getting started with the work on localization of public software, for instance, office software.Items 3 and 4 are desirable, since they allow for higher speed and quality of localization.Alongside tackling the above stated tasks, tools to computerize the localization process of software products were developed for home use.They simplify the process of upgrading localized versions, reducing it to updating and clarifying data bases for item and message translation, which takes dozens of times less time than manual localization.The Tamga-Kit Software Solution was developed to provide full support of the Kyrgyz language in Windows environment.The product basis comprises: Basic components have been developed since mid-1990s, and the full version of Tamga-KIT available since November, 2002, is free of charge for both secondary education and home use.The case of its creation is unprecedented: no funds from either government or non-governmental organizations were spent on its development.But its functionality and performance speak for themselves.This software has become extremely popular and widely-used; moreover, by parliament's decision the use of Tamga-KIT in education, science, culture, as well as in public and local institutions (i.e. nearly everywhere) was made mandatory.In today's globalised world, the demand for languages as cognitive and communicative tools, as well as their development and even further preservation as cultural phenomena are largely dependent on the use of information technology.Let us study the experience of introducing the Tatar language in cyberspace (i.e. the space of human interaction with computer systems and technology).Ensuring the Tatar A structural functional model of Tatar affixational morphemes has also been created, allowing for the construction of various pragmatic oriented morphological models.It served as a basis for the integrated "Tatar Morpheme" software data set.In fact, it is a computer workstation for developing various linguistic processors, and for educational and research activities in the field of Tatar linguistics.The "Tatar Morpheme" can be successfully used as a research tool for other languages as well.The Tatar Our long-term activities are the following.Creating an intellectual multilingual search engine.This initiative, facilitating the creation of an electronic Tatar corpus, is conditioned upon the current linguistic situation in the republic and upon new emerging linguistic and intellectual technologies for multilingual search based on a thorough word sense disambiguation.Regarding that in some developed countries several languages enjoy official status, the project can become in demand for further commercial use.Developing speech recognition software for Tatar.This action line is especially important as speech technologies are expected to be among the top trends of IT development in the coming years and ASR is to be widely implemented in major economy sectors.A Tatar-Russian machine translator will enable access to English online databases through Russian equivalents, thus supporting equality of Tatar and Russian as official languages of the Republic.Machine translators for Tatar and other Turkic languages will facilitate the convergence of kindred languages speakers.The task of creating such programmes is rather easily solved due to the affinity of languages.This area of research is related to the crucial task of developing intelligent operating systems and software tools using the potential of natural languages, their semantic and syntactic structures, as well as vocabulary.Four factors are essential for computer technologies, namely information processing time, memory capacity for data storage, active character of knowledge and the ability to give fuzzy instructions (unambiguous in a certain context).The latter two properties are of critical importance for intelligent systems and technologies.Research in this field is a burning issue.In case we identify structures, circuits, and formulas, implementing these properties in natural languages we can use them while creating artificial languages and programming systems, as well as other means of information description, storage and processing.It is commonly known that operating systems, programming languages , information processing tools and almost all software used today are Englishbased.Therefore, they are based on Western mentality.English as a fusional analytic language has almost zero morphology (compared with agglutinative languages).Complex meaning is communicated with phrases, which requires a much more complicated analysis and, consequently, an increase in the amount of memory and time required to process information.The only way out of this situation is eliminating wider context and complex structures and, ultimately, simplifying the meaning and semantics.Thus, the basis of the English language itself brings computing systems to a deadlock, causing them not to get "smarter", but to increase system performance and memory capacity, i.e. develop functional characteristics rather than "intelligence".Even the language structure and its syntax discourage the active character of knowledge.English is an SVO language, and it is not the information that dictates what action to take, what methods and algorithms to use for its processing.On the contrary, the means, the circuit, the algorithms force us to format, structure, and modify information.Unlike Indo-European languages , Turkic languages refer to the SOV type and in this case it is information that comes first.Our research shows that due to regular morphology and natural complexity agglutinative Turkic languages, including Tatar, can be efficient tools for creating intelligent information processing systems.They provide for ultimate solutions in terms of information storage and processing.The meaning of a text is much more easily conveyed on the lexical level due to these languages' ability to encode meaning synthetically, i.e. in a word form.Other types of languages, including English and Russian, have to convey the meaning by using several phrases or even groups of sentences.The Olonkho system designed as part of the programme is an innovative academic project aimed at creating a modern environment for education and scientific research.It can be implemented only as a collaborative effort between government agencies, epic scholars, linguists, IT specialists, translators, archivists, and so on.The Olonkho information system is aimed at gathering, processing, preserving, actualizing, spreading, representing and using relevant content.It should provide tools for formalizing, structuring and sharing knowledge used in research, education and archival work, as well as for standardising frequent work procedures and maintaining user-developer interaction.In this context, archival manuscripts, Olonkho texts, recitation audio and video, photographs, scholarly publications, and other related materials are seen as data arrays.Olonkho IS has been designed to meet specific user interests and needs within its target audience.Researchers will be above all interested in visiting the IS online library, with complete Olonkho texts, scholarly publications, digitized audio archives, graphic images, manuscripts of Olonkho and other folklore pieces, specialized dictionaries, encyclopaedias, and reference books; of primary importance to them is to be able to spread the results of their research and to find necessary contacts and links.Museum and archive personnel may find particularly useful the possibility of creating digital facsimile archives of their collections and making them available to the public.To students and teaching staff, Olonkho IS offers an exciting opportunity to create a modern learning infrastructure.The Olonkho system aims to define the vector of professional growth and competency development in the academia, stimulating research among teaching staff and students alike.Only if united into a single system, information resources could acquire new qualities (this is what philosophers call the notion of emergence, with emergent properties defined as effects that are not sums of the effects of each causal conjunct).The recitation of an epic is, by its very nature, a multimedia event.Various elements enter into play here, such as sound (speaking and singing), visual presentation (mimics, gestures and posturing), and environment (e.g. chiaroscuro on the auditorium walls, the breath of people in the audience, their spontaneous reactions, etc).In cyberspace, audio, video, original texts with translations, synopses, scholarly commentaries, dictionary entries on epic characters and archaic vocabulary, photos, graphics, links and footnotes can and should all be presented in a common hypermedia environment.Put together, these and other information sources will produce a cumulative effect unattainable if each is used separately.Olonkho IS will create a common information and communications environment for various educational, scientific and cultural institutions on the basis of specific agreements that take into account appropriate technological requirements, protocol regulations and, crucially, the property and copy rights of the parties involved.The system is designed to accumulate information in designated storages and record all necessary dimensions in databases.Digitized resources can be accessed through the Internet or an Intranet portal.The system has several key segments.• Olonkho: Archives, responsible for digitizing manuscripts, drawings, music scores, and other graphic images; • Olonkho: Audio, Olonkho: Photo, Olonkho: Video, to be used in transforming original information resources into the digital format; • Olonkho: E-Lib, to scan, identify, and collect textual documents for the IS electronic library; • Olonkho: Documents, to support an organization's electronic document turnover (agreements, standards, official correspondence, technical specifications, reports, etc.).The IS units' output will be presented in files of an appropriate format.Phenomena, objects and processes of the real world will acquire digital copies in a multidimensional model of a specific subject area.Each particular file -and, if necessary, its components -will come with metadata, or specially arranged information about the file and its content, as well as the formal attributes and a scientific description of the digital objects carried.Metadata are needed to make the availability of digital content visible to a potential user, as well as to administer the saving of documents and register their reliability, technical specifications, mode of access, user responsibility, context, timeline, and conservation purposes.Metadata shall be carried in the extended Dublin Core format; digital objects are to be described using the XML language and texts saved in Unicode for an adequate script representation.The Information Storage & Arrangement subsystem consists of two main units: Olonkho: Storage (a storage of digital objects) and Olonkho: Database (a database to be consulted by IS users while searching for objects they need).The base is to stock relevant information from the Information Gathering & Processing subsystem, metadata on a subject area model, and so on.This subsystem's functions include: • storing and processing textual documents in the original language, as well as video and photographic images; • storing alternative recordings and/or versions of documents (digital objects); • processing multiversion documents and their attributes; • modelling new entities with non-predetermined sets of attributes; • modifying existing connections and creating new ones between IS entities; • searching for and retrieving information with inter-entity connections in mind.The Information & Technical Servicing subsystem is responsible for technical support of the project and for software and information servicing of corporate users (units Olonkho: Software & Information Support; Olonkho: Technical Servicing).The IS information resources are built using licensed or open-source software.Yakut language software applications will ensure correct operations of the system's e-library, search engines, and multilingual database.Technical and semantic integration of the various constituent information resources will enable the entire system to operate more effectively.There is a need to develop thesauruses and curated dictionaries for information resource metadata compiling, as well as to find appropriate technology for building digital collections.Technical servicing will provide proper maintenance for corporate users' computer and office equipment, with their own maintenance departments often operating ineffectively, if at all.The protection of computer networks and PCs from malware is one of the priority tasks to be performed within the Technical Servicing subsystem.The Information Presentation subsystem's function is to make information available to IS users.This segment consists of the following units: Olonkho: Hypermedia, Olonkho: Science, Olonkho: Education, Olonkho: Internet Portal, and Olonkho: Television.Olonkho: Hypermedia is responsible for creating multimedia information resources and representing them correctly in the Web and as CD and DVD editions.Olonkho: Science and Olonkho: Education are intended for retrieving relevant content from the database and organizing it into specialized theme packages for scientific research or for school/university curricula.The description formats SCORM (general module) and LOM (academic module) are helpful in building teaching resources.The employment of these formats will facilitate the search, study, assessment and use of educational objects by students, teaching staff and (in the long run) by teaching software applications.International standards will enhance the mobility and transferability of courses, facilitating content sharing between partner organizations.Olonkho: Television allows to broadcast TV programmes through cable networks or the IP network (in case of Internet broadcasting).The Olonkho.Info Portal (www.olonkho.info) links IS users to the system's resources with the help of standard navigation tools.It also functions as an Intranet portal for corporate users.Network access is provided on the basis of user authentication and authorization, in compliance with applicable access policies.The IS developers are committed to ensuring the availability and protection of cultural heritage within the effective regulatory framework.At http://olonkho.info, information is available through interfaces in languages such as English, German, French, Japanese, Korean, Chinese and Turkish.Most of the textual content comes in Yakut and Russian.The website's philosophy proclaims the principle of language equality, meaning that information resources can be accessed through any of the existing language interfaces.For example, a Yakut-language text will be presented in each of the language subsystems with its title in the original and in translation, as well as with a note about the original language, a reference to the source, a hyperreference, and, if possible, a translation of the full text or its synopsis.Multimedia files should come with descriptions in all languages; metadata for all the information resources should also be multilingual.The user will thus be able to receive information in all available languages without having to leave his or her specific linguistic environment on the Web.The Olonkho.Info Portal has a developed CMS-content management system, which enables authenticated users to correct already existing resources and contribute new ones.Such a website is possible to build only in the environment of a university that can offer a powerful IT infrastructure as well as competent personnel, including computer programmers, folklorists, translators, and bibliographers.The Olonkho.Info Portal has significantly enhanced its capacities thanks to the 2010-2011 Development Programme for the North-Eastern University, previously known as the University of Yakutsk.The content it features includes scholarly and non-scholarly publications; Olonkho texts; profiles of Olonkho reciters and academics specializing in epic heritage; digitized manuscripts; archival audio recordings; video footage of Olonkho contests, including among young narrators; voiced dictionaries; class pages; press; teaching manuals; methodology literature; links to related websites and organizations, etc.In our efforts to preserve linguistic and cultural diversity, we should apply information technnology as extensively as possible.Subprojects implemented as part of the Olonkho IS project provide various examples of how IT could serve the purpose.Computer technology may be an especially powerful motivation tool for young Olonkho reciters.Through the feedback it provides, they will be able to see that their heritage popularization efforts resonate with a wide audience.Here are some of the Olonkho-related projects sponsored under the North-Eastern University's Development Programme.Yakutsk's Helios cable network.It airs educational programmes and culture content 16 hours per day.To be launched soon are the channels Olonkho HD (high-definition video) and Olonkho 3D (three-dimensional stereo).Internet television (http://olonkho.info/InternetTV/) and Internet radio (www.olonkho.info/internet_TV) allow to watch and listen to epic and other folkloric narrative recitations (recent and archival alike) any time of the day or night --something that traditional media cannot possibly provide.All events held as part of the Epic Heritage Archiving project are now filmed in FullHD.This format provides footage of excellent quality, with images five times as large as ones obtainable with analogue television systems such as PAL or SECAM.Used in teaching tools, digital technology may dramatically enhance the learning effect.Interactive maps and drawings stimulate our cognitive instinct more than conventional ones do, enabling us to learn more easily and effectively.3D visualization technology allows us to better feel the energy of a live event, such as a folk festival, and to identify with it.Reinforced with the multi-channel 5.1 or 7.1 sound, a 3D video makes a much more powerful experience than two-dimensional footage.3D scanners and printers make it possible to produce a digital threedimensional copy of an artefact and to then print it out for academic use.The North-Eastern University has already acquired some practical experience in using 3D technology in educational projects.Indeed, modern life requires that research and academic materials be broadly represented in cyberspace.Olonkho IS, along with its Olonkho Info portal, should try to meet this challenge.For the Olonkho state target programme, this is a strategic life-support system as well as a modern networking hub, which can facilitate and enhance efforts to preserve, study and promote the Yakut epic.Speech databases as a major type of linguistic resources are, per se, of much research interest.Such bases are essential to scholarly tasks related to the analysis and description of oral speech.Building large, wide-ranging and informative (multitier) speech databases, along with an easy-to-use and reliable set of tools for their development and employment is an increasingly important task, of relevance for computer applications and for fundamental phonetic research alike.Our efforts to create a speech database for the Buryat language are being made with due account for its regional varietals.Most of Russia's Buryat speakers live in the Republic of Buryatia, the Trans-Baikal region (the Aginskoye area), and in the Irkutsk Region's Ust-Ordynsky area; there are also large Buryat communities in Mongolia (specifically in the Dornod, Khentii, Selenge, and Khovsgol provinces, known locally as "aimags") as well as in northeastern China (Hulunbuir, in the Inner Mongolia Autonomy).The Buryat ethnicity's spread across vast territories in three countries, as well as its lack of homogeneity, has resulted in the language's broad dialectal variation of every level: segmental, suprasegmental, morphological, and lexical.The project's ambition is to preserve the distinctive regional features of the Buryat language, designing strategies for the creation of oral speech databases, and systematizing and putting into circulation the accumulated audio content.Samples of Buryat speech featured on the database should be used for further exploration of its phonetic and prosodic structure and its morphological and lexical characteristics.Corpus methods appear the most appropriate for the purpose as they allow to comprehensively represent a large, versatile array of data -with due account for the various characteristics of speech fragments, ranging from acoustic to discoursive.The would-be database is to include separate words, sentences with varied communicative purport, and coherent texts.The speech signals will each come with a transliteration and a phonetic/prosodic transcription.There will also be notes on idiosyncratic or unusual pronounciations and on emotionally coloured speech fragments, along with some background information on the speaker.The project involves recording speech samples and arranging them in the form of audio files.The technical groundwork will consist in the digitization of audio recordings and their multi-layer segmentation (into phrases, syntagmata, words, and sounds), along with textological decoding.As a result, each recording should be provided with an audio file carrying various segmentation markups, as well as with textual files that are transliterations or phonetic conversions of the recorded material.Department have by now assembled ample audio content on the standard Buryat language and its dialects, as well as on other Mongol languages, such as Daghur, Baerhu, and Khalkha Mongolian.Systematized, homogenized and arranged in a database, that material will allow to preserve the distinctive speech character of regional Buryat communities, which is now being erased by the growing influence of media language as well as by the shrinking use of the Buryat language itself owing to extralinguistic factors.In an age of globalization, the world is turning into one big mechanism, with all its parts interconnected.Innovative information and communications technologies push this process forward; they have a unifying role to play in building a new world order, opening up, as they do, new possibilities for the preservation of the languages and cultures of all ethnicities populating Planet Earth, including the small indigenous communities in Siberia and the circumpolar North.Lots of factors may put the existence of a language at risk: grave natural disasters wiping out entire communities; faulty public education systems providing no, or scarce, opportunities for schoolchildren to study in their native languages; or the lack of an adequate writing system, to give just a few examples.One more factor to have emerged in recent decades has to do with information and communications technology.The Internet offers plenty of opportunities for exercising one's right to free speech and getting access to information and quality education.One serious problem, though, is that information and services in cyberspace are still available only in a limited number of languages (just 400 of the world's 6,700 currently spoken languages are represented online so far).At the outset of the 21 st century (on November 2, 2001, to be precise), UNESCO adopted its Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, postulating that respect for diversity, tolerance, dialogue and cooperation in a climate of mutual trust and understanding are the best safeguards of peace and international security.Being a source of exchange, innovation and creation, cultural diversity is as important for the human race as biodiversity is for wildlife.The new century and millennium are seeing the formation of an integral sociocultural system that could serve as the basis for dialogue and interaction between cultures and faiths.This system is expected to shape a worldview for the generations to come and to determine their sustainable development patterns.The international conference on cultural and linguistic diversity in cyberspace that took place in the Republic of Sakha's capital, Yakutsk, on July 2-4, 2008, adopted, for its turn, a final document that became known as the Lena Resolution.The Resolution urges to foster linguistic and cultural diversity on the Web in every possible way and to continue efforts to record, preserve and advance various languages, especially smaller ones, with the help of modern ICT.A recent survey of the content available on the Internet about the indigenous communities of Russia's Siberia and circumpolar North has shown that the existing sites are disparate and not informative enough while fully systematized, comprehensive resources aren't there yet.Quite an exhaustive analysis of related content has been carried out by A. Burykin in his essay "Internet Resources on the Languages of Small Indigenous Peoples of Russia's North, Siberia and Far East: Content Overview and User Enquiries" [1] .The problem of supporting multilingualism in specific Russian regions as well as nationwide has been the focus of numerous publications by the Russian Committee of the UNESCO Information for All Programme (IFAP) and the Interregional Library Cooperation Centre [2, 3] .In practice, though, little progress has been made.Hence the idea to build a Portal on North-Eastern Russia's indigenous communities.Such a project should seek to ensure the linguistic and cultural diversity of those communities is adequately represented on the Internet, as well as to create an online environment where they could communicate in their native languages.This prospective Web site will provide wide-ranging information on the languages and cultures of all indigenous communities populating Russia's North-Eastern regions.The choice of that particular geographic area arises from its being under the jurisdiction of the Amosov North-Eastern Federal University, the driving force behind the project.Not all the indigenous language scripts are yet part of computer operating systems.Efforts will therefore be made to bring all missing scripts onboard, introducing them first as part of a universal keyboard layout.In a longer term, though, language-specific layouts are to be created.The online launch of scripts for all indigenous languages spoken in the designated area is expected to raise their profile on the global information scene while also offering possibilities for communicating in native languages online.This will facilitate both the preservation of endangered community languages and their advancement.The new Web portal is to be presented in indigenous languages as well as in Russian and English.Each of the relevant communities will have a separate section devoted to it, carrying informative content on its language and culture.In addition, a forum for communication in indigenous languages will be created.An English version of the site is already in place, along with an overview in the Yukahir language.A Web forum will be created in a while, for Yukaghirs to be able to communicate in their native language online.The Yukaghir section is the curtain-opener for this new Web portal, which will soon expand to include information on all other indigenous communities of North-Eastern Russia.peoples, through education, training and shared knowledge.UArctic also seeks to promote excellence in knowledge generation and knowledge application in areas relevant to the North.The UArctic membership body consists of members form the circumpolar area throughout all 8 Arctic Council member states, as well as associate members outside the Arctic that has strong interests in education and research in the Arctic.Currently UArctic has more than 130 members; together members have approximately 1 billion students and more than 70 thousand academic faculty.Even if not all students or faculty are directly engaged in UArctic activities, the network as such represents a huge potential for regional development in the Arctic.With regard to the indigenous profile, many UArctic members have strong ties to indigenous communities.Many of them offer relevant academic programmes and have designated departments and research programmes specifically dedicated to service their indigenous constituency.Besides this, among the UArctic members we also find smaller institutions that specialize on serving the needs of indigenous peoples highly focusing specifically on human, social and cultural development.With the current vision and goals UArctic represents a huge potential for further development of the cultural and linguistic diversity in the North, when carefully planned and carried out in practice.Visions and strategies however need implementation into institutional cultures and individual practices and the results need to be identified at the receivers' end.It is only when students, researchers and the northern communities together experience the fulfillment of their goals and aspiration, that we have a good indication of success of the added value of network.As already initially indicated, University of the Arctic as a network was established inter alia to create an improved and expanded platform for postsecondary education for indigenous peoples of the Arctic.• UArctic will have increased relevant training, higher education, and knowledge generation and application in the North with clear socio-economic benefits -particularly to remote communities and indigenous peoples.• UArctic's innovative programs will have a significant impact on increasing the level of education in the Circumpolar North, and generate highly qualified people in Northern communities by providing career bridging opportunities.• UArctic, through its members, will have a global leading role on Building Human Capacity in the North, Adaptation to Climate Change in the North, and Energy in the North from technical, cultural and economic as well as environmental perspectives.• UArctic's member institutions will be committed to the implementation of a common set of activities as outlined in the UArctic Charter.• UArctic will have enabled increased capacity in education, training, knowledge generation, and knowledge application for member institutions through its collaborative framework.• UArctic will be recognized as the body that carries forward the Arctic IPY Training and Higher Education Legacy.• UArctic will have, through partnering with other stakeholders in the Circumpolar North, ensured a stronger voice for the North globally". Further, among the specific goals in the strategic plan we find the following examples to be fulfilled by 2013: "Specific goals for 2013… • Indigenous peoples and northerners will continue to have a welldefined prominent role in the leadership and development of UArctic.• Opportunities will be created to facilitate online and local access to UArctic curriculum for indigenous and other students in Northern communities.• UArctic will continue to operate in close partnership with national and local governments, including indigenous peoples' governments and organizations, and the private sector." together university and college Presidents, Rectors, Provosts, Chancellors as well as Vice-Presidents around specific themes. In 2008 the rectors signed the UArctic Charter. The idea behind the charter was to have a mechanism for UArctic members to show increased commitment to UArctic activities. By signing the charter the institutions agreed among other things to the following: "UArctic recognizes the integral role of indigenous peoples in northern education, and seeks to engage their perspectives in all of its activities.UArctic and its member institutions further respect the needs of the indigenous peoples, and commit themselves to actively include the needs of the indigenous peoples and indigenous communities of the Arctic in education and training." This statement is very promising with regard to having UArctic as a strong engine to create good possibilities to maintain the cultural and linguistic diversity in the Arctic. During this strategic period 2009-2013 UArctic will refine the Rector's Forum as a venue for the leaders of the UArctic institutions to engage, jointly, in facilitation of development in the north. UArctic is organized into seven strategic areas, each consisting of one or several programs. These include: 1) Shared Focus -Thematic Networks The thematic networks are a mechanism for building partnership among members. Networks provide a structure for facilitating student and faculty mobility and collaboration. A Thematic Network is a group of UArctic members working together on subjects of shared interest to create learning experiences for students, faculty and communities. This includes student and faculty exchange and curriculum development. • UArctic members are engaged in research, education, and development activities with each other. • UArctic activities are coordinated with Arctic research. • UArctic activities are relevant to Arctic Council working groups, Indigenous peoples organizations, and Arctic science and development organizations. North2north student exchange programme allows students at UArctic Institutions to visit different northern regions, and share experiences face-toface, through study at other UArctic institutions. Mobility grants are provided for 3-12 months of study. Mobility programmes ensure the facilitation of student exchange, focus on best practices, increased funding of mobility, enhancement of knowledge about northerners and building of shared northern identity, motivation of all major scholarships to support north2north exchanges. Shared Resources means that UArctic builds capacity within members by providing services through the added value of the network, promotes UArctic members as study destinations, and promotes the North as a subject of study. Services to members include: • UArctic Information Service The University of the Arctic has recently accepted the invitation to establish the UArctic Research Office located at Northern (Arctic) Federal University in Archangelsk, Russia. This research office will coordinate the UArctic international research cooperation connected to UArctic international Arctic partners in research and research by the thematic networks and UArctic institutes. Programs are coordinated by offices hosted by member institutions and located around the Circumpolar North. UArctic plan to arrange with the North-Eastern Federal University to establish the office of the leadership of the UArctic undergraduate studies. The University of the Arctic hopes that organizing the undergraduate studies leadership will give a good opportunity to expand with thematic networks and Bachelor of Circumpolar studies and other activities to future associate members further east. The University of the Arctic, as a network, always depended on its member institutions commitment to succeed as a network for the benefit of indigenous communities. The success of the programmes, research and service depends on members' cooperation with indigenous communities and stakeholders. The next decade calls for improvements in this regards. UArctic 2011 Rectors' Forum and Student Forum declarations carried important messages about the need for continuous development. Both directly and indirectly the declarations reflect the need for enhanced activities that will foster more capacity to work with safeguarding and further development of the regions including indigenous languages, culture and knowledge. This underlines what the previous Rector's Forum declarations already stated, and is in line with the overall UArctic goals and strategy. The next step is to follow up on the operations level. This includes converting what there was into robust organizational structures. This challenges the network, but even more the single members themselves. Even if the network agrees of strong visions and strategic choices, the fulfillment of those depends on well developed institutional cultures and the practices of each one facilitating research and training. It is what happens at the delivery end of the line, as experienced improvements by students and community that counts as added value. UArctic aims at getting an NGO status and also realizes that to achieve such status there is a need for our member institutions and UArctic combined activities to add even more cooperation with UNESCO. We will integrate e-Learning/flexible learning platforms (e.g. telemedicine, social networking) into health and education to increase access to information and formal/informal education. High-speed internet is a prerequisite for establishing and maintaining interconnectivity between Arctic communities. Once all communities across the circumpolar north have access to high-speed internet, UArctic will be virtually situated to support education and research. Northern societies need access to community-based educational programmes that will enable them to determine their own futures. Especially the small indigenous minority languages need robust infrastructure and state of the art technology adapted to the diverse linguistic situation. During the UArctic council meeting in Yakutsk 2010 the VP Indigenous arranged a break-out session focusing on Ways to Improve Higher Education Services to Indigenous Peoples of the Arctic by Simultaneously Strengthening their Language and Culture. We will give selected examples from the report to show what it focuses on. • more demand for indigenous language learning than there are programs for (Yakutia example) • linguistics can assist: need to communicate the research in meaningful ways to indigenous communities • example: recording languages • for some groups language and culture is on the brink of being lost; for others the languages are still very alive • connect development of indigenous languages/cultures to the development of digital technologies, • access to new technologies: access to internet."In future UArctic developments, attention should be given to the interaction between language, culture and livelihood.Many of the traditional indigenous livelihood connected challenges are caused by no connection to modern virtual technology: technology is not adjusted to their real needs (like language compatibility), technology back up lacks, etc.As we experience, there are a lot of challenges reported that need solutions before cyberspace can in an advanced manner service the needs of small languages.Another break-out session at the 2011 council meeting discussed possible indigenous principles for the future development and will soon be available on the UArctic web-site.The idea is to arrange at the annual council meetings an indigenous forum where UArctic members can discuss and suggest possible ways of solving implementation gaps in UArctic activities to better fulfill the needs of the indigenous communities.The 2010 Arctic Social indicators report (a project under the auspices of the Arctic Councils' Sustainable Development Working Group) presents a broad definition of culture that leads to a multidimensional understanding of cultural well-being and vitality.They identified for their purposes the following dimensions of culture (p. 92): • Language (its use and retention), • Knowledge (and its transmission), • Communication (including education and performance), • Spirituality, such as religion and ritual, • Sociocultural events and media, • Economic and subsistence practices, • Social organization, institutions, and networks.Such an approach connects valuable domains that together form the potential composite of knowledge for a people.It is important to facilitate the opportunities for the indigenous communities of the Arctic to maintain such dimensions as a community and a society.It is not an easy task; this is what represents a part of the linguistic and cultural diversity of the Arctic.A holistic approach means to reach a level of balance between the preservation of domains that traditionally form the identity of the indigenous peoples and the expansion of modern technology and economy.However, such balance demands to form an integral platform for indigenous peoples to utilize possibilities in an integrated manner.Over the years of its existence, the Committee has held many events of the national and international level in every priority action line of the IFAP, i.e. information literacy, information preservation and accessibility, information ethics, and information for development.A number of reports on these issues have been prepared, over 60 books on the issues of knowledge society building are published.The Russian Committee of the UNESCO Information for All Programme is not a legal entity, hence to provide its efficient operation, it needs a working body to elaborate specific projects and to look for the means of their implementation.Interregional Library Cooperation Centre (ILCC), a non-governmental organization with a legal status of "an interregional public organization", has become such a body.ILCC was established in 1995, and since than it makes efforts in several directions.ILCC has taken active part in the elaboration and implementation of the national policy of reading promotion and is the developer of the National Programme for Reading Promotion and Development in Russia.Within this action field, since 2007 about 50 regional workshops and training sessions have been held, over 20 books covering philosophical and sociological aspects of the problem have been prepared and published, methodological recommendations for regional authorities, libraries, educational institutions, and mass media have been proposed.The annual All-Russian Conference "National Programme for Reading Promotion and Development: Problems and Prospects" is held at Moscow's most prestigious President Hotel.In 2010 we carried out an all-Russian monitoring of the related activities of the governmental authorities and major public libraries in all Russia's 83 regions.The questionnaires comprised about 100 questions on the efforts towards reading development, stakeholders, existing problems, results achieved, etc.An analytical report was drawn upon based on the monitoring findings.ILCC also participates in elaborating and implementing national library policy and collaborates closely with the Library and Archives Department of the Ministry of Culture of the Russian Federation.ILCC acts as a coordinator of Russia's National Programme for Analog Library Collections Preservation.We work in partnership with all major Russian federal and regional libraries.Numerous books on these issues have been prepared and published.In 2010 the Ministry of Culture of the Russian Federation and the Federal Agency for Press and Mass Communications requested for analytical reports on the problems of digital information preservation in Russia.The reports presented by the ILCC cover organizational, legal, technological and personnel issues of this tremendous problem, that the whole world is facing today.At present, on the order of the Russian Ministry of Culture we are working on the National Programme for Russian Digital Library Collections Preservation.We have delved into the issues of information accessibility and act as the coordinator of the Programme for Building the all-Russia Network of Public Centres for Legal and Socially Important Information.Approx.7,000 such centres based in libraries operate in Russia today.In 2010, we carried out the monitoring of the network status and published an analytical report.ILCC organizes major international and all-Russian conferences, workshops, and round tables in relevant fields.During the recent 6 years, over 100 such events have taken place.We have prepared and published over 60 titles of books, with 25,000 free copies delivered to scientific and public libraries in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan, and other countries.Almost all projects are joint projects of the Interregional Library Cooperation Centre and the Russian Committee of the UNESCO Information for All Programme, as these two organizations are closely connected and augment each other's efforts.The activities of the Russian Committee of the UNESCO Information for All Programme are recognized in many countries of the world.That is confirmed by the fact that in 2010, Evgeny Kuzmin, Committee Chair and ILCC's President, was elected the Chairman of the Intergovernmental Council of the UNESCO Information for All Programme.Today ILCC acts not only as the working body for the Russian Committee of the UNESCO Information for All Programme, but also as the Secretariat for the Intergovernmental Council Chairman.Promoting linguistic diversity in cyberspace is a cross-cutting issue of the UNESCO Information for All Programme, and the Russian IFAP Committee and ILCC have been working in this field for about 5 years.On the order of the Commission of the Russian Federation for UNESCO we prepared national report on measures taken to implement the UNESCO Recommendation concerning the Promotion and Use of Multilingualism and Universal Access to Cyberspace.We investigated the state of the art in the area in Russia and worldwide and recognized that not a single attempt had ever been made in Russia to conduct a systematic study and search for solution of the problem of language promotion in cyberspace, and especially from the political viewpoint, despite the fact that we have numerous highly experienced linguists and efficient politicians tackling the issues of cultural diversity.We have translated into Russian and published the works by prominent world experts in the area of multilingualism and cultural diversity development, and have prepared a number of original publications: • "Measuring Linguistic Diversity on the Internet" (the book by John Paolillo, Daniel Prado and Daniel Pimienta translated into Russian).• "Comment assurer la presence d'une langue dans le cyberespace?" (Russian translation of the book by Marcel Diki-Kidiri comprises practical recommendations on facilitating the process of increasing the number of languages presented and used in cyberspace through developing linguistic and information resources, cultural components and supporting user communities).• "Multilingualism in Russia: Regional aspects" (the book covers linguistic policies in several multinational and multilingual Russian regions, as well as activities by major regional libraries related to multilingualism promotion).• "Preservation of Linguistic Diversity: Russian Experience" (the publication in English examines practical experience and efforts made at various political levels and by various institutions to support multilingualism).• "Human Language Technologies for Europe" (the European Commission's book translated into Russian investigates the current status, problems of machine translation and prospects for Europe).• "Representing the Languages of Russia and the CIS countries in the Russian Internet Segment" (the book comprises the papers presented at the international seminar held in 2007 by the Russian IFAP Committee and ILCC).We started with seminars and later went on with the more representative events to promote this theme and managed to gather a pool of highly professional experts.For better understanding of the efforts being taken in Russia to develop multilingualism in cyberspace we have carried out a target study.We developed two questionnaires of 40-50 questions each and distributed them among Russia's leading universities and the Russian Federation constituent administrations.As a result, we have got a vast data array for us to analyze and learn who is doing something to support multilingualism on the Internet, where and what exactly.The findings are presented in the publication "Language Diversity in Cyberspace: Russian and Foreign Experience".The problem of multilingualism promotion concerns many parties -authorities, universities, libraries, and archives.However, they all need methodological support, analytical materials and information in Russian.For that reason, we have been gathering such information and posting it on the website of the Russian IFAP Committee http://ifapcom.ru/en.We came forward with the initiative to hold an international conference on language and cultural diversity in cyberspace in Russia and got support of the Ministry of Culture of the Russian Federation, Yakut Government, and UNESCO Moscow Office.The Conference was held in Yakutsk in July 2008, with participants representing 15 countries and all the continents.The proceedings were published both in the Russian and English languages.The financial support for the publications was provided by the North-Eastern Federal University and the Ministry of Culture of the Russian Federation.The President of the Russian Federation also devoted a grant for these purposes.The Conference became Russia's contribution to the United Nations International Year of Languages.It helped us win the recognition and invaluable experience, get acquainted with many prominent Russian and foreign experts who are today our partners, participants in this conference, and some of them -the coorganizers.I am speaking about Adama Samassekou and Daniel Prado, heads of the MAAYA World Network for Linguistic Diversity and Latin Union.The Conference final document -"The Lena Resolution" -has been widely recognized in the world.After three years, we have gathered for the second international conference under the same name.We are happy to inform that, in accordance with the Lena Resolution recommendations, Centre to Advance Multilingualism in Cyberspace was established in 2010 and works efficiently under the North-Eastern Federal University.Three years ago we could hardly imagine that.Nevertheless, the second conference has got two groups of organizers -in Moscow, and in Yakutsk, where the main load of organizing the conference in Yakutsk is taken by the Centre.Expecting the 2 nd International Conference "Linguistic and Cultural Diversity in Cyberspace", the book "Developing Multilingualism in Cyberspace: Guidelines for Libraries" was published with the support by the Ministry of Culture of the Russian Federation and UNESCO Moscow Office.The publication examines linguistic situation in Russia and efforts to support language diversity; potential action lines for libraries, global approaches, efforts made by international organizations in the sphere are described.The Multilingualism in Digital World project has been held from 2005 within a network of 11 higher education institutions in 8 Portuguese speaking countries.After six years of a very intense experience on promoting multilingualism in an academic ambience of monolingual (lusophone) tendency, we present some of our main obstacles and some of the possible horizons that we could glimpse.Our practical solution by now is to work with free operational systems, free softwares, digital libraries and translations.We hope that our experience might be useful to people interested in building a network like ours, to policy makers, to start a broader debate on the construction of inclusive societies, or in short: to start conversations.Working in a team with researchers from Angola, Mozambique, Cape Verde, Bissau Guinea, Saint Tome e Principe, East Timor, Macau (China), Portugal and Brazil it is quite easy to think of post colonialism and on what does it mean to develop common content in Portuguese that enable us to treasure, to respect and to maintain the bonds with our local languages and cultures.These countries and the region of Macau have Portuguese as their official language due to previous Portuguese colonization.I'll focus on the situation of Brazil: Brazil or officially the Federative Republic of Brazil has a territory of 8,514,877 km 2 , and a population of 190,755,799 (census 2010, IBGE), nowadays it has 39 linguistic families -the bigger diversity of the continent -and around 200 living local languages/cultures.And if we say that in 1500, at the time of the "discovery" of Brazil by Pedro Álvares Cabral, our linguists estimate around 1,300 languages/cultures living in the territory of what would become Brazil some hundreds years later, therefore more than five sixths (5/6) of these languages are gone.If we gather the local languages present today in all these territories which we work with, we will reach around 700 living local languages, and surely a big agenda to think how to manage to include these languages in digital world, and how to promote social/digital inclusion of these communities.Still, if we consider that Prof. David Crystal (2006) estimates the loss of two thirds (2/3) of the living languages of the world in the next three generations, we have to hurry.We have a big picture of the languages that we are connected with, and the countries concerned, and I'll draw some lines on the position that our project holds.It is very important to keep in mind that it is a research project by individuals feeling concerned with Multilingual issues, who are academics as well.I understand that a collective responsibility based ethics could be a good way to approach Multilingualism in Digital World issues, but to do that researchers from Latin America and Portuguese Speaking countries have to participate in international debates and know each other's work.We need to become a research network on Multilingualism."Here the heritage of colonialism and the operation of neocolonialism can only be confronted by systems of collective responsibility-based ethics, [...]" (Spivak, 85, 1999) As a linguist and as a researcher it's been a new experience to bring multilingualism to the campus at UNICAMP University, at the city of Campinas in São Paulo, Brazil.As we all know, the promotion of multilingualism and inclusive societies do not fit in a specific disciplinary field of knowledge in a traditional academy for many reasons, and I'll cite two of them that have surprised me: first of all, for its extreme interdisciplinary nature, and second because it has a link with local cultures and local communities that are not always welcome in educational institutions that traditionally were thought for local elite.There is lot of work ahead, many layers of change that would be necessary to have ideal conditions to promote multilingualism in digital world in our region and with our partner countries.Most of the barriers that we have found are historical, political and not at all in synchronicity with our project, or are being changed in a way that enhance such a proposal of digital and social inclusion like ours.So, we are working against the grain.Today, among 192 countries that are part of the UN, approximately 20 national states have more than one language as its official language.This does not mean that other societies or countries (like Brazil that have only Portuguese as its official language) are not bilingual or multilingual, it only shows the lack of political, juridical and educational support and recognition of these spoken languages and living cultures in national territories.It shows an old habit that was part of the construction of the state-nations that permit particularly in our case: the old Portuguese Empire and the Portuguese identity, a cultural and linguistic paradigm that has had its functionality and that now we need to better comprehend to move on.Fortunately it was good surprise to learn about the initiatives of the Russian Federation that together with countries like India, Canadá or South Africa might help us to approach efficiently our Multilingual issues.The understanding of what is valuable for a nation changes through time and specifically in 2005 Brazil signs the Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity.This declaration suggests, among other things, that cultures and languages shall be considered treasures of the nations, and underlines the need to support initiatives of recognition, respect, inclusion and circulation of these groups and the access to the knowledge generated by these groups in national territory as well as in the World Wide Web.In our region it is a brand new concept.The change of attitude towards minor languages concerns a perception of our socio cultural and historical bonds.There are many blind spots that we have to deal with to make this move.To work and to reflect on multilingualism social and digital inclusion when the paradigm since colonization has been to affirm monolingualism is a difficult job, and our local education goes towards major or dominant languages while minor languages were forbidden until approximately ten years ago.Some theoretical apparatus is necessary to deal with such contrast in academy -the interest to be part of hegemonic culture versus the need to recognize the value of local culture.Otherwise we might develop an academicschizophrenic profile as Kosambi and Spivak point out:"[...] "one cannot truly know the cultures of other places, other times," and then proceed to diagnose the hegemonic readings into place." (Kosambi/ Spivak, p.50, 1999) The first theoretical approach that I found to be useful and productive to comprehend Multilingualism in Brazil and in our partner countries is postcolonial reason criticism.One of the reasons might be that the idea of the foreclosure of the native informant is very present and quite visible in my field.Another possibility is for the need to comprehend the role of women in third world countries that is also something that catches my attention in postcolonial criticism works -being a woman in a third world country university -and by "third world" I'm referring to traditionally colonized academic culture and not specifically to Brazilian economy.Anyway, it is based on this theoretical approach and methodological tool that helps to deconstruct some hegemonic readings, that I'm able to present some perspective for the incoming project.From this perspective I could understand that the linguistic bond [the Portuguese as official language] that at first gathered the network of this project in a very naïve perspective, has been historically overestimated, and, as PEREIRA (2009, 155) says, "became a monument of the complicity between colonized and colonizer, complicity which does not guarantee the end of the reproduction of the colonizer-colonized [...]" violence.One possible question here is what language bonds cover, silence, pasteurize, and what can be done in terms of promoting inclusive societies in such ambiance.At school we learned about indigenous groups as part of the discovery of Brazil by the Portuguese in 1500, what immediately made them become creatures of the past.And what a surprise it is to find out that these communities survived and that they are alive in 2012, some of them with internet, wikis, blogs, some (the great majority in fact) needing help to get on digital world and to access information.Indigenous societies in Brazil are not studied in Sociology or History.Of course there are indigenous languages studies, but unfortunately they live apart from linguistics (western linguistics), language and literature groups.It is a very specific field, called in seminars linguistics of non-western languages, ethnic-linguistics, anthropological linguistics, etc.So it is not part of the general culture about our country or identity, for as Brazilians we are officially part of the western civilization, we are monolingual, and they are not.Talking to some indigenists in Brazil I figured out that they made a choice during the dictatorship to stay in national ground to work with these communities, learn their languages etc., and although it has propitiated a strong bond of the researcher with the local communities, it has left them no opportunities to participate in international debates.This is not a specific historical issue in Brazil, it happened in general in Latin America.If we look for organizations, academies or networks concerned with Multilingualism in this region, we will find a blank to be filled.More than that, if we look for funding, support, infrastructure, museums, collections, libraries, observatories on Multilingualism in our region... basically it is for our generation to build them.Our scope to comprehend Multilingualism in this project is quite open: in Latin America, Africa and Asia we have very different regional and historical aspects, but we have in common the link to Portugal, that somehow establishes patterns for silencing local cultures.To guide us in Multilingual issues we have clear policies of silence, policies for censorships, considering the historical and economical background of each group, but to reach local cultures, local languages, to develop and preserve it is yet something to come.Such a comparative study would be very interesting, not to victimize but to enable us to have a memory, to understand what happened and to resist these effects in better "knowledge conditions".With Europe we have a very clear counterpoint for they made an option for multilingualism which is different from the former scenarios.Our dialog with European countries is very important regarding their experience on multilingualism development, their academic history or even considering the funding possibilities.A very good partner to work with Multilingualism in our region is UNESCO team, because they give us feedback -which is rare in our local reality concerning this theme -and are capable of contextualizing the obstacles that we cannot surpass locally.In dialog with Frances Albernaz (UNESCO) who coordinates the Network Humaniredes 80 , and reading Luis Felipe de Alencastro -O Trato dos Viventes -I have chosen to start working on the Multilingualism in Digital World project with Portuguese speaking countries: Brazil, Bissau Guinea, Mozambique, Cape Verde, Saint Tome e Principe, Angola, and East Timor.Brazil's role is a bit differentiated in this group, for it's been officially "independent" for 190 years, while the other countries have an average of 36 years of "independent" life.Nevertheless, our common bond in international ground is the presence of the Portuguese language as the official language.It enhances an exchange of information considering Portuguese a vehicular language.Also, there is a strong need to reflect on the role of academic institutions, inspired by postcolonial criticism.In this aspect we are specially interested in Humanities local authorship development, recognizance and knowledge circulation.In short: south-south cooperation.This is our starting picture, and to develop such a proposal together with Prof. Frances Albernaz we have talked to the representatives of the eight countries about the network who have put us in touch with their national higher education institutions.We have had from the Brazilian Ministry of Culture the possibility to create and support points of culture (pontos de cultura).Basically we would have to: 1) promote a field research in at least one local language and to register it in media to share with the network and 2) elaborate a proposal to include this local community online.The project of points of culture would provide the cameras, server and computers to make the edition of the content and to publish it online.We sent a call from the Humaniredes network (2006) and fourteen universities sent us proposals.In 2007 we had the approval for a UNESCO Chair Multilingualism and Local Content Production in Digital World at the University of Campinas in São Paulo, Brazil.However the projects sent to the Ministry of Culture were denied, for the Brazilian Ministry of International Relations (Itamaraty) had forbidden to send Brazilian funding abroad.So, we had the projects ready, a UNESCO Chair, and no funding.We made some attempts to engage Brazilian research agencies, but multilingualism was out of the scope of any national call.We also tried to ask for funding from the European Union who understood that the project was good, but saw no objectives in the simple construction of a southsouth network, no possibility of and no reason for opening dialog and content exchange among us.Another interesting initiative in partnership with the European Research Council in 2007 was to foresee the needs of research in multilingualism and to produce a call for research customized for the ongoing projects.We have worked on that possibility and as far as I know, in the ERC internal meeting to deliberate about funding the representative from Portugal at ERC denied the proposal and so Portuguese speaking countries were kept out of the range of the call.At UNICAMP University in 2008 my former laboratory understood that multilingualism was out of the scope of the lab, and I was transferred to the Center of Memory, and in 2011 to the Center of Logic, Epistemology and the History of Science which is where I work now in this very project.Facing such difficulties was a surprise for us.In fact, it seemed natural to propose such a network, and as every agency not only agreed but also manifested interest to support it, none of these "failures/rejections" were expected.The Brazilian agencies and ministries discourses were centered in the idea of an interesting proposal that should have all institutional support, but by different reasons wouldn't have fund provisions, and at the university we had the recognition of an important project that wouldn't have institutional support by now.Multilingualism in Digital World -although thought as a simple proposal -touched pseudo-ethical issues, that were not in perspective at that time.The context that I'd call postcolonial did not permit the infrastructure to enhance the emergence of the discourse of the subalterns, of local languages, of local content production and of dialog.Nevertheless it seemed interesting to explore real possibilities for this enterprise as we have reached the bottom line of the politically correct discourse and found nothing concrete.It is a dead end for the project as conceived, but an interesting starting point for reflexion and for finding the right partners.Therefore with patience and without funding, I have consulted UNESCO about possibilities to work with this network under such conditions, and the suggestion was to work with the Greenstone digital library project greenstone.org>.And we developed the following idea.The notion of democratic access to information in this project will be developed through the creation and diffusion of local content in local languages.The idea is that speaking subjects experience their speaking capabilities through a variety of repertoires of linguistic character that exist simultaneously and in a gradual manner, without necessarily the presence of linguistic frontiers well delimited and well defined.The objective of a polyphonic digital library is to create a polyphonic knowledge data base that permits the comprehension and an integrated digital experience of this myriad of repertoires and to facilitate the navigation among them.This digital polyphonic library therefore is not centered in a mere translation process or in the transportation of knowledge from one language to another, but in an imaginary web of knowledge in which many linguistics repertoires are imbricated.This web finds its possible actualization in a digital polyphonic platform that permits the presence and the simultaneity of various phonies to be serialized, sequencialized, and shown in multilateral relations that do not affect their individuality.Before colonial era and the expansion of Europe in the world, the majority of populations lived in phonic regimes -speaking praxis, and sometimes, writing praxis -that were not based on the idea of languages as well determined totalities belonging to a specific territory (with its specific speaking population).Our point here is that the majority of people had an open linguistic repertoire, with internal and gradual differences, using them in different contexts and different goals, as well as linguistic formulas and vocabularies, that today are perceived as belonging to many languages.The idea of this polyphonic knowledge base has the following criteria: • To promote in its various aspects the permeability among many repertoires; • Consider computational system and its users intrinsically polyphonous; • Permit to many repertoires to interact with the minimum of barriers, and allow them to constitute themselves mutually as communicational spaces and digital knowledge; • Allow the knowledge of these many repertoires to be shared at its most possible extent; • Allow available collections historically associated to many repertoires to be freely shared; • Allow the digital inclusion of repertoires that do not possess substantial written collections and the creation of their relations others, in multimedia base; • Allow permeability among repertoires to generate rizomatic knowledge creation (i.e. in a web design and without neuralgic points of control), without disciplinary approach (i.e. through knowledge exchange and/ or through linguistic territorialities thought as historically rooted in different spaces and different time flux, that immediately will demand translation among them to communicate.); and • Use digital space as an instrument of de-territorialization.We have also asked the network members to share opinions on the opportunities of this project, and the mains obstacles.The list of current main local opportunities concerns roles for the university that were never available in our postcolonial set.And, unless we can trick history, there is no easy possibility to promote such insurrection of local content within the place that have systematic and consistently silenced it.Here is the positive list.• Possibility to develop local academic and artistic authorship, concerning subjects of local reality; • Possibility to develop digital inclusion with multicultural perspective; • Possibility to develop research on multilingualism with local researchers (south-south cooperation); • Participation of universities empowering communities in digital editing and publishing, with content quality priority; • Funding institutions with difficulties to innovate subject and approaches, unless they're considered important abroad; • Brain drain of academic staff usually to Europe and to United States.This list shows that we were not ready to start working at the level proposed in terms of basic infrastructure and sometimes human resources.It requires of us, as a network, a change of culture to work to propose academic South-South cooperation.Departing from this picture we made suggestions for new requirements (institutional and funding formats) for international and cutting edge research on Multilingualism: • Invest locally in Junior Researchers; • Consider research projects on national languages or official languages.This would be interesting to strengthen partnerships with local institutions, so they would be forced to get in touch with new research trends; • Invest in research network for humanities, sharing libraries and promotion of professors and researchers exchange; • Invest in similar pairs evaluation (someone in Angola is much more able to evaluate the real condition for research production in Mozambique, than a specialist that doesn't share the same research conditions).In our region there is a contradiction on the necessary presupposition that there is a dominant knowledge, expressed in academy, and that we -as scholarsare in a position to re-inscribe local languages and local cultures without any support.In contact with the group that works with multilingualism in the 2011 Yakutsk conference and with the UNESCO Information For All Programme group dedicated to multilingualism I figured out that from the academic perspective we need to organize the memory of the initiatives already taken, and to create an observatory of the projects in course.It is important to give a place in academy for studies on multilingualism in general and for Multilingualism in Digital World.We should be more flexible with multiple areas of knowledge to consider Multilingualism studies.It is possible to work with multilingualism from many angles.But to enable the construction of inclusive societies within local universities in our region, it is necessary to have a minimum of good examples, reports of national experiences, similar to the Russian publication "Preservation of Linguistic Diversity: citizens. That said, we also need to create favourable conditions for members of the country's other ethnic groups to speak and receive schooling in their native languages."This principle became the foundation for the National Programme of Language Use and Promotion, intended for the 2011-2020 period.The programme was elaborated in keeping with Articles 7 and 93 of the Constitution of Kazakhstan, the July 11, 1997 Law on Languages, the Doctrine of National Unity, and the Language Policy Framework.Work on the Programme will proceed in three areas: • broadening and enhancing the socio-communicative role of the national language; • maintaining the role of the Russian language in the cultural domain; • promoting other languages of Kazakhstan.There are three stages to cover: At President Nazarbayev's initiative, a national cultural project, "Language Triad", has also been launched.Every person living in modern-day Kazakhstan is well aware that the command of at least three languages -Kazakh, Russian and English -is crucial to his or her success.In our increasingly globalized world, speaking several languages is an indispensable asset because we all need to know how to orient ourselves in a multilingual environment.Objectives: • qualitative (an improved linguistic environment, more self-motivation to learn the Kazakh language among the country's non-Kazakh ethnic groups; wider research activities for Kazakh and other languages spoken in Kazakhstan); • quantitative (the proportion of Kazakh citizens speaking the national language may grow to 95%, up from today's 60%).These are official projections, to which we could add another 10% -representatives of ethnic minorities, such as Uigur, Tatar and Azeri -who speak their respective mother tongues and have a basic-level command of the Kazakh language.By the year 2020, the share of Kazakh citizens speaking Russian is expected to reach at least 95%, against today's 89%.English-language speakers should also grow in numbers, to eventually account for some 20% of the population.The Internet has become a truly cosmopolitan zone by now.And although the Web's linguistic landscape is still dominated by English, the world's nations seek to create online resources in many locally spoken languages.What is the situation like in Kazakhstan?September 2011 marked 17 years since the nation went online.These days, about a hundred new websites appear here monthly.Not all of them have a Kazakh-language version, though, with Kazakhstan's developers often giving priority to Russian and English these days.However, in the past five-seven years, there has been a positive trend toward the expansion of Kazakh-language Web content, prompted by the launch of a large-scale national programme to develop an online government.Another factor holding back the expansion of Kazakh presence online is the lack of technical support for the Kazakh script (the standard Cyrillic alphabet plus nine additional characters).It has taken quite a long time to develop a single standard for encoding these characters and to spread fonts that have them around.The effective language promotion programme gives reason to hope that a system of government support for Kazakh-language websites will be created before long.Already, active measures are being taken to promote Web content in the national language.And there is a whole number of success stories to inspire further effort.The project Kazakh National E-Library (www.kazneb.kz ), run by the National Research Library in partnership with its smaller counterparts, also seeks to promote the Kazakh language online.These days, Internet users can have access to 2,000 complete digitized copies of books in Kazakh, featuring Kazakhstan's history, culture, science and literature.With ICT being one of the most vibrant sectors in Kazakhstan's modern-day economy, the number of Internet users in the country is on the rise.In 2011, for instance, it exceeded 5 million, or 34% of the population.And Kazakhlanguage Web content is likely to grow further, provided that the government offers more incentives and public organizations provide their support.Being information and communication centres for their respective communities, Kazakhstan's libraries see it as their professional duty to promote the creation of a tolerant language environment as a factor of national unity.In their daily work, Kazakh library staffs are guided by UNESCO's Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, signed in Paris in November 2001, and, specifically, by its points about "safeguarding the linguistic heritage of humanity and giving support to expression, creation and dissemination in the greatest possible number of languages" and "promoting linguistic diversity in cyberspace and encouraging universal access through the global network to all information in the public domain."The government programme for the promotion of languages in 2011-2020 has prompted libraries to step up their efforts to popularise Kazakh as the 6. Using ICT in the creation of a qualitatively new model of library and reference services; 7. Providing methodology consulting on topical issues of library and reference services for the country's multi-ethnic population.The Kazakh libraries' main partner, without any doubt, is the Assembly of the Nation (http://www.assembly.kz ).Enthusiasm and love for one's language and culture are key to the assembly's success.This is a one-off public institution, committed to harmonising interethnic relations in Kazakhstan.No other country boasts such an organization.This is the first Kazakh president's "knowhow," which has been unfailingly proving its efficiency ever since the country gained its independence two decades ago.The assembly holds a depositary at Kazakhstan's National Research Library.The collection provides information support for the country's ethnic policy activities while also consolidating Kazakh society's spiritual culture, crucial to maintaining national unity.It features books providing a profile of the assembly and telling of activities by its units -various ethno-cultural associations, an expert council, and a public foundation.The collection is also accessible online, at the National Kazakh E-Library (www.kazneb.kz ).Thanks to its partnership with the assembly, this e-library has become a platform for various programmes in fostering intercultural dialogue and promoting the national language, as well as the languages, cultures and traditions of all of Kazakhstan's ethnic groups.The country's libraries realize perfectly well that information and communication technology is one of the most efficient tools for building a favourable linguistic environment.This is why, along with conventional forms of library and reference services, readers are also offered resources and services based on ICT, such as e-libraries and electronic reference units, websites, online displays, and e-posters.Some positive experience has already been accumulated in this area, but we still have a long way to go in promoting Web content in Kazakhstan's national language and languages spoken by the non-Kazakh population -a major priority with the country's public libraries.Creating Content in Minority Languages: Enhancing Users' Capacity Linguistic and cultural diversity as a part of the world's heritage is commonly known to be as crucial for mankind as biodiversity is for nature.UNESCO documents also highlight the importance of diversity, emphasizing the respect for linguistic and cultural diversity as one of the core principles of the modern society development.Over According to a 2010 survey results 60% of Karelians and Vepsians living in the republic read newspapers and magazines in their mother tongues, 75 %watch TV programmes and listen to radio broadcasts in mother tongues.80 % of Karelians and Vepsians deem their right to use mother tongue is regarded.There are, however, issues for concern.One in five Karelians and one in three Vepsians polled expressed their concern over the sustainability of their mother tongue.About 40% of Karelians and 30% of Vepsians mentioned their language being endangered.Only 41% of the respondents were positive of the modern school's increased opportunities for native languages preservation and promotion, while 40% considered it necessary to continue further work on preserving and supporting native languages.The survey did not cover the issues of ICT and Internet use by indigenous peoples, however even a shallow analysis of the social networks like "Facebook" or "VKontakte" shows that Karelian and Vepsian languages find representation there.Statistics demonstrates a rise in the frequency of use of full-text resources created in the republic in these languages.More users visit republican web sites presenting resources in Karelian, Vepsian, Finnish, as well as information in Russian on the indigenous peoples of Karelia, their languages, traditions and territory.Interactive multimedia projects (including Internet-based) are being actively implemented in the republic, aimed at the creation of content in national languages.Use of modern technologies facilitates the creation of information resources and products in various formats.Such "live" projects and complex forms of work cause constant broad public interest -both among adults and children, thus allowing raising the prestige of minority languages and strengthening their social and functional role.The Indigenous Peoples of Karelia project (http://knk.karelia.ru/), has been implemented since late 2009.It is a sort of a blog site aimed at providing information on our homeland, amazing and magical Karelia, on its past, present and future, on the people living here.We use Movable Type software as an open source platform, permitting the application of blogosphere technologies.We work on the creation of interesting content in cooperation with researchers, journalists and publishers, with Karelian republican and regional museums and the National Archive, with municipal libraries and cultural centres of different districts of the republic, with national public associations and NGOs.Users leave their comments, address our authors and each other, moderators are eager to answer any questions and often initiate personal messages sharing, and as a result the project somehow performs functions of a social media.Questions and commentaries help us adjust and update our plans for project development.We are expanding the range of web tools for publishing materials on the website.Users can watch videos, listen to recordings and work with flash diagrams.Various photo galleries are used for viewing images.Audio-visual materials in indigenous languages of Karelia are published in the "Media Library" section.Our key goal is the preservation and promotion of audiovisual cultural heritage and creation of our own audio and video resources.We also aim at providing support for national languages and ensuring their promotion online.The "E-book shelf" section contains bibliographic and reference lists, articles and publications on the history of our region.We always indicate the authorship and information sources.It might be for that reason that the Russian library community considers our project as a new format of bibliographic resources on the Web.Our website has already attracted visitors from over 80 countries.Our new project -the Digital Library of Karelian Authors (http://avtor. karelia.ru/) -is freely available since June 2011.We wanted to create a virtual meeting place for contemporary Karelian authors and their readers, to assist both authors and growing army of e-readers.We started with publishing 28 electronic editions of 14 authors invited to cooperate.Publications are grouped into nine categories, including prose, poetry, translations, literary criticism, etc.After placing links in the Karelian web-space and presenting the project in the local media we began to receive proposals from new authors through the feedback.We have made agreements with owners (authors and publishers).We are proud of having digital publications labeled "first published".It means our project has earned the trust of authors.We hope that it will catch the fancy of Internet users.Of course, we plan to prepare publications not only in Russian but also in Finnish, Karelian and Vepsian languages with Russian translation provided.Analyzing the demand for similar Internet projects, their standing in the local scientific and creative community, we come to the conclusion that success is only possible by combining various creative initiatives under the roof of the National Library.The Geneva Plan of Action calls for the exchange of knowledge, experiences and best practices on policies and tools designed to promote cultural and linguistic diversity at regional and sub-regional levels.Potential stakeholders of the multilingualism promotion process -those who can and should contribute to the maintenance and strengthening, equipping and development of language -are numerous.Of course, government policies and activities are of paramount importance.Efficient policy includes a set of interrelated measures aimed at strengthening and improving the activities by all other major stakeholders.Let us name these stakeholders: • education; • research institutions; • memory institutions; • cultural institutions: • book and media publishers; • bookstores, newspaper and magazine stands; • digital media; • ICT industry; • NGOs; • private sector.Institutions of primary, secondary and higher education undoubtedly play a crucial role in multilingualism promotion.They should cooperate with the legislative and executive bodies to support and develop minority languages.Research institutions can perform scientific and applied research in the field thus providing the scientific and theoretical basis for governments and other social institutions to support languages.Memory institutions aim at collecting, storing, and promoting all major evidences of the history of a given ethnic group, ensuring their availability to the public as well as developing various methods and forms of providing access to cultural heritage, including written.Media can also contribute to supporting and improving the status of minority languages serving as a tool for the exchange of spiritual values and the promotion of cultural and linguistic diversity.Book publishing and book trade can also do a lot to support multilingualism, since a language's lack of access to the book publishing sphere can pose a threat of its speakers to be largely excluded from the intellectual life of the community.Various projects on the creation of multimedia content in minority languages can be initiated and implemented by all the above mentioned institutions in collaboration with other institutions of culture, science and education.We are all aware of the fact that developing linguistic and cultural diversity in cyberspace grants us an opportunity to preserve languages and cultures, to expand domains of use of under resourced national languages.That is why it is extremely important to understand the problem clearly and define the set of actions to be taken to study, develop, use and promote languages.It's not only political measures that is required.Development of legal norms and standards is fundamental, however multilingualism support cannot be limited to the adoption of regulations or solving technical problems.All stakeholders should be aware of the burning challenges as well as possible solutions.This reqires developing specific guidelines for each institution.Of course, promoting best practice of leading experts in a particular field is important in this regard.Participants of activities aimed at multilingualism preservation should be provided with information on the current situation in the field, on the state of the art in their specific professional area in the country and the world.It is important to analyze the possibilities of potential actors, as this will help to outline the scope of collaborative efforts by representatives of different areas to support and promote linguistic diversity.We have attempted to offer a document containing specific methodological and practical guidelines for one of the institutions supporting multilingualism.The publication "Developing Multilingualism in Cyberspace: Guidelines for Libraries" has been prepared by the Interregional Library Cooperation Centre and the Russian UNESCO IFAP Committee.The book is intended primarily for library heads and specialists, but can be also useful for other organizations and institutions working in the fields of culture, science, education, information, communication, ethnic and cultural policy.We aimed at representing the global approach to solving this problem, the activities of international organizations, and the current linguistic situation in Russia.Why are we focusing on libraries?UNESCO considers libraries to be key partners in expanding access to diverse cultural and linguistic resources, and actively cooperates with the International Federation of Library Associations to promote the information capacity building in the library sphere.Libraries are regarded as educational, cultural and information centers that maintain, develop and represent various cultures, provide access to educational materials and programmes, acquire, create, systematize and provide access to information to meet the needs of all communities.The IFLA Multicultural Library Manifesto underscores the importance and essential nature of libraries in learning, as they facilitate access to a variety of cultural and linguistic resources that open horizons to different experiences.In order to fulfill this mandate, libraries must meet the varied needs and interests of the communities they serve, especially marginalized or minority groups that may exist within any given community.Library and information services in a culturally and linguistically diverse environment include both the provision of services to all types of library users and the provision of library services specifically targeted to underserved cultural and linguistic groups.Special attention should be paid to groups which are often marginalized in culturally diverse societies: minorities, asylum seekers and refugees, residents with a temporary residence permit, migrant workers and indigenous communities.Our publication represents best practices of libraries of Russia, CIS and foreign countries implementing activities in support of linguistic and cultural diversity, in particular in cyberspace.Of course, we could not cover everything in one book and had to give only some examples.While desribing foreign experience, we focused on Finland and New Zealandcountries that are among the world leaders from the point of living standards, the development of information society, and of library services.In We believe that success and consistency of our work in this sphere was made possible largely due to the creation in 1975 of a section of literature of the northern peoples within the Library's department of national and ethnological literature staffed by a senior manager and a librarian, which at present is unique in Russia.Once established, the section facilitated the launch of targetoriented work on compiling holdings of literature in the languages of the small-numbered peoples of the North and its promotion, and setting up library services to these peoples living in ethnic pockets.In the years that followed the creation of the section, a project was run to study the literature read in the languages of the Northern peoples within the All-Russian experiment on library and bibliographical service to the Northern peoples.The results of the experiment were used to produce recommendations on how to optimize library service to the small-numbered peoples of the North.It was recommended to the publishers to increase, in cooperation with the library communities, the number of books going out of print in the languages of these peoples, coordinate their publication and distribution throughout the northern territories of the country, etc.In those years, the Talking Book project was carried out and was highly appreciated among the indigenous peoples of the North, as well as the country's library community.Under this initiative, the "narrators" were chosen among the authors who then recorded their works in their native languages -Evenki, Even and Yukaghir.This project has given today's users the opportunity to hear and listen to the original voices of famous writers of small-numbered peoples of the North.Availability of "talking books" for all the categories of the population irrespective of their age and level of instruction, as well as the possibility to listen to audio files virtually everywhere -be it in public, in tents of reindeer breeders, or in a nomadic school -made them popular among the inhabitants not only of Yakutia, but of the Magadan, the Kamchatka and other regions too.According to the Library's statistics, some 3,000 people have already made use of the "talking books".New life was brought to the project in 2007 when audio tapes were digitized and were used to create 14 multimedia disks with the original voices of writers, taletellers, scientists and other people speaking literary language of the small peoples of the North.The recordings were published at the Knigakan web-site of the small-numbered peoples of the North.Since then, the Library has started to work systematically and consistently on increasing the activities aiming to create and manage the use of e-resources on the small peoples of the North on the basis of a program-based and targeted method.These efforts resulted into the establishment of the following resources: The The main goals of the Foundation for Siberian Cultures include the documentation of endangered languages and, especially, the local ecological knowledge expressed within them.But it also aims to take decisive steps toward preserving those languages and that knowledge by means of assisting local communities to produce relevant learning tools.To realize this mandate, the Foundation is playing an active role in international discourse on these issues.During workshops and seminars local traditions and experiences are placed into wider global contexts and provide a base for next appropriate methodological steps to be taken in order to realize this programme most effectively.In addition to anthropological interpretations of indigenous worldviews and mythologies, the focus in this programme will be on their contemporary representation in the fine arts, music and choreography.The Foundation for Siberian Cultures supports a range of creative exchanges between artists from Russia and those from other countries.Examples of such fascinating and vivid artistic dialogue was the exhibition "Shamans of Siberia" (http://www. kulturstiftung-sibirien.de/vir_21_E.html) as well as tours by Youth dance ensembles from Kamchatka in Europe (http://www.kulturstiftung-sibirien.de/ ver_42_E.html).Currently in preparation are a joint German-Russian project on video art, as well as other projects on lyrics and musical compositions that reflect Siberian landscapes and find expression in a variety of western and indigenous styles.Another project is the publication of comprehensive travel accounts by German explorers and scientists since the mid-18 th century.Their exhaustive descriptions and detailed reports are still considered some of the most valuable documents on the ethnography of the indigenous peoples of that part of the world.These works inform us about living conditions and particular ways of natural resource use at various times and provide us with valuable background information for current assessment.This anthology, which will be published in series format as part of the "Bibliotheca Kamtschatica" by the Foundation for Siberian Cultures (edited by Erich Kasten and Michael Dürr), is enriched through essays by scholars from various historical, ethnological and natural science perspectives.In cooperation with the Institute of Geography (KBPIG, FED RAS) in Petropavlovsk-Kamchatski, a database will be produced that brings together historical accounts, recent ethnographic recordings and relevant texts in native languages, and information from the natural sciences.All will be accessible via the Internet even by the general public, and as it is intended here in the first place, be used by colleagues in Russia and indigenous communities.(http:// www.siberian-studies.org/publications/bika_E.html).Learning tools and teaching materials focusing on indigenous communities may help to counteract forces that lead to the loss of cultural diversity and the dissolution of local and ethnic identities.Relevant materials have been, and will continue to be, produced in cooperation with local experts and using modern technologies.For this, the publishing arm of the Foundation for Siberian Cultures has established the DVD series "Languages & Cultures of Indigenous Peoples in Kamchatka", edited by Erich Kasten.The DVDs are first of all aimed at the school curriculum and at cultural programmes in Kamchatka and they present specimens of the related spoken languages in monologues and dialogues.These can be used as well in international research and in university courses.Individual publications of these sub-series address to the following themes: • The remembered past; • Traditional ecological knowledge; • Clothing & decorative arts; • Ritual practice & world view; • Human-environment relations as expressed in tales, songs and dance; • Conferences, workshops, festivals.This project results from an initiative of Tjan Zaotschnaja and aims to support the preservation of the Itelmen language in Kamchatka.It is being conducted in cooperation with the Munich-based group of the Society for Threatened Peoples ("Gesellschaft für bedrohte Völker -Regionalgruppe München").The Itelmen language is one of the most threatened languages in the world.There are only about two dozen remaining speakers of the older generation who speak the language fluently.At the same time, among Itelmen youth and in particular among those who live in the capital of Petropavlovsk-Kamchatski, there is a growing interest in maintaining their native language.For them, it embodies not only specific indigenous knowledge.It also links them to their ancestors, one of the most ancient peoples of Kamchatka.In 2010, a first project -organized and driven by Tjan Zaotschnaja -was launched by the Foundation for Siberian Cultures in cooperation with the Munich-based group of the Society for Threatened Peoples.Funding was provided to cover travel and accommodation costs in St. Petersburg of a future Itelmen teacher to take his exams there and the publication of his first Itelmen textbook.This series is published by the Foundation for Siberian Cultures in collaboration with one of its partner institutions in Kamchatka, the "State Koryak Center for Arts & Crafts" in Palana.The editors of this series are Erich Kasten and Aleksandra Urkachan.Besides its printed version for distribution in indigenous communities in Kamchatka, a digital version of each volume is also available on the web: http://www.siberian-studies.org/publications/echgan_E.html.Recent or current projects are presented on the web in the form of alternating photo-video shows.This provides a forum through which indigenous communities can participate and be informed about how their traditions are presented and received abroad.• January 2012 -Learning tools: DVD "Traditional knowledge in the world of Koryak fishing".• October 2011 -Seminar "Endangered languages and local knowledge".• July 2011 -Learning tools: "Itelmen language and culture".• April 2011 -Exhibition "The art of flying -the flight in mythology and in the art of dancing of Siberian peoples".• January 2011 -Learning tools: DVD "Traditional knowledge of Koryak Reindeer Herders".• October 2010 -Exhibition "250 years of German-Russian research on the nature of Kamchatka and the cultures of its indigenous peoples".• June 2010 -Learning tools: DVD "Koryak Songs and Dances, Lesnaya".• February 2010 -Exhibition "Shamans of Siberia".Currently, a more comprehensive programme is in preparation by Erich Kasten and Tjeerd de Graaf on "Vanishing voices of the Asian North Pacific rim" that will build on and expand to previous activities on the preservation of indigenous languages and cultures in Kamchatka to neighboring regions and peoples as well, such as to Nivch, Nanai, Chukchi and Yukaghir.This programme is related to an initiative by the Foundation for Endangered Languages to create Regional Interest Groups for specific areas in the world, where the languages and cultures of the local minority peoples are studied.UNESCO and some other international organizations are regarding the use of mother tongues in the real world as an important problem from the viewpoint of the linguistic diversity.Meanwhile also in the cyberspace, accompanying the popularization of the Internet, various problems around the linguistic diversity and the use of mother tongues are increasingly occurring.It is especially important in the educational context, as education becomes borderless with the popularization of e-learning, from the viewpoint of importation and exportation of educational service, Guidelines on Quality Provision in Cross-border Higher Education (2005, UNESCO/OECD) refer to the language usage in higher education: "Higher education institutions are responsible for the quality as well as the social, cultural and linguistic relevance of education and the standards of qualifications provided in their name, no matter where or how it is delivered.In this context, it is recommended that higher education institutions/providers delivering cross-border higher education(a)Ensure that the programmes they deliver across borders and in their home country are of comparable quality and that they also take into account the cultural and linguistic sensitivities of the receiving country.It is desirable that a commitment to this effect should be made public." The report suggested that this consideration should be applied not only to the face-toface education but also to the remote education including e-learning. The research on linguistic diversity in e-learning is being proceeded with an application of translation tools, for example, Language Grid. Many of the translation tools are developed for the multilingual communication with different mother tongues, evaluation for their translate function can be found in many places but there is few verification of their effect to the users. In this report, we will investigate the effect of translation tools to the users from the two case studies of e-learning education using ICT in Nagaoka University of Technology. First, we consider the relation between the language in class contents and knowledge acquirement of learners. In the Nagaoka University of Technology (NUT), there are about 200 exchange students. We extract 10% exchange students (the total number of students is 27, the largest mother tongue holder were Spanish with 10.4%, Malay with 8.3%, Chinese with 4.2%, Vietnam with 3.1%, Mongolian and Indonesian each with 1.4%) and take questionnaires for language use. Seven of ten students are enrolled at NUT with the primary objective of receiving professional education (engineering), not to learn language. For the most of exchange students, the competence in Japanese (non-mother tongue) is minimum for contextembedded language. Moreover, our university has no care of teaching language to bachelor course exchange students -they have to use Japanese for classes. For master course, there are several classes given in English, but students need to be good at Japanese or English to attend a class. It means they need to master Japanese or English if they would like to make high quality study or learning. From these facts, we can point out that exchange students in our university face a deep estrangement between special subjects they hope to acquire and the context-reduced language needed to achieve their hope. However, as the exchange students are small in number and their mother tongues are diverse, it is very difficult to support the mother tongue of each foreign student. Therefore, we have developed the multilingual learning support system with ICT and researched reactions of exchange students to the system. Figure 1 shows the structure of the multilingual learning support system. We did the research of exchange students' comprehension of contents with and without their mother tongues. We prepared 3 types of contents: A -electronic field (the rate of technical term t is 63.0%), B -mechanical field (t is 43.7%), C -information and communication field (t is 37.5%). Learners viewed the contents both with mother tongues support (type II) and without it (type I) and they were asked to evaluate their comprehension of contents with three degrees: "E1: I understood the content", "E2: I understood the content a little", "E3: I could not understand the content at all." Table 1 shows the result of the rate of understanding contents. Seven out of ten students answered E3 in the case of type I contents, but in the case of type II contents seven out of ten students answered E2. This means that for subjects including many technical terms, especially highly specialized subjects, learners' comprehension can be clearly improved with mother tongue translation support for technical terms. Moreover, applying summary submit and evaluation function has the effect not only to encourage learners' comprehension but also to train to learn technical terms. The students' learning activities is not only to learn knowledge via contents. The internal thought alienation or knowledge acquired by the communication with others is also important as an achievement of educational activities. In particular, growing attention is paid to collaboration important for the promotion of learners' independent actions, student participation learning, adoption of cross-cultural communication to respond the globalization that bring drastic change to university education. We implement the Problem The learning method is designed for one or a small group of learners to be able to acquire systematic knowledge on a subject by their independent activities (such as research on the previous works, discussion and so on) to find a method to solve problems. This method was used so far for the purpose of developing the skill to find a way to solve a problem mainly through discussion, at the place of succession of the technology. Noticing that PBL is usually supposed to be applied in a face-to-face environment, there arise two new aspects to consider when we aim at multicultural communication: 1. geographic constraint. There is a geographic limit on PBL in real world due to the practical difficulty in gathering participants from different countries. 2. linguistic constraint. In many cases we could not share the same language even if we could gather participants from the foreign countries. To solve these problems, we construct PBL environment in cyberspace. We adopt SecondLife 82 for developing platform and set up a classroom in cyberspace as shown in figure 2. In the classroom, we prepared a shared whiteboard and a screen for presentation. For communication in the lack of common language, we also equipped a text base multilingual chat system which adopts Language Grid 83 for multilanguage translation. Using these tools, the learners perform learning activities that include their interaction. Figure 3 shows the PBL environment system architecture. Under these preparations, we did the following experiments to evaluate PBL environment in the 3D virtual world. We collected two examinees respectively from Japanese, from German (who are familiar with both the mother tongue and English), and from Malay students, and divided them into two groups so that each group should contain speakers of respective languages. We refer to 90 minutes as one period, which is divided into two parts, a 30 minutes lecture and the succeeding 60 minutes discussion. In the lecture, a professor taught basic knowledge about a subject using chat function, and then students discussed on the subject using multilingual chat for 60 minutes. We prepared problems to ask basic knowledge of chemistry for undergraduate students as a PBL subject. The combination of theme and language is shown in Table 2 . Evaluation is done mainly focusing on the process of answering questions. The main points of evaluation are 1) how communication works in a multilingual chat and 2) how the shared whiteboard is used to help communication. For 1), we did a quantitative evaluation using a bibliometric method for English texts, Flesch Kincaid Reading Ease (FKRE)� and the amount of conversation. For 2), we did also a qualitative evaluation by tracking whiteboard usage and communication between avatars to the level of comparison of their contents. FKRE, the rating scale for communication -measures of a multilingual chathave the following characters : the smaller FKRE 84 value shows complex communication. In the experiment, we define "complex communication" as "frequent use of technical terms" namely, they make discussion along the theme. Calculating these values to the contents of multilingual chat we evaluate the quality of the communication. The results are shown in Table 3 , where L e means the number of efficient chat sentences, W m means the number of mean words per sentence, E means using English, NT means using mother tongue, Δ is (E-NT). Usually when someone utters a sentence regularly in a certain interval, the chart shows linear growth. Temporal more frequent conversation pushes the graph to the upper-left, while less conversation pushes it to lower-right. We can observe from the chart that group 1 showed less communication when English was used and more frequent communication when mother tongues were used. The group 2 shows that there was delay of conversation (area B) caused by large silence (area C) when English was used. When the mother tongues were used, the graph shows a steep inclination that means a rapid interchange of conversation, and students needed just a half amount of time to solve the problems compared with the case in English (area A). From these facts, we can conclude that discussion is delayed by the language barrier when English is used, ending without getting mutual enhancement, while the use of the mother tongues makes discussion smoother, leading to some excitement by collaboration of the group. Figure 5 shows an example in which the biggest movement was observed, displaying the communication with multilingual chat and the contents on the shared whiteboard along one time line. The timeline includes each avatar's talking and use whiteboard. Students shared the notion of energy level and its relation to the electron spin. We can observe how avatar B, behaving as a leader, explained them to avatar A and avatar C. Responding to avatar B, avatar A said "I can understand," and avatar C said "it is difficult to understand." The table in figure 5 starts when avatar C said "it is difficult." Answering avatar C, avatar B declared "I will explain it using whiteboard" and explained his idea using the chart. In the process avatar A also got engaged in the explanation and avatar C asked questions to avatars A and B. We could judge that they started having smooth communication. We can observe that avatar C also understood the subject from the analysis of the chat. By contrast, the group 2 did not have a leader, and there was an avatar who could not follow the discussion on the same problem that was given to the group 1. The conversation among the members of the group 2 was sparse and the number of sentences in it is just a half of the group 1. We also point out that the contents described on the shared whiteboard were not clear. From these facts, we can conclude that to promote students' learning, it is not sufficient just to prepare the discussion environment in mother tongue -an avatar acting as a leader or a mentor is also needed. Through these two experiments, we figure out the relation between the language that the learners use and the learning activities/acquirement of knowledge as follows. From case 1 we find that translation of non-mother tongue technical terms contained in the class contents into their mother tongue is useful for acquisition of knowledge Usually, however, non-mother tongue and mother tongue substitution is achieved using dictionaries. Hence, as a precondition for this translation to work, learners should have sufficient knowledge about technical terms in the mother tongue as a context-reduced language. From case 2 we think that there are two important aspects in developing collaboration study between students having different mother tongues: (1) training common language (English) and (2) training general communication skill so that students can express their own opinion.In the context of PBL the main focus is on the second point, i.e. our educational goal is to enhance communication skills. For this purpose the use of mother tongues is more appropriate than obliging students to study common language. This is proven by our experiments: dramatic increase of the amount of conversation, appearing a leader in the group, and effective use of support tools. To summarize, to provide collaborative education smoothly in multilingual environment it is desirable to support mother tongues for enhancing both learning activities and acquirement of knowledge. Although this is too difficult to achieve in the usual face-to-face environment, we demonstrated that we can support the use of mother tongues in multilingual environment by introducing ICT. It was proven to be one of useful ways to connect an online dictionary or an online translator with class contents and a chat tool. However, such tools have performance boundary, especially if students' mother tongues lack required technical terms. In that case, to support those students, a little more extra effort is required: one possibility is to neoterize these technical terms. However, such new technical terms tend to get widely spread quite rapidly in accordance with the permeation of education. In future, we will be able to automatically enrich the online dictionary/translator function using the feedback of observing new phrases or knowledge through, say, web crawling. Conclusions made in the course of related discussions found their way into the forum's final recommendations: • Developing joint interregional projects to represent scripts of small indigenous peoples of Russia's Northeast in computer operating systems; • Setting up an ad hoc group for gathering material on the linguistic and cultural diversity of the Russian North's native communities populating the Chukchi Autonomy and posting that material at the North-Eastern Federal University's website (www.arctic-megapedia.ru); • Elaborating a scientifically justified programme for introducing innovative technology into the traditional economic practices of the Chukchi Peninsula's indigenous population. Promoting linguistic diversity in cyberspace has both cultural and political significance. Dissemination of multilingual information on the history, languages and cultures of different nations facilitates mutual understanding and tolerance development. Each language is a unique repository of the information on its speakers and their culture. Recently, however, the process of languages extinction is becoming rampant. According to pessimistic forecasts, by the end of the XXI century, only about 10% of present-day languages may survive. Numerous factors threaten the existence of a language: natural disasters, leading to the death of entire peoples; weaknesses of the education system discouraging children to learn school subjects in their native language; the lack of writing to name a few. Any language's extinction is a great loss, as languages reflect historical experience and serve as a tool for socialization, expression and transmission of social and cultural traditions. While facilitating the growth of human knowledge, languages are a means of enhancing self-identification especially important for their speakers. In recent years a new factor has appeared, namely the rapid development of ICTs and the Internet. The Internet offers huge opportunities for users in terms of freedom of expression, education and access to information. However, information and services are accessible on the Internet only in dominant languages (about 400 out of the existing 6700 languages). • Studying and promoting Russian and foreign best practices on the preservation of linguistic diversity and its development in the cyberspace, facilitating its development and use. • Facilitating the creation of centres of excellence and the development of activities by various institutions and organizations in the sphere of promoting linguistic and cultural diversity in cyberspace. • Contributing to the enhancement of regional, national and international policies and regulatory framework in the field of culture, education, communication and information for the support and development of linguistic and cultural diversity in cyberspace. • Providing assistance in the preparation and publishing of scientific, educational, methodological, and other materials to draw attention to the problems of preservation of linguistic and cultural diversity of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) and the Russian Federation from students and graduates, teachers, researchers and other staff members of the NEFU and other institutions of education, science and culture, as well as public at large. • Providing methodological, organizational, information support for the activities by memory institutions to promote multilingualism in cyberspace. • Facilitating collaborative efforts by organizations and institutions to support linguistic diversity in cyberspace. • Contributing to organizing and implementing activities to document, preserve and develop the indigenous languages of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) and other peoples of the Russian Federation with the use of ICT. • Assisting the development and dissemination of appropriate free software, fonts, and other technical tools necessary for using various languages in cyberspace. The Centre to Advance Multilingualism focuses on encouraging and assisting all entities and individuals who can and should contribute to preserving, strengthening, equipping and developing languages, in particular in cyberspace. The Arctic State Institute of Arts and Culture (ASIAC) is Russia's only higher educational establishment with a mission to protect the culture of the small indigenous peoples of the North and to pass it on to future generations nationwide through the system of public education. The institute's strategic goals include implementing study programmes as well as creative and research projects of high academic quality, exploring ways to preserve indigenous communities' traditional culture, and promoting what is known as "living heritage" across Russia and the world using innovative educational, socio-cultural and information technology. Founded in 2000, ASIAC has since evolved into an important cultural centre, making a difference in community life across the region. While preserving the best of teaching traditions, it seeks to be relevant to the modern-day requirements for national education. The development of a quality management system is currently underway here, with the teaching staff trying new creative approaches and employing innovative teaching techniques. At ASIAC, conditions have been created for studying mother tongues and foreign languages, with these latter crucial to the institute's integration into the world's academic community. An Arctic dimension has been added to the curriculum so as to raise the students' awareness of local indigenous heritage and foster their commitment to preserving and promoting it, including through public education institution. ASIAC aims to raise public awareness of the value system and the traditions of northern indigenous communities' spiritual culture, making use of modern information technology. IT is crucial to its ambition of growing into a major centre of education, science and culture in North-Eastern Russia, whose rich intellectual and information resources could benefit the nation and the world at large. It is with this goal in mind that the institute works to expand its online resources, including the academic e-library. The library is comprised of databases featuring all kinds of material essential for learning, including digitized textbooks, teaching aids, methodology essays, and so on. A Web interface has been developed for the convenience of authorized users' access to those of the resources whose use should be confined to the local network. education, systematizing research in their arts and culture, and accumulating creative ideas and intellectual resources to preserve their cultural diversity. "Circumpolar Civilization in World Museums: Past, Present, Future" (http:// arcticmuseum.com/) has also been developed in association with UNESCO. This project shows how, despite the harsh climatic conditions, northern Russia's subpolar communities have managed to survive and develop highly distinctive cultures and lifestyles. They are part of a civilization referred to by the research community as "circumpolar" and dating back thousands of years. Here are some of the proposals concerning further efforts to support and promote the northern indigenous peoples' languages, arts and culture: 1. In order to improve native subpolar communities' access to information resources, the elaboration and implementation of the Programme for Promoting Indigenous Cultural and Linguistic Diversity should be recognized as a priority of Russia's Information Society Development Strategy (this task will be hard to fulfill without serious government support in the form of a target programme); 2. Setting up an association of developers of online resources on indigenous peoples' cultural and linguistic diversity and building an integrated e-library based on digitized content from Yakutia's Republican Library, complete with a common electronic catalogue; 3. Recommending to the Yakut government that it place a state order for programmes to train, retrain and upgrade specialists in culture-related IT at the Arctic Insitute of Arts and Culture, in line with the new, third-generation national educational standards. In the course of the emancipation of the Roma as a European ethnicity, Romani became one of the primary features of a transnational Roma identity. This process, which started in the 1970s, is mainly based on a common history and culture and consequently aims for a common language. This resulted in various attempts to standardise Romani, which have more or less failed so far. However, concrete measures to codify individual varieties and expand their functions from mainly oral use in informal situations into formal written usage have been successful to some extent. This expansion of Romani into formal domains resulted in literate forms of Romani and inter alia also in its use on the internet. The use of Romani on the internet is best described by the examples of various web pages which were set up as a result of the emancipation of the Roma as an ethnolinguistic community of Europe. Romani is used on websites of: • national and international Romani NGOs, • international NGOs and organisations, • public and private Romani media. Romani is a dominated language. Romani speakers are always plurilingual and mainly use the respective dominant language in formal written domains. Consequently, there are no monolingual Romani web pages on the internet. Romani texts primarily accompany texts in dominant languages which is in line with the additive type of linguistic diversity on the internet. Almost as a rule, the language of the state in which the respective NGO is active dominates its web pages. Some websites are almost exclusively in the dominant language as for instance the pages of the Austrian cultural association of Roma, the Kulturverein Österreichischer Roma . 86 • The use of Romani only in the name of the organisation also applies for the web presentation of the Kumanovo/Macedonia-based NGO Daja, 'Mothers', . Apart from the official denomination, the entire website is in Macedonian with some texts translated into English. Such bilingual websites using English in addition to the respective dominant language of the country where the NGO is active demonstrate not only the importance of English as an international language but also the functional restrictions of Romani as a dominated language outlined in chapter 1. The written style in public political domains of a state is fully covered by the dominant state language. Thus the scope of all other languages spoken on the territory of the respective country is limited to some other formal written domains, for instance education, and mainly to oral informal domains of everyday life and the private sphere. To spread information beyond the national level and to produce an effect on the international level, the use of an international language is indispensible. Therefore, English in its function as the global lingua franca is used alongside the national language. The use of Romani in web presentations of Romani NGOs is more or less mere symbolism. It is used for identity flagging, for indicating cultural independence, for maintaining ethnocultural status, etc., but almost never for communicative purposes. Supranational organisations and Roma NGOs acting primarily on the international level as a rule use English in its globally dominant function as the primary language for their web presence. Examples of such web pages are listed below: 89 • The web presentation of the European Roma Information Office -ERIO is exclusively in English. This international Brussels/Belgium-based NGO, which is almost exclusively run by Roma, aims to be the sole legitimate representation of Roma to the European Commission and the European Parliament. The use of Romani on international websites is obviously linked to the ethnic background of the majority of persons involved or dominating the respective organisation. On the websites of international NGOs run and dominated by Roma, the use of Romani seems to be a rare exception. On the websites of organisations initiated and led by Gadže, Romani is almost as a rule present on web pages in the form of translations. At first sight this correlation -the more Roma dominate the less Romani is used -seems contradictory. On the background of functionality and the need for symbolism this contradiction dissolves. Gadže include Romani into the web presentations of organisations they dominate or participate in for various but highly interlinked reasons: Romani is often used to express support for the self-organisation and emancipation process of the Roma that, to a large extent, aims for socio-cultural equality which is most obviously symbolised by language. Furthermore, the use of Romani insinuates sympathy for the political movement and commitment to assist the Roma in changing their sociocultural and sociopolitical situation. However, the use of Romani might also be interpreted as an act of legitimisation for the involvement of Gadže into the on-going emancipation process of the Roma. Consequently the online use of Romani by Gadže might be interpreted as the linguistic aspect of political correctness. As for Roma, the symbolic aspect of Romani use on international websites seems to be of minor or even no importance. The functional aspect dominates and, consequently, the internet presentation of international NGOs dominated by Roma and the information provided via the web is almost exclusively in English. As indicated by mentioning the online video language course on the website of the Romanian NGO Romathan, Romani gains communicative importance in oral language use and when the web is used interactively. This is inter alia also demonstrated by the use of Romani on and via the web pages of the Swedish Radio Romano -Nevimata thaj aktualitetura pe romani chib, 'Roma radionews and topicalities in the Romani language'. The web pages of Radio Romano are embedded into the website of Sveriges Radio/Radio Sweden and are accessible via the menu item Språk 'language' in the general menu of the website. The specific menu for navigation on the web pages of Radio Romano is provided in Romani. Written information on the pages is presented in Romani and to some extent also in Swedish. The archived broadcasts offered on the website are primarily in Romani with Swedish and other languages, mainly English, only used by and with interviewees with no competence in Romani. In contrast to the websites described so far, which primarily target the speakers of dominant languages for political purposes, these web pages above all aim to inform plurilingual individuals with competences in Romani, Swedish and also English. Instead of an additive multilingualism with symbolic function, language use in cases like Radio Romano has to be described as integrative plurilingualism with a primarily communicative function. The communicative function also prevails in numerous Roma chat rooms which are characterised by interactive language use and, as it is almost the rule in chat rooms used by speakers of dominated, non-standardised languages, by orate style as well as spontaneous writing. 91 As indicated by the texts on the welcome page of in German and Romani, Herzlich Willkommen im Roma-Chat!/T'aven saste taj bachtale, ' A warm welcome to Roma Chat/Be healthy and happy', the chat rooms hosted by the website are plurilingual. Actual language use in online chats of ethnic groups usually comprises all languages of the repertoire of the respective speech community. Language mixing or rather linguistic hybridisation in the form of spontaneous loans and communicative code switching are as common as changes in the primary language by situational switching. 92 If the primary language in a chat is a dominant language, a national language or an international lingua franca, Romani is often restricted to symbolic functions -see the welcome formula presented above -of identity flagging, and the expression of solidarity and affiliation. In 91 Whereas the dichotomy between oral and written refers to the form of communication which is defined by the respective acoustic and visual channels, the dichotomy between orate and literate refers to style. Both orate and literate style occur in written as well as in oral form: orate style in written form means spoken language written, literate style in oral form means written language spoken, etc. 92 As most chat rooms require registration to guarantee privacy, no specific examples are presented in this paper. Mitrivoca through reports and stories of their parents and grandparents. They were not yet born or small children when they left their countries of origin. Nevertheless, the Romani dialect of Kosova Mitrovica is the primary means of communication in the chat and is used in the plurilingual mode described above: orate style, spontaneous writing, and linguistic hybridisation by making use of all common languages in the repertoires of the interlocutors. 96 The difference between additive multilingualism and integrative plurilingualism outlined in chapter 1 of this paper has become obvious from the examples discussed in sections 2.1 and 2.2: • In additive multilingual settings Romani only functions as an auxiliary language. It is presented in a literate written form with predominant symbolic functions. The communicative aspect of websites that provide translations into Romani is mainly covered by the respective dominant languages, the national language of the country where a Roma NGO is based and active, or English on the web pages of supranational organisations and NGOs with international aims. • In integrative plurilingual settings Romani usage often equals that of other languages. It is used in an orate style and communicative functions prevail. As neither Romani speakers nor the internet are monolingual in Romani, other languages are used in domains they cover and/or are embedded into Romani in interactive online communication. Compared to the more or less static mode of Romani usage in additive online multilingualism, the mode of interaction in integrative plurilingual settings is dynamic and, consequently, highly transient. The differences described so far are in no way aspects of simple two-way dichotomies but features marking the two extremes of a gradual field between ethnic symbolism and communicative functionalism against the background of the sociolinguistic situation of Romani as expressed by the arrows in the following summary table: This limited but to some extent representative cross-section of Romani usage on the internet reflects the repertoire of Romani speech communities as well as the functions of Romani in relation to those of the other languages used in web presentations of Roma NGOs, international organisations and public as well as private Romani online media. As the sociolinguistic situation of Romani is by no means unique and asymmetrical relationships between languages are common and natural, the case of Romani allows for generalisations of language use against the background of linguistic diversity on the internet. The use of a language on the internet is more or less based on its functional scope. International English as the global lingua franca, naturally, is the dominant language of the internet. Transnational languages such as Portuguese, Russian, and Swahili cover their areas of usage in the same way as national, regional, or minority languages do. On the basis of a functional approach each domain is characterised by dominant and dominated languages, a situation that reflects communicative reality or rather functionalities, as well as the status and prestige of languages. However, status and function are not a dialectic pair. Status prevails over functionality and not the other way around. Therefore, web pages translated into dominated languages which lack the necessary functionalities only contribute to symbolic additive multilingualism which can be easily transformed into statistics. However, such data are not meaningful at all. Only dynamic, transient and consequently unmeasurable or rather uncountable language use which is based on communicative integrative plurilingualism reflects the reality of linguistic diversity on the internet. The dialogue between cultures and civilizations is among the most topical and popular themes in the world. Many countries arrange roundtables, conferences and forums on this dialogue. Every such meeting certainly deserves support and encouragement -at least, because it is in itself a dialogue. Regrettably, all these events have only token influence on the actual situation. Any news agency's information appearing on the TV or online proves that point. Prejudice, intolerance, ethnic purges, war and genocide reign in this world. Conflicts and confrontations are snowballing. However, ever more political, religious and community activists, researchers and people-in-the-street join discussions on the intercultural dialogue with every passing year to advance hypotheses, scenarios and initiatives. Thus, certain scholars are sure that the available contradictions between civilizations inevitably lead to antagonisms and clashes, the opportunities for a dialogue are dwindling, and the multicultural community has no future. There is another opinion -that all nations of the world should emulate the Western model to prevent confrontation. Doubtless, Western ideas of freedom and democracy, high living standards and rapid development are praiseworthy. Despite all that, we see quite well that these patterns cannot be accepted by the entire worldmainly due to the current amount and distribution of resources, as well as to geopolitical, historical and cultural factors. The intercultural dialogue is no longer a problem of cultural studies alone. It has crossed their limits to penetrate big politics. Globalization is underway. Some are enthusiastic about it while others consider it a disaster. Be that as it may, we are all aware of sweeping changes in our life. Probably, each of us should see that we are not only our countries' citizens: we are also members of a family named "humanity". Globalization has made us all dwellers of a vast united space in which dialogues between persons, states and nations should base on ethics. The political and economic laws that rule the present-day world are deplorably far from the principles of justice, and the idea of global ethics might appear utopian. However, let us look back at the past, and we will see that many breakthroughs of the current civilization started with ideas and actions that were in their time also regarded as utopian. All over the history of Azerbaijan, it was populated by dozens of tribes and ethnic and religious communities. They contacted each other for millennia to promote information exchanges between cultures and civilizations. The indigenous population consisted of Turkic, Caucasian and Persian ethnic entities. After Azerbaijan was incorporated into the Russian Empire, and later the USSR, it was flooded by thousands of people of diverse nationalities and ethnic backgrounds. They were mildly assimilated, just as the indigenous population with its psychological flexibility. Azerbaijanis have always been able to put up with aliens just the way they were. They never tried to forcefully adapt newcomers to their own customs and mentality. Shortly after the establishment of the Azerbaijani Democratic Republic, the ideas of equality and ethnic diversity were in the focus of government attention. The Declaration of Independence of Azerbaijan, made public on May 28, 1918, said: "The Azerbaijani Democratic Republic guarantees civil and political rights within its boundaries to all citizens, irrespective of ethnicity, religion, social status and gender" (Article 4), whereas Article 5 vouched "vast possibilities for free development" to all ethnic entities in the republic. There were schools with tuition in many ethnic languages all over the country. The ethnic press, cultural centres, theatres and educational institutions prospered. In 1920-1991, Azerbaijan was part of the Soviet Union, and so not an international legal entity. Its independence was again proclaimed in 1991. The sovereign Republic of Azerbaijan made its first intergovernmental agreements on the protection of ethnic minorities' rights with the other former Soviet constituent republics because millions of people found themselves outside their ethnic boundaries in the Soviet era. The new Constitution of Azerbaijan, endorsed in 1995, proclaimed equal rights of all its peoples irrespective of language, religion, race and cultural traditions. Article 44 says: "1.Every citizen shall have the right to retain his/her ethnic identity.2. No one shall be forced to change his/her ethnic identity." This statement fully complies with the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, whose Article 5, Clause 2, says: "Without prejudice to measures taken in pursuance of their general integration policy, the Parties shall refrain from policies or practices aimed at assimilation of persons belonging to national minorities against their will and shall protect these persons from any action aimed at such assimilation." Article 45, Clause 2, of the Constitution of Azerbaijan confirms: "1.Everyone shall have the right to use his/her native language.2. No one shall be deprived to the right to use his/her native language," while Article 21 emphasizes that "the Republic of Azerbaijan shall guarantee the free use and development of other languages spoken by the population." This statement finds practical confirmation by the presence of more than twenty schools with Russian as the only language of tuition, and approximately 300 schools with several languages of tuition. President Ilkham Aliev said: "Azerbaijan treats ethnic Russians traditionally well.Not a single Russian-language school has been closed.On the contrary, we provide conditions for the best possible Russian language studies." There are schools with tuition in Modern Hebrew in Baku and Red Borough, Kuba District. Jewish history and traditions are on the curricula there. A Jewish educational centre opened in a gala in Baku's Hatai District on October 4, 2010. The decisive role in its construction belonged to the Heidar Aliev Foundation. Several schools teach the fundamentals of the Ukrainian, Tatar, Lezgian and other languages. The Baku Slavic University, one of the best-respected universities in Azerbaijan, is known for Slav language studies and linguistic research, while the Baku State University has a faculty of Modern Hebrew. The Samed Vurgun State Russian-Language Theatre successfully works in Baku and frequently hosts guest performances by stage companies from Russia and other CIS countries. The Lezgian-and Georgian-language state theatres also thrive. There are press outlets and cultural and educational centres working in many languages spoken in Azerbaijan. Further harmonization of interethnic relations and prevention of encroachments on ethnic minorities' rights are an essential part of Azerbaijani government policies. The Ministry of Culture and Tourism is the principal government agency responsible for the implementation of programmes and policy of the promotion of intercultural dialogue at the national and local levels. It closely cooperates with the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sport, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Justice, the State Committee for Work with Religious Organizations, the State Committee for Family, Women and Children Affairs, the National Academy of Sciences, the Republican Copyright Agency, and other involved organizations. The Ministry of Culture and Tourism is implementing practical programmes to preserve and develop the cultural values of ethnic minorities and groups in Azerbaijan. These programmes envisage cooperation with ethnic minorities' cultural centres and communities, their stage companies' guest performances in and outside Azerbaijan, and ethnographic and art exhibitions. The ministry promotes the creation and performance of art works developing ethnic customs and traditions, and provides folk costumes, musical instruments and other equipment for amateur performing companies. The Ministry of Culture and Tourism goes on implementing the Cultural Diversity in Azerbaijan project, aiming to provide information about ethnic and cultural diversity and promote the public awareness of the necessity to develop and encourage the intercultural dialogue. Ethnic minorities' cultural associations are attracted to take part in the project. The "Azerbaijan, A second "Azerbaijan, My Native Land" festival followed in October 2008, and a third in June 2011.They included research conferences, photo shows, and routine and gala concerts that involved several thousand participants from almost all ethnic minorities and groups resident in all parts of Azerbaijan.With its efficient government policy of promoting languages and cultures, Azerbaijan is steadily turning into a universally recognized exporter of the experience of international support of cultural diversity, and Baku has national minorities the right of equality before the law and of equal protection of the law". Deserving special attention in this respect is ethnic minorities' active participation in public services of all levels and representative bodies of Azerbaijan. There are Lezghins, Avars, Russians, Jews, Kurds and people of other ethnic backgrounds among the members of the Milli Mejlis. Azerbaijan has a unique historical and ethnological situation: the offspring of its aboriginal population of many centuries ago still retain their languages and traditions -suffice to mention the Udin, whose majority live in the village of Nij in the Gabala District. With small exceptions, they profess Christianity and speak their native language in everyday situations. The same concerns the Shakhdag ethnic group, which consists of the Khanalyg, Budug and Kryz. The Azerbaijani nation has always taken pride in the multitude of peoples, religions and cultures in its land. The Azerbaijani think wisely that every citizen of their country is a member of one family whose duty it is to promote the development of his or her salient features and protect unique ethnic and cultural qualities. Our nation's humanism finds material proof in the small ethnic minorities surviving through centuries. History has given the world an inimitable example of peaceful coexistence of the many ethnic and religious groups. For many centuries, the Azerbaijani people have instilled patriotism in the nation without recurring to coercive assimilation, and developed mutual respect and intolerance of nationalism in whatever form. Multiculturalism is my country's present-day reality, which shows that time and patience can make an alloy of many peoples and religions. Role of Modern ICT in Keeping Sakha Language Afloat The Sakha language, better known as Yakut, branched off from its parent language, proto-Turkic, about two thousand years ago. Despite Mongol and Tungus-Manchurian influences, it has preserved its basic structure to this day, and, according to experts, is, perhaps, the closest of all modern languages to Proto-Turkic. The current processes of globalization and cultural homogenization dramatically undermine the world's ethnic diversity while also stepping up contact between languages, which may enrich or debilitate one another as a result. This leads to many smaller communities losing touch with their roots and finding themselves on the sidelines; the situation further aggravates social inequality, causing public discontent. There is a risk of subversive forces hijacking that protest sentiment, especially strong among the young. This is why it is so important to sustain linguistic and cultural continuity from one generation to the next. Few people would deny that language is an important (perhaps even the most important) element of any ethnic culture. Every particular language has its own ways to encode basic notions of life, and human language at large is a means of identity building as much as a product of social development. One method consists in linguistic standardization (including of neologismbuilding rules) and the creation of databases from documents and text corpora. Another is about the preservation of living small languages as means of everyday communication. This can be achieved by expanding their functional scope and, more importantly, by ensuring their generational continuity. Let us begin by outlining children's personality and worldview development milestones. For the sake of convenience, we will rely on the commonly accepted ages & stages model. Preschool education marks the most important developmental stage, one that paves the way for worldview formation and for the encoding of notions and actions with the help of words and phrases. There are two major types of preschool learning. One is about home-based education, usually provided by parents and grandparents, with the older family members serving in this case as the main transmitter of culture for the young. The other type is applicable to cases when both parents work outside home. A prominent role in children's early education is then played by nursery schools and kindergartens. Starting from two or three years of age, kids whose parents work fulltime have to spend most of the day with preschool teachers and caregivers. The next stage is primary and secondary education. In that period, children tend to spend less time with their teachers, so it would be only natural to expect a resurge in parental influence. In reality, though, the role of parents shrinks further because, on the one hand, child-teacher contacts gain in intensity, with the teacher becoming a major transmitter of knowledge, while on the other hand, the child's inner circle expands and so, too, does the range of his/her information sources. Then comes tertiary education (vocational schools, colleges, and universities). It is widely believed that by the time they pass on to this phase, most teenagers will have almost reached adult maturity. So the role of tertiary education establishments in personality molding is, more often than not, negligible. A community's status quo cannot be preserved unless a community member gives birth to and raises a child. For simple demographic reproduction, one woman (family) should give birth to 2.4 children (given infertility incidence, infant mortality, etc.). In smaller language communities these days, there are quite a few parents who believe that teaching the native language to their children is no longer relevant and may even be harmful, so they choose to concentrate on a national language instead. Because of this trend, a native speaker population in small language communities will take an increasingly high birth rate to reproduce itself. Looking at the modern-day Yakutia, we can see that preschool education here is rarely provided in the language of its indigenous inhabitants. The same is true of any other non-Russian ethnic region or community in Russia. So children who spend much of the day in a nursery-school environment are just bound to grow up without knowing their mother tongue. The second developmental phase (through high school) further consolidates the alienation from their mother tongue of children from smaller language communities (in most of the country's non-Russian ethnic regions, schools providing education in native languages are few and far between or virtually non-existent). This process is exacerbated by a lack of native-language content in a schoolchild's information environment (advertising, entertainment, games, extracurricular activities, mass media, the Internet, etc.). And at the tertiary stage, exposure to one's mother tongue in small language communities is often reduced to a bare minimum. As the basic speech and language skills are developed at the preschool stage, when children are still too dependent to make their own decisions, it is necessary to convince parents of the importance of passing mother-tongue knowledge on to their offspring -for him or her to grow into a wholesome personality and a community member competitive enough and resistant to harmful influences. It is necessary to provide every kind of support for native language learning at preschool education establishments, opening new, modern nursery schools and kindergartens. The right to study one's native language and in one's native language must also be ensured in primary and secondary education. There is a need to create an appropriate native language environment and to provide ample supply of various type of content in the language. To better understand what should be done to expand the Yakut language's functional scope, let us try to overview its present-day status. Yakut is better off than many other minority languages spoken in Russia. It is not that the Yakut have numerical superiority over fellow non-Russian communities. But unlike other indigenous groups, many of the Sakha people not only speak their language, but write in it, as well. This creates a demand for Yakut-speaking journalists and authors while also ensuring wide enough circulation for Yakut-language print media, large audiences for electronic media, and relatively high book publishing numbers. Basically, the Yakut language owes its high profile in modern-day community life to the prominence given to it on the school curriculum. But despite the broad circulation of Yakut periodicals (the newspaper Kyym, according to statistics from Russia's National Circulation Service, in 2009 set a record among the non-Russian newspapers, outstripping periodicals in Tatar, Bashkir and other minority languages) and the high number of young authors writing in Yakut (at last year's 17 th young writing talent conference, the auditorium was packed beyond capacity), we should not let ourselves become complacent. If, making the most of today's level of ICT development, it is not put on a par with functionally more advanced languages, but continues to service a limited number of areas of human activity (such as agriculture, arts, and household practices), young community members will be reluctant to study it themselves and to teach it to their children. And the Yakut language's relevance may then rapidly dwindle as a result. This is why it is so important for the Republic of Sakha's indigenous peoplesthe Yakut, the Evenki, the Even, and the Yukaghir -to have their languages represented in cyberspace and to expand their use in areas like science and technology, as well as in the activity of various public institutions. In the modern-day world, accessibility of information and communications technology is the key to language use expansion. Being accessible to Yakutia's urban population (at least in comparison with neighboring regions), ICT remains out of reach for most of the republic's rural communities, who constitute the main source of traditional culture and language knowledge. It is highly unlikely, though, that the local Internet and mobile phone providers will lower the prices of their services any time soon, nor that they will invest in the purchase of new hardware. In Yakutia's still narrow ICT market, such a behavior would defy the sheer logic of economics. So alternative solutions have to be found. One way of going about this problem would be to foster competition (for instance, by providing preferential treatment for innovative wireless communications technology) or to adopt regional government programmes aimed at reducing the digital gap. Providing users with quality information. Users (especially young ones) should be provided with a terminology base (in ICT and related areas) and relevant software, along with informative and entertaining content in their native language. A child/parent/teacher searching for some fairy tale or flash movie in the language should have a choice of several sites offering the required content. There is also a need for various computer-based teaching aids and training/ simulation tools, as well as for publicly accessible databases on various subject areas, such as law. In addition, indigenous inhabitants should be provided with opportunities for online communication in their native language with fellow counterparts. It seems like a good idea to create forums for specific expert communities, such as finance specialists, accountants, etc. And then again, there should be an excess supply of appropriate content and communication tools. Terminology. There is a need for the republic's Cabinet and parliament to adopt regulatory acts that would sustain the homogeneity of the Yakut terminology base. • Chukchi Peninsula Eskimo society Yupik (Providence, Chukchi Peninsula, Russia); • Ethnic & cultural public movement Chychetkin Vettav (Anadyr, Chukchi Peninsula, Russia). The programme's guidelines include identification, studying, preservation, and distribution (paper, digital and word-of-mouth) of content related to: • fundamentals of the Eskimo and the Chukchi languages, including professional vocabulary, traditional knowledge, and related industrial & cultural expertise, customs and rituals; • cultural landscape structures of sea hunters and reindeer breeders, including the system of traditional settlement and economic practices overland and at sea, as well as ethnic toponymics; • history of the various communities, biographies of their most prominent members; anthropologic categorization of the Asiatic Eskimo and Chukchi. The Programme's four sections are described below. Recording narratives and theme interviews, along with videotaping the narrators and their traditional economic activities. Materials prepared in the course of that work are preserved in digital form and subsequently published (see L. Bogoslovskaya, I. Slugin, I. Zagrebin, I Krupnik: Introduction to Sea Hunting, Heritage Institute Publishers, Anadyr, 2007). Of particular value are the original drafts and drawings of traditional hunting gear, primarily harpoon tips and baydaras (open skin boats) and the desriptions of their production techniques, illustrated with video footage. These drafts are nowadays used in building baydaras in many communities of the Providence and the Chukchi regions. The first ever dictionary of related terminology in the Chaplino Eskimo language has been released, with Russian equivalents. This is the result of a collaborative effort by Andrei Ankalin, a sea hunter from the Sireniki settlement, and the ship designer Sergei Bogoslovsky, who has built -to a traditional design -a model of an Eskimo baydara-anyapik, a small boat employed in ice hunting for sealife; it has a wooden skeleton secured by leather straps, and is upholstered with walrus skin. Going to sea on an Eskimo baydara built in the Sireniki community. © Photo by N.Perov. Inspectors of the Beringia park, A. Apalyu (of the Yanrakynnot village) and A. Borovik (from Novoye Chaplino) have photographed with digital cameras the entire cycle of hunting for grey and Greenland whales and of onshore game processing. The preservation of traditional whale and pinniped hunting as well as of food culture traditions is a key challenge facing the Chukchi Peninsula's indigenous population. Specialists in medical anthropology have proved that the increased incidence in iron-deficiency anemia and myopia, the high mortality rate among cancer patients, and the appearance of various kinds of "urban" disease, hitherto unknown locally, are all a direct consequence of the shift of the local population's diets toward industrial foods. Only traditional staples, including the flesh and fat of winnipeds and whales, can ensure good health and longevity for the modern and future generations of the Eskimo and coastal Chukchi, researchers say. languages. Another periodical, Sovetken Chukotka, then came to the scene, followed by Murgin Nutenut. With the advancement of radio and television, shows in community languages began to be broadcast all over the Chukchi Peninsula, even to reindeer breeders' camps. The local Krainiy Sever newspaper these days carries only Chukchi-language translations of Russian news stories, unfortunately. The paper's Website, ks87.ru, runs a special Chukchi-language column, called Vettav. Local radio stations continue broadcasting programmes in the Chukchi, the Eskimo, and the Evenki languages, but the duration of broadcasts has decreased dramatically since the mid-20 th century. The shrinking community-language scope and the decreasing number of indigenous inhabitants speaking their native languages have promptednorthern communities to create several public organizations that would work toward preserving their native languages and traditional cultures. The most efficient of these is arguably the Chychetkin Vettav (Native Word). Members of this association hold regular meetings, where only the Chukchi language is spoken, and invite over some of the prominent indigenous narrators and dancers, photographing and filming their performances. This section started off with efforts to study the photographic archives collected by V. Bogoraz and A. Forshtein, with the originals held at the American Museum of Natural History (New York City, U.S.) and the Peter the Great Anthropology and Ethnography Museum, of the Russian Academy of Sciences, St. Petersburg. These are rich collections of photographic images, giving a good idea of previous generations' looks and lifestyles. Some of the images have been attributed and, with the museums' consent, they were printed in the 2007 manual "Introduction to Sealife Hunting," in the "Tropoyu Bogoraza" collection (2008) , and in a book on sled dog breeding, "Nadezhda -a Race Along the Earth's Edge" (2011). V. Nuvano's family archives have been digitized and retouched. They contain one-off images of the Chukchi jailed after the 1940 uprising and sent to gulags, as well as pictures of the widows and orphaned children of the reindeer breeders persecuted then. Despite the significant achievements already made within the framework of the Programme for the Preservation of Cultural and Linguistic Diversity of the Eskimo and Chukchi, there is a need for more efforts toward preserving and studying the dialects of the Chukchi language and its unique gender differences (the male and female phonetic patterns). No clue has yet been found to explain the phenomenon of scarce cross-borrowings between the Eskimo and the coastal Chukchi languages. The famous sealife hunting culture of the Bering Strait exists in a bilingual environment, yet the two languages, with dissimilar origins and vocabulary, develop each their own separate way. Funds are now being raised to finance the showcasing of the programme's major achievements in a book series and in a collection of discs. The primary aim, though, is to instill the indigenous cultural and linguistic heritage preservation awareness among younger generations, encouraging them to join in the effort. Yukaghir Language and Culture in Cyberspace Scholars believe that the Yukaghir people once formed a separate family of related tribes. Russians who explored North-Eastern Siberia at the beginning of the 17 th century found survivors of twelve indigenous tribes in the area between the Lena and the Anadyr Rivers. Those tribes all had a common ethnonym, "Odul," along with various local names such as alai, koime, and anaul. According to period yasak tribute bills, there were about 6,000 Odul (or Yukaghir) speakers in the early 17 th century. Their numbers subsequently dropped, though. Overtime, the remnants of surviving tribes became dissolved in other ethnic communities, with only two groups maintaining their ancestral language and culture -the Yukaghirs of the lower and the upper Kolyma River (some specialists regard them as separate ethnicities speaking related languages). As of 2002, the total number of ethnic Yukaghirs was 1,509, including 1,097 Yakutia-based. Of these, only 604 (or 40%) spoke the Yukaghir language. It should be noted here that the Yukaghir language status differs from community to community. Many of the Yukaghir inhabitants based in the tundra have now switched over to either Yakut or Russian while those living in forestland tend to speak Russian more. The tundra-based Yukaghir communities, meanwhile, often opt for multilingualism, using languages such as Yukaghir, Even, Chukchi, Yakut and Russian. Importantly, these statistics do not reflect the actual level of language proficiency. The overwhelming majority of the respondents who claimed they speak Yukaghir are not fluent speakers really, with their "command" often based on the knowledge of a limited number of words and phrases. As of early 2011, fewer than thirty natives were fluent in the Yukaghir language, including five in its forestland dialect. The problem of language preservation is closely related to a community's socio-economic and cultural development. In efforts to preserve the Yukaghir language, particular attention should be paid to the following tasks: 1. Encouraging the use of the native language in a household environment; 2. Teaching the language at pre-school institutions; 3. Shaping language awareness in schoolchildren; 4. Teaching the language to college students; In 2010, the Yukaghir language and culture specialists L. Zhukova, P. Prokopieva, A. Prokopieva, E. Atlasova, and V. Shadrin, working in collaboration with the North-Eastern Federal University's Center of New Information Technology, developed a programme for the promotion of the Yukaghir language and culture on digital carriers and in cyberspace. Designed for the period through 2014, the programme should become a real breakthrough in efforts to preserve the Yukahghir language, including through the publication of relevant textbooks and teaching aids. That project received wide support from the university's top and became part of its own development programme. It provides, specifically, for the release of several dozen new-generation textbooks, the launch of the links webpage www.arctic-megapedia.ru, and the organization of expeditions into Yukaghir communities to collect ethnographic, linguistic and folklore material. The effort has already yielded its first results -five Yukaghirlanguage textbooks on CDs and a language & culture links webpage, prepared with contributions from native speakers and tradition carriers. There is every reason to expect that the North-Eastern Federal University will soon become a major centre for the preservation and advancement of the Yukaghir language and culture. "cultural diversity as a source of exchange, innovation and creativity is just as indispensable for humanity as biological diversity for Nature, and is a treasure shared by the entire human race", 10. Thanking also the Government and the people of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) for their hearty hospitality, which ensured the success of the Conference, In the context of this article, the term "culture" is used in the broadest sense to denote the entirety of salient material, intellectual and emotional features of a given community or social group, comprising the arts and literature, as well as lifestyle, the status of human rights, value systems, education, customs, traditions and philosophy. Legacy encodings are non-standardised, and often proprietary encodings. Abugida scripts are syllabic scripts, most of which are generated from Indian Brahmi scripts and currently used in South and Southeast Asian regions. Another important Abugida script is Amharic. Based on the Web version, an equivalent of the 16 th edition of Ethnologue. Two curves provide the upper and lower limits. The upper curve indicates the LDI of a two-language community. As the addition of a third-language speaker to this community increases the average probability to encounter different language speakers, this value is the minimum LDI of more than two language communities. The lower curve indicates the LDI of a very special case, where each member, in addition to the local language, speaks another language, or the maximum LDI. Language Observatory Project -http://www.language-observatory.org/. See reference[4]. Some information in this report is repeated from the author's 2008 report at the I International Conference on Linguistic and Cultural Diversity in Cyberspace(Yakutsk, Russian Federation, 2008). The full study Langues et cultures sur la Toile is available online: . 9 Corbeil Jean-Claude, «I comme informatique, industries de la langue et Internet », in B. Cerquigliny, Tu parles!?Le français dans tous ses états, Paris, Flammarion, 2000, p. 129. It should be noted that we refer to "recognition" when the engine can search in a language and find results. Google might offer interfaces in a given language -in 120 to date -but that does not mean that the engine recognizes the language. Bordon María, Gómez Isabel, "Towards a single language in science?A Spanish view" inSerials, vol. 17, No.2, July 2004, pp. 189-195. PCT Annual Review: The international patent system in 2008, WIPO, 2009, p. 20 of French version, [online]. (page consulted on 12 April 2010). See the final paragraph of the document presenting the White House's Innovation Strategy: . 17 Namely Catalan, Spanish, French, Italian, Portuguese and Romanian. Galician is finding it hard to find satisfaction despite various initiatives and the other Romance languages, for different reasons, are far from being considered suitably equipped to be used in contexts of specialization. Prado, Daniel (2012). Language Presence in the Real World and Cyberspace. In NET.LANG: Towards the Multilingual Cyberspace. MAAYA NETWORK: C&F Éditions: 35-51 Negash, Ghirmai (2005). Globalization and the Role of African Languages for Development. Paper presented at the conference "Language Communities or Cultural Empires",February 9-11, 2005, University of California at Berkeley.The Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan 2011, Government of South Sudan, Page 13.The Language Plan of Action for Africa, Council of Ministers , Forth -Sixth Ordinary Session, 20-25 July 1987, Res. 1123 (XLVI), Organization of the African Unity, General Secretariat, Addis Ababa, Pages 2-3.Second Decade of Education for Africa (2006-2015), Draft Plan of Action for the Second Decade of Education for Africa, June 2006, Department of Human Resources, Science and Technology, African Union Commission, Page 11. 29 Charter for African Cultural Renaissance, African Union Commission, January 2006, page 9. International Labor Organization Convention No. 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, Geneva, 1989; UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (adopted by Resolution 61/295 of the General Assembly, September 13, 2007); Concept for Sustainable Development of Small Indigenous Peoples of Russia's North, Siberia and Far East.Moscow, 2009.Work reported on in this paper was supported by the following Australian Research Council grants: SR0566965 -Sharing access and analytical tools for ethnographic digital media using high speed networks; DP0450342 -New methodologies for representing and accessing resources on endangered languages: a case study from South Efate.http://paradisec.org.au.http://www.language-archives.org/.36 http://nci.org.au/.37 See http://www.paradisec.org.au/info.html for more on filenaming.38 http://creativecommons.org/.http://www.esrc.unimelb.edu.au/hdms/.The collection catalog can be searched at http://paradisec.org.au/catalog, or at http://www.language-archives.org/search?q=&a=paradisec.org.au.46 http://www.paradisec.org.au/pdsc-manual10.pdf.This paper is based on an earlier study(Schüller 2008) carried out within EU-funded project TAPE -Training for Audiovisual Preservation in Europe, 2004-2008.The general situation of audiovisual documents, in which the situation of research materials is embedded, has recently been discussed at the International Conference Preservation of Digital Information in the Information Society: Problems and Prospects, Moscow,October 2011(Schüller, 2012).The principles of this strategy and the practical guidelines for audio and video see IASA-TC 03, 04, and 06.See: Wallaszkovits 2012.53 http://research.iub.edu/communications/media_preservation/.54 http://www.upethnom.com/index.php.http://www.senrevolution.com (among other sites).http://www.dsg.ae/NEWSANDEVENTS/UpcomingEvents/ASMRHome.aspx.64 http://www.dsg.ae/NEWSANDEVENTS/UpcomingEvents/ASMROverview2.aspx.65 http://www.dsg.ae/portals/0/ASMR2.pdf, page 9. http://www.dsg.ae/portals/0/ASMR2.pdf, page 6. 69 http://www.dsg.ae/portals/0/ASMR2.pdf, page 14.http://www.r-shief.org/.Work has been done with support from the Fundamental Linguistic Research Foundation (http://www.ffli. ru), Project S-43.The TEI's aim is to develop standardized methods for marking textual resources.[Editor's note.] 79 Concordance is a list of examples of the use of a particular word in context, as sourced from a textual corpus, complete with links to the source.	The 2 nd International Conference on Linguistic and Cultural Diversity in Cyberspace took place on 12-14 July, 2011, in Yakutsk, Russian Federation.It became one of the key events within the framework of the Russian chairmanship in the UNESCO Information for All Programme.The event was organized by the Russian Committee of the UNESCO Information for All Programme, the North-Eastern Federal University, the Interregional Library Cooperation Centre, the MAAYA World Network for Linguistic Diversity, and Latin Union with the support of the Ministry of Culture of the Russian Federation, the Commission of the Russian Federation for UNESCO, and UNESCO.The conference gathered about 100 experts from about 30 countries of all continents, including Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, China, Dominican Republic, Egypt, France, India, Japan, Kazakhstan, Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Mali, Mexico, Moldova, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Russia, South Africa, Thailand, UK, Ukraine, USA.The First Conference on Linguistic and Cultural Diversity in Cyberspace, held in Yakutsk in 2008, was our first step in raising public awareness of the problems of multilingualism preservation and its development in cyberspace.It strengthened and developed professional relations and gave birth to continuous friendly contacts.Three years after the First conference heads and leading experts of intergovernmental and international organizations; governmental authorities; institutions of culture, education, science, information and communication; representatives of business entities; civil society; media gathered again in Yakutsk to discuss political, cultural, educational, ideological, philosophical, social, ethical, technological and other aspects of the activities aimed at supporting and preserving languages and cultures and promoting them in cyberspace.While the First Conference was organized by the Russian team only, the Second Conference was prepared with the active participation of the MAAYA and Latin Union.Thematic coverage of the Second Conference's professional programme was even broader than that of the First Conference and highlighted three decisive factors for the development of languages in cyberspace, namely: instruments for language promotion in cyberspace; institutions that are actively involved in the promotion of these instruments; and creation of favorable environment.The Second International Conference on Linguistic and Cultural Diversity in Cyberspace was significant for the entire world and for Russia in particular because our country is one of the most multiethnic, multilingual, multicultural and multiconfessional countries of the world.The conference final document -Yakutsk Call for Action: a Roadmap towards the World Summit on Multilingualism (2017) -was unanimously adopted at the closing session.The conference was a real success thanks to the active support by the Commission of the Russian Federation for UNESCO and its leaders -Sergei Lavrov, Chairman of the Commission and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, and Grigory Orjonikidze, Executive Secretary of the Commission; by the Ministry of Culture and especially Andrei Busygin, Deputy Minister, as well as Tatyana Manilova, Head of the Division of Libraries and Archives, and by the Government of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia).We are extremely grateful for the invaluable contribution to the preparation of this conference to a new partner of the Russian Committee of the UNESCO Information for All Programme, the North-Eastern Federal University (NEFU), which is being managed nowadays by our old friend Evgenia Mikhailova, former Vice-President of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia).If not for her good will and patronage we would not have been able to hold our First Conference in 2008 either in Yakutsk or in any other city of Russia.Consequently, the Second conference could not have been convened either.Special thanks go to Adama Samassekou and Daniel Prado, whose achievements, commitment to the honorable cause of language preservation, and global vision of the problem of multilingualism have been inspiring us over the recent years.And, last but not least, I thank our friends from the NEFU -Vice-Rector Nadezhda Zaikova; a young Head of the recently established Centre to Advance Multilingualism in Cyberspace Liudmila Zhirkova, for whom participating in the Conference preparation turned out to be a real trial by fire; a new Director of the University Library Tatiana Maximova and all Yakut colleagues who contributed to the organization of this conference.We believe that this collection of conference materials will be valuable for all those who face the necessity to tackle the essential problems of preserving linguistic and cultural diversity, and developing it in cyberspace at the contemporary level.All languages are linked through their origins and borrowing, but each is a unique source of meaning for understanding and expressing reality.As wellsprings of knowledge, languages are essential for the transmission of knowledge and information, they are of vital importance to manage the cultural diversity of our world and achieve the internationally agreed development goals.This is even more important this year, in 2011, as we celebrate the 10th anniversary of UNESCO's universal declaration on cultural diversity.The digital revolution is providing us with new frontiers for innovation, creativity and development.Increased access to knowledge and information provides new possibilities for individuals and societies.Having the necessary literacies and means to participate in these digital spaces is key to improve the quality of our lives.Such possibilities must be effectively shared by all, in all languages.The globalization process is very much facilitated by new technologies and the Internet.The success of the online edition of UNESCO's Atlas of the World's Languages in Danger shows the power of the Internet to track the state of languages and multilingualism, and to raise awareness with a global audience.Globalization is also coupled with a tendency towards standardization, which jeopardizes the presence of many languages in cyberspace and weakens cultural diversity.In a few generations, more than half of the approximately 7,000 languages spoken today in the world could disappear.UNESCO is committed to promoting multilingualism on the Internet.A plural linguistic cyberspace allows the wealth of diversity to put in common.By elaborating and implementing policies that address constraints to linguistic diversity, including in cyberspace, UNESCO contributes to fostering linguistic and cultural diversity and improve the conditions for promoting sustainable development and peace.These goals guide UNESCO in its work with the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers.Strong initiatives aimed at reinforcing linguistic and cultural diversity online as well as off-line are being undertaken.UNESCO's Member States adopted in 2003, the "Recommendation Concerning the Promotion and Use of Multilingualism and Universal Access to Cyberspace", and the "Charter on the Preservation of Digital Heritage".Both instruments provide guidance on steps that are to be taken to advance multilingualism in cyberspace.This second edition of the international conference "Linguistic and Cultural Diversity in Cyberspace", is an important step in consolidating and advancing the progress to date.Your endeavours are vital to find appropriate solutions to pressing concerns such as: elaborating public policies on languages in cyberspace; identifying techniques to ensure the presence of absent and under-represented languages; supporting the implementation of UNESCO's normative instruments.I greatly welcome these actions and encourage you in your efforts to facilitate cooperation and exchange at the national, regional and international levels.Let us all harness the power of progress to protect diverse visions of the world and to promote all sources of knowledge and forms of expression.I wish you fruitful discussions and look forward with great interest to the outcomes of your conference.Message from Grigory Ordzhonikidze, Executive Secretary of the Commission of the Russian Federation for UNESCO, to the participants of the 2 nd International Conference "Linguistic and Cultural Diversity in Cyberspace" I cordially greet the organizers and participants of the 2 nd International Conference "Linguistic and Cultural Diversity in Cyberspace".The topic of the first conference held three years ago has proved its relevance: the rapid processes of building a global society, on the one hand, increase the unification of cultures, and on the other hand, offer opportunities for preserving and developing cultural diversity, in particular in such a universal, cross-border field as cyberspace.I believe that a way to eliminate this dialectic contradiction can be found in preventing the negative effects of globalization, in the collaborative search for ways to achieve sustainable development for everybody, in harmonizing relations among nations and civilizations, encouraging cultural diversity and identity of the peoples of our planet.UNESCO as the world's most influential organization can and should make a serious contribution in these activities.It is no coincidence that this organization has developed the concept of "World culture" built upon the idea of forming a new type of international relations, based on tolerance, non-violence, respect for human rights, mutual respect of cultures, traditions and religions.The problem of linguistic and cultural diversity preservation is topical for all countries, particularly for such multinational ones as Russia populated by over 180 peoples speaking more than 100 languages.No wonder that in 2008 here, on the Yakut land, where the climate is harsh, but people are kind and responsive to current problems of mankind, an international conference which became a contribution to the International Year of Languages, adopted a document of great importance known as "Lena resolution."What is extremely valuable about this appeal to the world is that it offers ways to implement some of the recommendations of the World Summit on the Information Society, and launches initiatives to provide universal access to information and knowledge, in particular the idea of holding a world summit on linguistic diversity in cyberspace under the aegis of UNESCO and MAAYA Network.I am confident that this conference will further support these initiatives and give participants an excellent opportunity to exchange ideas and experiences, while facilitating the preservation and development of cultural and linguistic diversity.I would like to thank the Government of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) and the Russian Committee of the UNESCO Information for All Programme for organizing such a representative and useful forum.I wish you successful and fruitful work, vivid impressions of staying on the unique land of Yakutia and all the best.Message from Alexander Avdeyev, Minister of Culture of the Russian Federation, to the participants of the 2 nd International Conference "Linguistic and Cultural Diversity in Cyberspace" On behalf of Russia's Culture Ministry, I extend a warm welcome to all delegates attending our second "Linguistic and Cultural Diversity in Cyberspace" conference.In UNESCO's 2001 Universal Declaration, cultural diversity is viewed as part of the humankind's heritage.Linguistic diversity is what forms the basis of cultural diversity.Languages are crucial to progressing toward sustainable development, given their key role in providing quality education, spreading knowledge, and stimulating social integration and economic development.This is why the theme of this conference is of so much relevance to the world community as a whole and particularly to Russia, which is one of the most multi-ethnic, multi-faith and multilingual countries, with as many as 180 languages spoken here and nearly 40 indigenous languages enjoying official language status.The Russian Constitution proclaims that the languages spoken by the country's constituent communities are all part of the national cultural heritage.This forum is being held within the framework of Russia's chairmanship in the Intergovernmental Council of the UNESCO Information for All Programme.features as many as 33 nations.The agenda is rich and interesting, with a whole array of topical issues to be discussed.We hope the forthcoming discussions will effect meaningful change, enabling us to find new efficient ways of preserving endangered languages and promoting language diversity in cyberspace with the help of innovative information technology.I wish you all an enjoyable and productive forum.I am certain that the conference will represent significant cultural initiatives in the field of multilingualism preservation in cyberspace; lay the foundation and open prospects for further activities in this sphere in Russia; provide an opportunity to discuss various aspects of the preservation and development of linguistic diversity in the information space.I wish you creative achievements, success in all undertakings, inexhaustible energy and new ideas!Message from Abulfas Karayev, Minister of Culture and Tourism of the Azerbaijan Republic, to the participants of the 2 nd International Conference "Linguistic and Cultural Diversity in Cyberspace" Esteemed conference participants, dear friends, On behalf of Azerbaijan's Ministry of Culture and Tourism and my fellow countrymen working in culture and the arts, I would like to greet all the organizers, participants and guests of the 2 nd conference "Linguistic and Cultural Diversity in Cyberspace".Computer information systems have become part and parcel of modern life while cultural and linguistic diversity, which makes our life so much richer, is a top priority on today's agenda.Linguistic and cultural diversity on the Web gives us a better understanding of the problems and interests of the presentday world.Our mission is to preserve countries' national identity along with their cultural and language diversity, crucial to ensuring the sustainable development of society and intercommunal harmony.We seek to attain modern cultural standards based on universal human values while also remaining loyal to our own distinctive traditions.We should evolve as a community by enhancing our spiritual capacity and social cohesion.The international context is currently characterized by the globalization of markets, which leads to losing the connection with the Other, the non acceptance of the Other, with more and more exclusion and violence in the relation to the Other.The world crisis today which, far from being financial or economic, is rather a societal one, a values crisis, leads to the fall of the economic model and system linked to a profit making culture, the culture of consumption and gain.Our world basically needs more humanness.Our world needs to develop another culture, the one of human being that is able to guarantee more humanness in people's relations and less mercantilism!There is a saying in Mali: Mogotigiya ka fisa nin fentigiya ye! ("Human relations are more valuable than money").We find the same in the Russian tradition: Не имей сто рублей, а имей сто друзей! ("Better to have 100 friends than 100 roubles!")That's why there is an urgent need to preserve and promote world cultures that put human being in the centre of their concerns, to promote those societies characterised by a vision of the world based on the permanent search of harmony between human beings and nature, and friendly relations as the cornerstone of our human existence.That's what we mean when we refer to linguistic and cultural diversity: we confront the rampant process of uniformizing cultures, the development of global common thinking and utopian monolingualism.As a matter of fact, linguistic diversity is as necessary for humankind as biodiversity is for nature: it is the breath that guarantees its vitality.Nature without biodiversity is nothing more than a nature morte and to suppress the diversity of the society is the same as to create soulless robots. 'The beauty of a carpet lies in its different colours", said Amadou Hampâté Bâ, a philosopher, writer and wise man.Dear friends, this advocacy for diversity is well known; even more, being militants for social transformation you know quite well that multilingualism is to culture what multilateralism is to politics: the frame that guarantees an equitable relation to others and the equilibrium of powers.Our purpose here is not to convince those present, but rather to turn from advocacy to action, that is to walk the talk.We should offer the world the means and ways of this action.This is the raison d'être of our MAAYA network!Our concern today is to be all committed to the development of institutional and legal instruments, that would enable preserving and promoting multilingualism worldwide.Although multilingualism is in the world a norm rather than an exception, very few countries are now using institutional instruments to support it.Certainly, it is partially due to the historical process of a monolingual Nation State development, but, what is more important, it is also a consequence of certain nations being dominated by others, in particular in different regions of the world, at different levels of the evolution of human societies.The experience of multilingual countries and regions (except for those where linguistic conflicts have separated peoples) shows that numerous languages can co-exist together, in harmony, in the same space, national or regional.How can we learn from these positive experiences today and develop instruments necessary to strengthen multilingual practice?From the very beginning we should realize that this is first and foremost a political question, linked to the philosophical conviction in the necessity of supporting diversity.It presupposes being mentally open to the Other and respect for fundamental human rights.Our approach should be implemented at three levels.The first institution to support multilingualism is the school (in the broadest sense, i.e. the educational system), which should be refounded in all countries in order to develop a mother tongue-based multilingual education (mother tongue understood as the most familiar language).The development of multilingualism is the best guarantee for the development of a society that is open to others and that respects linguistic and cultural diversity!Besides, it is vital to create, where they do not exist, institutions of research and promotion of the country's various languages.And those countries where such institutions are already established, should develop and reorient them towards the enhancement of multilingualism.An appropriate legal framework, with legislative and regulatory instruments should be elaborated, in the context of an explicit language policy aimed at promoting multilingualism and supporting every language of the country, both in public life and in the private sphere, according to the strategic approach we used to call «convivial functional multilingualism».All the institutions promoting book, reading and literary creativity (libraries, publishers, and associations of writers) should contribute to supporting multilingualism, particularly through proper usage of ICTs, including multimedia.At this level there are two complementary trends.On the one hand, at the level of each region of the world (according to the definition of the United Nations), it is necessary to encourage the creation of a structure similar to what African Academy of Languages (ACALAN) is for Africa, that is to say an intergovernmental scientific institution responsible for the enhancement and promotion of the languages of the continent, in the context of a continental language policy encouraging multilingualism and convivial partnership between all the existing languages.This institutional innovation could be reinforced with a more or less restricting legal instrument, inspired by the «European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages», yet with a permanent concern for equity between all the languages.On the other hand, at the level of each organization engaged in the promotion of one or several languages spoken in several regions in the world (OIF, Commonwealth, Latin Union, Arab League, CPLP, etc.),it is necessary to encourage them to leave the logic of defending a specific language or a group of languages in order to resolutely commit themselves to the promotion of languages co-existence and multilingualism.The MAAYA World Network for Linguistic Diversity was established to constitute a kind of international platform for a multistakeholder partnership in order to safeguard linguistic diversity and promote multilingualism.The existence of such organizations should make it possible to federate the initiatives taken at the international level, both from the point of implementing all the various declarations, resolutions and conventions dealing with multilingualism and cultural and linguistic diversity (UNESCO,WSIS, UN, various regional and interregional organizations, Lena Resolution, Bamako International Forum on Multilingualism, etc.),and from the point of establishing a kind of monitor structure, a world observatory for multilingualism.The MAAYA Network and its founding organizations initiated the process of the preparation for the World Summit on Multilingualism and this second Yakutsk conference is seen as a preparatory step for it.The Summit should permit to make concrete propositions at the highest level of the international community, in order to promote multilingualism in the world both from institutional and legal points of view, thus contributing to the global realization of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) and to the event of a World of Peace based on the dialogue of cultures and civilizations.It Is Time to Place Multilingualism and Linguistic Diversity at the Heart of the International Debate Our world is not the same as it was after the Second World War, when two different ways of seeing the world faced up to each other, when international relations were based on military, political and economic criteria and no thought at all was given to valuing culture as the basis of society.It is not the same either as the world we knew from the late 1990s, with a single dominant culture becoming more hegemonic.By 2011 the world has become multipolar, supranational alliances based on respect for culture have become stronger, alliances between regions of different nations sharing a language or a culture are being born every day.And although political and economic issues are still present in international relations, cultural aspects are taking a larger place.Religion, ethnicity, customs and language now play a part in the formulation of international policies, and even though they can be, unfortunately, a factor of discord, culture is increasingly perceived as a major vector in sustainable development and fair growth facilitating harmony among peoples and respect for their dignity.The adoption of the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions was the very symbol of culture's changing place in international relations.It emphasized that culture should be seen not as a mere economic value but above all as an essential condition of human beings' existence and the best motor for development that respects the future of the planet.The Convention is an opening that activists working for multilingualism and respect for linguistic diversity have seized upon as it is high time to consider language as closely associated to free expression and self-development, equal opportunities and promotion of understanding among peoples on fair and balanced foundations.Language does have an implicit place in the Convention but implicit is not obvious to everyone.The Millennium Development Goals, having omitted to include culture as a goal in its own right, also failed to refer to the language of individuals.The Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Heritage does make a careful reference and, then, both the Recommendation concerning the Promotion and Use of Multilingualism and Universal Access to Cyberspace, and the World Summit on the Information Society gave body to the idea of respect for linguistic diversity and multilingualism, but these instruments must be really followed by practical achievements.And we know that we are nowhere near being able to give all individuals the opportunity to develop freely in their own language.Since the beginning of the millennium, and in a surprising turnaround after decades of linguistic hegemony, language has become more present in both political and commercial issues.The main languages of communication that are official languages alongside English in international forums (French, Spanish, Russian, Chinese and Arabic at the United Nations; 22 other languages in the European Union; Portuguese, French, Arabic and Swahili in the African Union; French, Spanish and Portuguese in the organizations on the American continent, etc.)demand respect for balance in the way they are treated.Other languages which are not official (Portuguese at the United Nations, regional languages in the European Union, Guarani in South America, etc.)demand the right to be official too, and many initiatives (Council of Europe, Linguapax, UNESCO, etc.)are giving an increasingly significant role to languages that do not have an official national or regional status.Given the absence of international conventions concerning language, however, given the lack of reliable indicators on its impact on global development, given the probable death of almost half the world's languages, given the (still too high) level of injustice owing to the fact of speaking an unrecognized or a marginalized language, a large number of measures are called for in the field of indicators, policies and promotion, without forgetting the legal instruments.With such a wide-ranging debate, I shall emphasize only what the World Network for Linguistic Diversity MAAYA can propose in terms of promoting and enhancing (sometimes re-enhancing) languages, in particular in cyberspace.Although it is true to say that scarcely one individual in three today has access to the Internet, we can see constant movement towards the universal spread of the phenomenon.We also know that cyberspace and related technologies are tending to gradually replace our old ways of communicating, expressing ourselves, transmitting information and sharing knowledge.If languages cannot ensure the circulation of this information, knowledge or dialogue, they are in danger of losing value in the eyes of their speakers, since migration and urbanization and universal access generate confrontations between languages in which only those which are held in high esteem by their speakers can survive.Accordingly, MAAYA endeavours to inform those who can take decisions about policies to vitalize or revitalize languages of the full implications of cyberspace.MAAYA's meetings like the World Congress on Specialized Translation (Havana, 2008) , the Bamako International Forum on Multilingualism However, promotion and research are not enough.MAAYA is present in international forums trying to regulate and encourage the flourishing of all languages in the shared knowledge society, particularly those that came out of the World Summit on the Information Society, as sub-moderator for Action Line C8 (Cultural diversity and identity, linguistic diversity and local content) and lead moderator for the Dynamic Coalition for Linguistic Diversity in the context of the Internet Governance Forum.MAAYA will be present in these major undertakings ahead of us so as to ensure that every of the world's languages occupies its rightful place and guarantee the right of its speakers to use it fully.We are also glad to participate in the 2 nd International Conference on Linguistic and Cultural Diversity in Cyberspace in Yakutsk.We hope that any resolutions adopted here will help us make a reality of the idea of a world that is fairer, better balanced and more harmonious.Our Common Goal is to Preserve Not Only Our Language, but also Our Culture, Environment and People The First International Conference on Linguistic and Cultural Diversity held three years ago in Yakutsk was extremely informative and enlightening for many of us.Earlier, I have already tried to take real actions within the scope of my powers to create conditions for studying native languages at preschool educational institutions and at schools in order to preserve and promote cultural and linguistic diversity in the republic, expand the social base of native languages and the scope of their application and to publish works of writers and poets representing all the peoples living in Yakutia.After the conference in 2008, the preservation and promotion of cultural and linguistic diversity of our peoples became my highest priority.Our republic is multinational.The Yakuts (Sakha) are the most northern of stock-raising peoples, they have a particular economic structure, material and spiritual culture, as well as unique methods of education of their children and youth.People of Sakha familiarize their children with monuments of national culture from an early age.Conditions for the formation of linguistic competence and development of individuals, capable of using the system of global communication and familiar with information technology, have been created in educational institutions of the republic.In Yakutia, great importance is attached to the linguistic background, because it is viewed as a basis for cross-cultural communication that shapes the consciousness of a person, determines their world views, promotes readiness for dialogue, respect for their own culture and traditions, tolerance of other languages and cultures.In 1996-1997, which were declared by M. Nikolaev, President of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), the years of youth and education, content priorities of the courses of Russian, native and foreign languages were revised.The main focus was on the communicative aspect of language education, on free speech activity and communicational culture.Familiarizing students with the nation's cultural heritage and culture of modern society and teaching them to use their native language freely in all public areas of its application were announced priority tasks of language education.In the academic year 1996/1997, it was made possible in schools to study and to get education in six languages, namely in Russian, Yakut, Evenk, Even, Yukaghir and Chukchi languages.Following results were achieved during those years: 1,099 Evens (47.7% of all Even children), 907 Evenks (27.1%), 96 (58.5%) Yukaghirs and 95 Chukchis (78,5%) were studying their native language.These figures were due to the lack of trained teachers, as well as parents' reluctance to educate their children in their native language.At our first conference in 2008 As Minister of Education, I ensured in 1997 that Even, Evenk, Yukaghir, Chukchi and Dolgan children were no longer obliged to study Yakut language (according to the then-existing curriculum, these children had to be polyglots, as they had to study two official languages, Russian and Yakut, their native language and a foreign one, e.g. English).Being in charge of education, I saw my task in helping to create the best conditions for the development of each language and gradual formation of the need to use both official languages in full compliance with rights of a citizen to choose the language of study and understanding that nothing should be mandatory when it comes to human rights.We clearly understood that the state is obliged to create conditions for efficient pre-primary education and in 1997 the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) obliged pre-school educational institutions to admit children from the age of 5.Within a limited time, all preschool teachers were trained to teach reading (from the age of 5).Already in 1999, 93% of all five-year old children in the republic (100% in some areas) were attending preschool educational institutions.And in 2000, children who started their first grade were already able to read, and, most importantly, had the ability to learn in a group and live in the society.In 2000, through the personal efforts by Vyacheslav Shtyrov, President of OJSC ALROSA, computer equipment worth $2 million was donated by ALROSA to schools of the republic.Sakhatelecom company, then led by Nikolai Nikolaev, granted schools with a 3 year long "guest" Internet access.Such support helped to make a breakthrough in the education system of Yakutia.One of the major indications of the progress achieved by all school teachers and officials of the Ministry of Education was the fact that in 2003 Yakutia ranked third (after Moscow and St. Petersburg) in the federal competition "The best region of Russia in terms of ICT" within the programme of "Electronic Russia" for the use of ICT in education.The republic has made such a breakthrough in providing educational institutions with computers, because it recognized the priority of computerization and distance learning, given the remoteness of its educational institutions not only from Russian and foreign but even from Yakutsk research and methodological centers, and their significant information isolation by force of circumstances.Today, thanks to the implementation of National Priority Projects, initiated in 2006 by Russian President Vladimir Putin, all educational institutions of the republic have access to broadband Internet.All secondary school graduates speak Russian, native, foreign languages and are active users of ICT.The generations born after the advent of computers and information technology, are familiar with modern technologies.Today, the teacher is not the only source of information and knowledge.Instant communication technologies provide access to all relevant data.Nowadays through Internet people can always get the most effective courses by the best teachers.Modern school and college students no longer believe the myths that used to exist before the Internet: 1.School is the best place for learning.2.Intelligence is unchangeable.3.The level of education is the result of teaching.4 .We all learn in the same way.Even now, people sometimes confuse education with schooling, their health with disease treatment and hospitals, law with lawyers.Earlier, some people profited from this situation, as it helped to make people less self-reliant and less eager to make decisions about their life.But the society is undergoing huge changes, the transition from the old system to the new one is under way.Parents wonder why children are being prepared for life in the past, and not for the life in the future.Recent polls in Yakutia confirm a positive attitude of people of the republic towards changes in its educational system, particularly in the sphere of higher professional education.According to the federal educational policy of the country, establishment and development of federal universities is regarded as an instrument of social and economic advancement of the regions within federal districts and development of an innovative economy in Russia in general.For the period up to 2030, the Government of the Russian Federation expects Yakutia and its surrounding areas to meet a number of challenging social and economic objectives requiring a new quality of economic growth and exploration of new ways of development based on modern approaches.Major investment projects in the Far East provide for large-scale transformations aimed at accelerating economic development of the north-eastern part of Russia, increasing concentration of available resources and developing more effective management.This is precisely why Egor Borisov, President of the Republic, and the Yakut government place so much emphasis on creation of a new talent pool able to generate ideas and bring them into life.In this regard, the North-Eastern Federal University named after Maxim Ammosov (NEFU) becomes a major resource for the development of the republic and the north-east of the country.The NEFU has quite recently celebrated the first year of its new status in a new organizational form, the form of an autonomous institution.Systemic changes has started in all the spheres of the university life.Actions taken in accordance with the development priorities approved by the Government of the Russian Federation define and shape the establishment and development of the leading scientific, educational, methodological and cultural centre in the north-east of Russia.The implementation of the NEFU Development Programme provides for the establishment of a strong research and innovative entrepreneurial university that will contribute to the development of regional technologically innovative economy.The NEFU doesn't seek to become the largest regional university, its goal is to be the best, high-demand and useful for the region, to support new technologies' development and promotion, combine efforts to improve cross-cultural ties and corporate services in partnership with the public, businesses, academic institutions and state authorities.The university drives the expansion of the domestic market.It creates and ensures the development of human capital, which will contribute to the viability and competitiveness of the regional economy.In comparison with the programmes of other federal universities, that of the NEFU has a stronger humanitarian component.The innovative project, titled "Preservation and Development of the Languages and Cultures of the Peoples of the North-East of Russia", was launched immediately after the Decree had been signed by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and the programme had been approved.The NEFU has established its branch in the Chukotka Autonomous District (in the city of Anadyr).The following institutions were also created: • the Institute of Alexei Kulakovskiy, founder of Yakut literature; • the Olonkho Research Institute (Olohkho was declared by the UNESCO to be a Masterpiece of the Oral and Intangible Heritage of Humanity); • the Institute of Languages and Culture of the Peoples of the North-East of the Russian Federation; • the Institute of Foreign Philology and Regional Studies.The NEFU attaches great importance to language education and study of language processes.There are three philological divisions in the University.In July 2010, the Centre to Advance Multilingualism in Cyberspace was established in the NEFU, which contributed greatly to organizing the Second Conference on Linguistic and Cultural Diversity in Cyberspace.Problems and prospects of the Centre were discussed at the seminar held at the NEFU with participation of Evgeny Kuzmin, Chairman of the Intergovernmental Council and Russian Committee of the UNESCO Information for All Programme.In November 2010, Yakutsk hosted an offsite meeting of the Committee of the Federation Council of the Russian Federation on the North and Indigenous Peoples "On the use of modern information technologies for preservation and development of the languages, culture and spirituality of the peoples of the North (the case of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia))."The NEFU played an active part in the event and organized a special round-table discussion on November 17, 2010.All suggestions made by the NEFU were supported and included in the recommendations of the offsite meeting, and eventually an official policy document on the subject was adopted.Together with the Siberian Federal University, we launched a «Foresight» project («Foresight» -Study of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia)).The Yakut people are the main participants of this study aimed at defining a possible future of the peoples of the republic on the basis of expert assessments of social and economic spheres, utilizing the method of long-term regional development forecasting.Its main peculiarity is the focus on the development of practical measures for rapid achievement of the selected strategic objectives that guide the medium and long term development of the republic.A programme for the preservation and development of the Yukaghir language and culture in digital media and cyberspace for 2011-2014 was launched.The results achieved during the first six months of 2011 include five educational DVD-based courses on the Yukaghir language, a basis for the web-portal of the indigenous small peoples of the North, www.arctic-megapedia.ru , where materials on the language and culture of Yukaghirs are already available.Measures are being taken to further develop the ways for operational communication, interaction and bringing people together.Modern information technology shortens the distance, helps to overcome the language barrier and does indeed change the world.Within the NEFU Development Programme, a number of steps are being taken to advance information and communication technologies.The main goal is to build an IT system to support research and education process and achieve full automatization of university work.A Wi-Fi network provides a wireless Internet access to students within the University buildings and will soon be extended to cover the entire campus.The biggest university building of the Natural Sciences Department offers free Wi-Fi mobile working areas which are also helpful to our guests -foreign students from Norway, Finland, Sweden, who come here in the framework of the North-North exchange programmes, and South Korean students, who participate in the NEFU Summer School.The University works to integrate cutting-edge technologies.There is a wellknown expert estimate of ten information technologies that will change the world.Cloud Computing technology comes first among them: it enables small computers to process information using the potential of big datacenters located across the world.In this area, we explore ways to use cloud computing to build an innovative platform for a virtual electronic university -"the Yakutsk INTER-University."A student may enter a service cloud anytime and anywhere provided that he has an Internet connection.Any lecture room or classroom can turn into a laboratory or a computer classroom.The NEFU Development Programme includes elaborating a hardware and software system in 2011 that will be used to provide both high-performance computing and secure storage of large volumes of information resources and their prompt accessibility.It will also serve as a basis to create a NEFU repository of information and educational digital resources in the languages of small peoples of the North-East of Russia, including digitized copies of books and documents, electronic manuals and teaching aids, cinema and video films, audio recordings, etc.It will also allow free downloading of digitized copies of text and multimedia materials for those owners who would like to provide a free access to their resources but do not have sufficient technical capacities.We plan to put in place a free and open repository of information and educational digital resources in the languages of small peoples of the North-East of Russia and the Arctic regions transmitted by their authors and owners for secure storage and non-commercial use for educational purposes; to form an integrated catalogue of Internet resources; an to organize off-campus education projects with the help of the integrated catalogue and repository to boost interest in and use of Internet resources in the languages of small peoples of the North-East of Russia among speakers themselves, particularly among the youth.On June 9, 2011 UNESCO and the NEFU signed a treaty to establish the University-based UNESCO Chair "Adaptation of Society and Man in Arctic Regions in the Context of Climate Change and Globalization."The Chair is inter-departmental and aims at addressing issues of adaptation of both the society and man in Arctic regions by establishing international scientific and educational collaboration, raising awareness of the population by means of modern information and telecommunications technologies and forming an Internet information environment on the issues of Arctic regions.The Chair will promote cooperation between the outstanding scientists of the NEFU and other universities of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) and the Russian Federation, as well as foreign countries.The Constitution of the Russian Federation begins with the following words: "We, the multinational people of the Russian Federation…", and we must constantly bear in mind that Russia is a poly-ethnic State.According to the 2002 population census there are 180 ethnic communities living in Russia.Over the last decade, focus has been on the language policy.The Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) could be considered polylingual.We understand that, with all the importance of bilingual motivation, it is linguo-ecological motivation that has a crucial role to play, which implies preserving and developing languages of all peoples, expanding their application and use.I am convinced that our conference will contribute to the further development of linguistic and cultural diversity in cyberspace.Co-Chair, Conference Organizing Committee (Moscow, Russian Federation) Most nations in the contemporary world enjoy neither statehood nor sovereignty.Their languages are not state languages because a majority of countries are multiethnic and multilingual.Even in the best possible scenarios, when governments and dominant ethnic groups are rigorously protective of ethnic and linguistic minorities, most of their languages are still marginalised to varying extents.They exist and develop (or decline) in the shadow of the country's dominant language, which is used in all spheres of influencepolitical, economic, educational, cultural, scientific, etc.Globalisation, various possibilities for migration in a context of high mobility, and the rapid pace of urbanisation have made many ethnic minorities undervalue their native language.Learning native language to talk with fewer and fewer people on a decreasing number of topics is regarded as a blind alley.Meanwhile, state and international languages garner a wealth of attention and research.No language develops outside the context of its corresponding ethnos.At the same time, urbanisation and globalisation encourage smaller cultures to merge with the majority, and marginalize themselves.The knowledge and historical and cultural experience stored within these cultures gradually vanish, as well as the culture's/language's potential.Cultural and linguistic marginalisation is thus an interrelated and multifaceted process; with the death of a language, its unique carrier culture vanishes 1 .All these and other factors lead to a dramatic decrease in the number of active speakers of minority languages resulting in further marginalization (and extinction -in extreme cases) of the less equipped languages with the smallest number of speakers.These issues are salient for nearly every country where two or more languages cohabit.What can we do to stop or at last to hinder the process of language marginalisation, and to enhance the fitness of endangered languages?Who can do it, and whose duty is it?Let us examine how Russia, one of the most multiethnic, multilingual and multi-religious countries of the world; tackles these issues, and to what extent it solves them.180 world languages are spoken in Russia belonging to the Indo-European, Altaic, and Ural language families, the Caucasian and Paleo-Siberian language groups.Those are not languages of new immigrants; various Russian population groups have been speaking them for centuries.Over a hundred of these languages belong to indigenous ethnic entities historically formed within the present-day Russian borders or living there for centuries.The Constitution of the Russian Federation declares all languages of Russia to be common cultural assets.Almost all languages use graphic systems, even if some have acquired them somewhat recently.There are four most widely used languages except Russian with between 1.5 and 5.5 million speakers: Tatar, Chuvash, Bashkir, and Chechen.A further nine languages have between four hundred thousand and a million speakers -Yakut language belongs to this group.A further fifteen are spoken by between fifty thousand to four hundred thousand people.Intensive cultural dialog, mutual exchange and enrichment that took place on the territory of the Russian Empire and Soviet Union feature modern Russia as well.Respect for other peoples' cultures has been intrinsic to Russian policies allowing to preserve the richest cultural and linguistic diversity we are justifiably proud of.Unlike many other multilingual countries, Russia offers education (primary and even higher for certain fields of humanities education), television and radio broadcasting, internet resources, books and newspapers in nearly all of its languages.These activities find financial support by the state.Russia is unique in another respect as well: close to forty of its indigenous languages enjoy official status.All languages except Russian are minority languages, and all are marginalized to varying extents.Future perspectives are limited for representatives of indigenous peoples speaking their native language only.Proficiency in Russian is required for building a career or realizing one's potential, especially in the intellectual sphere.Problems and issues for concern are still numerous.Out of a hundred indigenous languages of Russia nearly thirty are minority languages of the peoples of the Far North, Siberia and the Far East less than fifty thousand speakers strong.Some of the languages have less than 100 speakers.Despite official efforts at every level of Russian bureaucracy to nurture these languages (especially those with less than two thousand speakers) and their corresponding cultures, the risk of extinction remains high due to globalization, urbanization and active migration processes leading to the rapid assimilation of these peoples.It is reasonable that Russia's top priority is protecting, preserving and developing the major state language -Russian -as the language of interethnic communication within the country, an instrument of transnational communication and an official language of international organizations.At the same time Russia advocates for linguistic and cultural diversity.While actively supporting this concept at the international level, Russia makes it a point to implement it consistently in home politics and everyday life -despite the tremendous complexity of this cost-demanding problem, especially in the context of numerous burning challenges and systemic problems our country is facing in the course of drastic changes in all spheres of life.Support for multilingualism is of great importance for modern Russia.Aside from preserving and developing languages as the basis for the cultural heritage of our country, i.e. the heritage of the Russian people and all other peoples living here, it has always been relevant for tackling political, economic, social and cultural problems, in particular those dealing with interethnical communication in polyethnic environments.In order to maintain and develop in our modern world languages should be indemand in cyberspace and get representation there.ICTs open possibilities to decelerate languages' extinction, preserve and even develop them.This chance should not be lost.Three years ago here, in Yakutsk, I talked on the measures taken in Russia to preserve languages and on the ways of organizing these activities on political and practical levels.This communication is included in the proceedings of the first conference.Our Yakut colleagues can describe in details the problems they are facing and the exemplary ethnolinguistic and sociocultural policies implemented in the Republic of Sakha.On the basis of Russian political and practical experience, I would like to define the roles and tasks of social institutions that can -and should -hold responsibility for languages' preservation and development in cyberspace.To develop in cyberspace languages should first of all get development in real life.Three more factors are important, however.First, tools for multilingualism promotion in cyberspace are required.Second, institutes are needed to a) elaborate and implement these tools creating attractive and useful content in minority languages and b) teach others to develop, create and use their own content.Information literacy is crucial for both representatives of language support institutions and ordinary users.Third, positive environment should be created to allow institutes and users work on the elaboration of instruments, creation and preservation of content and on providing proper training.As we analyse the experience (both positive and negative) of the Russian Federation and one of its entities, the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), we can attempt to draw out some more general conjectures regarding the question of how to guarantee the continued functioning of minority languages in the shadow of a dominant language in a national context.Potential contributors to the promotion and development of a language are manifold and diverse, and include: • national authorities; • local authorities; • educative systems; • research establishments (universities and institutes for scientific research); • memory institutions (libraries, archives, museums); • artistic establishments (theatres, philharmonic halls, musical and folk groups, art galleries working in close contact with local painters, sculptors and architects); • film studios; • cultural centres, principally in remote settlements, which unite the functions of memory institutions and art and educational centres; • book publishers and traders; • media outlets, including digital media; • the ICT industry; • public organisations and private persons; and • businesses.Let us now consider each of the above-listed contributors, and their corresponding targets and lines of action.National and local official policies and activities are prime.Effective policies include a combination of active, consistent, complementary steps to stimulate and add value to the activities by all major stakeholders.They should be allocated a duty to facilitate the preservation, free expression and development of linguistic, ethno-cultural and religious identity of ethnic communities, their cultural values, traditions, folklore, as well as the expansion of the domains of national languages' use via the practical application of principles of cultural pluralism, bilingualism and multilingualism.This goal demands the enactment of special laws (and/or update of the already existing ones) creating favorable environment for the preservation and equitable and authentic development of a country's languages.Monitoring and ensuring compliance with these laws is also essential.They can provide a basis for the formation of a broad system of statutory regulation of activities by legal entities and individuals, and for the elaboration of by-laws.Constitutions of many countries affirm bilingualism and multilingualism, stressing the equality of languages.Education in the state's official languages is guaranteed, and citizens are often free to choose the main language of education.Federal and regional language laws should stipulate that the acquisition of the state status by certain languages must not encroach on the linguistic rights and expression by all ethnic entities historically inhabiting a particular territory.Programmes of socio-economic, national and cultural development should be elaborated based on a set of measures to preserve and develop minority languages and cultures, to extend cooperation of all peoples for mutual intellectual and spiritual enrichment.Respect for customs, traditions, values, and institutions reflecting ethnic cultural specificity is a prerequisite for such programmes.Authorities should contribute to systemic language studies and multilingualism promotion in education, administration, law, cultural education, news media and cyberspace.The attainment of those goals can be facilitated by: • establishing a regulatory framework for the development of languages at the national level (the national constitution and federal laws, along with constituent entities' constitutions, statutes and laws); • forming and implementing cultural and educational strategies, policies and programmes explicitly aiming to promote minority cultures and languages; • targeting federal funding and soft taxation of both governmental and non-governmental programmes for language preservation and development; • granting state or official status to the largest minority languages either at the national level, or within regions densely inhabited by speakers of those languages; whenever possible, language equality must be affirmed in law; • affirming a given minority language's official status in the records of government and municipal authorities: using the language in governmental work, publishing federal and republican legal acts in it (and guaranteeing their equal legal force), and granting the language equal standing with the principal state language during elections, referendums and industrial, office and administrative activities; • creating official document databases in the language; • establishing councils on language policy within central and/or regional governments, and determining their rights and duties; • guaranteeing social, economic and legal protection of the language in legislative, executive and judicial bodies; • providing material incentives for experts to use both national and minority languages in their work; • signing (or lobbying for signing) and ratifying international acts promoting multilingualism; • promoting ethnic entities' interest in the development of their languages; • establishing targeted regional programmes to preserve culture and language; • helping and legally assisting the development of the language's body of literature through financial and other support of book publication and media dissemination, particularly that which is oriented to children and youth; • forming and implementing strategies and programmes promoting reading in the native language; • partnering with ethnic cultural associations outside the administrative territorial boundaries that are historically densely populated with members of the given ethnie; • supporting libraries, museums, archives and other cultural agencies in the preservation and development of minority cultures and languages; • establishing ethnic schools to intergenerationally transmit experiences, traditions, culture and ethics; • promoting the ethno-cultural component of education and extending it wherever necessary and possible; • equipping public schools with minority language and literature classrooms; • contracting the governments of other regions densely inhabited by speakers of a particular language to assist in measures to preserve that language, for example by supplying literature to public and school libraries to enable the study of a given language, and participating in the graduate and postgraduate training of teachers for ethnic minorities; and • creating graphic systems for non-literate languages.Securing languages representation and development in cyberspace gains in importance in the context of rapid Internet penetration in all spheres of modern life.Use of ICT has both positive and negative consequences.On the one hand, it may decrease linguistic and cultural diversity, on the other hand, it opens new prospects for preserving and even developing languages and cultures in cyberspace.Promoting linguistic and cultural diversity in cyberspace is a new field of action, expanding our opportunities for preserving languages and cultures and for extending the sphere of influence of under resourced languages rather promptly and efficiently.That is exactly why the Declaration of Principles of the World Summit on the Information Society stresses that the Information Society should be founded on and stimulate respect for cultural identity, cultural and linguistic diversity, traditions and religions, and foster dialogue among cultures and civilizations.The creation, dissemination and preservation of content in diverse languages and formats must be accorded high priority in building an inclusive Information Society.The development of local content suited to domestic or regional needs will encourage social and economic development and will stimulate participation of all stakeholders, including people living in rural, remote and marginal areas.To promote multilingualism in cyberspace, authorities can take both general and goal-oriented measures to create a multilingualism-friendly environment: • designing and implementing ICT penetration programmes; • drawing up action plans to promote public use of the Internet, including information literacy programmes for both dominant and minority languages; • providing telecommunication networks to remote areas; • elaborating information resource development programmes in minority languages; • promoting training in ICTs and information, especially in local languages; • promoting the creation of local content, translation and adaptation; • promoting the translation of world literary classics into minority languages, and of minority speakers into other languages, and posting these translations online; • establishing integrated multilingual information resource networks; • introducing electronic documentation and record management in at least two languages; and • promoting the research and development of operating systems, search engines and internet browsers, online dictionaries and term reference books, and their adaptation to local demands.Research centres provide the theoretical basis for governmental and nongovernmental efforts on multilingualism promotion and make fundamental and relevant applied research.Their duties may comprise: • studies of ethnic cultures, traditions and quotidian life; • studies of languages and their history; • studies of the current linguistic situation and related issues; • studies of language-promoting policy and practice in other parts of the country/world, display and dissemination of pioneer experience; • elaboration of proposals on adapting cutting edge experience; • elaboration and implementation of permanent monitoring tools to measure language use by social groups; • elaboration and implementation of permanent monitoring tools to qualify and quantify the work of language-promoting institutions; • proposals to the government for draft regulatory legislation on language protection and promotion; • initiation and organization of theoretical and applied conferences addressing the various aspects of minority language preservation and development; • establishment of research, education and information centres of minority languages and cultures, aimed at conducting research and training for relevant experts; • popularization of minority languages and cultures; • elaboration of national reading promotion programmes, in particular for minority languages, in cooperation with libraries, educational institutions, media outlets, and book publishers/traders; • elaboration of best practices guidelines for relevant offices and organisations, charged with the task of languages and cultures support; • publication of bilingual dictionaries that include audio recordings of words; • establishment of terminology and orthography commissions; • creation of text corpora and phonetic databases; • linguistic and folklore field studies and expeditions; • establishment of centralised archives, including electronic archives, for minority languages; • acquisition of private archives of researchers and community activists (including foreign) engaged in minority language support, and entrusting those archives to state memory institutions; • establishment of clear standards and guidelines for recording and representing texts, alphabets and graphic systems for non-literate languages -this is of particular importance for oral languages and languages having recently acquired a graphic system; • establishment of a unified literary language, if absent; • documentation of minority languages; • research and development of operating systems, search engines and information scanning systems; and • development of fonts in cooperation with relevant experts.Primary, secondary and higher educational establishments should cooperate with federal and regional executive and legislative bodies, as well as research and cultural institutions, to support and develop minority languages and multilingualism.Their sphere of activity includes: • participating in writing the regional/local component of national educational standards; • training minority language teachers for schools and universities; • training experts on languages, history and traditional culture of ethnic minorities; • implementing postgraduate teacher training programmes; • elaborating basic curricula; • elaborating academic curricula and learning packages; • elaborating language teaching and speech improvement methods; • making recommendations to implement new language teaching technologies; • establishing university classes in minority languages; • using minority languages as educational tools in all places of learning, including pre-school institutions, secondary schools and universities; • teaching minority language as part of core curricula for students who speak it as a second language in all educational establishments in areas where an ethnic minority makes up a considerable section of the population; • organising specialist language and literature classes; • organising educational competitions on minority languages and literature; • organising conferences and events on linguo-cultural and ethnocultural issues; • organising off-campus minority language courses, especially on interregional and international levels (including e-learning in higher education institutions); • organising summer camps conducted in minority languages; and • organising online conferences in minority languages (on diverse topics).Cultural institutions and activists are tremendously important in language support, not only those directly connected with preserving written cultures, but also theatres and conservatories, art schools, folklore performers, cultural centres in remote areas, and individual artists and cultural workers.It is the duty of these institutions to preserve, store, popularise and offer for public use all essential testimonies of a particular people's history; to elaborate all possible ways and forms of accessing its cultural and written heritage, intellectual and artistic products; to contribute to saturating public spaceboth real and virtual -with them.Libraries and archives must search, acquire, describe, study, popularise and store all printed matter, sound and video recordings emanating from a language, both in the geographical area that is densely inhabited by its users, and other areas (even foreign countries) where those languages are used.Not only materials in minority languages but all information about them published in other languages is important.The activities of memory institutions include: • gathering, preserving and extending comprehensive and thematic collections of all published and unpublished materials in a minority language; • creating full-text databases of periodicals in the given language; • constructing an exhaustive bibliography of printed and written resources in the language; • making available centralized catalogues of publications in the language (especially important for languages that have recently acquired a graphic system); • including bibliographic descriptions of works reflecting the history and culture of an ethnic minority in electronic national catalogues of all libraries at both national and international levels; • popularising these works, especially by organising readers' conferences, reader clubs, and meetings with writers, critics, publishers, illustrators, and others; • digitising documents and museum exhibits that reflect an ethnic entity's history and culture, establishing corresponding electronic libraries, museums and archives, and granting public access to them; • establishing electronic and other museum expositions in the given language or bilingual exhibitions using that language; • creating electronic catalogues in museum systems in the given language; and • preparing archives of electronic publications and exhibitions on cultural and linguistic diversity and memorable dates and events.Together with other cultural, research and educational establishments, libraries, museums and archives can launch multimedia projects pertaining to the founders of ethnic cultures, folklore collectors, writers, artists, composers and performing musicians to be applied in various fields.Texts, photographs, digital copies of paintings and sketches, sound and video recordings can be recorded on discs for broad circulation, and their online versions be posted on the websites of cultural, research and educational institutions with due respect for copyright.Today mass media tend to become most important and efficient tools for influencing public opinion, their effect being even stronger than that of education.Federal, regional and municipal media outlets can be purveyors of cultural and linguistic diversity and promote spiritual values exchange.The contemporary mass media should focus on: • preserving and developing periodicals in minority languages and sections in those languages in other periodicals; • organising television and radio broadcasting in minority languages, especially the release of programmes entirely or partly conducted in those languages and dedicated to the areas of their active use and the original ethnic culture of their speakers; • organising internet broadcasting in minority languages; and • establishing information portals.Book publishers and traders can make a tremendous contribution to the support of minority languages and development of multilingualism: a language without access to the book industry is a language excluded from intellectual community life.UNESCO says that "books are in fact a means of expression which live through language and in language" and stresses the importance of translation in strengthening multilingualism, and the urgent need to "give languages broader access to publishing, so as to promote the exchange of books and editorial content, and thus the free flow of ideas by word and image".Publishers can contribute to the promotion of minority languages through: • printing research, popular science and fiction books, periodicals and translations in a minority language; • promoting literary work in a minority language and its emerging authors; • assuring that libraries of educational institutions include books in minority languages; and • helping minority language speakers to acquire books, especially in remote areas that are historically densely populated by the given ethnie, and the diaspora outside the traditional settlement areas.Non-governmental language promotion activities include: • establishing weekend schools, clubs and ethno-cultural associations to provide supplemental linguistic and literary education; • organising competitions, festivals and creative events to promote cultural and linguistic traditions; • participating in language and culture days in and outside the traditional settlement areas of a given ethnie; • participating in folk festivals; and • communicating with and supporting a language's expatriate population.Individuals and groups of individuals can also participate in language preservation and promotion by: • establishing and supporting Wikipedia in minority languages; • establishing and supporting websites, blogs, Twitter and other social networks.Issues of linguistic diversity in global information networks and universal access to information in cyberspace dominate the agenda of the discussions on information society.The ICT industry should therefore become a crucial participant in supporting and enhancing a language's status.The ICT industry can channel its energy into the following areas: • articulating and promoting technical standards, taking into account ethnic minorities' demands; • creating complete computer fonts for minority languages; • participating in the establishment of international UNICODE standards and the implementation of the unified keyboard layout; • localising existing software and creating free software to support local languages; • elaborating computer language models and machine translation systems; • supporting minority languages in e-mail, chat and other messaging utilities; • uploading electronic study books and dictionaries in minority languages; • establishing multilingual domains and e-mail addresses; • creating software for multilingual internet domain names and content; • establishing localised, minority language retrieval systems; • creating information and other websites and portals in bilingual versions; • making information resources available electronically; and • developing the non-textual sphere of the internet (such as voice over IP, data streaming, and video on demand).The above measures can be efficient and bring about their desired results only when the entire ethnos -not only its cultural, intellectual and ruling elite -makes major intellectual and emotional efforts, and displays goodwill, desire and interest in the survival and development of its unique culture and linguistic identity.The Language Observatory [1] Project was founded in 2003.The main objective of the project is to observe the real state of language use on the web.When the first workshop of the project was held on 21 February 2004, the Russian Committee of the UNESCO Information for All Programme kindly reported it in Russian.Then we received several responses from various language communities around the world.This really encouraged us.The Language Observatory is designed to measure the use of each language on the World Wide Web.Measurement is done by counting the number of written pages on the Web in each language.The observatory consists of two major components.The first is a data collection instrument from the Web, a crawler robot developed at the University of Milan.It can collect millions of Web pages per day.The second component is a language identification instrument.We have developed software to identify language, script and encoding properties of Web pages with high accuracy and maximum coverage.The first version of the identification algorithm LIM (Language Identification Module) was developed in 2002 [2] and implemented in 2004.The most recent updated version is called G2LI.You can use it on the Web.According to a recent verification examination G2LI is capable of identifying 184 languages in ISO Language Code (ISO 639-1) with an average accuracy of 94%.In addition to a wide coverage of languages, it can identify various types of legacy encodings 2 , which are still extensively used by many non-Latin-script user communities.Hidden inside the language identification instrument is a set of training texts for the software.Considering that the richness and quality of training texts is the most critical in language identification task we used a set of translated texts from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) provided by the UN Higher Commission for Human Rights (UNHCHR).Of note is that not all translated UDHR texts are provided with encoding; some are available only as image files.Image files can be read by humans but not directly by computers, necessitating that we transform images into text data.Table 1 illustrates how many transformed texts are given in image format (322 languages were available at the date of the first search, in early 2004).More than two hundred languages use Latin script, with or without diacritics, and only three of them were given in PDF or GIF file format.In contrast to this, among languages using so-called Abugida script 3 , not a single language was presented in the form of encoded text.This fact might itself point to the existence of a digital language divide, or in this particular case, a "digital script divide".Around the same time as we launched the Language Observatory Project, Eric Miller launched UDHR-in-Unicode project.The objective of this project was to demonstrate the use of Unicode for a wide variety of languages, using the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) as a representative text.Currently, UDHR-in-Unicode is housed on the Unicode Consortium website and the texts are used in the study of natural language processing.The The first complete observation report was published in 2008.It was the first article on language distribution on the Asian Web providing an overview of web pages collected from Asian domains.The authors concluded that there is a serious digital language divide in the region.English was very widely used especially in South Asian countries and in the majority of South East Asian countries (60% of the web pages were in English).In West Asia, English dominance was less outstanding, and in some countries Arabic was the most widely used language.In Central Asia, Russian was the most widely used language except for Turkmenistan where English was used at 90% of the web pages.It is also important to notice that some of the indigenous languages, Turkish, Hebrew, Thai, Indonesian, Vietnamese and Mongolian were the most used languages in their country domains.Lieberson's Diversity Index (LDI) [4] is a widely used index of linguistic diversity that is defined by the following formula, where P i represents the share of i-th language speakers in a community: LDI = 1 -∑ P i 2 If anyone in a community speaks the same language, then P 1 = 1 and for the speakers of other languages, P i = 0.Thus the LDI of a completely monolingual community is zero.If four languages are spoken by an equal number of people, then P 1 = P 2 = P 3 = P 4 = 0.25 and the LDI can be calculated as LDI = 1 -(0.25) 2 * 4 = 0.75.Thus a higher LDI means larger linguistic diversity and a lower LDI means lower diversity.The basic idea of LDI can be explained by the illustration in Figure 1 .A square of P i means the probability that the i-th language speaker meets with a speaker of the same language.And the sum of P i squares represents the combined probability of any speaker meeting with a speaker of the same language in the community.Then the sum of P i squares is subtracted from 1, indicating the probability that any speaker will encounter different language speakers in a society.The darkcolored areas of the square in Figure 1 correspond to this probability.Ethnologue provides a complete list of LDI data for each country or region, together with population size and the number of indigenous and immigrant languages.Based on this data 4 , Figure 2 was prepared to show how LDI changes across countries and across continents.Each circle represents a country in this chart.The circle's size corresponds to the country's population, and its vertical axis represents the country's LDI.The two large circles on the axis of Asia correspond to India (LDI = 0.94) and China (LDI = 0.51).As the chart illustrates, countries in the African continent have the highest language diversity among the continents, followed by Asia, Europe, America (North and South America included) and Oceania.In the previous section, we reviewed the overall condition of linguistic diversity of the world based on data by Ethnologue that reflects the situation in the real world.And what about language diversity in the cyber world?Since being launched, the Language Observatory has focused its attention on two continents, Asia and Africa.The first observation results were reported during a workshop organized at UNESCO headquarter in February 2005; they are fully documented in an article published in 2008 [3] .Recently, the project has completed another round of surveys of Asia, Africa and the Caribbean region based on 2009 data.The following sections will introduce an overview of this most recent study.Here we propose a two-dimensional chart, which is tentatively named the LLchart, because the chart has the Local Language Ratio on the horizontal axis and the LDI on the vertical axis.The purpose of this chart is to solve a problem we encountered when preparing an LDI chart based on data from cyberspace.It often happens that languages used on the Web are completely different from languages spoken in the real world.In many cases, the latter consists of local languages while the former mainly consists of global languages like English, French or Russian.And in those cases, the LDI of languages in cyberspace and that in the real world are not considered to be the same.We have to take into account some measurements about the presence of local languages, as presented in Figure 3 .Notice that all countries with a local language ratio P fall within the area between the two curves 1−[P 2 +(1−P) 2 ], Lieberson's index in the case of two languages, and 1−P 2 , which gives the maximum value of Lieberson's index 5 .When P becomes larger than 0.5, the LDI becomes smaller and the plotted point will move towards the bottom-right corner.When P is small, there are two possibilities: either the vacancy of local language is filled by a dominant foreign language, in which case the LDI shrinks and the point moves down and to the left; or the vacancy of local language is filled with multiple foreign languages, in which case the LDI grows and the point moves up and to the left.Based on data collected in November 2009, the LDI and local language ratio were calculated for all country domains in Asia and Africa.As we do not have data for European countries, we used Google's page count by language.On the other hand, web contents in the Indian subcontinent have a nearly negligible local language presence on the Web.More than 70 % of these Web contents are written in English.Worth mentioning here is the case of Laos.According to Ethnologue, the country's LDI is only 0.674.Why then does it have such a high LDI on the Web?The major reason for this is that the ".la" domain is actively marketed to foreigners, including customers connected to Los Angeles.As the domain is sold mainly to foreign industries and peoples, only 8% of web pages of ".la" domain are written in Lao.LDIs of African domains are plotted in Figure 5 .The presence of local languages in African domains is far rarer than in Asian domains.The local language claims the majority only in Sudan and Libya.However, several countries show high Web LDIs.The LDIs of European and some Anglophone country domains are plotted in Figure 6 .Local language presence is above 50% with the exception of Slovenia and Denmark (those countries' web spaces are dominated by English), which results in a lower LDI.At the opposite extreme is the United Kingdom, which joins other Anglophone countries (USA, Australia and New Zealand) in displaying a characteristically low LDI.Though we have managed the project since 2003, the survey of the Web is becoming difficult year by year.The most serious challenge to the surveys comes from the sheer size of the growing Web.Nobody knows exactly how many web pages exist on the entire Web.In 1997, the number was estimated at only 320 million.In 2008, Google announced 1 trillion URLs on the Web, but it has since stopped providing data.Also we need a deeper analysis of the Web, not just a language-wise counting.The Web and its hyperlink structure can tell a lot about who and how is using the Webs, and what content is written there.Currently my friend Daniel Pimienta is preparing a new, ambitious project to achieve these goals. (Saint Domingue, Dominican Republic) The theme of linguistic diversity, in the broader frame of cultural diversity, is transversal to many society matters (from education to business) and is emerging at the center of many actual debates.Do languages -as assets of humanity -require public policies to be preserved, promoted or supported?Is English the accepted lingua franca for international research collaboration and business?To what extent has the business globalization opened inescapable requirements for marketing in other languages?These questions, that are essential for the development of information societies, gain even more relevance when they are referred to the Internet, a space which has seen the initial dominance of English getting more balanced, both in terms of users and contents, in the last years, as a consequence of the intense spread of the Net in many regions.Is the "digital divide" a simple issue of access or shall the content divide and subsequent linguistic divide also be addressed?Will translation of contents be a workable and acceptable panacea for multilingualism?The theme of linguistic diversity on the Internet, which has been for a long period dealt by a small group of specialists, is gaining now the attention it deserves among policy makers and many stakeholders.As a side effect from the recent development of internationalized domain names (IDNs) more public awareness has been gained and the theme is becoming a central topic in international agendas as seen in the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) and in the main organizations in the field of the information society, such as UNESCO and the International Telecommunication Union (ITU).Furthermore, the issue is also rising in the agenda of business, and calls for a clear policy framework for the virtual world.As for indicators, a recent publication by UNESCO [1] reports on the current situation and evaluates future perspectives: the situation it describes is indeed paradoxical and quite alarming.Until the late 90s, this field was marked by a lack of serious indicators; this period was followed by the preliminary work of a handful of pioneers, which provided some indicators, most of them limited to number of users and the split of the World Wide Web per language.However, now that interest in the theme is becoming visible, the existing works aiming at measuring the linguistic diversity in the Internet are being undermined by the almost infinite size of the web as well as by the evolution of search engines.Accordingly, no reliable indicators have been produced since 2007, when the Language Observatory Project (LOP) 6 and Funredes/ Union Latina, the two most visible actors in producing indicators, published their most recent results.In this context, and starting from the fact that it is hardly possible to formulate policies in any field without a clear vision of the situation, only obtained from reliable and frequently produced indicators, it is urgent to mobilize existing actors and to encourage new ones to engage in an ambitious, serious and collective research effort of building indicators for linguistic diversity in the Digital World.This effort should both build on existing approaches and explore new methods rather than those involving a static vision of supplied linguistic resources, thus also informing on the demand side (user behavior).DILINET will also introduce the first attempt to measure automatically content characteristics while recognizing languages and use conceptual maps and visual analytics to extract meaning to statistical data on languages in the digital world.In response to this context, the DILINET project aims to develop a set of methods for producing indicators of linguistic diversity on the Internet which will therefore support informed public policies in all fields related to the Information Society, at national and global level.DILINET will adopt an exploratory research approach, taking into account existing measuring methods and adding innovative approaches, including users-based measuring systems.To overcome the limitations created by the size of the Web, the project will develop crawling optimization methods based on non sequential mathematical or statistical approaches and use both distributed and super computing resources while opening new avenues such as recognition techniques for voice or automatic content characterization.Given the transversal relevance of the theme, the project will devote effort in engaging all the relevant stakeholders from the policy field (at regional, national, European and international level) and from the research field (both with public and private background).Specific attention will be paid to raising awareness and disseminating project results among users' communities and organizations working in the sphere of linguistic technologies.The project stems from the motivation of a group of key international organizations such as UNESCO, ITU, Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie (OIF) and Union Latina and will be built on the professional experience of some MAAYA (the World Network for Linguistic Diversity) members such as Funredes or the Language Observatory Project.DILINET will provide the crosschecked and validated values for a set of indicators of linguistic diversity in cyberspace, as well as trustable and sustained methods and processes to maintain a frequent production allowing perceiving the trends and being able to gauge the results of policy actions.Additionally, DILINET will provide effective awareness raising and training activities for policy and research stakeholders on the matter of linguistic diversity on cyberspace.DILINET will represent a historic breakthrough for the issue of linguistic diversity in the Digital World opening the floor for a professional approach to this emerging theme and, as a side effect, contributing to the change of paradigm of the vision of the digital divide, switching the perspective from access to content.Indirectly, DILINET will also open new promising avenues for the production of Information Society Impact Indicators and create opportunities for the professional consideration of languages as a key parameter of the digital economy.We also have these moments of truth in language, we might not be aware of them, but they do exist.The moment a child decided to forget their mother tongue and speak only a dominant language, that is a moment of truth.Thinking back on your own life there are these moments, good and bad.Some examples that Translate.org.za has seen out in the field: • A teacher telling a passionate Afrikaans linguist that they should choose another career as there is no money in languages; • Reading a novel that switches on love for your language; • A praise singer singing the praises of a president in Xhosa; • Walking into a library to see an empty Zulu shelf, confirming that your language really is only for conversing at home; • Writing a Xhosa poem and seeing every word underlined in red.This paper covers a number of activities that Translate.org.za, as well as other members of ANLoc (The African Network for Localisation), have undertaken that try to change these moments of truth into positive moments for multilingualism.Translate.org.za is a South African non-profit organization focused on removing the barriers that exist in technology that prevent people from working in their mother tongue.The organisation also works to increase the volume of content and content platforms that allow mother tongue speakers to produce local language content.Dipping your toe into the sea is not immersion.Dipping into language is not immersion.Immersion is where you take your whole body and submerge it into the sea.Immersion in language is the ability to do everything in your language.At Translate immersion is our vision, while for most languages it might not be a reality it is a goal for which we strive.For a language that is fully immersed this would mean: you switch on your computer and it boots in your language, your emails are written in your language and spell checked correctly, your keyboard works for your language.Your cellphone, TV, ATM are all in your language.When you surf the web you can get content: news, wikipedia, facebook in your language.You look for books online and you find ones written in your language.That is a fully immersed language.Moving from a dream to reality.We often hear talk of the 6000 languages of the world, often that figure is used to indicate how fast our languages are dying.We achieve this with a keyboard, to type in content; fonts, to see the content and a locale to store the information correctly on a computer.With these things in place it is possible to do all the other language interventions that are needed.You can't translate any application without a locale, you can't enter content into a blog or wikipedia without a keyboard and you can't see any of this content in documents or on the web without a font for your language.All the exotic language applications such as automatic speech recognition (ASR), text-to-speech (TTS) and machine translation (MT) cannot proceed without these basics.In the ANLoc project we created almost 100 locales, 12 keyboard layouts and a font to cover all of the latin characters used in African languages.For a large number of languages we can capture, see and store content -we applied first aid for these languages.And it can be applied to any marginalised language across the globe.Marginalised languages often have limited resources, but one resource that they do have is a community of speakers.For marginalised and under resourced languages to prosper is really about empowering these communities because then the community can take our work to new heights and in fact take over our work.Within the scope of limited resources this often means that there are no funds to pay contributors so there needs to be a body of committed volunteers.But scarce resources also means that good skills are in limited supply.Thus it is important that these scarce skills are used optimally.What that means is that those skills are deployed to important tasks while volunteers assist in other areas.Empowered communities in this case are assisting in optimising resources allocation for the benefit of the language.The following are examples that we have used to empower communities: 1.Translate@thons -Translate.org.za adopted this approach to community translation for working on various pieces of software.Google now uses a similar approach to use communities to translate the Google interface.3.Books scanning -many African language resources are locked away on the shelves of libraries.These public domain works are critical resources for speakers of the language to be able to read and be inspired by works in their language.They are not easily available as they are often in rare collections or out of print.These resources in digital format are also critical for the creation of linguistic resources such as spell checkers.Translate has begun a project in South Africa to recover African language books through scanning and digitisation.Children love to read and they don't need encouragement to read.What they do need are exciting books in a medium that they enjoy.For young readers to find exciting books we need lots of books and the medium is most likely the cellphone.Thanks to the m4lit project for having this quote demonstrating the value of content on mobile phones: It's great ... We hope that by scanning the books found in marginalised languages we can provide a resource: firstly, lead to someone discovering their first exciting book.Secondly, but more importantly, it should create a reading culture and produce new creative works in the language.Where do we get large volumes of books?From the public domain, which contains books whose copyright term has expired and thus have been returned to the people.In our project we are scanning books in order to make them available at low cost.In this way anyone can own a collection of Tswana classic literature.Our primary objective is of course reading, the secondary being linguistic resources.It is these linguistic resources that can lead to some exciting language tools.The linguistic data present in public domain works allows us to create spell checkers, grammar checkers, text-to-speech engines and machine translation.Other sources of public domain data that we are interested in and in which Translate is developing solutions include: 1.Assisting with the capture and dissemination of Hansard (the verbatim transcripts of parliamentary debates produced in a number of commonwealth nations) 2.Government website translation -in countries where translations of government resources is regularly performed or mandated by law these translations are a valuable linguistic resource for the language.These sources of open linguistic data are critical for the advancement of marginalised languages.Thus it is important that marginalised languages are active in ensuring that linguistic resources such as these are made available for the advancement of the language.In making these resources available it is critical that their availability be judged not by access to the resources, but by what new resources can be produced from them.Thus licensing that allows academic use but prevents the creation of a commercial spell checker are not in the best interests of the language or the community.In a similar vein the ongoing extension of copyright is problematic for marginalised languages.By extension we mean the move from the current international norms of 50 years of copyright to terms in excess of 70 years.Each extension means that more works are not available to the language.If we consider that copyright approximately 100 years ago was anything from 14 to 28 years and that now it ranges from 50 to 70+years we realise that marginalised languages have lost much of their public domain content.For marginal languages it is important to consider what benefit copyright extension has to the overall health of the language.Of interest to these languages is the championing of terms such as those found in the Egyptian copyright law that give authors 3 years in which to exercise their right to translate.If they fail to translate their work into Arabic within that time then anyone may translate their work into Arabic.This simple clause could dramatically stimulate the production of content in local languages.Linguistically speaking English is very far from either of the languages, Xhosa and Zulu.Xhosa and Zulu are both part of the Nguni language group in South Africa and are therefore linguistically closely related.Many efforts to use machine translation focus on the long distance translation of English to Zulu, French to Zulu or similar.While we won't discount the value of these it is worth considering that by machine translating from Zulu to Xhosa we grow a 10 million strong community into an 18 million strong community.There is an unexploited strength in these close communities that goes beyond machine translation.Zulu is a Bantu language and so is Swahili.Swahili has an estimated 140 million speakers.It is much easier to translate content from Swahili to Zulu.And by translation in this case we don't only mean machine translation, we mean human translation as well as the fact that the closer alignment of the cultures makes translation of cultural metaphors so much easier.For marginalised and minority language we really should be examining how we can exploit the closer relationships to grow the language speaking community, grow the financial viability of languages and grow the limited resources by the pooling of resources.Our efforts are part of a journey.Travellers share their meager possessions, but we in the language community are not very good at sharing our resources.Thus it is important that we create a common ground on how resources should be shared.As we said earlier this should not be defined by the act of sharing but by the outputs that can be created from the resources.As an example, in South Africa, we estimate there are four Zulu morphological analysers.This is clearly a waste of scarce resources in a language with limited access to funds to advance the language.The reason there are four is that there is no framework for sharing these resources.But ultimately it is because there is no clear objective on how these resources and tools should impact on the lives of real people.When it comes to tools for processing linguistic data, the same logic applies.We really do need to learn how to share so that we can focus on the work that impacts language speakers.If you look at the wave that is marginalised languages, those 6000 all crashing down on us at once, then we all want to run away.But if we focus on riding the wave then it could actually be quite fun.We at Translate have realised that it is in some ways about changing our thinking.We want to build solutions that meet the needs of language speakers.But we've realised that sometimes we need to address other people languages needs, and in so doing we create linguistic resources that we can employ to address the needs of our marginalised languages.For resource poor languages using modern technology to give oral literates the resources and tools to be active e-literate participants is the type of thinking, or wave riding, that is required.SIL International is a faith-based, non-profit organization committed to building the capacity of language communities worldwide for sustainable language development.We define language development as the series of ongoing planned actions that a language community takes to ensure that its language continues to serve its changing social, cultural, political, economic, and spiritual needs and goals.From its beginnings in 1934, SIL has had the privilege of working with over 2,590 language communities representing more than 1.7 billion people in nearly 100 countries.SIL's staff see their work as an outgrowth of their Christian commitment, valuing service, academic excellence, sharing of knowledge and partnership as we serve language communities in linguistics, literacy, translation and other language-centered development activities.In addition to language development activities undertaken with individual language communities, SIL takes an active role in advocacy for minority languages at the local, national and international level.Please see our web site at for more information.The increase in global collaboration on the Internet in recent years has opened significant opportunities for minority language communities.We are witnessing an increased visibility of and support for the needs of these communities from the governmental, commercial and non-profit sectors.Collaborative efforts to facilitate the use of all the world's languages in cyberspace are growing.This report highlights several significant efforts and SIL's participation in them.It reflects the work of many SIL colleagues and partners worldwide 7 .In order to facilitate the use of all languages in cyberspace equally, members of the language communities themselves and other interested parties need to be able to collect, organize and share information in and about all languages accurately and consistently.Multiple organizations, including the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), the Unicode Consortium and others, develop and support standards that facilitate this work.SIL International supports these efforts to enhance data sharing based on these standards.The following paragraphs will provide information on some recent developments.In June 2011, SIL International released a powerful web-based resource called ScriptSource.ScriptSource is a dynamic, collaborative reference to the writing systems of the world, with detailed information on scripts, characters and languages.A writing system for an individual language is composed of several elements including the script and individual characters.A language may be supported by several writing systems based on historic, political, educational or other reasons.Scripts, characters and language names are all currently codified by international standards, however the complex relationships between these elements are often not well understood or well documented.ScriptSource seeks to bring together authoritative information from standards and other recognized resources with contributions from the global community to document the writing systems of the world.We hope this resource will help bring visibility to the richness of languages and writing systems, as well as to help researchers, designers, linguists and software developers with the complex task of supporting the world's languages in different information and communication technologies.While almost 7000 living languages are spoken in the world today, only around 130 scripts are used to write them-if they have a written form.An individual script, such as Latin, Arabic or Cyrillic, is thus used to write many different languages.The set of characters used to write a specific language within a script is based on the linguistic characteristics of the language.These, and other elements, go into defining a writing system for a language.For minority languages that use a majority language script, documenting the elements of the writing system makes it possible to develop computing solutions that support the language.As an example, while the use of Cyrillic script for major languages is well documented, its use for some minority languages is not consistently documented or well understood, and that use continues to evolve and change.SIL is investigating the possibility of an extended Cyrillic documentation project that would bring together information from a wide variety of sources to catalog and describe the use of Cyrillic script by all languages that use it.We believe that ScriptSource can be a resource to facilitate that global discussion, and would like to see all interested parties included in the process.Please contact us if you feel this would be a useful project or if you would like to be involved.Comprehensive font development work is already underway.We acknowledge and appreciate the work of the font foundry, ParaType, in developing and releasing the PTSans and PTSerif fonts.These free/libre fonts are designed to support minority-language use of Cyrillic and Latin scripts in the Russian Federation.This development represents a strong partnership between government, non-government and commercial organizations to benefit the minority language communities.The fonts are licensed for the widest possible sharing and use.SIL also supports a wide range of extended Cyrillic characters with the Gentium, Charis, Doulos, and now Andika free/libre fonts.We intend to improve and broaden that support as more information becomes available.Beyond font development is a need to document which specific characters are used in a given language and to develop the standard locale information and other components for a complete writing system reference.Commercial and open source software developers use this information to support a specific language in computing applications.We hope to simplify the complex process of documenting the information needed for an individual language to be used in cyberspace and telecommunications.Once the information is clearly organized, we hope the process for submitting it to the appropriate standardssetting bodies will be clearer and more accessible.The ISO 639 family of standards was expanded in February 2007 with the formal adoption of ISO 639-3.This standard seeks to provide a comprehensive list of human languages, including living, extinct, ancient, and constructed languages, whether major or minor, written or unwritten.It provides a unique three-letter code for each language along with limited meta-data about the language.As the Registration Authority (RA) for Part 3 of the standard, SIL processes requests for changes to the language codes.We receive and review requests for adding new language codes and for changing existing ones according to criteria defined in the standard.All update requests undergo a period of public review before being acted upon in a yearly review cycle.In 2010, thirty-seven requests were considered, recommending fifty explicit changes in the code set.After a public review and comment process, 32 were fully approved and 5 were rejected: • 4 new language codes were created: 3 for living languages and 1 for an extinct language. •19 language names were either changed, or additional name forms added. •1 language had another language variety merged into it. •8 language codes were retired: 2 language codes were merged and 4 language codes were split.A grave concern for many in the world is the large number of minority languages that are endangered or at risk of extinction.SIL shares this concern and is partnering with many organizations to determine ways to document and share information about these languages before they become extinct, with the prospect that these languages can be preserved.We believe that every language has inherent value, and that speakers of minority languages and other interested parties should have the tools and techniques available to protect and enhance their cultural and linguistic heritage.In many cases around the world, we have witnessed renewed language vitality as members of a language community are equipped with the capacity to use their language in new and different areas of life.In addition, we are now working on solutions to publish dictionaries from FLEx on the web for further collaboration and knowledge sharing.With the advances in Unicode and web typography, complex scripts can now be utilized on the web, thus enhancing the language situation for minority languages.We have also developed software that helps non-linguists build a dictionary in their own language.WeSay has various ways to help indigenous speakers to think of words in their language and enter some basic data about them.The program is customizable and task-oriented, giving the advisor the ability to turn on or off tasks as needed and as the user receives training for those tasks.WeSay uses a standard XML format, so data can be exchanged with linguistoriented tools like FieldWorks.Community-level collaborative dictionary development can be a rallying point for language communities.It's something they can get involved in and it opens their eyes to a brighter future for their language.For further information on the FieldWorks suite of software applications, and to download the latest version, please visit the website at http://fieldworks.sil.org/. For an example of a multi-script lexicon with more than 6,600 entries created using FLEx, see the Nuosu Yi-Chinese-English glossary at http://www.yihanyingcihui.net/?lang=en.To learn more about WeSay and download a copy, visit http://www.wesay.org/. Governments around the world are increasingly aware of the difficulties that children face if the language of instruction at school is not the language the children speak at home.As more education systems seek to use the mother tongue of the children in the early years, demand is increasing for local language documentation and educational resources such as schoolbooks and multilingual dictionaries.SIL is developing software to help create early stage reading materials.SIL's long history in supporting language development activities with minority language communities around the world has given us the unique opportunity to develop and contribute technical expertise from the local to the international level.We are grateful for the privilege and are at the same time aware of the responsibility to share what we have learned.The growth of the Internet and the increase in global opportunities for collaboration, information sharing, and standardization on behalf of all language communities provide significant benefits for enhancing multilingualism in cyberspace.SIL continues to seek to be a valuable partner to support the particular needs of minority language communities.We are grateful for the significant progress being made.It is often said that using a language for professional, administrative, educational, legal and other purposes helps it stay alive, because speakers who are forced to switch language according to context tend gradually to use the language that allows them the widest variety of expression.In our knowledge society, a language loses value in the eyes of its speakers if they cannot find knowledge or access to the rest of the world through it.As we said here, in Yakutsk, in 2008, with communication playing a growing role in the balance of power between two competing languages, in the information age this phenomenon favours the languages that are the best equipped or the most "prestigious" to the detriment of the others.We know that the day is not far off when all, or at least the great majority of humanity will have access to cyberspace.In this context, if a language is absent from cyberspace, its speakers might, eventually, turn to other languages.There is a high risk of the disappearance of more than nine out of ten languages which are not represented in cyberspace, because their speakers will have to use other languages for information, education, making purchases, administrative procedures, offering services, connecting to the rest of the world and so on.Furthermore, of the minority of languages that do have access, that is, between 300 and 500 according to different estimates, very few are really well equipped and have a relevant presence on the Internet.Despite some clear progress in multilingualism in recent years, only a handful of the world's languages have a noteworthy presence on the Web.English is still the language most in use on the Internet, but, as all serious studies show, 8 its relative presence is falling.Corbeil told us back in 2000 that "very soon the presence of English should fall to about 40% when sites are created in different countries as they connect to the network" 9 , although we do not have scientific confirmation of this data.We should recall that most of the world's languages are represented in an essentially symbolic way with a few pages dedicated to them, and only a minority of languages are genuinely present.Given that Facebook, Google and Wikipedia are strong trends on the Internet, it is by no means trivial to note that the famous social network has menus in less than 1% of the world's languages, that the almost global search engine only provides at present language recognition for about 50 languages, and that only 5% of languages are represented in the famous encyclopaedia, which nevertheless seems to be the virtual location that is the most open to languages.In fact, there is at present no system of language recognition for any language of American or Oceanian origin on Google 10 .We said it in 2008, but it is worth repeating, that the phenomenon of the disappearance of languages, caused by several factors in the near past (colonization, genocide, epidemics, war, displacement of populations, prohibition on the use of the language, etc.),has grown as globalization has gathered pace, with its technological, political, and socio-economic consequences, in particular migration and urbanization.As a general rule, languages that used to play an important role in the past have experienced a significant decline in sectors linked to knowledge, to the benefit of English.All languages of European origin, apart from some minority or sidelined languages that have been able to make a come-back in recent years, have been affected: German, French, Spanish, Russian, Italian, Portuguese, and so on.Among these European languages, the Neo-Latin languages are also affected.Despite the fact that the main Romance languages played a major role for nearly 1,000 years, in particular French, Spanish, Portuguese and Italian (without forgetting the historic, and literary and lexical mark made by Occitan, Catalan, Norman, Venetian and many other Romance languages), they are today diminished, and the action of languages as vectors of knowledge and international negotiation is reduced.Of course, we understand that concerns about the ground lost by the Romance languages might seem misplaced when 99% of the world's languages have an uncertain future.However, the Romance languages are losing ground in international organizations, scientific and technical expression, international governance, higher education and international negotiations.They are certainly gaining in terms of demography and education as second languages (particular Spanish, Portuguese and French), but their use is above all related to tourism, culture, migration and owing to new populations becoming literate, and less and less to the sectors reserved for knowledge and negotiation.The outlook is not disastrous, as for a few years now speakers of French, Italian, Spanish and Portuguese have been working hard in many international bodies either to give their language specific status or to ensure that it is used as provided for in the rules and regulations.However all these languages are in decline in science and higher education, with our own research institutes preferring to publish their discoveries directly in English without providing a translation into the national language, and our higher education institutions proposing more and more courses in English only.The risk of "domain loss", well known in Nordic countries, leading to the disappearance of whole segments of the language and meaning that engineers will no longer be able to talk among themselves other than in English, is on the way to becoming a reality.We lack an accurate vision of the situation of languages that could help us propose actions for a readjustment in favour of linguistic diversity.No, it is a series of characteristics in which demographic weight is important, as is official status, and whether the language is easy to learn.But it also includes other parameters such as history (we should not forget that the official languages of the United Nations are the languages of the winners of the Second World War), politics, economics, tourism, science and technology, standard of living, literacy, cultural industries, migration and so on and so forth, and today, without a shadow of a doubt, presence on the Internet.Of course, these parameters are not sufficient without political determination behind them.Churchill paved the way followed by the numerous and powerful political and economic interests of the English-speaking world when he said that the widespread use of English would be "a gain to us far more durable and fruitful than the annexation of great provinces".As a result, the English languages is the main source of income for the United Kingdom, and Grin has reminded us that it thereby saves between 10 and 17 billion euros a year in translation costs owing the predominance of English in the drafting of European Union documents.Political will has also enabled societies such as those in Quebec and Catalonia to recover a professional, institutional and educational use for their languages, and has even enabled the restoration to life of dead languages like Hebrew.Access policies for all languages are needed, but especially what is needed is for their speakers to feel ownership.In order to formulate a policy though, reliable indicators are required as well as substantial written or audiovisual material.From the outset we have lacked any kind of indicator on languages and we still lack such indicators on the presence of languages in cyberspace at present, but when we do have some, for written languages in particular, we see that the virtual world seems to reflect the dynamic of languages in the real world.In 2008, we compared the first 30 languages to have a language recognition system in Google, and we noted that they were, roughly speaking, the most productive languages in terms of traditional literature.Recent public and private initiatives to digitize library holdings might only serve to reaffirm the status quo of linguistic diversity on the Web.Should we then conclude that the Web can only be added to when publishing comes first?Probably not really, because of the 50-odd languages with a language recognition system under Google, four fifths of them are the most productive of literature and translations and the remaining dozen might have far lower productivity but do have a larger quantity of articles on Wikipedia and are well represented on Facebook.As far as we know, there is no global study giving us an oversight of the place of languages at the world level on social networks.We have however noted, through an increase in the number of specialized studies and an accumulation of various statistics, that written production through these means is far higher than the production of web pages, even if it is often ephemeral 13 .The studies carried out by Semiocast 14 in 2010 for Twitter, for example, showed that Malay and Portuguese were used far more than Spanish, German, Russian and Italian, for instance, with a greater presence on the traditional Web and far more robust policies on the translation and digitization of works.The research has not been repeated since, but the languages spoken in Indonesia might be far more present today as it is the country with the third highest Generation 140 15 in the world.Do social networks represent a second chance for languages?Probably, because cyberspace actually opens the door to forms of expression of no interest to traditional publishing circuits.After all, science publishing in languages other than English has found a place, albeit a modest one, thanks to the ease and low cost of publishing on the Web, and traditional publishers do not want to run the risk of publishing articles that would be of concern to a very small number of readers.The Internet has undoubtedly enabled minorities absent from traditional publishing to express themselves, but we should not think that this is enough.There is still an inversely proportional relation between Internet access and global linguistic diversity as we showed in 2008; the language divide corresponds only too closely at the moment to the digital divide.That is why it is important to stress aspects relating to infrastructure as much as the ownership of technologies and content (text and multimedia) production.13 The observatory site Promoting the use of a language must take place at every level: educational, administrative, scientific and technical, even for leisure, and in the regional or national bodies concerned.It must take place basically at the level of the access of languages to technology.Of all the language technologies, those whose evolution has been followed most closely are those related to machine translation.As language is perceived to be what sets the human species apart, the thought that a machine might replace us -or even go further than us -in the major linguistic and cognitive exercise that is translation cannot fail to awaken deep-seated fears.And yet, after many years of failure, we are apparently not so far off the goal … at least, for a few pairs of privileged languages and still in the field of specialized translation which, we must recall, concerns between eight and nine of every ten pages translated in the world.If new public programmes do emerge with the aim of democratizing the use of machine translation and favouring language pairs that have not been studied in any depth until now, it is also at the root of competition between businesses.Thus, the United States administration sees it more as a way of making businesses more competitive 16 , on the grounds that on average 52 % of consumers would not buy a product not described in their own language, according to a study carried out in 2006 in eight developed countries.However, although everything seems to indicate that machine translation will be de facto integrated into all our applications, and although the quality seems to be quite satisfactory for some language pairs and the outlook broader in terms of the languages concerned, when it comes to most of the pairs treated, quality is lacking, and in any case concerns barely 60 of the world's languages.The geo-linguistic imbalance is clearly visible in machine translation.Although it is reaching maturity, although it is effective, although it is profitable, it only concerns very few languages, mostly used in North America and Europe, and to a lesser extent China and Japan, and the rest of the world is disregarded.As the most effective systems derive their performance from the corpora already existing (thanks to "translation memories" and systems that process statistics) we can see the challenges that persist for languages with small written corpora.To return to the Romance languages, although they are suitably equipped 17 , developments are still needed to give full satisfaction both to machine translators and to human translators working with these languages.For instance, in addition to overdue spelling reform for Portuguese, and a lack of public resources to automatize Italian, Portuguese and Romanian 18 other than those provided by the European Commission, there is a blatant lack of terminology policies for all these languages, other than French and Catalan.This latter situation is moreover the reason civil society initiatives have been launched, notably that of the Pan-Latin Terminology Network (Realiter) 19 , which brings together the main actors in the terminology of seven Romance languages, and which despite some remarkable work, is, clearly, far from being able to meet the needs of all these languages.The Three Linguistic Spaces 20 are preparing an interoperability project for Spanish, French and Portuguese terminological data banks, which might give strong impetus to the terminological vitality of the three languages, but the road ahead is long.Let us hope that a similar project on language technologies for all the Romance languages can follow on from it.We are striving today to give effect to Action Line C8 of the World Summit on the Information Society Action Plan "Cultural diversity and identity, linguistic diversity and local content", to recommendations of international meetings.Documents that came out of the MAAYA seminars in Bamako, Havana and Barcelona, and those that came out of the 2008 Conference in Yakutsk should be applied for equitable representativeness of languages and cultures in cyberspace 21 .The World Network for Linguistic Diversity MAAYA is well on the way to this goal, with constant support from the Latin Union.Today subject to the policy of preservation, promotion and modernization should be not only the Romance languages descended from Latin, but also all those with which they share spaces and concerns for the future.The Latin Union is convinced that supporting MAAYA ideas is essential, in particular the idea of holding a summit on linguistic diversity and multilingualism, because we are sure that the political will exists today more than ever before to renew most of the world's languages.This paper takes a holistic approach to the language issue in cyberspace.Specifically, on the one hand, it calls for fair language and regulatory policies that take into account the African Linguistic Mosaic and, on the other, it argues that ACALAN, as the sole language agency of the African Union entrusted with the task of fostering the development of African languages in collaboration with the member states, should play a pivotal role in the process of allocating proper space to African languages in cyberspace.The lighter area of the diagram represents mainly the urban areas dominated by the former colonial languages, i.e. English, French, Portuguese and Spanish.These languages, though spoken by small minority elite, were retained as official languages, when African countries achieved their independencies in the early sixties.As a result, they are associated with power, access to socioeconomic privileges, including education, justice and well-remunerated jobs.In other words, they dominate the socio-economic mainstream.As a result, these former colonial languages are regarded as passports for upward social mobility and, as such, given preference at the expenses of African languages, which occupy the darker area of the diagram, representing the rural areas where the vast majority of Africans live and communicate solely in these languages.As Negash 23 points out, while discussing globalization and the role African languages can play in the development of Africa, African governments and the elite still continue to channel away their resources and energies into learning 'imperial' languages that are used by a tiny minority of the population.The preference for former colonial languages has not only resulted in maintaining the status quo, but has also led to the exclusion and marginalisation of the vast majority of Africans keeping them on the periphery of the socio-economic mainstream.In this regard, while discussing language, dominance and control in Africa, Wolff 24 expresses a similar view, when he states that: Post- There are many factors militating against the presence of African languages in cyberspace.Major of them include: • The lack of political will to put in place effective language policies in Africa; • The lack of proper regulations favouring African languages; • The lack of human and financial resources; • The lack of effective training programmes that are informed by the African linguistic mosaic referred to above; • The lack of incentives, user-friendly as well as practical programmes offered in the institutions of higher learning; • The work to foster the presence of African languages in cyberspace is generally inspired by business interests, including competition that neither leaves space for experience sharing and cross-fertilization of ideas nor properly takes into account the African linguistic mosaic; and • The content of the African languages present in cyberspace tends to be confined to non-standardised translation engines and programmes.African decision makers have not yet gone beyond making ambiguous statements on language policies to which very often they pay leap service.This may explain why most constitutions of African countries contain varied clauses on the status of African languages.The constitution of the newly independent South Sudan is the very epitome of what is stated here.In its Part 1, article 6, clauses 1 and 2 on languages 26 it states that: (1) All indigenous languages of South Sudan are national languages and shall be respected, developed and promoted. (2) English shall be the official working language in the Republic of South Sudan, as well as the language of instruction at all levels of education.As is well know there is no better way to foster the development of a language than using it as a medium of instruction.The exclusion of African languages from the education system makes it difficult to pass regulations in favour of developing African languages and to accord them a proper place in cyberspace.Returning to the training aspect, apart from lucking lustre, most programmes on computational linguistics institutions of higher learning offer across Africa do not take into account the African linguistic mosaic and they are mostly concerned with theoretical issues with little impact on the development of African languages.Furthermore, work directly linked to African languages in cyberspace is generally informed by business imperatives and, as such, is broadly limited to developing spell checkers and online dictionaries while taking into account the number of speakers of the targeted language.Last but not least, is the lack of resources.The lack of funds to support research and training is another challenge facing the presence of African languages in cyberspace.This is exacerbated by the absence of clear language policies and regulations, as described above.Language is a cross-cutting issue and, as such, there is no single solution to the problems facing the presence of African languages in cyberspace.We therefore require a paradigm shift that will not only take into account the African linguistic mosaic, but will also allow a holistic approach, which takes into account various initiatives and resolutions taken at various forums.As the African proverb cited above reminds us "one thumb alone cannot crush a louse".Researchers on matters related to African languages and cyberspace tend to work on silos.It is therefore necessary to broaden the research agenda on Human Language Technology, while strengthening macro and micro cooperation across various disciplines and stakeholders as well as creating synergies.The African Academy of Languages (ACALAN) can play a vital role, particularly in lobbying for the support of African decision makers, urging them to put in place effective language policies that favour the development of African languages.It can also facilitate the mobilization of resources at national and international levels.As we all know ACALAN is the official language agency of the African Union whose statutes were approved during the Summit of the Heads of State and Governments that took place in Khartoum in 2006.Its mandate is to work in collaboration with the member states of the African Union towards the development, promotion of African languages so that they are used in all domains of the society in partnership with the languages inherited from Africa's colonial past; i.e. English, French, Portuguese and Spanish.The partnership component is vital as the minority elite referred to earlier always see the efforts to develop African languages as an attempt to replace former colonial languages with African languages.Far from it, all that is required is a linguistic equity in the same way Africa has been calling for gender equity.However, for all that to materialize, the quest for creating space for African languages in cyberspace should be part and parcel of the quest for developing African languages in particular and for poverty eradication in Africa in general.Taking into account the work on the harmonization of the orthographic systems of the Cinyanja/Chichewa, Fulfulde, Hausa, Mandenkan, Kiswahili, Setswana, Vehicular Cross-Border languages, ACALAN organized a workshop on African languages and cyberspace in Niamey from 14 to 15 in December 2011.The workshop brought together researchers working on African languages and cyberspace from Botswana, Djibouti, Kenya, and Nigeria.It took stock of current work on African languages and cyberspace with special reference to the vehicular cross-border languages mentioned here.One of the recommendations of the workshop was that ACALAN should create space on its website where researchers on African languages and cyberspace could post information on current work.This would allow ACALAN to consolidate the information and clearly define priority areas on which to focus its activities.As of the outcomes of the workshop, ACALAN has commissioned the development of spellcheckers to some of the researchers who participated in the workshop.Apart from contributing towards according equitable space to African languages in cyberspace, the spellchecker will allow to disseminate the harmonized orthographic systems of the vehicular cross-border languages mentioned above.As mentioned above, it is also necessary to take into account the various decisions, plans of actions and resolutions which directly and indirectly have bearing on the efforts to develop, promote and use African languages in all spheres of society, in particular: • The Language Plan of Action for Africa; • The Second Decade of Education for Africa; • The Charter for African Cultural Renaissance; • The Khartoum decision on the linkage between education and culture.The use of African languages has been one of the major preoccupations of the Organization of African Unity (now African Union) since its creation in 1963 in Addis Ababa, as indicated in Article XXIX of its founding charter stating that "The working languages of the organization and all its institutions shall be, if possible, African languages". •To encourage the increased use of African languages as vehicles of instruction at all educational levels; • To ensure that all the sectors of the political and socio-economic systems of each Member State is mobilised in such a manner that they play their due part in ensuring that the African language(s) prescribed as official language(s) assume their intended role in the shortest time possible; • To foster and promote national, regional and continental linguistic unity in Africa, in the context of the multilingualism prevailing in most African countries.The Language Plan of Action for Africa addresses some of the challenges described above, which need to be addressed so that African languages attain a significant position in cyberspace.First and foremost, the need for the member states to define clear language policies.There is also a list of priorities in the Language Plan of Action for Africa, including modernisation that has bearing on the research whose output will pave the way for African languages to enter cyberspace.As was the case with the resolutions referred to above, the Charter for African Cultural Renaissance also underlines the role African languages play in propelling Africa to economic and social development and the need to adopt and implement policies conducive to developing these languages.Furthermore, Article 19 of the charter urge African member states to effect reforms to integrate African languages in their education systems.In order for the objectives of the charter related to African languages to be attained, African languages should be accorded a proper place in cyberspace.Another decision taken during the Khartoum summit in 2006 relates to the linkage between education and culture.According to this decision, when African Union Member States undertake the reforms in their curriculum, within the ambit of the Second Decade of Education for Africa, they should ensure that the content of the curriculum is informed and inspired by African culture.ACALAN has been assigned the task of monitoring the process and regularly report to the African Union Commission.A holistic approach to the efforts to put African languages in cyberspace is therefore required.This approach will not only take into account the various decisions and resolutions pertaining to the development, promotion and use of African languages, but will also broaden the research agenda on Human Language Technology, as it would be difficult for African languages to gain an equitable place in cyberspace without strengthening applied research in that domain.In other words, in order to address the various challenges facing the efforts to accord equitable space to African languages in cyberspace a collective effort is required.Such effort should go beyond the concerns of linguists, language practitioners, teachers of African languages and other stakeholders whose work involve African languages regularly.As is well known, language is not everything; but it is in everything.This implies that according equitable space to African languages in cyberspace should be part and parcel of the search for viable strategies to bring about sustainable development that would change the lives of the vast majority of Africans for the better.Once again, we can remind ourselves of the African proverb cited above "one thumb alone cannot crush a louse."The CPLP, an international organization founded in 2000, brings together all Portuguese-speaking countries, covering a territory of 10.7 million km 2 in America, Africa, Europe and Asia, and a population of about 241 million.The member countries are: Angola, Brazil, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, Portugal, Sao Tome and Principe and East Timor.The degree of proficiency in Portuguese language in different countries varies from almost 100% in Portugal to less than 10% in Guinea Bissau and East Timor, as other 339 languages are also spoken in the CPLP, of which 215 languages in Brazil, which accounts for 5% of the number of languages in the world, set in roughly 6500.Although the CPLP is the attempt of construction of an international parity and democratic block, the expansion of Portuguese language was due to the construction of a colonial empire in the same way as European commercial colonialism in the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries.The Portuguese colonial empire was the last of this tradition to disappear, and this only occurred with the independence of African countries and East Timor in 1975.The process of independence was achieved through armed struggle, called the Colonial War (1961) (1962) (1963) (1964) (1965) (1966) (1967) (1968) (1969) (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) (1975) , a conflict that lasted in some countries, in new forms, till the late 1990's or even the early 2000's.The colonial situation left two main by-products when it comes to languages.On the one hand there was the impossibility of building the modern concept of citizenship and the consequent lack of interest in schooling of the population called "native", with a low participation in the Portuguese language community, low penetration of the Portuguese language, and very low level of literacy -the monarchical Brazil becomes Republic in 1889 with 98% of illiterates, a figure similar to that of Mozambique at the time of independence in 1975.On the other hand, colonial language policies or those already independent States, as in the case of Brazil, led to the exclusion of the other languages of virtually every prestigious areas of circulation, which meant that, at best, its use continued in oral language, out of institutions without building standards or instruments related to writing.The era of digitization of the languages found the world of Portuguese languages unprepared for the challenges of the Millennium Goals and the conformation of the Information Society in relation to the corpus of the languages, but also with regard to Internet access and to the necessary schooling of populations to participate in virtual communities.Nevertheless, the Portuguese is the fifth most used language on the Internet, with 87 million users, a figure growing rapidly, following the rapid growth of school population in the last 15 years and the improvement of logistics for the provision of access, as the supply of electricity.The Portuguese on the Internet is currently treated as two languages: Portuguese and Brazilian Portuguese, which results from the fact that we are facing a pluricentric language (rather bicentric), presenting two very different standards (Portuguese and Brazilian), particularly with regard to spelling: Portugal followed for decades the established spelling Orthographic Agreement of 1945, while Brazil was ruled by the Orthographic Form of 1943.This treatment of the Portuguese on the Internet as if it were two different languages weakens its position and international exposure, so it would be desirable that this situation should be reversed.The Orthographic Agreement of the Portuguese language in 1990, which was ratified by six of the CPLP countries, which is already in force in Brazil and Portugal (although in this country the transition phase between the two spellings is still on going until 2015) opens the prospect that Portuguese might come to be treated in a unified way on the Internet, as in this context, the spelling issues are very important to the weight they have in the construction of computational tools of production and recovery of contents.One of the aspects relevant to evaluate the weight of an international language and its vitality is its ability to respond to the challenges posed by science and technology in terms of scientific output in that language.As such, the presence of scientific texts in Portuguese is one of the parameters to consider when trying to portray the presence of this language on the Internet.In this particular aspect the Portuguese position on the Internet is clearly different from the two centers which so far have determined the bicentric character of this language: Portugal and Brazil.When comparing the scientific productions in Portuguese language available on the Internet, there is a clear imbalance between the two standards: the presence of scientific texts in Brazilian Portuguese on the internet is many times superior to the presence of Portuguese texts.To explain this, some data have to be taken into account, which go beyond the geographical and demographic differences between the two countries: Portugal has a total area of 92,389 km 2 and about 10 million inhabitants, while Brazil has 8,514,876 km 2 and approximately 191 million inhabitants.Portugal is a European country, which is part of the European Union since 1986.As such, since then the parameters of evaluation and funding of science and technology in this country have been marked by certain standards by the European Commission, who value scientific publication in English, at the expense of publication in Portuguese.Furthermore, in Portugal, given its size, geographic location, emigration (which has always been a constant) and bet on tourism since the 60's, the teaching of foreign languages not only has been encouraged but also has had very positive results: the literate population can express in one or two foreign languages, often acquired outside the formal school system.Currently English is the language preferred by young students and with more support at the level of government structures.It is to be noted that the implementation of compulsory teaching of English in schools from the third grade occurred in 2005 (Order 14753 / 2005 by the Minister of Education), to the detriment of other languages so far studied in the education system, French and German.All these factors contribute to the fact that a lot of scientific literature in Portugal, especially in the areas of the hard sciences and technologies, is produced primarily in English: this case is all the more visible when even in areas in which Portugal was once a pioneer, as the nautical and ship construction, the Portuguese language has ceased to be practically used and has been replaced by English in a professional context.In turn, the Brazilian government has not adopted policies of scientific literature in the English language in the same way, valuing, also, the scientific literature in Portuguese at the level of science funding agencies.On the other hand, Brazil, an emerging country, has structural problems at the level of basic education that are reflected in teaching and learning of foreign languages, very deficient when compared with the case of Portugal.If we add to this, economic power and the number of universities and research centers in Brazil, as well as the impact of areas in which Brazil is currently a leading producer of science and technology (note for example the case of biofuels), it is easily understood that the Brazilian scientific production in the Portuguese language is truly thriving.All these data have a direct impact on the amount of scientific texts (theses, reports, scientific articles) available on the Internet in Portuguese, and it is mostly ensured by Brazil -and in some subjects almost exclusively.Added to this framework, policies such as the universal availability of master's dissertations and doctoral theses of all Brazilian universities on the Internet, existing since 2000, which enhance the circulation of knowledge in Portuguese.Furthermore, we call attention to the SciELO Network, which indexes the scientific literature in Portuguese and Spanish, creating a broad scientific area in two very close languages, and which together are spoken by 580 million people in 30 countries.This last argument shows the opportunity for Portuguese-Spanish bilingualism, already adopted as communication policy of the MERCOSUR (Southern Common Market) in South America, and is seen increasingly as a strategy to promote the use of these two major languages as an alternative to the exclusive use of English.Within CPLP there are between 300 and 340 spoken languages, according to the way of counting, 215 languages being spoken in Brazil, including indigenous languages, languages of immigration, sign languages, Creole and Afro-Brazilian languages.The twenty-first century presents a more purposeful framework for the presence and promotion of minority languages in public compared with previous centuries, when this set of languages was ignored by the public power, or at various times, was largely suppressed by the colonial Portuguese or Brazilian power .The process of affirmation of linguistic diversity is very recent throughout the Portuguese speaking states, but practically all are moving to create new laws and practices in this field.Thus, we find cases of: • Officialization of minority languages in Timor, Portugal and Brazil; • Actions of heritage language valorization in Angola, Brazil, Cape Verde, Portugal, Timor and Sao Tome and Principe; • Bilingual education programmes involving minority languages, although experimentally, in Brazil, Portugal, Timor and Mozambique; • Corpus Development actions in Cape Verde, East Timor, Angola, Sao Tome and Principe, Mozambique and Brazil; • Inclusion Actions of minority languages in Internet instruments in Cape Verde, Brazil and East Timor.The very initial degree of preparation of corpus of the CPLP languages (scripturalization, standardization and regulation), as well as the incipient literacy of speakers in their own mother tongue, given the exclusion of these languages in most education systems, have been an impediment to further their presence in cyberspace.However, it is expected that soon changes will be experienced in this field.We can cite the example of Nheengatu in the Brazilian Amazon: a language that until the early twentieth century was spoken in much of the 4 million square kilometers of this territory, and now is spoken in an area of about 35,000 km ² by no more than 7 000 people.Nevertheless, it was favored by the legislation emanated from the 1988 Federal Constitution, so it was possible to iniciate in 1997 the Intercultural Bilingual Schools Programme and a teacher training programme.It was made official at the municipal level in São Gabriel da Cachoeira, along with the Tucano and Baniwa, by ordinary law of the City Council in 2002, in a process unprecedented in Brazil, and the law was legislated in 2006.It has been a year since the first Indigenous Language Degree, offered by the Federal University of Amazonas (UFAM) was established in the country; this programme selected 40 students of Nheengatu.Currently, the students are busy in the Cucuí community, Alto Rio Negro, on the border between Brazil and Venezuela, with the support of IILP, creating a Wikipedia in their language, virtual encyclopedia that will receive, in the form of entries, the knowledge researched and produced by them in the course.This path taken by Nheengatu can be followed soon by many other languages.In other words, this is a time of preparation of logistic conditions for the access of speakers and languages from CPLP into Cyberspace, and if the current trend continues we will have visibility of our major languages on the Internet very soon.For this reason the International Institute for Portuguese Language will hold The Maputo Colloquium on the Linguistic Diversity of the CPLP, from 12th to 14th September of the current year, which will assemble for the first time, in Mozambique, programme managers in linguistic diversity of the eight member countries.On that occasion there will be an exchange of experiences on the modus operandi of the institutions responsible for language rights, bi or multilingual education, the promotion of Portuguese in complex sociolinguistic contexts and other aspects related to the field.Also, and in a complementary way, the International Institute for Portuguese Language will hold at the end of January 2012, in the Brazilian state of Ceará, The Fortaleza Colloquium on the Portuguese Language in the Digital World and the Internet, in order to, also, establish contact between internet managers of the eight countries to think collectively about the future of our language in this medium.Both colloquia will have the opportunity to benefit from the knowledge conveyed here in this extraordinary conference in Yakutsk.The Maputo and the Fortaleza Charter will contain experts and managers advice to the II International Conference on the Future of Portuguese in the world system, which will take place in Lisbon, Portugal, in 2012, and shall prepare the Lisbon Action Plan for the Promotion, Diffusion and Projection of the Portuguese Language (2012-2014); this plan needs to strongly consider the global movement for language rights, the ecology of knowledge and the building of the future by all our citizens, speakers of many languages in which solidarity in diversity should be built up within the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries. (Mexico City, Mexico) The 2 nd International Conference Linguistic and Cultural Diversity in Cyberspace gives a unique opportunity to share information on some projects aimed at making a better use of the opportunities that cyberspace is offering to the global society in the 21 st century.These are particularly important for us, who lead and manage public institutions responsible for the revitalization, strengthening and development of national languages, working for the recognition and diffusion of cultural and linguistic diversity in our countries and regions, as well as the elimination of social practices of exclusion and discrimination.Although these issues have been ignored, I will discuss the importance of carrying on investment in infrastructure, equipment and human capital necessary to ensure the access of indigenous communities in cyberspace, promoting their incorporation with linguistic and cultural relevance to the intensive use of the Information and Communication Technologies (ICT).I propose the implementation of inter-institutional agreements, for carrying out joint actions, gathering global resources and using ICT in the revitalization, strengthening and development of indigenous languages.Nowadays, biodiversity and cultural diversity are facts that globalization and the use of ICT have made us more evident.Thus, linguistic diversity is as important for the cultural world development as biodiversity is for the sustainability of the planet.The mother tongue is an essential mechanism for our species to pass on knowledge and ways of seeing the world from generation to generation.According to the latest report from Ethnologue (2009) According to the latest XIII Censo General de Población y Vivienda (2010) nearly 7 million representatives of 62 indigenous peoples residing in the country speak national indigenous languages.However, migratory movements have prompted the dispersal of speakers of indigenous languages (SIL) on the length and width of the country, without considering the significant presence in the United States of America.It should be noted that the SIL live mainly in the States of Oaxaca, Chiapas, Veracruz and Yucatán, a million of them are still monolingual.Náhuatl, Maya, Mixtec, Zapotec, Tseltal and Tsotzil are linguistic groupings which "concentrate" 54% of SIL, although it should be mentioned that only these 6 groups add in total 184 linguistic variants, many of them as close as it can be Spanish with other Romance languages such as French, Italian or Portuguese.In an international level, Mexico has signed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights It is up to the INALI to promote knowledge, recognition, evaluation and appreciation of the national indigenous languages by the approach to multilingualism and interculturalism.This institution has the following strategic lines of action: 1.To promote public policies for indigenous languages, encouraging the participation of all social agents (indigenous peoples, public and private institutions, universities, research centers, experts, etc.),usage of different means of communication and inter-institutional linkages and coordination of efforts with the federation, states and municipalities.2.To encourage the use of the national languages in governmental practice and daily life, and 3.To ensure linguistic planning at national level with focus on the formalization of the national indigenous languages (cataloguing) and the standardization of writing, grammars and dictionaries and specialized lexicons.However, it should be noted that while the indigenous population is not able to seize the institutional framework that has been described, it is harder to reach more ambitious development goals.The only way out is organizing intensive diffusion campaigns to show that it is possible to break the cycle of poverty and discrimination, historically associated with the use and preservation of indigenous languages.In addition, jointly defining objectives and working out clear strategies international agencies, developers, and users of cyberspace would be able to: 1.Establish leadership to promote awareness, respect and the strengthening of the global, regional and local cultural and linguistic diversity.2.Reinforce support programmes to install infrastructure and equipment, as well as develop focused applications to revitalize and fortify linguistic diversity.Today the options that cyberspace and public media provide are essential to make visible and to spread knowledge about the social and regional realities of minority groups, traditionally excluded and isolated.The expansion of coverage and the accelerated growth of cyberspace and its applications, offer new opportunities to developers and users for revitalizing, strengthening and developing the cultural and linguistic diversity at all levels.At the same time, cyberspace is an "ideal place" where respect, freedom and democracy prevail, representing a real and huge "window of opportunity", allowing "the others" to be "visible and audible", to communicate among themselves and to share their ideas and creations with others.According to a recent United Nations report by Frank La Rue (UN Human Rights Council, 2011) Internet is a medium where the right to freedom of expression can be exercised; and that access should be included by the Member States as a human right to develop effective policies to achieve universal access.While this is a fast access medium even from remote places, members of indigenous peoples and their communities immediately get engaged in online communications in a very active and creative way due to the similarity of such activities to traditional forms of participation in community work, where information and results are freely shared.Since 2005 the INALI produces and promotes among the indigenous peoples and their communities multimedia, which are mostly available for free downloading at the official website: http://www.inali.gob.mx.There are music and audio CD's with testimonies and letters of speakers in their indigenous languages; as well as books of poetry, stories and riddles, dictionaries, vocabularies, and alphabets.Also, there have been animated productions from the presentations of the General Law of Linguistic Rights of Indigenous Peoples in order to spread linguistic diversity among the children, radio programmes and the ongoing campaign of "Los Guardavoces"; as well as DVD's with video in indigenous languages subtitled in Spanish.In the middle term INALI will look for opportunities to produce some TV shows.On the other hand, the cooperative model to develop free software has been used for generating some applications such as: Efforts in the diffusion and teaching of indigenous languages are also taken by other Mexican institutions such as the Autonomous University of Querétaro "YAAK".In conclusion, once again I want to insist that a joint definition of objectives and clear strategies would make it possible for those who are active in cyberspace and the ICT: 1.To establish a leadership to promote and strengthen cultural and linguistic diversity; and, 2.To reinforce investments on infrastructure for ensuring indigenous peoples and their communities' access to cyberspace and ICTs as a priority human right.The following proposals for action represent new possibilities for international cooperation in the construction of space enabling intercultural and multilingual dialog with due respect and tolerance, and the dismantling of stereotypical social representations which generate discrimination, racism and social exclusion: • Speeding up the installation of essential infrastructure and equipment so that more indigenous people have access to cyberspace. •Promotion of spaces which foster respectful intercultural and multilingual dialogues. •Providing technological support to the standardization of the writing of indigenous languages, particularly with regard to the handling of special characters. •Developing thematic agendas and inter-institutional agreements of international cooperation. •Promoting the opening of new markets, from approaches to intercultural and multilingual communication. •Recognizing leadership and granting awards for projects aimed at the dissemination and reassessment of linguistic and cultural diversity ("giving visibility and audibility").In the 21 st century equality depends on our ability to recognize that we are different, and in this regard, citing Delors, to bet for a real ethics of alterity we must learn to live among different people (Delors, 2001) .And one of the biggest challenges for us, users and developers of cyberspace, is to be able to recognize and to assume social responsibilities in multicultural and multilingual societies.University of Hyderabad (Hyderabad, India) Recent years have witnessed a number of significant changes in language management.For instance, largely as a result of globalization and scientific and technological advancements, there has been a considerable focus on frequency and intensity of use of languages in cyberspace.However, cyberspace is vastly available in developed and in some of the fast developing economics like India, China, Brazil, South Africa, etc.The reasons are obvious -qualified human resources, free capital movements, transcontinental trade resulting in consumption identical products, etc.Besides, the distribution of population and big improvement in the level of communication access (telephony, mobile phones, Internet, etc.)during last five years have given boost in these countries for designing tools and implementing them vigorously for effective use of tremendous huge size of cyberspace.The paper is divided into two parts.The first part deals with the background for multilingualism and its development.The second part concentrates on various governmental initiatives to promote multilingualism using information technology.Multilingualism represents a historical phenomenon in the Indian subcontinent.It began with the migration of Dravidians and then contact of Aryans with Dravidians.It is important to note that 'Dravidians' and ' Aryan' are not racial terms.As Krishnamurti (2003:3) observes, "still there is no archeological or linguistic evidence to show actually when the people who spoke the Dravidian languages entered India.But we know that they were already in northwest India by the time Rigvedic Aryans entered India by the fifteenth Century BC E.11".Scholars still debate on this issue and "a truly convincing hypothesis has not even been formulated yet" (Zvelebil, 1990:123) .However, this situation had provided basis for the birth of multilingualism in the Indian subcontinent.Multilingualism flourished with the spread of both the tribes across India and their contact with local austroloid tribes (a hypothesis yet to be established).In later centuries, Sanskrit which was the language of rituals became archaic and new forms of Sanskrit such as Pali, Prakrits came into existence (Deshpande 1979) .When Buddhism came into existence, it played an important role in consolidating multilingualism.It encouraged to write all its scriptures in Prakrit and Pali.Sanskrit gradually remained as a language of rituals when Buddhism began spreading over central and southern Dravidian territories.The Buddhist scripts and Official Orders were written in both Pali and regional language.This explains further development and maintenance of multilingualism in the Indian subcontinent.Cultural fusion between Aryan and Dravidian tribes which has taken place almost since beginning of the contact was further intensified.This resulted in the formation of the unique Indian culture in which these two cultures occupy major part.The extensive linguistic borrowing among languages and cultural amalgamation of different tribes in India have continued in subsequent centuries.For instance, Emeneau (1956) highlighted that many features shared between Dravidian and Aryan at linguistic level allow formulating the concept of 'India as a linguistic area'.My aim of looking briefly into the linguistic and cultural history of India is to draw attention on the fact that 1) multilinguality and multiculturality are being unconsciously maintained in the Indian society; 2) despite amalgamation of different cultures, each linguistic community in India preserved its specific cultural characteristics; 3) India represents a linguistic area, where local languages exist along with the national languages.The unconscious existence and maintenance of multilingualism has resulted in coexistence of diverse languages in Indian society.They can genetically be classified into four groups; 1) Indo-Aryan; 2) Dravidian; 3) Munda; 4) Tibeto-Burman.Due to their co-existence over thousands of years in one geographic area, these language groups share common areal features, while preserving their distinctiveness and identity.It should also be noted that because of 'peaceful' coexistence for long period, Aryan group of languages even altered their entire grammatical system under the influence of Dravidian and became similar to that of Dravidian (Prabhakara Rao, 2000) .To put it in typological linguistic terms, after getting in contact with Dravidian languages which are agglutinative in type, Aryan languages which were inflectional in type slowly converted into agglutinative type.The typological balance between the major group of languages has contributed to maintenance of multilingualism in Indian society.As it was mentioned, despite the fact that there is an amalgamation of cultures among different groups in India, cultural diversity is well maintained.Hence, scholars sometimes speak about 'pan-Indian language' and 'pan-Indian culture'.Therefore, India represents an illustration for the dialectical principle of unity in diversity and diversity in unity, which has to be thoroughly studied.Cyberspace provides a unique opportunity to procure information about everything.India which possess a large quantity of English-speaking and technical human resources, can utilize and implement information technologies in all fields of life.Today India is one of the biggest software services providers and software developers in the world.UNESCO Recommendations concerning the Promotion of Multilingualism clearly enunciates that "… linguistic diversity in the global information networks and universal access to information in cyberspace are at the core of contemporary debates and can be a determining factor in the development of knowledge-based society".It also underlines that "basic education and literacy are prerequisites for universal access to cyberspace".Recently India has enacted the Right to Information Act (2005) and the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act (2009).Now it is contemplating with the idea to encompass preprimary education also in these acts.Government of India is spending huge amount of money through Rajeev Sarwa Siksha Abhiyan ("Education for All" programme) on primary education and literacy.To give free access to information on all Acts, Bills, Decisions of various committees, Judgments, etc, the government made it mandatory to make them available on the Net.The information that is not available on the Net shall be provided to citizens with 5 days of applying for such information.India is not only a multilingual and multicultural, but also a multiscript country.The 22 official languages are written in 10 different scripts.Hence, it is a real challenge for specialists to design tools for information processing in local languages at low cost to bring 'Digital Unity' and to make 'knowledge available for all'.To build knowledge societies, it is essential to store, to transfer and to transmit that knowledge in a multilingual form and make it easily and freely accessible to people.This enables to build inclusive knowledge society with rapid economic growth.It seems government of India is totally convinced with this fact and initiated accordingly large number of measures to implement it (Vikas Om, 2001 ; Report by India to UNESCO, 2007).Preservation of linguistic diversity is one of the global problems and challenges of cultural ecology.At the end of the twentieth century humanity faced a complex of socio-natural acute contradictions that affect the world in general as well as particular regions and countries.Under generally accepted classification developed in the early 1980s three main groups of global problems are distinguished: • problems associated with basic human social communities (prevention of global nuclear catastrophe, closing the gap in the levels of socio-economic development between developed and developing countries, etc.); •issues concerning the relationship between man and environment (environmental, energy, raw materials and food, space exploration, etc.); •problems requiring special attention to the relationship between man and society (profiting from scientific and technological progress, elimination of dangerous diseases, health care improvement, eradication of illiteracy, etc.).There are other classifications of global problems, but any of them is arbitrary, since all problems are closely related, have no clear boundaries and overlap each other.One of the global problems is the rapid loss of linguistic diversity of mankind.Hundreds of languages are endangered: languages with a small number of speakers that have no writing and other signs of high social status, the so-called "small" or "minority" languages.This process can be compared to a decrease in the Earth's natural diversity.Environmentalists around the world precisely estimate the loss of biodiversity as a catastrophe.However, socio-cultural consequences of language extinction and decreasing linguistic diversity is hardly less dangerous than those of the decline of biodiversity.Like any other global challenge, the problem of linguistic diversity preservation is characterized by a number of criteria: • manifestations of magnitude that go beyond the limits of a single state or group of countries; • topicality; • complexity: all problems are intertwined with each other; • universal character of the problem, understandable and relevant to all countries and peoples; • requiring solution by the entire international community, all countries and ethnic groups.Preservation of linguistic diversity can justifiably be classified as an essential problem of cultural ecology.Surge and exacerbation of global problems of mankind requires for developing a complex understanding and choosing best solution methods.UNESCO has long been playing a leading role in coordinating international efforts to preserve linguistic diversity.In recent years the preparation of a number of important events (8) and documents (5; 6; 11; 13) has been initiated.In the Russian Federation the idea of preserving linguistic diversity is being actively promoted by the Russian Committee of the UNESCO Information for All Programme.Thanks to its efforts information on the ways of solving the problem of the linguistic diversity preservation in the modern world is collected, analysed and interpreted in Russia.The analysis of papers published by the Russian Committee (9; 10; 14) reveals the following set of measures, as well as forms and methods used in Russia to preserve multilingualism in cyberspace.Analysis of these data suggests that a system of measures, forms and methods of work of various institutions, from government to private individuals, is being developed in Russia to preserve linguistic diversity.However, this system does not explicitly mark one of the tools without which the preservation of multilingualism in cyberspace and digital environment is not feasible.Such an important and essential tool, in our view, is information literacy.The term "information literacy" was adopted by the international community to refer to a wide range of competences and skills related to the ability of individuals to use information and communication technology (ICT), in order to confidently navigate the huge flows of information, be able to locate, evaluate and effectively use this information to solve various problems of the modern world.UNESCO and IFLA were the leading international organizations to initiate the promotion of the idea of information literacy.As a result the concept of information literacy has been formed.The following steps have been taken by IFLA and UNESCO to promote information literacy in the world: According to the Alexandria Proclamation, information literacy: • creation • comprises the competencies to recognize information needs and to locate, evaluate, apply and create information within cultural and social contexts; • is crucial to the competitive advantage of individuals, enterprises (especially small and medium enterprises), regions and nations; • provides the key to effective access, use and creation of content to support economic development, education, health and human services, and all other aspects of contemporary societies, and thereby provides the vital foundation for fulfilling the goals of the Millennium Declaration and the World Summit on the Information Society; and • extends beyond current technologies to encompass learning, critical thinking and interpretative skills across professional boundaries and empowers individuals and communities (1).Based on this interpretation, we emphasize the role and importance of information literacy as an essential means of facilitating the task of linguistic diversity preservation in cyberspace.If you re-examine the above table showing the main action lines for social institutions, organizations and establishments to preserve multilingualism in cyberspace, almost all of them require for citizens' proficiency in information literacy.The most important functions of information literacy as a means of preserving multilingualism in cyberspace are connected with accessing information and communication.The "key" function of information literacy is its being a kind of a key that opens the door to information storages.We emphasize that this can be both traditional (libraries, archives, museums), and electronic information storages.Mastering information literacy allows individuals to get access to socially important information contained in the electronic environment, including the Internet.Without information literacy one cannot be provided with public access to modern digital resources: online newspapers and magazines, databases, Web sites and portals containing a wealth of legal, linguistic, educational and scientific information that reflects the rich traditions and culture of the peoples of the world, including small and indigenous nations.Another important function of information literacy is giving people an opportunity to communicate in digital environment.It expands opportunities for communication and interaction in cyberspace for native speakers and people studying a certain language, facilitates integrating the efforts of all those interested in the preservation and promotion of multilingualism, regardless of their location and distance from each other, through the use of ICT.The major benefits of ICT in this regard are: • openness -ability to access necessary information resources and communicate with all those interested in the preservation and promotion of multilingualism; • interactivity -active interaction of all stakeholders and usage of network information resources with feedback provided; • efficiency -high-speed information exchange, ability to regularly update and promptly amend information; • convenience -usability of the digital information environment and the possibility of access for remote users at any time convenient to them.In our view, the role of information literacy in the preservation of linguistic diversity in cyberspace is not limited to the above-described two functions.Information literacy surely performs the adaptive function as well ensuring individuals' adaptation to the new challenges of a rapidly changing information society.Moreover, information literacy is also an important factor of development, as it is aimed at enriching one's mental capacity and inner world.Information literacy is the foundation of any cognitive process, including education, and scientific research.It is a tool for tackling practical vital tasks requiring for the use of appropriate information and relevant knowledge and skills.The protective or preventive role of information literacy should be emphasized, allowing individual to protect himself from the negative effects of computerization and ICT development.Mastery of information literacy skills gives people a tool for protection from risks and challenges of the information society, connected with the huge volume of information, often unreliable and contradictory, from ICT penetration into all spheres of life and danger of manipulation of human consciousness.In this regard, developing critical thinking is essential for current training programmes on information literacy.Critical thinking allows to select, analyze and interpret information, draw one's own conclusions and form own point of view on various social, cultural, political, and other aspects of life instead of blindly trusting other's opinion.In conclusion, we want to emphasize once again the complexity of the problem of multilingualism preservation in cyberspace in the context of globalization.Its solution lies outside the scope of simple and unambiguous decisions, and requires for the integration of efforts by national and local governments, education, science, memory institutions (libraries, archives, museums), art institutions, both traditional and electronic media, public organizations and private individuals.It involves large-scale, long term and, most importantly, systemic activities including raising the level of information literacy of citizens.Information literacy development for preserving multilingualism, in turn, requires for state support and provision of the following conditions: 1) organizing citizens' training in information literacy through educational institutions and libraries of all kinds and types; 2) organizing professional training for specialists to teach information literacy to different categories of learners, including native speakers of various languages, representatives of small and indigenous peoples.This problem might be solved by using the potential of teachers and librarians (information specialists) mastering the technologies of information literacy development with due account for ethnicity, age and type of activities of students; 3) creating and using distributed information and learning environment, including specialized information resources (primarily documents in different languages, including small and indigenous peoples' languages, information publications and guides to electronic resources reflecting the culture and traditions of various nations, traditional and electronic library catalogs), computer equipment, means of access to remote domestic and world information resources. "Distributed" information and learning environment presupposes that its constituent components are concentrated in educational, library and information institutions; Preserving linguistic and cultural diversity is a need no one calls into question these days, with its importance consolidated in a whole number of international documents and intergovernmental agreements.Yet, small indigenous languages are still facing the risk of extinction, and that risk may be exacerbated by the ongoing process of information globalization.It is not unlikely that the expansion of information and communications technology and the emergence of global cyberspace will lead to a narrow group of major languages taking over the world, with smaller ones pushed to the sidelines.The extinction of minor languages was an issue prominent on the agenda of the first international conference "Linguistic and Cultural Diversity," held in Yakutsk in 2008 The proportion of native speakers routinely using their mother tongue in daily life had shrunk over the period to 3% (grandchildren's generation), up from 65% (great-grandparents).The disappearance of minor languages is a disastrous process, which in some cases may happen over just two or three generations.A survey undertaken that same year on the Yakut language, though, showed its high degree of sustainability, with a fluent command demonstrated by 100% in great-grandparents' generation and by 86% in grandchildren's.The decrease in native speaker numbers is more pronounced with urban dwellers.In rural areas, 100% of the ethnic Yakut born between 1910 and 1930 and 79% of those born in 1990-2010 demonstrate fluency in their native language.In cities, meanwhile, the figures are 93% and 61%, respectively.In ethnic Yakut inhabitants, aged 15-19 and 20-29, the willingness to preserve their cultural identity is much harder to come by than in older community members, aged between 30 and 65.To gauge the pace of processes related to native language and culture transmission, we have split the ethnic Yakut population into two categories depending on whether the original identity is neglected or preserved.In the former category, people attach little importance to their traditional culture; they are reluctant to cultivate ethnic traits in themselves, and have no willingness to use their mother tongue, nor teach it to their children (only 48% of the respondents intend to teach it, as compared with 95% in the latter category).The survey's findings show a deformation in the mechanisms of value, language and culture reproduction in the ethnic Yakut during their industrial and postindustrial transition.The limited amount of proven natural reserves and the industrial boom of major Asian economies (such as China and India) are likely to prompt major world powers' political, economic and socio-cultural expansion into the Arctic and circumpolar areas in the next two decades or so.Countries like the United States, Russia, Canada, and Norway are expected to step up their industrial activity in those territories.This will dramatically increase the migrant inflow in the sub-Arctic, along with bringing in different lifestyles, value systems, and socio-cultural standards.Faced with cultural and economic occupation in their ancestral lands, the region's indigenous communities may find themselves on the brink of cultural extinction within two or three generations.In the next two decades, the Republic of Sakha will be the scene of ambitious socio-economic and socio-cultural transformations, which may drastically change the living conditions of the local indigenous communities.In keeping with the federal government's Strategy for Socio-Economic Development of Russia's Far East and the Baikal Region through 2025, the gross regional product is expected to grow 8.5-fold on the year 2005.That growth could be provided primarily by large mining and transportation projects --the driving force behind the republic's future industrial advancement.The potential threat to the reproduction and existence of sub-Arctic indigenous communities is determined by three "waves" in Yakutia's cultural and economic development in the years to come: 1) New industrialization, that is, operations in the republic's territory of large Russian, foreign and transnational corporations (predominantly companies involved in mining); 2) Innovative progress, that is, high-tech projects to be launched by the government and the business community, and the introduction of new production lines and services relevant to the post-industrial stage; 3) Acculturation on the part of major world players, such as the United States and the Eurozone countries, who have a strong influence on global media and the Internet.They will try to impose their culture and value systems on the indigenous population, making extensive use of postmodernist humanitarian techniques, aimed at destroying traditional cultures and building a globalist, consumption-driven society.In these conditions, the very vitality of the indigenous communities' traditional economic patterns and their mechanisms for intergenerational transfer of cultural heritage and value systems will be put to test.The related problems include: • dilution of indigenous communities' livelihoods against the backdrop of large-scale development of local natural resources by large corporations; • exacerbation of social and environmental problems arising from the narrower spread of traditional occupations and the impossibility of the native population's full-fledged integration into the emerging industrial and postindustrial realities; • young people's loss of ethnic identity and breakaway from their native culture (including language, communication and conduct patterns, as well as value systems, under the pressure of mass culture and consumerism); • destruction of the genetic fund as a result of migrations and birth rate decline amidst growing urbanization and the emergence of new medical and socio-medical problems.Life shows indigenous communities' high sensitivity to aggressive industrial and postindustrial development and the likelihood of their consequent marginalization.Their role in humanity evolution risks being brought down to that of conserved and protected "relics," eventually.Having said that, the prospective expansion of mining operations in Yakutia and the advancement of high-tech sectors, with the North-Eastern Federal University among the major R&D contributors, will provide indigenous communities with vast opportunities for breakthrough.There is a possibility of creating an economic model that would enhance the financial and economic foundation for their sustenance and development.A broader scale and variety of products, services and socio-cultural activities would create a window of opportunity for expanding the competency range of Yakutia's indigenous inhabitants, thereby enriching its social and human resources.International documents 32 adopted on the issue in the past few decades recognize indigenous communities' political, economic, and cultural rights to the preservation of their social, cultural, religious and spiritual values and economic practices, as well as the rights of property and ownership of their ancestral lands.All this may be instrumental in helping preserve such communities' cultures and languages.Cyberspace and ICT have created an additional communications dimension and a new form of existence for languages and cultures.The international community and Russian authorities should do more to overcome the digital gap and to expand the use of cyberspace in efforts to preserve indigenous cultures and languages.However, such efforts alone will not be enough to counter the processes of Western culture, values, activities and lifestyles conquering the world.The domination in the information landscape of major languages, such as English, Chinese and Spanish, ensures the spread of world powers' value systems globally, depreciating the significance of minor languages to their native speakers.The presence of indigenous cultures and languages on the Web cannot guarantee their wider use by speaker communities in real life.There is also a risk of turning living indigenous cultures into a mouthballed heritage for museum conservation and display.The preservation of cultures and languages is no easy task, and there are still no established managerial practices to implement it.The problems of culture and language preservation management arise from a need for long-term commitment (50-100 years), the difficulty of foreseeing economic and socio-cultural scenarios, and the complexity of the object to be preserved.The Foresight Yakutia project is being run by two leading higher education establishments: the Siberian Federal University and the North-Eastern Federal University.Launched in 2010, it follows up on the republican government's policy toward preserving cultural and linguistic diversity.This project is a complex and multidisciplinary one.Its research and planning groups are comprised of methodology specialists, economics, sociologists, demographers, medical doctors, cultural anthropologists, specialists in culture studies, ethnographers, teachers, historians, and philosophers.The research and development work involves more than 50 scientists and scholars, many of whom hold high academic degrees.As a new tool for "working with the future," Foresight includes the following dimensions: • foreseeing the future (identifying basic trends in the development of large socio-economic systems, countries, regions, corporations, etc.); •managing the future (comparing forecasts by key players and coordinating their strategic goals); • promoting the future (drawing roadmaps that would show possible routes, bifurcation points, and windows of opportunity).Foresight is to be rerun every five years for verifying the findings, carrying out a critical analysis of the practical results, and updating the tasks set.A modern centre will be set up on the North-Eastern Federal University grounds to perform the following tasks: conducting research and monitoring sociocultural processes in circumpolar areas; elaborating modern sociohumanitarian techniques; and implementing pilot projects in socio-humanitarian practices for the preservation and development of northern ethnicities.The project has no analogues in Russia's cultural policy practices.Activities: • arranging comprehensive study and systemic planning of a longterm future for the indigenous communities of Yakutia; pushing the foresight boundaries to 40-50 years through the engagement of a broad range of competent Russian and foreign experts; • forming a public consensus, creating a broad-based public coalition for translating the most preferable of scenarios into reality, organizing and supporting the processes of long-term preservation and reproduction of Yakutia's cultures and languages; • elaborating principles of socio-cultural policy, building strategies and programmes for the preservation and promotion of Yakutia's languages and cultures within the format of strategic partnership between the government, the business community, and the general public.Aims and goals: 8.determining a 'scenario field' and describing major scenarios for the development of Yakutia's ethnicities, to cover the entire range from best-case through worst-case; selecting the 'basic scenario,' based on key players' consensus and vision for the future.Making an economic assessment of the scenarios, including the amount of investments required, the possibility of recouping the costs, etc.9.developing project proposals in major areas of activity: healthcare (type of treatment, the desired profile of medicine, medications, and diet; defining the notion 'healthy lifestyle' in reference to the indigenous communities of the North); education (socialization for integration into industrial and postindustrial formats of activity; transmission of traditional culture; specificity of childhood as an institution and the logic behind growing up into adulthood; result-oriented education); cultural practices (transmission of mentality specifics, systems of values, methods of identification, patterns of early-age and matureage socialization, etc.);10.Drawing a roadmap that would allow to coordinate efforts by the authorities, members of the business community and the public, and welfare organizations involved in the implementation of the basic scenario; 11.Developing guidelines for a policy of sociocultural development in the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) through the year 2025.A web site is a prominent and very important tool for promoting any given language in cyberspace.Therefore, it is worth using it to support less-diffused languages.Let us start with a brief recall of what is a web site.Basically a web site is a page of a document written in HTML or XML language in order to be published on the Web.This page may include different elements such as texts, pictures, movies and sounds.In the early age of the Web, only the webmaster could modify his website by adding to it or withdrawing from it any element of information.Interaction with the visitors of the site was limited to specific devices such as a guestbook, a forum or newsgroup.Since then, the Web technology has undergone a very deep evolution leading to what is known as "web 2.0", a thoroughly interactive kind of web site that allows a fast development of social networks.In this new model of web sites, every visitor may sign up and then is given a personal page with her/his profile.Users can access a large set of tools to act like a webmaster, post any document they want, and interact with an endless number of people individually, selectively or collectively.So, it becomes possible to organize all kinds of collaborative activities directly on the web site in real time.Now, the most important question is not "how to do?"but "what to do?"Indeed, the structure of your web site depends on what you want to do with it!That is where the content issue comes in.There is no limitation to the diversity of the content that can be included in a web site.Yet, as we are interested in web sites designed to support any less-diffused language, let us draw the outlines of some of the content which may be expected on this kind of web sites.On such a site information should be found on the language itself, on the language's situation, e.g. on where and when it is spoken and on the people who speak it, the way they live and their culture.One of the first decisions to make is whether the site should be written in the less-diffused language or in some more widely diffused one.The first option gives a good visibility to the supported language as it makes it become a working language on the web site.But only those who speak it can read and appreciate the web site's content.The second option reveals the less-diffused language to much more people in the world, but let it remain an object one can talk about instead of becoming a mean of communication.The best approach is likely to be a bilingual web site making use of the less-diffused language as well as a more widely spread one.Information about the less-diffused language encompasses phonetic and phonology data, morphology and syntax data, orthography and writing systems, all kinds of literary texts (proverbs, tales, poetry, short stories, novels, songs, mail and CV models, advertisements, and so on.)Each of these items can be developed on several pages and where it is suitable video files can be included and lessons can be designed for learners of the language.We'll come back on this last point further down.One of the most important language data which might deserve a whole separate website is the language lexicon.The technical approach to online dictionaries much depends on how they are intended to be used.It may be a word reference with a search field and a browser that lays out the result for each looked-up word.It may be presented as a full page of a dictionary with several entries in an alphabetic list.Multilingual dictionaries are usually based on semantic links that emphasize both similarities and differences between languages.The growth of a language entails the enrichment of its vocabulary.As a lessdiffused language becomes a working tool in cyberspace, it will necessarily need a technical terminology to talk about the Web site itself and activities carried online.A new way of speaking will come out and it is a good practice to talk about it and discuss it on a wiki space.The need of a series of specialized technical vocabulary will soon come up leading to a growing terminological activity in a variety of knowledge fields, which deserves a dedicated web site.Linguists love classifying languages.So, one of the basic kinds of information looked for about a less-diffused language is its classification amongst its cognates.In which language kinship and typology does it fit?In which country or countries is it spoken?What can be learned about its history?What is its social status?In a multilingual situation, which are the other languages spoken in the same area?All these questions can be answered in series of articles that fill several pages of a web site dedicated to the less-diffused language.As mentioned above, in order to increase the number of its speakers, a whole e-learning system can be built featuring sets of lessons for beginners, and other sets for advanced learners.Beginners' lessons include phonetic exercises, and common sentences used in everyday life or typical social conversations, while advanced lessons introduce more to the people's culture and literature aiming at a better mastership of the language.E-learning requires an important online interactivity between a local staff and a growing number of faraway students, each of whom should have a profile, a personal page and follow-up.Because everybody has different reasons to take lessons in any given language, it is a good practice to design the architecture of the whole course as a tree that allows different ways to progress through the lessons.Thus, each student can choose the better way for her/him, eventually with the advice of their teacher or mentor.How many people speak the less-diffused language, either as native speakers or as second language speakers?Do all the speakers share the same cultural area, way of life and custom?A good description of these features provides content of a high interest.This includes all aspects of the society's life such as social organization, administration, justice, labour, education, religion, philosophy, arts, food, architecture, transport, leisure and entertainment, and so forth.It is very common throughout the world that traditional communities develop a close relationship with specific animals they depend on for their life.For instance, a seal for the Inuits, a horse for the Mongolians, a cow for the Fulani, the Tutsi or the Texan cowboys, a sleigh dog for the Greenlanders, a reindeer for the Sami of northern Europe, a camel for the Sahara Tuaregs, a llama for the Indians in the Andes, a yak for the highlanders of Himalaya and neighboring regions, and so on.This special relationship between a specific animal and a human being community generates a very rich diversity in culture and civilization that all deserve being known to the whole mankind as a global human heritage.Who else can reveal them better than representatives of those traditional communities whose languages are usually less-diffused?Finally, a social network web site would give the opportunity to the most committed supporters of the less-diffused language to enhance the language's life on cyberspace by using it to chat and exchange all kind of messages and private data.By so doing, they automatically strengthen the vitality of the language that will thus become more and more used and diffused.Most of the time, people who are really committed to promote a language organize themselves into a legal cultural association.In this case, it is a good practice to give news of the association's activities on a web site in the supported language.Beside of this, a real online newspaper can be created on the same web site to inform and comment on current events in the supported language.News, comments, points of view, debates are the ingredients of these web site pages.But some items like calendar, horoscope, crosswords and similar games, meteorology information, sports, lottery and different polls can be added to make the page even more attractive.Since Olympic and global competitions are regularly organized, some sports like soccer and rugby have become popular all over the world.During these competitions that take a huge place in the news, comments are usually given only in widespread languages, never in a less-diffused one.So, it is a good idea to find a way of talking about these games in every native language, and this can be done on a web site.On the other hand, very few is said, if any, about games, sports and leisure practiced only in local communities.Since they are part of the local culture, it may be easier to talk about them in the less-diffused language.Here again, a multilingual presentation can help disclosing them to the rest of the world.As I said it right from the beginning, there is no limitation to the topics which can be addressed on a web site.I simply outlined here some of the most obvious ones that I would expect from a supportive web site dedicated to the promotion of a less-diffused language in cyberspace.The multilingual dimension is also useful to allow sharing knowledge worldwide.In the modern globalised world, being informed is, of course, very important for taking decisions and acting, but it is even more important to share knowledge and learn from each other in order to build a better world locally.Social network plays an important role in establishing an online collaborative society.Being seen in current occurrence, it provides a great impact in social, political, educational, and many other movements.Such a way of the change in the way of people collaboration can be promoted in developing humanity resources to enrich our linguistic and cultural knowledge.We developed a platform for Asian WordNet (AWN) (Sornlertlamvanich et al.2009) co-creation.It is prepared by connecting the existing bi-lingual dictionaries to the core Princeton WordNet (Fellbum, 1998 ) based on the degree of English equivalent list (Charoenporn et al.,2008) .WordNet is one of the most semantically rich English lexical banks and widely used as a resource in many aspects of research and development.Word knowledge can be logically represented by a set of synonyms called synset.Currently, there are 13 Asian languages semantically connected via Princeton WordNet, and the WordNet Management System (WNMS) is prepared for cross language access and additional term co-creation (Sornlertlamvanich et al.,2010) .Under the collaboration between Ministry of Culture and Ministry of Science and Technology by National Electronics and Computer Technology Center (NECTEC), a collection of cultural knowledge has been embodied since 2010.We did not start the work from scratch.Actually the work has been done some years ago by forming a set of servers individually operated by each province.Each province has to take care of their own contents about their responsible area.The initiative has been carried out for the purpose of creating a reference site of the local cultural knowledge.The distributed ssystem's aim is to decentralize the management and to maintain the uniqueness of each specific area.However, there is a trade-off between the independent design and cost of maintenance that covers the service operation, interoperability and integrity.There are currently 77 provinces in Thailand, and each province is allocated an office for provincial cultural center.With the approach of the above-mentioned distributed system, it is too costly to maintain the service and the standard for data interchange.The newly designed platform-based approach for digital cultural communication has been introduced.It is to build a co-creative relationship between the cultural institution and the community by using new media to produce audience-focused cultural interactive experience (Russo and Watkins 2005) .First, we collected the existing provincial cultural knowledge and convert them to conform to a standardized set of metadata.This is to prepare the cultural knowledge for an open data schema and interoperability.The metadata is defined to follow the Dublin Core Metadata Element Set with some additional elements to fulfill the requirements for the information during the recording process.Second, we assign representatives from each province and train them to be a core cultural content development team for community co-creation.The contributed content needs to be approved by the core team before public visibility.Third, the cultural knowledge will be put on service to the audience of such scholars, who may be interested in the cultural practice, or business developers who may benefit from attaching the cultural knowledge to their products, or tourists who may seek for cultural tourism.This cultural media assets will be linked and annotated by a governed conceptual scheme such as Asian WordNet (Sornlertlamvanich et al.2009 ).The semantic annotated and linked data will be serviced as a fine-grained cultural knowledge for higher-level applications.The new media for recording the cultural knowledge is in the form of narrative, photo, video, animation, image incorporated with GPS data for visualization on the map.The existing cultural data has been collected and cleaned up to conform to the designated standard metadata.The absent data are supposed to be revised and augmented by the experts from the Ministry of Culture.A few tens of thousands of records have been collected but most of them are captured in a coarse-grained image.Narratives and images are revised by a group of trained experts to create a seed of standardized annotated cultural knowledge base.Some new records have been added together with animation, video, panoramic photograph, etc.New technique in capturing the cultural image is aggressively introduced to create value added and gain more interest from the audience.The standardized annotated cultural knowledge base is presented through a set of viewing utilities to the audience.Filter according to the location and province is prepared for customizing to page for each province.This is to allow the unique presentation of each province.The administration of each province will be responsible for its content correctness and coverage.Actually, the attractive presentation and narrative are required to attract the audience.It is significant that the provided framework can encourage the data accumulation and fulfill the needs from the audience.Community co-creation will feedback the actual requirement that can improve the quality of the content.Institution plays an important role in mediating between community and the audience.As a result, the multiple types of content are generated on a designated standard.The annotated metadata can be used as a guideline for higher level of data manipulation such as semantic annotation, cross language and link analysis.In this report, we present a web-based participation model to support linguistic and cultural diversity, and discuss alternatives to design the model in some crucial aspects.The participation model includes key features to deal with linguistic and cultural assets: collection, review, and publication.It is designed to ultimately promote users' participation, and to embrace a diversity of linguistic and cultural information in terms of information characteristics and sources.Especially, such design consideration is required in the circumstance where diverse and heterogeneous devices including mobile systems are getting popular, and with parallel, the representation of linguistic and cultural data would be also diverse and complicated.For the purpose, our model is designed to allow a self-defined data representation in which a user can provide his/her own data.It has no doubt that such data representations should be effectively handled by computers as well as humans.Furthermore, the participation model plays as an open service platform which enables easy creation and launch of another new applications and services.Based on an open dictionary service, for instance, a phrase translation service or another dictionary with more specific interests can be built by others than original authors.In summary, such a participation model is expected to provide a ground to wider sharing and use their linguistic skills of the small ethnic groups, and further efficiently build up new challenging works as well as glue to naturally linked individual's thoughts.As we know, earlier web services had focused on how to publish and share their information which is mostly static and unchanged over time.But, since the advent of web 2.0, it has become a true communication space far beyond information sharing.Such new web features support collective collaboration, active social networking, and component integration.Collective collaboration is achieved by participatory creation and sharing.Active social networking enables users to dynamically interact to each other, based on personal profiles, their social links, and additional services.All the social media including blogs, twitters are enabled by this feature.Component integration combines data, presentation, and functionalities from multiple sources to create a new service or application.For example, Google opens their own map service as public APIs which other developers can freely use.In such circumstances, we are facing two barriers in supporting minority languages in cyberspace.First, sometimes their computing environments would be less developed.For instance, we need operating system supports with character codes, fonts, and input methods.It is also true for language supports in some major applications or services from Microsoft and Google.Also, the gap in leading technologies is getting larger.Secondly, the most important problem I think is the less participation in using a minority language in cyberspace.Especially, the cyberspace is not familiar with agro-typed rural residents and senior citizens who have much experience in their languages.In addition, younger generation prefers using official languages which are strongly recommended and advantageous in their community.Of the barriers just mentioned, the eager participation into the cyber community is the biggest challenge we have to address.In essence, it is not a problem linked to technology only, rather it is strongly related to social and cultural surroundings.In terms of technology, we have to support a communication model which satisfies the following requirements.Firstly, the model should encourage language users within a minority community.We expect that it will reinforce the solidarity among the indigenous people, and make a positive cycle to use their languages.But, we have to be very careful as a closed society is subject to threaten creativity or diversity in communication, and in the end, it may lose motivation to participate.So, the communication model should be able to bridge their local community and global world.Such mutual exchange could facilitate their linguistic, cultural, and creative activities.The Korean pop entertainment is a good example which has made huge achievements by such exchange.As shown in Figure 1 , we may have two separate systems for local and global communities.Also, the local systems may be proprietary and incompatible with the global systems.In that case, those could work for local community, but cannot interact with the global systems.By any means, we have to develop how to exploit global systems for the both.As an approach to support such a model, we need to design a gateway service between local and global communities on the Web.It consists of 4 components, such as directory of the minority users, interface localization, language translation, and contents analysis.We emphasize that the main purpose of this approach is to efficiently unite minority people while helping them play in the global space.Looking closer, the first one, directory service helps the indigenous people find out their colleagues or relevant contents with ease.It needs to maintain a directory for each web activity such as blogging and social media.Eventually, it acts as a contact point for someone to get into their local community.Two screen shots of Figure 2 show a simple case which is developed by Dr. Kevin Scannell at St. Louise University in America.The site is named indigenoustwitters.com.The left one shows a list of indigenous languages he found from the Twitter.And, the right one shows a list of active users in a specific language.So, you can easily find who stars in your language Twitter, and get into your community.Next, we need to localize some major applications such as Google, YouTube, and Twitter.Mostly, menus, popup messages, and on-line help are major targets to localize.For instance, Google is running the Google Technology User Group (GTUG) which officially supports language problem of each country.In another way, we can personally contribute to the localization through the Google In Your Language service.For example, we can put into the system a set of localized messages.The language translation is strongly required to interact with global community.It should automatically translate user's texts into a common language such as Russian or English.In case of Google, they provide a general translation service for about 50 languages.They also provide open translation APIs which can be employed by another application.In the above mentioned example users' twits are translated in Twitter by the Google APIs (it is also a typical example of component integration mentioned prior).For a language they do not support, you should develop a translation module which can be plugged into a Web browser.It is not easy, but it is worth it.Even though translation accuracy is not quite good, it is strongly required to link the indigenous community into global community.Lastly, we need to collect and analyze statistics on the web content.It can be conducted by crawling web data, and after analyzing, it can be used to rebuild a directory of minority users.It can be used to build a corpus and linguistic resources for minority languages including multimedia.Crubadan is an example module designed for this purpose by Dr. Scannell.It acts as a web crawler which gets a small set of seed texts, and forwards a query including these seeds to Google.Then, Google returns a list of documents potentially written in the same language.It is also performed by Google open APIs for web search.You may refer to this URL, http://borel.slu.edu/crubadan/ index.html.We need to provide a communication model which can support solidarity within local community as well as mutual exchange with global community.At present, web-based participation is definitely a feasible option option, and gateway service with following features may be considerable.I would like to finish with this saying by Nancy Hornberger from the University Of Pennsylvania, "Language revitalization is not about bringing a language back, but bringing it forward."I believe that our efforts and trials for minority languages will strengthen their future.Multilingualism, Multimedia and Orature in the Information Age: One of the advantages of digital technology is that it facilitates access to information in various forms and modes.This could be in the form of sounds such as speech or music and in the visual forms such as written texts as well as static images and motion pictures.The presentation of information in these various forms is what we now refer to collectively as multimedia.The relevance of digital technology to modern use of multimedia stems from the fact that the digital approach to the representation of natural reality offers uniformity in the storage, processing and retrieval of information on the same hardware by the use of appropriate software.This leads to economy of scale and many other benefits.The development of writing is a great mile stone in human civilization.Writing as a means of documenting human thought offers efficiency, portability and permanence.Writing is efficient in the sense that large volumes of information can be stored within relatively small volumes of media space, hence offering great advantages in the storage space of written ideas.It is portable in the sense that written texts can be moved to locations other than the one occupied by the producer of the idea and it can be at more than one location at the same time.Finally, written texts are said to be permanent in the sense that spoken words, fizzling into thin air after they have been uttered, when written, remain available for consultation for as long as the media on which they are written survive.Writing has enhanced the production and management of information and knowledge, providing means for productive storage, retrieval, transfer and dissemination.From the humble beginnings of the documentation of human experiences in cave drawings, totem poles and other semiotic endeavors to the precursors of the present information revolution facilitated by Gutenberg's printing technology, mankind has benefited immensely from the improved capacity for the storage, retrieval, transfer and dissemination of information and knowledge.Unfortunately however, not all the languages spoken in the world today have been reduced to writing.Furthermore, writing present a steep learning curve particularly for adult learners who did not get the opportunity to learn to read and write as children.Hence there are many segments of our so-called global information society in which a significant number of people still do not have the capacity to read and write.Worse still, there are whole communities that speak languages that are still unwritten languages.People in these sorts of situations are disadvantaged as they are pushed to the fringes of the information society.Their inability to read and write excludes them from many vital aspects of the life of the wider communities they live in.Consequently therefore, such people are systematically excluded from active participation in the development processes of both their local and global communities and their communities are the worst for it since these people cannot fully contribute their own required quota to development processes.To alleviate this exclusionary condition, multilateral agencies such as UNESCO as well as national governments and various NGOs put a lot of efforts into improving literacy levels in various communities around the world.They organize programs in developing writing systems for languages that remain yet unwritten and adult literacy programs for adults who live within literate cultures but did not manage to acquire literacy skill as children.Despite the best of these efforts however, there are still a lot of illiterate people in our world of the information age.It may be quite depressing but we must admit that it would appear that the death of illiterates is still one of the primary ways by which we are able to improve literacy in the world today.Despite the efficiency, portability and permanence of written text as discussed above, it must be noted that speech still remains the preferred mode of human communication.It is the most natural way by which humans communicate.This is easily demonstrated by the lengths to which we as humans still go in organizing conferences, seminars and workshops to sit together and consider issues of paramount importance based on the use of speech.These we still do despite the near ubiquity of written text.Given this reality, we need to pause and ask a pertinent question: if sound recording had been developed before writing, would writing still have developed in the same direction?Would it have still grown to acquire the importance it now has in our global society of today?Yet, our present bias for writing seems to manifest as a distraction in the ways we treat other media and modes of communication.The historical exploits of writing and the vibrant cultures and industries that have grown around it tend to ascribe an overrated importance to writing.For this reason, cyberspace has so far been developed based on the importance we attached to writing.This direction of growth of cyberspace is not inevitable and there are viable alternatives to the heavy demand of reading and writing that cyberspace as we now know it presents.Cultures using languages that yet do not have writing systems and many more that are shaped strongly by oral forms of information and knowledge sharing would not benefit maximally from cyberspace it we do not provide alternatives to the heavy dependence on reading and writing as we have now grown cyberspace.In such cultures, teaching and learning are still based primarily on memorization and recitation.People share knowledge by telling stories, proverbs, riddles, etc.In many of such cultures, the collective memory of society resides with Griots who memorize the history and tell it when required.Hence, the history is accessed primarily by performance.In some other cultures the collective memory is held within society at large based on an elaborate system of cognomens in which people are named and described according to the lives and times of their forbearers.These cognomens are usually stories of both valiance and villainy.Among the Zulu of southern Africa it is called Izithakazelo and among the Yoruba of West Africa it is called Oriki.In the Yoruba culture for example, children get some parts of their oriki recited to them at least once a day.Parents and other elders in the homestead, particularly mothers would go into a session of recitation of a child's oriki in response to a simple good morning greeting from the child.The oriki is also freely recited, both to children and adults during ceremonies and sometimes, just in acknowledgement of important achievements or in a bid to encourage prosperity.This way, various portions of the collective memory of the whole community is held in the brains of individual members of the community and is regularly rehearsed in performance for the purposes of retrieval whenever needed.Despite the known weaknesses of the human brain as a store of information, the sacred texts of the Ifa divination system of the Yoruba still remains largely in oral form.Even though some portions have been written, the bulk of it still resides mainly in the brains of Ifa scholars as an oral scripture.These sacred texts contain the knowledge of Yoruba philosophy, medicine and many other relevant sciences in elaborate poetry.The knowledge contained in these poems is organized in an equally elaborate system of information look-up based on binary mathematics and probability theory.How then do we accommodate such traditions that are based mainly on orature in cyberspace?How do we use multimedia to assist such cultures with documenting their histories and their knowledge of their environment in media that are more appropriate than the human brain?If we are to develop cyberspace as a truly multilingual knowledge space, is it pertinent to ensure that cultures that still learn by memorization and recitation also have access to the information superhighway?Apart from giving such cultures access to cyberspace, it is also necessary to offer modern technology as a means of documenting and mobilizing the knowledge that is otherwise held in the brains of mere mortals.To accommodate orature in cyberspace we need to consciously and deliberately reassess the role of multimedia as a means of information and knowledge sharing.Multimedia allows for the documentation of human thought, ideas and knowledge without literacy.It does not necessarily require the development of a system of orthography and therefore does not present the steep learning curve that literacy presents to adult illiterates.Modern digital technology has facilitated multimedia in unprecedented ways.By virtue of this development, it is now possible to document information in different forms and in various modes, be it in the form of sounds in speech and music or in the form of images in writing, still images and motion picture.Information in various forms and modes can now be stored and retrieved uniformly in various media on the same hardware.This diversified access to information through multimedia should be better exploited to include cultures that are still based primarily on orality in cyberspace.So far, multimedia has been used primarily as enhancement to written texts in cyberspace.Even though such use is welcomed, multimedia needs to be seen as valid and productive in its own right and should therefore not be used merely to enhance written texts.Literacy is defined as the ability to read and write.It must be noted, however, that the value of literacy is not really in the process of reading and writing but in the results we get from reading and writing; the sharing of information and knowledge.Hence, literacy is valuable only because it provides an efficient means for the documentation and reproduction of human thoughts, ideas and knowledge.If it is possible to achieve the same results without reading and writing, the value of the process of reading and writing becomes diminished and the result of reading and writing takes the full value.Multimedia offers the capacity to document human thought, ideas and knowledge beyond reading and writing and therefore offers the possibility of redefining literacy, changing it from 'the ability to read and write' to 'the capacity to engage literature'.Replacing the notion of ability with that of capacity moves the definition of literacy away from excluding those that are not able to including those that can be capacitated.The fight against illiteracy is a major preoccupation the world over, but as was observed earlier, death of illiterates still seems to be one of the most effective tools used in this fight.This is not to say that illiterates are deliberately killed in the fight, but the intrinsic link between illiteracy and ignorance weakens the chances of survival of an illiterate person, manifesting as a vicious cycle in which illiteracy breeds poverty and poverty weakens a person's capacity to become literate.Modern digital information communication technology can be used to break this vicious cycle by introducing multimedia as a means of productive information sharing without the ability to read and write.Such intervention is bound to lend a hand to the fight against illiteracy by producing e-literates out of illiterates.We may therefore be able to redefine literacy, changing its definition from 'the ability to read and write' to 'the capacity to engage literature'.The use of multimedia in the fight against illiteracy should be approached at two main levels.The first level involves the basic application of multimedia for documentation.This entails the use of audio recordings to document spoken information as well as the use of static images and motion picture to provide visual complements to such audio recordings.At a more advanced level we can use speech technologies such as Automatic Speech recognition (ASR) and Text-to-speech (TTS) Synthesis to turn speech into written text and written text in to speech respectively.This way we can derive all the advantages of written texts even without the ability to read and write.The use of hand-held devices such as Mobile Phones and Tablets is widening access to multimedia-enabled devices.Unfortunately however, the applications built for these devices still reflect a clear bias for written texts.As the popularity of these hand-held devices continues to grow, there is a need to reassess this bias for written texts in order to empower that large population of people who still live in oral societies to benefit from the cyberspace.To grow a truly multi-lingual cyberspace, we need to carefully reevaluate the importance of writing within the context of new developments in digital technologies and thereby make deliberate efforts to elevate the status of multimedia.We should not continue to overrate the importance of writing while there are other information media and modes that offer advantage we cannot afford to overlook.Supporting small languages can take many forms.A key to long term access to information about most of the world's languages is in the curation of existing records and the proper creation of records now.The network of language archives that exist in the world have been developing standards and have also been training practitioners (linguists, speakers or language workers) in good methods for language documentation.Websites can deliver accessible information, but the risk is that unique records will be placed only into websites and will not survive in the longer term.Archival forms of the records should be properly described using standard metadata terms and be created and stored at the highest possible quality, for later delivery in compressed formats suitable to web delivery.In this paper I outline the Pacific and Regional Archive for Digital Sources in Endangered Cultures (PARADISEC) (http://paradisec.org.au) as an example of a new kind of archive that is emerging, one that is not only a repository of curated material, but one that is involved in training, adopting standard formats for primary records and creating workflows that will result in multiple outputs from linguistic fieldwork.We have also developed a method for presenting interlinear text and media online (http://www.eopas.org) in order to encourage the creation of language records in reusable formats and to work towards a language museum in which samples of language in performance can be viewed on the internet.I suggest that we need to provide a service of advice and data conversion for those for whom it is simply too difficult to do this work themselves.An example of such a service is the Resource Network for Linguistic Diversity (http://www.rnld.org).It should always have been part of the discipline to produce good research data, but the use of digital recorders, storage and archives, together with the development of suitable standards for data and metadata construction, have all combined to refocus our efforts in this direction.At the turn of this century, a group of Australian linguistic and musicological researchers recognised that a number of small collections of unique and often irreplaceable field recordings mainly from the Southeast Asian and Pacific regions were not being properly housed and that there was no institution in Australia which would take responsibility for them.The recordings were not held in appropriate conditions and so were deteriorating and in need of digitisation.Further, there was no catalogue of their contents or their location so their existence was only known to a few people, typically colleagues of the collector.These researchers designed the Pacific and Regional Archive for Digital Sources in Endangered Cultures (PARADISEC 34 ), a digital archive based on internationally accepted standards (DC/OAI-PMH metadata, IASA audio standards and so on) and obtained Australian Research Council Infrastructure funding to develop an audio digitisation suite in 2003.Researchers working with speakers of small languages (those with few speakers) typically conduct fieldwork to learn how aspects of these societies function, how the languages are structured, or how musicological knowledge is constituted, in addition to recording life stories, ethnobiological and other information.Typically these are minority endangered languages for which no prior documentation exists.This is vitally important work which often records language structures and knowledge of the culture and physical environment that would otherwise be lost (see e.g., Evans 2010 , Maffi 2001 , Harrison 2007 ).However, while it is typical for the interpretation and analysis of this data to be published, the raw data is rarely made available.The data -tapes, field notes, photographs, and video -are often not properly described, catalogued, or made accessible, especially in the absence of a dedicated repository.This means that enormous amounts of data -often the only information we have on disappearing languages -remain inaccessible both to the language community itself, and to ongoing linguistic research.The data that we create as part of our research endeavour should be reusable, both by ourselves and by others.First because any claims that we make based on that data must themselves be replicable and testable by others, and second, because the effort of creating the data should not be duplicated later by others,but be used as a foundation that can be built on (cf.Thieberger 2009) .In order to be made accessible, the data recorded by researchers must be properly collated and indexed for public presentation and archiving (see Austin 2006 , Himmelmann 1998 , Woodbury 1998 .However, until recently there has been no simple means for doing this and access to physical analog records can be difficult, if not virtually impossible, when they are stored in a single location.This issue is being faced by scholars in many disciplines and is being addressed under the rubric of cyber infrastructure or e-humanities -how to build on existing knowledge and how to add new data that is being created in the course of various research projects so that the broader research community can benefit from it.This is all the more important when a linguist makes the only recordings for an endangered language-one that may no longer be spoken in the near future.Australia and its immediate neighbours are home to a third of the world's languages, most of which may never be recorded.In the initial phase of the PARADISEC project we established a steering committee with representatives of each of the partner universities (initially the University of Sydney, the University of Melbourne, and the Australian National University (ANU).The director of the project is Linda Barwick at the University of Sydney.With invaluable technical support from both the National Library of Australia and the National Film and Sound Archive and with funds from the Australian Research Council we bought a Quadriga digitisation suite and employed an audio engineer and administrative assistant, based at the University of Sydney.We also built a vacuum chamber and low-temperature oven to allow us to treat mouldy tapes that required special care before being playable.Tapes stored at the ANU were identified and located and then permission was sought from the collectors or their agents to digitise and accession them into the collection.In the first year of funding we had to come up with outcomes that would justify further funding grants and we aimed for 500 hours of digitised tapes in that first year (we achieved this goal in ten months).We wrote a catalog database in Filemaker Pro, aware that it would provide us with an immediately usable tool that would ultimately have to be converted to an online database.This database allowed us to refine data entry forms and controlled vocabularies without relying on a programmer.This first catalogue worked well and exported to the XML files required for inclusion as headers in Broadcast Wave Format (BWF) files, and also exported to a static repository for Open Archives Initiative harvesting via the Open Language Archives Community 35 harvester.Files generated by this system (at 96khz/24 bit) are large, around 1.5 Gb per 45-minute side of a cassette, and so require dedicated storage facilities.We established a tape backup system which ran periodically to copy files from the hard disk to storage tapes, but were fortunate when the National Computational Infrastructure 36 (NCI) designated PARADISEC a 'Project of National Significance', allowing us to use their mass data storage system, with considerable storage space provided to support our work.They further provided programming support by writing specialized software (called 'Babble') which provides weekly, monthly and quarterly reports on the state of the collection, as well as nightly querying the server in Sydney and copying files that are ready for archiving.Data is organized by collector, but also by the internal logic of the collections (the same collector working on two different languages will have two collections, or a collection of video may be distinct from a collection of still images).The collection-level also speeds up a user's typing into the catalog as common fields from the collection level can be inherited down to the item level.Our naming convention is rather simple 37 ('CollectionID'-'ItemID'-'FileID'.'extension') and it also provides the hierarchical file structure into which files are placed and stored on the server (with directories corresponding to the collection level and subdirectories corresponding to the item level).Subsequently and with funds from the ARC, we built digitisation suites in Melbourne and Canberra, allowing us to preserve important heritage tape collections.The primary aim of the project to date has been on preservation of unique cultural records.Including a licence, or information about how each item can be used, is critical to the establishment of a properly curated collection because without it there is no way of providing access.Each depositor must fill out a deposit form specifying any conditions that may apply to the material.We provide a default set of access conditions which any user must agree to prior to being given access to data, and depositors can choose to allow this set of conditions to govern their collection, or to determine their own conditions.We are presently investigating the use of Creative Commons 38 licences as a less restrictive and more standardised form of agreement.We provide material from the collection to those authorized to receive it, typically in the form of downloadable files, however we have also worked on specific methods for the online delivery of two kinds of material -page images and time-coded media.We made available images of 14,000 pages of fieldnotes (see Figure 1 ) from three deceased researchers using the Heritage Document Management System 39 with a digital camera rig that we took to the home of the estate's executor, or to the office in which the papers were stored.These notes from deceased researchers would otherwise have only been available in a single physical location.As we do not have the resources to keyboard all of these manuscripts the images are stored in the collection with sufficient contextual metadata to make them discoverable on the web.As noted earlier, the archival version of each image is stored separately from the representational version.While building a method for working with our own data we consider it important to create generalisable models and structures for others to use, and to engage in discussions and training sessions both in order to refine our methodologies and to impart new ideas.An example of such development is our work on the online presentation of interlinear glossed text together with recorded media (EOPAS 40 ), allowing material from any language to be heard in concert with its transcript and translation (Schroeter and Thieberger 2006) .A number of tools for annotating language data have been produced recently 41 and it is clear that more are envisaged now that several large projects are engaging with these issues in the USA, UK 42 , Germany and the Netherlands 43 .Annotation is a basic task that is undertaken following recording, and can take several forms, the most common of which, for linguists, is interlinear text.These texts are analysed and parsed by a glossing tool that produces parallel lines of text, word translation and grammatical information, together with a free translation.These texts are then the input into EOPAS, a schema-based XML system for making explicit the relationship between parts of interlinear texts together with links to the source media, streamed using HTML5 (see Figure 2 ) which allows searching and concordancing linked directly to the media.EOPAS is portable (the source code is freely available 44 ), allowing other initiatives to capitalise on the work and potentially develop it in different directions.The ultimate aim of this approach is to allow new perspectives on the data itself, provided by contextualised access to primary data, and then to allow new research questions to be asked, and richer answers to be provided, all in a fraction of the time that it would have taken with analogue data.the image itself (bottom) (http://paradisec.org.au/fieldnotes/SAW2/SAW2.htm).Currently (mid-2011) PARADISEC contains 7,220 items made up of 48,555 files totaling 5.3 TB, with just over 3,020 hours of audio data 45 .Digital video already makes up an increasingly significant part of the collection.We hold data representing 676 languages from 60 countries (see examples of the kinds of collections in Table 1 ) which is organized into 260 collections, some 85 of which represent new fieldworkers who have deposited material on their return from fieldwork (and one during the course of her fieldwork), thus providing a citable form of their data for their own research.Here are some examples of collections digitised and described by the PARADISEC project: The remaining collections are digitised from recordings made since the 1950s.The provision of this service requires ongoing support and negotiation with depositors and we have found that a key to establishing the collection has been the depositors' perception of the benefit accruing to them and to their data in having it well described.In addition, there are collections we know about and would dearly love to digitise but we do not have the resources to do this work.These include large audiotape collections at radio stations around the Pacific, many in local languages, and collections in regional cultural centres that do not have any local equipment to digitise their collections.Further, we are regularly approached by former colonial patrol officers or missionaries who have recordings, notes or photographs that they want to preserve. •We have published on our website 46 a detailed description of our workflow, developed over seven years of operation, that describes the various processes involved in locating tapes and then assessing, accessioning, digitising and describing them, managing the resulting data and metadata, and the return of original tapes.PARADISEC has been cited as an exemplary system for audiovisual archiving using digital mass storage systems by the International Association of Sound and Audiovisual Archives 47 and, in 2008, won the Victorian Eresearch Strategic Initiative prize for humanities eresearch.Once we built the infrastructure for a research repository, including the catalog, file system and naming conventions, it has been taken up by those researchers who are aware of the need to describe and preserve their research material.Often it is only in the process of depositing with PARADISEC that a collection is first described in a systematic way -one that then allows the description to be searched by Open Archives Initiative search engines (and also google).Every eight hours the PARADISEC catalog is queried by a service run by the Open Language Archives Community (OLAC) and any new or edited catalog entries are copied and made available to their aggregated search mechanism.Similarly, because the catalog complies with relevant standards, the Australian National Data Service (ANDS) has been able to incorporate our collections into its national search mechanism.The quality of the metadata we provide ensures that targeted searches by language name can be resolved without locating similar but irrelevant forms.While the initial focus for our collection was the region around Australia (as suggested by the name we chose at the outset of the project), it has become clear that we need to accept material that has no other place to be archived.Typically, this means supporting Australian researchers whose research is outside of Australia, with the geographic spread of material we house now extending from India, into China, and across to Rapanui (Easter Island).With limited resources PARADISEC has nevertheless established working relationships with cultural centres in the Pacific region (e.g., the Vanuatu Kaljoral Senta, or the Institute of PNG Studies) which have involved providing CD copies of relevant material and, in the case of the University of New Caledonia, cleaning and digitising old reel-to-reel tapes in Drehu.A serious concern for many such agencies in the region is the lack of continuity in funding and in staffing, with the potential result that collections established and curated over time may be at risk.We would like to be able to digitise the many hours of tapes held, often in less than ideal conditions, in countries of the region.We have begun an occasional mass backup of significant collections of digital material from the Vanuatu Kaljoral Senta and would like to extend this as a service to other agencies.We regularly offer training workshops in linguistic research methods, including the use of appropriate tools and recording methods and in data management for ethnographic field material.This is extremely important, as the more informed the research community can become about the need for reuse of primary data, the more likely they are to be creating well-formed data that needs no extra handling by PARADISEC to be accessioned into the collection.Such training has been offered at community language centres as well as in academic settings.We cooperate in two further initiatives for disseminating information.The first is a blog (Endangered Languages and Cultures 48 ) and the second a resource website with FAQs and a mailing list (the Resource Network for Linguistic Diversity 49 ).Because of the rapid changes in methods for recording, transcribing, and analysing human performance no one can keep completely up to date, so these web-based resources are widely quoted and appreciated by the community of researchers.PARADISEC is a practice-based archive, arising from a community of practice who recognised that it was part of our professional responsibility to ensure that the records we create are properly curated into the future.This is a new conception of a data repository, built into workflows and research methods of particular disciplines, but recognising the need to adhere to broader international standards.It is unique in its links on the one hand to fieldworkers and to speakers of Indigenous languages and on the other hand to the cuttingedge technologies of Web 2.0 and HTML5.Vice Chair, Intergovernmental Council, UNESCO Information for All Programme (Vienna, Austria) It is almost trivial to state that written text documents are inadequate tools to represent acoustical phenomena such as spoken language, dialect, and music, or optical manifestations of rituals, dances, etc.This applies specifically for orally transmitted cultures where no traditional relations are in place between texts and spoken language, or traditional forms of notations, e.g. for music and/ or dance.Verbal descriptions and written texts are insufficient and subjective, and this makes historical studies in ethnolinguistics, ethnomusicology, and social anthropology at large, cumbersome and rudimentary.However, this situation has changed with advent of audiovisual documentation technology in the 19 th century: photography was available since 1839, the phonograph was invented in 1877 and cinematography emerged in the 1880s and 1890s.The development of the phonograph was specifically associated with the scientific interest to understand the physics and physiology of human speech.Consequently, the phonograph has attracted linguists and anthropologists immediately since its practical availability in 1889/90.Systematic language and music recordings were at the cradle of emerging disciplines like phonetics, ethnolinguistics and dialectology, as well as ethnomusicology.Their histories are closely associated with the history of sound recording.Consequently, this led to the systematic establishment of sound archives, namely so-called "Phonogram Archives", the first in Vienna in 1899, followed by Berlin in 1900, and in 1908 by St. Petersburg.Cinematography was also introduced to anthropological fieldwork, but, because of the technical complexity and the costs of this technology, not systematically employed to considerable extent.Over the following decades the phonograph remained in use until the 1940s, as gramophone recording, though technically superior, was hardly applicable under field conditions.Audio field recording became only widespread with advent of battery operated tape recorders in the mid-1950s, which permitted uninterrupted recording of considerable lengths and quality everywhere in the world.Similarly, video recording became popular with the advent of "handy cams" since the 1980s.Though technically inferior to cinematography, even to 8mm amateur film, this was affordable even for private researchers which made "videotaping" a widespread documentary tool in fieldwork.More recently video documents became an important factor even in linguistics, to permit research into gestures and mimics.As a result of this technological development audiovisual collections mushroomed and became irreplaceable stocks of primary sources of linguistic and cultural diversity of human kind.This mushrooming was supported by the relative affordability of audio and video recording equipment, which lead to the establishment of collections as part of research institutions, museums, and even in the possession of private researches.Generally, however, these collections remained without specific custodial infrastructure, or any preservation strategy, let alone budgetary provisions.It is estimated that the greater part, possibly 80% of these primary sources, which are the basis of our present knowledge in many disciplines, are outside archival custody in the narrower sense.Only 20% of this heritage are professionally preserved.This system of relative anarchy has worked until recently somehow.However, audio and video recordings are prone to deterioration and threatened by format obsolescence.More dangerous than the instability of carriers is meanwhile the inescapable unavailability of replay equipment, as traditional analogue, and also single carrier based digital formats, became obsolete.As a consequence, the industry ceases production of equipment, spare parts and provision of service.This situation was anticipated already in 1989/1990 which had lead to shift of paradigm for audiovisual archiving; first for audio, followed since the late 1990s by video, and presently also applied for film archiving: The new strategy is to preserve the content, not the carrier, by transferring contents to digital files and migrate these files from one IT preservation platform to the next 51 .There is unanimous agreement that the time window left for transferring audiovisual carriers into safe digital repositories is only 15 years, if at all.After that even well preserved originals will be useless, because of unavailability of dedicated replay equipment.Feeding analogue and digital single carriers into digital repositories is in demand of time, modern format-specific and regularly maintained replay equipment, and specialised experts in fading technologies, to keep operations running.It is important to understand that autonomous transfer operation can only viably be performed if critical masses are available, which must amount to several thousands of items per format.However, transfer is the first step only.Professional IT repositories must be in place to take up digitised contents, which have to be migrated into the future from one technical preservation generation to the next.Long-term preservation of digital files calls for permanent engagement in terms of logistics, personnel, and financial means in previously inexperienced dimensions.Critical masses are again crucial for viable installations.Present costs are in the order 1-2 USD/GB/year for great repositories.Prices are further decreasing, but the slope will eventually flatten out.Over the past 15 years we have seen many audiovisual digitisation projects that had suffered from a bundle of typical insufficiencies or mistakes: Most concern inadequate equipment for signal extraction from original tapes.Latest generation of equipment shall be used, because only this would capture the originally recorded quality.Mediocre or badly maintained equipment would distort original quality.Typical mistakes made in the production of digital files are the use of non-precision AD converters (as parts of cheap sound cards), the choice of streaming instead of file formats as digital target formats (CD audio instead of Wave), inadequate digital resolution (44.1kHz /16 bit instead of at least 48kHz /24 bits), the use of data reduced ("compressed") target formats for analogue originals -e.g.DVD for analogue video originals or MP3 for audio, and, finally, the use of optical recordable discs as sole digital preservation media.Radio and television archives as well as national archives of wealthy countries will solve preservation problems professionally by -possibly selective -transfer of holdings within next 15 years and by providing sufficient funds to keep digital files alive.But what can be done to safeguard the small and hidden collections, which are outside custodial care, reflecting the greater part -estimated 80% -of the documents of linguistic and cultural diversity of human kind?The first and foremost action to be taken is awareness raising.Poor standards of basic knowledge about audiovisual preservation principles are widespread, even amongst librarians and (paper) archivists, let alone amongst the specialists in the contents of the audiovisual carriers.Most efficient, therefore, are tutorials and workshops organised at the fringe of discipline oriented conferences of specialists, such as linguistics, musicology or anthropology gatherings.A typical barrier against safeguarding audiovisual research materials in the West is that excellence, and therewith budgetary allocations, are measured on the academic output of institutions and individuals.Optimisation in terms of publications is in higher esteem than safeguarding primary source material for systematic restudies and new interpretation by other (schools of) researchers or by later generations.This frequently leads to sub-optimal archiving standards, and to a further neglect of audiovisual preservation in case of budgetary problems of academic institutions.Typical problems in Russia and post-soviet countries are mainly due to particular research traditions.Relatively small research units worked in separation of each other, often (part of) institutes of academies of sciences, and often even under one roof, generally without sharing archival infrastructures.In this manner great amounts of audio recording collections have been accumulated, significantly more than in the respective disciplines in the West.A specific widespread problem is the use of acetate cellulose tape of East-German origin, produced in the 1950s and 1960s, which was used all over the region until Vietnam.These tapes become very brittle with age and their replay is often a veritable challenge 52 .As typical small collections of cultural and academic institutions are below critical masses to allow for economic viable preservation, cooperative solutions have to be organised and financed to rescue the accumulated holdings.Cooperative models can be organised at different levels: Institutional: Universities, academies of sciences, and other institutions holding several audiovisual collections in their sub-units, join efforts by establishing a common preservation strategy.Digitisation and long-term preservation of digital contents is often organised separately.Typically, the strongest unit sets up a central transfer laboratory, while the digital files are often kept in a digital repository as part of the computer centre.A recent prominent example is the central organisation of the preservation of 560.000 audiovisual carriers at the Indiana University Bloomington, USA 53 .A smaller, but structurally identical project is under preparation at the University of the Philippines 54 , National: Other successful, although yet not wide spread models work on a national level.One example is the Vienna Phonogrammarchiv 55 , which holds a considerable part, probably 40-50% of audiovisual primary sources produced by Austrian scholars, which had made their field recordings with methodological advice and technological support by the archive.Over the past years, however, many institutions and scholars that had made their recording autonomously, without depositing their originals in the archive, offer now their collections, as they understand that their precious sources would otherwise be lost.The archive tries to raise sufficient funds over the coming years to safeguard at least the most important collections yet outside proper archival care.The major problem of many of these and similar projects is the uncertainty of continued funding to keep digitised files available in the long-term.Significant support has to come from disciplines themselves, which are challenged to enhance recognition of primary sources by promoting systematic re-studies of archive materials, by promoting diachronic and comparative studies, and by intensifying study of respective archival materials before new field work is started.The European Science Foundation as well as national research funding agencies are increasingly recognising the importance of research infrastructures, specifically in digital age, which will lead to a significant rise of financial means within the 8 th European Framework Programme.On national levels, research funding should limit autonomy of researchers by enforcing and financing the deposit of raw research materials in archives for further (and alternative) evaluation, and, additionally, by earmarking a percentage of research budgets for infrastructure, e.g. for archiving.Failure to preserve audiovisual primary sources will lead to their swift and total loss, which undermines fundamental research principles, invalidates modern research results, and diminishes considerably the resources for linguistic and cultural diversity in the cyberspace.Although 2010-2011 will enter the history as the two years of dramatic change in the Middle East and North Africa, revolutions in Arab countries didn't start in 2010.One should say the revolutions culminated and succeeded mainly in Tunisia and Egypt in 2011, after several attempts during the first years of the 21 st century.Revolts continue in several countries and are transforming in some others into massacres (Syria), into civil war and international intervention (Libya), and into a hidden repression (Bahrain).In fact, the young population is uprising on all the continents.And what about language?What about its usage during the uprising in MENA countries?Studying language and revolution is a very large domain which could be tackled from different perspectives.I had the opportunity to witness the revolution in Egypt and I was particularly interested by the role of language in that event.I studied the role of social media in Egypt mainly, and tried to explain how users/protestors and political movements used the Internet and the social media to communicate, mobilize the demonstrators, organize activities, and document and share the revolution events, repression, success and celebration.I came to ask the question about the impact of the revolution time on the presence of Arabic language on the net and in social media.Based on that experience, I am making the hypothesis that since the revolution started in Arab countries, more content in Arabic language is being produced and shared on the Internet and social media.This content is created by individuals, organisations and media, and is contributing to enhancing the rank of Arabic language on the Internet.Some research is corroborating my observations, but a lot is still to be done on that matter.Social media like Facebook, Twitter and YouTube are among the most used tools of the Internet in Arab countries.Facebook was blocked and unblocked several times in different countries from Tunisia to Syria during the last 3 to 4 years for political and social reasons.Although the e-Government applications are very well developed in these two countries, and each ministry and organisation have web sites, they created pages on Facebook, YouTube and opened accounts on Twitter to communicate their messages and try to engage the population in discussion and interaction inside the country and abroad.Even in a non-conflict situation, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) government built its profile on Facebook due to the presence of 45% of its population on that network.The government of the UAE is encouraging its employees to use social media to interact with citizens.It has trained some of them on the responsible usage and risk of Facebook, and offered a policy guidelines document for government entities 66 .Given the demographic of the population of the Arab countries (around 30% are young people between 19 and 25 years old), the political and economic situations, Facebook is being used in a wide variety of ways: "whether to rally people around social causes and political campaigns, boost citizen journalism and civic participation, create a forum for debate and interaction between governments and their communities, or to enhance innovation and collaboration within government."67 However, the main usage of Facebook was and is still the social networking among individuals and groups of buddies as intended by its creators.Despite the censorship and blocking by authorities, Facebook is the networking tool by excellence for those young people who want to communicate, meet each other, share hobbies and dreams, and endorse celebrities.The first quarter of 2011 witnessed a dramatic change in the role and perception of Facebook in Arab countries, due to the cyber-activism and the revolts in the streets.Curiously, blocking Facebook and Internet in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Syria, gave these tools more credibility and impact, and increased demand, then their usage.As quickly observed in Egypt since January 2011, social media are used by cyber-activists for mobilising people and demonstrators, preparing political activities and movements, sharing instructions and hints, and informing the international communities about the local events.YouTube and similar networks are used to document and share the events, ranging from calls for meetings to demonstrations, attacks and massacres.Dated videos permitted the protestors to prove the pacifist character of their actions and the brutality of the authorities such as in Syria (April 2011), Libya or Bahrain.Twitter is the communication channel for rally, SOS, quick instructions, feeding and receiving news, among others.The very nature of Twitter resides in the short messages or micro blogging, which make its integration on mobile phones seamless.Moreover, The Arab Social Media Report surveyed 126 people in Egypt and 105 in Tunisia that were asked about the main usage of Facebook during the civil movement and events in early 2011.As represented in the figure below: "In both countries, Facebook users were of the opinion that Facebook had been used primarily to raise awareness within their countries about the ongoing civil movements (31% in both Tunisia and Egypt), spread information to the world about the movements (33% and 24% in Tunisia and Egypt respectively), and organize activists and actions (22% and 30% in Tunisia and Egypt respectively).Less than 15% in either country believed Facebook was primarily being used for entertainment or social reasons" 68 .Facebook offers its interface in tens of languages most of them localised by users themselves.Users in Arab countries surveyed for the Arab Social Media Report "vary in their preference of language interface" 69 .Three main languages used on Facebook with no surprise are Arabic, French and English.The survey showed net preference for English in the Gulf countries, except for Saudi Arabia, and net preference for French in the three Maghreb countries and the Comoros.Egypt and Tunisia are worth observing because of the changes we will see later during the revolution.In terms of preference of language interface, users in Egypt split evenly between the use of Arabic (49.88%) and English (48.98%) interfaces (similar to Jordan, Libya and Iraq).Tunisian users showed a net preference for French interface (94.60%), then English (2.72%) and finally Arabic (1.56%).However, the language of the interface setting (only one language at a time) doesn't say much about the languages in which users are actually interacting on Facebook or other social media 70 .In fact, thank to HTML and UNICODE, browsers are now able to display text in virtually all the world languages. "Facebookers practice a diversity" or a mix of languages which "challenges conventional notions of multilingualism as a combination of two or more monolingualisms" 71 .It is not a surprise that language played an important role during the social and political uprising in Tunisia and Egypt, as well as in other countries of MENA.Some slogans chanted by demonstrators made the tour of the planet and became symbols or songs and are repeated by demonstrators around the world.Remember: "Ben Ali, dégage!"in Tunisia, or "The people want the regime to fall" ‫بعشلا(‬ ‫ديري‬ ‫طاقسا‬ ‫,)ماظنلا‬ repeated in Tunis, Cairo, Damascus, Benghazi, and Sana'a.Signs made and handled by protestors in Cairo streets were in Arabic mainly, but also in English, French, and Hebrew 72 .On the social media front, linguistic creativity was positively impacted by the uprising.We are making the hypothesis here that due to the revolution and the need to reach out to a larger community on burning issues social media users used local languages (Arabic), increasing the quantity of Arabic content published online both on social media like Facebook and Twitter, and on regular websites.This hypothesis is based on our observation of 1) the number of new websites published in Arabic by newspapers, social movements, and government entities; 2) the number of social media users who are now writing in Arabic.This hypothesis is corroborated by the results of the Arab Social Media Report updated in the 2 nd issue of May 2011.If we compare the language of the interface, and the language used by users in Egypt and in Tunisia to communicate during the civil movement of the first quarter of 2011, we see a huge difference.We have signals that social uprising, political and social unrest are making social media one of preferred tools to communicate, mobilize, demonstrate and voice the concerns of the population around the world.MENA countries showed a serious increase in the number of users of social media that are mainly communicating in their mother tongue, despite their interface preferences and the software offers.More research is still needed if we want to better document this phenomenon and build on it to enhance the quality of the content and, more important, the quality of the citizens' participation and engagement in the cyberspace, leading to more interaction and more benefits from the knowledge society.While specifying the most pressing challenges of enlarging access to the world's documentary heritage, the Lena Resolution adopted in 2008 at the International Conference on Linguistic and Cultural Diversity in Cyberspace has offered ways of efficiently tackling these challenges by means of developing multilingualism in digital environment.For the last three years after the dissemination of this essential document strenuous efforts have been made in the Republic of Dagestan by government agencies and civil society organizations to increase the volume of digital content in local languages in response to the growing marginalization of languages of numerous Dagestan ethnic groups.Given that marginality implies a shift towards monoculture, activities aimed at overcoming this negative trend in our specific linguistically diverse region should have a special focus on the preservation of languages and cultural openness of the peoples of Dagestan.Today the use of regional languages is drastically reduced to family and household communications in very limited areas, mainly rural, while cultural requirements and linguistic interests of Dagestan's peoples go far beyond ethnic borders.Emerging digital resources of various kinds has become the means of defining sociocultural profile of modern Dagestanis and their glorious forefathers.Full-text collections of fiction and local literature account for a sizable proportion of the Dagestan segment of the Internet.At this stage they cannot be considered full-fledged digital libraries, as the documents displayed are of medium quality, lack metadata, navigation and search tools.However the demand for such publications in traditional libraries makes us positive about their popularity in digital environment.This is proved by constant additions to these collections and an increase in the number of resources providing relevant content.Affecting sensory perception, digital products of that kind provide for a better and deeper understanding of one's affiliation not only to a certain ethnos, but to the whole mankind.The Lena resolution highlights inter alia the necessity of further support for the creation of multilingual dictionaries and thesauruses.Dagestan can boast of successful activities in this field.Over the past two years institutions of the Russian Academy of Sciences prepared and published for the first time ever a 18,000 Avakh-Russian dictionary and a Tsakhur-Russian dictionary comprising over 10,000 native and adopted words.The dictionaries are currently being digitized by one of the enthusiasts of Dagestan web resources development with the agreement of the copyright holders.Digital versions will be accessible online in addition to the 14 Dagestan-Russian dictionaries available there.In terms of the problem at hand, how mass media define the role and time to be provided for regional languages is of vital importance.Today a language can maintain its position as long as it actively penetrates into new communication modes.Despite new opportunities for regional languages emerging due to the development of broadcast techniques, active support by the state is required for Dagestanian languages to find a niche in digital media.A web portal for various Dagestanian newspapers in 13 local languages has been running since 2009, providing information on social, political, economic, academic, cultural and sports life of the republic.The Dagestan State TV and Radio Company broadcasts in six local languages, and two state radio companies broadcast over four hours daily in 13 languages.Almost every town and district has its own TV production companies funded by local budgets and broadcasting for the most part in one of the local languages.The number of private radio companies has increased significantly, that include national programmes in their line-up.Some of these channels have already created their own web pages with access to valuable archives of ethno-cultural materials.However these costly measures are not always efficient for tackling the pressing problems that regional languages are facing today due to a lack of qualified experts and the passivity of management unable to keep pace with the rapid changes of media environment.The just-completed educational project supported by the Council of Europe and European Commission was aimed at the elimination of these two problems.The results are yet to be summarized, but for now it is obvious that the project has equipped the republic's leading digital media with powerful tools for preserving and developing local languages.Russia is a vast and polyethnic country, perhaps the vastest and most polyethnic in the world.More than two hundred languages are used in its territory, belonging mainly to four language families: Indo-European, Altaic, North Caucasian and Ural.For the most part, the languages of peoples of Russia are based on the Cyrillic alphabet, but there are languages that use Latin and other writings, as well as oral languages.Russia as a multinational country has accumulated a solid experience of friendly coexistence of various nations.In such a country, the most obvious integrating element is not the territory and certainly not the language.All of us, the people of the Russian Federation, are united by our writing and its graphic tools, the fonts.Therefore, in 2009 while initiating a project to develop a nationwide font typeface for the title languages of subjects of the Russian Federation the ParaType Inc. set the following goals: • creating enhanced language support fonts for the languages of Russia, • replacement commercial fonts with free/libre fonts, • replacing western design with domestic for Cyrillic fonts, • creating a set of fonts for a wide range of applications.These goals conform to the Federal Law "On languages of the peoples of the Russian Federation" granting all languages of the peoples of our country equal rights for preservation and development, guaranteeing the right for education in native languages, and fixing the Cyrillic as the writing system.At present the process of formation and regulation of national languages' use is gaining momentum both in our country and throughout the world, regional laws on languages are being elaborated and adopted.This process should be accompanied by the creation of high-quality national fonts to be freely available.However in order to develop fonts supporting national characters knowledge of both the composition of national alphabets and the form of these glyphs' representation is required.Today, the Unicode standard determines most of them.We collaborate with the Unicode Consortium and a number of specialised agencies of Russian entities responsible for the issues of national languages to monitor the current linguistic situation.To provide feedback we created a special page on our site www.fonts.ru/public, representing all titular languages of the RF subjects and their characters.As a rule, regional laws on languages require duplicating texts and inscriptions in national languages in official documents, on road signs, signboards, etc.In addition, even without special legislation literature in national language should exist, in particular, textbooks and dictionaries.Therefore, major requirements for a national font are multilinguality, i.e., ability to support character sets of national alphabets, and accessibility.These are indispensable conditions for tackling a wide range of national fonts' issues.In order to solve these problems efficiently within regions professional communities and local authorities should cooperate to settle the national characters set and forms of these characters.The elaboration of regional language laws, cooperation with local institutions and authorities, as well as public debates in the media are essential in this regard.Free/libre fonts are those included in operating systems or put on the Web for free access.Existing national fonts do not meet certain requirements.Fonts put on the Internet for public access are usually of very poor quality both in terms of design and technical execution.Those few fonts with an extended set of characters included with Windows, support only a very limited number of Cyrillic-based languages.Paradoxically, the population of a huge country mostly uses fonts designed by a private American company.With all due respect for Microsoft, even knowing their careful and thougfhtful approach to national traditions, we cannot expect them to be able to embrace the boundless and solve the problems of preservation and development of writing of small peoples of Russia.The following decision is logical in this situation.The State may order a set of national fonts to be developed and made available for free downloading online.In addition, it is desirable that these fonts are included in the localized operating systems distributed on the territory of Russia (Apple Macintosh and Microsoft Windows).These fonts should support all titular languages of the entities of the Russian Federation.These considerations and the desire to get universal modern fonts, consistent with the idea of good Cyrillic became the basis of work on the design of the PT Sans -PT Serif typeface system by the ParaType Inc. in 2009-2011with support by the Federal Agency for Press and Mass Communications 76 .In 2009, ParaType developed and presented PT Sans, the first typeface of the project.In 2010 an antique font PT Serif was developed in the same proportions.PT Sans is a grotesque font of modern humanistic design intended for widespread use.The font is based on classical designs, but includes very distinctive features fulfilling present day aesthetic and functional requirements and making it usable for large-size headlines.The family consists of 8 styles: 4 basic styles; 2 caption styles for small sizes and 2 narrow styles for economic setting and is primarily intended for both printed and e-document flow.PT Serif is transitional serif face with humanistic terminals designed for use together with PT Sans and harmonized with PT Sans on metrics, proportions, weights and design.PT Serif consists of six styles: regular and bold weights with corresponding italics form a standard computer font family for basic text setting; two caption styles (regular and italic) are for texts of small point sizes.The PT Sans -PT Serif typeface system has quickly gained popularity with designers all over the world.Google Web Fonts API Stats monitors the demand for fonts analysing the number of users viewing websites using the above fonts.To date, more than 13 million users viewed sites where PT Serif is used (it is over 5 million a month!).The demand for PT Sans is even more significantmore than 210 million users per month!It is ranked fourth in a huge list of the most used fonts.We hope to enter the top three in the nearest future.PT Sans and PT Serif as free/libre fonts are freely available and distributed.They can be used, copied, modified, embedded in documents, etc.provided that both the original fonts and their derivatives or parts thereof are not used for commercial purposes, except for their usage as part of other commercial products.Fonts are available at www.fonts.ru/public and will be included with operating systems.So why were Mozilla Firefox and OpenOffice, of all, chosen for localization?The main pro is that both software products are distributed under free, non-commercial licenses; moreover, it is possible to use (optionally) their source codes.The first Mozilla Firefox localization (of version 1.0.3) financed through the grant of the Soros Foundation -Kyrgyzstan, appeared in February, 2005.But due to the lack of understanding of problems and their solutions throughout the working process, the localization product became highly outdated by the time of issue; and localization updating is one of the key elements in the comprehensive approach.The work was probably discontinued because of the low spread (at the time) of the browser across Kyrgyzstan as compared to Internet Explorer and Opera.The situation changed dramatically by 2009 when Firefox became more popular than its competitors.By the summer of 2009, the browser was upgraded to version 3.5 which underwent a final localization process.The basic and central distinction of version 3.5 and later versions lies in the fact that our Firefox build has become multilingual; this means that it allows switching between Kyrgyz and English or Russian.All other existing localized Firefox builds were monolingual, which led to certain difficulties: since it was impossible to use two versions in different languages simultaneously, you had to choose in favor of an English, Russian or Kyrgyz version.The appearance of the multilingual build offered a solution to this dilemma, and the build itself got widely spread in the Firefox user community in Kyrgyzstan.Today, the user may choose between two versions: typical installation and portable editions.The Tamga-KIT software product (to be described below) contains the Firefox 3.6 browser portable version as a mandatory item.OpenOffice The instrumental and term bases developed during the work on the OpenOffice and Firefox localizations made a very prompt localization of an enormous bulk of both free and proprietary software possible.Before starting work on the localization, we had to address the following general issues: 5.Developing common ICT terminology and special terminology for word-processing units and web browsers.We consider items 1, 2 and 5 of the above essential for getting started with the work on localization of public software, for instance, office software.Items 3 and 4 are desirable, since they allow for higher speed and quality of localization.Alongside tackling the above stated tasks, tools to computerize the localization process of software products were developed for home use.They simplify the process of upgrading localized versions, reducing it to updating and clarifying data bases for item and message translation, which takes dozens of times less time than manual localization.The Tamga-Kit Software Solution was developed to provide full support of the Kyrgyz language in Windows environment.The product basis comprises: Basic components have been developed since mid-1990s, and the full version of Tamga-KIT available since November, 2002, is free of charge for both secondary education and home use.The case of its creation is unprecedented: no funds from either government or non-governmental organizations were spent on its development.But its functionality and performance speak for themselves.This software has become extremely popular and widely-used; moreover, by parliament's decision the use of Tamga-KIT in education, science, culture, as well as in public and local institutions (i.e. nearly everywhere) was made mandatory.In today's globalised world, the demand for languages as cognitive and communicative tools, as well as their development and even further preservation as cultural phenomena are largely dependent on the use of information technology.Let us study the experience of introducing the Tatar language in cyberspace (i.e. the space of human interaction with computer systems and technology).Ensuring the Tatar A structural functional model of Tatar affixational morphemes has also been created, allowing for the construction of various pragmatic oriented morphological models.It served as a basis for the integrated "Tatar Morpheme" software data set.In fact, it is a computer workstation for developing various linguistic processors, and for educational and research activities in the field of Tatar linguistics.The "Tatar Morpheme" can be successfully used as a research tool for other languages as well.The Tatar Our long-term activities are the following.Creating an intellectual multilingual search engine.This initiative, facilitating the creation of an electronic Tatar corpus, is conditioned upon the current linguistic situation in the republic and upon new emerging linguistic and intellectual technologies for multilingual search based on a thorough word sense disambiguation.Regarding that in some developed countries several languages enjoy official status, the project can become in demand for further commercial use.Developing speech recognition software for Tatar.This action line is especially important as speech technologies are expected to be among the top trends of IT development in the coming years and ASR is to be widely implemented in major economy sectors.A Tatar-Russian machine translator will enable access to English online databases through Russian equivalents, thus supporting equality of Tatar and Russian as official languages of the Republic.Machine translators for Tatar and other Turkic languages will facilitate the convergence of kindred languages speakers.The task of creating such programmes is rather easily solved due to the affinity of languages.This area of research is related to the crucial task of developing intelligent operating systems and software tools using the potential of natural languages, their semantic and syntactic structures, as well as vocabulary.Four factors are essential for computer technologies, namely information processing time, memory capacity for data storage, active character of knowledge and the ability to give fuzzy instructions (unambiguous in a certain context).The latter two properties are of critical importance for intelligent systems and technologies.Research in this field is a burning issue.In case we identify structures, circuits, and formulas, implementing these properties in natural languages we can use them while creating artificial languages and programming systems, as well as other means of information description, storage and processing.It is commonly known that operating systems, programming languages , information processing tools and almost all software used today are Englishbased.Therefore, they are based on Western mentality.English as a fusional analytic language has almost zero morphology (compared with agglutinative languages).Complex meaning is communicated with phrases, which requires a much more complicated analysis and, consequently, an increase in the amount of memory and time required to process information.The only way out of this situation is eliminating wider context and complex structures and, ultimately, simplifying the meaning and semantics.Thus, the basis of the English language itself brings computing systems to a deadlock, causing them not to get "smarter", but to increase system performance and memory capacity, i.e. develop functional characteristics rather than "intelligence".Even the language structure and its syntax discourage the active character of knowledge.English is an SVO language, and it is not the information that dictates what action to take, what methods and algorithms to use for its processing.On the contrary, the means, the circuit, the algorithms force us to format, structure, and modify information.Unlike Indo-European languages , Turkic languages refer to the SOV type and in this case it is information that comes first.Our research shows that due to regular morphology and natural complexity agglutinative Turkic languages, including Tatar, can be efficient tools for creating intelligent information processing systems.They provide for ultimate solutions in terms of information storage and processing.The meaning of a text is much more easily conveyed on the lexical level due to these languages' ability to encode meaning synthetically, i.e. in a word form.Other types of languages, including English and Russian, have to convey the meaning by using several phrases or even groups of sentences.The Olonkho system designed as part of the programme is an innovative academic project aimed at creating a modern environment for education and scientific research.It can be implemented only as a collaborative effort between government agencies, epic scholars, linguists, IT specialists, translators, archivists, and so on.The Olonkho information system is aimed at gathering, processing, preserving, actualizing, spreading, representing and using relevant content.It should provide tools for formalizing, structuring and sharing knowledge used in research, education and archival work, as well as for standardising frequent work procedures and maintaining user-developer interaction.In this context, archival manuscripts, Olonkho texts, recitation audio and video, photographs, scholarly publications, and other related materials are seen as data arrays.Olonkho IS has been designed to meet specific user interests and needs within its target audience.Researchers will be above all interested in visiting the IS online library, with complete Olonkho texts, scholarly publications, digitized audio archives, graphic images, manuscripts of Olonkho and other folklore pieces, specialized dictionaries, encyclopaedias, and reference books; of primary importance to them is to be able to spread the results of their research and to find necessary contacts and links.Museum and archive personnel may find particularly useful the possibility of creating digital facsimile archives of their collections and making them available to the public.To students and teaching staff, Olonkho IS offers an exciting opportunity to create a modern learning infrastructure.The Olonkho system aims to define the vector of professional growth and competency development in the academia, stimulating research among teaching staff and students alike.Only if united into a single system, information resources could acquire new qualities (this is what philosophers call the notion of emergence, with emergent properties defined as effects that are not sums of the effects of each causal conjunct).The recitation of an epic is, by its very nature, a multimedia event.Various elements enter into play here, such as sound (speaking and singing), visual presentation (mimics, gestures and posturing), and environment (e.g. chiaroscuro on the auditorium walls, the breath of people in the audience, their spontaneous reactions, etc).In cyberspace, audio, video, original texts with translations, synopses, scholarly commentaries, dictionary entries on epic characters and archaic vocabulary, photos, graphics, links and footnotes can and should all be presented in a common hypermedia environment.Put together, these and other information sources will produce a cumulative effect unattainable if each is used separately.Olonkho IS will create a common information and communications environment for various educational, scientific and cultural institutions on the basis of specific agreements that take into account appropriate technological requirements, protocol regulations and, crucially, the property and copy rights of the parties involved.The system is designed to accumulate information in designated storages and record all necessary dimensions in databases.Digitized resources can be accessed through the Internet or an Intranet portal.The system has several key segments. •Olonkho: Archives, responsible for digitizing manuscripts, drawings, music scores, and other graphic images; • Olonkho: Audio, Olonkho: Photo, Olonkho: Video, to be used in transforming original information resources into the digital format; • Olonkho: E-Lib, to scan, identify, and collect textual documents for the IS electronic library; • Olonkho: Documents, to support an organization's electronic document turnover (agreements, standards, official correspondence, technical specifications, reports, etc.).The IS units' output will be presented in files of an appropriate format.Phenomena, objects and processes of the real world will acquire digital copies in a multidimensional model of a specific subject area.Each particular file -and, if necessary, its components -will come with metadata, or specially arranged information about the file and its content, as well as the formal attributes and a scientific description of the digital objects carried.Metadata are needed to make the availability of digital content visible to a potential user, as well as to administer the saving of documents and register their reliability, technical specifications, mode of access, user responsibility, context, timeline, and conservation purposes.Metadata shall be carried in the extended Dublin Core format; digital objects are to be described using the XML language and texts saved in Unicode for an adequate script representation.The Information Storage & Arrangement subsystem consists of two main units: Olonkho: Storage (a storage of digital objects) and Olonkho: Database (a database to be consulted by IS users while searching for objects they need).The base is to stock relevant information from the Information Gathering & Processing subsystem, metadata on a subject area model, and so on.This subsystem's functions include: • storing and processing textual documents in the original language, as well as video and photographic images; • storing alternative recordings and/or versions of documents (digital objects); • processing multiversion documents and their attributes; • modelling new entities with non-predetermined sets of attributes; • modifying existing connections and creating new ones between IS entities; • searching for and retrieving information with inter-entity connections in mind.The Information & Technical Servicing subsystem is responsible for technical support of the project and for software and information servicing of corporate users (units Olonkho: Software & Information Support; Olonkho: Technical Servicing).The IS information resources are built using licensed or open-source software.Yakut language software applications will ensure correct operations of the system's e-library, search engines, and multilingual database.Technical and semantic integration of the various constituent information resources will enable the entire system to operate more effectively.There is a need to develop thesauruses and curated dictionaries for information resource metadata compiling, as well as to find appropriate technology for building digital collections.Technical servicing will provide proper maintenance for corporate users' computer and office equipment, with their own maintenance departments often operating ineffectively, if at all.The protection of computer networks and PCs from malware is one of the priority tasks to be performed within the Technical Servicing subsystem.The Information Presentation subsystem's function is to make information available to IS users.This segment consists of the following units: Olonkho: Hypermedia, Olonkho: Science, Olonkho: Education, Olonkho: Internet Portal, and Olonkho: Television.Olonkho: Hypermedia is responsible for creating multimedia information resources and representing them correctly in the Web and as CD and DVD editions.Olonkho: Science and Olonkho: Education are intended for retrieving relevant content from the database and organizing it into specialized theme packages for scientific research or for school/university curricula.The description formats SCORM (general module) and LOM (academic module) are helpful in building teaching resources.The employment of these formats will facilitate the search, study, assessment and use of educational objects by students, teaching staff and (in the long run) by teaching software applications.International standards will enhance the mobility and transferability of courses, facilitating content sharing between partner organizations.Olonkho: Television allows to broadcast TV programmes through cable networks or the IP network (in case of Internet broadcasting).The Olonkho.Info Portal (www.olonkho.info) links IS users to the system's resources with the help of standard navigation tools.It also functions as an Intranet portal for corporate users.Network access is provided on the basis of user authentication and authorization, in compliance with applicable access policies.The IS developers are committed to ensuring the availability and protection of cultural heritage within the effective regulatory framework.At http://olonkho.info, information is available through interfaces in languages such as English, German, French, Japanese, Korean, Chinese and Turkish.Most of the textual content comes in Yakut and Russian.The website's philosophy proclaims the principle of language equality, meaning that information resources can be accessed through any of the existing language interfaces.For example, a Yakut-language text will be presented in each of the language subsystems with its title in the original and in translation, as well as with a note about the original language, a reference to the source, a hyperreference, and, if possible, a translation of the full text or its synopsis.Multimedia files should come with descriptions in all languages; metadata for all the information resources should also be multilingual.The user will thus be able to receive information in all available languages without having to leave his or her specific linguistic environment on the Web.The Olonkho.Info Portal has a developed CMS-content management system, which enables authenticated users to correct already existing resources and contribute new ones.Such a website is possible to build only in the environment of a university that can offer a powerful IT infrastructure as well as competent personnel, including computer programmers, folklorists, translators, and bibliographers.The Olonkho.Info Portal has significantly enhanced its capacities thanks to the 2010-2011 Development Programme for the North-Eastern University, previously known as the University of Yakutsk.The content it features includes scholarly and non-scholarly publications; Olonkho texts; profiles of Olonkho reciters and academics specializing in epic heritage; digitized manuscripts; archival audio recordings; video footage of Olonkho contests, including among young narrators; voiced dictionaries; class pages; press; teaching manuals; methodology literature; links to related websites and organizations, etc.In our efforts to preserve linguistic and cultural diversity, we should apply information technnology as extensively as possible.Subprojects implemented as part of the Olonkho IS project provide various examples of how IT could serve the purpose.Computer technology may be an especially powerful motivation tool for young Olonkho reciters.Through the feedback it provides, they will be able to see that their heritage popularization efforts resonate with a wide audience.Here are some of the Olonkho-related projects sponsored under the North-Eastern University's Development Programme.Yakutsk's Helios cable network.It airs educational programmes and culture content 16 hours per day.To be launched soon are the channels Olonkho HD (high-definition video) and Olonkho 3D (three-dimensional stereo).Internet television (http://olonkho.info/InternetTV/) and Internet radio (www.olonkho.info/internet_TV) allow to watch and listen to epic and other folkloric narrative recitations (recent and archival alike) any time of the day or night --something that traditional media cannot possibly provide.All events held as part of the Epic Heritage Archiving project are now filmed in FullHD.This format provides footage of excellent quality, with images five times as large as ones obtainable with analogue television systems such as PAL or SECAM.Used in teaching tools, digital technology may dramatically enhance the learning effect.Interactive maps and drawings stimulate our cognitive instinct more than conventional ones do, enabling us to learn more easily and effectively.3D visualization technology allows us to better feel the energy of a live event, such as a folk festival, and to identify with it.Reinforced with the multi-channel 5.1 or 7.1 sound, a 3D video makes a much more powerful experience than two-dimensional footage.3D scanners and printers make it possible to produce a digital threedimensional copy of an artefact and to then print it out for academic use.The North-Eastern University has already acquired some practical experience in using 3D technology in educational projects.Indeed, modern life requires that research and academic materials be broadly represented in cyberspace.Olonkho IS, along with its Olonkho Info portal, should try to meet this challenge.For the Olonkho state target programme, this is a strategic life-support system as well as a modern networking hub, which can facilitate and enhance efforts to preserve, study and promote the Yakut epic.Speech databases as a major type of linguistic resources are, per se, of much research interest.Such bases are essential to scholarly tasks related to the analysis and description of oral speech.Building large, wide-ranging and informative (multitier) speech databases, along with an easy-to-use and reliable set of tools for their development and employment is an increasingly important task, of relevance for computer applications and for fundamental phonetic research alike.Our efforts to create a speech database for the Buryat language are being made with due account for its regional varietals.Most of Russia's Buryat speakers live in the Republic of Buryatia, the Trans-Baikal region (the Aginskoye area), and in the Irkutsk Region's Ust-Ordynsky area; there are also large Buryat communities in Mongolia (specifically in the Dornod, Khentii, Selenge, and Khovsgol provinces, known locally as "aimags") as well as in northeastern China (Hulunbuir, in the Inner Mongolia Autonomy).The Buryat ethnicity's spread across vast territories in three countries, as well as its lack of homogeneity, has resulted in the language's broad dialectal variation of every level: segmental, suprasegmental, morphological, and lexical.The project's ambition is to preserve the distinctive regional features of the Buryat language, designing strategies for the creation of oral speech databases, and systematizing and putting into circulation the accumulated audio content.Samples of Buryat speech featured on the database should be used for further exploration of its phonetic and prosodic structure and its morphological and lexical characteristics.Corpus methods appear the most appropriate for the purpose as they allow to comprehensively represent a large, versatile array of data -with due account for the various characteristics of speech fragments, ranging from acoustic to discoursive.The would-be database is to include separate words, sentences with varied communicative purport, and coherent texts.The speech signals will each come with a transliteration and a phonetic/prosodic transcription.There will also be notes on idiosyncratic or unusual pronounciations and on emotionally coloured speech fragments, along with some background information on the speaker.The project involves recording speech samples and arranging them in the form of audio files.The technical groundwork will consist in the digitization of audio recordings and their multi-layer segmentation (into phrases, syntagmata, words, and sounds), along with textological decoding.As a result, each recording should be provided with an audio file carrying various segmentation markups, as well as with textual files that are transliterations or phonetic conversions of the recorded material.Department have by now assembled ample audio content on the standard Buryat language and its dialects, as well as on other Mongol languages, such as Daghur, Baerhu, and Khalkha Mongolian.Systematized, homogenized and arranged in a database, that material will allow to preserve the distinctive speech character of regional Buryat communities, which is now being erased by the growing influence of media language as well as by the shrinking use of the Buryat language itself owing to extralinguistic factors.In an age of globalization, the world is turning into one big mechanism, with all its parts interconnected.Innovative information and communications technologies push this process forward; they have a unifying role to play in building a new world order, opening up, as they do, new possibilities for the preservation of the languages and cultures of all ethnicities populating Planet Earth, including the small indigenous communities in Siberia and the circumpolar North.Lots of factors may put the existence of a language at risk: grave natural disasters wiping out entire communities; faulty public education systems providing no, or scarce, opportunities for schoolchildren to study in their native languages; or the lack of an adequate writing system, to give just a few examples.One more factor to have emerged in recent decades has to do with information and communications technology.The Internet offers plenty of opportunities for exercising one's right to free speech and getting access to information and quality education.One serious problem, though, is that information and services in cyberspace are still available only in a limited number of languages (just 400 of the world's 6,700 currently spoken languages are represented online so far).At the outset of the 21 st century (on November 2, 2001, to be precise), UNESCO adopted its Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, postulating that respect for diversity, tolerance, dialogue and cooperation in a climate of mutual trust and understanding are the best safeguards of peace and international security.Being a source of exchange, innovation and creation, cultural diversity is as important for the human race as biodiversity is for wildlife.The new century and millennium are seeing the formation of an integral sociocultural system that could serve as the basis for dialogue and interaction between cultures and faiths.This system is expected to shape a worldview for the generations to come and to determine their sustainable development patterns.The international conference on cultural and linguistic diversity in cyberspace that took place in the Republic of Sakha's capital, Yakutsk, on July 2-4, 2008, adopted, for its turn, a final document that became known as the Lena Resolution.The Resolution urges to foster linguistic and cultural diversity on the Web in every possible way and to continue efforts to record, preserve and advance various languages, especially smaller ones, with the help of modern ICT.A recent survey of the content available on the Internet about the indigenous communities of Russia's Siberia and circumpolar North has shown that the existing sites are disparate and not informative enough while fully systematized, comprehensive resources aren't there yet.Quite an exhaustive analysis of related content has been carried out by A. Burykin in his essay "Internet Resources on the Languages of Small Indigenous Peoples of Russia's North, Siberia and Far East: Content Overview and User Enquiries" [1] .The problem of supporting multilingualism in specific Russian regions as well as nationwide has been the focus of numerous publications by the Russian Committee of the UNESCO Information for All Programme (IFAP) and the Interregional Library Cooperation Centre [2, 3] .In practice, though, little progress has been made.Hence the idea to build a Portal on North-Eastern Russia's indigenous communities.Such a project should seek to ensure the linguistic and cultural diversity of those communities is adequately represented on the Internet, as well as to create an online environment where they could communicate in their native languages.This prospective Web site will provide wide-ranging information on the languages and cultures of all indigenous communities populating Russia's North-Eastern regions.The choice of that particular geographic area arises from its being under the jurisdiction of the Amosov North-Eastern Federal University, the driving force behind the project.Not all the indigenous language scripts are yet part of computer operating systems.Efforts will therefore be made to bring all missing scripts onboard, introducing them first as part of a universal keyboard layout.In a longer term, though, language-specific layouts are to be created.The online launch of scripts for all indigenous languages spoken in the designated area is expected to raise their profile on the global information scene while also offering possibilities for communicating in native languages online.This will facilitate both the preservation of endangered community languages and their advancement.The new Web portal is to be presented in indigenous languages as well as in Russian and English.Each of the relevant communities will have a separate section devoted to it, carrying informative content on its language and culture.In addition, a forum for communication in indigenous languages will be created.An English version of the site is already in place, along with an overview in the Yukahir language.A Web forum will be created in a while, for Yukaghirs to be able to communicate in their native language online.The Yukaghir section is the curtain-opener for this new Web portal, which will soon expand to include information on all other indigenous communities of North-Eastern Russia.peoples, through education, training and shared knowledge.UArctic also seeks to promote excellence in knowledge generation and knowledge application in areas relevant to the North.The UArctic membership body consists of members form the circumpolar area throughout all 8 Arctic Council member states, as well as associate members outside the Arctic that has strong interests in education and research in the Arctic.Currently UArctic has more than 130 members; together members have approximately 1 billion students and more than 70 thousand academic faculty.Even if not all students or faculty are directly engaged in UArctic activities, the network as such represents a huge potential for regional development in the Arctic.With regard to the indigenous profile, many UArctic members have strong ties to indigenous communities.Many of them offer relevant academic programmes and have designated departments and research programmes specifically dedicated to service their indigenous constituency.Besides this, among the UArctic members we also find smaller institutions that specialize on serving the needs of indigenous peoples highly focusing specifically on human, social and cultural development.With the current vision and goals UArctic represents a huge potential for further development of the cultural and linguistic diversity in the North, when carefully planned and carried out in practice.Visions and strategies however need implementation into institutional cultures and individual practices and the results need to be identified at the receivers' end.It is only when students, researchers and the northern communities together experience the fulfillment of their goals and aspiration, that we have a good indication of success of the added value of network.As already initially indicated, University of the Arctic as a network was established inter alia to create an improved and expanded platform for postsecondary education for indigenous peoples of the Arctic. •UArctic will have increased relevant training, higher education, and knowledge generation and application in the North with clear socio-economic benefits -particularly to remote communities and indigenous peoples. •UArctic's innovative programs will have a significant impact on increasing the level of education in the Circumpolar North, and generate highly qualified people in Northern communities by providing career bridging opportunities. •UArctic, through its members, will have a global leading role on Building Human Capacity in the North, Adaptation to Climate Change in the North, and Energy in the North from technical, cultural and economic as well as environmental perspectives. •UArctic's member institutions will be committed to the implementation of a common set of activities as outlined in the UArctic Charter. •UArctic will have enabled increased capacity in education, training, knowledge generation, and knowledge application for member institutions through its collaborative framework. •UArctic will be recognized as the body that carries forward the Arctic IPY Training and Higher Education Legacy. •UArctic will have, through partnering with other stakeholders in the Circumpolar North, ensured a stronger voice for the North globally".Further, among the specific goals in the strategic plan we find the following examples to be fulfilled by 2013: "Specific goals for 2013… • Indigenous peoples and northerners will continue to have a welldefined prominent role in the leadership and development of UArctic. •Opportunities will be created to facilitate online and local access to UArctic curriculum for indigenous and other students in Northern communities. •UArctic will continue to operate in close partnership with national and local governments, including indigenous peoples' governments and organizations, and the private sector."together university and college Presidents, Rectors, Provosts, Chancellors as well as Vice-Presidents around specific themes.In 2008 the rectors signed the UArctic Charter.The idea behind the charter was to have a mechanism for UArctic members to show increased commitment to UArctic activities.By signing the charter the institutions agreed among other things to the following: "UArctic recognizes the integral role of indigenous peoples in northern education, and seeks to engage their perspectives in all of its activities.UArctic and its member institutions further respect the needs of the indigenous peoples, and commit themselves to actively include the needs of the indigenous peoples and indigenous communities of the Arctic in education and training."This statement is very promising with regard to having UArctic as a strong engine to create good possibilities to maintain the cultural and linguistic diversity in the Arctic.During this strategic period 2009-2013 UArctic will refine the Rector's Forum as a venue for the leaders of the UArctic institutions to engage, jointly, in facilitation of development in the north.UArctic is organized into seven strategic areas, each consisting of one or several programs.These include: 1) Shared Focus -Thematic Networks The thematic networks are a mechanism for building partnership among members.Networks provide a structure for facilitating student and faculty mobility and collaboration.A Thematic Network is a group of UArctic members working together on subjects of shared interest to create learning experiences for students, faculty and communities.This includes student and faculty exchange and curriculum development. •UArctic members are engaged in research, education, and development activities with each other. •UArctic activities are coordinated with Arctic research. •UArctic activities are relevant to Arctic Council working groups, Indigenous peoples organizations, and Arctic science and development organizations.North2north student exchange programme allows students at UArctic Institutions to visit different northern regions, and share experiences face-toface, through study at other UArctic institutions.Mobility grants are provided for 3-12 months of study.Mobility programmes ensure the facilitation of student exchange, focus on best practices, increased funding of mobility, enhancement of knowledge about northerners and building of shared northern identity, motivation of all major scholarships to support north2north exchanges.Shared Resources means that UArctic builds capacity within members by providing services through the added value of the network, promotes UArctic members as study destinations, and promotes the North as a subject of study.Services to members include: • UArctic Information Service The University of the Arctic has recently accepted the invitation to establish the UArctic Research Office located at Northern (Arctic) Federal University in Archangelsk, Russia.This research office will coordinate the UArctic international research cooperation connected to UArctic international Arctic partners in research and research by the thematic networks and UArctic institutes.Programs are coordinated by offices hosted by member institutions and located around the Circumpolar North.UArctic plan to arrange with the North-Eastern Federal University to establish the office of the leadership of the UArctic undergraduate studies.The University of the Arctic hopes that organizing the undergraduate studies leadership will give a good opportunity to expand with thematic networks and Bachelor of Circumpolar studies and other activities to future associate members further east.The University of the Arctic, as a network, always depended on its member institutions commitment to succeed as a network for the benefit of indigenous communities.The success of the programmes, research and service depends on members' cooperation with indigenous communities and stakeholders.The next decade calls for improvements in this regards.UArctic 2011 Rectors' Forum and Student Forum declarations carried important messages about the need for continuous development.Both directly and indirectly the declarations reflect the need for enhanced activities that will foster more capacity to work with safeguarding and further development of the regions including indigenous languages, culture and knowledge.This underlines what the previous Rector's Forum declarations already stated, and is in line with the overall UArctic goals and strategy.The next step is to follow up on the operations level.This includes converting what there was into robust organizational structures.This challenges the network, but even more the single members themselves.Even if the network agrees of strong visions and strategic choices, the fulfillment of those depends on well developed institutional cultures and the practices of each one facilitating research and training.It is what happens at the delivery end of the line, as experienced improvements by students and community that counts as added value.UArctic aims at getting an NGO status and also realizes that to achieve such status there is a need for our member institutions and UArctic combined activities to add even more cooperation with UNESCO.We will integrate e-Learning/flexible learning platforms (e.g. telemedicine, social networking) into health and education to increase access to information and formal/informal education.High-speed internet is a prerequisite for establishing and maintaining interconnectivity between Arctic communities.Once all communities across the circumpolar north have access to high-speed internet, UArctic will be virtually situated to support education and research.Northern societies need access to community-based educational programmes that will enable them to determine their own futures.Especially the small indigenous minority languages need robust infrastructure and state of the art technology adapted to the diverse linguistic situation.During the UArctic council meeting in Yakutsk 2010 the VP Indigenous arranged a break-out session focusing on Ways to Improve Higher Education Services to Indigenous Peoples of the Arctic by Simultaneously Strengthening their Language and Culture.We will give selected examples from the report to show what it focuses on. •more demand for indigenous language learning than there are programs for (Yakutia example) • linguistics can assist: need to communicate the research in meaningful ways to indigenous communities • example: recording languages • for some groups language and culture is on the brink of being lost; for others the languages are still very alive • connect development of indigenous languages/cultures to the development of digital technologies, • access to new technologies: access to internet."In future UArctic developments, attention should be given to the interaction between language, culture and livelihood.Many of the traditional indigenous livelihood connected challenges are caused by no connection to modern virtual technology: technology is not adjusted to their real needs (like language compatibility), technology back up lacks, etc.As we experience, there are a lot of challenges reported that need solutions before cyberspace can in an advanced manner service the needs of small languages.Another break-out session at the 2011 council meeting discussed possible indigenous principles for the future development and will soon be available on the UArctic web-site.The idea is to arrange at the annual council meetings an indigenous forum where UArctic members can discuss and suggest possible ways of solving implementation gaps in UArctic activities to better fulfill the needs of the indigenous communities.The 2010 Arctic Social indicators report (a project under the auspices of the Arctic Councils' Sustainable Development Working Group) presents a broad definition of culture that leads to a multidimensional understanding of cultural well-being and vitality.They identified for their purposes the following dimensions of culture (p. 92): • Language (its use and retention), • Knowledge (and its transmission), • Communication (including education and performance), • Spirituality, such as religion and ritual, • Sociocultural events and media, • Economic and subsistence practices, • Social organization, institutions, and networks.Such an approach connects valuable domains that together form the potential composite of knowledge for a people.It is important to facilitate the opportunities for the indigenous communities of the Arctic to maintain such dimensions as a community and a society.It is not an easy task; this is what represents a part of the linguistic and cultural diversity of the Arctic.A holistic approach means to reach a level of balance between the preservation of domains that traditionally form the identity of the indigenous peoples and the expansion of modern technology and economy.However, such balance demands to form an integral platform for indigenous peoples to utilize possibilities in an integrated manner.Over the years of its existence, the Committee has held many events of the national and international level in every priority action line of the IFAP, i.e. information literacy, information preservation and accessibility, information ethics, and information for development.A number of reports on these issues have been prepared, over 60 books on the issues of knowledge society building are published.The Russian Committee of the UNESCO Information for All Programme is not a legal entity, hence to provide its efficient operation, it needs a working body to elaborate specific projects and to look for the means of their implementation.Interregional Library Cooperation Centre (ILCC), a non-governmental organization with a legal status of "an interregional public organization", has become such a body.ILCC was established in 1995, and since than it makes efforts in several directions.ILCC has taken active part in the elaboration and implementation of the national policy of reading promotion and is the developer of the National Programme for Reading Promotion and Development in Russia.Within this action field, since 2007 about 50 regional workshops and training sessions have been held, over 20 books covering philosophical and sociological aspects of the problem have been prepared and published, methodological recommendations for regional authorities, libraries, educational institutions, and mass media have been proposed.The annual All-Russian Conference "National Programme for Reading Promotion and Development: Problems and Prospects" is held at Moscow's most prestigious President Hotel.In 2010 we carried out an all-Russian monitoring of the related activities of the governmental authorities and major public libraries in all Russia's 83 regions.The questionnaires comprised about 100 questions on the efforts towards reading development, stakeholders, existing problems, results achieved, etc.An analytical report was drawn upon based on the monitoring findings.ILCC also participates in elaborating and implementing national library policy and collaborates closely with the Library and Archives Department of the Ministry of Culture of the Russian Federation.ILCC acts as a coordinator of Russia's National Programme for Analog Library Collections Preservation.We work in partnership with all major Russian federal and regional libraries.Numerous books on these issues have been prepared and published.In 2010 the Ministry of Culture of the Russian Federation and the Federal Agency for Press and Mass Communications requested for analytical reports on the problems of digital information preservation in Russia.The reports presented by the ILCC cover organizational, legal, technological and personnel issues of this tremendous problem, that the whole world is facing today.At present, on the order of the Russian Ministry of Culture we are working on the National Programme for Russian Digital Library Collections Preservation.We have delved into the issues of information accessibility and act as the coordinator of the Programme for Building the all-Russia Network of Public Centres for Legal and Socially Important Information.Approx.7,000 such centres based in libraries operate in Russia today.In 2010, we carried out the monitoring of the network status and published an analytical report.ILCC organizes major international and all-Russian conferences, workshops, and round tables in relevant fields.During the recent 6 years, over 100 such events have taken place.We have prepared and published over 60 titles of books, with 25,000 free copies delivered to scientific and public libraries in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan, and other countries.Almost all projects are joint projects of the Interregional Library Cooperation Centre and the Russian Committee of the UNESCO Information for All Programme, as these two organizations are closely connected and augment each other's efforts.The activities of the Russian Committee of the UNESCO Information for All Programme are recognized in many countries of the world.That is confirmed by the fact that in 2010, Evgeny Kuzmin, Committee Chair and ILCC's President, was elected the Chairman of the Intergovernmental Council of the UNESCO Information for All Programme.Today ILCC acts not only as the working body for the Russian Committee of the UNESCO Information for All Programme, but also as the Secretariat for the Intergovernmental Council Chairman.Promoting linguistic diversity in cyberspace is a cross-cutting issue of the UNESCO Information for All Programme, and the Russian IFAP Committee and ILCC have been working in this field for about 5 years.On the order of the Commission of the Russian Federation for UNESCO we prepared national report on measures taken to implement the UNESCO Recommendation concerning the Promotion and Use of Multilingualism and Universal Access to Cyberspace.We investigated the state of the art in the area in Russia and worldwide and recognized that not a single attempt had ever been made in Russia to conduct a systematic study and search for solution of the problem of language promotion in cyberspace, and especially from the political viewpoint, despite the fact that we have numerous highly experienced linguists and efficient politicians tackling the issues of cultural diversity.We have translated into Russian and published the works by prominent world experts in the area of multilingualism and cultural diversity development, and have prepared a number of original publications: • "Measuring Linguistic Diversity on the Internet" (the book by John Paolillo, Daniel Prado and Daniel Pimienta translated into Russian). • "Comment assurer la presence d'une langue dans le cyberespace?" (Russian translation of the book by Marcel Diki-Kidiri comprises practical recommendations on facilitating the process of increasing the number of languages presented and used in cyberspace through developing linguistic and information resources, cultural components and supporting user communities). • "Multilingualism in Russia: Regional aspects" (the book covers linguistic policies in several multinational and multilingual Russian regions, as well as activities by major regional libraries related to multilingualism promotion). • "Preservation of Linguistic Diversity: Russian Experience" (the publication in English examines practical experience and efforts made at various political levels and by various institutions to support multilingualism). • "Human Language Technologies for Europe" (the European Commission's book translated into Russian investigates the current status, problems of machine translation and prospects for Europe). • "Representing the Languages of Russia and the CIS countries in the Russian Internet Segment" (the book comprises the papers presented at the international seminar held in 2007 by the Russian IFAP Committee and ILCC).We started with seminars and later went on with the more representative events to promote this theme and managed to gather a pool of highly professional experts.For better understanding of the efforts being taken in Russia to develop multilingualism in cyberspace we have carried out a target study.We developed two questionnaires of 40-50 questions each and distributed them among Russia's leading universities and the Russian Federation constituent administrations.As a result, we have got a vast data array for us to analyze and learn who is doing something to support multilingualism on the Internet, where and what exactly.The findings are presented in the publication "Language Diversity in Cyberspace: Russian and Foreign Experience".The problem of multilingualism promotion concerns many parties -authorities, universities, libraries, and archives.However, they all need methodological support, analytical materials and information in Russian.For that reason, we have been gathering such information and posting it on the website of the Russian IFAP Committee http://ifapcom.ru/en.We came forward with the initiative to hold an international conference on language and cultural diversity in cyberspace in Russia and got support of the Ministry of Culture of the Russian Federation, Yakut Government, and UNESCO Moscow Office.The Conference was held in Yakutsk in July 2008, with participants representing 15 countries and all the continents.The proceedings were published both in the Russian and English languages.The financial support for the publications was provided by the North-Eastern Federal University and the Ministry of Culture of the Russian Federation.The President of the Russian Federation also devoted a grant for these purposes.The Conference became Russia's contribution to the United Nations International Year of Languages.It helped us win the recognition and invaluable experience, get acquainted with many prominent Russian and foreign experts who are today our partners, participants in this conference, and some of them -the coorganizers.I am speaking about Adama Samassekou and Daniel Prado, heads of the MAAYA World Network for Linguistic Diversity and Latin Union.The Conference final document -"The Lena Resolution" -has been widely recognized in the world.After three years, we have gathered for the second international conference under the same name.We are happy to inform that, in accordance with the Lena Resolution recommendations, Centre to Advance Multilingualism in Cyberspace was established in 2010 and works efficiently under the North-Eastern Federal University.Three years ago we could hardly imagine that.Nevertheless, the second conference has got two groups of organizers -in Moscow, and in Yakutsk, where the main load of organizing the conference in Yakutsk is taken by the Centre.Expecting the 2 nd International Conference "Linguistic and Cultural Diversity in Cyberspace", the book "Developing Multilingualism in Cyberspace: Guidelines for Libraries" was published with the support by the Ministry of Culture of the Russian Federation and UNESCO Moscow Office.The publication examines linguistic situation in Russia and efforts to support language diversity; potential action lines for libraries, global approaches, efforts made by international organizations in the sphere are described.The Multilingualism in Digital World project has been held from 2005 within a network of 11 higher education institutions in 8 Portuguese speaking countries.After six years of a very intense experience on promoting multilingualism in an academic ambience of monolingual (lusophone) tendency, we present some of our main obstacles and some of the possible horizons that we could glimpse.Our practical solution by now is to work with free operational systems, free softwares, digital libraries and translations.We hope that our experience might be useful to people interested in building a network like ours, to policy makers, to start a broader debate on the construction of inclusive societies, or in short: to start conversations.Working in a team with researchers from Angola, Mozambique, Cape Verde, Bissau Guinea, Saint Tome e Principe, East Timor, Macau (China), Portugal and Brazil it is quite easy to think of post colonialism and on what does it mean to develop common content in Portuguese that enable us to treasure, to respect and to maintain the bonds with our local languages and cultures.These countries and the region of Macau have Portuguese as their official language due to previous Portuguese colonization.I'll focus on the situation of Brazil: Brazil or officially the Federative Republic of Brazil has a territory of 8,514,877 km 2 , and a population of 190,755,799 (census 2010, IBGE), nowadays it has 39 linguistic families -the bigger diversity of the continent -and around 200 living local languages/cultures.And if we say that in 1500, at the time of the "discovery" of Brazil by Pedro Álvares Cabral, our linguists estimate around 1,300 languages/cultures living in the territory of what would become Brazil some hundreds years later, therefore more than five sixths (5/6) of these languages are gone.If we gather the local languages present today in all these territories which we work with, we will reach around 700 living local languages, and surely a big agenda to think how to manage to include these languages in digital world, and how to promote social/digital inclusion of these communities.Still, if we consider that Prof. David Crystal (2006) estimates the loss of two thirds (2/3) of the living languages of the world in the next three generations, we have to hurry.We have a big picture of the languages that we are connected with, and the countries concerned, and I'll draw some lines on the position that our project holds.It is very important to keep in mind that it is a research project by individuals feeling concerned with Multilingual issues, who are academics as well.I understand that a collective responsibility based ethics could be a good way to approach Multilingualism in Digital World issues, but to do that researchers from Latin America and Portuguese Speaking countries have to participate in international debates and know each other's work.We need to become a research network on Multilingualism. "Here the heritage of colonialism and the operation of neocolonialism can only be confronted by systems of collective responsibility-based ethics, [...]" (Spivak, 85, 1999) As a linguist and as a researcher it's been a new experience to bring multilingualism to the campus at UNICAMP University, at the city of Campinas in São Paulo, Brazil.As we all know, the promotion of multilingualism and inclusive societies do not fit in a specific disciplinary field of knowledge in a traditional academy for many reasons, and I'll cite two of them that have surprised me: first of all, for its extreme interdisciplinary nature, and second because it has a link with local cultures and local communities that are not always welcome in educational institutions that traditionally were thought for local elite.There is lot of work ahead, many layers of change that would be necessary to have ideal conditions to promote multilingualism in digital world in our region and with our partner countries.Most of the barriers that we have found are historical, political and not at all in synchronicity with our project, or are being changed in a way that enhance such a proposal of digital and social inclusion like ours.So, we are working against the grain.Today, among 192 countries that are part of the UN, approximately 20 national states have more than one language as its official language.This does not mean that other societies or countries (like Brazil that have only Portuguese as its official language) are not bilingual or multilingual, it only shows the lack of political, juridical and educational support and recognition of these spoken languages and living cultures in national territories.It shows an old habit that was part of the construction of the state-nations that permit particularly in our case: the old Portuguese Empire and the Portuguese identity, a cultural and linguistic paradigm that has had its functionality and that now we need to better comprehend to move on.Fortunately it was good surprise to learn about the initiatives of the Russian Federation that together with countries like India, Canadá or South Africa might help us to approach efficiently our Multilingual issues.The understanding of what is valuable for a nation changes through time and specifically in 2005 Brazil signs the Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity.This declaration suggests, among other things, that cultures and languages shall be considered treasures of the nations, and underlines the need to support initiatives of recognition, respect, inclusion and circulation of these groups and the access to the knowledge generated by these groups in national territory as well as in the World Wide Web.In our region it is a brand new concept.The change of attitude towards minor languages concerns a perception of our socio cultural and historical bonds.There are many blind spots that we have to deal with to make this move.To work and to reflect on multilingualism social and digital inclusion when the paradigm since colonization has been to affirm monolingualism is a difficult job, and our local education goes towards major or dominant languages while minor languages were forbidden until approximately ten years ago.Some theoretical apparatus is necessary to deal with such contrast in academy -the interest to be part of hegemonic culture versus the need to recognize the value of local culture.Otherwise we might develop an academicschizophrenic profile as Kosambi and Spivak point out:"[...] "one cannot truly know the cultures of other places, other times," and then proceed to diagnose the hegemonic readings into place." (Kosambi/ Spivak, p.50, 1999) The first theoretical approach that I found to be useful and productive to comprehend Multilingualism in Brazil and in our partner countries is postcolonial reason criticism.One of the reasons might be that the idea of the foreclosure of the native informant is very present and quite visible in my field.Another possibility is for the need to comprehend the role of women in third world countries that is also something that catches my attention in postcolonial criticism works -being a woman in a third world country university -and by "third world" I'm referring to traditionally colonized academic culture and not specifically to Brazilian economy.Anyway, it is based on this theoretical approach and methodological tool that helps to deconstruct some hegemonic readings, that I'm able to present some perspective for the incoming project.From this perspective I could understand that the linguistic bond [the Portuguese as official language] that at first gathered the network of this project in a very naïve perspective, has been historically overestimated, and, as PEREIRA (2009, 155) says, "became a monument of the complicity between colonized and colonizer, complicity which does not guarantee the end of the reproduction of the colonizer-colonized [...]" violence.One possible question here is what language bonds cover, silence, pasteurize, and what can be done in terms of promoting inclusive societies in such ambiance.At school we learned about indigenous groups as part of the discovery of Brazil by the Portuguese in 1500, what immediately made them become creatures of the past.And what a surprise it is to find out that these communities survived and that they are alive in 2012, some of them with internet, wikis, blogs, some (the great majority in fact) needing help to get on digital world and to access information.Indigenous societies in Brazil are not studied in Sociology or History.Of course there are indigenous languages studies, but unfortunately they live apart from linguistics (western linguistics), language and literature groups.It is a very specific field, called in seminars linguistics of non-western languages, ethnic-linguistics, anthropological linguistics, etc.So it is not part of the general culture about our country or identity, for as Brazilians we are officially part of the western civilization, we are monolingual, and they are not.Talking to some indigenists in Brazil I figured out that they made a choice during the dictatorship to stay in national ground to work with these communities, learn their languages etc.,and although it has propitiated a strong bond of the researcher with the local communities, it has left them no opportunities to participate in international debates.This is not a specific historical issue in Brazil, it happened in general in Latin America.If we look for organizations, academies or networks concerned with Multilingualism in this region, we will find a blank to be filled.More than that, if we look for funding, support, infrastructure, museums, collections, libraries, observatories on Multilingualism in our region... basically it is for our generation to build them.Our scope to comprehend Multilingualism in this project is quite open: in Latin America, Africa and Asia we have very different regional and historical aspects, but we have in common the link to Portugal, that somehow establishes patterns for silencing local cultures.To guide us in Multilingual issues we have clear policies of silence, policies for censorships, considering the historical and economical background of each group, but to reach local cultures, local languages, to develop and preserve it is yet something to come.Such a comparative study would be very interesting, not to victimize but to enable us to have a memory, to understand what happened and to resist these effects in better "knowledge conditions".With Europe we have a very clear counterpoint for they made an option for multilingualism which is different from the former scenarios.Our dialog with European countries is very important regarding their experience on multilingualism development, their academic history or even considering the funding possibilities.A very good partner to work with Multilingualism in our region is UNESCO team, because they give us feedback -which is rare in our local reality concerning this theme -and are capable of contextualizing the obstacles that we cannot surpass locally.In dialog with Frances Albernaz (UNESCO) who coordinates the Network Humaniredes 80 , and reading Luis Felipe de Alencastro -O Trato dos Viventes -I have chosen to start working on the Multilingualism in Digital World project with Portuguese speaking countries: Brazil, Bissau Guinea, Mozambique, Cape Verde, Saint Tome e Principe, Angola, and East Timor.Brazil's role is a bit differentiated in this group, for it's been officially "independent" for 190 years, while the other countries have an average of 36 years of "independent" life.Nevertheless, our common bond in international ground is the presence of the Portuguese language as the official language.It enhances an exchange of information considering Portuguese a vehicular language.Also, there is a strong need to reflect on the role of academic institutions, inspired by postcolonial criticism.In this aspect we are specially interested in Humanities local authorship development, recognizance and knowledge circulation.In short: south-south cooperation.This is our starting picture, and to develop such a proposal together with Prof. Frances Albernaz we have talked to the representatives of the eight countries about the network who have put us in touch with their national higher education institutions.We have had from the Brazilian Ministry of Culture the possibility to create and support points of culture (pontos de cultura).Basically we would have to: 1) promote a field research in at least one local language and to register it in media to share with the network and 2) elaborate a proposal to include this local community online.The project of points of culture would provide the cameras, server and computers to make the edition of the content and to publish it online.We sent a call from the Humaniredes network (2006) and fourteen universities sent us proposals.In 2007 we had the approval for a UNESCO Chair Multilingualism and Local Content Production in Digital World at the University of Campinas in São Paulo, Brazil.However the projects sent to the Ministry of Culture were denied, for the Brazilian Ministry of International Relations (Itamaraty) had forbidden to send Brazilian funding abroad.So, we had the projects ready, a UNESCO Chair, and no funding.We made some attempts to engage Brazilian research agencies, but multilingualism was out of the scope of any national call.We also tried to ask for funding from the European Union who understood that the project was good, but saw no objectives in the simple construction of a southsouth network, no possibility of and no reason for opening dialog and content exchange among us.Another interesting initiative in partnership with the European Research Council in 2007 was to foresee the needs of research in multilingualism and to produce a call for research customized for the ongoing projects.We have worked on that possibility and as far as I know, in the ERC internal meeting to deliberate about funding the representative from Portugal at ERC denied the proposal and so Portuguese speaking countries were kept out of the range of the call.At UNICAMP University in 2008 my former laboratory understood that multilingualism was out of the scope of the lab, and I was transferred to the Center of Memory, and in 2011 to the Center of Logic, Epistemology and the History of Science which is where I work now in this very project.Facing such difficulties was a surprise for us.In fact, it seemed natural to propose such a network, and as every agency not only agreed but also manifested interest to support it, none of these "failures/rejections" were expected.The Brazilian agencies and ministries discourses were centered in the idea of an interesting proposal that should have all institutional support, but by different reasons wouldn't have fund provisions, and at the university we had the recognition of an important project that wouldn't have institutional support by now.Multilingualism in Digital World -although thought as a simple proposal -touched pseudo-ethical issues, that were not in perspective at that time.The context that I'd call postcolonial did not permit the infrastructure to enhance the emergence of the discourse of the subalterns, of local languages, of local content production and of dialog.Nevertheless it seemed interesting to explore real possibilities for this enterprise as we have reached the bottom line of the politically correct discourse and found nothing concrete.It is a dead end for the project as conceived, but an interesting starting point for reflexion and for finding the right partners.Therefore with patience and without funding, I have consulted UNESCO about possibilities to work with this network under such conditions, and the suggestion was to work with the Greenstone digital library project greenstone.org>.And we developed the following idea.The notion of democratic access to information in this project will be developed through the creation and diffusion of local content in local languages.The idea is that speaking subjects experience their speaking capabilities through a variety of repertoires of linguistic character that exist simultaneously and in a gradual manner, without necessarily the presence of linguistic frontiers well delimited and well defined.The objective of a polyphonic digital library is to create a polyphonic knowledge data base that permits the comprehension and an integrated digital experience of this myriad of repertoires and to facilitate the navigation among them.This digital polyphonic library therefore is not centered in a mere translation process or in the transportation of knowledge from one language to another, but in an imaginary web of knowledge in which many linguistics repertoires are imbricated.This web finds its possible actualization in a digital polyphonic platform that permits the presence and the simultaneity of various phonies to be serialized, sequencialized, and shown in multilateral relations that do not affect their individuality.Before colonial era and the expansion of Europe in the world, the majority of populations lived in phonic regimes -speaking praxis, and sometimes, writing praxis -that were not based on the idea of languages as well determined totalities belonging to a specific territory (with its specific speaking population).Our point here is that the majority of people had an open linguistic repertoire, with internal and gradual differences, using them in different contexts and different goals, as well as linguistic formulas and vocabularies, that today are perceived as belonging to many languages.The idea of this polyphonic knowledge base has the following criteria: • To promote in its various aspects the permeability among many repertoires; • Consider computational system and its users intrinsically polyphonous; • Permit to many repertoires to interact with the minimum of barriers, and allow them to constitute themselves mutually as communicational spaces and digital knowledge; • Allow the knowledge of these many repertoires to be shared at its most possible extent; • Allow available collections historically associated to many repertoires to be freely shared; • Allow the digital inclusion of repertoires that do not possess substantial written collections and the creation of their relations others, in multimedia base; • Allow permeability among repertoires to generate rizomatic knowledge creation (i.e. in a web design and without neuralgic points of control), without disciplinary approach (i.e. through knowledge exchange and/ or through linguistic territorialities thought as historically rooted in different spaces and different time flux, that immediately will demand translation among them to communicate.);and • Use digital space as an instrument of de-territorialization.We have also asked the network members to share opinions on the opportunities of this project, and the mains obstacles.The list of current main local opportunities concerns roles for the university that were never available in our postcolonial set.And, unless we can trick history, there is no easy possibility to promote such insurrection of local content within the place that have systematic and consistently silenced it.Here is the positive list. •Possibility to develop local academic and artistic authorship, concerning subjects of local reality; • Possibility to develop digital inclusion with multicultural perspective; • Possibility to develop research on multilingualism with local researchers (south-south cooperation); • Participation of universities empowering communities in digital editing and publishing, with content quality priority; • Funding institutions with difficulties to innovate subject and approaches, unless they're considered important abroad; • Brain drain of academic staff usually to Europe and to United States.This list shows that we were not ready to start working at the level proposed in terms of basic infrastructure and sometimes human resources.It requires of us, as a network, a change of culture to work to propose academic South-South cooperation.Departing from this picture we made suggestions for new requirements (institutional and funding formats) for international and cutting edge research on Multilingualism: • Invest locally in Junior Researchers; • Consider research projects on national languages or official languages.This would be interesting to strengthen partnerships with local institutions, so they would be forced to get in touch with new research trends; • Invest in research network for humanities, sharing libraries and promotion of professors and researchers exchange; • Invest in similar pairs evaluation (someone in Angola is much more able to evaluate the real condition for research production in Mozambique, than a specialist that doesn't share the same research conditions).In our region there is a contradiction on the necessary presupposition that there is a dominant knowledge, expressed in academy, and that we -as scholarsare in a position to re-inscribe local languages and local cultures without any support.In contact with the group that works with multilingualism in the 2011 Yakutsk conference and with the UNESCO Information For All Programme group dedicated to multilingualism I figured out that from the academic perspective we need to organize the memory of the initiatives already taken, and to create an observatory of the projects in course.It is important to give a place in academy for studies on multilingualism in general and for Multilingualism in Digital World.We should be more flexible with multiple areas of knowledge to consider Multilingualism studies.It is possible to work with multilingualism from many angles.But to enable the construction of inclusive societies within local universities in our region, it is necessary to have a minimum of good examples, reports of national experiences, similar to the Russian publication "Preservation of Linguistic Diversity: citizens.That said, we also need to create favourable conditions for members of the country's other ethnic groups to speak and receive schooling in their native languages."This principle became the foundation for the National Programme of Language Use and Promotion, intended for the 2011-2020 period.The programme was elaborated in keeping with Articles 7 and 93 of the Constitution of Kazakhstan, the July 11, 1997 Law on Languages, the Doctrine of National Unity, and the Language Policy Framework.Work on the Programme will proceed in three areas: • broadening and enhancing the socio-communicative role of the national language; • maintaining the role of the Russian language in the cultural domain; • promoting other languages of Kazakhstan.There are three stages to cover: At President Nazarbayev's initiative, a national cultural project, "Language Triad", has also been launched.Every person living in modern-day Kazakhstan is well aware that the command of at least three languages -Kazakh, Russian and English -is crucial to his or her success.In our increasingly globalized world, speaking several languages is an indispensable asset because we all need to know how to orient ourselves in a multilingual environment.Objectives: • qualitative (an improved linguistic environment, more self-motivation to learn the Kazakh language among the country's non-Kazakh ethnic groups; wider research activities for Kazakh and other languages spoken in Kazakhstan); • quantitative (the proportion of Kazakh citizens speaking the national language may grow to 95%, up from today's 60%).These are official projections, to which we could add another 10% -representatives of ethnic minorities, such as Uigur, Tatar and Azeri -who speak their respective mother tongues and have a basic-level command of the Kazakh language.By the year 2020, the share of Kazakh citizens speaking Russian is expected to reach at least 95%, against today's 89%.English-language speakers should also grow in numbers, to eventually account for some 20% of the population.The Internet has become a truly cosmopolitan zone by now.And although the Web's linguistic landscape is still dominated by English, the world's nations seek to create online resources in many locally spoken languages.What is the situation like in Kazakhstan?September 2011 marked 17 years since the nation went online.These days, about a hundred new websites appear here monthly.Not all of them have a Kazakh-language version, though, with Kazakhstan's developers often giving priority to Russian and English these days.However, in the past five-seven years, there has been a positive trend toward the expansion of Kazakh-language Web content, prompted by the launch of a large-scale national programme to develop an online government.Another factor holding back the expansion of Kazakh presence online is the lack of technical support for the Kazakh script (the standard Cyrillic alphabet plus nine additional characters).It has taken quite a long time to develop a single standard for encoding these characters and to spread fonts that have them around.The effective language promotion programme gives reason to hope that a system of government support for Kazakh-language websites will be created before long.Already, active measures are being taken to promote Web content in the national language.And there is a whole number of success stories to inspire further effort.The project Kazakh National E-Library (www.kazneb.kz ), run by the National Research Library in partnership with its smaller counterparts, also seeks to promote the Kazakh language online.These days, Internet users can have access to 2,000 complete digitized copies of books in Kazakh, featuring Kazakhstan's history, culture, science and literature.With ICT being one of the most vibrant sectors in Kazakhstan's modern-day economy, the number of Internet users in the country is on the rise.In 2011, for instance, it exceeded 5 million, or 34% of the population.And Kazakhlanguage Web content is likely to grow further, provided that the government offers more incentives and public organizations provide their support.Being information and communication centres for their respective communities, Kazakhstan's libraries see it as their professional duty to promote the creation of a tolerant language environment as a factor of national unity.In their daily work, Kazakh library staffs are guided by UNESCO's Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, signed in Paris in November 2001, and, specifically, by its points about "safeguarding the linguistic heritage of humanity and giving support to expression, creation and dissemination in the greatest possible number of languages" and "promoting linguistic diversity in cyberspace and encouraging universal access through the global network to all information in the public domain."The government programme for the promotion of languages in 2011-2020 has prompted libraries to step up their efforts to popularise Kazakh as the 6.Using ICT in the creation of a qualitatively new model of library and reference services; 7.Providing methodology consulting on topical issues of library and reference services for the country's multi-ethnic population.The Kazakh libraries' main partner, without any doubt, is the Assembly of the Nation (http://www.assembly.kz ).Enthusiasm and love for one's language and culture are key to the assembly's success.This is a one-off public institution, committed to harmonising interethnic relations in Kazakhstan.No other country boasts such an organization.This is the first Kazakh president's "knowhow," which has been unfailingly proving its efficiency ever since the country gained its independence two decades ago.The assembly holds a depositary at Kazakhstan's National Research Library.The collection provides information support for the country's ethnic policy activities while also consolidating Kazakh society's spiritual culture, crucial to maintaining national unity.It features books providing a profile of the assembly and telling of activities by its units -various ethno-cultural associations, an expert council, and a public foundation.The collection is also accessible online, at the National Kazakh E-Library (www.kazneb.kz ).Thanks to its partnership with the assembly, this e-library has become a platform for various programmes in fostering intercultural dialogue and promoting the national language, as well as the languages, cultures and traditions of all of Kazakhstan's ethnic groups.The country's libraries realize perfectly well that information and communication technology is one of the most efficient tools for building a favourable linguistic environment.This is why, along with conventional forms of library and reference services, readers are also offered resources and services based on ICT, such as e-libraries and electronic reference units, websites, online displays, and e-posters.Some positive experience has already been accumulated in this area, but we still have a long way to go in promoting Web content in Kazakhstan's national language and languages spoken by the non-Kazakh population -a major priority with the country's public libraries.Creating Content in Minority Languages: Enhancing Users' Capacity Linguistic and cultural diversity as a part of the world's heritage is commonly known to be as crucial for mankind as biodiversity is for nature.UNESCO documents also highlight the importance of diversity, emphasizing the respect for linguistic and cultural diversity as one of the core principles of the modern society development.Over According to a 2010 survey results 60% of Karelians and Vepsians living in the republic read newspapers and magazines in their mother tongues, 75 %watch TV programmes and listen to radio broadcasts in mother tongues.80 % of Karelians and Vepsians deem their right to use mother tongue is regarded.There are, however, issues for concern.One in five Karelians and one in three Vepsians polled expressed their concern over the sustainability of their mother tongue.About 40% of Karelians and 30% of Vepsians mentioned their language being endangered.Only 41% of the respondents were positive of the modern school's increased opportunities for native languages preservation and promotion, while 40% considered it necessary to continue further work on preserving and supporting native languages.The survey did not cover the issues of ICT and Internet use by indigenous peoples, however even a shallow analysis of the social networks like "Facebook" or "VKontakte" shows that Karelian and Vepsian languages find representation there.Statistics demonstrates a rise in the frequency of use of full-text resources created in the republic in these languages.More users visit republican web sites presenting resources in Karelian, Vepsian, Finnish, as well as information in Russian on the indigenous peoples of Karelia, their languages, traditions and territory.Interactive multimedia projects (including Internet-based) are being actively implemented in the republic, aimed at the creation of content in national languages.Use of modern technologies facilitates the creation of information resources and products in various formats.Such "live" projects and complex forms of work cause constant broad public interest -both among adults and children, thus allowing raising the prestige of minority languages and strengthening their social and functional role.The Indigenous Peoples of Karelia project (http://knk.karelia.ru/), has been implemented since late 2009.It is a sort of a blog site aimed at providing information on our homeland, amazing and magical Karelia, on its past, present and future, on the people living here.We use Movable Type software as an open source platform, permitting the application of blogosphere technologies.We work on the creation of interesting content in cooperation with researchers, journalists and publishers, with Karelian republican and regional museums and the National Archive, with municipal libraries and cultural centres of different districts of the republic, with national public associations and NGOs.Users leave their comments, address our authors and each other, moderators are eager to answer any questions and often initiate personal messages sharing, and as a result the project somehow performs functions of a social media.Questions and commentaries help us adjust and update our plans for project development.We are expanding the range of web tools for publishing materials on the website.Users can watch videos, listen to recordings and work with flash diagrams.Various photo galleries are used for viewing images.Audio-visual materials in indigenous languages of Karelia are published in the "Media Library" section.Our key goal is the preservation and promotion of audiovisual cultural heritage and creation of our own audio and video resources.We also aim at providing support for national languages and ensuring their promotion online.The "E-book shelf" section contains bibliographic and reference lists, articles and publications on the history of our region.We always indicate the authorship and information sources.It might be for that reason that the Russian library community considers our project as a new format of bibliographic resources on the Web.Our website has already attracted visitors from over 80 countries.Our new project -the Digital Library of Karelian Authors (http://avtor.karelia.ru/) -is freely available since June 2011.We wanted to create a virtual meeting place for contemporary Karelian authors and their readers, to assist both authors and growing army of e-readers.We started with publishing 28 electronic editions of 14 authors invited to cooperate.Publications are grouped into nine categories, including prose, poetry, translations, literary criticism, etc.After placing links in the Karelian web-space and presenting the project in the local media we began to receive proposals from new authors through the feedback.We have made agreements with owners (authors and publishers).We are proud of having digital publications labeled "first published".It means our project has earned the trust of authors.We hope that it will catch the fancy of Internet users.Of course, we plan to prepare publications not only in Russian but also in Finnish, Karelian and Vepsian languages with Russian translation provided.Analyzing the demand for similar Internet projects, their standing in the local scientific and creative community, we come to the conclusion that success is only possible by combining various creative initiatives under the roof of the National Library.The Geneva Plan of Action calls for the exchange of knowledge, experiences and best practices on policies and tools designed to promote cultural and linguistic diversity at regional and sub-regional levels.Potential stakeholders of the multilingualism promotion process -those who can and should contribute to the maintenance and strengthening, equipping and development of language -are numerous.Of course, government policies and activities are of paramount importance.Efficient policy includes a set of interrelated measures aimed at strengthening and improving the activities by all other major stakeholders.Let us name these stakeholders: • education; • research institutions; • memory institutions; • cultural institutions: • book and media publishers; • bookstores, newspaper and magazine stands; • digital media; • ICT industry; • NGOs; • private sector.Institutions of primary, secondary and higher education undoubtedly play a crucial role in multilingualism promotion.They should cooperate with the legislative and executive bodies to support and develop minority languages.Research institutions can perform scientific and applied research in the field thus providing the scientific and theoretical basis for governments and other social institutions to support languages.Memory institutions aim at collecting, storing, and promoting all major evidences of the history of a given ethnic group, ensuring their availability to the public as well as developing various methods and forms of providing access to cultural heritage, including written.Media can also contribute to supporting and improving the status of minority languages serving as a tool for the exchange of spiritual values and the promotion of cultural and linguistic diversity.Book publishing and book trade can also do a lot to support multilingualism, since a language's lack of access to the book publishing sphere can pose a threat of its speakers to be largely excluded from the intellectual life of the community.Various projects on the creation of multimedia content in minority languages can be initiated and implemented by all the above mentioned institutions in collaboration with other institutions of culture, science and education.We are all aware of the fact that developing linguistic and cultural diversity in cyberspace grants us an opportunity to preserve languages and cultures, to expand domains of use of under resourced national languages.That is why it is extremely important to understand the problem clearly and define the set of actions to be taken to study, develop, use and promote languages.It's not only political measures that is required.Development of legal norms and standards is fundamental, however multilingualism support cannot be limited to the adoption of regulations or solving technical problems.All stakeholders should be aware of the burning challenges as well as possible solutions.This reqires developing specific guidelines for each institution.Of course, promoting best practice of leading experts in a particular field is important in this regard.Participants of activities aimed at multilingualism preservation should be provided with information on the current situation in the field, on the state of the art in their specific professional area in the country and the world.It is important to analyze the possibilities of potential actors, as this will help to outline the scope of collaborative efforts by representatives of different areas to support and promote linguistic diversity.We have attempted to offer a document containing specific methodological and practical guidelines for one of the institutions supporting multilingualism.The publication "Developing Multilingualism in Cyberspace: Guidelines for Libraries" has been prepared by the Interregional Library Cooperation Centre and the Russian UNESCO IFAP Committee.The book is intended primarily for library heads and specialists, but can be also useful for other organizations and institutions working in the fields of culture, science, education, information, communication, ethnic and cultural policy.We aimed at representing the global approach to solving this problem, the activities of international organizations, and the current linguistic situation in Russia.Why are we focusing on libraries?UNESCO considers libraries to be key partners in expanding access to diverse cultural and linguistic resources, and actively cooperates with the International Federation of Library Associations to promote the information capacity building in the library sphere.Libraries are regarded as educational, cultural and information centers that maintain, develop and represent various cultures, provide access to educational materials and programmes, acquire, create, systematize and provide access to information to meet the needs of all communities.The IFLA Multicultural Library Manifesto underscores the importance and essential nature of libraries in learning, as they facilitate access to a variety of cultural and linguistic resources that open horizons to different experiences.In order to fulfill this mandate, libraries must meet the varied needs and interests of the communities they serve, especially marginalized or minority groups that may exist within any given community.Library and information services in a culturally and linguistically diverse environment include both the provision of services to all types of library users and the provision of library services specifically targeted to underserved cultural and linguistic groups.Special attention should be paid to groups which are often marginalized in culturally diverse societies: minorities, asylum seekers and refugees, residents with a temporary residence permit, migrant workers and indigenous communities.Our publication represents best practices of libraries of Russia, CIS and foreign countries implementing activities in support of linguistic and cultural diversity, in particular in cyberspace.Of course, we could not cover everything in one book and had to give only some examples.While desribing foreign experience, we focused on Finland and New Zealandcountries that are among the world leaders from the point of living standards, the development of information society, and of library services.In We believe that success and consistency of our work in this sphere was made possible largely due to the creation in 1975 of a section of literature of the northern peoples within the Library's department of national and ethnological literature staffed by a senior manager and a librarian, which at present is unique in Russia.Once established, the section facilitated the launch of targetoriented work on compiling holdings of literature in the languages of the small-numbered peoples of the North and its promotion, and setting up library services to these peoples living in ethnic pockets.In the years that followed the creation of the section, a project was run to study the literature read in the languages of the Northern peoples within the All-Russian experiment on library and bibliographical service to the Northern peoples.The results of the experiment were used to produce recommendations on how to optimize library service to the small-numbered peoples of the North.It was recommended to the publishers to increase, in cooperation with the library communities, the number of books going out of print in the languages of these peoples, coordinate their publication and distribution throughout the northern territories of the country, etc.In those years, the Talking Book project was carried out and was highly appreciated among the indigenous peoples of the North, as well as the country's library community.Under this initiative, the "narrators" were chosen among the authors who then recorded their works in their native languages -Evenki, Even and Yukaghir.This project has given today's users the opportunity to hear and listen to the original voices of famous writers of small-numbered peoples of the North.Availability of "talking books" for all the categories of the population irrespective of their age and level of instruction, as well as the possibility to listen to audio files virtually everywhere -be it in public, in tents of reindeer breeders, or in a nomadic school -made them popular among the inhabitants not only of Yakutia, but of the Magadan, the Kamchatka and other regions too.According to the Library's statistics, some 3,000 people have already made use of the "talking books".New life was brought to the project in 2007 when audio tapes were digitized and were used to create 14 multimedia disks with the original voices of writers, taletellers, scientists and other people speaking literary language of the small peoples of the North.The recordings were published at the Knigakan web-site of the small-numbered peoples of the North.Since then, the Library has started to work systematically and consistently on increasing the activities aiming to create and manage the use of e-resources on the small peoples of the North on the basis of a program-based and targeted method.These efforts resulted into the establishment of the following resources: The The main goals of the Foundation for Siberian Cultures include the documentation of endangered languages and, especially, the local ecological knowledge expressed within them.But it also aims to take decisive steps toward preserving those languages and that knowledge by means of assisting local communities to produce relevant learning tools.To realize this mandate, the Foundation is playing an active role in international discourse on these issues.During workshops and seminars local traditions and experiences are placed into wider global contexts and provide a base for next appropriate methodological steps to be taken in order to realize this programme most effectively.In addition to anthropological interpretations of indigenous worldviews and mythologies, the focus in this programme will be on their contemporary representation in the fine arts, music and choreography.The Foundation for Siberian Cultures supports a range of creative exchanges between artists from Russia and those from other countries.Examples of such fascinating and vivid artistic dialogue was the exhibition "Shamans of Siberia" (http://www.kulturstiftung-sibirien.de/vir_21_E.html) as well as tours by Youth dance ensembles from Kamchatka in Europe (http://www.kulturstiftung-sibirien.de/ ver_42_E.html).Currently in preparation are a joint German-Russian project on video art, as well as other projects on lyrics and musical compositions that reflect Siberian landscapes and find expression in a variety of western and indigenous styles.Another project is the publication of comprehensive travel accounts by German explorers and scientists since the mid-18 th century.Their exhaustive descriptions and detailed reports are still considered some of the most valuable documents on the ethnography of the indigenous peoples of that part of the world.These works inform us about living conditions and particular ways of natural resource use at various times and provide us with valuable background information for current assessment.This anthology, which will be published in series format as part of the "Bibliotheca Kamtschatica" by the Foundation for Siberian Cultures (edited by Erich Kasten and Michael Dürr), is enriched through essays by scholars from various historical, ethnological and natural science perspectives.In cooperation with the Institute of Geography (KBPIG, FED RAS) in Petropavlovsk-Kamchatski, a database will be produced that brings together historical accounts, recent ethnographic recordings and relevant texts in native languages, and information from the natural sciences.All will be accessible via the Internet even by the general public, and as it is intended here in the first place, be used by colleagues in Russia and indigenous communities. (http:// www.siberian-studies.org/publications/bika_E.html).Learning tools and teaching materials focusing on indigenous communities may help to counteract forces that lead to the loss of cultural diversity and the dissolution of local and ethnic identities.Relevant materials have been, and will continue to be, produced in cooperation with local experts and using modern technologies.For this, the publishing arm of the Foundation for Siberian Cultures has established the DVD series "Languages & Cultures of Indigenous Peoples in Kamchatka", edited by Erich Kasten.The DVDs are first of all aimed at the school curriculum and at cultural programmes in Kamchatka and they present specimens of the related spoken languages in monologues and dialogues.These can be used as well in international research and in university courses.Individual publications of these sub-series address to the following themes: • The remembered past; • Traditional ecological knowledge; • Clothing & decorative arts; • Ritual practice & world view; • Human-environment relations as expressed in tales, songs and dance; • Conferences, workshops, festivals.This project results from an initiative of Tjan Zaotschnaja and aims to support the preservation of the Itelmen language in Kamchatka.It is being conducted in cooperation with the Munich-based group of the Society for Threatened Peoples ("Gesellschaft für bedrohte Völker -Regionalgruppe München").The Itelmen language is one of the most threatened languages in the world.There are only about two dozen remaining speakers of the older generation who speak the language fluently.At the same time, among Itelmen youth and in particular among those who live in the capital of Petropavlovsk-Kamchatski, there is a growing interest in maintaining their native language.For them, it embodies not only specific indigenous knowledge.It also links them to their ancestors, one of the most ancient peoples of Kamchatka.In 2010, a first project -organized and driven by Tjan Zaotschnaja -was launched by the Foundation for Siberian Cultures in cooperation with the Munich-based group of the Society for Threatened Peoples.Funding was provided to cover travel and accommodation costs in St. Petersburg of a future Itelmen teacher to take his exams there and the publication of his first Itelmen textbook.This series is published by the Foundation for Siberian Cultures in collaboration with one of its partner institutions in Kamchatka, the "State Koryak Center for Arts & Crafts" in Palana.The editors of this series are Erich Kasten and Aleksandra Urkachan.Besides its printed version for distribution in indigenous communities in Kamchatka, a digital version of each volume is also available on the web: http://www.siberian-studies.org/publications/echgan_E.html.Recent or current projects are presented on the web in the form of alternating photo-video shows.This provides a forum through which indigenous communities can participate and be informed about how their traditions are presented and received abroad. •January 2012 -Learning tools: DVD "Traditional knowledge in the world of Koryak fishing". •October 2011 -Seminar "Endangered languages and local knowledge". •July 2011 -Learning tools: "Itelmen language and culture". •April 2011 -Exhibition "The art of flying -the flight in mythology and in the art of dancing of Siberian peoples". •January 2011 -Learning tools: DVD "Traditional knowledge of Koryak Reindeer Herders". •October 2010 -Exhibition "250 years of German-Russian research on the nature of Kamchatka and the cultures of its indigenous peoples". •June 2010 -Learning tools: DVD "Koryak Songs and Dances, Lesnaya". •February 2010 -Exhibition "Shamans of Siberia".Currently, a more comprehensive programme is in preparation by Erich Kasten and Tjeerd de Graaf on "Vanishing voices of the Asian North Pacific rim" that will build on and expand to previous activities on the preservation of indigenous languages and cultures in Kamchatka to neighboring regions and peoples as well, such as to Nivch, Nanai, Chukchi and Yukaghir.This programme is related to an initiative by the Foundation for Endangered Languages to create Regional Interest Groups for specific areas in the world, where the languages and cultures of the local minority peoples are studied.UNESCO and some other international organizations are regarding the use of mother tongues in the real world as an important problem from the viewpoint of the linguistic diversity.Meanwhile also in the cyberspace, accompanying the popularization of the Internet, various problems around the linguistic diversity and the use of mother tongues are increasingly occurring.It is especially important in the educational context, as education becomes borderless with the popularization of e-learning, from the viewpoint of importation and exportation of educational service, Guidelines on Quality Provision in Cross-border Higher Education (2005, UNESCO/OECD) refer to the language usage in higher education: "Higher education institutions are responsible for the quality as well as the social, cultural and linguistic relevance of education and the standards of qualifications provided in their name, no matter where or how it is delivered.In this context, it is recommended that higher education institutions/providers delivering cross-border higher education (a)Ensure that the programmes they deliver across borders and in their home country are of comparable quality and that they also take into account the cultural and linguistic sensitivities of the receiving country.It is desirable that a commitment to this effect should be made public."The report suggested that this consideration should be applied not only to the face-toface education but also to the remote education including e-learning.The research on linguistic diversity in e-learning is being proceeded with an application of translation tools, for example, Language Grid.Many of the translation tools are developed for the multilingual communication with different mother tongues, evaluation for their translate function can be found in many places but there is few verification of their effect to the users.In this report, we will investigate the effect of translation tools to the users from the two case studies of e-learning education using ICT in Nagaoka University of Technology.First, we consider the relation between the language in class contents and knowledge acquirement of learners.In the Nagaoka University of Technology (NUT), there are about 200 exchange students.We extract 10% exchange students (the total number of students is 27, the largest mother tongue holder were Spanish with 10.4%, Malay with 8.3%, Chinese with 4.2%, Vietnam with 3.1%, Mongolian and Indonesian each with 1.4%) and take questionnaires for language use.Seven of ten students are enrolled at NUT with the primary objective of receiving professional education (engineering), not to learn language.For the most of exchange students, the competence in Japanese (non-mother tongue) is minimum for contextembedded language.Moreover, our university has no care of teaching language to bachelor course exchange students -they have to use Japanese for classes.For master course, there are several classes given in English, but students need to be good at Japanese or English to attend a class.It means they need to master Japanese or English if they would like to make high quality study or learning.From these facts, we can point out that exchange students in our university face a deep estrangement between special subjects they hope to acquire and the context-reduced language needed to achieve their hope.However, as the exchange students are small in number and their mother tongues are diverse, it is very difficult to support the mother tongue of each foreign student.Therefore, we have developed the multilingual learning support system with ICT and researched reactions of exchange students to the system.Figure 1 shows the structure of the multilingual learning support system.We did the research of exchange students' comprehension of contents with and without their mother tongues.We prepared 3 types of contents: A -electronic field (the rate of technical term t is 63.0%), B -mechanical field (t is 43.7%), C -information and communication field (t is 37.5%).Learners viewed the contents both with mother tongues support (type II) and without it (type I) and they were asked to evaluate their comprehension of contents with three degrees: "E1: I understood the content", "E2: I understood the content a little", "E3: I could not understand the content at all."Table 1 shows the result of the rate of understanding contents.Seven out of ten students answered E3 in the case of type I contents, but in the case of type II contents seven out of ten students answered E2.This means that for subjects including many technical terms, especially highly specialized subjects, learners' comprehension can be clearly improved with mother tongue translation support for technical terms.Moreover, applying summary submit and evaluation function has the effect not only to encourage learners' comprehension but also to train to learn technical terms.The students' learning activities is not only to learn knowledge via contents.The internal thought alienation or knowledge acquired by the communication with others is also important as an achievement of educational activities.In particular, growing attention is paid to collaboration important for the promotion of learners' independent actions, student participation learning, adoption of cross-cultural communication to respond the globalization that bring drastic change to university education.We implement the Problem The learning method is designed for one or a small group of learners to be able to acquire systematic knowledge on a subject by their independent activities (such as research on the previous works, discussion and so on) to find a method to solve problems.This method was used so far for the purpose of developing the skill to find a way to solve a problem mainly through discussion, at the place of succession of the technology.Noticing that PBL is usually supposed to be applied in a face-to-face environment, there arise two new aspects to consider when we aim at multicultural communication: 1.geographic constraint.There is a geographic limit on PBL in real world due to the practical difficulty in gathering participants from different countries.2.linguistic constraint.In many cases we could not share the same language even if we could gather participants from the foreign countries.To solve these problems, we construct PBL environment in cyberspace.We adopt SecondLife 82 for developing platform and set up a classroom in cyberspace as shown in figure 2.In the classroom, we prepared a shared whiteboard and a screen for presentation.For communication in the lack of common language, we also equipped a text base multilingual chat system which adopts Language Grid 83 for multilanguage translation.Using these tools, the learners perform learning activities that include their interaction.Figure 3 shows the PBL environment system architecture.Under these preparations, we did the following experiments to evaluate PBL environment in the 3D virtual world.We collected two examinees respectively from Japanese, from German (who are familiar with both the mother tongue and English), and from Malay students, and divided them into two groups so that each group should contain speakers of respective languages.We refer to 90 minutes as one period, which is divided into two parts, a 30 minutes lecture and the succeeding 60 minutes discussion.In the lecture, a professor taught basic knowledge about a subject using chat function, and then students discussed on the subject using multilingual chat for 60 minutes.We prepared problems to ask basic knowledge of chemistry for undergraduate students as a PBL subject.The combination of theme and language is shown in Table 2 .Evaluation is done mainly focusing on the process of answering questions.The main points of evaluation are 1) how communication works in a multilingual chat and 2) how the shared whiteboard is used to help communication.For 1), we did a quantitative evaluation using a bibliometric method for English texts, Flesch Kincaid Reading Ease (FKRE)� and the amount of conversation.For 2), we did also a qualitative evaluation by tracking whiteboard usage and communication between avatars to the level of comparison of their contents.FKRE, the rating scale for communication -measures of a multilingual chathave the following characters : the smaller FKRE 84 value shows complex communication.In the experiment, we define "complex communication" as "frequent use of technical terms" namely, they make discussion along the theme.Calculating these values to the contents of multilingual chat we evaluate the quality of the communication.The results are shown in Table 3 , where L e means the number of efficient chat sentences, W m means the number of mean words per sentence, E means using English, NT means using mother tongue, Δ is (E-NT).Usually when someone utters a sentence regularly in a certain interval, the chart shows linear growth.Temporal more frequent conversation pushes the graph to the upper-left, while less conversation pushes it to lower-right.We can observe from the chart that group 1 showed less communication when English was used and more frequent communication when mother tongues were used.The group 2 shows that there was delay of conversation (area B) caused by large silence (area C) when English was used.When the mother tongues were used, the graph shows a steep inclination that means a rapid interchange of conversation, and students needed just a half amount of time to solve the problems compared with the case in English (area A).From these facts, we can conclude that discussion is delayed by the language barrier when English is used, ending without getting mutual enhancement, while the use of the mother tongues makes discussion smoother, leading to some excitement by collaboration of the group.Figure 5 shows an example in which the biggest movement was observed, displaying the communication with multilingual chat and the contents on the shared whiteboard along one time line.The timeline includes each avatar's talking and use whiteboard.Students shared the notion of energy level and its relation to the electron spin.We can observe how avatar B, behaving as a leader, explained them to avatar A and avatar C. Responding to avatar B, avatar A said "I can understand," and avatar C said "it is difficult to understand."The table in figure 5 starts when avatar C said "it is difficult."Answering avatar C, avatar B declared "I will explain it using whiteboard" and explained his idea using the chart.In the process avatar A also got engaged in the explanation and avatar C asked questions to avatars A and B. We could judge that they started having smooth communication.We can observe that avatar C also understood the subject from the analysis of the chat.By contrast, the group 2 did not have a leader, and there was an avatar who could not follow the discussion on the same problem that was given to the group 1.The conversation among the members of the group 2 was sparse and the number of sentences in it is just a half of the group 1.We also point out that the contents described on the shared whiteboard were not clear.From these facts, we can conclude that to promote students' learning, it is not sufficient just to prepare the discussion environment in mother tongue -an avatar acting as a leader or a mentor is also needed.Through these two experiments, we figure out the relation between the language that the learners use and the learning activities/acquirement of knowledge as follows.From case 1 we find that translation of non-mother tongue technical terms contained in the class contents into their mother tongue is useful for acquisition of knowledge Usually, however, non-mother tongue and mother tongue substitution is achieved using dictionaries.Hence, as a precondition for this translation to work, learners should have sufficient knowledge about technical terms in the mother tongue as a context-reduced language.From case 2 we think that there are two important aspects in developing collaboration study between students having different mother tongues: (1) training common language (English) and (2) training general communication skill so that students can express their own opinion.In the context of PBL the main focus is on the second point, i.e. our educational goal is to enhance communication skills.For this purpose the use of mother tongues is more appropriate than obliging students to study common language.This is proven by our experiments: dramatic increase of the amount of conversation, appearing a leader in the group, and effective use of support tools.To summarize, to provide collaborative education smoothly in multilingual environment it is desirable to support mother tongues for enhancing both learning activities and acquirement of knowledge.Although this is too difficult to achieve in the usual face-to-face environment, we demonstrated that we can support the use of mother tongues in multilingual environment by introducing ICT.It was proven to be one of useful ways to connect an online dictionary or an online translator with class contents and a chat tool.However, such tools have performance boundary, especially if students' mother tongues lack required technical terms.In that case, to support those students, a little more extra effort is required: one possibility is to neoterize these technical terms.However, such new technical terms tend to get widely spread quite rapidly in accordance with the permeation of education.In future, we will be able to automatically enrich the online dictionary/translator function using the feedback of observing new phrases or knowledge through, say, web crawling.Conclusions made in the course of related discussions found their way into the forum's final recommendations: • Developing joint interregional projects to represent scripts of small indigenous peoples of Russia's Northeast in computer operating systems; • Setting up an ad hoc group for gathering material on the linguistic and cultural diversity of the Russian North's native communities populating the Chukchi Autonomy and posting that material at the North-Eastern Federal University's website (www.arctic-megapedia.ru); • Elaborating a scientifically justified programme for introducing innovative technology into the traditional economic practices of the Chukchi Peninsula's indigenous population.Promoting linguistic diversity in cyberspace has both cultural and political significance.Dissemination of multilingual information on the history, languages and cultures of different nations facilitates mutual understanding and tolerance development.Each language is a unique repository of the information on its speakers and their culture.Recently, however, the process of languages extinction is becoming rampant.According to pessimistic forecasts, by the end of the XXI century, only about 10% of present-day languages may survive.Numerous factors threaten the existence of a language: natural disasters, leading to the death of entire peoples; weaknesses of the education system discouraging children to learn school subjects in their native language; the lack of writing to name a few.Any language's extinction is a great loss, as languages reflect historical experience and serve as a tool for socialization, expression and transmission of social and cultural traditions.While facilitating the growth of human knowledge, languages are a means of enhancing self-identification especially important for their speakers.In recent years a new factor has appeared, namely the rapid development of ICTs and the Internet.The Internet offers huge opportunities for users in terms of freedom of expression, education and access to information.However, information and services are accessible on the Internet only in dominant languages (about 400 out of the existing 6700 languages). •Studying and promoting Russian and foreign best practices on the preservation of linguistic diversity and its development in the cyberspace, facilitating its development and use. •Facilitating the creation of centres of excellence and the development of activities by various institutions and organizations in the sphere of promoting linguistic and cultural diversity in cyberspace. •Contributing to the enhancement of regional, national and international policies and regulatory framework in the field of culture, education, communication and information for the support and development of linguistic and cultural diversity in cyberspace. •Providing assistance in the preparation and publishing of scientific, educational, methodological, and other materials to draw attention to the problems of preservation of linguistic and cultural diversity of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) and the Russian Federation from students and graduates, teachers, researchers and other staff members of the NEFU and other institutions of education, science and culture, as well as public at large. •Providing methodological, organizational, information support for the activities by memory institutions to promote multilingualism in cyberspace. •Facilitating collaborative efforts by organizations and institutions to support linguistic diversity in cyberspace. •Contributing to organizing and implementing activities to document, preserve and develop the indigenous languages of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) and other peoples of the Russian Federation with the use of ICT. •Assisting the development and dissemination of appropriate free software, fonts, and other technical tools necessary for using various languages in cyberspace.The Centre to Advance Multilingualism focuses on encouraging and assisting all entities and individuals who can and should contribute to preserving, strengthening, equipping and developing languages, in particular in cyberspace.The Arctic State Institute of Arts and Culture (ASIAC) is Russia's only higher educational establishment with a mission to protect the culture of the small indigenous peoples of the North and to pass it on to future generations nationwide through the system of public education.The institute's strategic goals include implementing study programmes as well as creative and research projects of high academic quality, exploring ways to preserve indigenous communities' traditional culture, and promoting what is known as "living heritage" across Russia and the world using innovative educational, socio-cultural and information technology.Founded in 2000, ASIAC has since evolved into an important cultural centre, making a difference in community life across the region.While preserving the best of teaching traditions, it seeks to be relevant to the modern-day requirements for national education.The development of a quality management system is currently underway here, with the teaching staff trying new creative approaches and employing innovative teaching techniques.At ASIAC, conditions have been created for studying mother tongues and foreign languages, with these latter crucial to the institute's integration into the world's academic community.An Arctic dimension has been added to the curriculum so as to raise the students' awareness of local indigenous heritage and foster their commitment to preserving and promoting it, including through public education institution.ASIAC aims to raise public awareness of the value system and the traditions of northern indigenous communities' spiritual culture, making use of modern information technology.IT is crucial to its ambition of growing into a major centre of education, science and culture in North-Eastern Russia, whose rich intellectual and information resources could benefit the nation and the world at large.It is with this goal in mind that the institute works to expand its online resources, including the academic e-library.The library is comprised of databases featuring all kinds of material essential for learning, including digitized textbooks, teaching aids, methodology essays, and so on.A Web interface has been developed for the convenience of authorized users' access to those of the resources whose use should be confined to the local network.education, systematizing research in their arts and culture, and accumulating creative ideas and intellectual resources to preserve their cultural diversity. "Circumpolar Civilization in World Museums: Past, Present, Future" (http:// arcticmuseum.com/) has also been developed in association with UNESCO.This project shows how, despite the harsh climatic conditions, northern Russia's subpolar communities have managed to survive and develop highly distinctive cultures and lifestyles.They are part of a civilization referred to by the research community as "circumpolar" and dating back thousands of years.Here are some of the proposals concerning further efforts to support and promote the northern indigenous peoples' languages, arts and culture: 1.In order to improve native subpolar communities' access to information resources, the elaboration and implementation of the Programme for Promoting Indigenous Cultural and Linguistic Diversity should be recognized as a priority of Russia's Information Society Development Strategy (this task will be hard to fulfill without serious government support in the form of a target programme); 2.Setting up an association of developers of online resources on indigenous peoples' cultural and linguistic diversity and building an integrated e-library based on digitized content from Yakutia's Republican Library, complete with a common electronic catalogue; 3.Recommending to the Yakut government that it place a state order for programmes to train, retrain and upgrade specialists in culture-related IT at the Arctic Insitute of Arts and Culture, in line with the new, third-generation national educational standards.In the course of the emancipation of the Roma as a European ethnicity, Romani became one of the primary features of a transnational Roma identity.This process, which started in the 1970s, is mainly based on a common history and culture and consequently aims for a common language.This resulted in various attempts to standardise Romani, which have more or less failed so far.However, concrete measures to codify individual varieties and expand their functions from mainly oral use in informal situations into formal written usage have been successful to some extent.This expansion of Romani into formal domains resulted in literate forms of Romani and inter alia also in its use on the internet.The use of Romani on the internet is best described by the examples of various web pages which were set up as a result of the emancipation of the Roma as an ethnolinguistic community of Europe.Romani is used on websites of: • national and international Romani NGOs, • international NGOs and organisations, • public and private Romani media.Romani is a dominated language.Romani speakers are always plurilingual and mainly use the respective dominant language in formal written domains.Consequently, there are no monolingual Romani web pages on the internet.Romani texts primarily accompany texts in dominant languages which is in line with the additive type of linguistic diversity on the internet.Almost as a rule, the language of the state in which the respective NGO is active dominates its web pages.Some websites are almost exclusively in the dominant language as for instance the pages of the Austrian cultural association of Roma, the Kulturverein Österreichischer Roma .86 • The use of Romani only in the name of the organisation also applies for the web presentation of the Kumanovo/Macedonia-based NGO Daja, 'Mothers', .Apart from the official denomination, the entire website is in Macedonian with some texts translated into English.Such bilingual websites using English in addition to the respective dominant language of the country where the NGO is active demonstrate not only the importance of English as an international language but also the functional restrictions of Romani as a dominated language outlined in chapter 1.The written style in public political domains of a state is fully covered by the dominant state language.Thus the scope of all other languages spoken on the territory of the respective country is limited to some other formal written domains, for instance education, and mainly to oral informal domains of everyday life and the private sphere.To spread information beyond the national level and to produce an effect on the international level, the use of an international language is indispensible.Therefore, English in its function as the global lingua franca is used alongside the national language.The use of Romani in web presentations of Romani NGOs is more or less mere symbolism.It is used for identity flagging, for indicating cultural independence, for maintaining ethnocultural status, etc.,but almost never for communicative purposes.Supranational organisations and Roma NGOs acting primarily on the international level as a rule use English in its globally dominant function as the primary language for their web presence.Examples of such web pages are listed below: 89 • The web presentation of the European Roma Information Office -ERIO is exclusively in English.This international Brussels/Belgium-based NGO, which is almost exclusively run by Roma, aims to be the sole legitimate representation of Roma to the European Commission and the European Parliament.The use of Romani on international websites is obviously linked to the ethnic background of the majority of persons involved or dominating the respective organisation.On the websites of international NGOs run and dominated by Roma, the use of Romani seems to be a rare exception.On the websites of organisations initiated and led by Gadže, Romani is almost as a rule present on web pages in the form of translations.At first sight this correlation -the more Roma dominate the less Romani is used -seems contradictory.On the background of functionality and the need for symbolism this contradiction dissolves.Gadže include Romani into the web presentations of organisations they dominate or participate in for various but highly interlinked reasons: Romani is often used to express support for the self-organisation and emancipation process of the Roma that, to a large extent, aims for socio-cultural equality which is most obviously symbolised by language.Furthermore, the use of Romani insinuates sympathy for the political movement and commitment to assist the Roma in changing their sociocultural and sociopolitical situation.However, the use of Romani might also be interpreted as an act of legitimisation for the involvement of Gadže into the on-going emancipation process of the Roma.Consequently the online use of Romani by Gadže might be interpreted as the linguistic aspect of political correctness.As for Roma, the symbolic aspect of Romani use on international websites seems to be of minor or even no importance.The functional aspect dominates and, consequently, the internet presentation of international NGOs dominated by Roma and the information provided via the web is almost exclusively in English.As indicated by mentioning the online video language course on the website of the Romanian NGO Romathan, Romani gains communicative importance in oral language use and when the web is used interactively.This is inter alia also demonstrated by the use of Romani on and via the web pages of the Swedish Radio Romano -Nevimata thaj aktualitetura pe romani chib, 'Roma radionews and topicalities in the Romani language'.The web pages of Radio Romano are embedded into the website of Sveriges Radio/Radio Sweden and are accessible via the menu item Språk 'language' in the general menu of the website.The specific menu for navigation on the web pages of Radio Romano is provided in Romani.Written information on the pages is presented in Romani and to some extent also in Swedish.The archived broadcasts offered on the website are primarily in Romani with Swedish and other languages, mainly English, only used by and with interviewees with no competence in Romani.In contrast to the websites described so far, which primarily target the speakers of dominant languages for political purposes, these web pages above all aim to inform plurilingual individuals with competences in Romani, Swedish and also English.Instead of an additive multilingualism with symbolic function, language use in cases like Radio Romano has to be described as integrative plurilingualism with a primarily communicative function.The communicative function also prevails in numerous Roma chat rooms which are characterised by interactive language use and, as it is almost the rule in chat rooms used by speakers of dominated, non-standardised languages, by orate style as well as spontaneous writing.91 As indicated by the texts on the welcome page of in German and Romani, Herzlich Willkommen im Roma-Chat!/T'aven saste taj bachtale, ' A warm welcome to Roma Chat/Be healthy and happy', the chat rooms hosted by the website are plurilingual.Actual language use in online chats of ethnic groups usually comprises all languages of the repertoire of the respective speech community.Language mixing or rather linguistic hybridisation in the form of spontaneous loans and communicative code switching are as common as changes in the primary language by situational switching.92 If the primary language in a chat is a dominant language, a national language or an international lingua franca, Romani is often restricted to symbolic functions -see the welcome formula presented above -of identity flagging, and the expression of solidarity and affiliation.In 91 Whereas the dichotomy between oral and written refers to the form of communication which is defined by the respective acoustic and visual channels, the dichotomy between orate and literate refers to style.Both orate and literate style occur in written as well as in oral form: orate style in written form means spoken language written, literate style in oral form means written language spoken, etc.92 As most chat rooms require registration to guarantee privacy, no specific examples are presented in this paper.Mitrivoca through reports and stories of their parents and grandparents.They were not yet born or small children when they left their countries of origin.Nevertheless, the Romani dialect of Kosova Mitrovica is the primary means of communication in the chat and is used in the plurilingual mode described above: orate style, spontaneous writing, and linguistic hybridisation by making use of all common languages in the repertoires of the interlocutors.96 The difference between additive multilingualism and integrative plurilingualism outlined in chapter 1 of this paper has become obvious from the examples discussed in sections 2.1 and 2.2: • In additive multilingual settings Romani only functions as an auxiliary language.It is presented in a literate written form with predominant symbolic functions.The communicative aspect of websites that provide translations into Romani is mainly covered by the respective dominant languages, the national language of the country where a Roma NGO is based and active, or English on the web pages of supranational organisations and NGOs with international aims. •In integrative plurilingual settings Romani usage often equals that of other languages.It is used in an orate style and communicative functions prevail.As neither Romani speakers nor the internet are monolingual in Romani, other languages are used in domains they cover and/or are embedded into Romani in interactive online communication.Compared to the more or less static mode of Romani usage in additive online multilingualism, the mode of interaction in integrative plurilingual settings is dynamic and, consequently, highly transient.The differences described so far are in no way aspects of simple two-way dichotomies but features marking the two extremes of a gradual field between ethnic symbolism and communicative functionalism against the background of the sociolinguistic situation of Romani as expressed by the arrows in the following summary table: This limited but to some extent representative cross-section of Romani usage on the internet reflects the repertoire of Romani speech communities as well as the functions of Romani in relation to those of the other languages used in web presentations of Roma NGOs, international organisations and public as well as private Romani online media.As the sociolinguistic situation of Romani is by no means unique and asymmetrical relationships between languages are common and natural, the case of Romani allows for generalisations of language use against the background of linguistic diversity on the internet.The use of a language on the internet is more or less based on its functional scope.International English as the global lingua franca, naturally, is the dominant language of the internet.Transnational languages such as Portuguese, Russian, and Swahili cover their areas of usage in the same way as national, regional, or minority languages do.On the basis of a functional approach each domain is characterised by dominant and dominated languages, a situation that reflects communicative reality or rather functionalities, as well as the status and prestige of languages.However, status and function are not a dialectic pair.Status prevails over functionality and not the other way around.Therefore, web pages translated into dominated languages which lack the necessary functionalities only contribute to symbolic additive multilingualism which can be easily transformed into statistics.However, such data are not meaningful at all.Only dynamic, transient and consequently unmeasurable or rather uncountable language use which is based on communicative integrative plurilingualism reflects the reality of linguistic diversity on the internet.The dialogue between cultures and civilizations is among the most topical and popular themes in the world.Many countries arrange roundtables, conferences and forums on this dialogue.Every such meeting certainly deserves support and encouragement -at least, because it is in itself a dialogue.Regrettably, all these events have only token influence on the actual situation.Any news agency's information appearing on the TV or online proves that point.Prejudice, intolerance, ethnic purges, war and genocide reign in this world.Conflicts and confrontations are snowballing.However, ever more political, religious and community activists, researchers and people-in-the-street join discussions on the intercultural dialogue with every passing year to advance hypotheses, scenarios and initiatives.Thus, certain scholars are sure that the available contradictions between civilizations inevitably lead to antagonisms and clashes, the opportunities for a dialogue are dwindling, and the multicultural community has no future.There is another opinion -that all nations of the world should emulate the Western model to prevent confrontation.Doubtless, Western ideas of freedom and democracy, high living standards and rapid development are praiseworthy.Despite all that, we see quite well that these patterns cannot be accepted by the entire worldmainly due to the current amount and distribution of resources, as well as to geopolitical, historical and cultural factors.The intercultural dialogue is no longer a problem of cultural studies alone.It has crossed their limits to penetrate big politics.Globalization is underway.Some are enthusiastic about it while others consider it a disaster.Be that as it may, we are all aware of sweeping changes in our life.Probably, each of us should see that we are not only our countries' citizens: we are also members of a family named "humanity".Globalization has made us all dwellers of a vast united space in which dialogues between persons, states and nations should base on ethics.The political and economic laws that rule the present-day world are deplorably far from the principles of justice, and the idea of global ethics might appear utopian.However, let us look back at the past, and we will see that many breakthroughs of the current civilization started with ideas and actions that were in their time also regarded as utopian.All over the history of Azerbaijan, it was populated by dozens of tribes and ethnic and religious communities.They contacted each other for millennia to promote information exchanges between cultures and civilizations.The indigenous population consisted of Turkic, Caucasian and Persian ethnic entities.After Azerbaijan was incorporated into the Russian Empire, and later the USSR, it was flooded by thousands of people of diverse nationalities and ethnic backgrounds.They were mildly assimilated, just as the indigenous population with its psychological flexibility.Azerbaijanis have always been able to put up with aliens just the way they were.They never tried to forcefully adapt newcomers to their own customs and mentality.Shortly after the establishment of the Azerbaijani Democratic Republic, the ideas of equality and ethnic diversity were in the focus of government attention.The Declaration of Independence of Azerbaijan, made public on May 28, 1918, said: "The Azerbaijani Democratic Republic guarantees civil and political rights within its boundaries to all citizens, irrespective of ethnicity, religion, social status and gender" (Article 4), whereas Article 5 vouched "vast possibilities for free development" to all ethnic entities in the republic.There were schools with tuition in many ethnic languages all over the country.The ethnic press, cultural centres, theatres and educational institutions prospered.In 1920-1991, Azerbaijan was part of the Soviet Union, and so not an international legal entity.Its independence was again proclaimed in 1991.The sovereign Republic of Azerbaijan made its first intergovernmental agreements on the protection of ethnic minorities' rights with the other former Soviet constituent republics because millions of people found themselves outside their ethnic boundaries in the Soviet era.The new Constitution of Azerbaijan, endorsed in 1995, proclaimed equal rights of all its peoples irrespective of language, religion, race and cultural traditions.Article 44 says: "1.Every citizen shall have the right to retain his/her ethnic identity.2.No one shall be forced to change his/her ethnic identity."This statement fully complies with the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, whose Article 5, Clause 2, says: "Without prejudice to measures taken in pursuance of their general integration policy, the Parties shall refrain from policies or practices aimed at assimilation of persons belonging to national minorities against their will and shall protect these persons from any action aimed at such assimilation."Article 45, Clause 2, of the Constitution of Azerbaijan confirms: "1.Everyone shall have the right to use his/her native language.2.No one shall be deprived to the right to use his/her native language," while Article 21 emphasizes that "the Republic of Azerbaijan shall guarantee the free use and development of other languages spoken by the population."This statement finds practical confirmation by the presence of more than twenty schools with Russian as the only language of tuition, and approximately 300 schools with several languages of tuition.President Ilkham Aliev said: "Azerbaijan treats ethnic Russians traditionally well.Not a single Russian-language school has been closed.On the contrary, we provide conditions for the best possible Russian language studies."There are schools with tuition in Modern Hebrew in Baku and Red Borough, Kuba District.Jewish history and traditions are on the curricula there.A Jewish educational centre opened in a gala in Baku's Hatai District on October 4, 2010.The decisive role in its construction belonged to the Heidar Aliev Foundation.Several schools teach the fundamentals of the Ukrainian, Tatar, Lezgian and other languages.The Baku Slavic University, one of the best-respected universities in Azerbaijan, is known for Slav language studies and linguistic research, while the Baku State University has a faculty of Modern Hebrew.The Samed Vurgun State Russian-Language Theatre successfully works in Baku and frequently hosts guest performances by stage companies from Russia and other CIS countries.The Lezgian-and Georgian-language state theatres also thrive.There are press outlets and cultural and educational centres working in many languages spoken in Azerbaijan.Further harmonization of interethnic relations and prevention of encroachments on ethnic minorities' rights are an essential part of Azerbaijani government policies.The Ministry of Culture and Tourism is the principal government agency responsible for the implementation of programmes and policy of the promotion of intercultural dialogue at the national and local levels.It closely cooperates with the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sport, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Justice, the State Committee for Work with Religious Organizations, the State Committee for Family, Women and Children Affairs, the National Academy of Sciences, the Republican Copyright Agency, and other involved organizations.The Ministry of Culture and Tourism is implementing practical programmes to preserve and develop the cultural values of ethnic minorities and groups in Azerbaijan.These programmes envisage cooperation with ethnic minorities' cultural centres and communities, their stage companies' guest performances in and outside Azerbaijan, and ethnographic and art exhibitions.The ministry promotes the creation and performance of art works developing ethnic customs and traditions, and provides folk costumes, musical instruments and other equipment for amateur performing companies.The Ministry of Culture and Tourism goes on implementing the Cultural Diversity in Azerbaijan project, aiming to provide information about ethnic and cultural diversity and promote the public awareness of the necessity to develop and encourage the intercultural dialogue.Ethnic minorities' cultural associations are attracted to take part in the project.The "Azerbaijan, A second "Azerbaijan, My Native Land" festival followed in October 2008, and a third in June 2011.They included research conferences, photo shows, and routine and gala concerts that involved several thousand participants from almost all ethnic minorities and groups resident in all parts of Azerbaijan.With its efficient government policy of promoting languages and cultures, Azerbaijan is steadily turning into a universally recognized exporter of the experience of international support of cultural diversity, and Baku has national minorities the right of equality before the law and of equal protection of the law".Deserving special attention in this respect is ethnic minorities' active participation in public services of all levels and representative bodies of Azerbaijan.There are Lezghins, Avars, Russians, Jews, Kurds and people of other ethnic backgrounds among the members of the Milli Mejlis.Azerbaijan has a unique historical and ethnological situation: the offspring of its aboriginal population of many centuries ago still retain their languages and traditions -suffice to mention the Udin, whose majority live in the village of Nij in the Gabala District.With small exceptions, they profess Christianity and speak their native language in everyday situations.The same concerns the Shakhdag ethnic group, which consists of the Khanalyg, Budug and Kryz.The Azerbaijani nation has always taken pride in the multitude of peoples, religions and cultures in its land.The Azerbaijani think wisely that every citizen of their country is a member of one family whose duty it is to promote the development of his or her salient features and protect unique ethnic and cultural qualities.Our nation's humanism finds material proof in the small ethnic minorities surviving through centuries.History has given the world an inimitable example of peaceful coexistence of the many ethnic and religious groups.For many centuries, the Azerbaijani people have instilled patriotism in the nation without recurring to coercive assimilation, and developed mutual respect and intolerance of nationalism in whatever form.Multiculturalism is my country's present-day reality, which shows that time and patience can make an alloy of many peoples and religions.Role of Modern ICT in Keeping Sakha Language Afloat The Sakha language, better known as Yakut, branched off from its parent language, proto-Turkic, about two thousand years ago.Despite Mongol and Tungus-Manchurian influences, it has preserved its basic structure to this day, and, according to experts, is, perhaps, the closest of all modern languages to Proto-Turkic.The current processes of globalization and cultural homogenization dramatically undermine the world's ethnic diversity while also stepping up contact between languages, which may enrich or debilitate one another as a result.This leads to many smaller communities losing touch with their roots and finding themselves on the sidelines; the situation further aggravates social inequality, causing public discontent.There is a risk of subversive forces hijacking that protest sentiment, especially strong among the young.This is why it is so important to sustain linguistic and cultural continuity from one generation to the next.Few people would deny that language is an important (perhaps even the most important) element of any ethnic culture.Every particular language has its own ways to encode basic notions of life, and human language at large is a means of identity building as much as a product of social development.One method consists in linguistic standardization (including of neologismbuilding rules) and the creation of databases from documents and text corpora.Another is about the preservation of living small languages as means of everyday communication.This can be achieved by expanding their functional scope and, more importantly, by ensuring their generational continuity.Let us begin by outlining children's personality and worldview development milestones.For the sake of convenience, we will rely on the commonly accepted ages & stages model.Preschool education marks the most important developmental stage, one that paves the way for worldview formation and for the encoding of notions and actions with the help of words and phrases.There are two major types of preschool learning.One is about home-based education, usually provided by parents and grandparents, with the older family members serving in this case as the main transmitter of culture for the young.The other type is applicable to cases when both parents work outside home.A prominent role in children's early education is then played by nursery schools and kindergartens.Starting from two or three years of age, kids whose parents work fulltime have to spend most of the day with preschool teachers and caregivers.The next stage is primary and secondary education.In that period, children tend to spend less time with their teachers, so it would be only natural to expect a resurge in parental influence.In reality, though, the role of parents shrinks further because, on the one hand, child-teacher contacts gain in intensity, with the teacher becoming a major transmitter of knowledge, while on the other hand, the child's inner circle expands and so, too, does the range of his/her information sources.Then comes tertiary education (vocational schools, colleges, and universities).It is widely believed that by the time they pass on to this phase, most teenagers will have almost reached adult maturity.So the role of tertiary education establishments in personality molding is, more often than not, negligible.A community's status quo cannot be preserved unless a community member gives birth to and raises a child.For simple demographic reproduction, one woman (family) should give birth to 2.4 children (given infertility incidence, infant mortality, etc.).In smaller language communities these days, there are quite a few parents who believe that teaching the native language to their children is no longer relevant and may even be harmful, so they choose to concentrate on a national language instead.Because of this trend, a native speaker population in small language communities will take an increasingly high birth rate to reproduce itself.Looking at the modern-day Yakutia, we can see that preschool education here is rarely provided in the language of its indigenous inhabitants.The same is true of any other non-Russian ethnic region or community in Russia.So children who spend much of the day in a nursery-school environment are just bound to grow up without knowing their mother tongue.The second developmental phase (through high school) further consolidates the alienation from their mother tongue of children from smaller language communities (in most of the country's non-Russian ethnic regions, schools providing education in native languages are few and far between or virtually non-existent).This process is exacerbated by a lack of native-language content in a schoolchild's information environment (advertising, entertainment, games, extracurricular activities, mass media, the Internet, etc.).And at the tertiary stage, exposure to one's mother tongue in small language communities is often reduced to a bare minimum.As the basic speech and language skills are developed at the preschool stage, when children are still too dependent to make their own decisions, it is necessary to convince parents of the importance of passing mother-tongue knowledge on to their offspring -for him or her to grow into a wholesome personality and a community member competitive enough and resistant to harmful influences.It is necessary to provide every kind of support for native language learning at preschool education establishments, opening new, modern nursery schools and kindergartens.The right to study one's native language and in one's native language must also be ensured in primary and secondary education.There is a need to create an appropriate native language environment and to provide ample supply of various type of content in the language.To better understand what should be done to expand the Yakut language's functional scope, let us try to overview its present-day status.Yakut is better off than many other minority languages spoken in Russia.It is not that the Yakut have numerical superiority over fellow non-Russian communities.But unlike other indigenous groups, many of the Sakha people not only speak their language, but write in it, as well.This creates a demand for Yakut-speaking journalists and authors while also ensuring wide enough circulation for Yakut-language print media, large audiences for electronic media, and relatively high book publishing numbers.Basically, the Yakut language owes its high profile in modern-day community life to the prominence given to it on the school curriculum.But despite the broad circulation of Yakut periodicals (the newspaper Kyym, according to statistics from Russia's National Circulation Service, in 2009 set a record among the non-Russian newspapers, outstripping periodicals in Tatar, Bashkir and other minority languages) and the high number of young authors writing in Yakut (at last year's 17 th young writing talent conference, the auditorium was packed beyond capacity), we should not let ourselves become complacent.If, making the most of today's level of ICT development, it is not put on a par with functionally more advanced languages, but continues to service a limited number of areas of human activity (such as agriculture, arts, and household practices), young community members will be reluctant to study it themselves and to teach it to their children.And the Yakut language's relevance may then rapidly dwindle as a result.This is why it is so important for the Republic of Sakha's indigenous peoplesthe Yakut, the Evenki, the Even, and the Yukaghir -to have their languages represented in cyberspace and to expand their use in areas like science and technology, as well as in the activity of various public institutions.In the modern-day world, accessibility of information and communications technology is the key to language use expansion.Being accessible to Yakutia's urban population (at least in comparison with neighboring regions), ICT remains out of reach for most of the republic's rural communities, who constitute the main source of traditional culture and language knowledge.It is highly unlikely, though, that the local Internet and mobile phone providers will lower the prices of their services any time soon, nor that they will invest in the purchase of new hardware.In Yakutia's still narrow ICT market, such a behavior would defy the sheer logic of economics.So alternative solutions have to be found.One way of going about this problem would be to foster competition (for instance, by providing preferential treatment for innovative wireless communications technology) or to adopt regional government programmes aimed at reducing the digital gap.Providing users with quality information.Users (especially young ones) should be provided with a terminology base (in ICT and related areas) and relevant software, along with informative and entertaining content in their native language.A child/parent/teacher searching for some fairy tale or flash movie in the language should have a choice of several sites offering the required content.There is also a need for various computer-based teaching aids and training/ simulation tools, as well as for publicly accessible databases on various subject areas, such as law.In addition, indigenous inhabitants should be provided with opportunities for online communication in their native language with fellow counterparts.It seems like a good idea to create forums for specific expert communities, such as finance specialists, accountants, etc.And then again, there should be an excess supply of appropriate content and communication tools.Terminology.There is a need for the republic's Cabinet and parliament to adopt regulatory acts that would sustain the homogeneity of the Yakut terminology base. •Chukchi Peninsula Eskimo society Yupik (Providence, Chukchi Peninsula, Russia); • Ethnic & cultural public movement Chychetkin Vettav (Anadyr, Chukchi Peninsula, Russia).The programme's guidelines include identification, studying, preservation, and distribution (paper, digital and word-of-mouth) of content related to: • fundamentals of the Eskimo and the Chukchi languages, including professional vocabulary, traditional knowledge, and related industrial & cultural expertise, customs and rituals; • cultural landscape structures of sea hunters and reindeer breeders, including the system of traditional settlement and economic practices overland and at sea, as well as ethnic toponymics; • history of the various communities, biographies of their most prominent members; anthropologic categorization of the Asiatic Eskimo and Chukchi.The Programme's four sections are described below.Recording narratives and theme interviews, along with videotaping the narrators and their traditional economic activities.Materials prepared in the course of that work are preserved in digital form and subsequently published (see L. Bogoslovskaya, I. Slugin, I. Zagrebin, I Krupnik: Introduction to Sea Hunting, Heritage Institute Publishers, Anadyr, 2007).Of particular value are the original drafts and drawings of traditional hunting gear, primarily harpoon tips and baydaras (open skin boats) and the desriptions of their production techniques, illustrated with video footage.These drafts are nowadays used in building baydaras in many communities of the Providence and the Chukchi regions.The first ever dictionary of related terminology in the Chaplino Eskimo language has been released, with Russian equivalents.This is the result of a collaborative effort by Andrei Ankalin, a sea hunter from the Sireniki settlement, and the ship designer Sergei Bogoslovsky, who has built -to a traditional design -a model of an Eskimo baydara-anyapik, a small boat employed in ice hunting for sealife; it has a wooden skeleton secured by leather straps, and is upholstered with walrus skin.Going to sea on an Eskimo baydara built in the Sireniki community.© Photo by N.Perov.Inspectors of the Beringia park, A. Apalyu (of the Yanrakynnot village) and A. Borovik (from Novoye Chaplino) have photographed with digital cameras the entire cycle of hunting for grey and Greenland whales and of onshore game processing.The preservation of traditional whale and pinniped hunting as well as of food culture traditions is a key challenge facing the Chukchi Peninsula's indigenous population.Specialists in medical anthropology have proved that the increased incidence in iron-deficiency anemia and myopia, the high mortality rate among cancer patients, and the appearance of various kinds of "urban" disease, hitherto unknown locally, are all a direct consequence of the shift of the local population's diets toward industrial foods.Only traditional staples, including the flesh and fat of winnipeds and whales, can ensure good health and longevity for the modern and future generations of the Eskimo and coastal Chukchi, researchers say.languages.Another periodical, Sovetken Chukotka, then came to the scene, followed by Murgin Nutenut.With the advancement of radio and television, shows in community languages began to be broadcast all over the Chukchi Peninsula, even to reindeer breeders' camps.The local Krainiy Sever newspaper these days carries only Chukchi-language translations of Russian news stories, unfortunately.The paper's Website, ks87.ru, runs a special Chukchi-language column, called Vettav.Local radio stations continue broadcasting programmes in the Chukchi, the Eskimo, and the Evenki languages, but the duration of broadcasts has decreased dramatically since the mid-20 th century.The shrinking community-language scope and the decreasing number of indigenous inhabitants speaking their native languages have promptednorthern communities to create several public organizations that would work toward preserving their native languages and traditional cultures.The most efficient of these is arguably the Chychetkin Vettav (Native Word).Members of this association hold regular meetings, where only the Chukchi language is spoken, and invite over some of the prominent indigenous narrators and dancers, photographing and filming their performances.This section started off with efforts to study the photographic archives collected by V. Bogoraz and A. Forshtein, with the originals held at the American Museum of Natural History (New York City, U.S.) and the Peter the Great Anthropology and Ethnography Museum, of the Russian Academy of Sciences, St. Petersburg.These are rich collections of photographic images, giving a good idea of previous generations' looks and lifestyles.Some of the images have been attributed and, with the museums' consent, they were printed in the 2007 manual "Introduction to Sealife Hunting," in the "Tropoyu Bogoraza" collection (2008) , and in a book on sled dog breeding, "Nadezhda -a Race Along the Earth's Edge" (2011).V. Nuvano's family archives have been digitized and retouched.They contain one-off images of the Chukchi jailed after the 1940 uprising and sent to gulags, as well as pictures of the widows and orphaned children of the reindeer breeders persecuted then.Despite the significant achievements already made within the framework of the Programme for the Preservation of Cultural and Linguistic Diversity of the Eskimo and Chukchi, there is a need for more efforts toward preserving and studying the dialects of the Chukchi language and its unique gender differences (the male and female phonetic patterns).No clue has yet been found to explain the phenomenon of scarce cross-borrowings between the Eskimo and the coastal Chukchi languages.The famous sealife hunting culture of the Bering Strait exists in a bilingual environment, yet the two languages, with dissimilar origins and vocabulary, develop each their own separate way.Funds are now being raised to finance the showcasing of the programme's major achievements in a book series and in a collection of discs.The primary aim, though, is to instill the indigenous cultural and linguistic heritage preservation awareness among younger generations, encouraging them to join in the effort.Yukaghir Language and Culture in Cyberspace Scholars believe that the Yukaghir people once formed a separate family of related tribes.Russians who explored North-Eastern Siberia at the beginning of the 17 th century found survivors of twelve indigenous tribes in the area between the Lena and the Anadyr Rivers.Those tribes all had a common ethnonym, "Odul," along with various local names such as alai, koime, and anaul.According to period yasak tribute bills, there were about 6,000 Odul (or Yukaghir) speakers in the early 17 th century.Their numbers subsequently dropped, though.Overtime, the remnants of surviving tribes became dissolved in other ethnic communities, with only two groups maintaining their ancestral language and culture -the Yukaghirs of the lower and the upper Kolyma River (some specialists regard them as separate ethnicities speaking related languages).As of 2002, the total number of ethnic Yukaghirs was 1,509, including 1,097 Yakutia-based.Of these, only 604 (or 40%) spoke the Yukaghir language.It should be noted here that the Yukaghir language status differs from community to community.Many of the Yukaghir inhabitants based in the tundra have now switched over to either Yakut or Russian while those living in forestland tend to speak Russian more.The tundra-based Yukaghir communities, meanwhile, often opt for multilingualism, using languages such as Yukaghir, Even, Chukchi, Yakut and Russian.Importantly, these statistics do not reflect the actual level of language proficiency.The overwhelming majority of the respondents who claimed they speak Yukaghir are not fluent speakers really, with their "command" often based on the knowledge of a limited number of words and phrases.As of early 2011, fewer than thirty natives were fluent in the Yukaghir language, including five in its forestland dialect.The problem of language preservation is closely related to a community's socio-economic and cultural development.In efforts to preserve the Yukaghir language, particular attention should be paid to the following tasks: 1.Encouraging the use of the native language in a household environment; 2.Teaching the language at pre-school institutions; 3.Shaping language awareness in schoolchildren; 4.Teaching the language to college students; In 2010, the Yukaghir language and culture specialists L. Zhukova, P. Prokopieva, A. Prokopieva, E. Atlasova, and V. Shadrin, working in collaboration with the North-Eastern Federal University's Center of New Information Technology, developed a programme for the promotion of the Yukaghir language and culture on digital carriers and in cyberspace.Designed for the period through 2014, the programme should become a real breakthrough in efforts to preserve the Yukahghir language, including through the publication of relevant textbooks and teaching aids.That project received wide support from the university's top and became part of its own development programme.It provides, specifically, for the release of several dozen new-generation textbooks, the launch of the links webpage www.arctic-megapedia.ru, and the organization of expeditions into Yukaghir communities to collect ethnographic, linguistic and folklore material.The effort has already yielded its first results -five Yukaghirlanguage textbooks on CDs and a language & culture links webpage, prepared with contributions from native speakers and tradition carriers.There is every reason to expect that the North-Eastern Federal University will soon become a major centre for the preservation and advancement of the Yukaghir language and culture. "cultural diversity as a source of exchange, innovation and creativity is just as indispensable for humanity as biological diversity for Nature, and is a treasure shared by the entire human race", 10.Thanking also the Government and the people of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) for their hearty hospitality, which ensured the success of the Conference, In the context of this article, the term "culture" is used in the broadest sense to denote the entirety of salient material, intellectual and emotional features of a given community or social group, comprising the arts and literature, as well as lifestyle, the status of human rights, value systems, education, customs, traditions and philosophy.Legacy encodings are non-standardised, and often proprietary encodings.Abugida scripts are syllabic scripts, most of which are generated from Indian Brahmi scripts and currently used in South and Southeast Asian regions.Another important Abugida script is Amharic.Based on the Web version, an equivalent of the 16 th edition of Ethnologue.Two curves provide the upper and lower limits.The upper curve indicates the LDI of a two-language community.As the addition of a third-language speaker to this community increases the average probability to encounter different language speakers, this value is the minimum LDI of more than two language communities.The lower curve indicates the LDI of a very special case, where each member, in addition to the local language, speaks another language, or the maximum LDI.Language Observatory Project -http://www.language-observatory.org/. See reference[4].Some information in this report is repeated from the author's 2008 report at the I International Conference on Linguistic and Cultural Diversity in Cyberspace(Yakutsk, Russian Federation, 2008).The full study Langues et cultures sur la Toile is available online: .9 Corbeil Jean-Claude, «I comme informatique, industries de la langue et Internet », in B. Cerquigliny, Tu parles!?Le français dans tous ses états, Paris, Flammarion, 2000, p. 129.It should be noted that we refer to "recognition" when the engine can search in a language and find results.Google might offer interfaces in a given language -in 120 to date -but that does not mean that the engine recognizes the language.Bordon María, Gómez Isabel, "Towards a single language in science?A Spanish view" inSerials, vol.17, No.2, July 2004, pp.189-195.PCT Annual Review: The international patent system in 2008, WIPO, 2009, p. 20 of French version, [online]. (page consulted on 12 April 2010).See the final paragraph of the document presenting the White House's Innovation Strategy: .17 Namely Catalan, Spanish, French, Italian, Portuguese and Romanian.Galician is finding it hard to find satisfaction despite various initiatives and the other Romance languages, for different reasons, are far from being considered suitably equipped to be used in contexts of specialization.Prado, Daniel (2012).Language Presence in the Real World and Cyberspace.In NET.LANG: Towards the Multilingual Cyberspace.MAAYA NETWORK: C&F Éditions: 35-51 Negash, Ghirmai (2005).Globalization and the Role of African Languages for Development.Paper presented at the conference "Language Communities or Cultural Empires",February 9-11, 2005, University of California at Berkeley.The Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan 2011, Government of South Sudan, Page 13.The Language Plan of Action for Africa, Council of Ministers , Forth -Sixth Ordinary Session, 20-25 July 1987, Res.1123 (XLVI), Organization of the African Unity, General Secretariat, Addis Ababa, Pages 2-3.Second Decade of Education for Africa (2006-2015), Draft Plan of Action for the Second Decade of Education for Africa, June 2006, Department of Human Resources, Science and Technology, African Union Commission, Page 11.29 Charter for African Cultural Renaissance, African Union Commission, January 2006, page 9.International Labor Organization Convention No.169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, Geneva, 1989; UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (adopted by Resolution 61/295 of the General Assembly, September 13, 2007); Concept for Sustainable Development of Small Indigenous Peoples of Russia's North, Siberia and Far East.Moscow, 2009.Work reported on in this paper was supported by the following Australian Research Council grants: SR0566965 -Sharing access and analytical tools for ethnographic digital media using high speed networks; DP0450342 -New methodologies for representing and accessing resources on endangered languages: a case study from South Efate.http://paradisec.org.au.http://www.language-archives.org/. 36 http://nci.org.au/. 37 See http://www.paradisec.org.au/info.html for more on filenaming.38 http://creativecommons.org/. http://www.esrc.unimelb.edu.au/hdms/. The collection catalog can be searched at http://paradisec.org.au/catalog, or at http://www.language-archives.org/search?q=&a=paradisec.org.au.46 http://www.paradisec.org.au/pdsc-manual10.pdf.This paper is based on an earlier study(Schüller 2008) carried out within EU-funded project TAPE -Training for Audiovisual Preservation in Europe, 2004-2008.The general situation of audiovisual documents, in which the situation of research materials is embedded, has recently been discussed at the International Conference Preservation of Digital Information in the Information Society: Problems and Prospects, Moscow,October 2011(Schüller, 2012).The principles of this strategy and the practical guidelines for audio and video see IASA-TC 03, 04, and 06.See: Wallaszkovits 2012.53 http://research.iub.edu/communications/media_preservation/. 54 http://www.upethnom.com/index.php.http://www.senrevolution.com (among other sites).http://www.dsg.ae/NEWSANDEVENTS/UpcomingEvents/ASMRHome.aspx.64 http://www.dsg.ae/NEWSANDEVENTS/UpcomingEvents/ASMROverview2.aspx.65 http://www.dsg.ae/portals/0/ASMR2.pdf, page 9.http://www.dsg.ae/portals/0/ASMR2.pdf, page 6.69 http://www.dsg.ae/portals/0/ASMR2.pdf, page 14.http://www.r-shief.org/. Work has been done with support from the Fundamental Linguistic Research Foundation (http://www.ffli.ru), Project S-43.The TEI's aim is to develop standardized methods for marking textual resources. [Editor's note.]79 Concordance is a list of examples of the use of a particular word in context, as sourced from a textual corpus, complete with links to the source. [Ed.]Network, established in 2005, involves mainly higher education institutions in Portugal and countries that were former colonies of Portugal.Unified Register of Indigenous Small-Numbered Peoples of the Russian Federation (Decree of the Russian Government Nr 536-r of 17 April 2006) http://www.secondlife.com/. 83 See Reference 3.See Reference 2.Accessed 2012-02-24.Accessed 2012-02-24.Accessed 2012-02-25.88 Another symptom of the low status of Romani in the web presentation of this organisation is the fact that the heading of the Romani text still remains German: Das sind wir.../That's us … Accessed 2012-02-25.See and < http://www.coe.int/t/dg3/RomaTravellers>; for the latter texts in Romani see http://www.coe.int/t/dg3/romatravellers/archive/documentation/ otherlanguages/default_en.asp; accessed 2012-02-25.
The impulse to this work came in spring 2010 from a respected Swedish colleague and teacher at the Department of Strategic and Defence Studies at the Finnish National Defence University.The radical Swedish defence reorganization and the unilateral declarations of solidarity made by Sweden created a rather opaque situation.The implications and consequences of the adopted policy were difficult to assess.The views and assessments of Finnish military and security experts are appreciated in Sweden.We accepted the invitation to write this report, which is part of a long-time international cooperation.The authors alone carry the responsibility of the final product.The powerful revival of geopolitics in world politics is an established fact.Its effects also extend to areas close to Finland.The Soviet Union's withdrawal from its positions in the Warsaw Pact and Baltic countries at the end of the Cold War was the first phase of the change, which simultaneously had a part in shaping Europe's new, so-called cooperative security regime within the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), later known as the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).The second phase, Russia's regaining a position of influence among former Soviet republics, gained impetus halfway through the last decade and reached its peak with the war in Georgia, the collapse of the so-called "Orange revolution" in the Ukraine, and further integration of Belarus into the Russian system."Russia is seeking to restore its great-power status and considers it very important to alter the decisions of the 1990s, which it deems as unfavourable to Russia".1 A somewhat adversarial stance has thus re-emerged into the picture, and faith in the Euro-Atlantic security regime has weakened, although the western countries are reluctant to admit that.One indication of that is Russia's attempt to overthrow the most important accomplishments of the OSCE, such as the basic security obligations stated in the Charter of European Security, adopted in Istanbul in 1999.In its military doctrine, Russia considers NATO a danger, and NATO in turn considers Russia a partner.In the 1990's, however, Western Europe began to consider the threat of war such an outmoded idea that it made possible an exceptionally large reduction in the armed forces of NATO and other Western countries, and a change of missions from territorial defence to crisis management.At the same time, the military readiness of countries was substantially reduced.The internal problems of NATO increased in a situation where the interests of its most important member state, the United States, were more and more strongly focused on Asia and the Pacific.The U.S. economic resources are diminishing, and its fulfilment of various commitments to allies and friends is becoming more uncertain.The actions and attitudes of traditional U.S. allies in Europe are also influencing the matter.The role of the NATO member state Germany is crucial.Germany's Russia policy in particular, but also the policy of France, have raised questions.Underlying Russia's reform of its armed forces, one can plainly see an effort to respond to different kinds of challenges appearing in different parts of its huge country.Organizational changes required by the times have been made.Heavy and cumbersome divisions have given way to more manageable brigades in the Western fashion.Old military districts (MD's) have been abandoned, and have given way to four operational-strategic combined commands, still called military districts in peacetime.The Western MD was created by combining the Leningrad and Moscow MD's.Its HQ is located in St. Petersburg, which is also a sign of the fact that the center of gravity in the western direction has been displaced from Central Europe toward the northwest.Steps are being taken to modernize Russia's dilapidated weaponry in comprehensive ways via large and increasingly large appropriations, and in part with the direct support of Germany and France.The armaments program in effect until 2020 has received an equipment appropriation totalling about 20 trillion roubles or approximately 500 billion euro.Extensive start-up of serial production of Russian military equipment is commencing for the first time since the break-up of the Soviet Union.General conscription will not be abandoned for at least the next ten to fifteen years, which guarantees the country a trained military reserve of several million men, 700,000 of which can be mobilised rapidly.Even if Russia develops her armed forces primarily with local warfare capability in mind and for control of her neighbourhood, she as a last resort, prepares also for a future large-scale war.A large reserve is needed particularly in the eastern direction.It is technically possible to use it as an occupying force.It is apparent that in the west, Russia needs small, mobile, highly trained and effective strike forces in high readiness, which are able to achieve operational results directly from their peacetime deployments.This vision is the result of new Russian military scientific thinking, which emphasizes the decisive importance not only of the initial period of war, but above all the first strategic strike, including pre-emptive actions.The forces can be reinforced quickly if necessary.The abandonment of territorial defence in most NATO countries and the increase in preparedness of Russian forces created confusion and uncertainty in countries near Finland and in the eastern parts of Central Europe.The number of Russian troop units and troop strength in the former Leningrad MD has changed markedly since the dissolution of the Soviet Union.The large decrease that took place in the late 1990s and at the start of this century has changed to an increased capability again.The current ground forces east and southeast of Finland seem to be under the command of the Russian 6 th Army Headquarters.In 2010 a motorized infantry brigade was reported to have been established south of St. Petersburg.It probably is part of the planned high readiness units.At Kamenka on the Karelian Isthmus there is in readiness a motorized infantry brigade which ranks among the elite army units.At Sertolovo, north of St. Petersburg, a brigade is likely to be formed at the supply depot there.A helicopter unit supporting the brigades is also located on the Karelian Isthmus.Among the abundant artillery groups supporting the troops let us mention the heavy rocket launcher brigade, the range of whose weapons is over eighty kilometres.An especially significant increase in military capability is the stationing of the Iskander-M ballistic missiles, with a range of 450 to 700 kilometres, with the artillery-missile brigade at Luga, south of St. Petersburg.These missiles represent the kind of high precision weapons mentioned in military doctrine, and its range covers, in addition to the Baltic countries, most of Finland.The Iskander-M can be equipped with either a variety of conventional warheads or a nuclear warhead.2 In Russian defence planning, the Iskander missile system is given important roles in various parts of the country as both a nuclear deterrent weapon and an effective offensive conventional weapon.Tactical ballistic missiles and cruise missiles are assuming an increasing operational-tactical role and augment aviation strike forces well.The country's military authorities have great expectations with regard to the Iskander missile system.In carrying out strategic strikes, the Luga Iskander missile brigade is of fundamental importance.Along with air power, its accurate strikes could be used to suppress any organized defence by opponents, taking advantage of their lack of readiness.In the Pskov area, an airborne assault division is deployed, along with a Special Forces (Spetsnaz) brigade.In Pechenga there is a motorized infantry brigade and a naval infantry brigade.The stated ambition is that these units be ready for action in only a few hours.An Arctic Brigade, recruited from Spetsnaz special forces accustomed to Arctic conditions, was also to be established in Pechenga, according to an announcement by the commander of Russia's ground forces in March 2011.Plans have since been postponed to 2015.It is too early to tell if the brigade will be an entirely new unit.The Alakurtti Air Base east of Salla is being repaired and a renovated helicopter regiment is likely to be stationed there.Its equipment includes attack helicopters and armed transport helicopters.From equipment stored in the area a new motorized infantry brigade can be established which the helicopter regiment may support.At least one more brigade may be established with the equipment stored in Petrozavodsk, the capability of which was demonstrated in a mobilisation and combat exercise in At Lekhtusi, to the north of St. Petersburg, an effective radar base has been completed in order to provide early warning of a possible strategic missile attack.In addition, a new air-surveillance radar base at Hogland (Suursaari) has been built.In addition to the Gulf of Finland, it covers the air space of Estonia and all of southern Finland.In the 1 st Air Force and Air Defence Command (1 Командование ВВС и ПВО) the air forces of the Baltic and Northern Fleets have a strength of more than two hundred combat aircraft of different types, plus more than a hundred combat helicopters, and an equal number of armed transport helicopters, plus many other specialized and transport planes.Certain other air force units also use this as a forward deployment area.Russia's air forces everywhere can be quickly mobilized; its units are constantly in a state of readiness and at full wartime strength.They can be moved quickly to even distant locations.New heavy S-400 air defence missiles, which earlier were operational only for the defence of Moscow, have been deployed in Kaliningrad.This, along with the Iskander missiles, is a powerful political signal.In a crisis situation, the S-400 would complicate aerial operations in the Baltic Sea airspace significantly, and perhaps even prevent such operations entirely.A significant conclusion of the Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences' A National Strategy for Neighbouring Areas research project is that NATO apparently would not be able to react quickly enough in case of a possible military conflict in the Baltic countries, but would be faced with a fait accompli.The primary duty of the Finnish Defence Forces (FDF) is the defence of the homeland.The chosen Finnish defence concept of general conscription and regional defence implies that the peacetime readiness of the Finnish army is at a low level.This should be a reassuring element in the area, but it places great demands on any effort to increase the readiness.The peacetime strength of the Finnish Defence Forces is among Europe's smallest, some 30,000 men and women.Especially in peacetime, the ground forces are in effect a training organization.Combat forces will be formed only from reserves.he division of Europe into two blocs actually began during the Second World War with the Allied race for Berlin, when a significant part of "liberated" Europe was left in the Soviet sphere of influence behind the Iron Curtain.3 In this huge political upheaval, the United States and the Soviet Union rose to be the undisputed leaders of the two political blocs, the East and the West.In the West, Soviet efforts to expand were dealt with using the so-called "Containment Policy" 4 devised by President Truman 5 and by founding the defensive North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949.Gradually the Soviet Union realized that it was surrounded.The same attitude is still very much alive in Russia.The next massive geopolitical change, the surprising break-up of the Soviet Union, came more than forty years later.According to Russia's President Putin, this was one of the great geopolitical catastrophes of the last century.6 Having recovered from the humiliating position experienced during Yeltsin's presidency, Russia is seeking to restore its great power status and considers it very important to alter the decisions of the 1990s, which it deems unfavourable to Russia.7 It is impossible to predict how well Russia will finally succeed, but it is certain that the effects of her aspirations, be they positive or negative, will extend to Finland and her neighbourhood.During the decades of the Cold War, the military alliances in Europe were armed for a large-scale war with one another.Finland was especially affected by the powerful Soviet military power beyond her border, a significant part of which was always at a high state of readiness.8 3 Churchill, 1946 .The key passage of Winston Churchill's Fulton speech reads as follows: "From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the Continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia, all these famous cities and the populations around them lie in what I must call the Soviet sphere, and all are subject in one form or another, not only to Soviet influence but to a very high and, in many cases, increasing measure of control from Moscow." 4 X (a.k.a. Kennan, George F.), 1947.5 Truman, 1947.6 President of Russia, 2005.7 Juntunen, 2013.Professor Alpo Juntunen paints a thorough picture of Russian political culture and mode of thought, which is based upon geopolitics and historical tradition.8 Gustafsson, 2007 .Former Supreme Commander of Sweden's defence forces, General Bengt Gustafsson, has written extensively about the Soviet Union's operational plans aimed at Sweden (and Finland).A departure from earlier times was the arrival of new weapons with hitherto unheard-of destructive power, including nuclear weapons.They totally upset the conception of a large-scale war, and they were perhaps the single most important factor in restraining the great powers from taking too great risks.In spite of several serious crises, peace was preserved between the great powers and their allies.9 The build-up of nuclear arsenals of the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, reached exceptional proportions.The striving for nuclear parity and the eventual goal to surpass the United States, with complete disregard both for efforts and costs, undoubtedly weighed more in Soviet decision-making than other factors.However, the country's political and military leaders had already concluded during the 1970s that there would be no victor in a nuclear war.10 This matter was finally confirmed by both President Reagan and Gorbachev in 1985 ."A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought."In addition, according to the Soviet leadership, a nuclear war must be avoided at all cost.11 It is difficult to interpret correctly the military-operational plans discovered in the archives of the former German Democratic Republic (East Germany or GDR) in which the abundant use of tactical nuclear weapons would have had an obvious and decisive role.As early as the time of the Cuban missile crisis in October of 1962, the Soviet military leadership issued a stern order that is was categorically forbidden to use the short-and medium-range nuclear weapons stationed in Cuba to repel a possible landing by the United States.12 Introduction • 3 In the West, the Soviet Union's aggressive offensive posture has perhaps been overemphasized while at the same time its fear of a Western surprise attack has been underestimated.13 For his part, General Matvei Burlakov, the last commander of the Soviet Western Army Group, spoke in March 2005, of the exceptionally high level of readiness of his troops in the former East Germany.His troops numbered over half a million men, and there were abundant nuclear weapons at their disposal, which could have been used in a first strike if necessary.14 Nuclear deterrence did not, however, prevent the Soviet Union from interfering in the people's uprisings among its Eastern European allies in the 1950s and 1960s, but it had a major significance in the preservation of peace in Europe.Finland was in a difficult position, but also benefited from that.he Cold War is generally considered to have ended with the collapse of the Berlin wall, or at the latest with the breakup of the Soviet Union in December of 1991.15 Geopolitical changes in the CSCE Member States were noteworthy.Germany was reunited, and the Soviet republics became independent.In the case of the Baltic States it was indeed a return to independence.The Government of Finland unilaterally declared in September of 1990 that the provisions of the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947 limiting Finland's sovereignty had lost their meaning.At the same time President Koivisto reinterpreted the Treaty on Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance [FCMA] , which finally disappeared into history on the fall of the Soviet Union in December the following year.16 Finland joined the European Union in 1995, and her security political position became perhaps more favourable than ever before after 1917, when independence was declared.The President of Czechoslovakia Vaclav Havel chaired the Warsaw Pact summit meeting on 1 July 1991, when that military alliance was formally terminated.17 NATO, however, prevailed, and was assigned new tasks.15 .The exact timing of the end of the Cold War is diffuse.It is rather a process that is still affected by the relations between the leading powers, because these have returned to it repeatedly.Speaking at the 47 th Munich Security Conference on 5 February 2011, Russia's Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov referred to President Dmitry Medvedev's initiative to conclude the Euro-Atlantic Security Treaty (EST) as follows: "[…] Essentially we are talking here about permanent elimination of the Cold War legacy".The United States and Russia made a joint statement at the 2010 NPT Review Conference which said that signing of the New START Treaty "in effect, marks the final end of the "Cold War" period".See also United Nations, 2010.Colonel Sergey Tretyakov, a former officer in charge of Russia's foreign security service SVR operations in the United States in 1995-2000, strongly denied that the Cold War was over as late as in June 2009.See also Fox News, 2009, "KGB Defector Weighs in on US/Russian Relations", 7 June 2009 [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zh7VG3jCHQA] and Earley, 2007, pp. 330-331 .16 Nyberg, 2007, pp. 285-299.17 Havel, 2008, p. 294 .President Havel was of the opinion that the termination of the Warsaw Pact was the single most significant event during his term as President.Because of his personal experiences he found the official termination ceremony to be both strange and absurd.Completing the Soviet withdrawal was a very complicated process and the last Soviet troops left the country only two years later.The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), later known as the Organization of Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), was instrumental in shaping Europe's new, so-called cooperative security regime (The Charter of Paris for a New Europe) in 1990.18 A crucially important update (The Istanbul Document 1999) was agreed upon in Istanbul, and it is still in force.19 After the break-up of the Soviet Union, Soviet forces withdrew some 1 000 kilometres to the east from Central Europe.The Soviet threat was gone and various "new threats" were added to the western threat scenarios with everincreasing weight.The 9/11 terrorist strike in New York in 2001 became a certain turning point.Western armed forces have been reduced radically and most countries have abandoned compulsory conscription.20 For that reason, significant reserves are not being built up.Military activities are concentrated on crisis management (CM) and repelling threats far away.In Western Europe, countries have almost entirely lost their capability of territorial defence.A respected Russian observer estimated in January of 2011: "In reality, Europe is becoming a defenceless continent. […] Without America the Europeans will be left naked and defenceless, because except for Britain, they have no armed forces to speak of." 21 Increasingly expensive modern weapons put a strain on arms expenditures of Western countries, and therefore the purchases have been modest even at the expense of capability.The fairly modest operation in Libya in the spring and summer of 2011 clearly revealed the military shortcomings of the European members of NATO.22 The out-going U.S. Secretary of Defence Robert M. Gates said at the NATO Headquarters on June 10, 2011 that The blunt reality is that there will be dwindling appetite and patience in the U.S. Congress … to expend increasingly precious funds on behalf of nations that are apparently unwilling to devote the necessary resources or make the necessary changes in order to be serious and capable partners in their own defence.23 At the same time Mr. Gates also acknowledged the contributions of Norway and Denmark, whose performance in Libya was exceptionally good in relation to their resources.NATO's total peacetime strength, the United States included, exceeded 5.3 million men in 1989.The corresponding figure of the Soviet Union was over 4.2 million and the strength of other Warsaw Pact forces was more than 1.1 million.Both military alliances were approximately equal in manpower.24 Russia's recent peacetime strength is about one million.Here the manpower of the other Russian "power" ministries, about 500 000, has been omitted.NATO's corresponding strength is still surprisingly high, over 3.9 million men, of which the share of the USA and Turkey is more than a half.25 There were grounds for such comparisons during the Cold War.Today they are no longer relevant.NATO no longer has any unified territorial defence and nei- 20 The latest examples of countries that have abandoned general conscription are Sweden, who left it resting in peacetime, and Germany whose last contingent entered service in early 2011.21 .22 Gates, 2011; Shankar, 2011 ; DeYoung & Jaffe, 2011.23 Ibid.24 IISS, 1989 .25 IISS, 2011 ther the troops trained for this task.Four distinguished researchers at RAND Corporation gave the following assessment of NATO's capabilities: Power projection and the maintenance of significant forces outside of Europe's immediate neighbourhood will be particularly difficult due to reduced force size; limited lift and logistics capability; and a lack of certain key enablers (such as missile defence and unmanned aerial vehicles).Additionally, several key NATO European nations are either eliminating or significantly reducing key capabilities such as littoral maritime forces and the related intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance platforms.[…] Put simply, the unit of account for European ground forces is set to become battalion battlegroups and brigade combat teams rather than full-strength divisions and corps.The navies of the major European naval powers will see radical reductions as well.For example, if Brazil's naval expansion plans are executed by the mid-2020s, the Brazilian navy will have carrier, destroyer and amphibious fleets comparable to the British and French navies combined.26 The manpower of new NATO member states is modest.The rebuilding of the armed forces of the former Warsaw Pact countries is still in process.Their armed forces were to be used operationally only in specific auxiliary tasks ordered by the Soviet Union.The warm relations between Russia and the western countries at the start of the period following the Cold War unfortunately did not last long.Russia's liberal Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Kozyrev, who was well disposed toward the West, surprised his audience at the CSCE foreign ministers' meeting in Stockholm on December 14, 1992.He noted that: The space of the former Soviet Union cannot be regarded as a zone of full application of CSCE norms.In essence, this is a post-imperial space, in which Russia has to defend its interests using all available means, including military and economic ones.We shall strongly insist that the former USSR Republics join the new Federation or Confederation without delay, and there will be tough talks on this matter.27 Kozyrev admitted later that the speech was intended to be a joke.Its objective had been to serve as an alarm clock.Twenty years later Russia is in the process of consolidating her grip over major portions of the post-Soviet space in the name of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), and hardline circles in Moscow are optimistic as, in their opinion, "The White House has sent a clear signal to Moscow [at the beginning of the second term of the Obama Administration] that the post-Soviet space is not included in the main priorities of U.S. foreign policy".28 This would give Russia freedom of action.The intergovernmental military alliance CSTO was agreed upon on 15 May 1992 and the Charter of CSTO entered into force on 18 September 2003.29 At the CSCE summit meeting held in Budapest in December 1994, a clear change in direction could be noted."Europe may be forced into a Cold Peace", President Boris Yeltsin, warned.30 After this, Russia's liberal political leadership was gradually forced to step aside.In January of 1996, Yevgeni Primakov, a high-ranking officer in the former KGB and the head of the foreign intelligence service SVR, replaced Mr. Kozyrev.Political power in Russia and the responsibility for threat assessments and situational awareness shifted increasingly into the hands of conservatives who were close to the country's security agencies and military authorities.The development sketched out in Andrei Kozyrev's "joking speech" of 1992 was conclusively realized after the war in Georgia, when President Medvedev 28 Руська Правда, 19 January 2013, США и Россия разграничат «сферы влияния» (Александров, Михаил (Aleksandrov, Mikhail)) [http://ruska-pravda.org/monitoring- smi/38-st-monitoring-smi/19724--l-r.html].Dr. Mikhail Alexandrov, Department head at the CIS Baltic Institute, writes in Ruska Pravda: "Washington actually offers Moscow exchange: to agree to the consolidation of the post-Soviet Russia's sphere of influence in return for non-interference in other regions of the world, which are vitally important to U.S. interests."See also RIA Novosti, 30 January 2013, "Russia, Kazakhstan Sign Air Defence Agreement" [http://en.rian.ru/world/20130130/179120146/Russia-Kazakhstan-Sign-Air-Defen-se-Agreement.html]; RIA Novosti, 31.01.2013, "Russia, Armenia Agree to Set up Joint Defence Enterprises" [http://en.rian.ru/military_news/20130131/17913 8896/Russia-Armenia-Agree-to-Set-up-Joint-Defense-Enterprises.html].In late January 2013 Russia and Kazakhstan signed an agreement to create a joint regional air defence system and Russia and Armenia agreed on defence co-operation, including building joint defence enterprises and maintenance centres for military equipment.29 Организация Договора о Коллективной Безопасности (OДКБ) − Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Basic facts [http://www.odkb.gov.ru/start/index_ aengl.htm, accessed 29 January 2013].The Secretary-General of CSTO, Col.Gen.Nikolay Bordyuzha was appointed in 2003.His background includes service in the Strategic Rocket Forces, the KGB, the Federal Border Service, and the Presidential Administration.See more VIPERSON.RU, 2013, "Бордюжа, Николай Николаевич" [http://viperson.ru/wind.php?ID=1487, accessed 29 January 2013 . 30 The disappointing Budapest CSCE summit was a disaster, according to Newsweek Magazine. Russia opposed NATO enlargement and especially the proposals for statements concerning Serbia and the war in Bosnia. Newsweek: "a red-faced Yeltsin admonishing a stunned Bill Clinton that 'the destinies . . . of the world community [cannot] be managed from a single capital [i.e., Washington] . ' " See Newsweek, 19 December 1994 , "Plunging into a Cold Peace" [http://www.newsweek.com/1994/12/ 18/plunging-into-a-coldpeace.html].After this "Cold Peace" as a concept has remained doggedly in the vocabulary of international politics.See Beste, Klussmann & Steingart, 2008.presented the main principles of Russian foreign and defence policy in August of 2008.Special attention was given to the following passage: Protecting the lives and dignity of our citizens, wherever they may be, is an unquestionable priority for our country.Our foreign policy decisions will be based on this need.We will also protect the interests of our business community abroad.It should be clear to all that we will respond to any aggressive acts committed against us.31 These principles were finally written into law at the end of 2009, giving Russia's armed forces the right to operate abroad.32 With regard to Russia's relations to foreign countries, Medvedev affirmed that "there are regions in which Russia has privileged interests. These regions are situated in countries with which we share special historical relations and are bound together as friends and good neighbors." 33 In September of 2008, Medvedev told political analysts from the Western countries that: "Our neighbors are close to us in many respects, and are a traditional area of interest for the Russian nation. We are so close to each other, it would be impossible to tear us apart, to say that Russia has to embark on one path and our neighbors on another." 34 Thus Russia also strives to strengthen the loyalty of Russians living outside her borders to their Motherland, and may also use harsh methods to achieve her goals.In this sense, problems have come up, especially in certain Baltic States in that preserving Russian citizenship is more important to a large number of Baltic Russians than the citizenship to their actual homeland.One may consider secondary citizenship to also include certain obligations to the country one is a citizen of.Problems of conflicting loyalties may arise from this in times of crisis and not only in the Baltic States.Finland is also a target of Russia's persistent efforts to increase her influence using "soft power".Under the pretext of protecting the rights of Russians living in Finland, Russian authorities have meddled in the affairs of private citizens and tried to elevate these issues to a national level.In a particular case concerning child-care, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov went as far as to condemn Finland of "uncivilized" treatment of a Russian national.35 31 President of Russia, 2008.32 Matthews & Nemtsova, 2009 ; People's Daily Online, 9 November 2009, "Medvedev Signs Use of Russian Army Abroad into Law" [http://english.people.com.cn/90001/ 90777/90851/6808120.html].33 President of Russia, 2008.34 Debski, 2008 .35 Voice of Russia, 8 October 2012, "Russian Foreign Chief Slams Finland for Separating Mother and New-Born Baby" [http://english.ruvr.ru/2012_10_08/Russian-foreign-chief- In the confusing times following the collapse of the Soviet Union, there arose in anti-Western circles an immediate desire to find a new direction and a new basis for values. From a group of conservative Russian geopolitical thinkers, there soon emerged a forward-looking young philosopher named Alexander Dugin (b. 1962) , who's influence on ruling circles has been noteworthy. According to Dugin, who grew up in a military family, true patriotism is to be found only in the army and in the security services. 36 In 1992 Dugin had already been appointed teacher in the General Staff Academy of the Russian armed forces. There, under Lieutenant General Nikolai Klokotov, the director of the Academy's Strategic Institute, and with the support of the Principal of the Academy and future Minister of Defence Army General Igor Rodionov, he started to work on an important book about the foundations of geopolitics and Russia's geopolitical future. In 2003, Dr. Alpo Juntunen, former Professor of Russia's security policy at the Finnish National Defence University, encapsulated Dugin's ideas as follows: [Dugin examines] everything as a battle between land and sea, in which the sides are the maritime powers led by the U.S.A., and Eurasia, led by Russia.The forces led by the United States are the enemy, which strives for a liberal-commercial, cultureless, and secularized world mastery.This grouping is now overwhelming, but in order to save the world, the Eurasian continent will have to counterattack under the leadership of Russia.A new great power alliance must be shaped, to be led by the Moscow-Berlin axis." 37 […] Military co-operation with Germany must be made closer. The worst military problems facing the future superpower are the border areas, the rimland, which the Atlantic powers are striving to get under their control in order to weaken the Moscowled mainland. Moscow has to take a firmer grip of the rimland area. […] Russia's only proper form of government is imperial. 38 slams-Finland-for-separating-mother-and-new-born-baby/]. A prominent role on the Russian side is played by Dr. Pavel A. Astakhov, Children's Rights Commissar for the President of the Russian Federation. He graduated from the Faculty of Law, Dzerzhinski KGB Higher School in 1991 [http://english.rfdeti.ru/content.php?id=12] . 36 Laruelle, 2006 . See also Dugin, 2010. 37 Other important axes to thwart the power of the United States and China are according to Dugin the Moscow-Tokyo and Moscow-Tehran axes. See Dunlop, 2004 . 38 Juntunen, 2003 Giving up the process of empire-building is, in Dugin's world of values, the same as "national suicide." Without an empire, Russia "will disappear as a nation". 39 Indications of the impact of Dugin's thinking came as early as October 1995 when INOBIS (Институт оборонных исследований, ИНОБИС), a semiofficial defence research institute close to Russia's power ministries, published an outspoken report which outlined the external threats to Russia's national security and possible countermeasures. 40 "The chief aim of the US and Western policy toward Russia is not to allow her to become an economically, politically, and militarily influential force and to turn the post-Soviet space into an economic and political appendage to the West, as well as its mineral-rich colony.That is why the United States and its allies are the sources of the major external threats to this country's national security and should be regarded as the main potential adversaries of the Russian Federation, political, and military affairs," states the INOBIS report dated October 26, 1995. In Dugin's vision, Germany and Russia would again divide Europe into spheres of influence. Germany would get Europe's Protestant and Catholic areas, but not Finland. Nevertheless, Europe's division into spheres of influence with Germany would not be Russia's final goal, but rather the "finlandisation of all of Europe". According to Dugin, Finland belongs to the Karelian-Finnish geopolitical zone, which is culturally and in part economically unified, but forms a strategic support for a Eurasian center [i.e. Moscow] […] As a state, Finland is very unstable, since it belongs naturally and historically to Russia's geopolitical sphere. 41 Russia's Minister of Culture, Vladimir Medinsky echoed these same sentiments at the 6 th Finno-Ugric Peoples World Congress in Siófok, Hungary on 5 September 2012. 42 39 Dugin, 1997, p. 197 and 251 . See also Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA), 2011. The well-known U.S. Russia expert, Professor Stephen J. Blank expressed essentially the same interpretation as Dugin in Helsinki in November 2011: "The logic of European integration represents in itself a threat to Russia's empire mindset.Also the values the EU represents are seen as threatening in Russia." 40 The Institute of Defence Studies (INOBIS), 1995. The supporters of the INOBIS institute included among others the General Staff, military industrial enterprises and the Ministry of Atomic Energy. See also Staar, 1996. Colonel (ret.) , Dr. Richard Staar was the Head of the U.S. Delegation to the negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) in Vienna 1981-1983. 41 Dugin, 1997, p. 316 . See also Koivisto, 2001 , p. 292. 42 Mallinen, 2012 In the presence of Finnish President Sauli Niinistö and Estonian President Tomas Hendrik Ilves, Russia's Minister of Culture Vladimir Medinsky said that the Dugin's suggested means for achieving Russia's sovereignty over Eurasia were not primarily military, but he favoured a more subtle program which also included subversive activities in the target countries and undermining their stability through the use of disinformation. In addition, Russia's gas, oil, and other natural products were to be used as a harsh means of pressuring and bending other countries to the will of Russia. The same was already proposed in the INOBIS report. According to Dugin, one should not even fear resorting to war, but it would be better if one could achieve the goals without the use of force: It is vitally important for Russia to prevent Western oil companies from illegally developing resources off the Caspian Sea shelf…Russia must...take practical steps and even use force if necessary to prevent any activity related to oil production by foreign companies in the former Soviet space. 43 Later developments, such as the war in Georgia and the continued pressure on that country, 44 clearly show that Dugin's basic ideas are significant and enjoy far-reaching support. 45 Russia has also succeeded in keeping central Asian states which are rich in hydrocarbons quite well in her grasp and has gained agreements advantageous to her from Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan. 46 Prime Minister Putin's initiative in October 2011 to establish a Eurasian Union fits Dugin's vision well. 47 Russia's preferred solution to the European missile defence problem -Finno-Ugric world is an inseparable part of the Russian world and that Russia will not repeat the multicultural mistakes that have been done in Europe. He went on to remind the Finns that Finland as a nation had survived only as a result of Russia's goodwill, and ended his speech by quoting Czar Alexander I, who speaking to a French visitor referred to a motley group of Finns, Tatars and Georgians as "all being my Russians". After this event Minister Medinsky went to Pskov to participate in the founding of the Izborsky Club for conservative patriots. See e.g. Samarina, 2012; Newsru.com, 8 September 2012, "Мединский все-таки приехал в "Изборский клуб" патриотов и выступил с заявлением" [http://www. newsru.com/arch/russia/08sep2012/medinsky.html]. 43 Dunlop, 2004 ; Международное Евразийское Движение (Mezhdunarodnoe Evraziiskoe dvizhenie), 5 February 2009, "Dugin: Russia should consider war to head off the Nabucco project, 'Today's Zaman'" [http://evrazia.info/modules.php?name=News& file=article&sid=4190]. 44 Antidze, 2011. The following source is a good example of how Dugin's teachings are put to practice: Umland, 2008 . 45 Dugin became a mystic later. See Laruelle, 2006. 46 See Juntunen, 2013, p. 81 . Professor Alpo Juntunen points out that the main problem of the Central Asian states is their dependence on Russia's energy industry and the transport routes that it controls. See also Juntunen, 2003. 47 Izvestia, 4 October 2011, "A New Integration Project for Eurasia: The Future in the Making (Putin, Vladimir) [http://www.rusemb.org.uk/press/246].According to Prime Minister Putin: "A crucial integration project, the Common Economic Space of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan dividing the area to be defended and responsibility for defence into separate sectors -reflects Dugin's geopolitical thinking. The construction of the Nord Stream gas pipeline in the Baltic Sea partially serves the same goal. Poland and the Baltic States have strongly opposed the construction of the pipe for reasons of economics and political security. 48 (CES), will kick off on January 1, 2012. This project is, without exaggeration, a historic milestone for all three countries and for the broader post-Soviet space."See also Marin, 2011 and FIIA, 2011.Stephen J Blank's summary in Helsinki, 8 November 2011: "The Eurasian Union is a reflection of Russia's empire mindset and there is nothing dramatically new in it. It is an integration project based on the primacy of Russia and Russia's interests at the expense of the sovereignty of the smaller post-Soviet states in the region."See also STRATFOR, 2011, "Russia, Belarus: Setting the Stage for the Eurasian Union", 25 November 2011.According to STRATFOR: "Russia used Belarus' financial hardship as an opportunity to assert itself, raising export duties on key goods in order to pressure Minsk at a time of weakness. Belarus eventually sold many of its strategic assets to Russia in order to get what Minsk wanted the whole time -economic and financial concessions, primarily in the form of lower natural gas prices. […] Lukashenko has voiced his support for Putin's Eurasian Union, calling for the union's formation to be moved up to 2013 (though Russia has preferred to stick to the original 2015 target date)." 48 Peltomäki, 2011 ."The Poles believed that the purpose of Nord Stream is to make it easier for Russia to use the threat of a cut-off of natural energy supplies as leverage against Poland and other East European countries. In principle, Nord Stream makes it possible for Russia to cut off supplies to East Europe, as it One can also view the warm period of relationship between Russia and Germany during the last decade in the light of history. U.S. history professor emeritus and former diplomat Albert Weeks emphasizes: "In the present post-communist era in Russia, Moscow's ties with Germany can be described as stronger than those with any other state." 49 The co-operation between these countries is extending strongly also into the military sphere, 50 which has caused uneasiness especially among the new NATO member states. Germany is known to have opposed NATO contingency planning for the defence of the Baltic States. 51 Germany's strivings for great power status, however, does not find popular political support and Germany is not ready to assume security political leadership in Europe. 52 That German position suits Russia perfectly. For a long time, the NATO enlargement has been a sore spot for Russia. The writers of the INOBIS report already considered the enlargement of NATO and especially the possibility of Baltic NATO membership so dangerous that Russia should have prepared to occupy those countries. Russia did not, however, resort to such extreme measures, but the so-called Bronze warrior dispute and especially the war in Georgia in August of 2008 demonstrated that Russia was prepared to take stern measures when necessary. "If we had wavered in 2008, the geopolitical layout would have been different; a range of countries which the North Atlantic [Treaty Organization] tries to artificially 'protect' would have been within it", President Medvedev said in November 2011. 53 did during the "gas war" of 2009 with Ukraine. The undersea pipeline makes this possible without interrupting sales to the lucrative West European market." 49 Weeks, 2011, p. 50 The Baltic States could be occupied without any risk, and "Russia has all legal and moral rights to invade the Baltics. …Analysis shows that no one in the West is going to fight with Russia over [these countries]", the INOBIS analysts concluded.This assessment is probably still relevant, and it raises the question of the difficult problems of defending the Baltic countries.54 The enlargement of the Atlantic Alliance since the early 1990s has been primarily a political process.Its military dimension has been secondary.In the background of Russia's stiff opposition is the knowledge that countries which have joined NATO may have slipped permanently from Russia's grip.For these reasons alone, "NATO expansion should be kept at bay with an iron fist." 55 Russia's former Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev wrote in the Newsweek magazine (February 10, 1997) that "the Russian people must be told the truth, and the truth is, NATO is not our enemy." 56 The contrast between the views of Kozyrev and those of the current Russian leadership is great.57 According to a Wikileaks report published in the Norwegian daily Aftenposten on December 17, 2009, Vladimir Putin allegedly told NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen that NATO no longer has a purpose and it was in Russia's interest that NATO no longer exists.58 The director of the Carnegie Moscow Institute, Dr. Dmitri Trenin, wrote in late November 2011 that "The Russians … persist in seeing the United States through the old Soviet prism of a superpower confrontation." 59 President Putin returned to this topic on 5 October 2012, when visiting the Russian 201 st Military Base in Tajikistan: I believe that NATO, which was formed during the Cold War, has long ago lost its primary function and it is unclear why it exists today.There is no more confrontation between two political systems since there are no two systems any longer and no Warsaw Pact, which one way or another was NATO's rival.So it is unclear why NATO exists to this day.I think it is largely a throwback to the Cold War.But the existence of this military bloc is a geopolitical reality which we must take into account.60 At the Istanbul summit in 1999, the OSCE member states, including Russia, approved the Charter for European Security (in The Istanbul Document).61 The following quote is worth mentioning: We affirm the inherent right of each and every participating State to be free to choose or change its security arrangements, including treaties of alliance as they evolve.[…] Within the OSCE no State, group of States, or organization can have pre-eminent responsibility for maintaining peace and stability in the OSCE area, or can consider any part of the OSCE area as its sphere of influence.62 This principle was already written in the NATO-Russia Founding Act signed in Paris on May 27, 1997.63 Russia compared this document to the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 and emphasized its binding nature.64 In the Founding Act, NATO and Russia […] shared the commitment to respect the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of all states, and their inherent right to choose the means to ensure their own security, the inviolability of borders, and the people's right of self-determination as enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act and in other OSCE documents.65 Since then Russia's spheres of influence thinking has only become stronger.She has taken the initiative to replace the Paris Charter and the Istanbul Document with a new "Helsinki Plus" agreement, which would better serve her geopolitical aspirations.66 In March 2011, the prestigious Russian Valdai Club, led by Professor Sergey Karaganov, published a report about the development of the relationship between Russia and the United States.The report proposes that, as a precondition for talks concerning non-strategic (tactical) nuclear weapons, the demands of the Istanbul Document and the so called flank rules of the CFE Treaty should be lifted.67 The summary of Europe's geopolitical development in the last few decades presented above demonstrates that the situation with regard to international security may not have changed as fundamentally as is generally believed.It also serves as a foundation for a more thorough assessment of Russia's military-political development.NOBIS published a report on Russia's military reform and security in 1996.68 The "strategy of neutralizing external threats and assuring the national survival of the Russian Federation" recommended by the writers of the INOBIS report contained forceful stands and concrete measures.According to the report, the role of the armed forces is so central to Russia that she should not participate in one-sided arms reductions.This is especially relevant to nuclear weapons."Russia's nuclear potential is one of the few arguments that can [still] convince the West."It is necessary to develop the strategic nuclear forces (SNF) with determination.Tactical nuclear weapons should become the backbone of Russia's defence capability in all three European theatres, i.e. in the Polish, Baltic Sea, and northern directions, and the southern Black Sea direction (Crimea, Abkhazia, Georgia, and Armenia).This would be even more important after Poland, Hungary, and the former Czechoslovakia became NATO members.69 The deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in Kaliningrad and on some of the ships of the Baltic Fleet was considered crucial.70 Dr. Alexander Pikayev, a well-known expert on nuclear weapons, wrote in the Moscow Carnegie Institute report as follows: The issue of TNWs in Europe became more acute after the Baltic States joined NATO.The buffer dividing Russia from NATO vanished, the Kaliningrad Oblast was surrounded by NATO member states' territory, and the Baltic States are only a short distance from Moscow, and even closer to St Petersburg.The small depth of defence, very short flight time for missiles and attack aviation if deployed in Latvia and Estonia, and the sizable overall imbalance in NATO's favour in conventional weapons and armed forces have inevitably increased Russian interest in NSNW's [non- 68 Dementyev & Surikov, 1996. 69 Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia became NATO member states on March 12, 1999, i .e. more than three years after the publication of the INOBIS article. 70 The recommendation of the INOBIS report was adopted in practice. There have been tactical nuclear weapons in Kaliningrad at least from the beginning of the 21 st century. Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt pointed out in August 2008: "There are nuclear weapons in Kaliningrad, which are integrated into Russia's Baltic Fleet. That has been the case for a period now, and we have also noticed that they perform exercises which include nuclear weapons" (Bildt, 2008) . See also Forss, 2001 ; Forss, 2001a and Burt, 2012. I strategic nuclear weapons] as a means of neutralizing the West's numerical, geostrategic and operational superiority.[...] So far, NATO's eastward expansion has not been accompanied by the deployment of nuclear weapons and the most destabilizing nuclear weapons delivery systems on the soil of the new member states.Brussels has observed the provisions of the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, which clearly states that NATO does not plan to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new member states.This document is not legally binding, but it continues to have important political significance as a factor contributing to security.71 Strategic parity in nuclear weapons with the United States still remains the cornerstone of Russian military doctrine.In tactical nuclear weapons, Russia has overwhelming superiority, even though their deployed numbers may be lower than earlier anticipated.72 The notion of nuclear first-use seems to have remained part of the doctrine, although it is not stated publicly.73 Large exercises like West-1999 and West-2009 [Zapad-1999 in the Baltic Sea area and Vostok-2010 [East-2010] in the Far East have ended with the simulated use of tactical nuclear weapons in situations where conventional forces alone were deemed insufficient.74 In Russia, both her position and her military capability are assessed primarily in relation to the United States, NATO and China.75 The USA, which has for long enjoyed military-technological superiority, is in a period of deep economic and fiscal problems.Expenditures, including those for defence, have to 71 Pikayev, 2009, p.be reduced markedly.76 She strives increasingly to stay out of those conflicts which do not directly affect her most important national interests.The Libyan conflict in the spring of 2011 is a good example of this.For its part, the Chinese economy has continued its strong growth, and the country is developing its military capability with clear objectives and increasing budgetary support.77 After the Cold War, the focus of attention of the United States has gradually shifted almost entirely from Europe to Asia and the Middle East.This opens new possibilities for Russia in Europe.78 Russia strives to deal with the European states and also to pursue projects on a bilateral basis, which undermines the cohesion of both NATO and the European Union.79 After making certain concessions regarding Afghanistan, Russia may strive to get assurances from NATO to show restraint, for example in its Baltic policy.80 This kind of development would be worrisome at least to those small countries which have sought security from NATO and the U.S. against possible pressure from Russia.The so-called Visegrad countries, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia have in this respect arrived at their own conclusion.On May12, 2011, they decided to establish a combat unit (brigade) with Poland as the lead country.81 This measure may be viewed as these countries' distrust in the ability and willingness of NATO and the US to provide sufficient security.In a report published by Russia's Academy of Military Sciences, its president, Army General Makhmut A. Gareev, writes that Russia in the coming years will have to prepare itself for powerful geopolitical challenges and even threats rising from two directions, especially from the U.S. but also from China.83 76 Substantial defence expenditure savings will materialize when the US withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan are concluded, but traditional Pentagon activities, such as procurement programs will be subject to major cuts.See IISS The Military Balance 2012.77 Ibid.78 Clinton, 2011 .See also Fluornoy, 2011.79 Daalder, 2011.80 Ibid.See also Felgenhauer, 2010a.81 83 Bridge, 2011.Gareev compares a potentially threatening situation with the "Troubled times" (B смутное время) of 1598-1613, when Russia had to face both famine and foreign invasion forces.See also Karaganov (ed.), 2011a, p. 31: "Last but not least, Russia needs tactical nuclear weapons to avert the rise of fears over the «Chinese threat» in the future."Russia may end up encircled in East-West pincers, and the task for planners is to find a solution for the problem in view.Although NATO considers Russia a partner, Russia, according to her new military doctrine that came into force in February of 2010, still considers NATO one of the main dangers, if no longer officially a threat.84 The enlargement of NATO and the possible arrival of U.S. troops in areas near Russia are also viewed as threats.85 Territorial claims to Russia, the use of military force in the vicinity of Russia, and international terrorism are presented as other threats.Russia is especially sensitive about the plans to deploy elements of the US missile defence system in areas of the former Warsaw Pact countries, in spite of US/NATO assurances that the missile defence is not aimed at Russia and assessments of leading Russian missile experts stating clearly that Russia's nu- 84 President of Russia, 2010.President Medvedev: "It is not about our military doctrine, but about the never-ending enlargement of NATO through absorbing the countries that used to be part of the Soviet Union or happen to be our closest neighbours, such as Romania and Bulgaria. This is the threat. NATO is a military alliance which has expanded itself right to our borders. Our Armed Forces should therefore be ready to accomplish their missions in light of the changes we have seen."See also Felgenhauer, 2010.Nikolai Patrushev, Secretary of the National Security Council and former Head of the FSB: "It is a consensus opinion of all who worked on the military doctrine that NATO threatens us and seriously." 85 Deryabin, 2009 and Russia Today, 5 February 2010, "Russia's New Military Doctrine Approved" [http://rt.com/usa/news/ russia-military-doctrine-approved/].clear deterrent is not endangered.86 Russia's primary response to U.S. initiatives regarding co-operation on missile defence has been a proposal to divide the areas to be defended into sectors, for the defence of which one of the partners would be responsible.NATO has opposed this idea steadfastly, as well as Russia's demand for a single missile defence agency to be formed together.87 Despite NATO's official optimism, possibilities of the US and Russia coming to an understanding about the missile defence plan, does not look promising.The politically infected issue has wound up in a difficult political deadlock, with Russia threatening to resort to strong asymmetric countermeasures against bordering states in Europe.88 Given the disparate level of missile defence technology and capabilities in the United States and Russia, and considering military operational factors, it would be most difficult to create an integrated and interoperable missile defence system that would satisfy both parties.89 In Russia's military doctrine, precision weapons and space-based systems play an essential role.Their strategic significance is considered so important that they should be regarded as being strategic weapons.In doctrines, cyber warfare capability plays an increasingly important role in our present online interactive world.At the same time it has become a lasting threat.Cyber operations are carried out daily all over the world.Paralyzing of societal infrastructure, electric power production, information, business, transportation and logistics networks, and, on the other hand, the repulsion of attacks on them are a part of modern warfare.Actual military strikes are to be carried out simultaneously with cyber-attacks or separately to ensure that the desired results in case the cyber-attacks and other paralyzing actions have failed.Before turning to Russian military organizational changes it may be prudent to remind of the four stages of armed conflict defined in Russia's military doctrine adopted in 2010, i.e. armed conflict, local war, regional war and largescale war.90 Russia's new territorial defence structure, the so called Operational-Strategic Commands (Oбъединённое стратегическое командованиe) and their respective command and control systems, came into force on December 1, 2010.These four new commands replaced the former six military districts.All other forces belonging to the so called power ministries would be subordinated to these commands, at least in times of crisis.The forces of the former Leningrad and Moscow military districts, the Northern and Baltic Fleets (with the exception of strategic missile-carrying submarines), and the 1 st Air Force and Air Defence Command (1 Командование ВВС и ПВО) are subordinated to the Joint Western Command (Western Military District).Its headquarters is located in St. Petersburg.91 The new command structure was already tested in the large-scale military exercises in 2009.The different services are still in charge of developing training and improving war materiel.The Naval headquarters moved from Moscow to St. Petersburg in October 2012.92 Chief of General Staff, Army General Nikolai Makarov commented on the effects of the reorganization in a speech in Helsinki in June 2012.He pointed out that joint command of army, navy, air force and air defence units resulted in a qualitative improvement of combat capability in all military districts.Less reaction time is needed in crisis situations.At the same time the strike force of the military districts increased and ambiguities concerning command authority were removed.93 The defence reorganization in Russia can be seen as a long-term security policy reaction to the major geopolitical changes that have already occurred, when NATO members are now her bordering neighbours.At the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union, Finland was perhaps regarded "neutral." 94 With Russia's gradual recovery from 2000 on, Finland is probably now regarded as a virtual NATO member state.On a lower diplomatic level, Finland has been warned that NATO membership would trigger countermeasures.95 At the same time, the economic significance of Russia's north-western area is clearly rising.In northern waters there are large natural reserves.Along with climate warming, the northern sea routes seem to be taking on a larger role.It is quite probable that the competition for influence in the arctic areas will grow.Russia views the Arctic in very different terms from all other littoral and nearby states, and takes any "foreign" interest in the area as an indication of hostile intent which may require a securitized response.96 In the Baltic Sea area, Russia has lost her former military superiority.At the same time the area is more important to her, because of the new Nord Stream gas pipeline and commercial traffic, especially oil transports.The significance of the St. Petersburg defensive zone and the entire north-western direction are emphasized in this new situation.97 An indication of how Russia assesses the importance of the various regions of the country can be obtained by comparing the regional distribution of her armed forces units.There are about 100 brigades in permanent readiness, 36 of which are deployed in Western MD, 26 in Eastern MD, 23 in Southern MD and 15 in Central MD.Airborne troops, naval infantry, coastal missile brigades and contingents abroad are often omitted in western and some Russian assessments.98 94 The Soviet Union finally recognized Finnish neutrality during President Mikhail Gorbachev's official state visit in Finland in 25-27 October, 1989.95 Kozin, 2007 .According to several Finnish and other sources, Dr. Kozin acted on direct orders from Moscow, and expressed this view in no unclear terms, both in the seminar and later in interviews on the major Finnish TV Channels YLE and MTV3; МИНИСТЕРСТВО ИНОСТРАННЫХ ДЕЛ РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ, ФИНЛЯНДСКАЯ РЕСПУБЛИКА (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation), 7 November 2011.The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation noted on its homepage in November 2011, that Finland is not excluding the possibility of joining NATO in the event of changes in the geopolitical situation and that the Defence Forces of Finland, as far as technical and organizational relationships are concerned, is fully compatible with NATO standards.96 Smith & Giles, 2007.97 Mukhin, 2009.98 See Annex 2.See also Barabanov (ed.) , 2011 as well as Vendil Pallin, 2012a and Warfare.be.The regional distribution of armed forces units certified to employ nonstrategic nuclear weapons is another good indication.Half of the active depots are in the Western MD, supporting more than twenty dual-capable units.99 Twelve of these are located in the Kola and in the neighbourhood of St. Petersburg and in Kaliningrad.The Central European direction is probably not as militarily significant to Russia as it was previously.Therefore the military centre of gravity in the new Western MD -not to be misinterpreted as the national military centre of gravity -seems to have been shifted to the northwest, perhaps as a preventive measure.100 An indication of this is the deployment of the first Iskander missile brigade in Luga.In the worst case scenario of the Cold War, the massive ballistic and cruise missile attack on Russia would have come from the north and northwest and some of the missile trajectories could have passed over Finnish territory.For NATO the Baltic Sea has become almost an inland sea.Only the Kaliningrad enclave has remained as an isle from which Russia can negate the other It is evident that Russia needs in the western direction small, efficient and flexible strike units in a high state of readiness, and which can be quickly reinforced when necessary."The nature of threats has become such that operations on a regional scale can start suddenly", the Chief of the General Staff, Army General Nikolai Makarov said on November 17, 2011.103 Behind this assessment it is possible to discern the thoughts of one of Russia's most prestigious military thinkers, Army General (ret.) Makhmut Gareev, president of the Academy of War Sciences.He strongly doubts the credibility of tactical nuclear weapons as general-purpose weapons in local conflicts.Russia's experiences of war, he thinks it is time to assess the merits of the decisive importance not only of the initial period of war, but above all the first strategic strike."More aggressive actions may be needed and pre-emptive actions as well, if necessary." 104 The Commander of Russia's Ground Forces Col. Gen. Vladimir Chirkin stated in July 2012 that Russia will form 26 additional brigades by 2020, including 10 reconnaissance brigades, 14 army aviation and two air defence brigades.105 On the other hand, large reserves are needed in the direction of China.President Medvedev announced in April of 2011, that Russia has to retain general conscription for 10-15 years.106 Russia is also preparing for the most extreme alternative, a large-scale war.107 Minister of Defence Anatoly Serdyukov repeated in October 2012, that Russia will not do away with the draft any time soon."An entirely professional army is optimal in my view," he said."But we cannot afford it for the foreseeable future," adding that for now the armed forces will include a mix of professionals serving under enlistment contracts and draftees.108 Mr. Serdyukov's dismissal in November 2012 supports the view that powerful circles in Russia that have not been happy with the concept of a small "New Look" Army, succeeded to limit it.Mr. Serdyukov's successor, Army General Sergei Shoigu has clearly changed direction.109 The end result of the Russian defence reform seems to be a mix of modern and more traditional armed forces, with a sufficiently large trained reserve.The recruiting of contract soldiers is one of the central factors in the process of improving capability, but at present it has not produced the desired result.The lack of trained non-commissioned officers is a problem.Therefore readiness and combat capability have not yet risen to the planned high level.110 General Makarov, however, reported that all units and formations in the category of permanent readiness have been reinforced to full combat strength.These units are to be ready to execute combat operations within one hour after receiving orders.111 In practice, however, it is evident that 'permanent readiness' brigades will not appear as originally planned, to be able to maintain daily readiness at full strength.Rather there will be combat units of battalion strength in permanent readiness.112 Colonel General Valery Gerasimov, successor to Army General Nikolai Makarov as Chief of the General Staff, pointed out in January 2013 that "no one rules out the possibility of a major war, and it cannot be said that we are unprepared".113 In 2008, the period of conscript service was reduced from two years to one.According to announcements made in the spring of 2011, the earlier goal of over 550 000 draftees annually was reduced to 400 000.114 The call-up in fall 2011, less than 136 000 men, was not encouraging and this raises doubts as to the possibilities to reach stated goals.115 If the modernized armed forces can pool up 300 000 conscripts annually, a challenging goal, the system will produce even in the future a reserve of several millions of trained reservists under the age of 35.A report published by the prestigious Valdai Club in July 2012, states: Thus, by the end of 2011 it is assumed that the million-strong army will consist of 220 000 officers, 425 000 contract soldiers, and 350 000 conscripts.The latter figure is much more realistic compared to the previously planned 700 000.However, it remains to be seen whether the Defense Ministry will be able to assemble a 400 000strong corps of contract personnel.116 Because of the military organizational changes, the current conscript service crisis in the Russian Armed Forces and the negative demographic develop- 111 The ambitious aim is to improve combat readiness for the frontline units to just 1−2 hours after given orders.; IHS Jane's World Armies, 15 November 2012, "Russian Federation."Jane's World Armies estimated in November 2012 that the majority of the Airborne Forces can be deployed within 12 hours while the bulk of the Ground Forces should be operational within 24 to 48 hours, albeit in many cases with 20−40 percent deficit in vehicles.See also Litovkin, 2010 and Estinko, 2010.112 McDermott, 2012.113 Litovkin, 2013; RIA Novosti, 26 January 2013, "Russia's Forces Are Ready for War -Army Chief" [http://en.rian.ru/mili-tary_news/20130126/179040460/Russias-Forces-Are-Ready-for-War-Army-Chief.html].114 Felgenhauer, 2011.115 Carlsson & Norberg, 2012, pp. 102−03 .See also Russian Defence Policy, 6 January 2012, "No One to Call (Part I)" [http://russiandefpolicy.wordpress.com/2012/01/06/noone-to-call-part-i/].The number of conscripted young men during 2011 was altogether 354,570, according to Russian Ministry of Defence.It is too early to tell if the steep decline in conscription figures in the fall of 2011 will prove to be permanent.According to official Russian census figures there should be about two million young men of 18−19 year's age, but some 800 000 seem to be able to evade conscription service without legally acceptable reasons.116 Barabanov, Makienko & Pukhov, 2012, p. 28 ment, it is uncertain if the stated goals will be achieved.117 The trained reserve in 2011 may in theory be 8 million, but the real figure is probably significantly lower, perhaps two million, because of lack of refresher training and equipment.118 Some clarification was given by Chief of General Staff, Army General Nikolai Makarov in November 2011: "We have a mobilization reserve of 700 000 men, we have brigades that may be put on war footing. Practically the entire mobilization reserve of the Army consists of conscripts." 119 One major problem not to be omitted seems to be the mobilization system itself, largely inherited from Soviet times and not very well adapted to the new defence structure.120 A sign of improvement is the mobilization of 4 000 reservists in the vicinity of Petrozavodsk, Karelia, where the 216 th Storage and Repair Depot is located, facilitating the first exercise of a fully manned Motorized Infantry Brigade since 1993.The exercise was held 13-30 September 2012.121 Russia has reduced her peacetime armed forces.After the difficult economic years, the country has accordingly increased her defence spending.This trend also grows stronger.122 The starting level was indeed low, but even after taking inflation corrections into account, the annual growth of the defence budget has been 10 to 15 percent.In 2011 the share of defence expenditures in the national budget exceeded 20 percent.123 President Medvedev stated in March 2011, that the money spent on defence (including military-related spending of the other power ministries) would rise to 4.5 percent of GDP in 2012.124 The actual outcome for 2012 will be slightly higher and since the planned defence expenditure growth for 2013−2015 is expected to be at approximately 12 cent annually, spending has now reached a level that is generating strains on the budget and could prove unsustainable, especially if another round of crisis were to afflict the global economy.125 As the State rearmament program for 2007−2015 had encountered serious problems from the very beginning, President Medvedev stated in March 2010 that a new and far more ambitious programme for 2011−2020 would be announced later that year.126 The first figure mentioned for funding of the armament program was 13 trillion roubles.Defence Minister Serdyukov disclosed in September 2010 that the figure would rise to 19 trillion roubles (approximately 500 billion euros).127 In an interview, Serdyukov said: This is the minimum we need to equip our armed forces with modern weaponry.We could ask for a bigger number, but we need to understand that the budget cannot afford such spending, so 19 trillion is a serious amount of money that will provide considerable orders for our defense industry.When funding for refurbishment of the worn out defence industry infrastructure is included, the sums rise even higher.Prime Minister Putin declared in March 2011: I'd like to remind you that we plan to allocate over 20 trillion roubles for this current programme through 2020, which is three times more than we allocated towards the previous one.These are very substantial funds, and as you can understand, they will have to come at the expense of other areas.But I believe that we are justified in investing in the defence industry inasmuch as it is by nature a high-tech industry.128 Russia's Minister of Finance, Alexey Kudrin, who opposed high defence expenditure, was dismissed in late September 2011.129 125 Mukhin, 2012; Cooper, 2012.126 President of Russia, 2010b.127 Arkhipov & Pronina, 2010.Minister Serdyukov's remark hinted at a request for more than 30 trillion roubles that the generals had calculated would be needed to restore the armed forces.128 Government of the Russian Federation, 21 March 2011.See also Military Parade, 2(104), March/April 2011, "Modernization of Army -A Priority Objective", pp. 4-7, and "Defence Industry Pivotal Modernization -A Priority", pp. 8-9.The planned defence spending for 2011-2020 is equivalent to about 500 billion euros."The money is available, it is necessary to bring order", according to Medvedev We cannot allow ourselves to simultaneously have a very high level of social protection in a system built on paternalistic principles, at the same time a very large army, and at the same time a very large amount of state property conjointly with very low prices for energy resources within the country.… Choose one, two at most.130 Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin, also chairman of the Military-Industrial Commission said in September 2012 that from now on national defence spending must be 3.5 percent of GDP.131 This does not include the ca 1.5 percent military related other spending.The well-known expert on Russia's defence economy and industry, Professor Julian Cooper, wrote: It has become clear that President Putin and the Prime Minister, Dmitry Medvedev, are resolutely committed to the full implementation of [the State Armament Programme, Gosudarstvennaya Programma Vooruzheniya, GPV-2020] even if it requires a larger defence burden on the economy.132 Summing up, the position of the Russian leadership is clear.The rearmament program is in fact seen as a means to boost the growth of the entire Russian industry, the same way as in the 1930s.133 This may prove to be an illusion.If the national economy cannot sustain such an ambitious defence program, social programs will have to yield.If the acquisitions are realized, actual defence spending would increase substantially in coming years, perhaps as much as 50 [ percent. The greatest impact would be at the end of this decade. 134 Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin announced a detailed breakdown of the planned annual expenditure at the end of 2012. "The state defence order will reach about 1.9 trillion roubles next year [i.e. 2013], about 2.2 trillion in 2014 and 2.8 trillion in 2015", and is expected to stay at that level until the end of the decade.135 The official Russian plans regarding defence expenditure have been received with various degrees of scepticism in the west.The prognosis of the Russian defence economy until 2020, made by the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) using a range of realistic growth figures for the whole economy as well as for the defence budget, shows that the defence budget is likely to increase 50-100 per cent in real terms during this decade.136 Carrying out the armaments program, will not, however, be easy for Russia because of the severe crisis in the defence industry.The problems are largely systemic in nature, which adds to the difficulty of finding lasting solutions.Among the major problems are corruption 137 and flawed business management practices, excessive brain drain, Soviet-style inefficient production methods, obsolete production machinery and aging personnel.According to Professor Cooper, the defence industry has lost four million workers during the last 20 years -the present manpower figure is now about 1.5 million -and that the average age of workers is 55 to 60 years.The percentage of those under 30 is only 0.5 percent.138 Similar estimates are presented in the respected defence publication Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie (NVO).139 As an illustration of how the Russian leaders tackle the problems, President Medvedev demanded in May 2011 that the government present ideas for making investments in national defence more effective and the military to submit tenders without delay.Otherwise a number of weapons systems, vital for Russia would not be delivered, as was the case in 2009.140 Then, 30 strategic missiles, three nuclear submarines, five Iskander missile systems, 300 armored vehicles, 30 helicopters, and 28 combat aircraft were not delivered to the armed forces.134 Russia's Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov said that the situation had not really changed for the better.141 Responsible managers have been sacked, but that doesn't solve the systemic problems.Great efforts have, however, been made in order to improve the conditions of the defence industry.In October 2011 Prime Minister Putin reported on an additional financial input of 3 000 billion roubles (about 72 billion euros) to improve the industrial production base.142 According to Prime Minister Medvedev, Russia will pay special attention to the development of aircraft construction and shipbuilding, as well as the radio-electronic, space and nuclear industries in the next few years."The military-industrial complex will receive a serious impetus. It should become a source of technological innovation, both in the military and civilian sectors", Medvedev said on 31 January 2013.143 The defence industrial focus is, however, shifting from research and development to production, even though resources for research show growth in absolute terms.One may, perhaps, doubt the credibility of official announcements, which deal with the huge economic appropriations for materiel acquisition during the period until 2020.Nevertheless, one can expect that all armed forces in the Russian Federation will be substantially strengthened.144 In 2010, Russia still had over 20 000 main battle tanks (MBTs), a large number of them are older types and are in poor condition.Future needs were announced to be 10 000 MBTs.145 Of these, 4 500 are modernized T-80's and 600 new T-90 types.146 Some of the T-72 MBTs are being modernized.147 The MBT inventory and the trained reserves will make it possible in principle to establish of some 200 armoured and motorized infantry brigades.Mobilization on such a scale would, however, take many months to accomplish.During the war in Georgia in 2008, Russia operated mainly with older equipment and did not mobilise.After introducing the brigade organization in the Russian Army in 2009, forty armoured brigades and infantry brigades, capable of fighting independently ("combined-arms operations") were established.The task of these front-line units is to be in a high state of readiness (with a constant strength of 95 percent and full combat readiness).The armoured brigade has three tank battalions and a total of some one hundred heavy MBTs.The motorized infantry brigade has one reinforced tank battalion (41 heavy MBTs).Altogether these brigades have about 2 000 heavy MBT's.It is believed that less than half of these units were combat ready in 2010.148 Russia has maintained her strong artillery and the principle of massive artillery fire support.A major program to procure new guided rocket launchers and artillery systems was announced in November 2012.149 Russia's ground forces have about 24 000 artillery pieces, of which over 6 000 are self-propelled artillery vehicles and about 3 500 rocket launchers.150 In addition, naval infantry and coastal defence units have more than 700 artillery pieces of various types.151 Even border units, which do not belong to the armed forces, and Interior Ministry units have some artillery in their inventory.New types of combat aircraft of the Russian Air Force are, among others, the Su-34 fighter-bomber, the Su-35 multi-purpose strike fighter, and the T-50 PAK FA fifth-generation multi-purpose strike-fighter, which is planned to enter service in the second half of the decade.152 Russia's goal is to obtain by the year 2020 nearly 1 500 new or thoroughly refurbished aircraft of various types, including 600 combat aircraft, 1 000 helicopters, and some 200 new airdefence missile systems.153 Development of the Russian Navy is primarily focused on developing and producing nuclear ballistic missile-carrying strategic submarines and their missiles as well as nuclear attack submarines.154 It is important for Finland and her small neighbouring countries to observe Russia's remarkable input to return to her invasion capability.Russia will procure four large Mistral amphibious assault landing ships (LHD) from France.Two of them will be built in Russia.155 The Mistral LHDs can carry 16 helicopters, four landing craft, and an entire tank battalion, i.e. some 30 MBTs.In addition, five Ivan Gren type landing craft are being built in Kaliningrad.Each of them can transport 13 MBTs or 60 armoured personnel carriers (APCs).156 While obtaining new naval ships and dismantling older types, the total inventory may continue to decrease.Contrary to earlier practices, Russia also aims to purchase other types of modern military technology from the West.For example, Russia buys hundreds of recce/patrol vehicles from France and Italy, and an advanced ground forces combat simulator from Germany as well as UAVs from Israel.157 The change of leadership in the Russian military community as well as technical difficulties concerning hardware procurement from the West, have reversed the trend.Co-operation with the West is not longer regarded as attractive as a few years ago.158 Vladimir Putin explained his position on the rearmament program in the Russian government daily Rossiyskaya Gazeta in February 2012 as follows: I am convinced that no "pinpoint" purchasing of military hardware and equipment can be a substitute for the production of our own types of armaments, it can only serve as the basis for obtaining technologies and knowledge.Incidentally this has happened before in history.Let me remind you that the whole "family" of our country's tanks in the 1930s was produced on the basis of American and British machines.And then, using the experience accumulated, our specialists developed the T-34 -the best tank in World War II.[...] In the coming decade the troops will take delivery of more than 400 modern groundand sea-launched intercontinental ballistic missiles, eight strategic missile submarines, around 20 multi-role submarines, more than 50 surface warships, around 100 military satellites, more than 600 modern aircraft, including fifth-generation fighters, more than 1 000 helicopters, 28 S-400 regiment-level surface-to-air missile systems, 38 Vityaz division-level surface-to-air missile systems, ten brigade-level Iskander-M systems, more than 2 300 modern tanks, around 2 000 self-propelled artillery systems and cannon, and also more than 17 000 military vehicles.[...] The updating of the defense industry complex will be the locomotive that will pull the development of the most diverse sectors in its wake.159 The outcome of the rearmament program remains to be seen.160 Some Western experts point out that "the currently envisaged plans for military expenditure do not seem to be sustainable, even if the economic situation does not deteriorate".161 Interestingly enough, the high command of the Swedish Defence Forces, stated clearly in January 2013, that Russia's "modernisation of her defence equipment is proceeding well".162 Pushing the programme through with great determination may be possible, but it could be accomplished only by diverting funds from social programs, which could trigger unpopular reactions and social unrest.On the other hand Russia's increasing defence export should be mentioned.Annual revenue during 2011−2012 alone is exceeding 10 billion euro.163 The Director of the U.S. National Intelligence, Lt.Gen.James R. Clapper gave the following assessment of Russia's military capabilities in January 2012: Moscow is now setting its sights on long-term challenges of rearmament and professionalization.In 2010, Medvedev and Putin approved a 10-year procurement plan to replace 159 Putin, 2012.160 It is likely, that the next refinement of the State rearmament program will take place at about 2015, when GPV-2025 would be announced.Long-term programs with a timespan of ten years very seldom materialize as such anywhere in the world.161 Cooper, 2012a.162 Försvarsmakten kommenterar (The Defence Forces comments), 14 January 2013, Försvarsmaktens anförande i Sälen 2013: Kartan och verkligheten (The Defence force's presentation in Sälen 2013: The map vs. reality, Peter Sandwall) [http://blogg. forsvarsmakten.se/kommentar/2013/01/14/forsvarsmaktens-anforande-i-salen-2013/].The speech at the annual Swedish national security conference Folk och Försvar (Society & Defence) was to be delivered by Supreme Commander, General Sverker Göranson, but due to acute illness he was replaced with the Director General of the Swedish Defence Forces, Mr. Peter Sandwall.163 Cooper, 2012a.Soviet-era hardware and bolster deterrence with a balanced set of modern conventional, asymmetric, and nuclear capabilities.However, funding, bureaucratic, and cultural hurdles-coupled with the challenge of reinvigorating a military industrial base that deteriorated for more than a decade after the Soviet collapse-will complicate Russian efforts.[...] The reform and modernization programs will yield improvements that will allow the Russian military to more rapidly defeat its smaller neighbors and remain the dominant military force in the post-Soviet space, but will not-and are not intended to-enable Moscow to conduct sustained offensive operations against NATO collectively.In addition, the steep decline in conventional capabilities since the collapse of the Soviet Union has compelled Moscow to invest significant capital to modernize its conventional forces.At least until Russia's high precision conventional arms achieve practical operational utility, Moscow will embrace nuclear deterrence as the focal point of its defense planning, and it still views its nuclear forces as critical for ensuring Russian sovereignty and relevance on the world stage, and for offsetting its military weaknesses vis-à-vis potential opponents with stronger militaries.164 ussia's operational plans are naturally secret, but by analysing the background and decisions regarding defence policy, deployments of armed forces units, military exercises and literature, one can present some estimates.As outlined earlier and based upon her strategic decisions, Russia is developing those of her armed forces that are in their own garrisons capable for immediate action in different directions.According to the country's traditional military thinking, the aim is to keep warfare outside the homeland territory.In dimensioning the capacity of her own armed forces facing west, Russia assesses the capabilities of the United States and NATO.In Russian thinking, high combat readiness of forces is nothing new.For example, Soviet forces in East Germany were ready to start "defence battle" by immediate attack.This was told by Colonel General Matvei Burlakov (the former Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Forces in East Germany) in 2005.165 A high state of readiness is an exceptionally great advantage in offensive operations, especially if the troops can be ordered into action directly from basic readiness.The possibility for successful surprise to the detriment of the adversary is then most favourable, since the enemy's intelligence has not been able to detect anything very alarming, but mainly contradictory signals or signals difficult to interpret.It seems improbable that governments would make difficult and costly decisions for mobilization on such shaky grounds.Thus Russia's striving to reach a high degree of basic readiness is logical defence planning.After reaching such high readiness capability, the Russian armed forces' ability to achieve their military objectives even with limited resources must be deemed as being good.For the time being Russia seems only to have embarked on the road to such higher readiness.Lieutenant General Vladimir Shamanov, commander of the airborne forces suggested in 2009 that: It makes sense to move to a three-way troop training system.While one battalion is sending people on leave, the second is at some distant range, the third will be carrying out combat training at its place of deployment.… It is on combat duty.The events in South Ossetia have shown the necessity of maintaining a fist of 5-10 battalions which are always ready to fight.166 The President of the Academy of War Sciences, Army General Makhmut Gareev, pointed out in December 2009 that it is impossible in modern conditions to resist a massive first strike.It is crucially important to analyze not only the initial period of war, but primarily the first strategic assault."Therefore, as in the fight against terrorism, we need more offensive action, and, if necessary, pre-emptive action." 167 In 1996 Lieutenant General (ret.) Valery Dementyev, a defence analyst and military adviser to the Russian President, the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff, jointly with defence analyst Dr. (Tech.) Anton Surikov described in an exceptionally frank manner the characteristics of an operation similar to "strategic assault": In the first stage, aviation, special military intelligence (GRU) forces, and special Federal Security Services (FSB) and Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) groups carry out strikes for the purpose of destroying or seizing the most important enemy targets and eliminating the enemy's military and political leadership.Then Mobile Forces, with the support of army and frontline aviation and naval forces, crush and eliminate enemy forces and take over their territory.After that, subunits of Ground Forces and Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, RF, preferably with some combat experience, move in.They establish control of the most crucial locations and carry out "cleansing" of the territory.Then, with the help of militia formed out of the pro-Russian part of the local population, they establish control over the territory and ensure the elimination of nationalists and deportation of some categories of citizens from certain locations.It should be emphasized that until the end of the special operation, local authorities are needed only insofar as they are useful in supporting military control over the territory.168 Detailed information of Soviet military contingency plans for occupation of Helsinki, bearing a striking resemblance with the general outline for a strategic 166 Giles, 2012, p. 13.According to Keir Giles, "Five to ten battalions at real readiness may have greater value in the kind of future conflict envisaged by the Russian military than 85 brigades at theoretical readiness." 167 Miranovitsh, Gennady, 2009 .See also McDermott, 2011, pp. 67−68.This c o rresponds well with the traditional Russian defence doctrine of offensive defence.168 Dementyev & Surikov, 1996 .Dr. (Tech.) Anton Viktorovich Surikov (26 May 1961 -23 November 2009 was also a high-ranking officer in the military intelligence service GRU and served as adviser in the government of Yevgeny Primakov and as assistant to Yuri Maslyukov, Chairman of the Defence Industrial Commission.He died in rather murky circumstances at the age of 48 in November 2009.Surikov's biography can be found at: [http://www.peoples.ru/state/politics /anton_surikov/].assault described above, became public in June 2012.169 Evaluation of these plans became possible by analyzing very detailed military maps from 1989, made and successively updated by the Soviet Army General Staff.The Finnish interpretation of what Soviet Cold War contingency planning would have meant, if operations had been executed, can be summarized as follows: Central functions of the Finnish society were to be paralyzed, radio and TV stations knocked out, the Parliament, the Presidential palace and military command centres were to be seized rapidly.Road junctions, harbours, bus depots, railway and metro stations were to be captured, financial institutions, water supply and district heating shut down.The aggressor would strive to defeat any organized military resistance by a steady supply of airborne reinforcements as well as by forces landing from the sea.The general population's will to resist was expected to break down in a few days as hunger and thirst take command.The whole Finnish capital and its surroundings would be occupied and sealed off in a matter of a few days.Military operations are designed to not only defeat the enemy physically, but also to crush their morale, and not just of the troops but also of the people and the government.Factors such as the depth of support for the war among the general population play an increasingly important role and, accordingly, so does understanding and using culturally specific features of the enemy and his political system, including through exposure via the media.[...] The distinction between "civilian" and "military" segments of society is disappearing.The aim of a military campaign is to impact not only the enemy army, but also its society, understood in terms of its cultural as well as its physical aspects.This trend makes it necessary to conduct joint "civilian-military" operations, rather than purely military ones.170 If Russia's decision to extend her operations to enemy territory was made one month before execution, some brigades may be ready for deployment.If the decision is made, say, six months in advance, an additional force, roughly 20-30 brigades, could be ready for deployment.Forces available for deployment could be even more, if they are not bound to other directions.Concealment 169 Salonen, 2012.The existence of these valuable maps in Estonia became known at the time of the Soviet withdrawal from Estonia.Their destruction was averted and Finnish military historian Antero Uitto was later able to acquire them.It is interesting that the Soviet Union placed Finland squarely in the enemy camp, regardless of the FCMA Treaty between the countries, the cornerstone on which Finnish and Russian official political relations were built.170 Barabanov and deception ('maskirovka') are essential parts of activities.The amount of available units will of course be affected by the opponent's reaction as well as his readiness level, and by the role of possible allies and the general situation elsewhere.Neighbouring Countries In the light of history, Russia has had a tendency to consider all the areas she has once governed as "legitimate" spheres of interest.171 While seeking influence, she also sees threats everywhere.In the 1930s, the Soviet Union set as her goal to return her sphere of influence of 1914.In the 1920s, Finland was classified as "neutral", but in the next decade she had already become an "enemy state." 172 Finland became friendly only after the legally binding Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA) came into force in 1948.This period lasted for more than four decades.However, if Russia should decide to take action against the Baltic countries, the Finnish Defence Forces would probably be tied up, in order to prevent Finland from becoming a flank threat.The means of such actions could be threatening, various kinds of precision attacks, or even invasion.180 175 See cf.Chekinov and Bogdanov, 2010, p. 8 176 Finland lost about 10 percent of its territory and property to the Soviet Union in 1940 and 1944.Many Finns would want to buy back their former land property, build Summer houses etc.This has proved to be very difficult and Russia applies a far more restrictive policy towards Finns than the Finnish Government towards Russians buying property in Finland.177 Agrell, 2010, p. 235 (in Swedish) .Professor Wilhelm Agrell, well-known Swedish peace and conflict researcher, is of the same opinion as Russia, but with opposite arguments, that the credibility of the European security regime collapsed in the war in Georgia, at the latest.178 Студия "Альфа", г.Тверь, 7 August 2012, "Потерянный день" вся правда о Войне 08.08.08г.Puheloinen, 1999, pp. 50-51.180 When the Red Army executed its grand strategic assault in the Baltics in late summer 1944, the Soviet Union tied up the Finnish forces, which still held a considerable strike capability, at Ilomantsi in eastern Finland.The loss of two Red Army divisions was the price the Soviet Union was then ready to pay in order to avert the flank threat.The number of Russian forces in the former Leningrad Military District has changed significantly after the break-up of the Soviet Union.The units withdrawn from East Germany were first concentrated there.Then followed a huge reduction of troops.Now the trend has again been reversed.The headquarters of the 6 th Russian Army was stationed in Petrozavodsk.It is now located near Kasimovo, the "military village" built by the Finns for Russian helicopter units north of St. Petersburg.The headquarters appears to be in charge of the ground forces east and south-east of Finland.In building a capability for strategic assault operations, the Iskander missile brigade in Luga is of fundamental importance.By taking advantage of the opponent's low readiness, precision strikes by this brigade could be used together with air strikes to paralyze his defence.It is interesting to note that units from the 98 th Guards Airborne Division in Ivanovo, 400 kilometres north-east of Moscow, exercised in Luga in February 2012.185 An air assault division is active in the Pskov area, along with a 'Special Designation' (Spetsnaz) commando brigade.In Pechenga there is a motorized infantry brigade and a naval infantry brigade.These brigades are in full readiness (in hours).According to Colonel General Postnikov, then commander of the Russian Ground Forces, an arctic brigade composed of Spetsnaz troops, familiar with arctic conditions, would also be established in Pechenga.In February 2012 it became evident that the plans were postponed to 2015.186 Chief of General Staff, Army General Makarov assured in Helsinki on 5 June 2012 that Russia "has no intention of establishing any arctic brigades".187 Russia's statements are contradictory.The real outcome remains to be seen.The condition of the Alakurtti airbase, east of Salla, will be improved and a refurbished helicopter regiment will be stationed there.Its equipment will include attack helicopters and armed transport helicopters.Apparently, new helicopters are badly needed.188 A reserve motorized infantry brigade can be mobilized with equipment from the Alakurtti storage.The above-mentioned helicopter regiment will support this brigade.The depot in Petrozavodsk consists of equipment for one reserve brigade, which performed a mobilization and refresher training exercise in September 2012, thus proving its capability as a military unit not to be dismissed.189 A powerful early warning radar against strategic missile attack at Lekhtusi village, north of St. Petersburg has been completed.A new air surveillance radar station on Hogland Island is under construction.It will cover the entire air space over southern Finland, the Gulf of Finland and Estonia.All together the 1 st Air Force and Air Defence Command, the air force of the Northern and Baltic Fleets, have more than 200 combat aircraft of different types, more than 100 combat helicopters and a corresponding amount of armed transport helicopters and many special and transport planes of various kinds.Some other air force units use air bases in the area for forward staging purposes.190 The air force units can universally be quickly mobilized.They can be transferred in a short time from long distances to the desired areas.The Chief of General Staff, Army General Nikolai Makarov, declared in February 2011 that the Russian air force units are in permanent readiness and in full combat order.191 To clarify dimensions one may observe that the Finnish inventory of about 60 F/A-18 Hornet combat aircraft will even in the future primarily serve as interceptors.The situation will change somewhat, when they obtain air-to-ground capability after completion of their mid-life upgrade.192 The once formidable Swedish Air Force, one of the strongest air forces in Europe during the Cold War, has been allowed to diminish dramatically in capability.When the threat of massive invasion in the Baltic Sea area faded away, the major portion of squadrons were disbanded.This was also the case with most of Sweden's impressive road-base network, vital for wartime combat endurance.The numbers of both pilots and missiles available in the Swedish Air Force are thought to be modest."Our capability for air support of ground combat in a war situation is completely inadequate because of lack of suitable weapons", Major General (retd.) Karlis Neretnieks, the former Chief of Operations of the Swedish Defence Forces writes in "Friends in Need", published by the Royal Swedish Academy of Military Sciences in the spring of 2011.193 193 Neretnieks, 2011, p. 216 .This pessimistic assessment may be only partly true as the Swedish Air Force is equipped with various types of laser-guided Paveway bombs, Maverick missiles and Saab Rb15 anti-ship missiles.The Swedish Air Force has a limited tradition with regard to close air support (CAS), but has rather focused on air interdiction, striking against supply lines, etc., in the rear of the adversary, and air defence.See more Rydell, 2012.CONCLUSIONS FROM THE FINLAND'S POINT OF VIEW 6 .1 Alliances and Proclamations of Solidarity he major global geopolitical changes and deep economic problems of many countries have also affected Europe and the neighbourhood of Finland.The foundations of the European Union and NATO no longer appear as solid as at the turn of the century.The most important NATO and European Union member states have greatly reduced their defence spending.A profound difference of threat assessments can be found between old and new NATO member states.The strategic interest of the United States is increasingly focused towards the Asian direction.194 Russia is significantly increasing her defence expenditure, and also growing stronger militarily.The smaller countries are uncertain and confused as to how to organize their security.The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which was established primarily to protect the security of Western Europe against the Soviet threat, has been largely dismantled.Except for the integrated command and control system, NATO's armed forces have in practice been armed forces of sovereign member states, which have decided independently on how to use their forces.The political goals to guarantee the security of member countries have remained, although with the exception of the United States, the allies' military capability is questionable.The decision taken by the four Visegrad countries in May 2011 speaks for itself.The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually 194 Clinton, 2011.T and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.[…] Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council.Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.195 NATO's security clause is not unconditional, but the power to decide whether to give aid remains with the member states, who also decide on the quantity and quality of that aid.In addition, Article 5 is also directly coupled to the United Nations and especially to its security council, whose permanent members may theoretically complicate the application of NATO's Article 5.Swedish defence researcher Mike Winnerstig notes: In the end, NATO's Strategic Concept 2010 as well as NATO's Charter and Article 5, are mainly words on a piece of paper.How these articles will be applied in peacetime becomes a central question in assessing their credibility.196 NATO's significance as a guarantor of security is, above all, political in nature.The mere achievement of membership in a defence alliance was not "an objective or an accomplishment, but a logical step in a broadly based defence and security reform," Estonia's Defence Minister Mart Laar stated in April 2011.197 NATO is a security-political haven for new members, and it also imposes duties upon them.This is also the opinion of old member states, who do not consider the threat from Russia to be acute at all.It was already previously stated that Russia has no respect for the defence capabilities of individual European NATO members.On the other hand, Russia has a strong interest in trying to marginalize NATO as a political factor.As a member of the European Union, Finland has also approved the Lisbon Treaty's articles 1-42.7: If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States.The wording of the EU solidarity clause is noticeably more demanding than NATO's Article 5.The contradiction between the goals of solidarity and their credible application is also a question of resources.198 The EU does not have an independent military organisational structure, and NATO member states are committed to fulfil only their own obligations, albeit with a diminished capability as a result of significant military reductions and a lack of political cohesion.NATO has, however, to some extent returned to actual contingency planning.The EU's ability to react quickly to a serious security-political crisis in its own area or outside it is modest.A great majority, 21 EU member states are also NATO members and nearly 95 percent of all EU citizens live in NATO countries.These states oppose the creation of duplicate military organizations as a useless waste of resources, for the single purpose of meeting the needs of a small minority.Therefore, it is highly unlikely that EU's military-political weight will increase in the future.On the contrary, the EU's weakness in taking responsibility was revealed in an embarrassing way when the Libyan crisis erupted in spring 2011.It should be noted that the development of the EU's military capabilities, according to the Union's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), is exclusively directed towards crisis management operations, not waging war.Finland and Sweden have committed themselves to helping other EU countries, and Sweden, in addition, to assisting Nordic countries which are not EU member states, i.e. Norway and Iceland.Finland and Sweden themselves will decide upon the quantity and quality of the aid.The unilateral proclamation of solidarity issued by Sweden in 2009, has evoked vivid discussion.It was issued at a time when the country's capabilities to give significant military assistance had already declined sharply in the wake of Sweden's radical defence reform.199 The key passage of the solidarity proclamation states: A military conflict in our immediate region in which only one country alone is affected is virtually inconceivable.Sweden will not take a passive stance should another EU member state or Nordic country suffer a disaster or come under attack.We expect these countries to act in the same way if Sweden is similarly affected.Sweden should thus both extend and receive military support.200 198 Koivula & Forss, 2012, pp. 147-173.199 Rydell, 2011, pp. 55-57.The full manpower strength of the Swedish Armed Forces will be about 50 000, but only 15 700 in continuous service.See also Agrell, 2010, p. 235.The mention of an ability to give and receive military aid is also a way to make public the secret basic pillar of the country's defence policy during the Cold War; her extensive co-operation with the United States and NATO.201 While pondering the mutual solidarity declaration, the different defence solutions of Finland, Sweden and the other Nordic countries have been an obstacle to finding a binding security guarantee between them.The Finnish position has been that separate Nordic security guarantees are not trustworthy as such.Norway and Denmark, which enjoy NATO's security guarantees, cannot unilaterally add to NATO's burden by making promises which eventually may be left to the bigger NATO countries to carry.A very unfavourable situation for Finland would be one in which the Nordic countries would be left alone with their mutual solidarity commitments in a conflict between the great powers, as has sometimes happened in history.202 These political problems would not arise if all Nordic countries were NATO members.For small militarily non-aligned states like Finland, current changes in her neighbourhood create a condition of deepening insecurity.The Finnish white paper (Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2009) stated that "strong grounds exist for considering Finland's membership of NATO".203 No security guarantees, whether provided by organizations or states are, however, comprehensive but being left alone also has its risks.In the light of history, agreements have often been interpreted in a way that the interpreter considers beneficial from his own point of view.The basic security-political positions in the Nordic countries have been static for a long time.Some significant movement can, however, be noted as a result of geopolitical developments and fiscal austerity in Europe and the USA.These provide strong incentives for the Nordic countries to deepen their defence co-operation.It is still premature to consider binding security guarantees in one or another form, but there is a clear understanding that creating common capabilities will serve the Nordic interest.204 Recent examples of military intervention or crisis management suggest that 'coalitions of the willing' are often a more realistic alternative than full commitment of defence alliances such as NATO.Russia's position to Nordic defence co-operation (NORDEFCO) is negative.205 Closer Finnish co-operation with the United States in the field of defence might bring a substantial change in the current situation, with advantages and disadvantages alike.Thus, Finland has to build her defence relying primarily on her own resources without underestimating the significance of cooperation with other partners, such as the Nordic countries.Finland's national Defence Forces (FDF) exist above all for those unpredictable circumstances when Finland may have to face unacceptable demands, and all other security arrangements have failed.The guiding factors in deciding the future of the national defence forces are the tasks and demands on the FDF defined by the Finnish Government and Parliament.The Government report of 2009 stated inter alia the following with regard to the role of the FDF and military defence: The Defence Forces, pursuant to their statutory tasks, are employed in the military defence of Finland, in supporting the other authorities as well as in international military crisis management.[…] Finland prepares to repel the use of military force, or the threat thereof, against the nation.This highlights the importance of deterrence.The defence capability and readiness are scaled to correspond to the situation at hand.[…] In line with the comprehensive approach, it is necessary to estimate whether it is possible to carry out the required tasks with national capabilities alone.Should the capabilities prove inadequate, during normal conditions it is necessary to guarantee the reception of military and other assistance needed in a crisis situation.This can be achieved through close international cooperation or through being allied with others.206 The strength of Finland's peacetime defence forces is among the smallest in Europe, some 30 000.Especially in peacetime, the ground forces are essentially a training organization.Combat forces will have to be mobilized from the reserve.These comparisons are misleading, incomplete and slanted in which Finland's total wartime strength of 230 000 after full mobilization is compared to the strength of professional armies of countries with many times larger populations, smaller national territorial areas and a completely different geopolitical position.207 In discussions about professional armies, the focus is primarily on ground forces.For Finland a professional army is out of the question.Economic grounds alone rule out that alternative.This fact was once again established in September 2010 by the so-called Siilasmaa Committee, appointed by the Finnish Ministry of Defence.208 A professional army would be such an expensive solution that its actual size would inevitably be very small.As a new, low-pay profession, the professional soldier would not be an attractive alternative for young Finns to enlist, and the impact on the will of the Finns, which has remained exceptionally high for many decades, to defend their country could be disastrous.209 Participation in international military co-operation is natural.Doing so also serves Finland's own defence capability.Finnish reservists with versatile skills have proved to be useful in various tasks in international operations.Finland's resources are, however, sufficient only for a small contribution to the international crisis management (CM) activities, no matter how much harder we would strive to increase our share in CM operations.The primary task of the FDF remains the defence of the homeland.However, the cost-effective defence solution has its downside.Combat units, established from the reserve are most vulnerable at the moment of mobilization.Another significant fact is that peacetime readiness is so low that repelling a surprise attack may be difficult.210 207 Commander of the Finnish Defence Forces, 8 February 2012.208 Ministry of Defence (Finland), 2010, p. 7.According to the source, "General conscription is in our opinion the most cost-effective way to produce defence capability in Finland. The costs of even a very modest professional army would be significantly higher than that of the conscript army."The chairman of the committee, Mr. Risto Siilasmaa is the co-founder of the F-Secure Corporation and present chairman of the board of the Nokia Corporation.209 The will to defend their country is traditionally very high among the Finns.About 75 percent of the Finns regularly answer "yes" and about 20 percent "no" to the following question: "If Finland were attacked, should Finns, in your opinion, take up arms to defend themselves in all situations even if the outcome seemed uncertain?"See Ministry of Defence (Finland), The Advisory Board for Defence Information, 2009.210 In the Finnish Ground Forces there are perhaps only about a company of Special Jaegers ready to return fire immediately.The Finnish peacetime units are primarily training units, not fighting units.The readiness of the Finnish Air Force is considered good, but its peacetime inventory of combat missiles is very low, adequate only for training needs and surveillance flights.It is decisively important that the units mobilized are not eliminated with a few well-targeted strikes, and that they would be capable of fighting territorially dispersed after having survived the first blows.Sufficient endurance is needed and also for buying time to allow for counteractions of friends and allies even after surprise precision strikes.The Finnish defence community and the FDF contingency planning have to consider the significance of nearby foreign forces in a high state of permanent readiness.Sufficient reserves must be available in order to compensate for initial losses during the mobilization phase and those caused by enemy strikes as well as for personnel rejected due to deteriorated combat capability or for other reasons.If the trained reserve is only equal to the nominal mobilization strength, the precondition for the entire defence capability is rapidly put into question.A significant part of the reserve will be tied up with different kinds of guarding, protection and auxiliary support duties.The need is already great during the pressuring and threatening phase of the crisis.The call-up and training of the whole annual contingents is necessary in order to satisfy the quantitative demands for reserve units.For example, at the end of the Cold War, there were in Sweden 8 000 sites or locations considered vital for the national defence to be guarded.211 One can assume that in Finland, there would be thousands of corresponding locations.The Finnish territorial defence is largely based on the requisition of vehicles and tools from the civilian community in order to fill the needs for mobilized reserve territorial units.There are available at low cost in our country enough all-terrain, four-wheel drive vehicles, snow mobiles, 'monkeys' and other vehicles.Enemy operations would extend deeply into our territory from the very start with no single, clearly defined front line, and the need for defending units in the vast Finnish territory will be great.An aggressor would have to be met with determined resistance from the very onset of hostilities at important locations anywhere in the country.The crucial question is how to allocate resources between increasingly expensive state-of-the-art army units and the indispensable local defence system which covers the whole country.A certain modern spearhead is needed to defeat the aggressor.Yet it is questionable how much a possible invader is deterred by a Finnish qualitative military high-tech capability if the quantitative dimension of it is miniscule.Agrell, 2010, p. 44.he forceful return of geopolitics in international affairs is a fact.It also has implications in the neighbourhood of Finland.The withdrawal of the Russian forces from the previous Soviet positions in the Warsaw Pact countries and in the Baltic States at the end of the Cold War was the first phase of the change, which coincided with the efforts of the CSCE to build a new cooperative security structure for Europe.The second phase, Russia's return as a dominant player in the former Soviet sphere began in earnest halfway through the last decade and gained increased momentum during the war in Georgia, the downfall of the so-called Ukrainian orange revolution, and the broader integration of Belarus into the Russian systems.212 Russia's efforts to establish a Eurasian Union, is a manifestation of her current ambitions and is also an excellent example of the impact of Alexander Dugin's thinking on contemporary Russian policy.Wilhelm Agrell, a Swedish professor and well-known peace and conflict researcher, wrote in 2010 that the European security architecture suffered a disastrous failure in the war in Georgia: The war, no matter how insignificant it was, and how well its foreign political effects have been brushed out of sight, simply should never have taken place […] It was an anomaly, an exception impossible to explain in light of the adopted basic security political framework.[…] The war did not fit at all into the picture of the EU's and the eastern border area's mutual and stabilizing relationships […] .The EU's primary or rather only foreign political capability -soft power -turned out to be merely a stage setting which the Russians punctured unscrupulously.The military operations we conducted to force Georgia to peace … were absolutely necessary.The fact that Russia adopted such a tough line at the time ultimately ensured that the situation is much more peaceful now, in spite of certain difficulties.[…] We were able to calm down some of our neighbours by showing them how they should behave with regard to Russia and small adjacent states.For some of our partners, including NATO, it was a signal that they must think about the geopolitical stability before making a decision to expand the alliance.I see this as the main lessons of what happened in 2008.214 President Putin confirmed in August 2012 that planning for the war started in late 2006.His comment came after high-ranking military officials criticized their former Supreme Commander Medvedev for his hesitant leadership, and for failing to give the final order to execute the plan in time.The Russian political and military leadership have in recent years adopted a more confrontational language.After Vladimir Putin's return as President in 2012, Russia has more and more adopted positions in line with the traditional FSB attitudes.The dominant players in the West tended to dismiss this mostly as posturing without much substance in deeds.215 Russia's invasion of Georgia was simply forgotten.216 This western perception may, however, be changing as the first cracks in the friendly facade among Russia's closest western partners begin to appear.217 214 President of Russia, 2011.Russia's NATO Ambassador Dmitry Rogozin was more explicit, without active Russian operations Georgia and Ukraine would have become NATO members.See РИА Новости, "Медведев: бездействие РФ в 2008 г могло бы привести к расширению НАТО", November 21, 2011, [http://ria.ru/defence_safety/ 20111121/494106971.html] .See also Giles, 2012a.Keir Giles argues convincingly that the Russian view of events related to the war in Georgia is not credible."Russia and the world woke up to war on the morning of 8 August, but close study of events leading up to that point provides a number of indicators that suggest additional Russian troops were moving into South Ossetia significantly earlier -crucially, without necessarily having explicit authority to do so from the supreme command."In addition, he raises the important question of risks related to deficient command and control systems in Russia, which may lead to dangerous and provocative activity at a time of tension by individual units, as was the case in Georgia.215 Germany's Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle's comments to Russia's threats to react militarily to NATO's missile defence plans in Europe are revealing: "In any case, I see not only the possibility for agreement, but the necessity for agreement. … We will not ensure our own security against Russia, but together with Russia in Europe."See Bidder, 2011.Another example is provided by Army General Makarov's speech in Helsinki on 5 June 2012 and President Putin's confirmation that the Chief of the General Staff voiced Russia's position.Finnish Foreign Minister Erkki Tuomioja held that the General had spoken in a personal capacity.216 Seldom has a fine book carried such a sadly misplaced title as that of the late Ronald D. Asmus, A Little War that Shook the World -Georgia, Russia and the Future of the West, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.217 Neukirch, 2012.Dr. Andreas Schockenhoff, Chancellor Merkel's commissioner for German-Russian co-operation has strongly criticized the leadership style of President Vladimir Putin and charged that "state power (in Russia) views politically active citizens as Russia aims to overthrow perhaps the most important achievements of the OSCE, the commitments by the member states made in the Paris Charter (1990) and the Istanbul Document (1999). 218 Russia suspended implementation of the CFE Treaty in 2007. The United States and the UK followed suit four years later and other NATO member states are expected to follow. 219 Russia responded strongly, using the ballistic missile defence controversy as a tool. "The current political leadership can't act like Gorbachev, and it wants written obligations secured by ratification documents," Russia's former NATO envoy, Ambassador Dmitry Rogozin said.220 The U.S. think-tank STRATFOR commented already in December 2011 as follows: For Russia, the fundamental issue at hand is not the BMD system itself, but the U.S. military presence the system would bring with it.U.S. BMD plans are focused on Central Europe, which abuts Russia's former Soviet periphery.Moscow can't help but feel threatened by the U.S. military commitment to the region that the system represents.221 In its military doctrine, Russia considers NATO a danger.The authors of the doctrine, however, regarded NATO still a threat to Russia, even a serious threat.222A disunited NATO, on the other hand, considers Russia a partner.The experienced Swedish Russia expert Jan Leijonhielm writes in Friends in Need: opponents rather than partners." Well-known Russian scientist, Dr Igor Sutyagin, who spent 11 years in prison and labour camps on dubious charges before he was released in the swap related to the exposed Russian spy ring in the USA in 2010, cited a British politician as follows: "If you want to speak about Russia, speak about it as it is, not as you want it to be." See Sutyagin, 2012. 218 . Ambassador Rogozin points out that the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE, 1990) and the adapted CFE Treaty (1999) were agreed upon at a time when Russia was weak and that they are no longer acceptable. The CFE negotiations took place in parallel with the confidence-building talks leading up to the Paris Charter and the Istanbul Document. 219 Kimball, 2011 . See also RIA Novosti, 25 November 2011, "UK Halts Military Data Sharing with Russia" [http://en.rian.ru/world/20111125/169036481.html]. 220 Isachenkov, 2011 . "We won't allow them to treat us like fools," he [Mr. Rogozin] said, and continued: "Nuclear deterrent forces aren't a joke." Mr. Rogozin was soon afterwards appointed Deputy Prime Minister. His main responsibilities are in the domain of arms procurement. 221 STRATFOR, 8 December 2011, "Central Europe Watches as Washington, Moscow Clash over BMD" [http: //www.stratfor.com/memberships/205624/geopolitical_diary/ 20111207 -central-europe-watches-washington-moscow-spar-over-bmd]. 222 Felgenhauer, 2010. For small states in Russia's neighbourhood the military doctrine is by no means a calming document, given the earlier-mentioned Russian law stipulating a right for Moscow to intervene wherever and however in defence of Russian citizens abroad. […] Investment in considerably higher readiness, great mobility and attempts to increase air assault capabilities […] matches ill with the development of Russian doctrine, which stresses defensive capability. A possible future Chinese threat, for example would probably not require any major naval landing capability. 223 In Western Europe, the threat of war is considered an extremely outdated thought. It has resulted in exceptionally large reductions in the armed forces of NATO and of other Western countries, and the emphasis of tasks has shifted from national defence to international crisis management. At the same time their military operational readiness has decreased drastically. Russia takes advantage of this situation, and acts in her own way. In developing the capabilities of her armed forces she aims to create units of high readiness which are able to achieve operational results also in the western direction by surprise strikes directly from their peacetime deployments. Reinforcements would be brought in and possible occupation forces mobilized from the reserve only after the operation has begun. The "new" NATO member states gained a political victory when the Alliance finally agreed to work on contingency plans for the defence of the Baltic States. The geostrategic position of these countries is exceptionally unfavourable. A capacity to repel invasion from the very outset of hostilities may therefore not be deemed possible. Only scarce open information about these plans is available, but it appears that the starting point for the planning is retaking of lost ground. 224 If Russia were forced to consolidate territorial gains, obtained with conventional means, she might be tempted to use nuclear threat. Open discussions of "de-escalation" of conflicts by the use of nuclear weapons, the simulated use of tactical nuclear weapons at the end of large military exercises, such as Zapad-2009 and Vostok-2010, and the deployment of dual-capable Iskander missiles not far from the Estonian border, support this view. 225 It will be in-teresting to see how the planned Russian-Belarusian Zapad-2013 exercise will be executed in September 2013, announced as a CSTO exercise. 226 A general perception is that there is no immediate threat in view now. 227 However, no one can predict reliably what the world will look like ten or twenty years from now, the timeframe of today's strategic decision-making. Finland's influence on world affairs is modest, at best. Capabilities, not intentions are significant. The defence can be considered credible, when the aggressor realizes that defeating it will be achieved only at an unacceptably high cost. The defender himself has to be confident of his capabilities. In broader terms, national defence requires the comprehensive military and societal capability to endure. The importance of good strategic early warning should not be underestimated. A sufficiently large military reserve is a signal of the people's will to defend the homeland. Above all, it also indicates that the defence cannot be paralyzed by a surprise attack or by threat thereof, and that resistance will continue even after enemy invasion. The preventive value of a large reserve is significant. 226 РИА Новости, 28 December 2012, "Российско-белорусские стратегические учения пройдут в 2013 году" [http://ria.ru/defense_safety/20121224/915972564.html]. President Putin: "It is important to enhance the interaction with allies, particularly those in the CSTO.Such tasks will be solved in the framework of the planned Russian-Belarusian military exercises West-2013." 227 As this report deals primarily with military capability developments, the authors leave it to others, mainly the decision-makers, to assess the threat. In September 2012 the Russian government submitted to parliament the draft budget for the years 2013 to 2015. The Russian State Duma approved it for the next three years at first reading at the end of October. 228 The budget proposal subsequently passed the parliamentary process and was signed into law by the President on 5 December 2012. 229 Overall, the federal budget demonstrates the government's commitment to responsible macroeconomic policy. The Russian government is prepared to deal with the probable drop in oil revenues, which constitute almost half of the federal government income. Russia's finance ministry unveiled in July 2012 the direction of 2013−2015 federal state budgets, presenting a rise in defence spending by 25.8 percent for 2013 alone. 230 The total state budget for 2013 is 12 745 billion rubles (€ 316 billion; 40.3 RUR = € 1).The do c ument formed the basis for the 2013 budget presented by Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev later in 2012. Interesting to note is that the budget plan stipulated an oil price of $92 for a barrel in 2013. The budget breakdown provides insight on the priorities of the Putin administration. More than one third of the federal government spending is assigned to defence, security and police. According to the analysis of Gaidar Institute, a leading Russian think-tank, the military spending is the only part of the budget growing in real terms in 2013−2015 with the total three-year increase of 37%. In contrast, the health care spending will be cut by 50% from the current mediocre level. The details on the defence budget are not disclosed: 50% of spending is secret. Presumably, most of the money will be spent on the rearmament of the Russian military force. 231 "Targeted 'national defence' spending as a percentage of GDP will amount to 3.2 percent in 2013, 3.4 percent in 2014 and 3.7 percent in 2015", Defence Committee chairman Vladimir Komoedov was quoted as saying in the committee's conclusion on the draft budget for 2013-2015. The spending proposals provide financing to "re-equip units with new weapon systems, military and special equipment and provide housing and social safeguards for service members" among other issues, Komoedov said. 232 The share of GDP relating to the total military expenditure is shown in the The share concerning other security and military services (so called "power ministries", siloviki, Russian: силовики ) is estimated to exceed 1%. Although salaries for members of the Russian armed forces are rising fast, it is not visible in the budget. 234 The current rearmament programme (total amount of 20 000 billion roubles, approximately 500 billion euros) extends to 2020. It will be aimed more at purchasing of new armaments instead of modernizing old. In addition, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin announced already in October 2011, that the government is going to use 3000 billion roubles (around 72 billion euros) for upgrading defence industry, a necessary step for fulfilling the ongoing purchasing plans. 235 The Defence Ministry coordinates also the weapons procurement of all other "power ministries". 236 Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin announced a detailed breakdown of the planned annual rearmament expenditure at the end of 2012 as follows: "The state defence order will reach about 1.9 trillion roubles in 2013, about 2.2 trillion in 2014 and 2.8 trillion in 2015", and is expected to stay at that level until the end of the decade. 237 232 This rapid and intensive military reform turned out to be the most radical transformation of the armed forces since the Second World War. From the very beginning the planned reform met with strong opposition from conservative circles of the defence community, eventually leading to what could almost be called dishonourable discharge of both the defence minister and the chief of general staff in November 2012. Although implementation of the reform is well under way, it is by no means completed. Ambitions to create a pure and radically smaller professional army than the former Soviet-style army, equipped with state-of-the-art weapons, were thwarted. The final outcome remains to be seen, but is likely to be a mix of both concepts. The purpose of the reforms is to create mobile and well-trained armed forces equipped with modern equipment and weapons. Priorities are as follows: • Re-deployment of all formations and units for permanent combat readiness, 100% staffing for a state of war, The President of Russian Federation Dmitri Medvedev appeared in March 2010 at the meeting of the Collegium of the Ministry of Defence. At that meeting the ten year rearmament program (2011−2020) for the Russian Armed Forces was finally accepted. The Russian Government was given the task of renewing the weaponry of the Armed Forces by an average of 9-11% per year, so that by 2020 the modern equipment would make up 70% of the total. At the same time they were also to improve the education of officers and other military personnel and to raise the combat readiness of troops. 239 One main objective of the rearmament program, signed by the President on 31 December, 2010, is to secure maintenance and further development of Russia's strategic nuclear weapons. About 10% of all the funds are concentrated on the development and acquisition of land-based nuclear weapons. These include both the modernization of existing systems and the purchase of new ones. 240 Efforts are also being made to improve the nuclear strike capability. 241 Another priority is strategic space defence, especially the development of an advance early warning system. By 2018 the modernization of the present system should be completed and new facilities constructed in all threatened directions. The program also includes different types of satellites, and other space defence systems. 242 The Voronezh-M anti-missile radar at Lekhtusi, north-east of St. Petersburg, became the first radar station of its kind in the country. There are three other new generation radar stations in other directions of Russia. At the end of 2011, Russia started to operate another new missile warning radar Voronezh-DM. This station is located in the Kaliningrad enclave. These stations can monitor the Northern sector including space and missile launches in Sweden and Norway. They are also monitoring aircraft flying in the area of their responsibility. 243 Russia is also modernising her airborne early warning and control aircraft, A-50 Mainstay (AEW&C). 244 There have already been doubts about the realization of the latest equipment program, since the three previous programs were not completed. The former program (GPV-2015) for 2007−2015 was far behind the established schedule when it was abrogated in 2010. 245 There are serious doubts that Russian defence industry will be able to fulfil its goals. Co-operation today with several western manufacturers is one indica-tion. On the other hand, it should be noted that when Russia's defence industry finally received the promised entire budgetary funds, it was able to carry out about 70% of the State's orders. 246 Now it seems that the new leadership team at the MOD has decided to stop using the threat of importing armaments from abroad to get Russian defence industry to improve the quality of its products. For a couple of years, this seemed to be a favourite tool used by former Defence Minister Serdyukov, especially in his bid to improve the quality of Russian tanks and armoured vehicles. Just in the beginning of 2013 there have been some indications that the MOD has turned away from imports and will return to the autarkic model of military procurement that has been more traditional for the Russian armed services. 247 The reform of the Russian army includes forming three categories of brigades, designed for different tasks. 248 The first category of brigades, heavy brigades, will be the main army unit and will maintain permanent readiness status. Such a brigade consists of tracked, main battle tanks (for example T-90) and BMP (amphibious tracked infantry fighting vehicles). The brigade's organic artillery is mainly armoured with self propelled guns. The second category of brigades, medium brigades, will be used as rapidresponse unit. The combat vehicles of these medium brigades are mainly wheeled-chassis armour (BTR). The brigade's artillery is towed or self propelled on wheels. The third and final category of brigades, light brigades, will be highly mobile units and use light armoured vehicles are characterized by high protective full field equipment of individual combatants. In all military districts, from Kamchatka to Kaliningrad, groups of armed formations capable of offensive strike operations, have been built. In these formations, combat brigades and airborne divisions of permanent readiness are playing the most significant role. The troop skills in combat have been tested in many large field exercises. The Chief of General Staff, Army General Nikolai Makarov mentioned on 17 November, 2011 that all these formations are fully operational and ready to meet their combat tasks in one hour. 250 According to our estimates in reality each permanent readiness brigade may have only one battalion battle group in high daily readiness. The Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, Colonel-General Vladimir Chirkin has said that Russia will also add 10 reconnaissance, 14 army aviation and two air defence brigades by 2020 without increasing the overall number of personnel in the Armed Forces. In line with the current military reform, the Russian Armed Forces have been reduced to 1 million personnel and reorganized from a four-tier (military district -army -division -regiment) to a more flexible and battle-ready three-tier structure (military district -operational command -brigade). At present, there are more than 100 brigades deployed in four military districts. (See after the table on previous page) . 251 The military districts have formed their own separate reconnaissance units. The ground forces brigades of constant readiness will be capable to operate independently aside mobile battle groups and other brigades. With the aid of these intelligence units, the commanders have a clear picture of what is happening from 25−100 kilometres beyond the front lines. In the near future this capacity can be extended even to 5000 kilometres by the aid of UAV`s and other modern means. Each military district has its own separate reconnaissance brigade and each motorized and armour brigade has its own reconnaissance battalion. 252 At least three military districts have a new air assault brigade at their disposal. There will be total six of these brigades. To improve the mobility of these brigades each of them will have a helicopter regiment of 60 helicopters (40 Mi-8s and 20 Mi-24s). These brigades will serve in the role of strategic reserve for the Joint Strategic Commands (Military Districts) as the airborne divisions are subordinated the Supreme Command. 253 Each Military District will also have an artillery missile brigade with dual capable Iskander-M missiles. The first brigade of this kind is already operational at Luga base, near St. Petersburg. The range of the missile is officially below 500 kilometres, but it has potential to fly 700 kilometres in its present configuration and 1000 kilometres in a model employing new, more efficient fuel. Each brigade has twelve launchers of two missiles. The new structure of the Russian Ground Forces is said to be alike its western counterparts. The new structure is expected to improve the effectiveness of operations, to coordinate and shorten the chain of command. 254 The brigade organisation also seems noticeably more flexible and more suitable for local conflicts, since the divisions were too large and cumbersome, and regiments on the other hand, lacked weapons and equipment necessary for carrying out independent operations. The ground force brigades will be used as constantly ready units which will be capable to operate independently, along with highly mobile units under one command. 255 The tendency in reorganization is to strengthen important directions like Northwest, South and Far East, on expenses of other areas. 256 Ground Forces play a primary role in defending a large area and long borders of Russia and securing country's integrity. It has a decisive role also in present circumstances in defeating enemy and in gaining important goals and objectives. 257 Reforming the armament and other equipment The Army Colonel-General Aleksandr Postnikov, the former Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Ground Forces has stated three problematic areas and six priorities as follows: The problems: • Lack of modern equipment, • Uneven capability and performance of older equipment, ineffective intelligence, C 3 , navigation, target acquisition, camouflage, forces protection, and firepower ("gun power"), • Wide range of equipment models further aggravate maintenance and repair. The six priorities: • The creation of a common, automated intelligence and information system, C 3 I, capable of serving through the chain of command agency on all leadership levels (ESU TZ leadership organization), • Equipping of troops with different kinds of precision long-distance and short-range weapons, • Increasing the effectiveness of the equipment for a solitary fighter with the aid of different intelligence elements, • Introducing remote guided and piloted recognition and weapon systems i.e. robots, drones, sensors, UAV's, • Improving the capacity of individual soldier by net centric systems and utilising nanotechnology in micro-miniaturizing, • Improving protection of individual soldiers and vehicles. 258 The fundamental change in 2010 was to move from repairing and modernizing the equipment to production of new and modern weapon systems. Top on the purchase list among other things are: • Ground Forces anti-aircraft brigades` automatic C 3 I system (ASU), • Further acquisition of missile and an artillery systems for Ground Forces, such as tactical missiles Iskander-M, heavy multiple rocket launcher Tornado-G, self-propelled artillery systems Hosta and Nona-SVK and anti-tank missile system Khrysantema-S, • Modernized S-300V4, Buk-M2 and Buk-M3 SAMs, Tor-M2U(M) short range AA-system, shoulder launched Igla-S and Verta close range AA-missiles, • New T-90 MBT, BTR-82A ACV and considerable amount of foreign and domestic produced trucks. 259 In 2012 the Russian Ministry of Defence bought armament and equipment worth of $ 23.1 billion (about € 18 b illio n). By 2020, Russia's tro o ps are to receive approximately 2,000 new artillery systems, 2,300 tanks, and 17,000 vehicles. Four hundred (400) intercontinental ballistic missiles will be purchased over the coming decade. 260 In Russia artillery is traditionally called "God of the War" (Bog voinyi). The development of different types of Russian artillery is still going on. The accuracy, rate and range of fire are particular objects for development. Russia's artillery currently deploys the 122-mm Grad, 220-mm Uragan, and 300-mm Smerch rocket systems and the improved Tornado-S, Tornado-G, and Uragan 1-M are currently undergoing state acceptance trials. The army is in the process of receiving up to 30 Tornado-G systems this year, replacing the BM-21 Grad. The Russian Army is gradually moving toward a new level of capability for deploying precision use of long-range rocket artillery. For instance Russia is now developing new long-range multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) with improved guidance that could allow them to strike targets up to 200 km away. That means a new generation of MLRS with a range of 200 km. The new Tornado-S rocket launcher will have a longer range and increased effectiveness, thanks to greater accuracy and the use of new warhead payloads and a reduced launch readiness time of just three minutes. 261 The Russian Army is planning to begin modernize its armoured and mechanized forces beginning in 2015, fielding a new family of vehicles comprising a new main battle tank, armoured infantry fighting vehicles, and various support platforms. The main battle tank (MBT) will be based on the new model Armata, the prototype is scheduled to enter field trials in 2013, about 10 months ahead of schedule. According to the First Deputy Defence Minister Alexander Sukhorukov, the new tank is under development at Uralvagonzavod in Omsk. The first deliveries of the tank to the Armed Forces are scheduled for 2015. 262 According to preliminary reports, the new tank designated T-99 will be less radical and ambitious than the failed 'Object 195' or T-95. It will weigh less, therefore, become more agile and will be more affordable, compared to its more ambitious predecessors. 263 The Armata platform is intended to be the basis for a number of other vehicles too, including a main battle tank, a heavy infantry fighting vehicle, a combat engineering vehicle, an armoured recovery vehicle, a heavy armoured personnel carrier, a tank support combat vehicle and several types of self-propelled fighting vehicles. 264 It should be remembered that the Russians are building their fighting forces not only against NATO, but more importantly, to protect their long southern borders with radical Islamic countries that may be gathering military power, and the growing dominance of China in the east. Armoured and mechanized forces are key to maintaining military superiority or parity against such threats. The level of sophistication in meeting those threats is not as demanding as meeting the advanced technology fielded by US and NATO forces. 265 The Russian Air Force is currently undergoing a period of significant restructuring, both in terms of general organization as well air base and unit structure. The organization will be changed from previous division-regiment struc- 261 ture to air base organization. There will be about 50 bases of three different categories. 266 • The first category air base includes 5-10 squadrons. The main bulk of bases are of this category. They will be located in directions, where army brigades most probably need air support and cover. • The second and third category bases are less well equipped. Not long ago, the Russian Air Force was in quite poor shape. Almost all of its aircraft were 20−25 years old, outdated, and in poor condition. It's therefore not surprising that the State Armament Program made procurement of new aircraft a priority, with a total investment of four trillion roubles (~ € 100 b illion) in that sector alone. 267 According to the new ten year procurement programme the Russian Air Force will purchase over 1 500 new aircraft and significantly increase the number of high-precision weapons in its arsenal by 2020. Overall, Air Force is planning to acquire and modernize about 2 000 aircraft and helicopters by 2020, including more than 1 500 new aircraft and about 400 modernized ones. The number of all-weather aircraft, capable of carrying out day and night missions would increase almost 80 percent, and the share of UAV's would constitute about 30 percent of the total by 2020. 268 Every Joint Strategic Command (Military District) can enable its own air support (air transport and close air support) exploiting its own frontal air force and helicopter brigade. Even each motorized rifle brigade and tank brigade will have air support from its helicopter unit (helicopter squadron). 269 Since 1992 until in 2010 Russian Air Force has not received new aircraft in significant numbers. The new aircraft received earlier were not genuine serial production products but came from smaller prototype series. In 2010 the first fifth generation T-50 PAK FA stealth fighter flew its maiden flight. It is due to enter service in the middle of this decade. 270 Some of the largest investments in the Russian Air Force are earmarked for military transport aircraft. Contracts have been signed to acquire 20 Antonov An-124-100 Ruslan (NATO: Condor) heavy strategic transport aircraft starting in 2015, 39 Ilyushin Il-476 (aka Il-76MD-90A) heavy airlifters starting in 2014, 11 Antonov An-140 light transport planes (two of them have already been delivered), and up to 30 Czech made Let L-410UVP commuters (7 of them have already been delivered). In addition, there are plans to purchase up to 50 Il-214 MTA medium-lift military transport aircraft, which are expected to be ready for production by 2016, and up to 20 Antonov An-148 passenger transport planes. Finally, 41 Il-76s and 20 An-124s will undergo modernization. Some Russian experts mentioned the possibility of a tender for up to 100 Ilyushin Il-112 light transport planes. 271 The air force is also planning to buy up to 30 refuelling planes that will be based on the Il-476 transport plane. There are also plans to buy an unspecified number of A-100 Beriev AWACS planes, which are currently under development, and four Tupolev Tu-204 reconnaissance planes. These will serve in conjunction with 12 modernized A-50 Beriev (NATO: Mainstay) AWACS planes and 10 modernized MiG-25RB reconnaissance planes. The Russian Air Force has altogether around 20 A-50 Mainstay AWACS planes, based on Ilyushin Il-76 transport. 272 In terms of strike aircraft, the air force is placing a big bet on the Sukhoi T-50 PAK FA fifth generation strike fighter. Sixty of these planes are expected to be procured starting in 2016 (originally planned for 2014). While four T-50 prototypes are already being tested, there are indications that new engines and advanced electronic systems (and especially its avionics) are not yet ready. This may lead to another round of delays in serial production. 273 While waiting for the Sukhoi T-50 PAK FA fighters, the air force is receiving new Su-35S "generation 4++" strike aircraft, 48 of which were ordered in 2009 for delivery through 2015. Four have been received to date. According to estimates in 2011 the Russian Defence Ministry received at least 28 jets (two Sukhoi Su-35S multirole fighters, six Su-34 fighter-bombers, eight Su-27SM3 4+ generation fighters, eight Yak-130 trainers, one Tupolev Tu-214ON (Open Skies surveillance plane) 274 , two Tu-154Ms and one Antonov An-140-100 transport air craft) and more than 100 helicopters (15 Mil Mi-28Ns, 10 Kamov Ka-52s, two Mil Mi-35Ms, one Mi-26, six Ansat-U helicopters, six Ka-226s, more than 60 Mi-8s of different modifications). 275 It is possible that an additional 48 or 72 Su-35s may be ordered once the current order is completed. The air force is also planned to receive 30 Su-30SM fighters by 2015, with an option for an additional 30 planes. The first two of these have been received. The Russian military has also received four Sukhoi Su-30M2s and twelve Su-27SM3s since 2010. Older planes are being modern-ized, including a total of 120 Sukhoi Su-25 (NATO: Frogfoot) close air support aircraft (50 already upgraded) and 120 Mikoyan MiG-31 (Foxhound) interceptor aircraft (at least 25 to be completed by the end of 2012). 276 In addition to the fighters, the air force has ordered 129 Sukhoi Su-34 fighterbombers to be delivered by 2020, with an option for at least another 18. Fifteen of these planes have been delivered. In the meantime, the air force is continuing to modernize its existing stock of Su-24s, with 50 already modernized and 50 to be upgraded before 2020. In terms of training aircraft, 18 Yak-130s have been delivered as of October 2012, with another 49 on order and an option for another 10. The air force is also purchasing twelve Su-25UBM two-seaters that will likely be used for training. 277 By comparison, long-range aviation will get very little over the next decade. There are no plans to complete the two or three remaining Tupolev Tu-160 (NATO: Blackjack) supersonic strategic bomber, carrying cruise missiles. Production of these strategic bombers dates back to Soviet times. Discussions about designs for a new long range bomber are continuing. In any case, production of new long range bombers will not start until after 2020. The only contracts in this sector are for modernization, including 30 Tupolev Tu-22M3 (NATO: Backfire) bombers and cruise missile carriers, 14-16 Tu-160 strategic bombers, and up to 30 Tu-95MS (NATO: Bear) strategic bombers. 278 In terms of rotary-wing aircraft, there are contracts in place for 167 Mi-28N (45 already delivered), 180 Kamov Ka-52, and 49 Mil Mi-35M (10 already delivered) attack helicopters. Transport helicopter orders include 38 Mi-26 heavy lift helicopters. Six have already been delivered and another 22 may be ordered in the future. Up to 500 Mi-8s of various types will be purchased. These are currently being produced at a rate of 50 per year. There are also contracts in place for 36 Ka-226 (6 already delivered) and 32 Mil Ansat-U (16 delivered) light transport helicopters. Additional contracts for 38 Ansat-U and up to 100 Kamov Ka-62 helicopters may be placed in the near term. 279 During the year 2012 the Russian Air Force appears to have turned a corner on procurement, having received 40 new airplanes and 127 new helicopters. For the first time, the entire aviation procurement plan appears to have been fulfilled. The winged aircraft include now 10 Su-34s, 6 Su-35s, 2 Su-30SMs, and over 20 Yak-130s. There's no detailed breakdown regarding helicopters, though the bulk are probably Mi-28N and Ka-52s. This is an improvement on 2011, when 31 fixed-wing aircraft and over 50 helicopters were procured. Given that in 2010, the numbers were 23 and 37, respectively. 280 It will probably still be tricky for the aircraft industry to reach the stated State Armament Program goal of delivering 1 120 helicopters and 600 fixed-wing aircraft by 2020, but reaching 70 percent of that target by 2020 appears doable, with the rest arriving by 2025 at the latest. 281 The Aerospace Defence (Vozdushno-Kosmicheskaya Oborona -VKO) On 1 December, 2011 the Aerospace Defence Forces (Vozdushno-Kosmicheskaya Oborona -VKO) were officially formed and headed by Lieutenant-General Oleg Ostapenko. Two commands were included in the structure: the Space Command and the PVO and PRO (Air and Missile Defence). In the first phase of equipping the VKO, which is placed operationally under the General Staff, the PVO/PRO Command's missile defence division and three S-44 SAM brigades stationed in Podmoskovye were tasked with protecting Moscow. It is planned to reinforce this defence with additional brigades and by 2020 to introduce the advanced S-500 air defence system. 282 The Air Defence system of Russia works as follows: Fighter jets act as the first echelon, covering the area beyond the range of anti-missile systems (from 300-400km to 1,000-1,500km). At the distance of 50-100 km to 250-400 km, targets are engaged by S-300PM, S-400 and S-300V4 air defence missile systems, capable of shooting down combat jets, unmanned aerial vehicles and airborne command posts deep in the enemy's formations. 283 Medium-range surface-to-air missile systems, such as Vityaz (with a range of up to 120 km) and Buk (with a range of up to 30-70 km), cover the further stretch of the way to the vital military facilities. The Russian air defence is currently equipped with just ten systems of this type, supplied in 2010. The missile weapon system consists of command post, an X-band multi-functional fire control, tracking and surveillance radar, and up to three missile launchers with ten 9M96E missiles or two 9M100 short-range missiles replacing one 9M96E missile. The Vityaz system is able to detect and track up to 40 targets simultaneously while engaging eight of them with two missiles per target. 284 280 The plan to renew Russian Air Defence in the near future includes also the acquisition of 100 (ten battalions) new, still under development, S-500 Samoderzhets ("Czar") surface-to-air missiles, the first to be completed by 2013 and 56 battalions of S-400Triumf (SA-21 Growler) missile systems. Two air defence regiments were armed with this system prior to 2010 and an additional five were to be procured in 2011. S-400 missile system is able to destroy cruise missiles and tactical missiles 400 km away. The S-400 missile system is already operational around Moscow and Kaliningrad. 285 A standard battalion includes eight launchers with four missiles each. 286 The goal is to have as many as 23 S-400 air defence missile regiments (of 8 to 12 missiles each) by 2015. It will then be augmented by the more advanced S-500 system, currently under development and expected to be ready for production by 2013. Both the S-400 and S-500 systems are claimed to be superior to the U.S. Patriot PAC-3 in maximum speed, range, and accuracy. Russia will also continue to procure the Pantsir-S1 short-range surface-to-air missile, with at least 200 units expected to be added by 2016 to the 10 already in service in 2010. 287 All air defence regiments in the Russian Armed Forces will be equipped with advanced S-400 Triumf and Pantsir-S missile systems by 2020, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin said in March 2011. "We are planning to revamp our air defence network.All air defence regiments will receive new S-400 Triumf and Pantsir-S systems," Putin told defence industry officials commenting on the state arms procurement program until 2020. 288 The S-400 system has a maximum range of up to 400 km and may engage targets up to an altitude of 40−50 kilometres. The system uses a range of missiles, optimized for engaging ballistic and cruise missiles. Pantsir-S is a short-to-medium range combined surface-to-air missile and antiaircraft artillery system designed to protect point and area targets. 289 It carries up to 12 two-stage solid-fuel surface-to-air missiles in sealed ready-to-launch containers and has two dual 30 mm automatic cannons that can engage targets at a range of up to 4 km. 290 Russia planned to station several new S-400 Triumf air defense systems near its borders in 2012, former Air Force Commander-in-Chief Alexander Zelin stated. "The Russian Armed Forces will receive several S-400 air defence missile systems this year," Zelin told RIA Novosti. "This time they will be deployed in air defence units guarding [Russia's] border regions." The Russian Naval Headquarters officially moved to St. Petersburg after several years of plans and delays. On the Senate Square a ceremony was held and the Andreyevskiy flag hoisted over Admiralty in a light snowfall November 7, 2012. 291 The latest Russian armament program for the Navy includes 100 fighting ships. In addition to strategic nuclear submarines the ten year program (2011−2020) includes acquisition of following ships and weapon systems: The limits in shipbuilding have forced Russia to purchase special ships also from abroad. In 2010 Russia signed a contract with France to buy four Mistral class amphibious assault ships (LHD). Two will be acquired from France and two license-built in Russia. The deal also includes the Zenith-9 C 3 I system. The carriers will be strengthened and equipped so that they are able to operate with other surface combatants, submarines and air force in arctic waters. 293 President Vladimir Putin visited the northern city of Severodvinsk on 30 July 2012 and attended the ceremony marking the launching of the fourth Borei class nuclear ballistic missile submarine Prince Vladimir. He also presided over a meeting on the future naval construction program. Putin underlined the importance of the naval capability of Russia: "The Navy is an instrument 290 Ibid.291 RusNavyCom, 31 October 2012, "Russian Navy HQ Finally Settled in Saint Petersburg" [http://rusnavy.com/news/navy/index.php?ELEMENT_ID=16318].292 Gorenburg, 2011b.293 Falichev, 2011a, p. 1..for defending our national economic interests, including in regions like the Arctic, which holds a rich concentration of bio-resources, as well as deposits of hydrocarbons and other natural resources." 294 The naval construction program calls for investing about 4.5 trillion roubles (ca € 111 m illio n) over the next several years, for the construction of 51 modern surface warships, 16 nuclear attack submarines and 8 nuclear ballistic missile submarines by 2020 (two of which are now undergoing trials), all but two of the surface ships to be built in Russian shipyards. This will allow the share of modern vessels and equipment making up the naval forces to be brought to 70 percent by 2020, Putin said. An explicit part of the program is the upgrading of Russia's defence industry, which has been slow to deliver new weapons in recent years. 295 These formations are part of the order of battle of the above mentioned armies or some of them are directly subordinated to the Western Military District (WMD). 301 In the WMD there are altogether more than 60 brigades/formations in declared permanent readiness or to be established from reserves in mobilisation (including all branches). 302 The Russian Ministry of Defence has reported plans to establish two new arctic brigades. It was decided at the Security Council in September 2008 that Russia is to deploy a combined-arms force to protect its political and economic interests in the Arctic by 2020, including military, border and coastal guard units to guarantee Russia's military security in diverse military and political circumstances. 303 The first arctic brigade seems to be the present 200 th Motorized Rifle Brigade at Pechenga. As possible locations of the second one Arkhangelsk, Alakurtti and even Novaya Zemlya have been mentioned. 304 In Alakurtti village infrastructure already exists and from there is also railway connection to the vicin-ity of Kandalaksha harbour at the White Sea. 305 The formation of the Arctic brigades has been delayed and the schedule according to present planning is set to 2015. 306 The Coast Guard formations (FSB) in the northern waters are to be strengthened and their presence to be increased by 2017. 307 The strength of the training centre of the Western Military District at Mulino 308 , near Moscow, is equivalent to a former reinforced army division. Detached ground force training subcenters at Sertolovo 309 , north of Saint Petersburg and Kovrov 310 east of Mulino, almost equal the strength of a brigade. This annex has not listed training battalions and regiments of different military schools. Under the WMD's premises there are in additional different types of supporting units and paramilitary, armed formations of other ministries. All these units will be subordinated to the Joint Strategic Command of the WMD in the time of crisis. Several maintenance and repair depots in the area will also establish reserve formations/units with the equipment at their disposal. 311 The maintenance and repair depots near Finland are able to establish at least three reserve brigades, such as 62 nd Motorized Rifle Brigade at Alakurtti, 41 st Motorized Rifle Brigade at Sertolovo, and 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade in Petrozavodsk. 312 The 85 th Detached Helicopter Regiment (Mi-24, Mi-8 helicopters) at Alakurtti will be re-established. 313 There are approximately 60 army depots in Russia. Most of them have the capacity to establish at least one brigade size unit. Military schools and training centres have a certain role in mobilisation. 314 The Baltic Fleet The allocation of the total defence budget for naval forces has been about 25 percent. The strategic ballistic missile submarines of the Northern and Pacific Fleets retain their traditional role (second strike) in the nuclear triad. The role of the Baltic Fleet is in securing the country's export -import routes, especially of energy export. The Baltic Sea is nowadays only partly under Russia's control. Because of NATO's eastward expansion and some increase of activities (for example the U.S. Patriot surface-to-air missiles in north-eastern Poland) Russia has decided to improve her military readiness in the Baltic area. After the collapse of the Soviet Union the situation of the Russian Baltic Fleet weakened, when it lost a major bulk of its previous bases. Its main base and headquarters are located in Kaliningrad area. The main tasks of the Baltic Fleet of Russia at present are as follows: • Protection of the Russian economic zone and areas of productive activities, suppression of illegal productive activities, • Ensuring safety of navigation, • Implementation of foreign policy actions of the Government in economically important areas of the World oceans (visits, routine entries, joint exercises, and action in the composition of peacekeeping forces, etc.), • Co-operation with other Russian naval units operating in the area, especially with the Northern Fleet. 315 The operational forces of the Baltic Fleet include: • Two diesel submarines, • Five principal surface combatants (destroyers/frigates), • 20 Coastal combatants (corvettes) and patrol boats, • Around 70 fixed wing aircraft and some 55 helicopters of various types. 316 While renewing surface combatants the focus is in building corvettes with precision guided weapons and long ranged cruise missiles. The amphibious capability will improve drastically, if the Fleet will introduce the new amphibious assault ships. 317 If transferring other major naval combatants from the Atlantic to the Baltic Sea is part of contingency plans, they have to pass the Danish Straits before crisis. The Northern Fleet is the strongest and most versatile command in the Russian Navy. Its major role is the maritime component of the nuclear triad. The growing importance of northern waters emphasizes the role of this fleet and its support area. The Fleet HQ is located in Severomorsk near Murmansk. Other bases are situated mostly by the fjords of the northern coast of Kola Peninsula, and in Severodvinsk on the south-eastern coast of the White Sea. 318 Jane's World Air Forces reported that: Russia's long-range air force has had its mission changed from nuclear deterrence to conventional strike against point targets in support of counter-insurgency operations. In 2005, the division took delivery of the first examples of the new Kh-101 conventional stealthy air-launched cruise missile and augmented its fleet with a pair of upgraded Tu-160 bombers able to carry and deliver laser-guided bombs. 321 While counter-insurgency operations were mentioned as a motive for the rolechange, it is obvious that these long-range weapon systems can reach anywhere in Europe. According to its mission and tasks the Air Force's Aviation is divided into long-range, front-line, military transport and army aviation, which in turn include bomber, attack, fighter, reconnaissance, transport and special aircraft. The core of the Air Force's combat element is composed from air bases and brigades of the Air Defence. 322 Air Force's divisional/regimental echelons have been supplanted by Air Base unit establishments, with the majority of these possessing three subordinate squadrons. In addition, a number of former Naval Aviation elements have been (and are still being) reassigned to the Air Force (these include Su-27 and MiG-31 interceptor units, Tu-22M medium-range bomber units and at least two major air bases in the Kaliningrad region). Many of the changes have been accomplished simply by transferring aircraft. This process of consolidation permits closure of a substantial number of airfields. 323 The 1 st Command of Air Force and Air Defence consists of the following formations: • Headquarters is located in Voronezh, and the 7000 th AFB in Voronezh is the main air base, 324 • 1 st air-space defence brigade (Severomorsk) • 2 nd air-space defence brigade (St. Petersburg) • 6961 st aviation base (Petrozavodsk) (Sukhoi Su-27) 320 Gorenburg, 2011. 321 IHS Jane's World Air Forces, "The Engels-Based Bomber Force, Which Includes Examples of the Tu-22M 'Backfire', Tu-95MS 'Bear' and Tu-160 'Blackjack'", 27.11..2012. 322 McDermott, 2012b. 323 IHS Jane's World Air Forces, "Russia", 27 November 2012. 324 Gavrilov, 2009. • 6964 th aviation base (Monchegorsk, Murmansk Oblast) (Sukhoi Su-24M, Su-24MP) • 6965 th aviation base (Viaz'ma, Smolensk Oblast) • 7000 th aviation base (Voronezh) (Sukhoi Su-24M, Su-24MP, Su-34). 325 The inventory of the Russian Air Force may have included around 5000 fixed and rotary wing air craft before the military reform. 326 The number of aircraft left in the Air Force and Army Aviation after the reform, has not been disclosed. The plan was to reduce them by no less than a third. 327 A significant portion of the assets are apparently beyond repair. IISS Military Balance 2012 lists about 1 800 fixed wing aircraft and 1 000 rotary wing aircraft as combat capable. 328 The Swedish Defence Research Establishment FOI has presented even lower numbers and predicts that the number of aircraft will continue to diminish until 2020, when equipment from the Soviet era is finally phased out. 329 Selected air units of Russia's Western military district have started preparations to return to abandoned Arctic airfields, the commander of the district's aviation Maj. Gen. Igor Makushev said on Wednesday 30 May 2012. The military airfields in the Arctic were used extensively in the Soviet era, but after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 they have been generally mothballed. "We will start reopening airfields on Novaya Zemlya and in Naryan-Mar as early as this summer (2012) ," Makushev told a news conference in Saint Petersburg. Plans for 2013 include the reopening of a military airfield on Graham Bell Island, which is part of Franz Josef Land. 330 These plans turn out to have been more political than based on real plans and are to be considered premature. Ex-commander of the Air Force Vladimir Mikhailov says that it is too early to talk about a base of jet fighters in the Arctic. "In the current situation we don't need any base there.First we have to deal with all the problems on the main land, and only then, when we are "tougher", we will move on to Novaya Zemlya". 331 This does not, however, reverse Russia's plans to strengthen her military means to protect its political and economic interests in the Arctic region by 325 Gorenburg, 2011c. 326 The numbers were calculated from the order of battle lists given by Jane's, but they probably do not represent the situation as of November 2012 accurately, since detailed figures have not been disclosed after Russia stopped CFE Treaty implementation and data sharing in 2007. See IHS Jane's World Air Forces, "Russia". 327 , p. 59. 328 IISS, 2012 , p. 197. 329 Carlsson & Norberg, 2012 Melnikov, 2012 ; IHS Jane's World Air Forces, "Russia." 331 Pettersen, 2013. 2020. Deployment includes military combined-arms, including border and coastal guard units to guarantee Russia's military security in diverse military and political circumstances. Large-scale strategic military exercises of Russian Armed Forces and together with forces of other "power ministries", so called "siloviki", have been carried out in different parts of Russia on rotation basis every 1-4 years. After one such exercise, Kavkaz-2008 troops continued directly to the pre-planned military operation against Georgia, instead of returning to their home bases in the Northern Caucasus Military District. 332 The next large-scale strategic military exercise Zapad-2013 (West-2013) will take place in western Russia and Belarus in 2013. 333 Large-scale strategic exercises in North-West Russia have not been frequent. The year 2009 made an exception. Two large-scale partly overlapping exercises were carried out. Exercise Ladoga-2009 was carried out in a zone of 300 km x 1200 km, from Pechenga to Vyborg and further south of St. Petersburg. A few weeks later started another, even larger exercise, Zapad (West) 2009 which tested the new chain of command. Both exercises started from the same basic scenario, invasion by enemy ground forces from the west toward western and north-western Russia, supported by air and naval forces. Exercise Ladoga took place mainly in nine separate ranges between The Arctic Ocean and Pskov oblast. The live firing climax was a launch of ballistic missiles. Both exercises were coordinated by the General Staff. Ladoga-2009 was executed under the command of Commander-in-Chief of Russian Ground Forces and Zapad-2009 under Chief of General Staff. 334 One important goal of both exercises was to scrutinize the protection of flanks of two commands. New tactical and technical innovations with "good 332 Cohen, 2008 .See also the video Студия "Альфа", г.Тверь, 7 August 2012, Потерянный день" вся правда о Войне 08.08.08г. (The Lost Day -the Whole Truth about the War on 8 August 2008) & Felgenhauer, 2012. The "Lost Day" film and the comments by Putin and Medvedev have revealed a great deal: that the invasion of Georgia in August 2008 was indeed a pre-planned aggression and that so-called "Russian peacekeepers" in South Ossetia and Abkhazia were in fact the vanguard of the invading forces that were in blatant violation of Russia's international obligations and were training and arming the local separatist forces. 333 Belarusian Telegraph Agency (BELTA), 26 October 2012, "Belarus to Host Next Belarusian-Russian Army Exercise in 2013" [http://news.belta.by/en/news/society?id= 664528]. 334 Khaimendrinov, 2009. old" equipment and weaponry were used.The command, control and cooperation of troops were the focal point of both exercises.Comprehensive net work based air defence, wide signal intelligence, common communications system and automated command (ASU TZ) in one integrated net work were tested.Satellite intelligence, UAVs, electronic warfare, automated C 3 I will be essential factors on future battlefield.335 About 20 000 Russian and Belorussian troops participated in Exercise Zapad-2009 and about 7 400 Russian soldiers of different "power ministries" participated in Exercise Ladoga-2009.Parts of the 28th Motorized Rifle Brigade were transferred from Yekaterinburg by train to the Karelian Isthmus.Troops of 20 th Guards Army from then Moscow Military District were transported to Zapad-2009 exercise area.336 Approximately 60 Russian and Belorussian combat aircraft and more than 40 helicopters were involved in Zapad-2009.New generation precision guided weapon and target acquisition systems were tested.The Joint Russian -Belorussian Air Defence System, which was founded earlier in 2009, was also proved.Night vision capable combat helicopter Mil Mi-28Ns together with older, but modernized Mi-24 PMs operated the first time at exercises.Also Kamov Ka-50s and Ka-52s were seen.The latest model MiG-29 SMT interceptors participated also for the first time.Aged but modernized Tupolev Tu-160, Tu-95MS, Tu-22MS bombers, Sukhoi Su-27SM, Mikoyan MiG-31BM fighters and Sukhoi Su-24M2 and Su-25SM ground attack air craft were in action.Units of long range S-400 and S-300 PM SAM-batteries performed in air defence and anti air duties.337 Air launched precision guided weapons from Tupolev Tu-22M3 (NATO: Backfire) bomber and tactical Sukhoi Su-24M (NATO: Fencer) attack aircraft were also tested in Belarus during this exercise.338 As to the exercise's maritime section, a naval anti-ship cruise missile P-700 Granit (NATO: SS-N-19 Shipwreck) salvo, employing so called "wolfpack" tactics, was launched from different directions for the first time in fifteen years.Maximum range of the Granit missile is about 550 km.339 335 Ekström, 2010, p. 25.336 Khaimendrinov, 2009.337 RIA Novosti, 8 September 2009 , "Russia and Belarus Start Zapad 2009 Military Exercise" [http://en.rian.ru/military_news/20090908/156054418.html] & Smith, 2009 Semenuk, 2009.339 Warfare.be, "SS-N-19 Shipwreck/P-700 Granit" [http://warfare.be/?linkid=2082 &catid=312].The summary a few months after the exercise declares that major reorganizations were made or were in the final phase.Thus the Commander-in-Chief of Ground Forces emphasized e.g. following factors: 340 In several military districts, including border and inland regions extending from Kamchatka to Kaliningrad, efficient formations have been established.Permanent-readiness brigades and airborne divisions play the most important role.Instead of the previous former six first-line assault strike divisions, altogether 85 motorized rifle, armour, missile, artillery, air assault, and various kinds of signal and electronic warfare, engineering, ABC-warfare and logistic brigades had been formed.These brigades are at full strength and fully equipped.Their combat skills were tested, for example in Ladoga-2009 and Zapad-2009 large scale exercises.The new C 3 I (ASU TZ) system has been successfully tested during these exercises.Three military districts have got detached air assault brigades.They will be directly subordinated to the military districts.These brigades will serve as the mobile reserve for the Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Strategic Command.Brigades can be used in prompt actions in dangerous zones or directed to support infantry fighting units.In larger operations air assault brigades may be supported by helicopter regiments.The brigade has an organic helicopter regiment of sixty helicopters.Each Joint Strategic Command (Military District) will have at least one helicopter brigade (70−100 helicopters).In some cases a helicopter unit (squadron) can be attached to a motorized rifle or tank brigade.341 The Army Aviation will be transferred from the Air Force back to the Ground Forces, which is a significant advantage.This makes it easier to move air assault and infantry units to necessary directions according to battlefield's requirements.Subsequently Mi-24 and Mi-28N combat helicopters assure immediate air support for brigades in all circumstances both in defence and attack.All military districts have formed their own detached reconnaissance brigade, which will assure the necessary information about enemy at many levels.The permanent-readiness brigades of the General Purpose Forces have got their own reconnaissance battalion.The commanding officers of above mentioned units will get information from a range of 25-100 km beyond the front line.The intention is to extend gradually the range of reconnaissance up to 500 km with UAV's and other means.Each military district will get or has already got a missile brigade equipped with Iskander-M ballistic missiles with versatile conventional warheads.These missile units are also certified to employ nuclear warheads.342 The 26 th Missile Brigade at Luga, south of Saint Petersburg is already operational.The system will include in addition to ballistic missiles also cruise missiles.The readiness of Ground Forces has been increased significantly in recent years.General Makarov, however, reported in November 2011 that all units and formations in the category of permanent readiness have been reinforced to full combat strength.These units are to be ready to execute combat operations within 1−2 hours after given order.This claim should, however, rather be interpreted as an ambition, not as an established fact.343 Jane's World Armies estimated in November 2012 that the majority of the Russian Airborne Forces can be deployed within 12 hours while the bulk of the Ground Forces should be operational within 24 to 48 hours, albeit in many cases with 20−40 percent deficit in vehicles.344 In practice, it is evident that 'permanent readiness' brigades will not appear as originally planned, to be able to maintain daily readiness at full strength.Rather there will be combat units of battalion strength in permanent readiness.345 Conscript soldiers are transferred from their training centres after six months basic training to formations (brigades) of constant readiness.They can be transferred to any theatre of war at short notice.The mobilization system of Russian Ground Forces has changed drastically in recent years.In addition to cadre brigades there are numerous (more than 60) depots/storages, each with sufficient equipment for a brigade size unit or even more.from reserve, brought to full readiness and performed a combat exercise between 13 and 30 September 2012.349 The brigade organization is more flexible and fits better into local conflicts in comparison with previous division organization.The main function of the ground force brigades as a permanent-readiness formation is capability to operate independently with highly mobile battle groups or other brigades under common command.War games are yet another tool used in annual command exercises that are conducted in the country's different strategic regions.In 2012 the Russian Army tested its new organizational and command structures, much like it did during the Zapad (West) 2009, Vostok (East) 2010 and Zentr (Center) 2011 exercises.350 The intensity and activity of Russia's Armed Forces have gradually grown over the last few years.Several factors have contributed.Main reasons are found in the recently introduced new military organisation (military command-army-brigade), adopted new equipment, weaponry and particularly test runs of the new command and control system.351 It seems that the command system tested in Zapad-2009 and Ladoga-2009 was then still in its infancy.The Russian Armed Forces' exercises cover practically all the services and branches plus other power ministries' armed elements.In addition, Russia has traditionally conducted exercises mutually with some other country or even multinational exercises and, of course, military exercises of her own.The year 2012 is not an exception in this respect.As for the coming large-scale strategic exercise in 2013, the Russian General Staff has released information that the biggest exercise of the whole Russian Armed Forces will be "Zapad-2013" (West 2013) in September 2013, at the same time a Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) exercise.In Central Asia the Russian, Chinese and Tajik Armed Forces took part in a common counter terrorism exercise in Tajikistan between June 8 and 14, 2012.Of the five former Soviet Central Asian states, only isolationist Turkmenistan is not a member of the Shanghai Co-operation Organization (SCO), the group named after the city where it was set up in 2001.Over the past few years China has strengthened its interests in Central Asia.353 The CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organisation) joint drills hinged on humanitarian and anti-terror manoeuvres to synchronize command and logistics operations of CSTO member states and tested force elements assigned to the KSOR -the Collective Rapid Reaction Force.A number of international organizations were also expected to join in the drills, for instance the Red Cross movement.354 The joint Russian-Kazakh anti-terrorist exercise "Aldaspan-2012", was conducted in June 2012 in the Koktal exercise area in south-eastern Kazakhstan.355 Russia held also different military exercises with Mongolia, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia and Belarus during 2012.Already in early May (11-16) Russia and Norway held another common naval exercise "Pomor-2012".356 "The Northern Eagle 2012" trilateral naval exercises for Russia, Norway and the United States were held 21-25 August, in the Norwegian Sea.The Russians were represented by the Admiral Chabanenko, a Northern Fleet destroyer at the manoeuvres, Norway by the Nordkapp coast guard frigate and the U.S. by the Farragut guided weapons destroyer.All three countries will arrange these exercises in turn.This kind of management system has previously repeatedly been tested in the Norwegian-Russian Pomor exercises and was recognized as the most effective way to work together at sea.357 CSTO-alliance-in-response-to-U-S-anti-missile-shield/]; BELTA, 26 October 2012, "Belarus to Host Next Belarusian-Russian Army Exercise in 2013." 353 Kilner, 2012 354 Kramnik, 2012.355 The September 2012 war games, dubbed Kavkaz-2012, were to focus on "polishing" the armed forces' command and control units, which have received a lot of criticism over the past few years.Kavkaz-2012 was the largest Russian military exercise conducted in 2012.It was held in the area of the Southern Military Command.358 This time the size of the military exercise contingent involved about eight thousand personnel, was aided by up to 200 armoured vehicles, less than a hundred artillery systems, a group of ten warships and boats, as well as an unidentified number of frontline combat aircraft, helicopters, and drones.In fact, as a gesture of goodwill the contingents in the Russian bases in Armenia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia were not involved in the exercise.According to Deputy Chief of the General Staff Alexander Postnikov, this decision was taken in order not to heighten tension in the region.Moreover, the exercise was to be held far away from the Georgian border.359 Ladoga-2012 Pilots from the Western Military District flew on MiG-29SMT, MiG-31 and different modifications of Su-27 fighter aircraft during "Ladoga-2012" air force exercise on 9-15 April, 2012.Military airbases in north-western Russia (Karelian Republic, Kursk, Tver and Kaliningrad oblasts) were used in the exercise.About 50 aircraft and 100 pilots participated.Live firing (gun, rocket and missile) took place above Lake Ladoga and its shore area.360 Air Force and Air Defence Exercise The Western Military District conducted also another tactical exercise on air defence brigade level in area of the Karelian republic, Murmansk, Leningrad and Tver regions in June 2012.The aircraft (Sukhoi Su-27 fighters and Sukhoi Su-24 fighter bombers) taking part in the exercise came from Khotilovo (Tver Region), Besovets (Karelian Republic) and Monchegorsk (Murmansk Region) airbases.In addition to flying units, the air defence missile brigades (S-300), radar and radio units formed the interception zone.361 Command Post Exercise (CPX) in Kola Peninsula On 25 October 2012, as part of a Command Post Exercise in the Western Military District, the coastal forces of the Northern Fleet made Russia's first ever sea-borne landing on the shores of the uninhabited Kotelny Island.That was a part of a wide-ranging exercise which included all the Russian armed forces' units deployed in the Kola Peninsula area.This was the first time that combat training of this kind focused on protecting civilian facilities -research stations, drilling facilities and energy-industry installations located in the Arctic region.These were the reasons why the large destroyer "Vice-Admiral Kulakov" and the heavy nuclear-powered battle cruiser "Pyotr Veliky" were stationed in coastal Arctic waters of the Northern Sea Route.More than 7000 military personnel and 150 objects of military equipment were involved in the CPX.Training exercises conducted in the military testing zones of the Barents Sea, the sub-Arctic areas of the Northern Sea Route, the coastal regions of the Pechenga Area in Murmansk Region, and on the Sredniy and Rybachiy Peninsulas.362 Under the command of the Western Military District the 138.Guard Detached Motor Rifle Brigade conducted in mid October a large exercise on local firing range area on the Karelian Isthmus at Kamenka (in Finnish Perkjärvi).More than 3000 troops, 150 military vehicles, army air force (incl. Mi-24 attack helicopters and Su-24 bombers) took part in the exercise.More than one hundred generals and other high ranking officers of the Western Military District staffs and other formations also visited the exercise.The most important training objects were to demonstrate strong heavy weapon fire and action against enemy's reconnaissance groups.363 To sum up, there have been at least five exercises of medium or larger scale in the near vicinity of Finland in 2012, held by the Russian military.The Western Military District did not conduct any strategic level large-scale exercise in 2012.The exercise intensity has in the last year, however, grown essentially because of the diversity of several medium-size local exercises (ground force, air force, navy, mobilization, inter-arms etc).Although Russia has, on the one hand, carried out constantly growing number of different types of military exercises on a yearly basis, it has, on the other hand, strongly criticized some neighbours which have held their own manoeuvres.364 362 Kislyakov, 2012.363 Pochinyuk, 2012.364 Pettersen, 2012; Blank, 2012.Geopolitiikan vahva paluu maailmanpolitiikkaan on tosiasia.Vaikutukset ulottuvat myös Suomen lähialueelle.Neuvostoliiton/Venäjän vetäytyminen asemistaan Varsovan liiton maissa ja Baltian maissa kylmän sodan loputtua oli muutoksen ensimmäinen vaihe, joka samalla osui Euroopan uuden ns.yhteistyövaraisen turvallisuusjärjestelmän rakentamisen aikaan ETY-järjestön puitteissa.Toinen vaihe, Venäjän uusi nousu entisen Neuvostoliiton maiden vaikutuspiiriin, pääsi vauhtiin viime vuosikymmenen puolivälissä ja huipentui Georgian sotaan, Ukrainan ns.oranssin vallankumouksen kaatumiseen ja Valko-Venäjän laajempaan integrointiin Venäjän järjestelmiin.Maalle on tärkeää korjata epäedulliseksi kokemansa 1990-luvun ratkaisut.Venäjä tavoittelee suurvaltaasemansa palauttamista.Vastakkainasettelu on siten jossain määrin palannut kuvaan mukaan ja euroatlanttisen turvallisuusjärjestelyn uskottavuus heikentynyt, vaikka sitä lännessä ei mielellään myönnetä.Yhtenä osoituksena tästä on Venäjän yritys kumota Euroopan turvallisuus-ja yhteistyöjärjestön (ETYJ) tärkeimmät saavutukset, kuten Euroopan turvallisuuden peruskirjan sitoumukset vuodelta 1999.Venäjä pitää sotilasdoktriinissaan Natoa vaarana ja epäyhtenäinen Nato puolestaan Venäjää kumppanina.Länsi-Euroopassa alettiin kuitenkin 1990-luvulla pitää sodan uhkaa niin vanhentuneena ajatuksena, että se mahdollisti Nato-maiden ja muiden länsimaiden asevoimien poikkeuksellisen mittavan alasajon ja tehtävien suuntaamisen maanpuolustuksesta kriisienhallintaan.Samalla maiden sotilaallinen valmius heikkeni olennaisesti.Puolustusliitto Naton sisäiset vaikeudet korostuvat tilanteessa, jossa liiton tärkeimmän jäsenen Yhdysvaltain intressit kohdistuvat yhä voimakkaammin Aasian ja Tyynenmeren suuntaan.Yhdysvaltain taloudelliset resurssit kaventuvat ja erilaisten sitoumusten täyttäminen käy epävarmemmaksi.Asiaan vaikuttavat myös Yhdysvaltain perinteisten suurten eurooppalaisten liittolaisten teot ja asenteet.Nato-maa Saksan rooli on keskeinen ja erityisesti Saksan mutta myös Ranskan Venäjä-politiikka on herättänyt kysymyksiä.Suurten eurooppalaisten Nato-maiden sotilaalliset resurssit ovat kaventuneet nopeasti.Venäjän asevoimien uudistamisprosessin taustalta on selvästi nähtävissä pyrkimys vastata eri puolilla valtavaa valtakuntaa ilmeneviin erimuotoisiin haasteisiin.Organisatorisesti on tehty ajan edellyttämiä muutoksia.Raskas ja kömpelö divisioonaorganisaatio on lännen tapaan saanut antaa tilaa joustavammalle prikaatiorganisaatiolle.Vanhoista sotilaspiireistä on luovuttu ja niiden tilalle on tullut neljä operatiivis-strategista yhteisjohtoporrasta.Leningradin ja Mosko-van sotilaspiirit yhdistämällä muodostetun Läntisen sotilaspiirin esikunta on sijoitettu Pietariin.Tämän yhteisjohtoportaan alaisuuteen on liitetty myös Pohjoinen ja Itämeren laivastot sekä koko uuden sotilaspiirin alueen ilmavoimat ja ilmapuolustus.Tämä on samalla osoitus painopisteen siirtymisestä läntisellä suunnalla Keski-Euroopasta luoteeseen.Venäjän rapautuneita asevoimia on ryhdytty modernisoimaan monipuolisesti vahvalla ja kasvavalla taloudellisella panostuksella, osittain myös Saksan ja Ranskan suoranaisella tuella.Vuoteen 2020 ulottuvalle varusteluohjelmalle on varattu yhteensä noin 20 biljoonaa ruplaa eli noin 500 miljardia euroa.Venäjän asevoimien kaluston laajamittainen sarjatuotanto on käynnistymässä ensi kertaa Neuvostoliiton hajoamisen jälkeen.Venäjän johdon päättäväisyys varustelusuunnitelmien toteuttamisessa näkyy tulevien vuosien nopeasti kasvavissa puolustusmäärärahoissa.Ruotsin puolustusvoimien arvion mukaan Venäjän varusteluohjelma sujuu hyvin.Varusmiespalvelusta ei luovuta ainakaan seuraavien 10−15 vuoden aikana, mikä takaa maalle usean miljoonan miehen koulutetun reservin, joista 700 000 voidaan mobilisoida nopeasti.Vaikka Venäjä kehittää asevoimiaan ennen muuta alueellista sodankäyntikykyä varten, se varautuu myös jatkossa äärimmäisenä vaihtoehtona suurimittaiseen sotaan.Suurta reserviä tarvitaan erityisesti itäisellä suunnalla.Sitä on teknisesti mahdollista käyttää myös miehitysjoukkona.On ilmeistä, että Venäjä tarvitsee läntisellä suunnalla pieniä, joustavia, hyvin koulutettuja ja korkeassa perusvalmiudessa olevia tehokkaita iskujoukkoja joilla on kyky saavuttaa operatiivisia tuloksia suoraan rauhan ajan ryhmityksestä.Tämä visio on uuden venäläisen sotatieteellisen ajattelun tulosta, ja se korostaa sotien alkuvaiheiden ratkaisevaa merkitystä, mutta myös ensimmäisen strategisen iskun, mukaan lukien ennalta ehkäisevien toimien tärkeyttä.Joukkoja voidaan tarvittaessa vahventaa nopeasti.Nato-maiden alueellisen puolustuksen alasajo ja toisaalta Venäjän korkeassa valmiudessa olevien joukkojen kehittäminen ovat aiheuttaneet hämmennystä ja epävarmuutta lähialueellamme ja itäisen Keski-Euroopan valtioissa.Venäjän joukkojen määrä entisen Leningradin sotilaspiirin alueella on vaihdellut merkittävästi Neuvostoliiton hajoamisen jälkeen.Vuosituhannen alun suurten joukkojen supistusten jälkeen suunta on taas muuttunut nousujohteiseksi.Venäjän asevoimien harjoitusaktiviteetti on selvästi vilkastunut.Venäjän 6.Armeijan esikunta johtanee Suomen itä-ja kaakkoispuolella olevia maavoimien joukkoja.Vuonna 2010 perustettiin uusi moottoroitu jalkaväkiprikaati Pietarin eteläpuolelle.Se kuulunee kaavailtuihin korkean valmiuden joukkoihin.Kannaksella on valmiudessa maan valioyksiköihin kuuluva moottoroitu jalkaväkiprikaati Kamenkassa.Pietarin pohjoispuolella, Sertolovossa olevasta kalustovarastosta voidaan tarvittaessa perustaa prikaati.Prikaateja tu-keva helikopteriyksikkö sijaitsee myös Karjalan kannaksella.Runsaasta, joukkoja tukevasta tykistöstä mainittakoon raskas raketinheitinprikaati, jonka heittimien kantama on yli 80 kilometriä.Varsin merkittävä potentiaalin lisäys on uusien 450-700 kilometrin kantaman omaavien Iskander-M -ohjusten sijoittaminen Lugaan, Pietarin eteläpuolella olevaan tykistöohjusprikaatiin.Ne edustavat doktriinissakin mainittua täsmäaseistusta ja niiden kantama kattaa Baltian ohella pääosan Suomen alueesta.Iskander-M voidaan varustaa monipuolisilla tavanomaisilla taistelukärjillä ja tarvittaessa myös ydinkärjillä.Iskander-ohjusjärjestelmälle on Venäjän puolustussuunnittelussa kaavailtu sekä tärkeä ydinpeloterooli että tehokas hyökkäyksellinen rooli eri puolilla maata.Taktiset ballistiset ohjukset ja risteilyohjukset ovat ottamassa yhä lisääntyvän operatiivis-taktisen roolin ja täydentävät rynnäkköilmavoimia erinomaisesti.Maan sotilasviranomaisilla on suuria odotuksia tämän ohjuksen suhteen.Strategisen iskun suorittamisen kannalta Lugan Iskander-tykistö-ohjusprikaati on olennaisen tärkeä.Sen täsmäiskuja saatettaisiin käyttää ilmavoimien ohella vastustajan puolustusjärjestelmän lamauttamiseen käyttäen hyväksi tämän alhaista valmiutta.Pihkovan alueella toimii ilmarynnäkködivisioona sekä erikoisjoukkojen (spetsnaz) prikaati.Petsamossa on yksi moottoroitu jalkaväkiprikaati sekä merijalkaväkiprikaati.Myös näiden joukkojen valmiusvaatimus on vain tuntiluokkaa.Arktisiin oloihin soveltuva Spetsnaz-erikoisjoukoista koottava Arktinen prikaati perustetaan myös Petsamoon, Venäjän maavoimien komentaja ilmoitti maaliskuussa 2011.Suunnitelmat on sittemmin lykätty vuoteen 2015.On ennenaikaista sanoa, onko kyseessä täysin uusi yksikkö.Sallan itäpuolella sijaitsevaa Alakurtin lentotukikohtaa kunnostetaan ja sinne sijoitettaneen uusittu helikopterirykmentti.Sen kalusto käsittää rynnäkköhelikoptereita ja aseistettuja kuljetus-helikoptereita.Alueella olevasta kalustovarastosta perustettaneen moottoroitu jalkaväkiprikaati, jota helikopterirykmentti voi tukea.Myös Petroskoissa sijaitsevasta kalustovarastosta voidaan perustaa ainakin yksi prikaati, jonka kykyä demonstroitiin liikekannallepano-ja taisteluharjoituksessa syyskuussa 2012.Lehtusiin, Pietarin pohjoispuolelle on valmistunut tehokas tutka-asema mm. antamaan ennakkovaroitusta mahdollisesta strategisesta ohjushyökkäyksestä.Lisäksi Suursaaressa on jälleen pitkähkön tauon jälkeen rakennettu uusi ilmavalvontatutka-asema.Suomenlahden ohella se tulee kattamaan muun muassa Viron ja koko eteläisen Suomen ilmatilan.1.Ilmavoima-ja ilmapuolustusalueella, Pohjoisen laivaston ja Itämeren laivaston ilmavoimilla on yhteensä yli 200 erityyppistä taistelulentokonetta, toista sataa taisteluhelikopteria ja vastaava määrä aseistettavia kuljetushelikoptereita sekä paljon muita erikois-ja kuljetuskoneita.Alueelle tukeutuu lisäksi eräitä muita ilmavoimien yksiköitä.Venäjän ilmavoimat ovat kaikkialla nopeasti mobilisoitavissa ja yksiköt ovat jatkuvassa valmiudessa ja täydessä sodan ajan kokoonpanossa.Niitä voidaan siirtää lyhyessä ajassa kaukaakin halutulle kohdealueelle.Uusia raskaita S-400-ilmatorjuntaohjuksia, joita aiemmin oli operatiivisina vain Moskovan suojana, on nyt myös sijoitettu Kaliningradiin.Lugan Iskanderohjusten ohella myös tämä on vahva poliittinen signaali.S-400 voisi kriisitilanteessa vaikeuttaa toimimista Itämeren alueen ilmatilassa merkittävästi ja käytännössä ehkä sulkea ilmatilan täysin.Asia vaikuttaa suoraan kysymykseen Baltian maiden puolustamisesta, josta erityisesti Ruotsissa on kannettu huolta.Ruotsin sotatiedeakatemian Nationell strategi för närområdet -tutkimushankkeen yksi merkittävä tulos oli, että Nato todennäköisesti ei ehtisi reagoida kyllin nopeasti mahdollisessa sotilaallisessa konfliktissa Baltian maissa, vaan joutuisi tapahtuneiden tosiasioiden eteen.Venäjällä on julkisuudessa esitetty yhä enemmän arvioita Suomen kuulumisesta Venäjän etupiiriin ja vastustettu yhä selvemmin Suomen Nato-jäsenyyttä ja pohjoismaista puolustusyhteistyötä.Suomen puolustusvoimien päätehtävänä pysyy oman maan puolustaminen.Valitun alueellisen puolustusjärjestelmän rauhan ajan valmius on matala.Tämän tulisi olla ympäristöä rauhoittava elementti, mutta samalla se asettaa suuria vaatimuksia valmiuden kohottamisjärjestelyille.Suomen puolustusvoimien rauhan ajan vahvuus on Euroopan pienimpiä, noin 30 000 henkilöä.Erityisesti rauhan ajan maavoimat on käytännössä koulutusorganisaatio.Taistelujoukot muodostetaan vasta reserviläisistä perustamalla.Harhaanjohtavia, puutteellisia ja tarkoitushakuisilta vaikuttavia ovat vertailut, joissa Suomen täyden liikekannallepanon edellyttämää vahvuutta, 230 000, verrataan väestöltään moninkertaisten, pinta-alaltaan paljon pienempien ja geopoliittiselta asemaltaan kokonaan toisenlaisten maiden ammattiarmeijoiden rauhan ajan vahvuuksiin.Suomen alue on suuri ja reserviä tarvitaan paljon lukuisien kohteiden suojaamiseen koko valtakunnan alueella sekä korvaamaan liikekannallepanon hävikkejä ja ensi-iskuissa aiheutuvia tappioita.Koko vuosittaisen ikäluokan kouluttaminen on tarpeen jos aiotaan saada riittävästi yksiköitä.Suuri reservi on osoitus maanpuolustustahdosta ja siitä, että vastarintaa on tarkoitus jatkaa jopa maahantunkeutumisen jälkeen.Tämän ennaltaehkäisevä arvo on suuri.Prime Minister's Office, 2009, p. 40.The next Finnish government White paper, released on 21 December 2012, says that Russia strives for a multipolar world and wants recognition as one of the major actors in world politics.Prime Minister's Office, 2012, p. 30.For a thorough military-political and technical analysis of this missile system seeForss, 2012.Burr & Savranskaya, 2009.14 Kalashnikova, 2005.The interview given by General Burlakov reveals that nuclear first use was indeed planned, regardless of what the political leadership officially stated."[Foreign Minister Gromyko] said one thing and the military thought another. We are the ones who are responsible for [fighting] wars."Gordon, Johnson, Larrabee & Wilson, 2012, p. 140.27 Rotfeld, 2009, p. 30;Whitney, 1992.100 Professor Stephen J. Blank confirmed this assessment at the Q/A session after his presentation at FIIA, Helsinki, 8 November 2011.He pointed out that there is a clear trend towards strengthening the defence at the country's periphery.The same can also be seen in the east.See also STRATFOR, 7 December 2011, Estonia's Defensive Options Against Russia [http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20111206-estonias-defensive-options-against-russia]; See further Bidder, 2011 and Leijonhielm, 2012, p. 89.countries' almost total control of the sea.However, Russia can, if need be, prevent her opponents from using the Baltic Sea waters, with the exception of the Gulf of Bothnia, by the use of new air-launched and ground-launched missiles.McDermott, 2011, pp. 67-68.See alsoMiranovitsh, 2009.105 RIA Novosti, 16 July 2012, "Russian Military to Form 26 New Brigades by 2020" [http://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20120716/174634711.html].106 RIA Novosti, 4 April 2011, "Russia to Continue Military Conscription for 10-15 Years -Medvedev" [http://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20110404/163367728.html].107 Daily Mail, 18 November 2011, "Nuclear War Could Erupt along Russia's Border with Europe, Warns Kremlin Commander" [http://www.dailymail. co.uk/news/article-2062865/Nikolai-Makarov-Nuclear-war-erupt-Russias-borders-Europe.html].108 RIA Novosti, 7 October 2012, "Russian Military Pay Rises, but Draft to Remain -Chief" [http://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20121007/176467212.html].For a more detailed analysis, see McDermott, 2012a.109 McDermott, 2013.110 McDermott, 2011.See also, Felgenhauer, 2011.RIA Novosti, 19 May 2011, "Russian State Defence Order Still in Bad Shape -Govt" [http://en.rian.ru/russia/20110519/164111503.html]; RIA Novosti, 17 May 2011, "Russian High-Ranking Officials Sacked over State Defence Order" [http://en.rian.ru/russia/ 20110517/164078046.html].142 Rosbalt, 6 October 2011, "Премьер-министр РФ: В бюджете-2012 возрастут расходы на военные нужды" (Prime Minister: The Budget 2012 Will Increase Military Spending) [http://www.rosbalt.ru/business/2011/10/06/898103.html].143 RIA Novosti, 31 January 2013, "Russia to Prioritize Military Industry -PM Medvedev" [http://en.rian.ru/military_news/20130131/179152543/Russia-to-Prioritize-Military-Industry---PM-Medvedev.html].144Oxenstierna, 16 February 2011, p. 13 and 24.According to Susanne Oxenstierna, "It is questionable if the goals will be met, but it is clear that materiel procurement will consume an ever growing portion of the defence budget and seems to be prioritized."See also Mukhin, 2010.It is pointed out in the FOI report that the procurement program plans are indicative, not mandated by law.See also IHS Jane's World Armies, "Russian Federation", 15 November 2012.JWA estimates that "between 2012 and 2016 alone Russia will commit more than USD 18 billion to land forces procurement programmes, which even when taking into consideration any misallocation of funds or an unrealistic calculation of the budget for the state armaments programme -the planned expenditure should greatly aid attempts to modernise the equipment of the Russian armed forces." 145 RIA Novosti, 25 February 2010, "Russia's New Ground Forces Chief Urges Drastic Cuts in Tanks" [http://en.rian.ru/russia/20100225/158003606.html].146 IISS 2010, p. 223 and ArmyTechnology.com, "T-90S Main Battle Tank" Clapper, 31 January 2012.Kalashnikova, 2005.An English version, "All They Had to Do Was Give the Signal" is found at [http://www.kommersant.com/ page.asp?id=558042].Koivisto, 2001, p. 292.172 Kilin, 2010, pp. 19−37.173 This was confirmed by Russia's Minister of Defence Anatoly Serdyukov during the visit by his Finnish counterpart Stefan Wallin in Moscow on 14 February 2012.174 Virkkunen, 2007.Ambassador Jaakko Blomberg illuminates further the attempts of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to negate the Finnish decision of 21 September 1990, to declare the military clauses of the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947 void, which would in fact have curtailed Finnish sovereignty; Blomberg, 2011, pp. 56−58.The efficiency of Russia's air assault units depends heavily on the capability of the helicopters.The present equipment is evidently so worn out that, for example, the 76 th Air Assault Division deployed to Georgia as ordinary infantry units.SeeLeijonhielm, 2012, p.North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 1949.196 Winnerstig, 2011, pp. 113-134.197 Iivonen, 2011, p. 13.Holmström, 2011.Sweden's role as NATO's unofficial 17 th member during the Cold War was one of the cornerstones of Swedish defence policy.The co-operation with the United States and NATO assumed the form of quite detailed plans to receive and give help, but due to Sweden's neutrality this had to be kept strictly secret -especially from the Swedish people.202Koivula & Forss, 2012, pp. 147-173.203 Prime Minister's Office, 2012, p.75.The government white paper released on 21 December 2012 says that Finland preserves the possibility to apply for NATO membership.204This was articulated in an op-ed article in Helsingin Sanomat by the Swedish, Finnish and Norwegian Chiefs of Defence in September 2012.SeeGöranson, Puheloinen and Sunde, 2012.See also STRATFOR, 1 November 2012, Finland, Sweden: A Step Toward Greater Nordic Security Cooperation.Russia's Chief of General Staff, Army General Nikolai Makarov, Helsinki 5 June 2012.See also Benitez, 2012.206 Prime Minister's Office, 2009, p. 109.The substance of the wordings in the new government white paper, released on 21 December 2012, remains essentially unchanged.See Valtioneuvoston kanslia, 2012, pp. 96-97.Leijonhielm, 2012, p. 98 and 106.224 Neretnieks, 2012, pp. 199-204.According to Karlis Neretnieks, "It's all about retake."This description of the allied contingency planning for the Baltic States was communicated by a Swedish defence researcher.225In addition to Luga, Iskander missile deployment to both Kaliningrad and Belarus is contemplated.See Liakhovich, 2012.Barabanov, Makienko & Pukhov, 2012..247 Gorenburg, 2013a.248Boltenkov, Gayday, Karnaukhov, Lavrov & Tseluiko, 2011, p. 30.Warfare.be, "Russia's New Army" [http://www.cast.ru, http://warfare.be].250McDermott, 2011c.The substance of that specific claim became the topic of heated discussion.Few observers accept it as such.Pitalev, 2012.252 Ibid.253Gavrilov, 2009.254 Ibid.Ibid.259 Tikhonov, 2011.260 Kashin 2012.Gavrilov, 2009.267 Gorenburg, 2012.268 Kiselev, 2010.269 Litovkin, 2010.270 Barabanov, 2011.Gorenburg, 2012.272 Ibid.273Ibid.274Verba, 2012 275 RUSSIAN AVIATION, 25 March 2011, "Russian Air Force Upgrade Review" [http://www. ruaviation.com/docs/4/2011/3/25/27/print/].	The impulse to this work came in spring 2010 from a respected Swedish colleague and teacher at the Department of Strategic and Defence Studies at the Finnish National Defence University.The radical Swedish defence reorganization and the unilateral declarations of solidarity made by Sweden created a rather opaque situation.The implications and consequences of the adopted policy were difficult to assess.The views and assessments of Finnish military and security experts are appreciated in Sweden.We accepted the invitation to write this report, which is part of a long-time international cooperation.The authors alone carry the responsibility of the final product.The powerful revival of geopolitics in world politics is an established fact.Its effects also extend to areas close to Finland.The Soviet Union's withdrawal from its positions in the Warsaw Pact and Baltic countries at the end of the Cold War was the first phase of the change, which simultaneously had a part in shaping Europe's new, so-called cooperative security regime within the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), later known as the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).The second phase, Russia's regaining a position of influence among former Soviet republics, gained impetus halfway through the last decade and reached its peak with the war in Georgia, the collapse of the so-called "Orange revolution" in the Ukraine, and further integration of Belarus into the Russian system. "Russia is seeking to restore its great-power status and considers it very important to alter the decisions of the 1990s, which it deems as unfavourable to Russia".1 A somewhat adversarial stance has thus re-emerged into the picture, and faith in the Euro-Atlantic security regime has weakened, although the western countries are reluctant to admit that.One indication of that is Russia's attempt to overthrow the most important accomplishments of the OSCE, such as the basic security obligations stated in the Charter of European Security, adopted in Istanbul in 1999.In its military doctrine, Russia considers NATO a danger, and NATO in turn considers Russia a partner.In the 1990's, however, Western Europe began to consider the threat of war such an outmoded idea that it made possible an exceptionally large reduction in the armed forces of NATO and other Western countries, and a change of missions from territorial defence to crisis management.At the same time, the military readiness of countries was substantially reduced.The internal problems of NATO increased in a situation where the interests of its most important member state, the United States, were more and more strongly focused on Asia and the Pacific.The U.S. economic resources are diminishing, and its fulfilment of various commitments to allies and friends is becoming more uncertain.The actions and attitudes of traditional U.S. allies in Europe are also influencing the matter.The role of the NATO member state Germany is crucial.Germany's Russia policy in particular, but also the policy of France, have raised questions.Underlying Russia's reform of its armed forces, one can plainly see an effort to respond to different kinds of challenges appearing in different parts of its huge country.Organizational changes required by the times have been made.Heavy and cumbersome divisions have given way to more manageable brigades in the Western fashion.Old military districts (MD's) have been abandoned, and have given way to four operational-strategic combined commands, still called military districts in peacetime.The Western MD was created by combining the Leningrad and Moscow MD's.Its HQ is located in St. Petersburg, which is also a sign of the fact that the center of gravity in the western direction has been displaced from Central Europe toward the northwest.Steps are being taken to modernize Russia's dilapidated weaponry in comprehensive ways via large and increasingly large appropriations, and in part with the direct support of Germany and France.The armaments program in effect until 2020 has received an equipment appropriation totalling about 20 trillion roubles or approximately 500 billion euro.Extensive start-up of serial production of Russian military equipment is commencing for the first time since the break-up of the Soviet Union.General conscription will not be abandoned for at least the next ten to fifteen years, which guarantees the country a trained military reserve of several million men, 700,000 of which can be mobilised rapidly.Even if Russia develops her armed forces primarily with local warfare capability in mind and for control of her neighbourhood, she as a last resort, prepares also for a future large-scale war.A large reserve is needed particularly in the eastern direction.It is technically possible to use it as an occupying force.It is apparent that in the west, Russia needs small, mobile, highly trained and effective strike forces in high readiness, which are able to achieve operational results directly from their peacetime deployments.This vision is the result of new Russian military scientific thinking, which emphasizes the decisive importance not only of the initial period of war, but above all the first strategic strike, including pre-emptive actions.The forces can be reinforced quickly if necessary.The abandonment of territorial defence in most NATO countries and the increase in preparedness of Russian forces created confusion and uncertainty in countries near Finland and in the eastern parts of Central Europe.The number of Russian troop units and troop strength in the former Leningrad MD has changed markedly since the dissolution of the Soviet Union.The large decrease that took place in the late 1990s and at the start of this century has changed to an increased capability again.The current ground forces east and southeast of Finland seem to be under the command of the Russian 6 th Army Headquarters.In 2010 a motorized infantry brigade was reported to have been established south of St. Petersburg.It probably is part of the planned high readiness units.At Kamenka on the Karelian Isthmus there is in readiness a motorized infantry brigade which ranks among the elite army units.At Sertolovo, north of St. Petersburg, a brigade is likely to be formed at the supply depot there.A helicopter unit supporting the brigades is also located on the Karelian Isthmus.Among the abundant artillery groups supporting the troops let us mention the heavy rocket launcher brigade, the range of whose weapons is over eighty kilometres.An especially significant increase in military capability is the stationing of the Iskander-M ballistic missiles, with a range of 450 to 700 kilometres, with the artillery-missile brigade at Luga, south of St. Petersburg.These missiles represent the kind of high precision weapons mentioned in military doctrine, and its range covers, in addition to the Baltic countries, most of Finland.The Iskander-M can be equipped with either a variety of conventional warheads or a nuclear warhead.2 In Russian defence planning, the Iskander missile system is given important roles in various parts of the country as both a nuclear deterrent weapon and an effective offensive conventional weapon.Tactical ballistic missiles and cruise missiles are assuming an increasing operational-tactical role and augment aviation strike forces well.The country's military authorities have great expectations with regard to the Iskander missile system.In carrying out strategic strikes, the Luga Iskander missile brigade is of fundamental importance.Along with air power, its accurate strikes could be used to suppress any organized defence by opponents, taking advantage of their lack of readiness.In the Pskov area, an airborne assault division is deployed, along with a Special Forces (Spetsnaz) brigade.In Pechenga there is a motorized infantry brigade and a naval infantry brigade.The stated ambition is that these units be ready for action in only a few hours.An Arctic Brigade, recruited from Spetsnaz special forces accustomed to Arctic conditions, was also to be established in Pechenga, according to an announcement by the commander of Russia's ground forces in March 2011.Plans have since been postponed to 2015.It is too early to tell if the brigade will be an entirely new unit.The Alakurtti Air Base east of Salla is being repaired and a renovated helicopter regiment is likely to be stationed there.Its equipment includes attack helicopters and armed transport helicopters.From equipment stored in the area a new motorized infantry brigade can be established which the helicopter regiment may support.At least one more brigade may be established with the equipment stored in Petrozavodsk, the capability of which was demonstrated in a mobilisation and combat exercise in At Lekhtusi, to the north of St. Petersburg, an effective radar base has been completed in order to provide early warning of a possible strategic missile attack.In addition, a new air-surveillance radar base at Hogland (Suursaari) has been built.In addition to the Gulf of Finland, it covers the air space of Estonia and all of southern Finland.In the 1 st Air Force and Air Defence Command (1 Командование ВВС и ПВО) the air forces of the Baltic and Northern Fleets have a strength of more than two hundred combat aircraft of different types, plus more than a hundred combat helicopters, and an equal number of armed transport helicopters, plus many other specialized and transport planes.Certain other air force units also use this as a forward deployment area.Russia's air forces everywhere can be quickly mobilized; its units are constantly in a state of readiness and at full wartime strength.They can be moved quickly to even distant locations.New heavy S-400 air defence missiles, which earlier were operational only for the defence of Moscow, have been deployed in Kaliningrad.This, along with the Iskander missiles, is a powerful political signal.In a crisis situation, the S-400 would complicate aerial operations in the Baltic Sea airspace significantly, and perhaps even prevent such operations entirely.A significant conclusion of the Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences' A National Strategy for Neighbouring Areas research project is that NATO apparently would not be able to react quickly enough in case of a possible military conflict in the Baltic countries, but would be faced with a fait accompli.The primary duty of the Finnish Defence Forces (FDF) is the defence of the homeland.The chosen Finnish defence concept of general conscription and regional defence implies that the peacetime readiness of the Finnish army is at a low level.This should be a reassuring element in the area, but it places great demands on any effort to increase the readiness.The peacetime strength of the Finnish Defence Forces is among Europe's smallest, some 30,000 men and women.Especially in peacetime, the ground forces are in effect a training organization.Combat forces will be formed only from reserves.he division of Europe into two blocs actually began during the Second World War with the Allied race for Berlin, when a significant part of "liberated" Europe was left in the Soviet sphere of influence behind the Iron Curtain.3 In this huge political upheaval, the United States and the Soviet Union rose to be the undisputed leaders of the two political blocs, the East and the West.In the West, Soviet efforts to expand were dealt with using the so-called "Containment Policy" 4 devised by President Truman 5 and by founding the defensive North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949.Gradually the Soviet Union realized that it was surrounded.The same attitude is still very much alive in Russia.The next massive geopolitical change, the surprising break-up of the Soviet Union, came more than forty years later.According to Russia's President Putin, this was one of the great geopolitical catastrophes of the last century.6 Having recovered from the humiliating position experienced during Yeltsin's presidency, Russia is seeking to restore its great power status and considers it very important to alter the decisions of the 1990s, which it deems unfavourable to Russia.7 It is impossible to predict how well Russia will finally succeed, but it is certain that the effects of her aspirations, be they positive or negative, will extend to Finland and her neighbourhood.During the decades of the Cold War, the military alliances in Europe were armed for a large-scale war with one another.Finland was especially affected by the powerful Soviet military power beyond her border, a significant part of which was always at a high state of readiness.8 3 Churchill, 1946 .The key passage of Winston Churchill's Fulton speech reads as follows: "From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the Continent.Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe.Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia, all these famous cities and the populations around them lie in what I must call the Soviet sphere, and all are subject in one form or another, not only to Soviet influence but to a very high and, in many cases, increasing measure of control from Moscow."4 X (a.k.a.Kennan, George F.), 1947.5 Truman, 1947.6 President of Russia, 2005.7 Juntunen, 2013.Professor Alpo Juntunen paints a thorough picture of Russian political culture and mode of thought, which is based upon geopolitics and historical tradition.8 Gustafsson, 2007 .Former Supreme Commander of Sweden's defence forces, General Bengt Gustafsson, has written extensively about the Soviet Union's operational plans aimed at Sweden (and Finland).A departure from earlier times was the arrival of new weapons with hitherto unheard-of destructive power, including nuclear weapons.They totally upset the conception of a large-scale war, and they were perhaps the single most important factor in restraining the great powers from taking too great risks.In spite of several serious crises, peace was preserved between the great powers and their allies.9 The build-up of nuclear arsenals of the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, reached exceptional proportions.The striving for nuclear parity and the eventual goal to surpass the United States, with complete disregard both for efforts and costs, undoubtedly weighed more in Soviet decision-making than other factors.However, the country's political and military leaders had already concluded during the 1970s that there would be no victor in a nuclear war.10 This matter was finally confirmed by both President Reagan and Gorbachev in 1985 . "A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought."In addition, according to the Soviet leadership, a nuclear war must be avoided at all cost.11 It is difficult to interpret correctly the military-operational plans discovered in the archives of the former German Democratic Republic (East Germany or GDR) in which the abundant use of tactical nuclear weapons would have had an obvious and decisive role.As early as the time of the Cuban missile crisis in October of 1962, the Soviet military leadership issued a stern order that is was categorically forbidden to use the short-and medium-range nuclear weapons stationed in Cuba to repel a possible landing by the United States.12 Introduction • 3 In the West, the Soviet Union's aggressive offensive posture has perhaps been overemphasized while at the same time its fear of a Western surprise attack has been underestimated.13 For his part, General Matvei Burlakov, the last commander of the Soviet Western Army Group, spoke in March 2005, of the exceptionally high level of readiness of his troops in the former East Germany.His troops numbered over half a million men, and there were abundant nuclear weapons at their disposal, which could have been used in a first strike if necessary.14 Nuclear deterrence did not, however, prevent the Soviet Union from interfering in the people's uprisings among its Eastern European allies in the 1950s and 1960s, but it had a major significance in the preservation of peace in Europe.Finland was in a difficult position, but also benefited from that.he Cold War is generally considered to have ended with the collapse of the Berlin wall, or at the latest with the breakup of the Soviet Union in December of 1991.15 Geopolitical changes in the CSCE Member States were noteworthy.Germany was reunited, and the Soviet republics became independent.In the case of the Baltic States it was indeed a return to independence.The Government of Finland unilaterally declared in September of 1990 that the provisions of the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947 limiting Finland's sovereignty had lost their meaning.At the same time President Koivisto reinterpreted the Treaty on Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance [FCMA] , which finally disappeared into history on the fall of the Soviet Union in December the following year.16 Finland joined the European Union in 1995, and her security political position became perhaps more favourable than ever before after 1917, when independence was declared.The President of Czechoslovakia Vaclav Havel chaired the Warsaw Pact summit meeting on 1 July 1991, when that military alliance was formally terminated.17 NATO, however, prevailed, and was assigned new tasks.15 .The exact timing of the end of the Cold War is diffuse.It is rather a process that is still affected by the relations between the leading powers, because these have returned to it repeatedly.Speaking at the 47 th Munich Security Conference on 5 February 2011, Russia's Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov referred to President Dmitry Medvedev's initiative to conclude the Euro-Atlantic Security Treaty (EST) as follows: "[…] Essentially we are talking here about permanent elimination of the Cold War legacy".The United States and Russia made a joint statement at the 2010 NPT Review Conference which said that signing of the New START Treaty "in effect, marks the final end of the "Cold War" period".See also United Nations, 2010.Colonel Sergey Tretyakov, a former officer in charge of Russia's foreign security service SVR operations in the United States in 1995-2000, strongly denied that the Cold War was over as late as in June 2009.See also Fox News, 2009, "KGB Defector Weighs in on US/Russian Relations", 7 June 2009 [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zh7VG3jCHQA] and Earley, 2007, pp.330-331 .16 Nyberg, 2007, pp.285-299.17 Havel, 2008, p. 294 .President Havel was of the opinion that the termination of the Warsaw Pact was the single most significant event during his term as President.Because of his personal experiences he found the official termination ceremony to be both strange and absurd.Completing the Soviet withdrawal was a very complicated process and the last Soviet troops left the country only two years later.The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), later known as the Organization of Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), was instrumental in shaping Europe's new, so-called cooperative security regime (The Charter of Paris for a New Europe) in 1990.18 A crucially important update (The Istanbul Document 1999) was agreed upon in Istanbul, and it is still in force.19 After the break-up of the Soviet Union, Soviet forces withdrew some 1 000 kilometres to the east from Central Europe.The Soviet threat was gone and various "new threats" were added to the western threat scenarios with everincreasing weight.The 9/11 terrorist strike in New York in 2001 became a certain turning point.Western armed forces have been reduced radically and most countries have abandoned compulsory conscription.20 For that reason, significant reserves are not being built up.Military activities are concentrated on crisis management (CM) and repelling threats far away.In Western Europe, countries have almost entirely lost their capability of territorial defence.A respected Russian observer estimated in January of 2011: "In reality, Europe is becoming a defenceless continent. […]Without America the Europeans will be left naked and defenceless, because except for Britain, they have no armed forces to speak of."21 Increasingly expensive modern weapons put a strain on arms expenditures of Western countries, and therefore the purchases have been modest even at the expense of capability.The fairly modest operation in Libya in the spring and summer of 2011 clearly revealed the military shortcomings of the European members of NATO.22 The out-going U.S. Secretary of Defence Robert M. Gates said at the NATO Headquarters on June 10, 2011 that The blunt reality is that there will be dwindling appetite and patience in the U.S. Congress … to expend increasingly precious funds on behalf of nations that are apparently unwilling to devote the necessary resources or make the necessary changes in order to be serious and capable partners in their own defence.23 At the same time Mr. Gates also acknowledged the contributions of Norway and Denmark, whose performance in Libya was exceptionally good in relation to their resources.NATO's total peacetime strength, the United States included, exceeded 5.3 million men in 1989.The corresponding figure of the Soviet Union was over 4.2 million and the strength of other Warsaw Pact forces was more than 1.1 million.Both military alliances were approximately equal in manpower.24 Russia's recent peacetime strength is about one million.Here the manpower of the other Russian "power" ministries, about 500 000, has been omitted.NATO's corresponding strength is still surprisingly high, over 3.9 million men, of which the share of the USA and Turkey is more than a half.25 There were grounds for such comparisons during the Cold War.Today they are no longer relevant.NATO no longer has any unified territorial defence and nei- 20 The latest examples of countries that have abandoned general conscription are Sweden, who left it resting in peacetime, and Germany whose last contingent entered service in early 2011.21 .22 Gates, 2011; Shankar, 2011 ; DeYoung & Jaffe, 2011.23 Ibid.24 IISS, 1989 .25 IISS, 2011 ther the troops trained for this task.Four distinguished researchers at RAND Corporation gave the following assessment of NATO's capabilities: Power projection and the maintenance of significant forces outside of Europe's immediate neighbourhood will be particularly difficult due to reduced force size; limited lift and logistics capability; and a lack of certain key enablers (such as missile defence and unmanned aerial vehicles).Additionally, several key NATO European nations are either eliminating or significantly reducing key capabilities such as littoral maritime forces and the related intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance platforms. […]Put simply, the unit of account for European ground forces is set to become battalion battlegroups and brigade combat teams rather than full-strength divisions and corps.The navies of the major European naval powers will see radical reductions as well.For example, if Brazil's naval expansion plans are executed by the mid-2020s, the Brazilian navy will have carrier, destroyer and amphibious fleets comparable to the British and French navies combined.26 The manpower of new NATO member states is modest.The rebuilding of the armed forces of the former Warsaw Pact countries is still in process.Their armed forces were to be used operationally only in specific auxiliary tasks ordered by the Soviet Union.The warm relations between Russia and the western countries at the start of the period following the Cold War unfortunately did not last long.Russia's liberal Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Kozyrev, who was well disposed toward the West, surprised his audience at the CSCE foreign ministers' meeting in Stockholm on December 14, 1992.He noted that: The space of the former Soviet Union cannot be regarded as a zone of full application of CSCE norms.In essence, this is a post-imperial space, in which Russia has to defend its interests using all available means, including military and economic ones.We shall strongly insist that the former USSR Republics join the new Federation or Confederation without delay, and there will be tough talks on this matter.27 Kozyrev admitted later that the speech was intended to be a joke.Its objective had been to serve as an alarm clock.Twenty years later Russia is in the process of consolidating her grip over major portions of the post-Soviet space in the name of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), and hardline circles in Moscow are optimistic as, in their opinion, "The White House has sent a clear signal to Moscow [at the beginning of the second term of the Obama Administration] that the post-Soviet space is not included in the main priorities of U.S. foreign policy".28 This would give Russia freedom of action.The intergovernmental military alliance CSTO was agreed upon on 15 May 1992 and the Charter of CSTO entered into force on 18 September 2003.29 At the CSCE summit meeting held in Budapest in December 1994, a clear change in direction could be noted. "Europe may be forced into a Cold Peace", President Boris Yeltsin, warned.30 After this, Russia's liberal political leadership was gradually forced to step aside.In January of 1996, Yevgeni Primakov, a high-ranking officer in the former KGB and the head of the foreign intelligence service SVR, replaced Mr. Kozyrev.Political power in Russia and the responsibility for threat assessments and situational awareness shifted increasingly into the hands of conservatives who were close to the country's security agencies and military authorities.The development sketched out in Andrei Kozyrev's "joking speech" of 1992 was conclusively realized after the war in Georgia, when President Medvedev 28 Руська Правда, 19 January 2013, США и Россия разграничат «сферы влияния» (Александров, Михаил (Aleksandrov, Mikhail)) [http://ruska-pravda.org/monitoring- smi/38-st-monitoring-smi/19724--l-r.html].Dr. Mikhail Alexandrov, Department head at the CIS Baltic Institute, writes in Ruska Pravda: "Washington actually offers Moscow exchange: to agree to the consolidation of the post-Soviet Russia's sphere of influence in return for non-interference in other regions of the world, which are vitally important to U.S. interests."See also RIA Novosti, 30 January 2013, "Russia, Kazakhstan Sign Air Defence Agreement" [http://en.rian.ru/world/20130130/179120146/Russia-Kazakhstan-Sign-Air-Defen-se-Agreement.html]; RIA Novosti, 31.01.2013, "Russia, Armenia Agree to Set up Joint Defence Enterprises" [http://en.rian.ru/military_news/20130131/17913 8896/Russia-Armenia-Agree-to-Set-up-Joint-Defense-Enterprises.html].In late January 2013 Russia and Kazakhstan signed an agreement to create a joint regional air defence system and Russia and Armenia agreed on defence co-operation, including building joint defence enterprises and maintenance centres for military equipment.29 Организация Договора о Коллективной Безопасности (OДКБ) − Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Basic facts [http://www.odkb.gov.ru/start/index_ aengl.htm, accessed 29 January 2013].The Secretary-General of CSTO, Col.Gen. Nikolay Bordyuzha was appointed in 2003.His background includes service in the Strategic Rocket Forces, the KGB, the Federal Border Service, and the Presidential Administration.See more VIPERSON.RU, 2013, "Бордюжа, Николай Николаевич" [http://viperson.ru/wind.php?ID=1487, accessed 29 January 2013 .30 The disappointing Budapest CSCE summit was a disaster, according to Newsweek Magazine.Russia opposed NATO enlargement and especially the proposals for statements concerning Serbia and the war in Bosnia.Newsweek: "a red-faced Yeltsin admonishing a stunned Bill Clinton that 'the destinies . . .of the world community [cannot] be managed from a single capital [i.e., Washington] . ' "See Newsweek, 19 December 1994 , "Plunging into a Cold Peace" [http://www.newsweek.com/1994/12/ 18/plunging-into-a-coldpeace.html].After this "Cold Peace" as a concept has remained doggedly in the vocabulary of international politics.See Beste, Klussmann & Steingart, 2008.presented the main principles of Russian foreign and defence policy in August of 2008.Special attention was given to the following passage: Protecting the lives and dignity of our citizens, wherever they may be, is an unquestionable priority for our country.Our foreign policy decisions will be based on this need.We will also protect the interests of our business community abroad.It should be clear to all that we will respond to any aggressive acts committed against us.31 These principles were finally written into law at the end of 2009, giving Russia's armed forces the right to operate abroad.32 With regard to Russia's relations to foreign countries, Medvedev affirmed that "there are regions in which Russia has privileged interests.These regions are situated in countries with which we share special historical relations and are bound together as friends and good neighbors."33 In September of 2008, Medvedev told political analysts from the Western countries that: "Our neighbors are close to us in many respects, and are a traditional area of interest for the Russian nation.We are so close to each other, it would be impossible to tear us apart, to say that Russia has to embark on one path and our neighbors on another."34 Thus Russia also strives to strengthen the loyalty of Russians living outside her borders to their Motherland, and may also use harsh methods to achieve her goals.In this sense, problems have come up, especially in certain Baltic States in that preserving Russian citizenship is more important to a large number of Baltic Russians than the citizenship to their actual homeland.One may consider secondary citizenship to also include certain obligations to the country one is a citizen of.Problems of conflicting loyalties may arise from this in times of crisis and not only in the Baltic States.Finland is also a target of Russia's persistent efforts to increase her influence using "soft power".Under the pretext of protecting the rights of Russians living in Finland, Russian authorities have meddled in the affairs of private citizens and tried to elevate these issues to a national level.In a particular case concerning child-care, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov went as far as to condemn Finland of "uncivilized" treatment of a Russian national.35 31 President of Russia, 2008.32 Matthews & Nemtsova, 2009 ; People's Daily Online, 9 November 2009, "Medvedev Signs Use of Russian Army Abroad into Law" [http://english.people.com.cn/90001/ 90777/90851/6808120.html].33 President of Russia, 2008.34 Debski, 2008 .35 Voice of Russia, 8 October 2012, "Russian Foreign Chief Slams Finland for Separating Mother and New-Born Baby" [http://english.ruvr.ru/2012_10_08/Russian-foreign-chief- In the confusing times following the collapse of the Soviet Union, there arose in anti-Western circles an immediate desire to find a new direction and a new basis for values.From a group of conservative Russian geopolitical thinkers, there soon emerged a forward-looking young philosopher named Alexander Dugin (b. 1962) , who's influence on ruling circles has been noteworthy.According to Dugin, who grew up in a military family, true patriotism is to be found only in the army and in the security services.36 In 1992 Dugin had already been appointed teacher in the General Staff Academy of the Russian armed forces.There, under Lieutenant General Nikolai Klokotov, the director of the Academy's Strategic Institute, and with the support of the Principal of the Academy and future Minister of Defence Army General Igor Rodionov, he started to work on an important book about the foundations of geopolitics and Russia's geopolitical future.In 2003, Dr. Alpo Juntunen, former Professor of Russia's security policy at the Finnish National Defence University, encapsulated Dugin's ideas as follows: [Dugin examines] everything as a battle between land and sea, in which the sides are the maritime powers led by the U.S.A., and Eurasia, led by Russia.The forces led by the United States are the enemy, which strives for a liberal-commercial, cultureless, and secularized world mastery.This grouping is now overwhelming, but in order to save the world, the Eurasian continent will have to counterattack under the leadership of Russia.A new great power alliance must be shaped, to be led by the Moscow-Berlin axis."37 […] Military co-operation with Germany must be made closer.The worst military problems facing the future superpower are the border areas, the rimland, which the Atlantic powers are striving to get under their control in order to weaken the Moscowled mainland.Moscow has to take a firmer grip of the rimland area. […]Russia's only proper form of government is imperial.38 slams-Finland-for-separating-mother-and-new-born-baby/].A prominent role on the Russian side is played by Dr. Pavel A. Astakhov, Children's Rights Commissar for the President of the Russian Federation.He graduated from the Faculty of Law, Dzerzhinski KGB Higher School in 1991 [http://english.rfdeti.ru/content.php?id=12] .36 Laruelle, 2006 .See also Dugin, 2010.37 Other important axes to thwart the power of the United States and China are according to Dugin the Moscow-Tokyo and Moscow-Tehran axes.See Dunlop, 2004 .38 Juntunen, 2003 Giving up the process of empire-building is, in Dugin's world of values, the same as "national suicide."Without an empire, Russia "will disappear as a nation".39 Indications of the impact of Dugin's thinking came as early as October 1995 when INOBIS (Институт оборонных исследований, ИНОБИС), a semiofficial defence research institute close to Russia's power ministries, published an outspoken report which outlined the external threats to Russia's national security and possible countermeasures.40 "The chief aim of the US and Western policy toward Russia is not to allow her to become an economically, politically, and militarily influential force and to turn the post-Soviet space into an economic and political appendage to the West, as well as its mineral-rich colony.That is why the United States and its allies are the sources of the major external threats to this country's national security and should be regarded as the main potential adversaries of the Russian Federation, political, and military affairs," states the INOBIS report dated October 26, 1995.In Dugin's vision, Germany and Russia would again divide Europe into spheres of influence.Germany would get Europe's Protestant and Catholic areas, but not Finland.Nevertheless, Europe's division into spheres of influence with Germany would not be Russia's final goal, but rather the "finlandisation of all of Europe".According to Dugin, Finland belongs to the Karelian-Finnish geopolitical zone, which is culturally and in part economically unified, but forms a strategic support for a Eurasian center [i.e. Moscow] […] As a state, Finland is very unstable, since it belongs naturally and historically to Russia's geopolitical sphere.41 Russia's Minister of Culture, Vladimir Medinsky echoed these same sentiments at the 6 th Finno-Ugric Peoples World Congress in Siófok, Hungary on 5 September 2012.42 39 Dugin, 1997, p. 197 and 251 .See also Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA), 2011.The well-known U.S. Russia expert, Professor Stephen J. Blank expressed essentially the same interpretation as Dugin in Helsinki in November 2011: "The logic of European integration represents in itself a threat to Russia's empire mindset.Also the values the EU represents are seen as threatening in Russia."40 The Institute of Defence Studies (INOBIS), 1995.The supporters of the INOBIS institute included among others the General Staff, military industrial enterprises and the Ministry of Atomic Energy.See also Staar, 1996.Colonel (ret.) ,Dr. Richard Staar was the Head of the U.S. Delegation to the negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) in Vienna 1981-1983.41 Dugin, 1997, p. 316 .See also Koivisto, 2001 , p. 292.42 Mallinen, 2012 In the presence of Finnish President Sauli Niinistö and Estonian President Tomas Hendrik Ilves, Russia's Minister of Culture Vladimir Medinsky said that the Dugin's suggested means for achieving Russia's sovereignty over Eurasia were not primarily military, but he favoured a more subtle program which also included subversive activities in the target countries and undermining their stability through the use of disinformation.In addition, Russia's gas, oil, and other natural products were to be used as a harsh means of pressuring and bending other countries to the will of Russia.The same was already proposed in the INOBIS report.According to Dugin, one should not even fear resorting to war, but it would be better if one could achieve the goals without the use of force: It is vitally important for Russia to prevent Western oil companies from illegally developing resources off the Caspian Sea shelf…Russia must...take practical steps and even use force if necessary to prevent any activity related to oil production by foreign companies in the former Soviet space.43 Later developments, such as the war in Georgia and the continued pressure on that country, 44 clearly show that Dugin's basic ideas are significant and enjoy far-reaching support.45 Russia has also succeeded in keeping central Asian states which are rich in hydrocarbons quite well in her grasp and has gained agreements advantageous to her from Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan.46 Prime Minister Putin's initiative in October 2011 to establish a Eurasian Union fits Dugin's vision well.47 Russia's preferred solution to the European missile defence problem -Finno-Ugric world is an inseparable part of the Russian world and that Russia will not repeat the multicultural mistakes that have been done in Europe.He went on to remind the Finns that Finland as a nation had survived only as a result of Russia's goodwill, and ended his speech by quoting Czar Alexander I, who speaking to a French visitor referred to a motley group of Finns, Tatars and Georgians as "all being my Russians".After this event Minister Medinsky went to Pskov to participate in the founding of the Izborsky Club for conservative patriots.See e.g. Samarina, 2012; Newsru.com, 8 September 2012, "Мединский все-таки приехал в "Изборский клуб" патриотов и выступил с заявлением" [http://www.newsru.com/arch/russia/08sep2012/medinsky.html].43 Dunlop, 2004 ; Международное Евразийское Движение (Mezhdunarodnoe Evraziiskoe dvizhenie), 5 February 2009, "Dugin: Russia should consider war to head off the Nabucco project, 'Today's Zaman'" [http://evrazia.info/modules.php?name=News& file=article&sid=4190].44 Antidze, 2011.The following source is a good example of how Dugin's teachings are put to practice: Umland, 2008 .45 Dugin became a mystic later.See Laruelle, 2006.46 See Juntunen, 2013, p. 81 .Professor Alpo Juntunen points out that the main problem of the Central Asian states is their dependence on Russia's energy industry and the transport routes that it controls.See also Juntunen, 2003.47 Izvestia, 4 October 2011, "A New Integration Project for Eurasia: The Future in the Making (Putin, Vladimir) [http://www.rusemb.org.uk/press/246].According to Prime Minister Putin: "A crucial integration project, the Common Economic Space of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan dividing the area to be defended and responsibility for defence into separate sectors -reflects Dugin's geopolitical thinking.The construction of the Nord Stream gas pipeline in the Baltic Sea partially serves the same goal.Poland and the Baltic States have strongly opposed the construction of the pipe for reasons of economics and political security.48 (CES), will kick off on January 1, 2012.This project is, without exaggeration, a historic milestone for all three countries and for the broader post-Soviet space."See also Marin, 2011 and FIIA, 2011.Stephen J Blank's summary in Helsinki, 8 November 2011: "The Eurasian Union is a reflection of Russia's empire mindset and there is nothing dramatically new in it.It is an integration project based on the primacy of Russia and Russia's interests at the expense of the sovereignty of the smaller post-Soviet states in the region."See also STRATFOR, 2011, "Russia, Belarus: Setting the Stage for the Eurasian Union", 25 November 2011.According to STRATFOR: "Russia used Belarus' financial hardship as an opportunity to assert itself, raising export duties on key goods in order to pressure Minsk at a time of weakness.Belarus eventually sold many of its strategic assets to Russia in order to get what Minsk wanted the whole time -economic and financial concessions, primarily in the form of lower natural gas prices. […]Lukashenko has voiced his support for Putin's Eurasian Union, calling for the union's formation to be moved up to 2013 (though Russia has preferred to stick to the original 2015 target date)."48 Peltomäki, 2011 . "The Poles believed that the purpose of Nord Stream is to make it easier for Russia to use the threat of a cut-off of natural energy supplies as leverage against Poland and other East European countries.In principle, Nord Stream makes it possible for Russia to cut off supplies to East Europe, as it One can also view the warm period of relationship between Russia and Germany during the last decade in the light of history.U.S. history professor emeritus and former diplomat Albert Weeks emphasizes: "In the present post-communist era in Russia, Moscow's ties with Germany can be described as stronger than those with any other state."49 The co-operation between these countries is extending strongly also into the military sphere, 50 which has caused uneasiness especially among the new NATO member states.Germany is known to have opposed NATO contingency planning for the defence of the Baltic States.51 Germany's strivings for great power status, however, does not find popular political support and Germany is not ready to assume security political leadership in Europe.52 That German position suits Russia perfectly.For a long time, the NATO enlargement has been a sore spot for Russia.The writers of the INOBIS report already considered the enlargement of NATO and especially the possibility of Baltic NATO membership so dangerous that Russia should have prepared to occupy those countries.Russia did not, however, resort to such extreme measures, but the so-called Bronze warrior dispute and especially the war in Georgia in August of 2008 demonstrated that Russia was prepared to take stern measures when necessary. "If we had wavered in 2008, the geopolitical layout would have been different; a range of countries which the North Atlantic [Treaty Organization] tries to artificially 'protect' would have been within it", President Medvedev said in November 2011.53 did during the "gas war" of 2009 with Ukraine.The undersea pipeline makes this possible without interrupting sales to the lucrative West European market."49 Weeks, 2011, p. 50 The Baltic States could be occupied without any risk, and "Russia has all legal and moral rights to invade the Baltics. …Analysis shows that no one in the West is going to fight with Russia over [these countries]", the INOBIS analysts concluded.This assessment is probably still relevant, and it raises the question of the difficult problems of defending the Baltic countries.54 The enlargement of the Atlantic Alliance since the early 1990s has been primarily a political process.Its military dimension has been secondary.In the background of Russia's stiff opposition is the knowledge that countries which have joined NATO may have slipped permanently from Russia's grip.For these reasons alone, "NATO expansion should be kept at bay with an iron fist."55 Russia's former Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev wrote in the Newsweek magazine (February 10, 1997) that "the Russian people must be told the truth, and the truth is, NATO is not our enemy."56 The contrast between the views of Kozyrev and those of the current Russian leadership is great.57 According to a Wikileaks report published in the Norwegian daily Aftenposten on December 17, 2009, Vladimir Putin allegedly told NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen that NATO no longer has a purpose and it was in Russia's interest that NATO no longer exists.58 The director of the Carnegie Moscow Institute, Dr. Dmitri Trenin, wrote in late November 2011 that "The Russians … persist in seeing the United States through the old Soviet prism of a superpower confrontation."59 President Putin returned to this topic on 5 October 2012, when visiting the Russian 201 st Military Base in Tajikistan: I believe that NATO, which was formed during the Cold War, has long ago lost its primary function and it is unclear why it exists today.There is no more confrontation between two political systems since there are no two systems any longer and no Warsaw Pact, which one way or another was NATO's rival.So it is unclear why NATO exists to this day.I think it is largely a throwback to the Cold War.But the existence of this military bloc is a geopolitical reality which we must take into account.60 At the Istanbul summit in 1999, the OSCE member states, including Russia, approved the Charter for European Security (in The Istanbul Document).61 The following quote is worth mentioning: We affirm the inherent right of each and every participating State to be free to choose or change its security arrangements, including treaties of alliance as they evolve. […]Within the OSCE no State, group of States, or organization can have pre-eminent responsibility for maintaining peace and stability in the OSCE area, or can consider any part of the OSCE area as its sphere of influence.62 This principle was already written in the NATO-Russia Founding Act signed in Paris on May 27, 1997.63 Russia compared this document to the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 and emphasized its binding nature.64 In the Founding Act, NATO and Russia […] shared the commitment to respect the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of all states, and their inherent right to choose the means to ensure their own security, the inviolability of borders, and the people's right of self-determination as enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act and in other OSCE documents.65 Since then Russia's spheres of influence thinking has only become stronger.She has taken the initiative to replace the Paris Charter and the Istanbul Document with a new "Helsinki Plus" agreement, which would better serve her geopolitical aspirations.66 In March 2011, the prestigious Russian Valdai Club, led by Professor Sergey Karaganov, published a report about the development of the relationship between Russia and the United States.The report proposes that, as a precondition for talks concerning non-strategic (tactical) nuclear weapons, the demands of the Istanbul Document and the so called flank rules of the CFE Treaty should be lifted.67 The summary of Europe's geopolitical development in the last few decades presented above demonstrates that the situation with regard to international security may not have changed as fundamentally as is generally believed.It also serves as a foundation for a more thorough assessment of Russia's military-political development.NOBIS published a report on Russia's military reform and security in 1996.68 The "strategy of neutralizing external threats and assuring the national survival of the Russian Federation" recommended by the writers of the INOBIS report contained forceful stands and concrete measures.According to the report, the role of the armed forces is so central to Russia that she should not participate in one-sided arms reductions.This is especially relevant to nuclear weapons. "Russia's nuclear potential is one of the few arguments that can [still] convince the West."It is necessary to develop the strategic nuclear forces (SNF) with determination.Tactical nuclear weapons should become the backbone of Russia's defence capability in all three European theatres, i.e. in the Polish, Baltic Sea, and northern directions, and the southern Black Sea direction (Crimea, Abkhazia, Georgia, and Armenia).This would be even more important after Poland, Hungary, and the former Czechoslovakia became NATO members.69 The deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in Kaliningrad and on some of the ships of the Baltic Fleet was considered crucial.70 Dr. Alexander Pikayev, a well-known expert on nuclear weapons, wrote in the Moscow Carnegie Institute report as follows: The issue of TNWs in Europe became more acute after the Baltic States joined NATO.The buffer dividing Russia from NATO vanished, the Kaliningrad Oblast was surrounded by NATO member states' territory, and the Baltic States are only a short distance from Moscow, and even closer to St Petersburg.The small depth of defence, very short flight time for missiles and attack aviation if deployed in Latvia and Estonia, and the sizable overall imbalance in NATO's favour in conventional weapons and armed forces have inevitably increased Russian interest in NSNW's [non- 68 Dementyev & Surikov, 1996.69 Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia became NATO member states on March 12, 1999, i .e.more than three years after the publication of the INOBIS article.70 The recommendation of the INOBIS report was adopted in practice.There have been tactical nuclear weapons in Kaliningrad at least from the beginning of the 21 st century.Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt pointed out in August 2008: "There are nuclear weapons in Kaliningrad, which are integrated into Russia's Baltic Fleet.That has been the case for a period now, and we have also noticed that they perform exercises which include nuclear weapons" (Bildt, 2008) .See also Forss, 2001 ; Forss, 2001a and Burt, 2012.I strategic nuclear weapons] as a means of neutralizing the West's numerical, geostrategic and operational superiority. [...]So far, NATO's eastward expansion has not been accompanied by the deployment of nuclear weapons and the most destabilizing nuclear weapons delivery systems on the soil of the new member states.Brussels has observed the provisions of the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, which clearly states that NATO does not plan to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new member states.This document is not legally binding, but it continues to have important political significance as a factor contributing to security.71 Strategic parity in nuclear weapons with the United States still remains the cornerstone of Russian military doctrine.In tactical nuclear weapons, Russia has overwhelming superiority, even though their deployed numbers may be lower than earlier anticipated.72 The notion of nuclear first-use seems to have remained part of the doctrine, although it is not stated publicly.73 Large exercises like West-1999 and West-2009 [Zapad-1999 in the Baltic Sea area and Vostok-2010 [East-2010] in the Far East have ended with the simulated use of tactical nuclear weapons in situations where conventional forces alone were deemed insufficient.74 In Russia, both her position and her military capability are assessed primarily in relation to the United States, NATO and China.75 The USA, which has for long enjoyed military-technological superiority, is in a period of deep economic and fiscal problems.Expenditures, including those for defence, have to 71 Pikayev, 2009, p. be reduced markedly.76 She strives increasingly to stay out of those conflicts which do not directly affect her most important national interests.The Libyan conflict in the spring of 2011 is a good example of this.For its part, the Chinese economy has continued its strong growth, and the country is developing its military capability with clear objectives and increasing budgetary support.77 After the Cold War, the focus of attention of the United States has gradually shifted almost entirely from Europe to Asia and the Middle East.This opens new possibilities for Russia in Europe.78 Russia strives to deal with the European states and also to pursue projects on a bilateral basis, which undermines the cohesion of both NATO and the European Union.79 After making certain concessions regarding Afghanistan, Russia may strive to get assurances from NATO to show restraint, for example in its Baltic policy.80 This kind of development would be worrisome at least to those small countries which have sought security from NATO and the U.S. against possible pressure from Russia.The so-called Visegrad countries, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia have in this respect arrived at their own conclusion.On May12, 2011, they decided to establish a combat unit (brigade) with Poland as the lead country.81 This measure may be viewed as these countries' distrust in the ability and willingness of NATO and the US to provide sufficient security.In a report published by Russia's Academy of Military Sciences, its president, Army General Makhmut A. Gareev, writes that Russia in the coming years will have to prepare itself for powerful geopolitical challenges and even threats rising from two directions, especially from the U.S. but also from China.83 76 Substantial defence expenditure savings will materialize when the US withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan are concluded, but traditional Pentagon activities, such as procurement programs will be subject to major cuts.See IISS The Military Balance 2012.77 Ibid.78 Clinton, 2011 .See also Fluornoy, 2011.79 Daalder, 2011.80 Ibid.See also Felgenhauer, 2010a.81 83 Bridge, 2011.Gareev compares a potentially threatening situation with the "Troubled times" (B смутное время) of 1598-1613, when Russia had to face both famine and foreign invasion forces.See also Karaganov (ed.),2011a, p. 31: "Last but not least, Russia needs tactical nuclear weapons to avert the rise of fears over the «Chinese threat» in the future."Russia may end up encircled in East-West pincers, and the task for planners is to find a solution for the problem in view.Although NATO considers Russia a partner, Russia, according to her new military doctrine that came into force in February of 2010, still considers NATO one of the main dangers, if no longer officially a threat.84 The enlargement of NATO and the possible arrival of U.S. troops in areas near Russia are also viewed as threats.85 Territorial claims to Russia, the use of military force in the vicinity of Russia, and international terrorism are presented as other threats.Russia is especially sensitive about the plans to deploy elements of the US missile defence system in areas of the former Warsaw Pact countries, in spite of US/NATO assurances that the missile defence is not aimed at Russia and assessments of leading Russian missile experts stating clearly that Russia's nu- 84 President of Russia, 2010.President Medvedev: "It is not about our military doctrine, but about the never-ending enlargement of NATO through absorbing the countries that used to be part of the Soviet Union or happen to be our closest neighbours, such as Romania and Bulgaria.This is the threat.NATO is a military alliance which has expanded itself right to our borders.Our Armed Forces should therefore be ready to accomplish their missions in light of the changes we have seen."See also Felgenhauer, 2010.Nikolai Patrushev, Secretary of the National Security Council and former Head of the FSB: "It is a consensus opinion of all who worked on the military doctrine that NATO threatens us and seriously."85 Deryabin, 2009 and Russia Today, 5 February 2010, "Russia's New Military Doctrine Approved" [http://rt.com/usa/news/ russia-military-doctrine-approved/].clear deterrent is not endangered.86 Russia's primary response to U.S. initiatives regarding co-operation on missile defence has been a proposal to divide the areas to be defended into sectors, for the defence of which one of the partners would be responsible.NATO has opposed this idea steadfastly, as well as Russia's demand for a single missile defence agency to be formed together.87 Despite NATO's official optimism, possibilities of the US and Russia coming to an understanding about the missile defence plan, does not look promising.The politically infected issue has wound up in a difficult political deadlock, with Russia threatening to resort to strong asymmetric countermeasures against bordering states in Europe.88 Given the disparate level of missile defence technology and capabilities in the United States and Russia, and considering military operational factors, it would be most difficult to create an integrated and interoperable missile defence system that would satisfy both parties.89 In Russia's military doctrine, precision weapons and space-based systems play an essential role.Their strategic significance is considered so important that they should be regarded as being strategic weapons.In doctrines, cyber warfare capability plays an increasingly important role in our present online interactive world.At the same time it has become a lasting threat.Cyber operations are carried out daily all over the world.Paralyzing of societal infrastructure, electric power production, information, business, transportation and logistics networks, and, on the other hand, the repulsion of attacks on them are a part of modern warfare.Actual military strikes are to be carried out simultaneously with cyber-attacks or separately to ensure that the desired results in case the cyber-attacks and other paralyzing actions have failed.Before turning to Russian military organizational changes it may be prudent to remind of the four stages of armed conflict defined in Russia's military doctrine adopted in 2010, i.e. armed conflict, local war, regional war and largescale war.90 Russia's new territorial defence structure, the so called Operational-Strategic Commands (Oбъединённое стратегическое командованиe) and their respective command and control systems, came into force on December 1, 2010.These four new commands replaced the former six military districts.All other forces belonging to the so called power ministries would be subordinated to these commands, at least in times of crisis.The forces of the former Leningrad and Moscow military districts, the Northern and Baltic Fleets (with the exception of strategic missile-carrying submarines), and the 1 st Air Force and Air Defence Command (1 Командование ВВС и ПВО) are subordinated to the Joint Western Command (Western Military District).Its headquarters is located in St. Petersburg.91 The new command structure was already tested in the large-scale military exercises in 2009.The different services are still in charge of developing training and improving war materiel.The Naval headquarters moved from Moscow to St. Petersburg in October 2012.92 Chief of General Staff, Army General Nikolai Makarov commented on the effects of the reorganization in a speech in Helsinki in June 2012.He pointed out that joint command of army, navy, air force and air defence units resulted in a qualitative improvement of combat capability in all military districts.Less reaction time is needed in crisis situations.At the same time the strike force of the military districts increased and ambiguities concerning command authority were removed.93 The defence reorganization in Russia can be seen as a long-term security policy reaction to the major geopolitical changes that have already occurred, when NATO members are now her bordering neighbours.At the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union, Finland was perhaps regarded "neutral."94 With Russia's gradual recovery from 2000 on, Finland is probably now regarded as a virtual NATO member state.On a lower diplomatic level, Finland has been warned that NATO membership would trigger countermeasures.95 At the same time, the economic significance of Russia's north-western area is clearly rising.In northern waters there are large natural reserves.Along with climate warming, the northern sea routes seem to be taking on a larger role.It is quite probable that the competition for influence in the arctic areas will grow.Russia views the Arctic in very different terms from all other littoral and nearby states, and takes any "foreign" interest in the area as an indication of hostile intent which may require a securitized response.96 In the Baltic Sea area, Russia has lost her former military superiority.At the same time the area is more important to her, because of the new Nord Stream gas pipeline and commercial traffic, especially oil transports.The significance of the St. Petersburg defensive zone and the entire north-western direction are emphasized in this new situation.97 An indication of how Russia assesses the importance of the various regions of the country can be obtained by comparing the regional distribution of her armed forces units.There are about 100 brigades in permanent readiness, 36 of which are deployed in Western MD, 26 in Eastern MD, 23 in Southern MD and 15 in Central MD.Airborne troops, naval infantry, coastal missile brigades and contingents abroad are often omitted in western and some Russian assessments.98 94 The Soviet Union finally recognized Finnish neutrality during President Mikhail Gorbachev's official state visit in Finland in 25-27 October, 1989.95 Kozin, 2007 .According to several Finnish and other sources, Dr. Kozin acted on direct orders from Moscow, and expressed this view in no unclear terms, both in the seminar and later in interviews on the major Finnish TV Channels YLE and MTV3; МИНИСТЕРСТВО ИНОСТРАННЫХ ДЕЛ РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ, ФИНЛЯНДСКАЯ РЕСПУБЛИКА (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation), 7 November 2011.The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation noted on its homepage in November 2011, that Finland is not excluding the possibility of joining NATO in the event of changes in the geopolitical situation and that the Defence Forces of Finland, as far as technical and organizational relationships are concerned, is fully compatible with NATO standards.96 Smith & Giles, 2007.97 Mukhin, 2009.98 See Annex 2.See also Barabanov (ed.) ,2011 as well as Vendil Pallin, 2012a and Warfare.be.The regional distribution of armed forces units certified to employ nonstrategic nuclear weapons is another good indication.Half of the active depots are in the Western MD, supporting more than twenty dual-capable units.99 Twelve of these are located in the Kola and in the neighbourhood of St. Petersburg and in Kaliningrad.The Central European direction is probably not as militarily significant to Russia as it was previously.Therefore the military centre of gravity in the new Western MD -not to be misinterpreted as the national military centre of gravity -seems to have been shifted to the northwest, perhaps as a preventive measure.100 An indication of this is the deployment of the first Iskander missile brigade in Luga.In the worst case scenario of the Cold War, the massive ballistic and cruise missile attack on Russia would have come from the north and northwest and some of the missile trajectories could have passed over Finnish territory.For NATO the Baltic Sea has become almost an inland sea.Only the Kaliningrad enclave has remained as an isle from which Russia can negate the other It is evident that Russia needs in the western direction small, efficient and flexible strike units in a high state of readiness, and which can be quickly reinforced when necessary. "The nature of threats has become such that operations on a regional scale can start suddenly", the Chief of the General Staff, Army General Nikolai Makarov said on November 17, 2011.103 Behind this assessment it is possible to discern the thoughts of one of Russia's most prestigious military thinkers, Army General (ret.)Makhmut Gareev, president of the Academy of War Sciences.He strongly doubts the credibility of tactical nuclear weapons as general-purpose weapons in local conflicts.Russia's experiences of war, he thinks it is time to assess the merits of the decisive importance not only of the initial period of war, but above all the first strategic strike. "More aggressive actions may be needed and pre-emptive actions as well, if necessary."104 The Commander of Russia's Ground Forces Col.Gen. Vladimir Chirkin stated in July 2012 that Russia will form 26 additional brigades by 2020, including 10 reconnaissance brigades, 14 army aviation and two air defence brigades.105 On the other hand, large reserves are needed in the direction of China.President Medvedev announced in April of 2011, that Russia has to retain general conscription for 10-15 years.106 Russia is also preparing for the most extreme alternative, a large-scale war.107 Minister of Defence Anatoly Serdyukov repeated in October 2012, that Russia will not do away with the draft any time soon. "An entirely professional army is optimal in my view," he said. "But we cannot afford it for the foreseeable future," adding that for now the armed forces will include a mix of professionals serving under enlistment contracts and draftees.108 Mr. Serdyukov's dismissal in November 2012 supports the view that powerful circles in Russia that have not been happy with the concept of a small "New Look" Army, succeeded to limit it.Mr. Serdyukov's successor, Army General Sergei Shoigu has clearly changed direction.109 The end result of the Russian defence reform seems to be a mix of modern and more traditional armed forces, with a sufficiently large trained reserve.The recruiting of contract soldiers is one of the central factors in the process of improving capability, but at present it has not produced the desired result.The lack of trained non-commissioned officers is a problem.Therefore readiness and combat capability have not yet risen to the planned high level.110 General Makarov, however, reported that all units and formations in the category of permanent readiness have been reinforced to full combat strength.These units are to be ready to execute combat operations within one hour after receiving orders.111 In practice, however, it is evident that 'permanent readiness' brigades will not appear as originally planned, to be able to maintain daily readiness at full strength.Rather there will be combat units of battalion strength in permanent readiness.112 Colonel General Valery Gerasimov, successor to Army General Nikolai Makarov as Chief of the General Staff, pointed out in January 2013 that "no one rules out the possibility of a major war, and it cannot be said that we are unprepared".113 In 2008, the period of conscript service was reduced from two years to one.According to announcements made in the spring of 2011, the earlier goal of over 550 000 draftees annually was reduced to 400 000.114 The call-up in fall 2011, less than 136 000 men, was not encouraging and this raises doubts as to the possibilities to reach stated goals.115 If the modernized armed forces can pool up 300 000 conscripts annually, a challenging goal, the system will produce even in the future a reserve of several millions of trained reservists under the age of 35.A report published by the prestigious Valdai Club in July 2012, states: Thus, by the end of 2011 it is assumed that the million-strong army will consist of 220 000 officers, 425 000 contract soldiers, and 350 000 conscripts.The latter figure is much more realistic compared to the previously planned 700 000.However, it remains to be seen whether the Defense Ministry will be able to assemble a 400 000strong corps of contract personnel.116 Because of the military organizational changes, the current conscript service crisis in the Russian Armed Forces and the negative demographic develop- 111 The ambitious aim is to improve combat readiness for the frontline units to just 1−2 hours after given orders. ;IHS Jane's World Armies, 15 November 2012, "Russian Federation."Jane's World Armies estimated in November 2012 that the majority of the Airborne Forces can be deployed within 12 hours while the bulk of the Ground Forces should be operational within 24 to 48 hours, albeit in many cases with 20−40 percent deficit in vehicles.See also Litovkin, 2010 and Estinko, 2010.112 McDermott, 2012.113 Litovkin, 2013; RIA Novosti, 26 January 2013, "Russia's Forces Are Ready for War -Army Chief" [http://en.rian.ru/mili-tary_news/20130126/179040460/Russias-Forces-Are-Ready-for-War-Army-Chief.html].114 Felgenhauer, 2011.115 Carlsson & Norberg, 2012, pp.102−03 .See also Russian Defence Policy, 6 January 2012, "No One to Call (Part I)" [http://russiandefpolicy.wordpress.com/2012/01/06/noone-to-call-part-i/].The number of conscripted young men during 2011 was altogether 354,570, according to Russian Ministry of Defence.It is too early to tell if the steep decline in conscription figures in the fall of 2011 will prove to be permanent.According to official Russian census figures there should be about two million young men of 18−19 year's age, but some 800 000 seem to be able to evade conscription service without legally acceptable reasons.116 Barabanov, Makienko & Pukhov, 2012, p. 28 ment, it is uncertain if the stated goals will be achieved.117 The trained reserve in 2011 may in theory be 8 million, but the real figure is probably significantly lower, perhaps two million, because of lack of refresher training and equipment.118 Some clarification was given by Chief of General Staff, Army General Nikolai Makarov in November 2011: "We have a mobilization reserve of 700 000 men, we have brigades that may be put on war footing.Practically the entire mobilization reserve of the Army consists of conscripts."119 One major problem not to be omitted seems to be the mobilization system itself, largely inherited from Soviet times and not very well adapted to the new defence structure.120 A sign of improvement is the mobilization of 4 000 reservists in the vicinity of Petrozavodsk, Karelia, where the 216 th Storage and Repair Depot is located, facilitating the first exercise of a fully manned Motorized Infantry Brigade since 1993.The exercise was held 13-30 September 2012.121 Russia has reduced her peacetime armed forces.After the difficult economic years, the country has accordingly increased her defence spending.This trend also grows stronger.122 The starting level was indeed low, but even after taking inflation corrections into account, the annual growth of the defence budget has been 10 to 15 percent.In 2011 the share of defence expenditures in the national budget exceeded 20 percent.123 President Medvedev stated in March 2011, that the money spent on defence (including military-related spending of the other power ministries) would rise to 4.5 percent of GDP in 2012.124 The actual outcome for 2012 will be slightly higher and since the planned defence expenditure growth for 2013−2015 is expected to be at approximately 12 cent annually, spending has now reached a level that is generating strains on the budget and could prove unsustainable, especially if another round of crisis were to afflict the global economy.125 As the State rearmament program for 2007−2015 had encountered serious problems from the very beginning, President Medvedev stated in March 2010 that a new and far more ambitious programme for 2011−2020 would be announced later that year.126 The first figure mentioned for funding of the armament program was 13 trillion roubles.Defence Minister Serdyukov disclosed in September 2010 that the figure would rise to 19 trillion roubles (approximately 500 billion euros).127 In an interview, Serdyukov said: This is the minimum we need to equip our armed forces with modern weaponry.We could ask for a bigger number, but we need to understand that the budget cannot afford such spending, so 19 trillion is a serious amount of money that will provide considerable orders for our defense industry.When funding for refurbishment of the worn out defence industry infrastructure is included, the sums rise even higher.Prime Minister Putin declared in March 2011: I'd like to remind you that we plan to allocate over 20 trillion roubles for this current programme through 2020, which is three times more than we allocated towards the previous one.These are very substantial funds, and as you can understand, they will have to come at the expense of other areas.But I believe that we are justified in investing in the defence industry inasmuch as it is by nature a high-tech industry.128 Russia's Minister of Finance, Alexey Kudrin, who opposed high defence expenditure, was dismissed in late September 2011.129 125 Mukhin, 2012; Cooper, 2012.126 President of Russia, 2010b.127 Arkhipov & Pronina, 2010.Minister Serdyukov's remark hinted at a request for more than 30 trillion roubles that the generals had calculated would be needed to restore the armed forces.128 Government of the Russian Federation, 21 March 2011.See also Military Parade, 2(104), March/April 2011, "Modernization of Army -A Priority Objective", pp.4-7, and "Defence Industry Pivotal Modernization -A Priority", pp.8-9.The planned defence spending for 2011-2020 is equivalent to about 500 billion euros. "The money is available, it is necessary to bring order", according to Medvedev We cannot allow ourselves to simultaneously have a very high level of social protection in a system built on paternalistic principles, at the same time a very large army, and at the same time a very large amount of state property conjointly with very low prices for energy resources within the country. …Choose one, two at most.130 Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin, also chairman of the Military-Industrial Commission said in September 2012 that from now on national defence spending must be 3.5 percent of GDP.131 This does not include the ca 1.5 percent military related other spending.The well-known expert on Russia's defence economy and industry, Professor Julian Cooper, wrote: It has become clear that President Putin and the Prime Minister, Dmitry Medvedev, are resolutely committed to the full implementation of [the State Armament Programme, Gosudarstvennaya Programma Vooruzheniya, GPV-2020] even if it requires a larger defence burden on the economy.132 Summing up, the position of the Russian leadership is clear.The rearmament program is in fact seen as a means to boost the growth of the entire Russian industry, the same way as in the 1930s.133 This may prove to be an illusion.If the national economy cannot sustain such an ambitious defence program, social programs will have to yield.If the acquisitions are realized, actual defence spending would increase substantially in coming years, perhaps as much as 50 [ percent.The greatest impact would be at the end of this decade.134 Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin announced a detailed breakdown of the planned annual expenditure at the end of 2012. "The state defence order will reach about 1.9 trillion roubles next year [i.e. 2013], about 2.2 trillion in 2014 and 2.8 trillion in 2015", and is expected to stay at that level until the end of the decade.135 The official Russian plans regarding defence expenditure have been received with various degrees of scepticism in the west.The prognosis of the Russian defence economy until 2020, made by the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) using a range of realistic growth figures for the whole economy as well as for the defence budget, shows that the defence budget is likely to increase 50-100 per cent in real terms during this decade.136 Carrying out the armaments program, will not, however, be easy for Russia because of the severe crisis in the defence industry.The problems are largely systemic in nature, which adds to the difficulty of finding lasting solutions.Among the major problems are corruption 137 and flawed business management practices, excessive brain drain, Soviet-style inefficient production methods, obsolete production machinery and aging personnel.According to Professor Cooper, the defence industry has lost four million workers during the last 20 years -the present manpower figure is now about 1.5 million -and that the average age of workers is 55 to 60 years.The percentage of those under 30 is only 0.5 percent.138 Similar estimates are presented in the respected defence publication Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie (NVO).139 As an illustration of how the Russian leaders tackle the problems, President Medvedev demanded in May 2011 that the government present ideas for making investments in national defence more effective and the military to submit tenders without delay.Otherwise a number of weapons systems, vital for Russia would not be delivered, as was the case in 2009.140 Then, 30 strategic missiles, three nuclear submarines, five Iskander missile systems, 300 armored vehicles, 30 helicopters, and 28 combat aircraft were not delivered to the armed forces.134 Russia's Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov said that the situation had not really changed for the better.141 Responsible managers have been sacked, but that doesn't solve the systemic problems.Great efforts have, however, been made in order to improve the conditions of the defence industry.In October 2011 Prime Minister Putin reported on an additional financial input of 3 000 billion roubles (about 72 billion euros) to improve the industrial production base.142 According to Prime Minister Medvedev, Russia will pay special attention to the development of aircraft construction and shipbuilding, as well as the radio-electronic, space and nuclear industries in the next few years. "The military-industrial complex will receive a serious impetus.It should become a source of technological innovation, both in the military and civilian sectors", Medvedev said on 31 January 2013.143 The defence industrial focus is, however, shifting from research and development to production, even though resources for research show growth in absolute terms.One may, perhaps, doubt the credibility of official announcements, which deal with the huge economic appropriations for materiel acquisition during the period until 2020.Nevertheless, one can expect that all armed forces in the Russian Federation will be substantially strengthened.144 In 2010, Russia still had over 20 000 main battle tanks (MBTs), a large number of them are older types and are in poor condition.Future needs were announced to be 10 000 MBTs.145 Of these, 4 500 are modernized T-80's and 600 new T-90 types.146 Some of the T-72 MBTs are being modernized.147 The MBT inventory and the trained reserves will make it possible in principle to establish of some 200 armoured and motorized infantry brigades.Mobilization on such a scale would, however, take many months to accomplish.During the war in Georgia in 2008, Russia operated mainly with older equipment and did not mobilise.After introducing the brigade organization in the Russian Army in 2009, forty armoured brigades and infantry brigades, capable of fighting independently ("combined-arms operations") were established.The task of these front-line units is to be in a high state of readiness (with a constant strength of 95 percent and full combat readiness).The armoured brigade has three tank battalions and a total of some one hundred heavy MBTs.The motorized infantry brigade has one reinforced tank battalion (41 heavy MBTs).Altogether these brigades have about 2 000 heavy MBT's.It is believed that less than half of these units were combat ready in 2010.148 Russia has maintained her strong artillery and the principle of massive artillery fire support.A major program to procure new guided rocket launchers and artillery systems was announced in November 2012.149 Russia's ground forces have about 24 000 artillery pieces, of which over 6 000 are self-propelled artillery vehicles and about 3 500 rocket launchers.150 In addition, naval infantry and coastal defence units have more than 700 artillery pieces of various types.151 Even border units, which do not belong to the armed forces, and Interior Ministry units have some artillery in their inventory.New types of combat aircraft of the Russian Air Force are, among others, the Su-34 fighter-bomber, the Su-35 multi-purpose strike fighter, and the T-50 PAK FA fifth-generation multi-purpose strike-fighter, which is planned to enter service in the second half of the decade.152 Russia's goal is to obtain by the year 2020 nearly 1 500 new or thoroughly refurbished aircraft of various types, including 600 combat aircraft, 1 000 helicopters, and some 200 new airdefence missile systems.153 Development of the Russian Navy is primarily focused on developing and producing nuclear ballistic missile-carrying strategic submarines and their missiles as well as nuclear attack submarines.154 It is important for Finland and her small neighbouring countries to observe Russia's remarkable input to return to her invasion capability.Russia will procure four large Mistral amphibious assault landing ships (LHD) from France.Two of them will be built in Russia.155 The Mistral LHDs can carry 16 helicopters, four landing craft, and an entire tank battalion, i.e. some 30 MBTs.In addition, five Ivan Gren type landing craft are being built in Kaliningrad.Each of them can transport 13 MBTs or 60 armoured personnel carriers (APCs).156 While obtaining new naval ships and dismantling older types, the total inventory may continue to decrease.Contrary to earlier practices, Russia also aims to purchase other types of modern military technology from the West.For example, Russia buys hundreds of recce/patrol vehicles from France and Italy, and an advanced ground forces combat simulator from Germany as well as UAVs from Israel.157 The change of leadership in the Russian military community as well as technical difficulties concerning hardware procurement from the West, have reversed the trend.Co-operation with the West is not longer regarded as attractive as a few years ago.158 Vladimir Putin explained his position on the rearmament program in the Russian government daily Rossiyskaya Gazeta in February 2012 as follows: I am convinced that no "pinpoint" purchasing of military hardware and equipment can be a substitute for the production of our own types of armaments, it can only serve as the basis for obtaining technologies and knowledge.Incidentally this has happened before in history.Let me remind you that the whole "family" of our country's tanks in the 1930s was produced on the basis of American and British machines.And then, using the experience accumulated, our specialists developed the T-34 -the best tank in World War II. [...]In the coming decade the troops will take delivery of more than 400 modern groundand sea-launched intercontinental ballistic missiles, eight strategic missile submarines, around 20 multi-role submarines, more than 50 surface warships, around 100 military satellites, more than 600 modern aircraft, including fifth-generation fighters, more than 1 000 helicopters, 28 S-400 regiment-level surface-to-air missile systems, 38 Vityaz division-level surface-to-air missile systems, ten brigade-level Iskander-M systems, more than 2 300 modern tanks, around 2 000 self-propelled artillery systems and cannon, and also more than 17 000 military vehicles. [...]The updating of the defense industry complex will be the locomotive that will pull the development of the most diverse sectors in its wake.159 The outcome of the rearmament program remains to be seen.160 Some Western experts point out that "the currently envisaged plans for military expenditure do not seem to be sustainable, even if the economic situation does not deteriorate".161 Interestingly enough, the high command of the Swedish Defence Forces, stated clearly in January 2013, that Russia's "modernisation of her defence equipment is proceeding well".162 Pushing the programme through with great determination may be possible, but it could be accomplished only by diverting funds from social programs, which could trigger unpopular reactions and social unrest.On the other hand Russia's increasing defence export should be mentioned.Annual revenue during 2011−2012 alone is exceeding 10 billion euro.163 The Director of the U.S. National Intelligence, Lt.Gen. James R. Clapper gave the following assessment of Russia's military capabilities in January 2012: Moscow is now setting its sights on long-term challenges of rearmament and professionalization.In 2010, Medvedev and Putin approved a 10-year procurement plan to replace 159 Putin, 2012.160 It is likely, that the next refinement of the State rearmament program will take place at about 2015, when GPV-2025 would be announced.Long-term programs with a timespan of ten years very seldom materialize as such anywhere in the world.161 Cooper, 2012a.162 Försvarsmakten kommenterar (The Defence Forces comments), 14 January 2013, Försvarsmaktens anförande i Sälen 2013: Kartan och verkligheten (The Defence force's presentation in Sälen 2013: The map vs. reality, Peter Sandwall) [http://blogg.forsvarsmakten.se/kommentar/2013/01/14/forsvarsmaktens-anforande-i-salen-2013/].The speech at the annual Swedish national security conference Folk och Försvar (Society & Defence) was to be delivered by Supreme Commander, General Sverker Göranson, but due to acute illness he was replaced with the Director General of the Swedish Defence Forces, Mr. Peter Sandwall.163 Cooper, 2012a.Soviet-era hardware and bolster deterrence with a balanced set of modern conventional, asymmetric, and nuclear capabilities.However, funding, bureaucratic, and cultural hurdles-coupled with the challenge of reinvigorating a military industrial base that deteriorated for more than a decade after the Soviet collapse-will complicate Russian efforts. [...]The reform and modernization programs will yield improvements that will allow the Russian military to more rapidly defeat its smaller neighbors and remain the dominant military force in the post-Soviet space, but will not-and are not intended to-enable Moscow to conduct sustained offensive operations against NATO collectively.In addition, the steep decline in conventional capabilities since the collapse of the Soviet Union has compelled Moscow to invest significant capital to modernize its conventional forces.At least until Russia's high precision conventional arms achieve practical operational utility, Moscow will embrace nuclear deterrence as the focal point of its defense planning, and it still views its nuclear forces as critical for ensuring Russian sovereignty and relevance on the world stage, and for offsetting its military weaknesses vis-à-vis potential opponents with stronger militaries.164 ussia's operational plans are naturally secret, but by analysing the background and decisions regarding defence policy, deployments of armed forces units, military exercises and literature, one can present some estimates.As outlined earlier and based upon her strategic decisions, Russia is developing those of her armed forces that are in their own garrisons capable for immediate action in different directions.According to the country's traditional military thinking, the aim is to keep warfare outside the homeland territory.In dimensioning the capacity of her own armed forces facing west, Russia assesses the capabilities of the United States and NATO.In Russian thinking, high combat readiness of forces is nothing new.For example, Soviet forces in East Germany were ready to start "defence battle" by immediate attack.This was told by Colonel General Matvei Burlakov (the former Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Forces in East Germany) in 2005.165 A high state of readiness is an exceptionally great advantage in offensive operations, especially if the troops can be ordered into action directly from basic readiness.The possibility for successful surprise to the detriment of the adversary is then most favourable, since the enemy's intelligence has not been able to detect anything very alarming, but mainly contradictory signals or signals difficult to interpret.It seems improbable that governments would make difficult and costly decisions for mobilization on such shaky grounds.Thus Russia's striving to reach a high degree of basic readiness is logical defence planning.After reaching such high readiness capability, the Russian armed forces' ability to achieve their military objectives even with limited resources must be deemed as being good.For the time being Russia seems only to have embarked on the road to such higher readiness.Lieutenant General Vladimir Shamanov, commander of the airborne forces suggested in 2009 that: It makes sense to move to a three-way troop training system.While one battalion is sending people on leave, the second is at some distant range, the third will be carrying out combat training at its place of deployment. …It is on combat duty.The events in South Ossetia have shown the necessity of maintaining a fist of 5-10 battalions which are always ready to fight.166 The President of the Academy of War Sciences, Army General Makhmut Gareev, pointed out in December 2009 that it is impossible in modern conditions to resist a massive first strike.It is crucially important to analyze not only the initial period of war, but primarily the first strategic assault. "Therefore, as in the fight against terrorism, we need more offensive action, and, if necessary, pre-emptive action."167 In 1996 Lieutenant General (ret.)Valery Dementyev, a defence analyst and military adviser to the Russian President, the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff, jointly with defence analyst Dr. (Tech.)Anton Surikov described in an exceptionally frank manner the characteristics of an operation similar to "strategic assault": In the first stage, aviation, special military intelligence (GRU) forces, and special Federal Security Services (FSB) and Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) groups carry out strikes for the purpose of destroying or seizing the most important enemy targets and eliminating the enemy's military and political leadership.Then Mobile Forces, with the support of army and frontline aviation and naval forces, crush and eliminate enemy forces and take over their territory.After that, subunits of Ground Forces and Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, RF, preferably with some combat experience, move in.They establish control of the most crucial locations and carry out "cleansing" of the territory.Then, with the help of militia formed out of the pro-Russian part of the local population, they establish control over the territory and ensure the elimination of nationalists and deportation of some categories of citizens from certain locations.It should be emphasized that until the end of the special operation, local authorities are needed only insofar as they are useful in supporting military control over the territory.168 Detailed information of Soviet military contingency plans for occupation of Helsinki, bearing a striking resemblance with the general outline for a strategic 166 Giles, 2012, p. 13.According to Keir Giles, "Five to ten battalions at real readiness may have greater value in the kind of future conflict envisaged by the Russian military than 85 brigades at theoretical readiness."167 Miranovitsh, Gennady, 2009 .See also McDermott, 2011, pp.67−68.This c o rresponds well with the traditional Russian defence doctrine of offensive defence.168 Dementyev & Surikov, 1996 .Dr. (Tech.)Anton Viktorovich Surikov (26 May 1961 -23 November 2009 was also a high-ranking officer in the military intelligence service GRU and served as adviser in the government of Yevgeny Primakov and as assistant to Yuri Maslyukov, Chairman of the Defence Industrial Commission.He died in rather murky circumstances at the age of 48 in November 2009.Surikov's biography can be found at: [http://www.peoples.ru/state/politics /anton_surikov/].assault described above, became public in June 2012.169 Evaluation of these plans became possible by analyzing very detailed military maps from 1989, made and successively updated by the Soviet Army General Staff.The Finnish interpretation of what Soviet Cold War contingency planning would have meant, if operations had been executed, can be summarized as follows: Central functions of the Finnish society were to be paralyzed, radio and TV stations knocked out, the Parliament, the Presidential palace and military command centres were to be seized rapidly.Road junctions, harbours, bus depots, railway and metro stations were to be captured, financial institutions, water supply and district heating shut down.The aggressor would strive to defeat any organized military resistance by a steady supply of airborne reinforcements as well as by forces landing from the sea.The general population's will to resist was expected to break down in a few days as hunger and thirst take command.The whole Finnish capital and its surroundings would be occupied and sealed off in a matter of a few days.Military operations are designed to not only defeat the enemy physically, but also to crush their morale, and not just of the troops but also of the people and the government.Factors such as the depth of support for the war among the general population play an increasingly important role and, accordingly, so does understanding and using culturally specific features of the enemy and his political system, including through exposure via the media. [...]The distinction between "civilian" and "military" segments of society is disappearing.The aim of a military campaign is to impact not only the enemy army, but also its society, understood in terms of its cultural as well as its physical aspects.This trend makes it necessary to conduct joint "civilian-military" operations, rather than purely military ones.170 If Russia's decision to extend her operations to enemy territory was made one month before execution, some brigades may be ready for deployment.If the decision is made, say, six months in advance, an additional force, roughly 20-30 brigades, could be ready for deployment.Forces available for deployment could be even more, if they are not bound to other directions.Concealment 169 Salonen, 2012.The existence of these valuable maps in Estonia became known at the time of the Soviet withdrawal from Estonia.Their destruction was averted and Finnish military historian Antero Uitto was later able to acquire them.It is interesting that the Soviet Union placed Finland squarely in the enemy camp, regardless of the FCMA Treaty between the countries, the cornerstone on which Finnish and Russian official political relations were built.170 Barabanov and deception ('maskirovka') are essential parts of activities.The amount of available units will of course be affected by the opponent's reaction as well as his readiness level, and by the role of possible allies and the general situation elsewhere.Neighbouring Countries In the light of history, Russia has had a tendency to consider all the areas she has once governed as "legitimate" spheres of interest.171 While seeking influence, she also sees threats everywhere.In the 1930s, the Soviet Union set as her goal to return her sphere of influence of 1914.In the 1920s, Finland was classified as "neutral", but in the next decade she had already become an "enemy state."172 Finland became friendly only after the legally binding Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA) came into force in 1948.This period lasted for more than four decades.However, if Russia should decide to take action against the Baltic countries, the Finnish Defence Forces would probably be tied up, in order to prevent Finland from becoming a flank threat.The means of such actions could be threatening, various kinds of precision attacks, or even invasion.180 175 See cf.Chekinov and Bogdanov, 2010, p. 8 176 Finland lost about 10 percent of its territory and property to the Soviet Union in 1940 and 1944.Many Finns would want to buy back their former land property, build Summer houses etc.This has proved to be very difficult and Russia applies a far more restrictive policy towards Finns than the Finnish Government towards Russians buying property in Finland.177 Agrell, 2010, p. 235 (in Swedish) .Professor Wilhelm Agrell, well-known Swedish peace and conflict researcher, is of the same opinion as Russia, but with opposite arguments, that the credibility of the European security regime collapsed in the war in Georgia, at the latest.178 Студия "Альфа", г.Тверь, 7 August 2012, "Потерянный день" вся правда о Войне 08.08.08г.Puheloinen, 1999, pp.50-51.180 When the Red Army executed its grand strategic assault in the Baltics in late summer 1944, the Soviet Union tied up the Finnish forces, which still held a considerable strike capability, at Ilomantsi in eastern Finland.The loss of two Red Army divisions was the price the Soviet Union was then ready to pay in order to avert the flank threat.The number of Russian forces in the former Leningrad Military District has changed significantly after the break-up of the Soviet Union.The units withdrawn from East Germany were first concentrated there.Then followed a huge reduction of troops.Now the trend has again been reversed.The headquarters of the 6 th Russian Army was stationed in Petrozavodsk.It is now located near Kasimovo, the "military village" built by the Finns for Russian helicopter units north of St. Petersburg.The headquarters appears to be in charge of the ground forces east and south-east of Finland.In building a capability for strategic assault operations, the Iskander missile brigade in Luga is of fundamental importance.By taking advantage of the opponent's low readiness, precision strikes by this brigade could be used together with air strikes to paralyze his defence.It is interesting to note that units from the 98 th Guards Airborne Division in Ivanovo, 400 kilometres north-east of Moscow, exercised in Luga in February 2012.185 An air assault division is active in the Pskov area, along with a 'Special Designation' (Spetsnaz) commando brigade.In Pechenga there is a motorized infantry brigade and a naval infantry brigade.These brigades are in full readiness (in hours).According to Colonel General Postnikov, then commander of the Russian Ground Forces, an arctic brigade composed of Spetsnaz troops, familiar with arctic conditions, would also be established in Pechenga.In February 2012 it became evident that the plans were postponed to 2015.186 Chief of General Staff, Army General Makarov assured in Helsinki on 5 June 2012 that Russia "has no intention of establishing any arctic brigades".187 Russia's statements are contradictory.The real outcome remains to be seen.The condition of the Alakurtti airbase, east of Salla, will be improved and a refurbished helicopter regiment will be stationed there.Its equipment will include attack helicopters and armed transport helicopters.Apparently, new helicopters are badly needed.188 A reserve motorized infantry brigade can be mobilized with equipment from the Alakurtti storage.The above-mentioned helicopter regiment will support this brigade.The depot in Petrozavodsk consists of equipment for one reserve brigade, which performed a mobilization and refresher training exercise in September 2012, thus proving its capability as a military unit not to be dismissed.189 A powerful early warning radar against strategic missile attack at Lekhtusi village, north of St. Petersburg has been completed.A new air surveillance radar station on Hogland Island is under construction.It will cover the entire air space over southern Finland, the Gulf of Finland and Estonia.All together the 1 st Air Force and Air Defence Command, the air force of the Northern and Baltic Fleets, have more than 200 combat aircraft of different types, more than 100 combat helicopters and a corresponding amount of armed transport helicopters and many special and transport planes of various kinds.Some other air force units use air bases in the area for forward staging purposes.190 The air force units can universally be quickly mobilized.They can be transferred in a short time from long distances to the desired areas.The Chief of General Staff, Army General Nikolai Makarov, declared in February 2011 that the Russian air force units are in permanent readiness and in full combat order.191 To clarify dimensions one may observe that the Finnish inventory of about 60 F/A-18 Hornet combat aircraft will even in the future primarily serve as interceptors.The situation will change somewhat, when they obtain air-to-ground capability after completion of their mid-life upgrade.192 The once formidable Swedish Air Force, one of the strongest air forces in Europe during the Cold War, has been allowed to diminish dramatically in capability.When the threat of massive invasion in the Baltic Sea area faded away, the major portion of squadrons were disbanded.This was also the case with most of Sweden's impressive road-base network, vital for wartime combat endurance.The numbers of both pilots and missiles available in the Swedish Air Force are thought to be modest. "Our capability for air support of ground combat in a war situation is completely inadequate because of lack of suitable weapons", Major General (retd.)Karlis Neretnieks, the former Chief of Operations of the Swedish Defence Forces writes in "Friends in Need", published by the Royal Swedish Academy of Military Sciences in the spring of 2011.193 193 Neretnieks, 2011, p. 216 .This pessimistic assessment may be only partly true as the Swedish Air Force is equipped with various types of laser-guided Paveway bombs, Maverick missiles and Saab Rb15 anti-ship missiles.The Swedish Air Force has a limited tradition with regard to close air support (CAS), but has rather focused on air interdiction, striking against supply lines, etc.,in the rear of the adversary, and air defence.See more Rydell, 2012.CONCLUSIONS FROM THE FINLAND'S POINT OF VIEW 6 .1 Alliances and Proclamations of Solidarity he major global geopolitical changes and deep economic problems of many countries have also affected Europe and the neighbourhood of Finland.The foundations of the European Union and NATO no longer appear as solid as at the turn of the century.The most important NATO and European Union member states have greatly reduced their defence spending.A profound difference of threat assessments can be found between old and new NATO member states.The strategic interest of the United States is increasingly focused towards the Asian direction.194 Russia is significantly increasing her defence expenditure, and also growing stronger militarily.The smaller countries are uncertain and confused as to how to organize their security.The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which was established primarily to protect the security of Western Europe against the Soviet threat, has been largely dismantled.Except for the integrated command and control system, NATO's armed forces have in practice been armed forces of sovereign member states, which have decided independently on how to use their forces.The political goals to guarantee the security of member countries have remained, although with the exception of the United States, the allies' military capability is questionable.The decision taken by the four Visegrad countries in May 2011 speaks for itself.The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually 194 Clinton, 2011.T and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. […]Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council.Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.195 NATO's security clause is not unconditional, but the power to decide whether to give aid remains with the member states, who also decide on the quantity and quality of that aid.In addition, Article 5 is also directly coupled to the United Nations and especially to its security council, whose permanent members may theoretically complicate the application of NATO's Article 5.Swedish defence researcher Mike Winnerstig notes: In the end, NATO's Strategic Concept 2010 as well as NATO's Charter and Article 5, are mainly words on a piece of paper.How these articles will be applied in peacetime becomes a central question in assessing their credibility.196 NATO's significance as a guarantor of security is, above all, political in nature.The mere achievement of membership in a defence alliance was not "an objective or an accomplishment, but a logical step in a broadly based defence and security reform," Estonia's Defence Minister Mart Laar stated in April 2011.197 NATO is a security-political haven for new members, and it also imposes duties upon them.This is also the opinion of old member states, who do not consider the threat from Russia to be acute at all.It was already previously stated that Russia has no respect for the defence capabilities of individual European NATO members.On the other hand, Russia has a strong interest in trying to marginalize NATO as a political factor.As a member of the European Union, Finland has also approved the Lisbon Treaty's articles 1-42.7: If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States.The wording of the EU solidarity clause is noticeably more demanding than NATO's Article 5.The contradiction between the goals of solidarity and their credible application is also a question of resources.198 The EU does not have an independent military organisational structure, and NATO member states are committed to fulfil only their own obligations, albeit with a diminished capability as a result of significant military reductions and a lack of political cohesion.NATO has, however, to some extent returned to actual contingency planning.The EU's ability to react quickly to a serious security-political crisis in its own area or outside it is modest.A great majority, 21 EU member states are also NATO members and nearly 95 percent of all EU citizens live in NATO countries.These states oppose the creation of duplicate military organizations as a useless waste of resources, for the single purpose of meeting the needs of a small minority.Therefore, it is highly unlikely that EU's military-political weight will increase in the future.On the contrary, the EU's weakness in taking responsibility was revealed in an embarrassing way when the Libyan crisis erupted in spring 2011.It should be noted that the development of the EU's military capabilities, according to the Union's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), is exclusively directed towards crisis management operations, not waging war.Finland and Sweden have committed themselves to helping other EU countries, and Sweden, in addition, to assisting Nordic countries which are not EU member states, i.e. Norway and Iceland.Finland and Sweden themselves will decide upon the quantity and quality of the aid.The unilateral proclamation of solidarity issued by Sweden in 2009, has evoked vivid discussion.It was issued at a time when the country's capabilities to give significant military assistance had already declined sharply in the wake of Sweden's radical defence reform.199 The key passage of the solidarity proclamation states: A military conflict in our immediate region in which only one country alone is affected is virtually inconceivable.Sweden will not take a passive stance should another EU member state or Nordic country suffer a disaster or come under attack.We expect these countries to act in the same way if Sweden is similarly affected.Sweden should thus both extend and receive military support.200 198 Koivula & Forss, 2012, pp.147-173.199 Rydell, 2011, pp.55-57.The full manpower strength of the Swedish Armed Forces will be about 50 000, but only 15 700 in continuous service.See also Agrell, 2010, p. 235.The mention of an ability to give and receive military aid is also a way to make public the secret basic pillar of the country's defence policy during the Cold War; her extensive co-operation with the United States and NATO.201 While pondering the mutual solidarity declaration, the different defence solutions of Finland, Sweden and the other Nordic countries have been an obstacle to finding a binding security guarantee between them.The Finnish position has been that separate Nordic security guarantees are not trustworthy as such.Norway and Denmark, which enjoy NATO's security guarantees, cannot unilaterally add to NATO's burden by making promises which eventually may be left to the bigger NATO countries to carry.A very unfavourable situation for Finland would be one in which the Nordic countries would be left alone with their mutual solidarity commitments in a conflict between the great powers, as has sometimes happened in history.202 These political problems would not arise if all Nordic countries were NATO members.For small militarily non-aligned states like Finland, current changes in her neighbourhood create a condition of deepening insecurity.The Finnish white paper (Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2009) stated that "strong grounds exist for considering Finland's membership of NATO".203 No security guarantees, whether provided by organizations or states are, however, comprehensive but being left alone also has its risks.In the light of history, agreements have often been interpreted in a way that the interpreter considers beneficial from his own point of view.The basic security-political positions in the Nordic countries have been static for a long time.Some significant movement can, however, be noted as a result of geopolitical developments and fiscal austerity in Europe and the USA.These provide strong incentives for the Nordic countries to deepen their defence co-operation.It is still premature to consider binding security guarantees in one or another form, but there is a clear understanding that creating common capabilities will serve the Nordic interest.204 Recent examples of military intervention or crisis management suggest that 'coalitions of the willing' are often a more realistic alternative than full commitment of defence alliances such as NATO.Russia's position to Nordic defence co-operation (NORDEFCO) is negative.205 Closer Finnish co-operation with the United States in the field of defence might bring a substantial change in the current situation, with advantages and disadvantages alike.Thus, Finland has to build her defence relying primarily on her own resources without underestimating the significance of cooperation with other partners, such as the Nordic countries.Finland's national Defence Forces (FDF) exist above all for those unpredictable circumstances when Finland may have to face unacceptable demands, and all other security arrangements have failed.The guiding factors in deciding the future of the national defence forces are the tasks and demands on the FDF defined by the Finnish Government and Parliament.The Government report of 2009 stated inter alia the following with regard to the role of the FDF and military defence: The Defence Forces, pursuant to their statutory tasks, are employed in the military defence of Finland, in supporting the other authorities as well as in international military crisis management. […]Finland prepares to repel the use of military force, or the threat thereof, against the nation.This highlights the importance of deterrence.The defence capability and readiness are scaled to correspond to the situation at hand. […]In line with the comprehensive approach, it is necessary to estimate whether it is possible to carry out the required tasks with national capabilities alone.Should the capabilities prove inadequate, during normal conditions it is necessary to guarantee the reception of military and other assistance needed in a crisis situation.This can be achieved through close international cooperation or through being allied with others.206 The strength of Finland's peacetime defence forces is among the smallest in Europe, some 30 000.Especially in peacetime, the ground forces are essentially a training organization.Combat forces will have to be mobilized from the reserve.These comparisons are misleading, incomplete and slanted in which Finland's total wartime strength of 230 000 after full mobilization is compared to the strength of professional armies of countries with many times larger populations, smaller national territorial areas and a completely different geopolitical position.207 In discussions about professional armies, the focus is primarily on ground forces.For Finland a professional army is out of the question.Economic grounds alone rule out that alternative.This fact was once again established in September 2010 by the so-called Siilasmaa Committee, appointed by the Finnish Ministry of Defence.208 A professional army would be such an expensive solution that its actual size would inevitably be very small.As a new, low-pay profession, the professional soldier would not be an attractive alternative for young Finns to enlist, and the impact on the will of the Finns, which has remained exceptionally high for many decades, to defend their country could be disastrous.209 Participation in international military co-operation is natural.Doing so also serves Finland's own defence capability.Finnish reservists with versatile skills have proved to be useful in various tasks in international operations.Finland's resources are, however, sufficient only for a small contribution to the international crisis management (CM) activities, no matter how much harder we would strive to increase our share in CM operations.The primary task of the FDF remains the defence of the homeland.However, the cost-effective defence solution has its downside.Combat units, established from the reserve are most vulnerable at the moment of mobilization.Another significant fact is that peacetime readiness is so low that repelling a surprise attack may be difficult.210 207 Commander of the Finnish Defence Forces, 8 February 2012.208 Ministry of Defence (Finland), 2010, p. 7.According to the source, "General conscription is in our opinion the most cost-effective way to produce defence capability in Finland.The costs of even a very modest professional army would be significantly higher than that of the conscript army."The chairman of the committee, Mr. Risto Siilasmaa is the co-founder of the F-Secure Corporation and present chairman of the board of the Nokia Corporation.209 The will to defend their country is traditionally very high among the Finns.About 75 percent of the Finns regularly answer "yes" and about 20 percent "no" to the following question: "If Finland were attacked, should Finns, in your opinion, take up arms to defend themselves in all situations even if the outcome seemed uncertain?"See Ministry of Defence (Finland), The Advisory Board for Defence Information, 2009.210 In the Finnish Ground Forces there are perhaps only about a company of Special Jaegers ready to return fire immediately.The Finnish peacetime units are primarily training units, not fighting units.The readiness of the Finnish Air Force is considered good, but its peacetime inventory of combat missiles is very low, adequate only for training needs and surveillance flights.It is decisively important that the units mobilized are not eliminated with a few well-targeted strikes, and that they would be capable of fighting territorially dispersed after having survived the first blows.Sufficient endurance is needed and also for buying time to allow for counteractions of friends and allies even after surprise precision strikes.The Finnish defence community and the FDF contingency planning have to consider the significance of nearby foreign forces in a high state of permanent readiness.Sufficient reserves must be available in order to compensate for initial losses during the mobilization phase and those caused by enemy strikes as well as for personnel rejected due to deteriorated combat capability or for other reasons.If the trained reserve is only equal to the nominal mobilization strength, the precondition for the entire defence capability is rapidly put into question.A significant part of the reserve will be tied up with different kinds of guarding, protection and auxiliary support duties.The need is already great during the pressuring and threatening phase of the crisis.The call-up and training of the whole annual contingents is necessary in order to satisfy the quantitative demands for reserve units.For example, at the end of the Cold War, there were in Sweden 8 000 sites or locations considered vital for the national defence to be guarded.211 One can assume that in Finland, there would be thousands of corresponding locations.The Finnish territorial defence is largely based on the requisition of vehicles and tools from the civilian community in order to fill the needs for mobilized reserve territorial units.There are available at low cost in our country enough all-terrain, four-wheel drive vehicles, snow mobiles, 'monkeys' and other vehicles.Enemy operations would extend deeply into our territory from the very start with no single, clearly defined front line, and the need for defending units in the vast Finnish territory will be great.An aggressor would have to be met with determined resistance from the very onset of hostilities at important locations anywhere in the country.The crucial question is how to allocate resources between increasingly expensive state-of-the-art army units and the indispensable local defence system which covers the whole country.A certain modern spearhead is needed to defeat the aggressor.Yet it is questionable how much a possible invader is deterred by a Finnish qualitative military high-tech capability if the quantitative dimension of it is miniscule.Agrell, 2010, p. 44.he forceful return of geopolitics in international affairs is a fact.It also has implications in the neighbourhood of Finland.The withdrawal of the Russian forces from the previous Soviet positions in the Warsaw Pact countries and in the Baltic States at the end of the Cold War was the first phase of the change, which coincided with the efforts of the CSCE to build a new cooperative security structure for Europe.The second phase, Russia's return as a dominant player in the former Soviet sphere began in earnest halfway through the last decade and gained increased momentum during the war in Georgia, the downfall of the so-called Ukrainian orange revolution, and the broader integration of Belarus into the Russian systems.212 Russia's efforts to establish a Eurasian Union, is a manifestation of her current ambitions and is also an excellent example of the impact of Alexander Dugin's thinking on contemporary Russian policy.Wilhelm Agrell, a Swedish professor and well-known peace and conflict researcher, wrote in 2010 that the European security architecture suffered a disastrous failure in the war in Georgia: The war, no matter how insignificant it was, and how well its foreign political effects have been brushed out of sight, simply should never have taken place […] It was an anomaly, an exception impossible to explain in light of the adopted basic security political framework. […]The war did not fit at all into the picture of the EU's and the eastern border area's mutual and stabilizing relationships […] .The EU's primary or rather only foreign political capability -soft power -turned out to be merely a stage setting which the Russians punctured unscrupulously.The military operations we conducted to force Georgia to peace … were absolutely necessary.The fact that Russia adopted such a tough line at the time ultimately ensured that the situation is much more peaceful now, in spite of certain difficulties. […]We were able to calm down some of our neighbours by showing them how they should behave with regard to Russia and small adjacent states.For some of our partners, including NATO, it was a signal that they must think about the geopolitical stability before making a decision to expand the alliance.I see this as the main lessons of what happened in 2008.214 President Putin confirmed in August 2012 that planning for the war started in late 2006.His comment came after high-ranking military officials criticized their former Supreme Commander Medvedev for his hesitant leadership, and for failing to give the final order to execute the plan in time.The Russian political and military leadership have in recent years adopted a more confrontational language.After Vladimir Putin's return as President in 2012, Russia has more and more adopted positions in line with the traditional FSB attitudes.The dominant players in the West tended to dismiss this mostly as posturing without much substance in deeds.215 Russia's invasion of Georgia was simply forgotten.216 This western perception may, however, be changing as the first cracks in the friendly facade among Russia's closest western partners begin to appear.217 214 President of Russia, 2011.Russia's NATO Ambassador Dmitry Rogozin was more explicit, without active Russian operations Georgia and Ukraine would have become NATO members.See РИА Новости, "Медведев: бездействие РФ в 2008 г могло бы привести к расширению НАТО", November 21, 2011, [http://ria.ru/defence_safety/ 20111121/494106971.html] .See also Giles, 2012a.Keir Giles argues convincingly that the Russian view of events related to the war in Georgia is not credible. "Russia and the world woke up to war on the morning of 8 August, but close study of events leading up to that point provides a number of indicators that suggest additional Russian troops were moving into South Ossetia significantly earlier -crucially, without necessarily having explicit authority to do so from the supreme command."In addition, he raises the important question of risks related to deficient command and control systems in Russia, which may lead to dangerous and provocative activity at a time of tension by individual units, as was the case in Georgia.215 Germany's Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle's comments to Russia's threats to react militarily to NATO's missile defence plans in Europe are revealing: "In any case, I see not only the possibility for agreement, but the necessity for agreement. …We will not ensure our own security against Russia, but together with Russia in Europe."See Bidder, 2011.Another example is provided by Army General Makarov's speech in Helsinki on 5 June 2012 and President Putin's confirmation that the Chief of the General Staff voiced Russia's position.Finnish Foreign Minister Erkki Tuomioja held that the General had spoken in a personal capacity.216 Seldom has a fine book carried such a sadly misplaced title as that of the late Ronald D. Asmus, A Little War that Shook the World -Georgia, Russia and the Future of the West, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.217 Neukirch, 2012.Dr. Andreas Schockenhoff, Chancellor Merkel's commissioner for German-Russian co-operation has strongly criticized the leadership style of President Vladimir Putin and charged that "state power (in Russia) views politically active citizens as Russia aims to overthrow perhaps the most important achievements of the OSCE, the commitments by the member states made in the Paris Charter (1990) and the Istanbul Document (1999).218 Russia suspended implementation of the CFE Treaty in 2007.The United States and the UK followed suit four years later and other NATO member states are expected to follow.219 Russia responded strongly, using the ballistic missile defence controversy as a tool. "The current political leadership can't act like Gorbachev, and it wants written obligations secured by ratification documents," Russia's former NATO envoy, Ambassador Dmitry Rogozin said.220 The U.S. think-tank STRATFOR commented already in December 2011 as follows: For Russia, the fundamental issue at hand is not the BMD system itself, but the U.S. military presence the system would bring with it.U.S. BMD plans are focused on Central Europe, which abuts Russia's former Soviet periphery.Moscow can't help but feel threatened by the U.S. military commitment to the region that the system represents.221 In its military doctrine, Russia considers NATO a danger.The authors of the doctrine, however, regarded NATO still a threat to Russia, even a serious threat.222 A disunited NATO, on the other hand, considers Russia a partner.The experienced Swedish Russia expert Jan Leijonhielm writes in Friends in Need: opponents rather than partners."Well-known Russian scientist, Dr Igor Sutyagin, who spent 11 years in prison and labour camps on dubious charges before he was released in the swap related to the exposed Russian spy ring in the USA in 2010, cited a British politician as follows: "If you want to speak about Russia, speak about it as it is, not as you want it to be."See Sutyagin, 2012.218 .Ambassador Rogozin points out that the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE, 1990) and the adapted CFE Treaty (1999) were agreed upon at a time when Russia was weak and that they are no longer acceptable.The CFE negotiations took place in parallel with the confidence-building talks leading up to the Paris Charter and the Istanbul Document.219 Kimball, 2011 .See also RIA Novosti, 25 November 2011, "UK Halts Military Data Sharing with Russia" [http://en.rian.ru/world/20111125/169036481.html].220 Isachenkov, 2011 . "We won't allow them to treat us like fools," he [Mr. Rogozin] said, and continued: "Nuclear deterrent forces aren't a joke."Mr. Rogozin was soon afterwards appointed Deputy Prime Minister.His main responsibilities are in the domain of arms procurement.221 STRATFOR, 8 December 2011, "Central Europe Watches as Washington, Moscow Clash over BMD" [http: //www.stratfor.com/memberships/205624/geopolitical_diary/ 20111207 -central-europe-watches-washington-moscow-spar-over-bmd].222 Felgenhauer, 2010.For small states in Russia's neighbourhood the military doctrine is by no means a calming document, given the earlier-mentioned Russian law stipulating a right for Moscow to intervene wherever and however in defence of Russian citizens abroad. […]Investment in considerably higher readiness, great mobility and attempts to increase air assault capabilities […] matches ill with the development of Russian doctrine, which stresses defensive capability.A possible future Chinese threat, for example would probably not require any major naval landing capability.223 In Western Europe, the threat of war is considered an extremely outdated thought.It has resulted in exceptionally large reductions in the armed forces of NATO and of other Western countries, and the emphasis of tasks has shifted from national defence to international crisis management.At the same time their military operational readiness has decreased drastically.Russia takes advantage of this situation, and acts in her own way.In developing the capabilities of her armed forces she aims to create units of high readiness which are able to achieve operational results also in the western direction by surprise strikes directly from their peacetime deployments.Reinforcements would be brought in and possible occupation forces mobilized from the reserve only after the operation has begun.The "new" NATO member states gained a political victory when the Alliance finally agreed to work on contingency plans for the defence of the Baltic States.The geostrategic position of these countries is exceptionally unfavourable.A capacity to repel invasion from the very outset of hostilities may therefore not be deemed possible.Only scarce open information about these plans is available, but it appears that the starting point for the planning is retaking of lost ground.224 If Russia were forced to consolidate territorial gains, obtained with conventional means, she might be tempted to use nuclear threat.Open discussions of "de-escalation" of conflicts by the use of nuclear weapons, the simulated use of tactical nuclear weapons at the end of large military exercises, such as Zapad-2009 and Vostok-2010, and the deployment of dual-capable Iskander missiles not far from the Estonian border, support this view.225 It will be in-teresting to see how the planned Russian-Belarusian Zapad-2013 exercise will be executed in September 2013, announced as a CSTO exercise.226 A general perception is that there is no immediate threat in view now.227 However, no one can predict reliably what the world will look like ten or twenty years from now, the timeframe of today's strategic decision-making.Finland's influence on world affairs is modest, at best.Capabilities, not intentions are significant.The defence can be considered credible, when the aggressor realizes that defeating it will be achieved only at an unacceptably high cost.The defender himself has to be confident of his capabilities.In broader terms, national defence requires the comprehensive military and societal capability to endure.The importance of good strategic early warning should not be underestimated.A sufficiently large military reserve is a signal of the people's will to defend the homeland.Above all, it also indicates that the defence cannot be paralyzed by a surprise attack or by threat thereof, and that resistance will continue even after enemy invasion.The preventive value of a large reserve is significant.226 РИА Новости, 28 December 2012, "Российско-белорусские стратегические учения пройдут в 2013 году" [http://ria.ru/defense_safety/20121224/915972564.html].President Putin: "It is important to enhance the interaction with allies, particularly those in the CSTO.Such tasks will be solved in the framework of the planned Russian-Belarusian military exercises West-2013."227 As this report deals primarily with military capability developments, the authors leave it to others, mainly the decision-makers, to assess the threat.In September 2012 the Russian government submitted to parliament the draft budget for the years 2013 to 2015.The Russian State Duma approved it for the next three years at first reading at the end of October.228 The budget proposal subsequently passed the parliamentary process and was signed into law by the President on 5 December 2012.229 Overall, the federal budget demonstrates the government's commitment to responsible macroeconomic policy.The Russian government is prepared to deal with the probable drop in oil revenues, which constitute almost half of the federal government income.Russia's finance ministry unveiled in July 2012 the direction of 2013−2015 federal state budgets, presenting a rise in defence spending by 25.8 percent for 2013 alone.230 The total state budget for 2013 is 12 745 billion rubles (€ 316 billion; 40.3 RUR = € 1).The do c ument formed the basis for the 2013 budget presented by Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev later in 2012.Interesting to note is that the budget plan stipulated an oil price of $92 for a barrel in 2013.The budget breakdown provides insight on the priorities of the Putin administration.More than one third of the federal government spending is assigned to defence, security and police.According to the analysis of Gaidar Institute, a leading Russian think-tank, the military spending is the only part of the budget growing in real terms in 2013−2015 with the total three-year increase of 37%.In contrast, the health care spending will be cut by 50% from the current mediocre level.The details on the defence budget are not disclosed: 50% of spending is secret.Presumably, most of the money will be spent on the rearmament of the Russian military force.231 "Targeted 'national defence' spending as a percentage of GDP will amount to 3.2 percent in 2013, 3.4 percent in 2014 and 3.7 percent in 2015", Defence Committee chairman Vladimir Komoedov was quoted as saying in the committee's conclusion on the draft budget for 2013-2015.The spending proposals provide financing to "re-equip units with new weapon systems, military and special equipment and provide housing and social safeguards for service members" among other issues, Komoedov said.232 The share of GDP relating to the total military expenditure is shown in the The share concerning other security and military services (so called "power ministries", siloviki, Russian: силовики ) is estimated to exceed 1%.Although salaries for members of the Russian armed forces are rising fast, it is not visible in the budget.234 The current rearmament programme (total amount of 20 000 billion roubles, approximately 500 billion euros) extends to 2020.It will be aimed more at purchasing of new armaments instead of modernizing old.In addition, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin announced already in October 2011, that the government is going to use 3000 billion roubles (around 72 billion euros) for upgrading defence industry, a necessary step for fulfilling the ongoing purchasing plans.235 The Defence Ministry coordinates also the weapons procurement of all other "power ministries".236 Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin announced a detailed breakdown of the planned annual rearmament expenditure at the end of 2012 as follows: "The state defence order will reach about 1.9 trillion roubles in 2013, about 2.2 trillion in 2014 and 2.8 trillion in 2015", and is expected to stay at that level until the end of the decade.237 232 This rapid and intensive military reform turned out to be the most radical transformation of the armed forces since the Second World War.From the very beginning the planned reform met with strong opposition from conservative circles of the defence community, eventually leading to what could almost be called dishonourable discharge of both the defence minister and the chief of general staff in November 2012.Although implementation of the reform is well under way, it is by no means completed.Ambitions to create a pure and radically smaller professional army than the former Soviet-style army, equipped with state-of-the-art weapons, were thwarted.The final outcome remains to be seen, but is likely to be a mix of both concepts.The purpose of the reforms is to create mobile and well-trained armed forces equipped with modern equipment and weapons.Priorities are as follows: • Re-deployment of all formations and units for permanent combat readiness, 100% staffing for a state of war, The President of Russian Federation Dmitri Medvedev appeared in March 2010 at the meeting of the Collegium of the Ministry of Defence.At that meeting the ten year rearmament program (2011−2020) for the Russian Armed Forces was finally accepted.The Russian Government was given the task of renewing the weaponry of the Armed Forces by an average of 9-11% per year, so that by 2020 the modern equipment would make up 70% of the total.At the same time they were also to improve the education of officers and other military personnel and to raise the combat readiness of troops.239 One main objective of the rearmament program, signed by the President on 31 December, 2010, is to secure maintenance and further development of Russia's strategic nuclear weapons.About 10% of all the funds are concentrated on the development and acquisition of land-based nuclear weapons.These include both the modernization of existing systems and the purchase of new ones.240 Efforts are also being made to improve the nuclear strike capability.241 Another priority is strategic space defence, especially the development of an advance early warning system.By 2018 the modernization of the present system should be completed and new facilities constructed in all threatened directions.The program also includes different types of satellites, and other space defence systems.242 The Voronezh-M anti-missile radar at Lekhtusi, north-east of St. Petersburg, became the first radar station of its kind in the country.There are three other new generation radar stations in other directions of Russia.At the end of 2011, Russia started to operate another new missile warning radar Voronezh-DM.This station is located in the Kaliningrad enclave.These stations can monitor the Northern sector including space and missile launches in Sweden and Norway.They are also monitoring aircraft flying in the area of their responsibility.243 Russia is also modernising her airborne early warning and control aircraft, A-50 Mainstay (AEW&C).244 There have already been doubts about the realization of the latest equipment program, since the three previous programs were not completed.The former program (GPV-2015) for 2007−2015 was far behind the established schedule when it was abrogated in 2010.245 There are serious doubts that Russian defence industry will be able to fulfil its goals.Co-operation today with several western manufacturers is one indica-tion.On the other hand, it should be noted that when Russia's defence industry finally received the promised entire budgetary funds, it was able to carry out about 70% of the State's orders.246 Now it seems that the new leadership team at the MOD has decided to stop using the threat of importing armaments from abroad to get Russian defence industry to improve the quality of its products.For a couple of years, this seemed to be a favourite tool used by former Defence Minister Serdyukov, especially in his bid to improve the quality of Russian tanks and armoured vehicles.Just in the beginning of 2013 there have been some indications that the MOD has turned away from imports and will return to the autarkic model of military procurement that has been more traditional for the Russian armed services.247 The reform of the Russian army includes forming three categories of brigades, designed for different tasks.248 The first category of brigades, heavy brigades, will be the main army unit and will maintain permanent readiness status.Such a brigade consists of tracked, main battle tanks (for example T-90) and BMP (amphibious tracked infantry fighting vehicles).The brigade's organic artillery is mainly armoured with self propelled guns.The second category of brigades, medium brigades, will be used as rapidresponse unit.The combat vehicles of these medium brigades are mainly wheeled-chassis armour (BTR).The brigade's artillery is towed or self propelled on wheels.The third and final category of brigades, light brigades, will be highly mobile units and use light armoured vehicles are characterized by high protective full field equipment of individual combatants.In all military districts, from Kamchatka to Kaliningrad, groups of armed formations capable of offensive strike operations, have been built.In these formations, combat brigades and airborne divisions of permanent readiness are playing the most significant role.The troop skills in combat have been tested in many large field exercises.The Chief of General Staff, Army General Nikolai Makarov mentioned on 17 November, 2011 that all these formations are fully operational and ready to meet their combat tasks in one hour.250 According to our estimates in reality each permanent readiness brigade may have only one battalion battle group in high daily readiness.The Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, Colonel-General Vladimir Chirkin has said that Russia will also add 10 reconnaissance, 14 army aviation and two air defence brigades by 2020 without increasing the overall number of personnel in the Armed Forces.In line with the current military reform, the Russian Armed Forces have been reduced to 1 million personnel and reorganized from a four-tier (military district -army -division -regiment) to a more flexible and battle-ready three-tier structure (military district -operational command -brigade).At present, there are more than 100 brigades deployed in four military districts. (See after the table on previous page) .251 The military districts have formed their own separate reconnaissance units.The ground forces brigades of constant readiness will be capable to operate independently aside mobile battle groups and other brigades.With the aid of these intelligence units, the commanders have a clear picture of what is happening from 25−100 kilometres beyond the front lines.In the near future this capacity can be extended even to 5000 kilometres by the aid of UAV`s and other modern means.Each military district has its own separate reconnaissance brigade and each motorized and armour brigade has its own reconnaissance battalion.252 At least three military districts have a new air assault brigade at their disposal.There will be total six of these brigades.To improve the mobility of these brigades each of them will have a helicopter regiment of 60 helicopters (40 Mi-8s and 20 Mi-24s).These brigades will serve in the role of strategic reserve for the Joint Strategic Commands (Military Districts) as the airborne divisions are subordinated the Supreme Command.253 Each Military District will also have an artillery missile brigade with dual capable Iskander-M missiles.The first brigade of this kind is already operational at Luga base, near St. Petersburg.The range of the missile is officially below 500 kilometres, but it has potential to fly 700 kilometres in its present configuration and 1000 kilometres in a model employing new, more efficient fuel.Each brigade has twelve launchers of two missiles.The new structure of the Russian Ground Forces is said to be alike its western counterparts.The new structure is expected to improve the effectiveness of operations, to coordinate and shorten the chain of command.254 The brigade organisation also seems noticeably more flexible and more suitable for local conflicts, since the divisions were too large and cumbersome, and regiments on the other hand, lacked weapons and equipment necessary for carrying out independent operations.The ground force brigades will be used as constantly ready units which will be capable to operate independently, along with highly mobile units under one command.255 The tendency in reorganization is to strengthen important directions like Northwest, South and Far East, on expenses of other areas.256 Ground Forces play a primary role in defending a large area and long borders of Russia and securing country's integrity.It has a decisive role also in present circumstances in defeating enemy and in gaining important goals and objectives.257 Reforming the armament and other equipment The Army Colonel-General Aleksandr Postnikov, the former Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Ground Forces has stated three problematic areas and six priorities as follows: The problems: • Lack of modern equipment, • Uneven capability and performance of older equipment, ineffective intelligence, C 3 , navigation, target acquisition, camouflage, forces protection, and firepower ("gun power"), • Wide range of equipment models further aggravate maintenance and repair.The six priorities: • The creation of a common, automated intelligence and information system, C 3 I, capable of serving through the chain of command agency on all leadership levels (ESU TZ leadership organization), • Equipping of troops with different kinds of precision long-distance and short-range weapons, • Increasing the effectiveness of the equipment for a solitary fighter with the aid of different intelligence elements, • Introducing remote guided and piloted recognition and weapon systems i.e. robots, drones, sensors, UAV's, • Improving the capacity of individual soldier by net centric systems and utilising nanotechnology in micro-miniaturizing, • Improving protection of individual soldiers and vehicles.258 The fundamental change in 2010 was to move from repairing and modernizing the equipment to production of new and modern weapon systems.Top on the purchase list among other things are: • Ground Forces anti-aircraft brigades` automatic C 3 I system (ASU), • Further acquisition of missile and an artillery systems for Ground Forces, such as tactical missiles Iskander-M, heavy multiple rocket launcher Tornado-G, self-propelled artillery systems Hosta and Nona-SVK and anti-tank missile system Khrysantema-S, • Modernized S-300V4, Buk-M2 and Buk-M3 SAMs, Tor-M2U(M) short range AA-system, shoulder launched Igla-S and Verta close range AA-missiles, • New T-90 MBT, BTR-82A ACV and considerable amount of foreign and domestic produced trucks.259 In 2012 the Russian Ministry of Defence bought armament and equipment worth of $ 23.1 billion (about € 18 b illio n).By 2020, Russia's tro o ps are to receive approximately 2,000 new artillery systems, 2,300 tanks, and 17,000 vehicles.Four hundred (400) intercontinental ballistic missiles will be purchased over the coming decade.260 In Russia artillery is traditionally called "God of the War" (Bog voinyi).The development of different types of Russian artillery is still going on.The accuracy, rate and range of fire are particular objects for development.Russia's artillery currently deploys the 122-mm Grad, 220-mm Uragan, and 300-mm Smerch rocket systems and the improved Tornado-S, Tornado-G, and Uragan 1-M are currently undergoing state acceptance trials.The army is in the process of receiving up to 30 Tornado-G systems this year, replacing the BM-21 Grad.The Russian Army is gradually moving toward a new level of capability for deploying precision use of long-range rocket artillery.For instance Russia is now developing new long-range multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) with improved guidance that could allow them to strike targets up to 200 km away.That means a new generation of MLRS with a range of 200 km.The new Tornado-S rocket launcher will have a longer range and increased effectiveness, thanks to greater accuracy and the use of new warhead payloads and a reduced launch readiness time of just three minutes.261 The Russian Army is planning to begin modernize its armoured and mechanized forces beginning in 2015, fielding a new family of vehicles comprising a new main battle tank, armoured infantry fighting vehicles, and various support platforms.The main battle tank (MBT) will be based on the new model Armata, the prototype is scheduled to enter field trials in 2013, about 10 months ahead of schedule.According to the First Deputy Defence Minister Alexander Sukhorukov, the new tank is under development at Uralvagonzavod in Omsk.The first deliveries of the tank to the Armed Forces are scheduled for 2015.262 According to preliminary reports, the new tank designated T-99 will be less radical and ambitious than the failed 'Object 195' or T-95.It will weigh less, therefore, become more agile and will be more affordable, compared to its more ambitious predecessors.263 The Armata platform is intended to be the basis for a number of other vehicles too, including a main battle tank, a heavy infantry fighting vehicle, a combat engineering vehicle, an armoured recovery vehicle, a heavy armoured personnel carrier, a tank support combat vehicle and several types of self-propelled fighting vehicles.264 It should be remembered that the Russians are building their fighting forces not only against NATO, but more importantly, to protect their long southern borders with radical Islamic countries that may be gathering military power, and the growing dominance of China in the east.Armoured and mechanized forces are key to maintaining military superiority or parity against such threats.The level of sophistication in meeting those threats is not as demanding as meeting the advanced technology fielded by US and NATO forces.265 The Russian Air Force is currently undergoing a period of significant restructuring, both in terms of general organization as well air base and unit structure.The organization will be changed from previous division-regiment struc- 261 ture to air base organization.There will be about 50 bases of three different categories.266 • The first category air base includes 5-10 squadrons.The main bulk of bases are of this category.They will be located in directions, where army brigades most probably need air support and cover. •The second and third category bases are less well equipped.Not long ago, the Russian Air Force was in quite poor shape.Almost all of its aircraft were 20−25 years old, outdated, and in poor condition.It's therefore not surprising that the State Armament Program made procurement of new aircraft a priority, with a total investment of four trillion roubles (~ € 100 b illion) in that sector alone.267 According to the new ten year procurement programme the Russian Air Force will purchase over 1 500 new aircraft and significantly increase the number of high-precision weapons in its arsenal by 2020.Overall, Air Force is planning to acquire and modernize about 2 000 aircraft and helicopters by 2020, including more than 1 500 new aircraft and about 400 modernized ones.The number of all-weather aircraft, capable of carrying out day and night missions would increase almost 80 percent, and the share of UAV's would constitute about 30 percent of the total by 2020.268 Every Joint Strategic Command (Military District) can enable its own air support (air transport and close air support) exploiting its own frontal air force and helicopter brigade.Even each motorized rifle brigade and tank brigade will have air support from its helicopter unit (helicopter squadron).269 Since 1992 until in 2010 Russian Air Force has not received new aircraft in significant numbers.The new aircraft received earlier were not genuine serial production products but came from smaller prototype series.In 2010 the first fifth generation T-50 PAK FA stealth fighter flew its maiden flight.It is due to enter service in the middle of this decade.270 Some of the largest investments in the Russian Air Force are earmarked for military transport aircraft.Contracts have been signed to acquire 20 Antonov An-124-100 Ruslan (NATO: Condor) heavy strategic transport aircraft starting in 2015, 39 Ilyushin Il-476 (aka Il-76MD-90A) heavy airlifters starting in 2014, 11 Antonov An-140 light transport planes (two of them have already been delivered), and up to 30 Czech made Let L-410UVP commuters (7 of them have already been delivered).In addition, there are plans to purchase up to 50 Il-214 MTA medium-lift military transport aircraft, which are expected to be ready for production by 2016, and up to 20 Antonov An-148 passenger transport planes.Finally, 41 Il-76s and 20 An-124s will undergo modernization.Some Russian experts mentioned the possibility of a tender for up to 100 Ilyushin Il-112 light transport planes.271 The air force is also planning to buy up to 30 refuelling planes that will be based on the Il-476 transport plane.There are also plans to buy an unspecified number of A-100 Beriev AWACS planes, which are currently under development, and four Tupolev Tu-204 reconnaissance planes.These will serve in conjunction with 12 modernized A-50 Beriev (NATO: Mainstay) AWACS planes and 10 modernized MiG-25RB reconnaissance planes.The Russian Air Force has altogether around 20 A-50 Mainstay AWACS planes, based on Ilyushin Il-76 transport.272 In terms of strike aircraft, the air force is placing a big bet on the Sukhoi T-50 PAK FA fifth generation strike fighter.Sixty of these planes are expected to be procured starting in 2016 (originally planned for 2014).While four T-50 prototypes are already being tested, there are indications that new engines and advanced electronic systems (and especially its avionics) are not yet ready.This may lead to another round of delays in serial production.273 While waiting for the Sukhoi T-50 PAK FA fighters, the air force is receiving new Su-35S "generation 4++" strike aircraft, 48 of which were ordered in 2009 for delivery through 2015.Four have been received to date.According to estimates in 2011 the Russian Defence Ministry received at least 28 jets (two Sukhoi Su-35S multirole fighters, six Su-34 fighter-bombers, eight Su-27SM3 4+ generation fighters, eight Yak-130 trainers, one Tupolev Tu-214ON (Open Skies surveillance plane) 274 , two Tu-154Ms and one Antonov An-140-100 transport air craft) and more than 100 helicopters (15 Mil Mi-28Ns, 10 Kamov Ka-52s, two Mil Mi-35Ms, one Mi-26, six Ansat-U helicopters, six Ka-226s, more than 60 Mi-8s of different modifications).275 It is possible that an additional 48 or 72 Su-35s may be ordered once the current order is completed.The air force is also planned to receive 30 Su-30SM fighters by 2015, with an option for an additional 30 planes.The first two of these have been received.The Russian military has also received four Sukhoi Su-30M2s and twelve Su-27SM3s since 2010.Older planes are being modern-ized, including a total of 120 Sukhoi Su-25 (NATO: Frogfoot) close air support aircraft (50 already upgraded) and 120 Mikoyan MiG-31 (Foxhound) interceptor aircraft (at least 25 to be completed by the end of 2012).276 In addition to the fighters, the air force has ordered 129 Sukhoi Su-34 fighterbombers to be delivered by 2020, with an option for at least another 18.Fifteen of these planes have been delivered.In the meantime, the air force is continuing to modernize its existing stock of Su-24s, with 50 already modernized and 50 to be upgraded before 2020.In terms of training aircraft, 18 Yak-130s have been delivered as of October 2012, with another 49 on order and an option for another 10.The air force is also purchasing twelve Su-25UBM two-seaters that will likely be used for training.277 By comparison, long-range aviation will get very little over the next decade.There are no plans to complete the two or three remaining Tupolev Tu-160 (NATO: Blackjack) supersonic strategic bomber, carrying cruise missiles.Production of these strategic bombers dates back to Soviet times.Discussions about designs for a new long range bomber are continuing.In any case, production of new long range bombers will not start until after 2020.The only contracts in this sector are for modernization, including 30 Tupolev Tu-22M3 (NATO: Backfire) bombers and cruise missile carriers, 14-16 Tu-160 strategic bombers, and up to 30 Tu-95MS (NATO: Bear) strategic bombers.278 In terms of rotary-wing aircraft, there are contracts in place for 167 Mi-28N (45 already delivered), 180 Kamov Ka-52, and 49 Mil Mi-35M (10 already delivered) attack helicopters.Transport helicopter orders include 38 Mi-26 heavy lift helicopters.Six have already been delivered and another 22 may be ordered in the future.Up to 500 Mi-8s of various types will be purchased.These are currently being produced at a rate of 50 per year.There are also contracts in place for 36 Ka-226 (6 already delivered) and 32 Mil Ansat-U (16 delivered) light transport helicopters.Additional contracts for 38 Ansat-U and up to 100 Kamov Ka-62 helicopters may be placed in the near term.279 During the year 2012 the Russian Air Force appears to have turned a corner on procurement, having received 40 new airplanes and 127 new helicopters.For the first time, the entire aviation procurement plan appears to have been fulfilled.The winged aircraft include now 10 Su-34s, 6 Su-35s, 2 Su-30SMs, and over 20 Yak-130s.There's no detailed breakdown regarding helicopters, though the bulk are probably Mi-28N and Ka-52s.This is an improvement on 2011, when 31 fixed-wing aircraft and over 50 helicopters were procured.Given that in 2010, the numbers were 23 and 37, respectively.280 It will probably still be tricky for the aircraft industry to reach the stated State Armament Program goal of delivering 1 120 helicopters and 600 fixed-wing aircraft by 2020, but reaching 70 percent of that target by 2020 appears doable, with the rest arriving by 2025 at the latest.281 The Aerospace Defence (Vozdushno-Kosmicheskaya Oborona -VKO) On 1 December, 2011 the Aerospace Defence Forces (Vozdushno-Kosmicheskaya Oborona -VKO) were officially formed and headed by Lieutenant-General Oleg Ostapenko.Two commands were included in the structure: the Space Command and the PVO and PRO (Air and Missile Defence).In the first phase of equipping the VKO, which is placed operationally under the General Staff, the PVO/PRO Command's missile defence division and three S-44 SAM brigades stationed in Podmoskovye were tasked with protecting Moscow.It is planned to reinforce this defence with additional brigades and by 2020 to introduce the advanced S-500 air defence system.282 The Air Defence system of Russia works as follows: Fighter jets act as the first echelon, covering the area beyond the range of anti-missile systems (from 300-400km to 1,000-1,500km).At the distance of 50-100 km to 250-400 km, targets are engaged by S-300PM, S-400 and S-300V4 air defence missile systems, capable of shooting down combat jets, unmanned aerial vehicles and airborne command posts deep in the enemy's formations.283 Medium-range surface-to-air missile systems, such as Vityaz (with a range of up to 120 km) and Buk (with a range of up to 30-70 km), cover the further stretch of the way to the vital military facilities.The Russian air defence is currently equipped with just ten systems of this type, supplied in 2010.The missile weapon system consists of command post, an X-band multi-functional fire control, tracking and surveillance radar, and up to three missile launchers with ten 9M96E missiles or two 9M100 short-range missiles replacing one 9M96E missile.The Vityaz system is able to detect and track up to 40 targets simultaneously while engaging eight of them with two missiles per target.284 280 The plan to renew Russian Air Defence in the near future includes also the acquisition of 100 (ten battalions) new, still under development, S-500 Samoderzhets ("Czar") surface-to-air missiles, the first to be completed by 2013 and 56 battalions of S-400Triumf (SA-21 Growler) missile systems.Two air defence regiments were armed with this system prior to 2010 and an additional five were to be procured in 2011.S-400 missile system is able to destroy cruise missiles and tactical missiles 400 km away.The S-400 missile system is already operational around Moscow and Kaliningrad.285 A standard battalion includes eight launchers with four missiles each.286 The goal is to have as many as 23 S-400 air defence missile regiments (of 8 to 12 missiles each) by 2015.It will then be augmented by the more advanced S-500 system, currently under development and expected to be ready for production by 2013.Both the S-400 and S-500 systems are claimed to be superior to the U.S. Patriot PAC-3 in maximum speed, range, and accuracy.Russia will also continue to procure the Pantsir-S1 short-range surface-to-air missile, with at least 200 units expected to be added by 2016 to the 10 already in service in 2010.287 All air defence regiments in the Russian Armed Forces will be equipped with advanced S-400 Triumf and Pantsir-S missile systems by 2020, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin said in March 2011. "We are planning to revamp our air defence network.All air defence regiments will receive new S-400 Triumf and Pantsir-S systems," Putin told defence industry officials commenting on the state arms procurement program until 2020.288 The S-400 system has a maximum range of up to 400 km and may engage targets up to an altitude of 40−50 kilometres.The system uses a range of missiles, optimized for engaging ballistic and cruise missiles.Pantsir-S is a short-to-medium range combined surface-to-air missile and antiaircraft artillery system designed to protect point and area targets.289 It carries up to 12 two-stage solid-fuel surface-to-air missiles in sealed ready-to-launch containers and has two dual 30 mm automatic cannons that can engage targets at a range of up to 4 km.290 Russia planned to station several new S-400 Triumf air defense systems near its borders in 2012, former Air Force Commander-in-Chief Alexander Zelin stated. "The Russian Armed Forces will receive several S-400 air defence missile systems this year," Zelin told RIA Novosti. "This time they will be deployed in air defence units guarding [Russia's] border regions."The Russian Naval Headquarters officially moved to St. Petersburg after several years of plans and delays.On the Senate Square a ceremony was held and the Andreyevskiy flag hoisted over Admiralty in a light snowfall November 7, 2012.291 The latest Russian armament program for the Navy includes 100 fighting ships.In addition to strategic nuclear submarines the ten year program (2011−2020) includes acquisition of following ships and weapon systems: The limits in shipbuilding have forced Russia to purchase special ships also from abroad.In 2010 Russia signed a contract with France to buy four Mistral class amphibious assault ships (LHD).Two will be acquired from France and two license-built in Russia.The deal also includes the Zenith-9 C 3 I system.The carriers will be strengthened and equipped so that they are able to operate with other surface combatants, submarines and air force in arctic waters.293 President Vladimir Putin visited the northern city of Severodvinsk on 30 July 2012 and attended the ceremony marking the launching of the fourth Borei class nuclear ballistic missile submarine Prince Vladimir.He also presided over a meeting on the future naval construction program.Putin underlined the importance of the naval capability of Russia: "The Navy is an instrument 290 Ibid.291 RusNavyCom, 31 October 2012, "Russian Navy HQ Finally Settled in Saint Petersburg" [http://rusnavy.com/news/navy/index.php?ELEMENT_ID=16318].292 Gorenburg, 2011b.293 Falichev, 2011a, p. 1.. for defending our national economic interests, including in regions like the Arctic, which holds a rich concentration of bio-resources, as well as deposits of hydrocarbons and other natural resources."294 The naval construction program calls for investing about 4.5 trillion roubles (ca € 111 m illio n) over the next several years, for the construction of 51 modern surface warships, 16 nuclear attack submarines and 8 nuclear ballistic missile submarines by 2020 (two of which are now undergoing trials), all but two of the surface ships to be built in Russian shipyards.This will allow the share of modern vessels and equipment making up the naval forces to be brought to 70 percent by 2020, Putin said.An explicit part of the program is the upgrading of Russia's defence industry, which has been slow to deliver new weapons in recent years.295 These formations are part of the order of battle of the above mentioned armies or some of them are directly subordinated to the Western Military District (WMD).301 In the WMD there are altogether more than 60 brigades/formations in declared permanent readiness or to be established from reserves in mobilisation (including all branches).302 The Russian Ministry of Defence has reported plans to establish two new arctic brigades.It was decided at the Security Council in September 2008 that Russia is to deploy a combined-arms force to protect its political and economic interests in the Arctic by 2020, including military, border and coastal guard units to guarantee Russia's military security in diverse military and political circumstances.303 The first arctic brigade seems to be the present 200 th Motorized Rifle Brigade at Pechenga.As possible locations of the second one Arkhangelsk, Alakurtti and even Novaya Zemlya have been mentioned.304 In Alakurtti village infrastructure already exists and from there is also railway connection to the vicin-ity of Kandalaksha harbour at the White Sea.305 The formation of the Arctic brigades has been delayed and the schedule according to present planning is set to 2015.306 The Coast Guard formations (FSB) in the northern waters are to be strengthened and their presence to be increased by 2017.307 The strength of the training centre of the Western Military District at Mulino 308 , near Moscow, is equivalent to a former reinforced army division.Detached ground force training subcenters at Sertolovo 309 , north of Saint Petersburg and Kovrov 310 east of Mulino, almost equal the strength of a brigade.This annex has not listed training battalions and regiments of different military schools.Under the WMD's premises there are in additional different types of supporting units and paramilitary, armed formations of other ministries.All these units will be subordinated to the Joint Strategic Command of the WMD in the time of crisis.Several maintenance and repair depots in the area will also establish reserve formations/units with the equipment at their disposal.311 The maintenance and repair depots near Finland are able to establish at least three reserve brigades, such as 62 nd Motorized Rifle Brigade at Alakurtti, 41 st Motorized Rifle Brigade at Sertolovo, and 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade in Petrozavodsk.312 The 85 th Detached Helicopter Regiment (Mi-24, Mi-8 helicopters) at Alakurtti will be re-established.313 There are approximately 60 army depots in Russia.Most of them have the capacity to establish at least one brigade size unit.Military schools and training centres have a certain role in mobilisation.314 The Baltic Fleet The allocation of the total defence budget for naval forces has been about 25 percent.The strategic ballistic missile submarines of the Northern and Pacific Fleets retain their traditional role (second strike) in the nuclear triad.The role of the Baltic Fleet is in securing the country's export -import routes, especially of energy export.The Baltic Sea is nowadays only partly under Russia's control.Because of NATO's eastward expansion and some increase of activities (for example the U.S. Patriot surface-to-air missiles in north-eastern Poland) Russia has decided to improve her military readiness in the Baltic area.After the collapse of the Soviet Union the situation of the Russian Baltic Fleet weakened, when it lost a major bulk of its previous bases.Its main base and headquarters are located in Kaliningrad area.The main tasks of the Baltic Fleet of Russia at present are as follows: • Protection of the Russian economic zone and areas of productive activities, suppression of illegal productive activities, • Ensuring safety of navigation, • Implementation of foreign policy actions of the Government in economically important areas of the World oceans (visits, routine entries, joint exercises, and action in the composition of peacekeeping forces, etc.), •Co-operation with other Russian naval units operating in the area, especially with the Northern Fleet.315 The operational forces of the Baltic Fleet include: • Two diesel submarines, • Five principal surface combatants (destroyers/frigates), • 20 Coastal combatants (corvettes) and patrol boats, • Around 70 fixed wing aircraft and some 55 helicopters of various types.316 While renewing surface combatants the focus is in building corvettes with precision guided weapons and long ranged cruise missiles.The amphibious capability will improve drastically, if the Fleet will introduce the new amphibious assault ships.317 If transferring other major naval combatants from the Atlantic to the Baltic Sea is part of contingency plans, they have to pass the Danish Straits before crisis.The Northern Fleet is the strongest and most versatile command in the Russian Navy.Its major role is the maritime component of the nuclear triad.The growing importance of northern waters emphasizes the role of this fleet and its support area.The Fleet HQ is located in Severomorsk near Murmansk.Other bases are situated mostly by the fjords of the northern coast of Kola Peninsula, and in Severodvinsk on the south-eastern coast of the White Sea.318 Jane's World Air Forces reported that: Russia's long-range air force has had its mission changed from nuclear deterrence to conventional strike against point targets in support of counter-insurgency operations.In 2005, the division took delivery of the first examples of the new Kh-101 conventional stealthy air-launched cruise missile and augmented its fleet with a pair of upgraded Tu-160 bombers able to carry and deliver laser-guided bombs.321 While counter-insurgency operations were mentioned as a motive for the rolechange, it is obvious that these long-range weapon systems can reach anywhere in Europe.According to its mission and tasks the Air Force's Aviation is divided into long-range, front-line, military transport and army aviation, which in turn include bomber, attack, fighter, reconnaissance, transport and special aircraft.The core of the Air Force's combat element is composed from air bases and brigades of the Air Defence.322 Air Force's divisional/regimental echelons have been supplanted by Air Base unit establishments, with the majority of these possessing three subordinate squadrons.In addition, a number of former Naval Aviation elements have been (and are still being) reassigned to the Air Force (these include Su-27 and MiG-31 interceptor units, Tu-22M medium-range bomber units and at least two major air bases in the Kaliningrad region).Many of the changes have been accomplished simply by transferring aircraft.This process of consolidation permits closure of a substantial number of airfields.323 The 1 st Command of Air Force and Air Defence consists of the following formations: • Headquarters is located in Voronezh, and the 7000 th AFB in Voronezh is the main air base, 324 • 1 st air-space defence brigade (Severomorsk) • 2 nd air-space defence brigade (St. Petersburg) • 6961 st aviation base (Petrozavodsk) (Sukhoi Su-27) 320 Gorenburg, 2011.321 IHS Jane's World Air Forces, "The Engels-Based Bomber Force, Which Includes Examples of the Tu-22M 'Backfire', Tu-95MS 'Bear' and Tu-160 'Blackjack'", 27.11..2012.322 McDermott, 2012b.323 IHS Jane's World Air Forces, "Russia", 27 November 2012.324 Gavrilov, 2009. •6964 th aviation base (Monchegorsk, Murmansk Oblast) (Sukhoi Su-24M, Su-24MP) • 6965 th aviation base (Viaz'ma, Smolensk Oblast) • 7000 th aviation base (Voronezh) (Sukhoi Su-24M, Su-24MP, Su-34).325 The inventory of the Russian Air Force may have included around 5000 fixed and rotary wing air craft before the military reform.326 The number of aircraft left in the Air Force and Army Aviation after the reform, has not been disclosed.The plan was to reduce them by no less than a third.327 A significant portion of the assets are apparently beyond repair.IISS Military Balance 2012 lists about 1 800 fixed wing aircraft and 1 000 rotary wing aircraft as combat capable.328 The Swedish Defence Research Establishment FOI has presented even lower numbers and predicts that the number of aircraft will continue to diminish until 2020, when equipment from the Soviet era is finally phased out.329 Selected air units of Russia's Western military district have started preparations to return to abandoned Arctic airfields, the commander of the district's aviation Maj.Gen. Igor Makushev said on Wednesday 30 May 2012.The military airfields in the Arctic were used extensively in the Soviet era, but after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 they have been generally mothballed. "We will start reopening airfields on Novaya Zemlya and in Naryan-Mar as early as this summer (2012) ," Makushev told a news conference in Saint Petersburg.Plans for 2013 include the reopening of a military airfield on Graham Bell Island, which is part of Franz Josef Land.330 These plans turn out to have been more political than based on real plans and are to be considered premature.Ex-commander of the Air Force Vladimir Mikhailov says that it is too early to talk about a base of jet fighters in the Arctic. "In the current situation we don't need any base there.First we have to deal with all the problems on the main land, and only then, when we are "tougher", we will move on to Novaya Zemlya".331 This does not, however, reverse Russia's plans to strengthen her military means to protect its political and economic interests in the Arctic region by 325 Gorenburg, 2011c.326 The numbers were calculated from the order of battle lists given by Jane's, but they probably do not represent the situation as of November 2012 accurately, since detailed figures have not been disclosed after Russia stopped CFE Treaty implementation and data sharing in 2007.See IHS Jane's World Air Forces, "Russia".327 , p. 59.328 IISS, 2012 , p. 197.329 Carlsson & Norberg, 2012 Melnikov, 2012 ; IHS Jane's World Air Forces, "Russia."331 Pettersen, 2013.2020.Deployment includes military combined-arms, including border and coastal guard units to guarantee Russia's military security in diverse military and political circumstances.Large-scale strategic military exercises of Russian Armed Forces and together with forces of other "power ministries", so called "siloviki", have been carried out in different parts of Russia on rotation basis every 1-4 years.After one such exercise, Kavkaz-2008 troops continued directly to the pre-planned military operation against Georgia, instead of returning to their home bases in the Northern Caucasus Military District.332 The next large-scale strategic military exercise Zapad-2013 (West-2013) will take place in western Russia and Belarus in 2013.333 Large-scale strategic exercises in North-West Russia have not been frequent.The year 2009 made an exception.Two large-scale partly overlapping exercises were carried out.Exercise Ladoga-2009 was carried out in a zone of 300 km x 1200 km, from Pechenga to Vyborg and further south of St. Petersburg.A few weeks later started another, even larger exercise, Zapad (West) 2009 which tested the new chain of command.Both exercises started from the same basic scenario, invasion by enemy ground forces from the west toward western and north-western Russia, supported by air and naval forces.Exercise Ladoga took place mainly in nine separate ranges between The Arctic Ocean and Pskov oblast.The live firing climax was a launch of ballistic missiles.Both exercises were coordinated by the General Staff.Ladoga-2009 was executed under the command of Commander-in-Chief of Russian Ground Forces and Zapad-2009 under Chief of General Staff.334 One important goal of both exercises was to scrutinize the protection of flanks of two commands.New tactical and technical innovations with "good 332 Cohen, 2008 .See also the video Студия "Альфа", г.Тверь, 7 August 2012, Потерянный день" вся правда о Войне 08.08.08г. (The Lost Day -the Whole Truth about the War on 8 August 2008) & Felgenhauer, 2012.The "Lost Day" film and the comments by Putin and Medvedev have revealed a great deal: that the invasion of Georgia in August 2008 was indeed a pre-planned aggression and that so-called "Russian peacekeepers" in South Ossetia and Abkhazia were in fact the vanguard of the invading forces that were in blatant violation of Russia's international obligations and were training and arming the local separatist forces.333 Belarusian Telegraph Agency (BELTA), 26 October 2012, "Belarus to Host Next Belarusian-Russian Army Exercise in 2013" [http://news.belta.by/en/news/society?id= 664528].334 Khaimendrinov, 2009.old" equipment and weaponry were used.The command, control and cooperation of troops were the focal point of both exercises.Comprehensive net work based air defence, wide signal intelligence, common communications system and automated command (ASU TZ) in one integrated net work were tested.Satellite intelligence, UAVs, electronic warfare, automated C 3 I will be essential factors on future battlefield.335 About 20 000 Russian and Belorussian troops participated in Exercise Zapad-2009 and about 7 400 Russian soldiers of different "power ministries" participated in Exercise Ladoga-2009.Parts of the 28th Motorized Rifle Brigade were transferred from Yekaterinburg by train to the Karelian Isthmus.Troops of 20 th Guards Army from then Moscow Military District were transported to Zapad-2009 exercise area.336 Approximately 60 Russian and Belorussian combat aircraft and more than 40 helicopters were involved in Zapad-2009.New generation precision guided weapon and target acquisition systems were tested.The Joint Russian -Belorussian Air Defence System, which was founded earlier in 2009, was also proved.Night vision capable combat helicopter Mil Mi-28Ns together with older, but modernized Mi-24 PMs operated the first time at exercises.Also Kamov Ka-50s and Ka-52s were seen.The latest model MiG-29 SMT interceptors participated also for the first time.Aged but modernized Tupolev Tu-160, Tu-95MS, Tu-22MS bombers, Sukhoi Su-27SM, Mikoyan MiG-31BM fighters and Sukhoi Su-24M2 and Su-25SM ground attack air craft were in action.Units of long range S-400 and S-300 PM SAM-batteries performed in air defence and anti air duties.337 Air launched precision guided weapons from Tupolev Tu-22M3 (NATO: Backfire) bomber and tactical Sukhoi Su-24M (NATO: Fencer) attack aircraft were also tested in Belarus during this exercise.338 As to the exercise's maritime section, a naval anti-ship cruise missile P-700 Granit (NATO: SS-N-19 Shipwreck) salvo, employing so called "wolfpack" tactics, was launched from different directions for the first time in fifteen years.Maximum range of the Granit missile is about 550 km.339 335 Ekström, 2010, p. 25.336 Khaimendrinov, 2009.337 RIA Novosti, 8 September 2009 , "Russia and Belarus Start Zapad 2009 Military Exercise" [http://en.rian.ru/military_news/20090908/156054418.html] & Smith, 2009 Semenuk, 2009.339 Warfare.be, "SS-N-19 Shipwreck/P-700 Granit" [http://warfare.be/?linkid=2082 &catid=312].The summary a few months after the exercise declares that major reorganizations were made or were in the final phase.Thus the Commander-in-Chief of Ground Forces emphasized e.g. following factors: 340 In several military districts, including border and inland regions extending from Kamchatka to Kaliningrad, efficient formations have been established.Permanent-readiness brigades and airborne divisions play the most important role.Instead of the previous former six first-line assault strike divisions, altogether 85 motorized rifle, armour, missile, artillery, air assault, and various kinds of signal and electronic warfare, engineering, ABC-warfare and logistic brigades had been formed.These brigades are at full strength and fully equipped.Their combat skills were tested, for example in Ladoga-2009 and Zapad-2009 large scale exercises.The new C 3 I (ASU TZ) system has been successfully tested during these exercises.Three military districts have got detached air assault brigades.They will be directly subordinated to the military districts.These brigades will serve as the mobile reserve for the Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Strategic Command.Brigades can be used in prompt actions in dangerous zones or directed to support infantry fighting units.In larger operations air assault brigades may be supported by helicopter regiments.The brigade has an organic helicopter regiment of sixty helicopters.Each Joint Strategic Command (Military District) will have at least one helicopter brigade (70−100 helicopters).In some cases a helicopter unit (squadron) can be attached to a motorized rifle or tank brigade.341 The Army Aviation will be transferred from the Air Force back to the Ground Forces, which is a significant advantage.This makes it easier to move air assault and infantry units to necessary directions according to battlefield's requirements.Subsequently Mi-24 and Mi-28N combat helicopters assure immediate air support for brigades in all circumstances both in defence and attack.All military districts have formed their own detached reconnaissance brigade, which will assure the necessary information about enemy at many levels.The permanent-readiness brigades of the General Purpose Forces have got their own reconnaissance battalion.The commanding officers of above mentioned units will get information from a range of 25-100 km beyond the front line.The intention is to extend gradually the range of reconnaissance up to 500 km with UAV's and other means.Each military district will get or has already got a missile brigade equipped with Iskander-M ballistic missiles with versatile conventional warheads.These missile units are also certified to employ nuclear warheads.342 The 26 th Missile Brigade at Luga, south of Saint Petersburg is already operational.The system will include in addition to ballistic missiles also cruise missiles.The readiness of Ground Forces has been increased significantly in recent years.General Makarov, however, reported in November 2011 that all units and formations in the category of permanent readiness have been reinforced to full combat strength.These units are to be ready to execute combat operations within 1−2 hours after given order.This claim should, however, rather be interpreted as an ambition, not as an established fact.343 Jane's World Armies estimated in November 2012 that the majority of the Russian Airborne Forces can be deployed within 12 hours while the bulk of the Ground Forces should be operational within 24 to 48 hours, albeit in many cases with 20−40 percent deficit in vehicles.344 In practice, it is evident that 'permanent readiness' brigades will not appear as originally planned, to be able to maintain daily readiness at full strength.Rather there will be combat units of battalion strength in permanent readiness.345 Conscript soldiers are transferred from their training centres after six months basic training to formations (brigades) of constant readiness.They can be transferred to any theatre of war at short notice.The mobilization system of Russian Ground Forces has changed drastically in recent years.In addition to cadre brigades there are numerous (more than 60) depots/storages, each with sufficient equipment for a brigade size unit or even more.from reserve, brought to full readiness and performed a combat exercise between 13 and 30 September 2012.349 The brigade organization is more flexible and fits better into local conflicts in comparison with previous division organization.The main function of the ground force brigades as a permanent-readiness formation is capability to operate independently with highly mobile battle groups or other brigades under common command.War games are yet another tool used in annual command exercises that are conducted in the country's different strategic regions.In 2012 the Russian Army tested its new organizational and command structures, much like it did during the Zapad (West) 2009, Vostok (East) 2010 and Zentr (Center) 2011 exercises.350 The intensity and activity of Russia's Armed Forces have gradually grown over the last few years.Several factors have contributed.Main reasons are found in the recently introduced new military organisation (military command-army-brigade), adopted new equipment, weaponry and particularly test runs of the new command and control system.351 It seems that the command system tested in Zapad-2009 and Ladoga-2009 was then still in its infancy.The Russian Armed Forces' exercises cover practically all the services and branches plus other power ministries' armed elements.In addition, Russia has traditionally conducted exercises mutually with some other country or even multinational exercises and, of course, military exercises of her own.The year 2012 is not an exception in this respect.As for the coming large-scale strategic exercise in 2013, the Russian General Staff has released information that the biggest exercise of the whole Russian Armed Forces will be "Zapad-2013" (West 2013) in September 2013, at the same time a Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) exercise.In Central Asia the Russian, Chinese and Tajik Armed Forces took part in a common counter terrorism exercise in Tajikistan between June 8 and 14, 2012.Of the five former Soviet Central Asian states, only isolationist Turkmenistan is not a member of the Shanghai Co-operation Organization (SCO), the group named after the city where it was set up in 2001.Over the past few years China has strengthened its interests in Central Asia.353 The CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organisation) joint drills hinged on humanitarian and anti-terror manoeuvres to synchronize command and logistics operations of CSTO member states and tested force elements assigned to the KSOR -the Collective Rapid Reaction Force.A number of international organizations were also expected to join in the drills, for instance the Red Cross movement.354 The joint Russian-Kazakh anti-terrorist exercise "Aldaspan-2012", was conducted in June 2012 in the Koktal exercise area in south-eastern Kazakhstan.355 Russia held also different military exercises with Mongolia, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia and Belarus during 2012.Already in early May (11-16) Russia and Norway held another common naval exercise "Pomor-2012".356 "The Northern Eagle 2012" trilateral naval exercises for Russia, Norway and the United States were held 21-25 August, in the Norwegian Sea.The Russians were represented by the Admiral Chabanenko, a Northern Fleet destroyer at the manoeuvres, Norway by the Nordkapp coast guard frigate and the U.S. by the Farragut guided weapons destroyer.All three countries will arrange these exercises in turn.This kind of management system has previously repeatedly been tested in the Norwegian-Russian Pomor exercises and was recognized as the most effective way to work together at sea.357 CSTO-alliance-in-response-to-U-S-anti-missile-shield/]; BELTA, 26 October 2012, "Belarus to Host Next Belarusian-Russian Army Exercise in 2013."353 Kilner, 2012 354 Kramnik, 2012.355 The September 2012 war games, dubbed Kavkaz-2012, were to focus on "polishing" the armed forces' command and control units, which have received a lot of criticism over the past few years.Kavkaz-2012 was the largest Russian military exercise conducted in 2012.It was held in the area of the Southern Military Command.358 This time the size of the military exercise contingent involved about eight thousand personnel, was aided by up to 200 armoured vehicles, less than a hundred artillery systems, a group of ten warships and boats, as well as an unidentified number of frontline combat aircraft, helicopters, and drones.In fact, as a gesture of goodwill the contingents in the Russian bases in Armenia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia were not involved in the exercise.According to Deputy Chief of the General Staff Alexander Postnikov, this decision was taken in order not to heighten tension in the region.Moreover, the exercise was to be held far away from the Georgian border.359 Ladoga-2012 Pilots from the Western Military District flew on MiG-29SMT, MiG-31 and different modifications of Su-27 fighter aircraft during "Ladoga-2012" air force exercise on 9-15 April, 2012.Military airbases in north-western Russia (Karelian Republic, Kursk, Tver and Kaliningrad oblasts) were used in the exercise.About 50 aircraft and 100 pilots participated.Live firing (gun, rocket and missile) took place above Lake Ladoga and its shore area.360 Air Force and Air Defence Exercise The Western Military District conducted also another tactical exercise on air defence brigade level in area of the Karelian republic, Murmansk, Leningrad and Tver regions in June 2012.The aircraft (Sukhoi Su-27 fighters and Sukhoi Su-24 fighter bombers) taking part in the exercise came from Khotilovo (Tver Region), Besovets (Karelian Republic) and Monchegorsk (Murmansk Region) airbases.In addition to flying units, the air defence missile brigades (S-300), radar and radio units formed the interception zone.361 Command Post Exercise (CPX) in Kola Peninsula On 25 October 2012, as part of a Command Post Exercise in the Western Military District, the coastal forces of the Northern Fleet made Russia's first ever sea-borne landing on the shores of the uninhabited Kotelny Island.That was a part of a wide-ranging exercise which included all the Russian armed forces' units deployed in the Kola Peninsula area.This was the first time that combat training of this kind focused on protecting civilian facilities -research stations, drilling facilities and energy-industry installations located in the Arctic region.These were the reasons why the large destroyer "Vice-Admiral Kulakov" and the heavy nuclear-powered battle cruiser "Pyotr Veliky" were stationed in coastal Arctic waters of the Northern Sea Route.More than 7000 military personnel and 150 objects of military equipment were involved in the CPX.Training exercises conducted in the military testing zones of the Barents Sea, the sub-Arctic areas of the Northern Sea Route, the coastal regions of the Pechenga Area in Murmansk Region, and on the Sredniy and Rybachiy Peninsulas.362 Under the command of the Western Military District the 138.Guard Detached Motor Rifle Brigade conducted in mid October a large exercise on local firing range area on the Karelian Isthmus at Kamenka (in Finnish Perkjärvi).More than 3000 troops, 150 military vehicles, army air force (incl.Mi-24 attack helicopters and Su-24 bombers) took part in the exercise.More than one hundred generals and other high ranking officers of the Western Military District staffs and other formations also visited the exercise.The most important training objects were to demonstrate strong heavy weapon fire and action against enemy's reconnaissance groups.363 To sum up, there have been at least five exercises of medium or larger scale in the near vicinity of Finland in 2012, held by the Russian military.The Western Military District did not conduct any strategic level large-scale exercise in 2012.The exercise intensity has in the last year, however, grown essentially because of the diversity of several medium-size local exercises (ground force, air force, navy, mobilization, inter-arms etc).Although Russia has, on the one hand, carried out constantly growing number of different types of military exercises on a yearly basis, it has, on the other hand, strongly criticized some neighbours which have held their own manoeuvres.364 362 Kislyakov, 2012.363 Pochinyuk, 2012.364 Pettersen, 2012; Blank, 2012.Geopolitiikan vahva paluu maailmanpolitiikkaan on tosiasia.Vaikutukset ulottuvat myös Suomen lähialueelle.Neuvostoliiton/Venäjän vetäytyminen asemistaan Varsovan liiton maissa ja Baltian maissa kylmän sodan loputtua oli muutoksen ensimmäinen vaihe, joka samalla osui Euroopan uuden ns.yhteistyövaraisen turvallisuusjärjestelmän rakentamisen aikaan ETY-järjestön puitteissa.Toinen vaihe, Venäjän uusi nousu entisen Neuvostoliiton maiden vaikutuspiiriin, pääsi vauhtiin viime vuosikymmenen puolivälissä ja huipentui Georgian sotaan, Ukrainan ns.oranssin vallankumouksen kaatumiseen ja Valko-Venäjän laajempaan integrointiin Venäjän järjestelmiin.Maalle on tärkeää korjata epäedulliseksi kokemansa 1990-luvun ratkaisut.Venäjä tavoittelee suurvaltaasemansa palauttamista.Vastakkainasettelu on siten jossain määrin palannut kuvaan mukaan ja euroatlanttisen turvallisuusjärjestelyn uskottavuus heikentynyt, vaikka sitä lännessä ei mielellään myönnetä.Yhtenä osoituksena tästä on Venäjän yritys kumota Euroopan turvallisuus-ja yhteistyöjärjestön (ETYJ) tärkeimmät saavutukset, kuten Euroopan turvallisuuden peruskirjan sitoumukset vuodelta 1999.Venäjä pitää sotilasdoktriinissaan Natoa vaarana ja epäyhtenäinen Nato puolestaan Venäjää kumppanina.Länsi-Euroopassa alettiin kuitenkin 1990-luvulla pitää sodan uhkaa niin vanhentuneena ajatuksena, että se mahdollisti Nato-maiden ja muiden länsimaiden asevoimien poikkeuksellisen mittavan alasajon ja tehtävien suuntaamisen maanpuolustuksesta kriisienhallintaan.Samalla maiden sotilaallinen valmius heikkeni olennaisesti.Puolustusliitto Naton sisäiset vaikeudet korostuvat tilanteessa, jossa liiton tärkeimmän jäsenen Yhdysvaltain intressit kohdistuvat yhä voimakkaammin Aasian ja Tyynenmeren suuntaan.Yhdysvaltain taloudelliset resurssit kaventuvat ja erilaisten sitoumusten täyttäminen käy epävarmemmaksi.Asiaan vaikuttavat myös Yhdysvaltain perinteisten suurten eurooppalaisten liittolaisten teot ja asenteet.Nato-maa Saksan rooli on keskeinen ja erityisesti Saksan mutta myös Ranskan Venäjä-politiikka on herättänyt kysymyksiä.Suurten eurooppalaisten Nato-maiden sotilaalliset resurssit ovat kaventuneet nopeasti.Venäjän asevoimien uudistamisprosessin taustalta on selvästi nähtävissä pyrkimys vastata eri puolilla valtavaa valtakuntaa ilmeneviin erimuotoisiin haasteisiin.Organisatorisesti on tehty ajan edellyttämiä muutoksia.Raskas ja kömpelö divisioonaorganisaatio on lännen tapaan saanut antaa tilaa joustavammalle prikaatiorganisaatiolle.Vanhoista sotilaspiireistä on luovuttu ja niiden tilalle on tullut neljä operatiivis-strategista yhteisjohtoporrasta.Leningradin ja Mosko-van sotilaspiirit yhdistämällä muodostetun Läntisen sotilaspiirin esikunta on sijoitettu Pietariin.Tämän yhteisjohtoportaan alaisuuteen on liitetty myös Pohjoinen ja Itämeren laivastot sekä koko uuden sotilaspiirin alueen ilmavoimat ja ilmapuolustus.Tämä on samalla osoitus painopisteen siirtymisestä läntisellä suunnalla Keski-Euroopasta luoteeseen.Venäjän rapautuneita asevoimia on ryhdytty modernisoimaan monipuolisesti vahvalla ja kasvavalla taloudellisella panostuksella, osittain myös Saksan ja Ranskan suoranaisella tuella.Vuoteen 2020 ulottuvalle varusteluohjelmalle on varattu yhteensä noin 20 biljoonaa ruplaa eli noin 500 miljardia euroa.Venäjän asevoimien kaluston laajamittainen sarjatuotanto on käynnistymässä ensi kertaa Neuvostoliiton hajoamisen jälkeen.Venäjän johdon päättäväisyys varustelusuunnitelmien toteuttamisessa näkyy tulevien vuosien nopeasti kasvavissa puolustusmäärärahoissa.Ruotsin puolustusvoimien arvion mukaan Venäjän varusteluohjelma sujuu hyvin.Varusmiespalvelusta ei luovuta ainakaan seuraavien 10−15 vuoden aikana, mikä takaa maalle usean miljoonan miehen koulutetun reservin, joista 700 000 voidaan mobilisoida nopeasti.Vaikka Venäjä kehittää asevoimiaan ennen muuta alueellista sodankäyntikykyä varten, se varautuu myös jatkossa äärimmäisenä vaihtoehtona suurimittaiseen sotaan.Suurta reserviä tarvitaan erityisesti itäisellä suunnalla.Sitä on teknisesti mahdollista käyttää myös miehitysjoukkona.On ilmeistä, että Venäjä tarvitsee läntisellä suunnalla pieniä, joustavia, hyvin koulutettuja ja korkeassa perusvalmiudessa olevia tehokkaita iskujoukkoja joilla on kyky saavuttaa operatiivisia tuloksia suoraan rauhan ajan ryhmityksestä.Tämä visio on uuden venäläisen sotatieteellisen ajattelun tulosta, ja se korostaa sotien alkuvaiheiden ratkaisevaa merkitystä, mutta myös ensimmäisen strategisen iskun, mukaan lukien ennalta ehkäisevien toimien tärkeyttä.Joukkoja voidaan tarvittaessa vahventaa nopeasti.Nato-maiden alueellisen puolustuksen alasajo ja toisaalta Venäjän korkeassa valmiudessa olevien joukkojen kehittäminen ovat aiheuttaneet hämmennystä ja epävarmuutta lähialueellamme ja itäisen Keski-Euroopan valtioissa.Venäjän joukkojen määrä entisen Leningradin sotilaspiirin alueella on vaihdellut merkittävästi Neuvostoliiton hajoamisen jälkeen.Vuosituhannen alun suurten joukkojen supistusten jälkeen suunta on taas muuttunut nousujohteiseksi.Venäjän asevoimien harjoitusaktiviteetti on selvästi vilkastunut.Venäjän 6.Armeijan esikunta johtanee Suomen itä-ja kaakkoispuolella olevia maavoimien joukkoja.Vuonna 2010 perustettiin uusi moottoroitu jalkaväkiprikaati Pietarin eteläpuolelle.Se kuulunee kaavailtuihin korkean valmiuden joukkoihin.Kannaksella on valmiudessa maan valioyksiköihin kuuluva moottoroitu jalkaväkiprikaati Kamenkassa.Pietarin pohjoispuolella, Sertolovossa olevasta kalustovarastosta voidaan tarvittaessa perustaa prikaati.Prikaateja tu-keva helikopteriyksikkö sijaitsee myös Karjalan kannaksella.Runsaasta, joukkoja tukevasta tykistöstä mainittakoon raskas raketinheitinprikaati, jonka heittimien kantama on yli 80 kilometriä.Varsin merkittävä potentiaalin lisäys on uusien 450-700 kilometrin kantaman omaavien Iskander-M -ohjusten sijoittaminen Lugaan, Pietarin eteläpuolella olevaan tykistöohjusprikaatiin.Ne edustavat doktriinissakin mainittua täsmäaseistusta ja niiden kantama kattaa Baltian ohella pääosan Suomen alueesta.Iskander-M voidaan varustaa monipuolisilla tavanomaisilla taistelukärjillä ja tarvittaessa myös ydinkärjillä.Iskander-ohjusjärjestelmälle on Venäjän puolustussuunnittelussa kaavailtu sekä tärkeä ydinpeloterooli että tehokas hyökkäyksellinen rooli eri puolilla maata.Taktiset ballistiset ohjukset ja risteilyohjukset ovat ottamassa yhä lisääntyvän operatiivis-taktisen roolin ja täydentävät rynnäkköilmavoimia erinomaisesti.Maan sotilasviranomaisilla on suuria odotuksia tämän ohjuksen suhteen.Strategisen iskun suorittamisen kannalta Lugan Iskander-tykistö-ohjusprikaati on olennaisen tärkeä.Sen täsmäiskuja saatettaisiin käyttää ilmavoimien ohella vastustajan puolustusjärjestelmän lamauttamiseen käyttäen hyväksi tämän alhaista valmiutta.Pihkovan alueella toimii ilmarynnäkködivisioona sekä erikoisjoukkojen (spetsnaz) prikaati.Petsamossa on yksi moottoroitu jalkaväkiprikaati sekä merijalkaväkiprikaati.Myös näiden joukkojen valmiusvaatimus on vain tuntiluokkaa.Arktisiin oloihin soveltuva Spetsnaz-erikoisjoukoista koottava Arktinen prikaati perustetaan myös Petsamoon, Venäjän maavoimien komentaja ilmoitti maaliskuussa 2011.Suunnitelmat on sittemmin lykätty vuoteen 2015.On ennenaikaista sanoa, onko kyseessä täysin uusi yksikkö.Sallan itäpuolella sijaitsevaa Alakurtin lentotukikohtaa kunnostetaan ja sinne sijoitettaneen uusittu helikopterirykmentti.Sen kalusto käsittää rynnäkköhelikoptereita ja aseistettuja kuljetus-helikoptereita.Alueella olevasta kalustovarastosta perustettaneen moottoroitu jalkaväkiprikaati, jota helikopterirykmentti voi tukea.Myös Petroskoissa sijaitsevasta kalustovarastosta voidaan perustaa ainakin yksi prikaati, jonka kykyä demonstroitiin liikekannallepano-ja taisteluharjoituksessa syyskuussa 2012.Lehtusiin, Pietarin pohjoispuolelle on valmistunut tehokas tutka-asema mm.antamaan ennakkovaroitusta mahdollisesta strategisesta ohjushyökkäyksestä.Lisäksi Suursaaressa on jälleen pitkähkön tauon jälkeen rakennettu uusi ilmavalvontatutka-asema.Suomenlahden ohella se tulee kattamaan muun muassa Viron ja koko eteläisen Suomen ilmatilan.1.Ilmavoima-ja ilmapuolustusalueella, Pohjoisen laivaston ja Itämeren laivaston ilmavoimilla on yhteensä yli 200 erityyppistä taistelulentokonetta, toista sataa taisteluhelikopteria ja vastaava määrä aseistettavia kuljetushelikoptereita sekä paljon muita erikois-ja kuljetuskoneita.Alueelle tukeutuu lisäksi eräitä muita ilmavoimien yksiköitä.Venäjän ilmavoimat ovat kaikkialla nopeasti mobilisoitavissa ja yksiköt ovat jatkuvassa valmiudessa ja täydessä sodan ajan kokoonpanossa.Niitä voidaan siirtää lyhyessä ajassa kaukaakin halutulle kohdealueelle.Uusia raskaita S-400-ilmatorjuntaohjuksia, joita aiemmin oli operatiivisina vain Moskovan suojana, on nyt myös sijoitettu Kaliningradiin.Lugan Iskanderohjusten ohella myös tämä on vahva poliittinen signaali.S-400 voisi kriisitilanteessa vaikeuttaa toimimista Itämeren alueen ilmatilassa merkittävästi ja käytännössä ehkä sulkea ilmatilan täysin.Asia vaikuttaa suoraan kysymykseen Baltian maiden puolustamisesta, josta erityisesti Ruotsissa on kannettu huolta.Ruotsin sotatiedeakatemian Nationell strategi för närområdet -tutkimushankkeen yksi merkittävä tulos oli, että Nato todennäköisesti ei ehtisi reagoida kyllin nopeasti mahdollisessa sotilaallisessa konfliktissa Baltian maissa, vaan joutuisi tapahtuneiden tosiasioiden eteen.Venäjällä on julkisuudessa esitetty yhä enemmän arvioita Suomen kuulumisesta Venäjän etupiiriin ja vastustettu yhä selvemmin Suomen Nato-jäsenyyttä ja pohjoismaista puolustusyhteistyötä.Suomen puolustusvoimien päätehtävänä pysyy oman maan puolustaminen.Valitun alueellisen puolustusjärjestelmän rauhan ajan valmius on matala.Tämän tulisi olla ympäristöä rauhoittava elementti, mutta samalla se asettaa suuria vaatimuksia valmiuden kohottamisjärjestelyille.Suomen puolustusvoimien rauhan ajan vahvuus on Euroopan pienimpiä, noin 30 000 henkilöä.Erityisesti rauhan ajan maavoimat on käytännössä koulutusorganisaatio.Taistelujoukot muodostetaan vasta reserviläisistä perustamalla.Harhaanjohtavia, puutteellisia ja tarkoitushakuisilta vaikuttavia ovat vertailut, joissa Suomen täyden liikekannallepanon edellyttämää vahvuutta, 230 000, verrataan väestöltään moninkertaisten, pinta-alaltaan paljon pienempien ja geopoliittiselta asemaltaan kokonaan toisenlaisten maiden ammattiarmeijoiden rauhan ajan vahvuuksiin.Suomen alue on suuri ja reserviä tarvitaan paljon lukuisien kohteiden suojaamiseen koko valtakunnan alueella sekä korvaamaan liikekannallepanon hävikkejä ja ensi-iskuissa aiheutuvia tappioita.Koko vuosittaisen ikäluokan kouluttaminen on tarpeen jos aiotaan saada riittävästi yksiköitä.Suuri reservi on osoitus maanpuolustustahdosta ja siitä, että vastarintaa on tarkoitus jatkaa jopa maahantunkeutumisen jälkeen.Tämän ennaltaehkäisevä arvo on suuri.Prime Minister's Office, 2009, p. 40.The next Finnish government White paper, released on 21 December 2012, says that Russia strives for a multipolar world and wants recognition as one of the major actors in world politics.Prime Minister's Office, 2012, p. 30.For a thorough military-political and technical analysis of this missile system seeForss, 2012.Burr & Savranskaya, 2009.14 Kalashnikova, 2005.The interview given by General Burlakov reveals that nuclear first use was indeed planned, regardless of what the political leadership officially stated."[Foreign Minister Gromyko] said one thing and the military thought another.We are the ones who are responsible for [fighting] wars."Gordon, Johnson, Larrabee & Wilson, 2012, p. 140.27 Rotfeld, 2009, p. 30;Whitney, 1992.100 Professor Stephen J. Blank confirmed this assessment at the Q/A session after his presentation at FIIA, Helsinki, 8 November 2011.He pointed out that there is a clear trend towards strengthening the defence at the country's periphery.The same can also be seen in the east.See also STRATFOR, 7 December 2011, Estonia's Defensive Options Against Russia [http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20111206-estonias-defensive-options-against-russia]; See further Bidder, 2011 and Leijonhielm, 2012, p. 89.countries' almost total control of the sea.However, Russia can, if need be, prevent her opponents from using the Baltic Sea waters, with the exception of the Gulf of Bothnia, by the use of new air-launched and ground-launched missiles.McDermott, 2011, pp.67-68.See alsoMiranovitsh, 2009.105 RIA Novosti, 16 July 2012, "Russian Military to Form 26 New Brigades by 2020" [http://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20120716/174634711.html].106 RIA Novosti, 4 April 2011, "Russia to Continue Military Conscription for 10-15 Years -Medvedev" [http://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20110404/163367728.html].107 Daily Mail, 18 November 2011, "Nuclear War Could Erupt along Russia's Border with Europe, Warns Kremlin Commander" [http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2062865/Nikolai-Makarov-Nuclear-war-erupt-Russias-borders-Europe.html].108 RIA Novosti, 7 October 2012, "Russian Military Pay Rises, but Draft to Remain -Chief" [http://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20121007/176467212.html].For a more detailed analysis, see McDermott, 2012a.109 McDermott, 2013.110 McDermott, 2011.See also, Felgenhauer, 2011.RIA Novosti, 19 May 2011, "Russian State Defence Order Still in Bad Shape -Govt" [http://en.rian.ru/russia/20110519/164111503.html]; RIA Novosti, 17 May 2011, "Russian High-Ranking Officials Sacked over State Defence Order" [http://en.rian.ru/russia/ 20110517/164078046.html].142 Rosbalt, 6 October 2011, "Премьер-министр РФ: В бюджете-2012 возрастут расходы на военные нужды" (Prime Minister: The Budget 2012 Will Increase Military Spending) [http://www.rosbalt.ru/business/2011/10/06/898103.html].143 RIA Novosti, 31 January 2013, "Russia to Prioritize Military Industry -PM Medvedev" [http://en.rian.ru/military_news/20130131/179152543/Russia-to-Prioritize-Military-Industry---PM-Medvedev.html].144Oxenstierna, 16 February 2011, p. 13 and 24.According to Susanne Oxenstierna, "It is questionable if the goals will be met, but it is clear that materiel procurement will consume an ever growing portion of the defence budget and seems to be prioritized."See also Mukhin, 2010.It is pointed out in the FOI report that the procurement program plans are indicative, not mandated by law.See also IHS Jane's World Armies, "Russian Federation", 15 November 2012.JWA estimates that "between 2012 and 2016 alone Russia will commit more than USD 18 billion to land forces procurement programmes, which even when taking into consideration any misallocation of funds or an unrealistic calculation of the budget for the state armaments programme -the planned expenditure should greatly aid attempts to modernise the equipment of the Russian armed forces."145 RIA Novosti, 25 February 2010, "Russia's New Ground Forces Chief Urges Drastic Cuts in Tanks" [http://en.rian.ru/russia/20100225/158003606.html].146 IISS 2010, p. 223 and ArmyTechnology.com, "T-90S Main Battle Tank" Clapper, 31 January 2012.Kalashnikova, 2005.An English version, "All They Had to Do Was Give the Signal" is found at [http://www.kommersant.com/ page.asp?id=558042].Koivisto, 2001, p. 292.172 Kilin, 2010, pp.19−37.173 This was confirmed by Russia's Minister of Defence Anatoly Serdyukov during the visit by his Finnish counterpart Stefan Wallin in Moscow on 14 February 2012.174 Virkkunen, 2007.Ambassador Jaakko Blomberg illuminates further the attempts of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to negate the Finnish decision of 21 September 1990, to declare the military clauses of the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947 void, which would in fact have curtailed Finnish sovereignty; Blomberg, 2011, pp.56−58.The efficiency of Russia's air assault units depends heavily on the capability of the helicopters.The present equipment is evidently so worn out that, for example, the 76 th Air Assault Division deployed to Georgia as ordinary infantry units.SeeLeijonhielm, 2012, p. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 1949.196 Winnerstig, 2011, pp.113-134.197 Iivonen, 2011, p. 13.Holmström, 2011.Sweden's role as NATO's unofficial 17 th member during the Cold War was one of the cornerstones of Swedish defence policy.The co-operation with the United States and NATO assumed the form of quite detailed plans to receive and give help, but due to Sweden's neutrality this had to be kept strictly secret -especially from the Swedish people.202 Koivula & Forss, 2012, pp.147-173.203 Prime Minister's Office, 2012, p.75.The government white paper released on 21 December 2012 says that Finland preserves the possibility to apply for NATO membership.204 This was articulated in an op-ed article in Helsingin Sanomat by the Swedish, Finnish and Norwegian Chiefs of Defence in September 2012.SeeGöranson, Puheloinen and Sunde, 2012.See also STRATFOR, 1 November 2012, Finland, Sweden: A Step Toward Greater Nordic Security Cooperation.Russia's Chief of General Staff, Army General Nikolai Makarov, Helsinki 5 June 2012.See also Benitez, 2012.206 Prime Minister's Office, 2009, p. 109.The substance of the wordings in the new government white paper, released on 21 December 2012, remains essentially unchanged.See Valtioneuvoston kanslia, 2012, pp.96-97.Leijonhielm, 2012, p. 98 and 106.224 Neretnieks, 2012, pp.199-204.According to Karlis Neretnieks, "It's all about retake."This description of the allied contingency planning for the Baltic States was communicated by a Swedish defence researcher.225 In addition to Luga, Iskander missile deployment to both Kaliningrad and Belarus is contemplated.See Liakhovich, 2012.Barabanov, Makienko & Pukhov, 2012..247 Gorenburg, 2013a.248 Boltenkov, Gayday, Karnaukhov, Lavrov & Tseluiko, 2011, p. 30.Warfare.be, "Russia's New Army" [http://www.cast.ru, http://warfare.be].250 McDermott, 2011c.The substance of that specific claim became the topic of heated discussion.Few observers accept it as such.Pitalev, 2012.252 Ibid.253 Gavrilov, 2009.254 Ibid.Ibid.259 Tikhonov, 2011.260 Kashin 2012.Gavrilov, 2009.267 Gorenburg, 2012.268 Kiselev, 2010.269 Litovkin, 2010.270 Barabanov, 2011.Gorenburg, 2012.272 Ibid.273 Ibid.274 Verba, 2012 275 RUSSIAN AVIATION, 25 March 2011, "Russian Air Force Upgrade Review" [http://www.ruaviation.com/docs/4/2011/3/25/27/print/].Gorenburg, 2012.277 Ibid.278 Ibid.279 Gorenburg, 2012.President of Russia, 2012c; Russia Today, 31 July 2012, "Bid For Naval Dominance: Russia Significantly Boosts Nuclear Fleet" [http://rt.com/news/russia-navy-nuclearsubmarine-fleet-450/]; NTI Global Security Newswire, 31 July 2012, "Putin Pledges to Bolster Sea-Based Nuclear Arms" [http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/putin-pledges-bolster-sea-based-nuclear-arms/].295 Ibid.Gavrilov, 2009.341 Litovkin, 2010.
Europe's defence ambitions are crippled by the lack of a common strategic outlook.Most EU member states have a national security strategy; but most of these documents are incoherent, derivative, devoid of the sense of a common European geostrategic situation, and often long out-of-date.Yet Brussels continues to shun any elaboration or revision of the tenyear-old European Security Strategy.So the essential conceptual framework that should guide priorities in foreign and security policy, and the allocation of defence resources, is missing at both the European and, with some few honourable exceptions, the national levels.As a result of this strategic myopia and cacophony, defence budget cuts are being taken in an uncoordinated way that will have far-reaching consequences for European defence capabilities.Van Rompuy should recommend some bold steps to help make "pooling and sharing" a reality: a European "defence semester" and integrative projects such as common policing of Europe's airspace.Ultimately, however, the European defence project is not going to work unless the 27 member states, or at any rate the bulk of them, can get themselves onto the same geostrategic page.The European Council should therefore build on the growing intellectual momentum that is developing and launch a shared EU exercise to define a new strategy for Europe in the world.though there are some honourable exceptions, most member states' national defence and security strategies are not fit for purpose -that is, to ensure that specific national security decisions, and especially decisions about the allocation of defence resources, are taken in the light of a coherent strategic vision.The brief focuses on the implications for Europe of this strategic deficit and lack of common vision.As a result of strategic myopia and cacophony, defence budget cuts are being taken in an uncoordinated way that could have disastrous long-term consequences for European defence capabilities.When the European Council discusses defence in December, President Herman Van Rompuy should recommend some bold steps to help make a reality out of "pooling and sharing", such as a European "defence semester" and integrative projects such as common policing of Europe's airspace.But because greater coherence and interdependence on defence among European states ultimately depend upon a closer alignment of their strategic world views, Europe must also define a global strategy -that is, to decide what it wants to be in the world and work out ways to match the means at its disposal (including its defence capabilities) to those ends.In the last ten years, the EU has lost the sense of common purpose and shared ambition that marked the start of the European defence enterprise.In 2003, Britain and France jointly proposed "a new initiative for the EU to focus on the development of its rapid reaction capabilities".2 Within days of this Franco-British summit, which launched the idea of battle groups, EU heads of state met in Brussels to endorse the very first European Security Strategy (ESS) -a document that announced that "Europe should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security", and declared that "We need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention".3 Ten years on, with "Germany's refusal to join foreign deployments […] undermining faith in Berlin's reliability", as Spiegel put it, and the UK eyeing the EU exit, such declarations now do more to embarrass than inspire.4 Europe's failure to develop a shared strategic culture has not just undermined its ambition to be a more credible and effective actor, and therefore one that carries greater political weight, on the international scene -it has also hamstrung its efforts to maintain its defence capabilities in the wake of the financial crisis gripping the continent.European leaders solemnly aver that they will compensate for falling defence budgets by "pooling and sharing" -and then shape their forward plans without cross-reference or consultation.They underline the need to protect the continent's defence technological and industrial base -and then block the mergers that industry needs to survive, and eviscerate spending on research.5 Manifestly, most European governments are simply not serious about defence, or about doing more together.Things are unlikely to get better without a renewed effort by Europe's leaders to work out a joint strategy: a shared reassessment of what is going on in the world around them, and where and how Europeans should be acting together if they want a continued role in shaping global developments.The European Parliament has repeatedly insisted on the need for a "White Book" on European defence and there have been various academic appeals for a European "grand strategy".6 In 2010, Felipe Gonzalez's Reflection Group on the Future of the EU also argued for such a strategic stocktake.7 But although the Lisbon Treaty was meant to make the EU a more effective global player, Brussels continues to display a rooted aversion to formulating the strategy by which such a player might operate.The EU has resisted such efforts with the assertion that it already has a perfectly good strategy in place in the form of the ESS, which was widely and rightly praised in its day.But even the document's authors were uncomfortable with the title of "strategy" for what was mainly a set of operating principles for addressing the security threats of the post-Soviet world.And the ESS's day was a decade ago -a bygone era in which the West still ran the world, the Chinese economy was less than half the size it is today, liberal interventionism had not yet learned lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan, financial and economic crisis in Europe seemed not so much improbable as inconceivable, and the US had not yet "pivoted" to Asia.It is not just Brussels that has remained obdurate.Certainly, the EU institutions reacted with a predictable "not invented here" when, in 2008, Paris pushed to revisit the ESS.But the decisive opposition came from the British, who correctly sensed that a European strategic exercise would require them to talk about Europe, and the Germans, who equally correctly sensed a requirement to talk about Russia.Since London and Berlin were allergic to these topics, the project was dead on arrival -and was buried in the shroud of an eminently forgettable review of ESS "implementation".Put Europeans together in a Brussels conference room and invite them to think about Europe's place in the world and how to make the best of it, and the consensus seems to be: "never again".Fortunately, this conclusion has been rejected by an increasing number of academics and other authorities around Europe who, fed up with waiting for Brussels to initiate the necessary debate, have decided to do it themselves.The most prominent effort is that sponsored by the foreign ministers of Italy, Poland, Spain, and Sweden, whereby four national think tanks are collaborating (with a dozen other associated institutions across Europe) to come up with a "European Global Strategy", due for publication in early summer 2013.8 Another group of think tanks mobilised by Notre Europe are similarly addressing the need for the EU "to equip itself with a more integrated global strategy" under the "Think Global, Act European" banner.9 Other comparable efforts are also underway.And there may even be some restored official appetite for strategic ideas in 2013.France is completing a new "Livre Blanc" exercise and, though burned by its 2008 experience, is again keen to see if some new momentum can subsequently be given to the European defence enterprise.Potentially most significant of all, the European Council has put defence on its agenda for December 2013.Though the terms in which it has done so are cautiously conservative, the dog has been shown the rabbit, and 2013 will surely see a rash of activity by those anxious to "prepare" the Council's discussion.10 All such efforts are welcome -indeed, it will take no less to address both the strategic myopia and cacophony that our study into European defence policies made so painfully clear.The EU's 27 national security strategies are a motley collection of documents.They even have a variety of names: white paper, security strategy, defence strategy, national security resolution, statement of strategy, defence policy guidelines, military doctrine, and national defence law, to name but a few.This diverse nomenclature hints at the range of issues EU states engage with in their documentationfrom high-level strategy to capability development, force planning and administration -and the variety of ways in which they "do" strategy.For us it seems axiomatic that a "livre blanc", "national security strategy", or any functionally equivalent piece of documentation should have an essentially prescriptive purpose.It should serve to establish a tighter link between the "ends" of more deliberately formulated external policies and the "means" of defence capabilities.It should guide national decisions on budgeting, investment and force planning, and enable governments to determine the optimum future size and shape of their armed forces, all within the level of resources that the country is prepared to allocate to its defence.To do this effectively, it needs to assess the future strategic environment, identifying both threats and opportunities; sketch the role the country will seek to play in it, with whom; derive from this the missions of its future armed forces; define these in terms of capabilities and levels of ambition; and finally, pin all this down to specific force structures, numbers, and equipment.Of course, in the real world elegantly deductive processes of this kind are subverted by having to start from the wrong place, by a lack of money, and by the intrusion of myriad vested interests.But that does not alter the fundamentals: there is little point in writing interesting essays about the international scene unless you deduce actionable conclusions from them; and you are unlikely to make sensible decisions about the nuts and bolts of national security unless you properly assess the strategic context.In short, a good national security analysis needs to address the full spectrum, from geostrategy to resources.Judged by this criterion, most of the documentation we reviewed falls short.Much of it is simply out of date.Little of it shows an interest in the rapidly evolving geostrategic situation -including the changing nature of the transatlantic security relationship.Though analysis of security risks and threats is a near-universal feature, little effort is made to relate this to defining the roles and missions of the national armed forces.(Thus it is not much use emphasising the problem of cybersecurity whilst leaving unresolved the question of whether the military, or some other national authority, should have the lead responsibility for dealing with it.)In particular, the mutualisation of capabilities is everywhere supported but without any attempt to resolve the inescapable conundrum of how much mutualisation is possible, and in what areas, without unacceptable prejudice to national autonomy.Co-operation with neighbours is often endorsed -though seldom with any clarity about scope and purposebut commitment to pursue this on a European scale is weak or non-existent.Equally absent, except in a handful of cases, is any sense of continental interdependence -that is, of Europeans being in the same strategic boat.Of course, not all of these deficiencies are present in all national strategy efforts.Indeed, a handful of them are very good -to the extent that they deserve the title "strategists".But the rest fall short in different ways."Globalists" tend to concentrate more readily on shifting balances of power and general policy objectives, without, however, unpacking the operational consequences they entail."Localists", on the other hand, are states for whom operational considerations tend to crowd out broader strategic preoccupations: they look to their borders and focus on the operational means of preserving their territorial integrity.Some states address neither means nor ends systematically.Among these, "abstentionists" might be said to have forgone strategy in security matters altogether, by culture or by conviction."Drifters", on the other hand, are circumstantial nonstrategists: past strategists whose portfolio is outdated and at odds with current realities.Full-out "strategists" in Europe are few and far between.Unsurprisingly perhaps, the best are France and the UK, but Finland, Sweden, and the Czech Republic might also fit this description.The 2008 French white paper provides a helpful model insofar as it establishes a clear link between high-level guidance and the allocation of defence resources further down the line.The document opens with a broad assessment of recent geostrategic trends -the decline of Western actors, the power shift to the east, strategic uncertainty, and the growing role of non-state actors.It takes stock of the shifting strategic context, identifies risks, threats and opportunities, and attempts to infer the requisite foreign policy aims and determine how the country's armed forces are likely to best fulfil them.Such a process allows high-level aims to follow through to operational recommendations.The big question mark over France's 2008 strategy, however, is whether it remains affordable -an issue with which the 2012/2013 revision is grappling.The UK's strategic thinking runs along the same lines, although the link between ends and means appears perhaps less clearly.Britain's defence review was praised for identifying cyber security and terrorism as the two main threats to national security, but criticised for prescribing aircraft carriers as the remedy.11 Nonetheless, the document lays out the country's sense of its role on the global stage and articulates a foreign policy vision it seeks to implement.The UK's national security strategy speaks of the country's "distinctive role in the world" and assumes it will "continue to play an active and engaged role in shaping global change." 12 Britain will therefore strive to promote its values and its strategic interests on the international scene when and where it can: "we should look to our existing areas of comparative advantage […] . We can and will invest in all those areas where we are relatively stronger than other countries." 13 As the distinction between domestic and external security progressively fades, so also does the necessity of protecting and promoting strategic interests "in the round" become more pressing.14 As the French document puts it, "The traditional distinction between internal and external security is no longer relevant. This continuity has now acquired a strategic dimension and France and Europe must […] define overarching strategies integrating all the different dimensions of security into a single approach." 15 Britain and France's keen idea of their role in the world comes with a sharper sense of how their armed forces might sustain it.Both states still aim to retain a capacity for autonomous action, a full gamut of defence capabilities, and an ability to project force outside national borders where necessary.Other European states are also equipped with thorough security strategies -albeit not necessarily underpinned by a full panoply of military means and a grand strategy in the round.The Czech document undertakes a detailed assessment of the wider strategic context, formulates national strategic objectives, and tailors the roles and missions of the armed forces accordingly.16 It goes on to address capability development, industrial policy, defence markets, budget projections, human resources, and force planning in systematic fashion.Despite (or perhaps because of) a tradition of political neutrality, Sweden and Finland are likewise endowed with consistent and extensive strategies.The Finnish document broadens the lens to include an assessment of the EU's relationship with international players, such as NATO, the UN, the African Union, the Balkans, Turkey, Ukraine, and the Eastern neighbourhood.17 It conceives of the EU as a strategic actor in its own right and assesses its role in the world accordingly.It mentions EU enlargement and neighbourhood policy, the Barcelona process and the Union for the Mediterranean, as well as the so-called Northern Dimension -"common policy involving the European Union, Russia, Norway and Iceland […] aims to promote economic well-being and security in Northern Europe." 18 The Swedish strategy is notable for its candid assessment of the regional context and of Russia's role within it: "The political developments in Russia are taking on increasingly clear authoritarian traits, with elements of corruption, curtailment of civil society independence and rising nationalism. [...] It is nationalism that characterises decisionmaking in Moscow. Russia has in recent years made every effort to regain its superpower role in the global geopolitical scene [...] and with all available means, including military".19 Beyond this, both Nordic documents address the two ends of the strategic spectrum -from geostrategy to capability systems, procurement, industry and markets, and research and development (R&D) -in such a way that high-level guidance is allowed to trickle down to specific decisions about means.As the Spanish strategy illustrates, the "globalist" approach tends to lay the emphasis on the higher end of the strategic spectrum.20 Spain's document very much focuses on geostrategic issues, as opposed to operational ones.It breaks down the main international trends by means of an elaborate conceptual toolbox that identifies "risk multipliers" (globalisation, demographic asymmetry, poverty, inequality, climate change, technology, and extremism) and separates out threats into "domains": sea, air, land, space, cyberspace, and the information space.It then proceeds to tailor external policy objectives to each of these domains.The Dutch strategy likewise uses a sophisticated method to assess the shifts in the geostrategic environment: its multifactor approach separates out strategic foresight, midterm analysis, risk assessment, short-term horizon scanning, and strategic planning.21 Both Dutch and Spanish strategies launch in places into wholly theoretical discussions about concepts and values.The Spanish strategy affirms it "supports the principle of Responsibility to Protect, approved at the UN World Summit in 2005, which establishes the collective responsibility of the international community to protect populations whose own States fail to do so in extreme cases of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing or crimes against humanity." 22 The Dutch strategy discusses the democratic ethos: "Equal treatment and the prohibition of discrimination; freedom of religion and belief; freedom of expression; freedom of association, meeting and demonstration; respect for privacy; integrity of the person. A number of social values that are necessary for a properly functioning democratic state also fall under the core values. Think of, inter alia, truthfulness, empathy and sympathy for others, respect for the opinion of others, and willingness to modify one's own opinion, but think also of social skills such as flexibility, responsiveness and sense of responsibility, a certain pragmatism, and being able to bear uncertainty and ambivalences." 23 It would not be outlandish to assume that such lofty considerations played little part in recent operational decisions by the Dutch to renounce main battle tanks entirely -a sign that, for all its sophistication, the Dutch strategy remains altogether descriptive.Pointedly bypassing topics like armament programmes or force planning hardly allows high-level analysis to follow through to actual decisions about the armed forces.In consequence, the Dutch tank decision took their allies by surprise.While the Spanish and Dutch documents at least feature a measure of innovative analysis, strategic thinking amongst other "globalists" is less original and more derivative.The assessment of the international environment, for example, tends to fall back onto the stock list of risks and threats that features in extant EU, NATO and UN documents.Germany's policy document accordingly opens with the following inventory: "Today, risks and threats are emerging above all from failing and failed states, acts of international terrorism, terrorist regimes and dictatorships, turmoil when these break up, criminal networks, climatic and natural disasters, from migration developments, from the scarcity of or shortages in the supply of natural resources and raw materials, from epidemics and pandemics, as well as from possible threats to critical infrastructure such as information technology." 24 The remainder of Germany's document, though clear and well written, altogether sidesteps the issue of how to apply national armed forces to the threats it identifies upfront.The Hungarian and Slovenian strategies as a whole also revolve around this staple catalogue of risks and threats.25 When it comes to how exactly to respond to them however, the analysis becomes more formulaic.The Hungarian document, having identified cyber security as a vital national security concern, goes on to give an entirely evasive account of the response required: "It is a primary task to systematically identify and prioritise actual or potential threats and risks in cyberspace, to strengthen governmental coordination, to increase societal awareness, and to capitalise on opportunities provided by international cooperation. In addition to strengthening the protection of the critical national information infrastructure, Hungary strives to enhance the security of information systems and to participate in the development of appropriate levels of cyber defence." 26 There appears to be little point in emphasising how crippling such threats might be without going on to establish how to address them in organisational terms.steering clear of these thornier issues.27 In short, globalists are more inclined to describe things as they are than stipulate why and how things should be changed to reflect strategic objectives."Localists", not unlike globalists, adopt a piecemeal approach to strategy that concentrates chiefly on one end of the strategic spectrum.But where globalists look to broader ends, localists focus on means.Their main concern is with preserving territorial integrity in the face of a shifting regional environment, within which Russia is cited alternatively as a threat and a potential partner.For example, the Latvian strategy states: "Promotion of cooperation with the Russian Federation is a security and stability strengthening aspect of the Baltic Sea region. It is within the interests of Latvia to promote the principle of openness and mutual trust in the dialogue with the Russian Federation in bilateral contacts, and at the levels of the OSCE, EU and NATO." 28 The apparent insistence on the lack of conventional military threat is offset by repeated references to the subversion of state stability.29 The Bulgarian document goes to great lengths to stress the "absence of immediate military threats" to national sovereignty and says that the probability of being drawn into a conflict is "negligible" -and then proceeds in the main to extensively discuss security on its eastern and southern flanks.30 Likewise, strategic thinking in the Danish document revolves around the regional context -mainly the situation in the Arctic and its potential consequences for the Danish forces.31 But there is otherwise little place for geostrategy; indeed, the remainder of the Danish strategy focuses most thoroughly on operational issues.Perhaps surprisingly, Poland's defence strategy also forgoes high-level strategy.Perhaps surprisingly, Poland's defence strategy also forgoes high-level strategy.Despite a rapid foray into most recent strategic trends and risks, it deals mostly with the organisation of the state's defence system and the issue of territorial invasion.32 Indeed it brings up matters that may seem altogether peripheral to national defence, such as compulsory training in citizen martial arts for the Polish population.33 Where localists' strategy goes beyond the parochial or the regional, it remains derivative.Many documents contain token or stilted pieces of analysis.The Romanian document is entitled The National Security of Romania: The European Romania, the Euro-Atlantic Romania.For a Better Life in a Democratic, Safer and More Prosperous Country.As this suggests, it is not inclined to delve into particulars and makes for fairly soporific reading.The emphasis it puts on a community of shared values and on Romania's place inside the "euro-Atlantic" space sounds arch: "To achieve its rightful interests, in its position as an integral part of the Euro-Atlantic civilization and an active participant in the process of building the new Europe, Romania [is] [...] firmly committed to the process of moral reconstruction, institutional modernization and civic awareness, in full agreement with its own fundamental values and with the European and Euro-Atlantic values".34 In effect, most Baltic and Eastern European countries simply resort to recycling accepted NATO or EU wisdom.Slovakian, Bulgarian, or Polish strategies start off by dutifully ticking off a standard list of "new" risks and threats.For example, the Slovakian strategy mentions "the threat of terrorist attacks, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, organized crime, the growing potential for the misuse of cybernetic space, [...] and an increasing potential for the development of unexpected crisis situations." 35 They then pointedly shift to matters of territorial defence implications for the state defence system and wholly different concerns such as conscription, pastoral care, defence sustainability and health services.Any broader strategic thinking amongst localists usually refers back to NATO or the United States.Latvia's strategy declares that the US is "the most important strategic partner for Latvia, is essential in providing security for Latvia and the entire region […] and will remain the key strategic partner of Latvia in the field of defence and military matters." 36 Denmark's strategy says that "in a strategic perspective Denmark's sovereignty is secured through NATO's Article 5 commitment to collective defence of Alliance territory. At the same time, NATO provides a framework for the participation of the Danish Armed Forces in international missions." 37 Most military planning is undertaken in strict accordance with NATO defence planning cycles.Estonia's strategy says that "NATO methodologies are used to determine defence expenditures." 38 This tends to cause inflation in strategic reviews and sub-strategies.39 Meanwhile, references to the EU are few and far between.Where the EU features, it is either as a complement or a subordinate to NATO.For example, the Latvian strategy says that "the strengthening of the European military capabilities must contribute to NATO's military capacity"a trait that is shared by most of the strategic corpus.40 Collective undertakings are found wanting where they fail to tie in with local concerns (mainly territorial).The EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) efforts come up short in this respect.According to the Latvian strategy, "The Lisbon Treaty's mutual assistance clause (Article 42.7 of the Treaty) specifies that in the event of an armed aggression, the EU Member States are obliged to provide the victim state with aid and assistance by all means at their disposal. This clause has the role of promoting political solidarity, but the Lisbon Treaty does not provide a mechanism for its implementation. Therefore, it is important for Latvia to maintain a maximum degree of national competence in the decision-making regarding the EU security and defence policy issues." 41 The EU's pooling and sharing efforts are dismissed on the same count: "The most effective solutions for maintaining and developing military capabilities are being sought in NATO. In view of the Allies' cooperation on pooling and sharing of military capabilities, the capabilities needed for the Alliance become more cost-efficient and available." 42 The geostrategic outlook often comes across as more decidedly pragmatic: "the immediate objective is a sharp and visible increase of efficiency and effectiveness in spending Bulgarian taxpayers' money, for example by taking advantage of our membership in NATO and the European Union, which provide opportunities for sharing defence costs as well as significantly improving their effectiveness." 43 Whether out of conviction ("abstentionists") or circumstance ("drifters"), some European states appear to have largely forgone strategic thinking in matters of security.It is first worth noting that not all countries feel the need to commit their defence and security policies to one solemn, overarching document.A number of papers, in fact, bear very little resemblance to security strategies at all.Belgian and Luxembourgian official documentation boils down to a body of statements made by defence ministers over the years and a number of defence laws.44 Strategic defence planning will therefore be carried out on the basis of an assortment of disparate documents.Where there is one official, synthetic document, it is often informal or exceedingly parochial.For example, while the Irish security strategy addresses the question of fisheries at length, it fails to touch upon more fundamental matters like defence planning.45 The issue is compounded by the different institutional setups that exist at the national level.Not all EU states possess fully-fledged defence administrations: Austria, Malta, and Luxembourg do not have ministries whose sole official remits are defence.A lack of consensus, therefore, extends not merely to what form national strategies should take, but also to how they sit with the country's defence planning system.These national setups also affect the weight and function of a country's strategic portfolio.46 Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Portugal do not even deem their strategic documents of sufficient significance to merit translation into English.47 Nor does it help, of course, that many of these strategies are woefully out of date.Any document published before the start of the financial crisis in 2007 must safely be deemed an incoherent basis for defence planning -yet nearly half of the security strategies were in this position in 2012.Encouragingly, however, a number of documents have been updated since, in an attempt to factor in latest economic and strategic shifts -and more are on the way.48 In fact, 2013 might yet prove something of a watershed: Cyprus, the only remaining country not yet equipped with a security strategy, is expected to complete its own in the course of the year.Yet some countries continue to pose difficulties: in one extreme case, Greece, the last public strategy paper runs back to the twentieth century, effectively rendering the document all but useless.49 Italy is another prime -and telling -example of strategic drifting.The most recent Italian white paper was published in 2002 in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks and exists alongside a set of equally antiquated documents.50 Official strategic thought is currently contained only in an annual report on defence geared toward short-term allocation of defence resources.51 Italy is therefore quite simply not equipped with a document that addresses its national defence needs systematically.Its strategic portfolio leaves it without a view of the road ahead at a time of dire budget restrictions and unprecedented global change.Coming from a state that is by no means a military minnow in Europe, such a dearth of strategic vision is certainly disquieting.Overall, then, few of the national strategies we have reviewed pass the test of comprehensiveness -that is, of linking strategic aims to operational means.And too many fail the test of currency -they are simply out of date.Such documents may still have their uses: they may prove helpful merely by dint of the democratic accountability they provide or the national 48 Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Portugal, Ireland, Romania, France, Luxemburg, and Cyprus are expected to produce documents this year.49 Greece, White Paper for the Armed Forces, 1997, available at http://www.resdal.org/ Archivo/d000007e.htm.Although updated, unclassified parts of it have been made available since.European security strategies by comprehensiveness and currency visibility they give to security and defence matters.But they cannot be said to provide a sound basis for deployment of defence resources.Figure 1 illustrates the relative standings of European national security strategies against these important criteria of comprehensiveness and currency.If a strategic vision amounts to a view of the road ahead, then most European defence and security establishments are driving with their eyes fixed on the rear-view mirrorwhich makes effective changes of speed and direction almost impossible to implement.Little wonder that most national defence planning in Europe consists of simply trying to keep the show on the road, with the smallest possible touches on the steering wheel.So, instead of moving to "pool and share" as everyone now promises, all EU member states have responded to fiscal crisis by trying to hang on to what they have always had, but less of it -and/or by chopping out particular chunks of capability, with no consultation or regard for the impact of such unilateral cuts on the European whole.The consequences of this myopia are now well known.The inefficiency with which Europe converts its resource input (collective spending that still approaches €200 billion annually -comfortably more than Russia and China combined) into useful defence output has become a byword.Hugely over-manned military structures (substantially more men and women in uniform than in the entire US armed forces) are starved of modern equipment; in contradiction of repeated declarations of intent, investment in research and technology has been slashed.The consequences for Europe's ability to mount and sustain a relatively modest air campaign were exposed for all to see in Libya in 2011 and again in Mali this year.The European Council's plan to discuss defence at their December 2013 meeting comes not a moment too soon.The preview contained in the December 2012 Conclusions offers little hint of fresh thinking (there is the usual tired talk of the "comprehensive approach" and of "facilitating synergies"), or of an agenda worth the engagement of national leaders.52 But President Van Rompuy has at least reserved to himself the right to offer "recommendations".Here are some suggestions.A European "defence semester" First, if 17 European governments can put their national budget planning up for scrutiny by their eurozone partners -the "European semester" -then they can certainly agree to some more systematic "mutual accounting" about their national defence plans.Indeed, the December 2012 Conclusions suggest at least the beginnings of wisdom in this regard when they talk of "systematically considering cooperation from the outset in national defence planning by Member States".It takes a lot to change the direction of the ponderous defence juggernaut.Certainly, if you are serious about switching from a predominantly national to a more collaborative track, such changes will have to be planned well in advance.As the experience of recent years has confirmed, if you simply say "who has some spare money which they would be happy to put into a joint project later this year?", the answer will invariably be a lemon.So what is needed is first of all to "share" national defence plans -that is, for each member state to tell the others how much it plans to spend on defence in coming years and where it sees the money going.Such a process of reciprocal "show and tell" (which the European Defence Agency would be well placed to manage) would not involve putting sovereign decisions on defence "into commission" with partners, international bodies, or anyone else.But it would highlight as no other process could the extent of the waste and duplication in European defence expenditure; the size and nature of the capability gaps, present and future; the incoherence of national programmes when summed together; and, crucially, the opportunities for getting more from less by pooling efforts and resources in new co-operative projects.A "European semester" for defence would still, however, encounter the ingrained conservatism and risk-aversion of defence.So the European Council needs to shake up the system by itself demanding that blueprints be produced for one or two major, exemplary, integrative projects.Common air policing of European airspace is an obvious candidateand something that could save hundreds of millions of euros by culling redundant combat aircraft and infrastructure across Europe.The savings could then be redeployed into a joint European Strike Force -the collective capability Europe should have had at its disposal two years ago to wage the Libyan air campaign without having to fall back on the Americans for air-tanking, reconnaissance, smart munitions and so on.To be clear, we are not suggesting here some sort of "standing force", funded in common and under supranational command.Rather, we propose a co-operative effort to determine what components in what quantities (how many cruise missiles? how many reconnaissance drones?) would need to be available for Europe to "do another Libya"; to assign responsibility for the provision of the different components to different member states; and to plan a migration path from today's unbalanced and often unusable inventories and force structures to a set of national parts that add up to an effective capability when brought together.Navies too could benefit from this approach -indeed, as they struggle to fulfil their national fleet programmes with diminishing hull numbers, European admirals are already talking about how they might better cover for each other by closer co-ordination.53 "Pooling and sharing" has thus far failed because national leaders have contented themselves with blessing the principle, and then asking "the staff" for ideas.The need now is to challenge the staff by demanding not suggestions but specific plans to bring about specified changes.If there are killer objections, they must be set out and properly evaluated.For example, there is a widespread tacit assumption that a European Strike Force could never work because the Germans would have to be assigned a significant role -but could not be relied upon to turn up on the day.Certainly, there is a real confidence issue here -but rather than despairing, ways around it need to be explored.Perhaps the Bundestag might offer pre-emptive reassurance on the point.Or Germany could be assigned a non-lethal role in the force (responsibility for air tanking, say).Failing all else, some redundancy could be built back into the force's design.Mutual accountability over defence planning and serious exploration of a couple of major integrative projects would be important steps for the December 2013 European Council to take.Ultimately, however, the European defence "project" is not going to work unless the 27 member states, or at any rate the bulk of them, can get themselves onto the same geostrategic page.This will mean converging on some key propositions: that if Europeans are to continue to count for something in the world, then they are condemned to cooperate; that effective armed forces are among the assets they will need to deploy, as instruments of power and influence as much as for "war-fighting" purposes; and that maintaining effective armed forces will require biting the bullet of significantly greater mutual dependence.This consensus will not materialise out of thin air.It will require a process of working through the arguments, testing the assumptions, and exploring the alternatives.A joint effort is required, in other words, to take stock of how the strategic environment has changed, and may change in future; what assets Europeans can bring to bear (not just armed forces of course) to protect their interests and values and to safeguard the security and prosperity of future generations; and how and where those assets will be best applied.In sum, the time has come for Europe to define a strategy -to decide what it wants to be in the world and work out ways to match the means at its disposal to those ends.By the time of this December's European Council meeting, a good deal of material on just these themes will have been offered up by a range of European institutions and analysts.So the key trick for President Van Rompuy to take will be to exploit his right of "recommendation" to channel this intellectual momentum and ensure that it leads to a formally adopted Global Strategy for Europe.The modalities will need thought -the "group of sages" device may be needed to counteract the smothering effect of the Brussels institutions.But the essential point is simply that defence enterprises do not succeed without a strategy -and it is past time for Europe to equip itself with one.ECFR has developed a strategy with three distinctive elements that define its activities: • A pan-European Council.ECFR has brought together a distinguished Council of over two hundred Memberspoliticians, decision makers, thinkers and business people from the EU's member states and candidate countries -which meets once a year as a full body.Through geographical and thematic task forces, members provide ECFR staff with advice and feedback on policy ideas and help with ECFR's activities within their own countries.The Council is chaired by Martti Ahtisaari, Joschka Fischer and Mabel van Oranje.• A physical presence in the main EU member states.ECFR, uniquely among European think-tanks, has offices in Berlin, London, Madrid, Paris, Rome, Sofia and Warsaw.In the future ECFR plans to open an office in Brussels.Our offices are platforms for research, debate, advocacy and communications.• A distinctive research and policy development process.ECFR has brought together a team of distinguished researchers and practitioners from all over Europe to advance its objectives through innovative projects with a pan-European focus.ECFR's activities include primary research, publication of policy reports, private meetings and public debates, 'friends of ECFR' gatherings in EU capitals and outreach to strategic media outlets.ECFR is a registered charity funded by the Open Society Foundations and other generous foundations, individuals and corporate entities.These donors allow us to publish our ideas and advocate for a values-based EU foreign policy.ECFR works in partnership with other think tanks and organisations but does not make grants to individuals or institutions.Olivier de France and Nick Witney, Étude comparative des livres blancs des 27 États membres de l'UE : pour la définition d'un cadre européen, Institut de recherche stratégique de l'Ecole militaire, available at http://www.defense.gouv.fr/content/ download/185008/2037037/file/Etude%2018-2012.pdf."On the European Global Strategy project, see http://www.euglobalstrategy.eu/. 9 On this project, see http://www.eng.notre-europe.eu/011015-103-Think-Global-Act-European.html. 10 European Council Conclusions, December 2012, §20-25, available at http://www. consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/134353.pdf. "Respect for cultural diversity is also seen by Hungary as a security policy consideration.Successfully ensuring the traditional coexistence of different cultures European Council, 13/14 December 2012, Conclusions, available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/134353.pdf.53Fleet "programmes" have to be planned years in advance to accommodate maintenance and refit; periods in home ports to allow crews to get reacquainted with loved ones; training and exercising; and of course the deployments -for example, maintaining a presence in the Gulf or the West Indies -which are the raison d'être of a peacetime navy.As navies shrink, so different nations will have to plan to share (take turn and turn about) on such deployments -or give some of them up altogether.In other words, if Europeans are to keep on "showing the flag" in distant waters they will increasingly have to do it co-operatively -maintaining a "European" as much as a national presence.	Europe's defence ambitions are crippled by the lack of a common strategic outlook.Most EU member states have a national security strategy; but most of these documents are incoherent, derivative, devoid of the sense of a common European geostrategic situation, and often long out-of-date.Yet Brussels continues to shun any elaboration or revision of the tenyear-old European Security Strategy.So the essential conceptual framework that should guide priorities in foreign and security policy, and the allocation of defence resources, is missing at both the European and, with some few honourable exceptions, the national levels.As a result of this strategic myopia and cacophony, defence budget cuts are being taken in an uncoordinated way that will have far-reaching consequences for European defence capabilities.Van Rompuy should recommend some bold steps to help make "pooling and sharing" a reality: a European "defence semester" and integrative projects such as common policing of Europe's airspace.Ultimately, however, the European defence project is not going to work unless the 27 member states, or at any rate the bulk of them, can get themselves onto the same geostrategic page.The European Council should therefore build on the growing intellectual momentum that is developing and launch a shared EU exercise to define a new strategy for Europe in the world.though there are some honourable exceptions, most member states' national defence and security strategies are not fit for purpose -that is, to ensure that specific national security decisions, and especially decisions about the allocation of defence resources, are taken in the light of a coherent strategic vision.The brief focuses on the implications for Europe of this strategic deficit and lack of common vision.As a result of strategic myopia and cacophony, defence budget cuts are being taken in an uncoordinated way that could have disastrous long-term consequences for European defence capabilities.When the European Council discusses defence in December, President Herman Van Rompuy should recommend some bold steps to help make a reality out of "pooling and sharing", such as a European "defence semester" and integrative projects such as common policing of Europe's airspace.But because greater coherence and interdependence on defence among European states ultimately depend upon a closer alignment of their strategic world views, Europe must also define a global strategy -that is, to decide what it wants to be in the world and work out ways to match the means at its disposal (including its defence capabilities) to those ends.In the last ten years, the EU has lost the sense of common purpose and shared ambition that marked the start of the European defence enterprise.In 2003, Britain and France jointly proposed "a new initiative for the EU to focus on the development of its rapid reaction capabilities".2 Within days of this Franco-British summit, which launched the idea of battle groups, EU heads of state met in Brussels to endorse the very first European Security Strategy (ESS) -a document that announced that "Europe should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security", and declared that "We need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention".3 Ten years on, with "Germany's refusal to join foreign deployments […] undermining faith in Berlin's reliability", as Spiegel put it, and the UK eyeing the EU exit, such declarations now do more to embarrass than inspire.4 Europe's failure to develop a shared strategic culture has not just undermined its ambition to be a more credible and effective actor, and therefore one that carries greater political weight, on the international scene -it has also hamstrung its efforts to maintain its defence capabilities in the wake of the financial crisis gripping the continent.European leaders solemnly aver that they will compensate for falling defence budgets by "pooling and sharing" -and then shape their forward plans without cross-reference or consultation.They underline the need to protect the continent's defence technological and industrial base -and then block the mergers that industry needs to survive, and eviscerate spending on research.5 Manifestly, most European governments are simply not serious about defence, or about doing more together.Things are unlikely to get better without a renewed effort by Europe's leaders to work out a joint strategy: a shared reassessment of what is going on in the world around them, and where and how Europeans should be acting together if they want a continued role in shaping global developments.The European Parliament has repeatedly insisted on the need for a "White Book" on European defence and there have been various academic appeals for a European "grand strategy".6 In 2010, Felipe Gonzalez's Reflection Group on the Future of the EU also argued for such a strategic stocktake.7 But although the Lisbon Treaty was meant to make the EU a more effective global player, Brussels continues to display a rooted aversion to formulating the strategy by which such a player might operate.The EU has resisted such efforts with the assertion that it already has a perfectly good strategy in place in the form of the ESS, which was widely and rightly praised in its day.But even the document's authors were uncomfortable with the title of "strategy" for what was mainly a set of operating principles for addressing the security threats of the post-Soviet world.And the ESS's day was a decade ago -a bygone era in which the West still ran the world, the Chinese economy was less than half the size it is today, liberal interventionism had not yet learned lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan, financial and economic crisis in Europe seemed not so much improbable as inconceivable, and the US had not yet "pivoted" to Asia.It is not just Brussels that has remained obdurate.Certainly, the EU institutions reacted with a predictable "not invented here" when, in 2008, Paris pushed to revisit the ESS.But the decisive opposition came from the British, who correctly sensed that a European strategic exercise would require them to talk about Europe, and the Germans, who equally correctly sensed a requirement to talk about Russia.Since London and Berlin were allergic to these topics, the project was dead on arrival -and was buried in the shroud of an eminently forgettable review of ESS "implementation".Put Europeans together in a Brussels conference room and invite them to think about Europe's place in the world and how to make the best of it, and the consensus seems to be: "never again".Fortunately, this conclusion has been rejected by an increasing number of academics and other authorities around Europe who, fed up with waiting for Brussels to initiate the necessary debate, have decided to do it themselves.The most prominent effort is that sponsored by the foreign ministers of Italy, Poland, Spain, and Sweden, whereby four national think tanks are collaborating (with a dozen other associated institutions across Europe) to come up with a "European Global Strategy", due for publication in early summer 2013.8 Another group of think tanks mobilised by Notre Europe are similarly addressing the need for the EU "to equip itself with a more integrated global strategy" under the "Think Global, Act European" banner.9 Other comparable efforts are also underway.And there may even be some restored official appetite for strategic ideas in 2013.France is completing a new "Livre Blanc" exercise and, though burned by its 2008 experience, is again keen to see if some new momentum can subsequently be given to the European defence enterprise.Potentially most significant of all, the European Council has put defence on its agenda for December 2013.Though the terms in which it has done so are cautiously conservative, the dog has been shown the rabbit, and 2013 will surely see a rash of activity by those anxious to "prepare" the Council's discussion.10 All such efforts are welcome -indeed, it will take no less to address both the strategic myopia and cacophony that our study into European defence policies made so painfully clear.The EU's 27 national security strategies are a motley collection of documents.They even have a variety of names: white paper, security strategy, defence strategy, national security resolution, statement of strategy, defence policy guidelines, military doctrine, and national defence law, to name but a few.This diverse nomenclature hints at the range of issues EU states engage with in their documentationfrom high-level strategy to capability development, force planning and administration -and the variety of ways in which they "do" strategy.For us it seems axiomatic that a "livre blanc", "national security strategy", or any functionally equivalent piece of documentation should have an essentially prescriptive purpose.It should serve to establish a tighter link between the "ends" of more deliberately formulated external policies and the "means" of defence capabilities.It should guide national decisions on budgeting, investment and force planning, and enable governments to determine the optimum future size and shape of their armed forces, all within the level of resources that the country is prepared to allocate to its defence.To do this effectively, it needs to assess the future strategic environment, identifying both threats and opportunities; sketch the role the country will seek to play in it, with whom; derive from this the missions of its future armed forces; define these in terms of capabilities and levels of ambition; and finally, pin all this down to specific force structures, numbers, and equipment.Of course, in the real world elegantly deductive processes of this kind are subverted by having to start from the wrong place, by a lack of money, and by the intrusion of myriad vested interests.But that does not alter the fundamentals: there is little point in writing interesting essays about the international scene unless you deduce actionable conclusions from them; and you are unlikely to make sensible decisions about the nuts and bolts of national security unless you properly assess the strategic context.In short, a good national security analysis needs to address the full spectrum, from geostrategy to resources.Judged by this criterion, most of the documentation we reviewed falls short.Much of it is simply out of date.Little of it shows an interest in the rapidly evolving geostrategic situation -including the changing nature of the transatlantic security relationship.Though analysis of security risks and threats is a near-universal feature, little effort is made to relate this to defining the roles and missions of the national armed forces. (Thus it is not much use emphasising the problem of cybersecurity whilst leaving unresolved the question of whether the military, or some other national authority, should have the lead responsibility for dealing with it.)In particular, the mutualisation of capabilities is everywhere supported but without any attempt to resolve the inescapable conundrum of how much mutualisation is possible, and in what areas, without unacceptable prejudice to national autonomy.Co-operation with neighbours is often endorsed -though seldom with any clarity about scope and purposebut commitment to pursue this on a European scale is weak or non-existent.Equally absent, except in a handful of cases, is any sense of continental interdependence -that is, of Europeans being in the same strategic boat.Of course, not all of these deficiencies are present in all national strategy efforts.Indeed, a handful of them are very good -to the extent that they deserve the title "strategists".But the rest fall short in different ways. "Globalists" tend to concentrate more readily on shifting balances of power and general policy objectives, without, however, unpacking the operational consequences they entail. "Localists", on the other hand, are states for whom operational considerations tend to crowd out broader strategic preoccupations: they look to their borders and focus on the operational means of preserving their territorial integrity.Some states address neither means nor ends systematically.Among these, "abstentionists" might be said to have forgone strategy in security matters altogether, by culture or by conviction. "Drifters", on the other hand, are circumstantial nonstrategists: past strategists whose portfolio is outdated and at odds with current realities.Full-out "strategists" in Europe are few and far between.Unsurprisingly perhaps, the best are France and the UK, but Finland, Sweden, and the Czech Republic might also fit this description.The 2008 French white paper provides a helpful model insofar as it establishes a clear link between high-level guidance and the allocation of defence resources further down the line.The document opens with a broad assessment of recent geostrategic trends -the decline of Western actors, the power shift to the east, strategic uncertainty, and the growing role of non-state actors.It takes stock of the shifting strategic context, identifies risks, threats and opportunities, and attempts to infer the requisite foreign policy aims and determine how the country's armed forces are likely to best fulfil them.Such a process allows high-level aims to follow through to operational recommendations.The big question mark over France's 2008 strategy, however, is whether it remains affordable -an issue with which the 2012/2013 revision is grappling.The UK's strategic thinking runs along the same lines, although the link between ends and means appears perhaps less clearly.Britain's defence review was praised for identifying cyber security and terrorism as the two main threats to national security, but criticised for prescribing aircraft carriers as the remedy.11 Nonetheless, the document lays out the country's sense of its role on the global stage and articulates a foreign policy vision it seeks to implement.The UK's national security strategy speaks of the country's "distinctive role in the world" and assumes it will "continue to play an active and engaged role in shaping global change."12 Britain will therefore strive to promote its values and its strategic interests on the international scene when and where it can: "we should look to our existing areas of comparative advantage […] .We can and will invest in all those areas where we are relatively stronger than other countries."13 As the distinction between domestic and external security progressively fades, so also does the necessity of protecting and promoting strategic interests "in the round" become more pressing.14 As the French document puts it, "The traditional distinction between internal and external security is no longer relevant.This continuity has now acquired a strategic dimension and France and Europe must […] define overarching strategies integrating all the different dimensions of security into a single approach."15 Britain and France's keen idea of their role in the world comes with a sharper sense of how their armed forces might sustain it.Both states still aim to retain a capacity for autonomous action, a full gamut of defence capabilities, and an ability to project force outside national borders where necessary.Other European states are also equipped with thorough security strategies -albeit not necessarily underpinned by a full panoply of military means and a grand strategy in the round.The Czech document undertakes a detailed assessment of the wider strategic context, formulates national strategic objectives, and tailors the roles and missions of the armed forces accordingly.16 It goes on to address capability development, industrial policy, defence markets, budget projections, human resources, and force planning in systematic fashion.Despite (or perhaps because of) a tradition of political neutrality, Sweden and Finland are likewise endowed with consistent and extensive strategies.The Finnish document broadens the lens to include an assessment of the EU's relationship with international players, such as NATO, the UN, the African Union, the Balkans, Turkey, Ukraine, and the Eastern neighbourhood.17 It conceives of the EU as a strategic actor in its own right and assesses its role in the world accordingly.It mentions EU enlargement and neighbourhood policy, the Barcelona process and the Union for the Mediterranean, as well as the so-called Northern Dimension -"common policy involving the European Union, Russia, Norway and Iceland […] aims to promote economic well-being and security in Northern Europe."18 The Swedish strategy is notable for its candid assessment of the regional context and of Russia's role within it: "The political developments in Russia are taking on increasingly clear authoritarian traits, with elements of corruption, curtailment of civil society independence and rising nationalism. [...]It is nationalism that characterises decisionmaking in Moscow.Russia has in recent years made every effort to regain its superpower role in the global geopolitical scene [...] and with all available means, including military".19 Beyond this, both Nordic documents address the two ends of the strategic spectrum -from geostrategy to capability systems, procurement, industry and markets, and research and development (R&D) -in such a way that high-level guidance is allowed to trickle down to specific decisions about means.As the Spanish strategy illustrates, the "globalist" approach tends to lay the emphasis on the higher end of the strategic spectrum.20 Spain's document very much focuses on geostrategic issues, as opposed to operational ones.It breaks down the main international trends by means of an elaborate conceptual toolbox that identifies "risk multipliers" (globalisation, demographic asymmetry, poverty, inequality, climate change, technology, and extremism) and separates out threats into "domains": sea, air, land, space, cyberspace, and the information space.It then proceeds to tailor external policy objectives to each of these domains.The Dutch strategy likewise uses a sophisticated method to assess the shifts in the geostrategic environment: its multifactor approach separates out strategic foresight, midterm analysis, risk assessment, short-term horizon scanning, and strategic planning.21 Both Dutch and Spanish strategies launch in places into wholly theoretical discussions about concepts and values.The Spanish strategy affirms it "supports the principle of Responsibility to Protect, approved at the UN World Summit in 2005, which establishes the collective responsibility of the international community to protect populations whose own States fail to do so in extreme cases of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing or crimes against humanity."22 The Dutch strategy discusses the democratic ethos: "Equal treatment and the prohibition of discrimination; freedom of religion and belief; freedom of expression; freedom of association, meeting and demonstration; respect for privacy; integrity of the person.A number of social values that are necessary for a properly functioning democratic state also fall under the core values.Think of, inter alia, truthfulness, empathy and sympathy for others, respect for the opinion of others, and willingness to modify one's own opinion, but think also of social skills such as flexibility, responsiveness and sense of responsibility, a certain pragmatism, and being able to bear uncertainty and ambivalences."23 It would not be outlandish to assume that such lofty considerations played little part in recent operational decisions by the Dutch to renounce main battle tanks entirely -a sign that, for all its sophistication, the Dutch strategy remains altogether descriptive.Pointedly bypassing topics like armament programmes or force planning hardly allows high-level analysis to follow through to actual decisions about the armed forces.In consequence, the Dutch tank decision took their allies by surprise.While the Spanish and Dutch documents at least feature a measure of innovative analysis, strategic thinking amongst other "globalists" is less original and more derivative.The assessment of the international environment, for example, tends to fall back onto the stock list of risks and threats that features in extant EU, NATO and UN documents.Germany's policy document accordingly opens with the following inventory: "Today, risks and threats are emerging above all from failing and failed states, acts of international terrorism, terrorist regimes and dictatorships, turmoil when these break up, criminal networks, climatic and natural disasters, from migration developments, from the scarcity of or shortages in the supply of natural resources and raw materials, from epidemics and pandemics, as well as from possible threats to critical infrastructure such as information technology."24 The remainder of Germany's document, though clear and well written, altogether sidesteps the issue of how to apply national armed forces to the threats it identifies upfront.The Hungarian and Slovenian strategies as a whole also revolve around this staple catalogue of risks and threats.25 When it comes to how exactly to respond to them however, the analysis becomes more formulaic.The Hungarian document, having identified cyber security as a vital national security concern, goes on to give an entirely evasive account of the response required: "It is a primary task to systematically identify and prioritise actual or potential threats and risks in cyberspace, to strengthen governmental coordination, to increase societal awareness, and to capitalise on opportunities provided by international cooperation.In addition to strengthening the protection of the critical national information infrastructure, Hungary strives to enhance the security of information systems and to participate in the development of appropriate levels of cyber defence."26 There appears to be little point in emphasising how crippling such threats might be without going on to establish how to address them in organisational terms.steering clear of these thornier issues.27 In short, globalists are more inclined to describe things as they are than stipulate why and how things should be changed to reflect strategic objectives. "Localists", not unlike globalists, adopt a piecemeal approach to strategy that concentrates chiefly on one end of the strategic spectrum.But where globalists look to broader ends, localists focus on means.Their main concern is with preserving territorial integrity in the face of a shifting regional environment, within which Russia is cited alternatively as a threat and a potential partner.For example, the Latvian strategy states: "Promotion of cooperation with the Russian Federation is a security and stability strengthening aspect of the Baltic Sea region.It is within the interests of Latvia to promote the principle of openness and mutual trust in the dialogue with the Russian Federation in bilateral contacts, and at the levels of the OSCE, EU and NATO."28 The apparent insistence on the lack of conventional military threat is offset by repeated references to the subversion of state stability.29 The Bulgarian document goes to great lengths to stress the "absence of immediate military threats" to national sovereignty and says that the probability of being drawn into a conflict is "negligible" -and then proceeds in the main to extensively discuss security on its eastern and southern flanks.30 Likewise, strategic thinking in the Danish document revolves around the regional context -mainly the situation in the Arctic and its potential consequences for the Danish forces.31 But there is otherwise little place for geostrategy; indeed, the remainder of the Danish strategy focuses most thoroughly on operational issues.Perhaps surprisingly, Poland's defence strategy also forgoes high-level strategy.Perhaps surprisingly, Poland's defence strategy also forgoes high-level strategy.Despite a rapid foray into most recent strategic trends and risks, it deals mostly with the organisation of the state's defence system and the issue of territorial invasion.32 Indeed it brings up matters that may seem altogether peripheral to national defence, such as compulsory training in citizen martial arts for the Polish population.33 Where localists' strategy goes beyond the parochial or the regional, it remains derivative.Many documents contain token or stilted pieces of analysis.The Romanian document is entitled The National Security of Romania: The European Romania, the Euro-Atlantic Romania.For a Better Life in a Democratic, Safer and More Prosperous Country.As this suggests, it is not inclined to delve into particulars and makes for fairly soporific reading.The emphasis it puts on a community of shared values and on Romania's place inside the "euro-Atlantic" space sounds arch: "To achieve its rightful interests, in its position as an integral part of the Euro-Atlantic civilization and an active participant in the process of building the new Europe, Romania [is] [...] firmly committed to the process of moral reconstruction, institutional modernization and civic awareness, in full agreement with its own fundamental values and with the European and Euro-Atlantic values".34 In effect, most Baltic and Eastern European countries simply resort to recycling accepted NATO or EU wisdom.Slovakian, Bulgarian, or Polish strategies start off by dutifully ticking off a standard list of "new" risks and threats.For example, the Slovakian strategy mentions "the threat of terrorist attacks, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, organized crime, the growing potential for the misuse of cybernetic space, [...] and an increasing potential for the development of unexpected crisis situations."35 They then pointedly shift to matters of territorial defence implications for the state defence system and wholly different concerns such as conscription, pastoral care, defence sustainability and health services.Any broader strategic thinking amongst localists usually refers back to NATO or the United States.Latvia's strategy declares that the US is "the most important strategic partner for Latvia, is essential in providing security for Latvia and the entire region […] and will remain the key strategic partner of Latvia in the field of defence and military matters."36 Denmark's strategy says that "in a strategic perspective Denmark's sovereignty is secured through NATO's Article 5 commitment to collective defence of Alliance territory.At the same time, NATO provides a framework for the participation of the Danish Armed Forces in international missions."37 Most military planning is undertaken in strict accordance with NATO defence planning cycles.Estonia's strategy says that "NATO methodologies are used to determine defence expenditures."38 This tends to cause inflation in strategic reviews and sub-strategies.39 Meanwhile, references to the EU are few and far between.Where the EU features, it is either as a complement or a subordinate to NATO.For example, the Latvian strategy says that "the strengthening of the European military capabilities must contribute to NATO's military capacity"a trait that is shared by most of the strategic corpus.40 Collective undertakings are found wanting where they fail to tie in with local concerns (mainly territorial).The EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) efforts come up short in this respect.According to the Latvian strategy, "The Lisbon Treaty's mutual assistance clause (Article 42.7 of the Treaty) specifies that in the event of an armed aggression, the EU Member States are obliged to provide the victim state with aid and assistance by all means at their disposal.This clause has the role of promoting political solidarity, but the Lisbon Treaty does not provide a mechanism for its implementation.Therefore, it is important for Latvia to maintain a maximum degree of national competence in the decision-making regarding the EU security and defence policy issues."41 The EU's pooling and sharing efforts are dismissed on the same count: "The most effective solutions for maintaining and developing military capabilities are being sought in NATO.In view of the Allies' cooperation on pooling and sharing of military capabilities, the capabilities needed for the Alliance become more cost-efficient and available."42 The geostrategic outlook often comes across as more decidedly pragmatic: "the immediate objective is a sharp and visible increase of efficiency and effectiveness in spending Bulgarian taxpayers' money, for example by taking advantage of our membership in NATO and the European Union, which provide opportunities for sharing defence costs as well as significantly improving their effectiveness."43 Whether out of conviction ("abstentionists") or circumstance ("drifters"), some European states appear to have largely forgone strategic thinking in matters of security.It is first worth noting that not all countries feel the need to commit their defence and security policies to one solemn, overarching document.A number of papers, in fact, bear very little resemblance to security strategies at all.Belgian and Luxembourgian official documentation boils down to a body of statements made by defence ministers over the years and a number of defence laws.44 Strategic defence planning will therefore be carried out on the basis of an assortment of disparate documents.Where there is one official, synthetic document, it is often informal or exceedingly parochial.For example, while the Irish security strategy addresses the question of fisheries at length, it fails to touch upon more fundamental matters like defence planning.45 The issue is compounded by the different institutional setups that exist at the national level.Not all EU states possess fully-fledged defence administrations: Austria, Malta, and Luxembourg do not have ministries whose sole official remits are defence.A lack of consensus, therefore, extends not merely to what form national strategies should take, but also to how they sit with the country's defence planning system.These national setups also affect the weight and function of a country's strategic portfolio.46 Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Portugal do not even deem their strategic documents of sufficient significance to merit translation into English.47 Nor does it help, of course, that many of these strategies are woefully out of date.Any document published before the start of the financial crisis in 2007 must safely be deemed an incoherent basis for defence planning -yet nearly half of the security strategies were in this position in 2012.Encouragingly, however, a number of documents have been updated since, in an attempt to factor in latest economic and strategic shifts -and more are on the way.48 In fact, 2013 might yet prove something of a watershed: Cyprus, the only remaining country not yet equipped with a security strategy, is expected to complete its own in the course of the year.Yet some countries continue to pose difficulties: in one extreme case, Greece, the last public strategy paper runs back to the twentieth century, effectively rendering the document all but useless.49 Italy is another prime -and telling -example of strategic drifting.The most recent Italian white paper was published in 2002 in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks and exists alongside a set of equally antiquated documents.50 Official strategic thought is currently contained only in an annual report on defence geared toward short-term allocation of defence resources.51 Italy is therefore quite simply not equipped with a document that addresses its national defence needs systematically.Its strategic portfolio leaves it without a view of the road ahead at a time of dire budget restrictions and unprecedented global change.Coming from a state that is by no means a military minnow in Europe, such a dearth of strategic vision is certainly disquieting.Overall, then, few of the national strategies we have reviewed pass the test of comprehensiveness -that is, of linking strategic aims to operational means.And too many fail the test of currency -they are simply out of date.Such documents may still have their uses: they may prove helpful merely by dint of the democratic accountability they provide or the national 48 Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Portugal, Ireland, Romania, France, Luxemburg, and Cyprus are expected to produce documents this year.49 Greece, White Paper for the Armed Forces, 1997, available at http://www.resdal.org/ Archivo/d000007e.htm.Although updated, unclassified parts of it have been made available since.European security strategies by comprehensiveness and currency visibility they give to security and defence matters.But they cannot be said to provide a sound basis for deployment of defence resources.Figure 1 illustrates the relative standings of European national security strategies against these important criteria of comprehensiveness and currency.If a strategic vision amounts to a view of the road ahead, then most European defence and security establishments are driving with their eyes fixed on the rear-view mirrorwhich makes effective changes of speed and direction almost impossible to implement.Little wonder that most national defence planning in Europe consists of simply trying to keep the show on the road, with the smallest possible touches on the steering wheel.So, instead of moving to "pool and share" as everyone now promises, all EU member states have responded to fiscal crisis by trying to hang on to what they have always had, but less of it -and/or by chopping out particular chunks of capability, with no consultation or regard for the impact of such unilateral cuts on the European whole.The consequences of this myopia are now well known.The inefficiency with which Europe converts its resource input (collective spending that still approaches €200 billion annually -comfortably more than Russia and China combined) into useful defence output has become a byword.Hugely over-manned military structures (substantially more men and women in uniform than in the entire US armed forces) are starved of modern equipment; in contradiction of repeated declarations of intent, investment in research and technology has been slashed.The consequences for Europe's ability to mount and sustain a relatively modest air campaign were exposed for all to see in Libya in 2011 and again in Mali this year.The European Council's plan to discuss defence at their December 2013 meeting comes not a moment too soon.The preview contained in the December 2012 Conclusions offers little hint of fresh thinking (there is the usual tired talk of the "comprehensive approach" and of "facilitating synergies"), or of an agenda worth the engagement of national leaders.52 But President Van Rompuy has at least reserved to himself the right to offer "recommendations".Here are some suggestions.A European "defence semester" First, if 17 European governments can put their national budget planning up for scrutiny by their eurozone partners -the "European semester" -then they can certainly agree to some more systematic "mutual accounting" about their national defence plans.Indeed, the December 2012 Conclusions suggest at least the beginnings of wisdom in this regard when they talk of "systematically considering cooperation from the outset in national defence planning by Member States".It takes a lot to change the direction of the ponderous defence juggernaut.Certainly, if you are serious about switching from a predominantly national to a more collaborative track, such changes will have to be planned well in advance.As the experience of recent years has confirmed, if you simply say "who has some spare money which they would be happy to put into a joint project later this year?",the answer will invariably be a lemon.So what is needed is first of all to "share" national defence plans -that is, for each member state to tell the others how much it plans to spend on defence in coming years and where it sees the money going.Such a process of reciprocal "show and tell" (which the European Defence Agency would be well placed to manage) would not involve putting sovereign decisions on defence "into commission" with partners, international bodies, or anyone else.But it would highlight as no other process could the extent of the waste and duplication in European defence expenditure; the size and nature of the capability gaps, present and future; the incoherence of national programmes when summed together; and, crucially, the opportunities for getting more from less by pooling efforts and resources in new co-operative projects.A "European semester" for defence would still, however, encounter the ingrained conservatism and risk-aversion of defence.So the European Council needs to shake up the system by itself demanding that blueprints be produced for one or two major, exemplary, integrative projects.Common air policing of European airspace is an obvious candidateand something that could save hundreds of millions of euros by culling redundant combat aircraft and infrastructure across Europe.The savings could then be redeployed into a joint European Strike Force -the collective capability Europe should have had at its disposal two years ago to wage the Libyan air campaign without having to fall back on the Americans for air-tanking, reconnaissance, smart munitions and so on.To be clear, we are not suggesting here some sort of "standing force", funded in common and under supranational command.Rather, we propose a co-operative effort to determine what components in what quantities (how many cruise missiles?how many reconnaissance drones?)would need to be available for Europe to "do another Libya"; to assign responsibility for the provision of the different components to different member states; and to plan a migration path from today's unbalanced and often unusable inventories and force structures to a set of national parts that add up to an effective capability when brought together.Navies too could benefit from this approach -indeed, as they struggle to fulfil their national fleet programmes with diminishing hull numbers, European admirals are already talking about how they might better cover for each other by closer co-ordination.53 "Pooling and sharing" has thus far failed because national leaders have contented themselves with blessing the principle, and then asking "the staff" for ideas.The need now is to challenge the staff by demanding not suggestions but specific plans to bring about specified changes.If there are killer objections, they must be set out and properly evaluated.For example, there is a widespread tacit assumption that a European Strike Force could never work because the Germans would have to be assigned a significant role -but could not be relied upon to turn up on the day.Certainly, there is a real confidence issue here -but rather than despairing, ways around it need to be explored.Perhaps the Bundestag might offer pre-emptive reassurance on the point.Or Germany could be assigned a non-lethal role in the force (responsibility for air tanking, say).Failing all else, some redundancy could be built back into the force's design.Mutual accountability over defence planning and serious exploration of a couple of major integrative projects would be important steps for the December 2013 European Council to take.Ultimately, however, the European defence "project" is not going to work unless the 27 member states, or at any rate the bulk of them, can get themselves onto the same geostrategic page.This will mean converging on some key propositions: that if Europeans are to continue to count for something in the world, then they are condemned to cooperate; that effective armed forces are among the assets they will need to deploy, as instruments of power and influence as much as for "war-fighting" purposes; and that maintaining effective armed forces will require biting the bullet of significantly greater mutual dependence.This consensus will not materialise out of thin air.It will require a process of working through the arguments, testing the assumptions, and exploring the alternatives.A joint effort is required, in other words, to take stock of how the strategic environment has changed, and may change in future; what assets Europeans can bring to bear (not just armed forces of course) to protect their interests and values and to safeguard the security and prosperity of future generations; and how and where those assets will be best applied.In sum, the time has come for Europe to define a strategy -to decide what it wants to be in the world and work out ways to match the means at its disposal to those ends.By the time of this December's European Council meeting, a good deal of material on just these themes will have been offered up by a range of European institutions and analysts.So the key trick for President Van Rompuy to take will be to exploit his right of "recommendation" to channel this intellectual momentum and ensure that it leads to a formally adopted Global Strategy for Europe.The modalities will need thought -the "group of sages" device may be needed to counteract the smothering effect of the Brussels institutions.But the essential point is simply that defence enterprises do not succeed without a strategy -and it is past time for Europe to equip itself with one.ECFR has developed a strategy with three distinctive elements that define its activities: • A pan-European Council.ECFR has brought together a distinguished Council of over two hundred Memberspoliticians, decision makers, thinkers and business people from the EU's member states and candidate countries -which meets once a year as a full body.Through geographical and thematic task forces, members provide ECFR staff with advice and feedback on policy ideas and help with ECFR's activities within their own countries.The Council is chaired by Martti Ahtisaari, Joschka Fischer and Mabel van Oranje. •A physical presence in the main EU member states.ECFR, uniquely among European think-tanks, has offices in Berlin, London, Madrid, Paris, Rome, Sofia and Warsaw.In the future ECFR plans to open an office in Brussels.Our offices are platforms for research, debate, advocacy and communications. •A distinctive research and policy development process.ECFR has brought together a team of distinguished researchers and practitioners from all over Europe to advance its objectives through innovative projects with a pan-European focus.ECFR's activities include primary research, publication of policy reports, private meetings and public debates, 'friends of ECFR' gatherings in EU capitals and outreach to strategic media outlets.ECFR is a registered charity funded by the Open Society Foundations and other generous foundations, individuals and corporate entities.These donors allow us to publish our ideas and advocate for a values-based EU foreign policy.ECFR works in partnership with other think tanks and organisations but does not make grants to individuals or institutions.Olivier de France and Nick Witney, Étude comparative des livres blancs des 27 États membres de l'UE : pour la définition d'un cadre européen, Institut de recherche stratégique de l'Ecole militaire, available at http://www.defense.gouv.fr/content/ download/185008/2037037/file/Etude%2018-2012.pdf. "On the European Global Strategy project, see http://www.euglobalstrategy.eu/. 9 On this project, see http://www.eng.notre-europe.eu/011015-103-Think-Global-Act-European.html.10 European Council Conclusions, December 2012, §20-25, available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/134353.pdf. "Respect for cultural diversity is also seen by Hungary as a security policy consideration.Successfully ensuring the traditional coexistence of different cultures European Council, 13/14 December 2012, Conclusions, available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/134353.pdf.53 Fleet "programmes" have to be planned years in advance to accommodate maintenance and refit; periods in home ports to allow crews to get reacquainted with loved ones; training and exercising; and of course the deployments -for example, maintaining a presence in the Gulf or the West Indies -which are the raison d'être of a peacetime navy.As navies shrink, so different nations will have to plan to share (take turn and turn about) on such deployments -or give some of them up altogether.In other words, if Europeans are to keep on "showing the flag" in distant waters they will increasingly have to do it co-operatively -maintaining a "European" as much as a national presence.
The main political problem for European security is now the growing mistrust of Russia among Western countries and the growing mistrust of Western countries among a more authoritarian Russian leadership.With the end of the Cold War, conventional arms control has contributed to the greatly reduced threat of interstate war in Europe through the reduction of conventional forces.Then again, military unaccountability and unpredictability seem to be increasing for Russia with the enlargement of NATO and the planned development of conventional missile defense in Europe.The adapted CFE Treaty, signed at the end of the 1990s, should be able to constrain the growing unaccountability and potential instability caused by alliance enlargement through its innovative and more rigid limitation system; but it has not yet entered into force.During the last decade, progress on conventional arms control was blocked by conservative arms control adversaries in the Bush administration and other countries that linked progress along these lines almost exclusively with the regulation of the unresolved territorial conflicts in the Caucasus.Obama tried to remove this blockade by resetting U.S.-Russia relations in arms control.The new START Treaty has been an initial success but in spite of some preliminary efforts, the reset has not had an impact on conventional arms control so far.The decision by NATO in Lisbon 2010 to establish a conventional missile defense capability against a possible future threat of nuclear-tipped missiles from Iran, in combination with U.S. defense plans for prompt conventional global strike capability and, more importantly, a conventional long-rage strike capability by bombers and ships, have all raised Russian concerns about the future stability of its nuclear deterrence forces.Russia suspended the implementation of the outdated CFE Treaty at the end of 2007 as a warning signal to NATO and stopped its talks after few months about the modernization of conventional arms control three years later in May 2011.A conservative U.S. Congress blocked the political maneuverability of U.S. President Obama with regard to missile defense before his second election, so progress on this issue could be not expected.Since then, it seems Russia has taken conventional arms control as a hostage for further progress on cooperation in missile defense.With the re-election of Obama, the reset of U.S.-Russia relations in missile defense and conventional arms control is still pending.Progress on the controversial issue of missile defense seems to be a precondition to revive the political reset and initiate new talks on the modernization of conventional arms control.However, the previous attempt in autumn 2007 to marginally update the adapted CFE Treaty and ratify it then will no longer work.Too much will have changed in security policy and military technological developments in the next years.A new approach is necessary; one that focuses on the growing mistrust of Russia.It should cover all new conventional military developments which may threaten future stability in Europe, increase the military accountability of NATO enlargement, and strengthen war prevention in the cases of the unregulated territorial conflicts.It should further contribute to Obama's new goal of Global Zero by facilitating the reduction and withdrawal of sub-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe.Germany has used this period of standstill in conventional arms control to develop new conceptual ideas in regards to 'verified transparency' for future conventional arms control in Europe and has started its own discussions.These discussions are on-going and have been deepened.It now seems the right time to participate in this discussion from a research perspective and discuss the pros and cons of these conceptual ideas, at least as far as they are currently known.The author was involved in an experts hearing and has been following the discussion closely.The report is based on these observations and presents only his personal views.Transparency is an integral tool for reducing mistrust and increasing confidence and accountability; verification of transparency strongly supports this goal.A comprehensive approach towards openness can widen this desired effect.It can likewise cover a wide range of military developments that may go on to tackle future military stability.Therefore, it seems well suited to overcome Russia's growing mistrust towards NATO.Verified transparency builds less on limitations than other options might, while comprehensive transparency reduces the demands for limitations.However, these ideas do not exclude limitations per se.They may still be necessary to prevent war and increase crisis stability in the cases of unregulated territorial conflicts, to support regional stabilization and to prevent future destabilizing military developments.The new ideas are built upon a certain level of confidence, as neither NATO nor Russia has the intention to revive Cold War military confrontations.The high budget deficit in the USA, the severe financial crisis in the EU and the growing necessity of economic reforms in Russia strongly support cooperative management of military security in Europe and should therefore receive greatly increased attention from leading politicians of all involved parties.The new ideas of verified transparency could be used with great flexibility and are based on many known elements of conventional arms control.They consist of three major complementary and mutually reinforcing elements: the verified transparency of military potentials, of military intentions, and of military capabilities.This should be supplemented by additional confidence and security building measures.Transparency of military potentials should be widened and include data on special and rapid response forces, force multipliers, and military transportation systems.The conventional sea forces of European states including U.S. and Canadian navies along with missions for European security should also be covered.They should, however, be excluded from any constraints of other forces.It is of utmost importance to heighten transparency of Western sea forces and their military capabilities in order for Russia to calm growing security concern and facilitate a reduction of Russian sub-strategic nuclear weapons, which are mainly concentrated in Russian naval forces.Transparency of military capabilities serves as a new ambitious approach to conventional arms control and would complement transparency of military potentials.It is dependent on sufficient countable and verifiable military elements of the selected capabilities and would go beyond a simple bean counting approach.All participants would have access to a realistic view of what military forces can do and what they cannot do.This new approach also offers the opportunity to discuss possible destabilizing military developments and options for their regulation if necessary.This approach is open to the realm of missile defense, but other cooperative solutions should be possible as well.Transparency of military intentions is important in that it informs others about the goals of military forces and can be compared with one's own military potentials and capabilities to enhance accountability and confidence.A layered system of openness and verification would be sufficient for this purpose.This would be based on information concerning military doctrines, defense guidelines, defense plans and defense budgets.It would include verification via regular multinational observation of one or two major military activities every two or three years for each participant.Defensive intentions can compensate for military asymmetries of conventional potentials and capabilities as long as military stability is not touched.Additional confidence and security building measures should increase the accountability of NATO enlargement, strengthen the security of East Central European states and enhance war prevention and crisis stability for states with unregulated territorial conflicts.They would also present a functional equivalent for the controversial flank limitations.Under a new deployment rule, all states would notify others of new small deployments of combat forces in advance.Any deployment of land and air forces that reaches a critical threshold for significant deployments of combat troops would require additional strong justification and should be observed regularly.The same mechanism is proposed for a concentration rule which would force all states to notify others in advance of the concentration of land forces in a defined border area if they reach a critical threshold.Such activity should be observed by multinational observers as well.If activities such as these persist for a longer time, their notification and observation should be repeated every three months.Mutual politically binding 'no-increase' commitments for military forces in certain regions and areas can further strengthen this rule.Verification is an indispensable tool of this approach.It could be strengthened by the introduction of a new multinational verification agency, similar to the OPCW or IAEA.This agency could overcome the existing structural deficits of CFE verification and save costs for many of the members.However, capability inspections should continue to be organized by national verification agencies due to the fact that the inspectors would need advanced special education, something that an international agency could not provide in a cost effective manner.Passive inspections of capabilities should be limited to two or three every three to five years for each member, owing to the time consuming preparations involved.Verification of naval forces should be conducted in European home ports and designated European ports for Canadian and U.S. forces.Institutions such as NATO, the EU, and CSTO cannot provide European security on their own.They need mutual security cooperation under the roof of the OSCE to achieve this purpose.Several existing unregulated territorial conflicts in Europe can only be resolved with and not in spite of Russia.Therefore, not blockades -as utilized in the last decade -but the modernization of conventional arms control will help create the political environment conducive to this important task.The political solution of unregulated territorial conflicts should therefore be separated from conventional arms control.Conventional arms control in Europe consists of three complementary regimes: the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty), the Open Skies Treaty, and the Vienna Document on Confidence and Security Building Measures.The CFE Treaty limits the arsenals of land and air forces in five weapon categories (tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery, attack helicopters, and combat aircraft) and the CFE 1A agreement limits military personnel.1 The aim of this treaty was to prevent any surprise or comprehensive attacks between NATO and the former Warsaw Pact members.The Open Skies Treaty covers the territory of 34 participating states between Vladivostok and Vancouver in regards to observation flights.2 It can also be used to verify all arms control regimes of the participants.The Vienna Document limits military activities and contains additional transparency and confidence-building measures to enhance the security of all 57 OSCE member states.3 This system of conventional arms control now finds itself in deep crisis and may soon come to an end.In part, this crisis is a consequence of the success of conventional arms control and the arms reductions of the CFE Treaty in the first half of the 1990s.It forced NATO and the former Warsaw Pact member countries to reduce over 70,000 weapons (Crawford 2010: 30, 32) .These reductions and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1991, followed by the break-up of the Soviet Union in the same year, have ended the large military confrontations in Europe.In light of this, is conventional arms control still necessary?However, the enlargement of NATO into Eastern Europe challenged the block-toblock structure of the CFE Treaty and raised fears in Moscow that the Western alliance could move its superior conventional forces nearer to its border, if these trends were not halted.The adapted CFE Treaty (aCFE), signed in 1999, was meant to overcome this outdated block-to-block structure and reduce such Russian fears through its new concept of more rigid national and territorial limitations.4 But Western countries ended up blocking 1 For further details, see Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, in: www.osce.org/library/14087 (28.2.2013).The treaty finally entered into force on November 9, 1992 and has the following 30 members: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Luxembourg, Moldova, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, the treaty's ratification.The Bush administration, which was averse to arms control, and many other governments linked its intentions to finding a political solution to a number of unregulated territorial conflicts 5 in the South Caucasus.This politically decoupled the ongoing process of alliance enlargement from stabilizing arms control measures completely, thereby raising suspicion and mistrust in Russia.Russian suspicion and mistrust have further been aggravated by the growing debate on missile defense in the Western alliance.Russia feared that NATO would widen its military capabilities in a second sensitive security area without any constraints or accountability.Furthermore, an unlimited Western missile defense system in Europe had the potential to one day jeopardize Russian's second strike capability (Arbatov 2011: 17) .Additionally, the enlargement of NATO towards Georgia and the Ukraine was looming on the horizon.In response, Putin suspended the CFE Treaty at the end of 2007 as a warning signal for others to take Russian security concerns more seriously.NATO's decision in 2008 to offer Georgia and the Ukraine alliance membership at a yet undetermined time raised tensions between Russia and Georgia.These tensions led to an attack by Georgia on its entity, South Ossetia, in August 2008 and the subsequent Russian intervention.Later, Moscow recognized the Georgian entities Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states.This complicates conventional arms control further since both Western states and Georgia desire to return to the territorial status quo ante before the war.In 2009, newly elected U.S. President Obama started the reset of U.S. relations towards Russia with the aim of repairing the strained relationship under the Bush administration.In this context, the revival of strategic nuclear arms control had priority for both.In 2010, the Corfu Process 6 , the OSCE summit in Astana and the NATO proposal to establish a 'Strategic Partnership' between the Alliance and Russia led the way for a start of new conventional arms control talks.But progress has become more difficult with time.The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), which enhanced the range, accuracy and efficiency of U.S. conventional weapon systems, has further increased already existing security concerns (Miasnikov 2012; Gormley 2009 ; Arbatov/Dvorkin/Oznobishchev 2012) in Russia.American military programs like the conventional long range strike (CLRS) capabilities and the controversial conventional prompt global strike (CPGS) capabilities have enhanced such Russian fears (Acton 2011: 59) .Therefore, Russia not only wants more accountability from NATO enlargement but also increased accountability on the issue of the extent to which these new conventional technological developments and future military capabilities will threaten essential security functions of its (nuclear) forces (Arbatov 2011: 23-24 ).Because the U.S. government was unable -for domestic reasons -to accept limitations of U.S. conventional ballistic missile defense capabilities in Europe or offer a legal guarantee that these means will not be used against Russian nuclear forces, Moscow was unwilling to go ahead with conventional arms control talks on a new framework agreement.7 They were suspended in May 2011 8 and, in response, the CFE Treaty members belonging to NATO suspended their annual information exchange with Russia in 2011, along with Georgia and Moldova.These developments have again changed the framework for conventional arms control.A minor update of aCFE and its prompt ratification will no longer be possible and must be replaced by a new approach (Gottemoeller 2012) .What is more, the new stalemate has provided time for discussing alternatives for conventional arms control, owing to the fact that U.S. President Obama was unable to break the Russian blockade before his re-election at the end of 2012.9 In Germany, the stalemate has been used for the development of new conceptual ideas.A procedural idea is to launch this discussion in three consecutive steps: First, it should start with talks about future principles and objectives for conventional arms control.Second, once a common understanding has been reached, the paths towards a new regime should be outlined.Finally, negotiations on the necessary instruments should follow.This report is built upon this procedural line as well: after a chapter that discusses the reasons for the current crisis, possible future principles and objectives, the ways and instruments for conventional arms control are addressed.In regards to the instruments, the author presents new conceptual ideas pertaining to 'verified transparency'.The principle purpose of this report is to introduce these new ideas to both the public and a broader international community of (academic) experts and, based on these ideas, present a flexible concept that has been developed by the author and, in turn, learn from the concept's pros and cons that will arise from subsequent discussions.The author wishes to emphasize that these are only his personal views on the matter.10 As growing mistrust between Russia and NATO is the main concern for European security, it is the primary goal of the ideas presented here to restore confidence through substantially enhanced transparency of military arsenals, capabilities and intentions and their necessary verification.Only heightened transparency that covers all major new technological developments of conventional military arsenals and capabilities can perform such a task.The new ideas are less oriented towards limitations (Nikel 2012: 11-12) and are thus based on the condition of a certain amount of confidence growing among the participating states.However, they do not exclude limitations per se, rather reduce their necessity.Verification of military arsenals, capabilities and intentions is an indispensable tool for creating sufficient trust and accountability.Most of the discussed measures are not entirely new and some may already be widely known.They can, however, be implemented in a different manner for new conventional arms control architecture.Furthermore, conceptual ideas can be structured and used in a very flexible manner for a variety of purposes.They offer a versatile toolkit for disseminating information about, analyzing, examining and evaluating military forces.Therefore, comprehensive verified transparency seems much better suited to enhancing confidence and answering the question of the extent to which military stability can be threatened by certain new military developments and capabilities.The conclusions aim to evaluate the possible political problems related to implementing these new ideas.Finally, two annexes have been added to provide an overview of the CFE Treaty and of the Vienna Document.Various developments on the political, security, and military-technical levels have converged and weakened the perspective of conventional arms control in Europe.As mentioned above, one of the major political issues is the mounting mistrust on the Russian side owing to NATO enlargement and the fact that conventional missile defense in Europe has not yet been constrained.This raises the question as to whether the U.S. and NATO are at all interested in maintaining military accountability in Europe any longer being that Russia appears too weak militarily and can therefore be downplayed.On the other hand, many Western countries are disappointed by the growing authoritarian rule in Russia and the mounting differences in regards to the ways that Moscow has managed the nuclear crisis with Iran as well as the civil war in Syria.Furthermore, Western countries complain of a lack to willingness on the part of Russia in regards to engagement in finding a solution to the unregulated territorial conflicts in Georgia, Moldova and between Armenia and Azerbaijan.But here, Western critics, in particular in the U.S. Congress, should bear in mind that internal Western territorial conflicts such as Gibraltar, between Spain and United Kingdom, 11 and Cyprus, between Turkey and Greece, are even older and have been not resolved either.The U.S. government has still not formulated any new goals while its new approach towards conventional arms control in Europe and the interagency process for a consensus on arms control have not yet been started.Within the Russian government, division over conventional arms control is growing between the foreign and defense ministries.The defense ministry currently determines arms control policies for Russia.This ministry has a much lower interest in arms control and subordinates the matter completely under its conventional force modernization plans.The foreign ministry seems to have a stronger interest in conventional arms control but has lost the prerogative.Therefore, Russia currently finds itself in a 'wait and see' mode.The crisis of conventional arms control has several additional origins.Because the large conventional military threat has disappeared in Europe, high-ranking politicians in North America and Western Europe no longer have a major interest in conventional arms control or its modernization.It seems very difficult to win their attention on this issue.As a further consequence of the diminished threat, Europe faces growing political diversity of security views, creating more difficulties for defining common goals for future conventional arms control.West European countries such as Spain, France, Great Britain, Italy and Germany generally do not fear Russia or its forces; however, small Central-Eastern European countries like the Baltic States have a different view, for understandable historical reasons.They look upon Moscow's planned conventional military modernization up to 2020 as well as new weapon and force deployments in the Russian Federation with a different perception.Outside of the alliance, states like Georgia, Moldova and Azerbaijan have tried to subordinate progress on conventional arms control to their political goal of finding a solution for their unregulated territorial conflicts first.What is more, the nature of the threat has changed.During the Cold War, the risk of interstate conflict was high in Europe.With the end of this era, the risks in other fields, namely domestic violence, civil wars and terroristic acts, have increased across Europe.But traditional arms control, which takes place on the interstate level, is less suited for the management of such risks.The crisis is further aggravated by the modern technological revolution.Conventional troops and weapons can be moved faster than in the past and the conventionalization of previous strategic nuclear delivery systems like intercontinental ballistic missiles, the coming introduction of conventional hypersonic glide vehicles within the conventional prompt global strike program of the U.S., and growing numbers of heavy bombers within the conventional long-range strike program give conventional weapons a global and strategic range.With this important distinctions between conventional and nuclear strategic weapons have begun to be blurred.The ongoing development of unmanned weapon systems like armed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), combat aircraft and armored combat vehicles, which can even be steered from other continents, is changing modern conventional warfare as well.The interrelationship between all these conventional modernization efforts and the ongoing development of cyber weapons for modern warfare is not fully understood and this further increases unaccountability, insecurity and concerns about military stability (Anthony 2012: 416) .In spite of all these negative developments there is still room for conventional arms control.The political enlargement of the Western alliance has not changed the military deployments in Europe in such a significant way.The rotational deployment of some small U.S. army and air force units in Poland, Bulgaria and Romania since 2005, the establishment of NATO's Baltic Air Policing mission since 2004, and the higher presence of NATO vessels in the Black Sea and the eastern part of the Baltic See cannot be seen as major change of its strategic orientation towards Russia.On the contrary, U.S. Forces in Europe will further reduce their footprint by the withdrawal of two brigades by the end of 2014 on account of severe budget deficit in the United States and their reorientation towards Asia.12 This question is more difficult to answer now than during the Cold War as the grave military threat has disappeared.Neither NATO nor Russia currently has the intention of attacking the other or preparing the development of military capabilities in the future.Under the present financial crisis in the United States and Europe, it would be imprudent to adopt such a policy goal.On the contrary, the present financial crisis should be seen as strong motive to go ahead with conventional arms control in order to promote and strengthen common security in Europe at the lowest possible costs and thereby use conventional arms control as a means to overcome the present financial difficulties.An agreement of mutual military restraint in Europe could also facilitate cooperation in other areas between the participants.Additional reasons for maintaining and modernizing conventional arms control also exist.Permanent military transparency and on-site verification of military forces preserve and create accountability and trust between states.On the contrary, ending military transparency and verification could increase mistrust and unaccountability and thereby enhance security concerns in Europe once again.Mutual suspicions would return and undermine efforts towards security and stability in Europe.A major threat lies in the mere existence of military forces and their development.The central question is whether or not they will be used solely for defensive purposes or if they will also be utilized for offensive goals.This is a question of military intentions and what a state intends to do with its forces.As long as the intentions are purely defensive, they should not pose any security issues for others, even if a state possesses large forces.But offensive intentions are also a possibility.It is therefore imperative to have sufficient information about intentions and have the ability to assess them in a credible and reliable way.Here, the interrelationship between military intentions and military capabilities comes into play.The capabilities of military forces can also be either more defensive or offensive.If defensive intentions are congruent with the military capabilities of forces, this set-up should prove least threatening.If offensive intentions correspond with offensive military capabilities, this poses a high potential threat to others.Also, a certain mix of offensive and defensive military capabilities can raise security concerns and threaten stability, if defensive capabilities of one side largely outbalance the offensive capabilities of the adversary, especially if the offensive capabilities of the first can allow a preemptive strike.Even the assumption that one state will follow this path can raise security concerns and mistrust.Examples of such a perception are Russia and China, who look with growing mistrust to conventional missile defense capabilities of the United States and also to new conventional offensive capabilities such as 'conventional prompt global strike' and 'conventional long range strike'.Here, a mere regional arms control approach to stabilize these new capabilities will not work.But in the case of conventional missile defense in Europe, a regional approach might be possible as long as the system defends only European territory against short and medium range missiles.In reality, a purely defensive or offensive orientation is rare; often there is a mix of defensive and offensive intentions and military capabilities which create ambivalence of threat perceptions and assessments.These 'mixed signal' can still generate insecurity, mistrust and contribute to the security dilemma.The acceptance and implementation of arms control can reduce the ambivalence of threat perceptions, promote confidence and thereby further strengthen war prevention and crisis stability.Notwithstanding the fact that the Cold War military threat has disappeared, Europe still faces several smaller threats and risks to security.The perception of these threats is decisive and it does not really matter how rational it is.In spite of the fact that the Cold War was overcome more than twenty years ago, individuals and groups with the traditional perception that NATO and Russia are a military threat to each other still abound.Even in the newest Russian military doctrine, NATO is mentioned as the 'main threat' (RusMilDoc 2010: No. 8a) and the former conservative U.S. presidential candidate, Mitt Romney, described Russia as the 'number one geopolitical foe'.13 Such perceptions cannot be overcome overnight; conventional arms control can help to surmount such views.Another threat lies in a number of unresolved territorial conflicts.As the local war in Georgia showed in 2008 14 , the unresolved territorial conflicts in Europe can cause internal violence with the risk of escalating into interstate war, thereby jeopardizing European security as long as political solutions to such conflicts are not possible.This risk still exists in Georgia, between the central state and its entities of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, in Moldova, between the central government and the entity of Transdniestre, and in Serbia, 15 between the central government and the entity of Kosovo.A similar, though not identical situation, exists between Turkey and Greece over Cyprus and an even stronger threat of war exists between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the entity Nagorno-Karabakh.The risk of war seems high in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh and very low in the case of Transdniestre and Cyprus, while the threats in the other conflicts are classified as medium.In all these examples, the outlook for an early political solution seems rather dim.Therefore, the tasks of war prevention, crisis stability and of preventive diplomacy -also by means of conventional arms control -are still very important, not only on the local and regional levels, but also on the European security level, since these conflicts can escalate into full-fledged interstate wars.Due to historical and political considerations, some small Eastern European countries have more reason to mistrust and fear Russia, thereby demanding greater military engagement from Western NATO countries and the U.S. for their territorial defense.On the other hand, Russia fears the further enlargement of the Alliance and a stronger military engagement of Western NATO countries and the U.S. near its borders.These can be the preconditions for a vicious self-fulfilling circle if it is not interrupted.Here, again, conventional arms control and military confidence building can contribute to minimizing such fears and risks and enhancing accountability, security and confidence on all sides.After the end of the Cold War, military cooperation has slowly grown between NATO and Russia.More military cooperation can also increase confidence and accountability, thereby reducing the demands for arms control.But the process of military cooperation between NATO and Russia is still in its early stages and cannot currently provide the same security performance as a conventional arms control regime.Therefore, we need both military cooperation and arms control in tandem in order to enhance and stabilize security in Europe (Richter 2011: 3).Finally, the swelling interest in long term goals of reducing nuclear weapons to zero increases the importance of conventional military forces, conventional deterrence, and the asymmetries in this field for European security and the stability of nuclear deterrence.Russia compensates for its perceived conventional military inferiority in Europe with a much higher number of sub-strategic nuclear weapons in its European areas (Arbartov/ Kaliadine 2012: 40).Without the preservation and modernization of conventional arms control, it seems impossible to imagine how all these asymmetries and potential instabilities can be managed in a stable and accountable way that reassure and support a stable and secure process of regional and global nuclear disarmament (Acton 2011: 76, 77) .The preservation and modernization of conventional arms control is also an argument for promoting the latter in other regions of the world with greater credibility.The principles of the Helsinki Decalogue (1975) form the basis of cooperative security and arms control in Europe.16 Sovereign equality, refraining from the threat or use of force, inviolability of frontiers, territorial integrity of states, and the peaceful settlement of disputes are still important principles.They are supplemented by other principles such as the indivisibility of security, the freedom of states to choose their own security arrangements (Charter of Paris 1990), and the principle of reciprocity.In principle, all OSCE participating states in Europe should have the right to enter into and to participate in a future European arms control regime.In particular, this should cover all states which are members of security institutions in Europe (NATO, CSTO 17 and EU).However, the above-mentioned variance in the security situation in Europe raises the question of whether it is still possible to gain the same level of security for all participants by using the same means of arms control in the whole of Europe.Or, does it seem more appropriate to maintain a similar or equal level of security by adapting the means of arms control to changes in security?In the latter case, the principle of indivisible security should be reinterpreted for the outcome of security.If such a reinterpretation is acceptable, it would be important that all arms control elements that manage security issues with varied means should have equal value in an overall agreement.The old CFE Treaty was designed to establish parity and stability on a lower level between the two alliances (groups of states parties) in order to prevent a 'surprise attack' or a 'large scale offensive action'.18 Russia still has an interest in maintaining a certain level of parity vis-á-vis NATO since this would constrain the enlargement of the alliance.But NATO countries have rejected such proposals, as they will supposedly not significantly contribute to more stability, according to the Alliance.With the existence of one enlarged alliance, one smaller, less stable Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the European Union (EU), and an additional mix of larger and smaller independent states, the principle of parity is no longer applicable or valid for the whole of Europe.But the case is different on the regional level: The adaptation of the CFE Treaty upon the dissolution of the Soviet Union by the Tashkent Agreement in Mai 1992 supported the armistice agreements mediated by Russia in the unresolved territorial conflicts of Georgia, Moldova and between Armenia and Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh) to some degree.All these countries were forced to accept low weapon ceilings based on the principle of parity.Here, low limitations and the principle of parity could be still important.The objective of preventing a 'surprise attack' or 'large scale offensive action '-repeated in Article 1 of the adapted CFE Treaty -has lost its previous value for NATO and Russia.19 A large scale offensive action or a surprise attack seems very unlikely between most CFE states in Europe.But in the case of the unresolved territorial conflicts, the threat of a 'surprise attack' is real, as the Georgian military intervention against its entity South Ossetia demonstrated in 2008.Despite the government in Azerbaijan favoring a diplomatic solution for the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, there are also high-ranking Azerbaijani voices who do not exclude resorting to military force to end the conflict over the contested enclave.20 Therefore, it is strongly recommended to maintain the goal of war prevention and the goal of prevention of surprise attack for a future agreement.In this context, a new important objective will be to prevent destabilizing force concentrations of land forces between states parties.The prevention of destabilizing force concentrations supports the goal of war prevention and crisis stability.21 The prevention of destabilizing force concentrations can also enhance confidence building, security, and stability in cases where new NATO members come close or even have a direct border with Russia and in cases where large countries like Russia border small neighbors.Here, the principle of reciprocity will play an important role.Regulations that prevent threatening and destabilizing force concentrations also offer the opportunity to replace the controversial flank limitations of the CFE Treaty.The new main goal of conventional arms control should not be limited to maintaining military transparency, verification, and accountability of military potentials for all of its members.Verified transparency of military potential through the counting of military personnel, units, weapons, and other equipment alone is insufficient even if extended weapon categories and naval forces were included, as important qualitative factors would not be covered.The structure of forces, missions, and military weapons, equipment, its support and capabilities are changing.Military units are becoming smaller and more mobile and can be used far from their homeland.This has strengthened potential destabilizing intervention capabilities.Traditional military weapon systems like heavy battle tanks, armored combat vehicles and combat aircraft, mainly limited by the old CFE Treaty, will lose their value because of the improving efficiency and accuracy of modern munitions and missiles in the compound structure of intelligence, reconnaissance, communication, command and control, described as network-centric warfare capability.The growing vulnerability of such major weapon systems favors a trend towards more unmanned, smaller, semi-automatic weapon systems with stealth characteristics in future military activities.A simple increase of conventional weapon categories and the inclusion of all military services in conventional arms control would only partially match future capabilities of military forces.A more comprehensive approach to conventional arms control is necessary, one which does not only look to the strengths of selected military weapon categories.Based on the conceptual ideas of verified transparency, a new objective should also include transparency of military capabilities and transparency of military intentions.Transparency of military capabilities would go beyond the simple bean counting-approach of military potentials and include important new qualitative factors into future conventional arms control which cannot be accounted for otherwise.It would allow for a more realistic assessment of what modern conventional forces can and cannot do with regard to their doctrinal objectives.This could reduce the overestimation of military capabilities and also threat perception.Transparency of military intentions records the goals of military forces which usually determine their strength, structure and capabilities.Verified transparency of military intentions could therefore demonstrate to what extent they are congruent with military potentials, structures and capabilities.They could additionally facilitate the renunciation of limitations or reduce their value.Military intentions with a defensive orientation and military forces and structures that are not oriented towards neighbors reduce demands for limitations and strengthen the concept of verified transparency.However, verified transparency alone is always to the advantage of the strongest party militarily -currently the Western alliance (Hartmann/Schmidt 2011: 30) .Therefore, the instrument of limitations as such is still important in order to balance this advantage.Limitations seem necessary in three distinct areas: First, to strengthen war prevention and crisis stability in the cases of local unregulated territorial conflicts.Second, limitations may be necessary to prevent possible future military instabilities.Finally, several countries like Russia, Turkey, Greece, Romania and Italy still believe in limitations for different political reasons.In the case of Turkey and Greece, they support regional stabilization.Therefore, limitations may be necessary to supplement the new conceptual ideas of verified transparency and should not be seen as a contradiction to them.Hence, the CFE and aCFE objectives, "maintaining a secure and stable and balanced overall level of conventional armed forces in Europe lower than heretofore" and "of eliminating disparities prejudicial to stability and security" should be preserved.22 They represent the goal of maintaining security on the lowest possible force levels in Europe and preventing disparities which can be a risk for future stability and security.Further, NATO member states should restate their commitments to restrain from deploying substantial combat forces in the new member countries as long as Russia seems willing to accept similar constraints in Belarus, Armenia and for the controversial entities South Ossetia and Abkhazia.A very controversial objective is the principle of 'host nation consent'.It allows for the deployment of foreign troops only with the explicit consent of a host state.Russia is basically willing to accept this principle and the wording in the adapted CFE Treaty since it ratified the agreement in 2004.However, some state parties want to use this principle beyond arms control as a tool for the political regulation of their unresolved territorial conflicts.But this has stepped beyond the bounds of arms control.Therefore, the political regulation of the frozen conflicts in the Caucasus must be negotiated in the existing political institutions (Minsk Process for Nagorno-Karabakh, 5 + 2 Process for Transdniestre and Geneva Talks for South Ossetia and Abkhazia).23 Unfortunately, the recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia by Russia in 2008 has complicated this problem since it enhanced the territorial conflict between Western capitals and Moscow.However, there is no other option than to separate arms control from the political solutions of these conflicts and seek workable compromises on the implementation of the host nation consent principle at the end of the negotiations.Further, the goal of Global Zero for nuclear weapons has increased the importance of conventional asymmetries and their impact on stability in regards to nuclear deterrence.A new objective is recommended for this: Conventional arms control should contribute to nuclear disarmament and not create new obstacles to it.Finally, all OSCE member states in Europe should have the right to enter into a future European arms control regime.This shall cover all NATO, CSTO, and EU member countries and independent states.These new conceptual ideas are still in their early stages of development.Therefore, it is important to meet states and experts where they currently stand and listen to their concerns and adjust these ideas to them as far as possible.Before a multilateral discussion and negotiations over the new approach are initiated, it is important to begin with bilateral discussions.First, this makes it easier to explain the new approaches in all their facets; secondly, one can better respect the different views and concerns of the partner.Subsequently, the new approach should be discussed and developed in the Alliance before new negotiations with others can start.Who should participate in these negotiations?The answer to this question is controversial.In the previous informal talks named 'to 36 format' between December 2010 and May 2011, all 30 CFE state parties and six new NATO countries (Albania, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovenia) participated.Due to the enlargement of the alliance, these six 23 See also Rose Gottemoeller, acting head the Bureau of Arms Control and of International Security in the U.S. State Department, who said: "But, of course, international arms control agreements cannot and should not resolve all the bilateral and other problems, like the frozen conflicts you mentioned. Such agreements, can, however, build confidence between the parties to such territorial disputes and improve security in the zone of the conflicts. Another question is the future structure of conventional arms control in Europe. Should the new concept be further developed into an independent CFE follow-up agreement and should the Vienna Document 2011 (see Annex II) be adapted to it, or should the new concept be incorporated into the Vienna Document and only create a single agreement? If one integrated and politically binding agreement is the goal, it seems easier to integrate the new concept into the Vienna Document. But there is no implicit necessity for following this resolution. If a legally binding treaty has priority, two separate agreements would be necessary since only the Vienna Document is politically binding. In this case, the Vienna Document could be adapted to the new objectives of conventional arms control. The integration of enhanced transparency for military doctrines and defense guidelines should also not cause too many difficulties. A new, single, integrated comprehensive military data exchange measure could be established either in the Vienna Document or the legally binding conventional arms control agreement. In the latter case, data exchanges in the Vienna document can either be reduced or terminated to minimize future workload. What should happen to the Open Skies Treaty in this context? Due to the fact that the Open Skies Treaty is a legally binding regime, has a smaller body of membership, and can be used for transparency measures in all arms control agreements, it would be a severe mistake to try integrating it into a future conventional arms regime. But a future conventional arms control regime could try to make better use of Open Skies for the purpose of observations and inspections. This would further strengthen Open Skies. Also, a mechanism would be necessary that regulates the transfer of participants from the Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control 24 to the new European-wide Agreement, thereby covering Croatia as a NATO member. A further question is the binding character of this new agreement. Many states such as Russia, Turkey, Greece, Romania, Italy and conservative political forces in the U.S. 25 to preserve the legally binding character of conventional arms control. In principle, a legally binding treaty has higher value compared to a politically binding agreement and is therefore preferable. But ratification of a legally binding treaty would be a challenging task for several reasons: First, the divergent security views in Europe and in North America will surely increase difficulties for national ratification. Second, the management of territorial conflicts is controversial and can create an additional hurdle for ratification. Third, any new treaty will take several years to get be ratified. Fourth, the conservatives in the U.S. in particular may be very sensitive to the above-mentioned points and have the capacity to prevent ratification owning to the fact that the American constitution requires the support of two thirds of the Senate. Fifth, as the ratification of New START has shown, the price for ratification may be too high compared with any gains attained from a new agreement. Furthermore, the question of a new arms control agreement still being important enough to justify such a procedure with its inherent high risk of failure remains, along with the alternative of a multinational politically binding agreement seeming more appropriate. A multinational political agreement has more binding power than a bilateral agreement. The history of the multilateral politically binding CFE 1A agreement and the Vienna Document are good examples of this (Zellner 2012: 18) . Such agreements offer the additional advantage of entering into force immediately after their signature and would facilitate future changes. The new conceptual ideas of verified transparency would make it necessary to enlarge and redefine some known instruments, structure other means of conventional arms control in a new way and introduce new means and measures to meet the principles and objectives discussed above. But in spite of the necessary changes they should use excisting procedures, rules, measures, and means as much as possible. Here, these ideas are meant to differentiate among verified transparency of military potentials and military intentions. Verified transparency of military potentials would consist of the command structure of military forces (down to the battalion level), the arsenal of military weapons and military equipment, and (a new measure) the analysis and evaluation of military capabilities. This will make it necessary to enlarge the weapon categories and their support equipment in order to fulfill this task. Further, existing definitions of weapon categories should be adapted to their technological development. Verified transparency of military intentions would be a new instrument (see chapter 6.4). The function of existing stabilizing limitations can be replaced and strengthenedwherever possible and acceptable -by the timely notification and the multinational observation of certain military activities if they reach a commonly defined military threshold. Other observable threshold measures should be added to enhance security, accountability and confidence (see chapter 6.3). As in past, nuclear forces and weapons should be excluded from conventional arms control and dual capable weapons systems (nuclear and conventional) will only be counted and verified in their conventional role. However, Russia has a growing interest in including what it calls 'conventional strategic weapons' into future bilateral START negotiations with the U.S. 26 This is currently rejected by the U.S. government, who deems these merely "conventional weapons with strategic range (beyond 5.500 km)". It seems very likely that this controversy will have an impact on future talks on the modernization of conventional arms control in Europe. In this regard, it should be emphasized that verified transparency, in its logic, covers all conventional weapons with strategic ranges that would be deployed in and around Europe to conduct missions in and for European security, should they not otherwise be regulated. New cyber weapon systems can, to a certain degree, substitute the military tasks of conventional forces by threats and attacks against civil and military infrastructure (telecommunication, electricity, water supply). But they will be excluded here due to their very different characteristics and low transparency and must be regulated in a separate manner. 27 Transparency of military potentials provides the basis for all other measures. In contrast to the CFE regime, it should be based on an extended approach to cover all relevant new technological and military developments of conventional forces which can have an impact on military security and stability. This means existing weapon categories should be redefined to include new smaller and lighter weapon types with similar or enhanced fire power, as in the case of combat vehicles. All weapon and equipment definitions should cover semi-automatic and automatic systems as in the CFE Treaty since they are set to have a growing impact on future warfare capabilities. New weapon and force categories should likewise be added. Conventional air and missile defense systems, 28 which are mobile or can be used for area defense, like Patriot or SM-3 and the Russian SA-300/-400/-500, should be included, as should short range missile systems like the Russian SS-26 Iskander as their potential counterpart. Separate information is necessary for special and rapid response forces on account of their playing the greatest role for offensive operations and interventions. This must be supplemented by transparency of military air and sealift forces which are also important for the analysis and evaluation of sustainability, deployability and intervention capability. Paramilitary forces must be covered since they offer the opportunity to circumvent transparency of regular troops, especially if weapon systems are transferred to them. On the procedural level, any update of the Protocol of Existing Type (POET) of Conventional Armaments and Military Equipment should no longer be based on the consensus of all participants in order to reduce the risk of a new blockade. 29 In contrast to CFE, it is strongly recommended to move beyond the covered land and air forces and include conventional naval forces of the participants as well. Naval forces, which are not only procured for coastal defense, have a regional and global reach and can be concentrated in order to deny other states access to or from the high seas. They can further be used for the landing of land forces (marines) and also have a growing capability to threaten or attack targets at sea and on land with high precision long range cruise missiles or sea-based combat aircraft and helicopters (over 90 percent of the global land territory are in striking distance of naval weapon systems with a range of 900 nautical miles). Additionally, the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and its security are of growing value for many states with adjacent sea areas. Therefore, transparency and verification of naval forces can contribute to greater accountability and confidence building in this area too. A further argument for transparency of naval forces is that Russia has many of its substrategic nuclear weapons earmarked for its sea forces (Zagorski 2011: 17, 18) in order to balance conventional superiority of Western sea forces. More transparency of conventional naval forces increases their accountability and can thereby facilitate further reductions of naval sub-strategic nuclear weapons. Transparency measures should cover all conventional naval forces of European states and include all sea forces for the U.S. and Canada with missions/deployment in the North Atlantic and high sea areas around Europe for security tasks in Europe. The enhanced transparency of conventional military equipment is not entirely new. Since 1994, the annual 'Global Exchange of Military Information' has contained ever more information about conventional land, air and naval forces. 30 Furthermore, the introduction of new major weapon systems must be notified. The Vienna Document even goes so far as to demand demonstrations of new weapon systems to other participants as a confidence-building measure (see Annex II). The 'Annual Exchange of Military Information of the Vienna Document' contains figures about active and non-active units and offers thereby basic information about mobilization capability. It also presents separate figures for land-based naval combat aircraft that were excluded from the CFE Treaty in 1991. Since 1994, the 'Annual Information Exchange on Defense Planning and Military Budgets' -now a part of the Vienna Document 2011 -contains, beyond that, additional data about transport aircraft and air defense missile systems. Additionally, it covers the 29 Since 1997, the update of this protocol has been blocked because of the consensus rule and the unresolved differences between Russia and the USA on the exact classification of certain combat vehicle types. 30 It includes information about armored combat vehicles with fixed antitank missile launchers, transport helicopters, and transport aircraft, all combat aircraft (with a separate figure of combat aircraft on aircraft carriers), primary trainer aircraft, surface warships with more than 400 t displacement fully loaded and submarines with more than 50 t displacement submerged ( structure and aggregate data of naval forces, including figures on fleet strength, the medical service, and force support elements for all forces. Many elements of the necessary information for verified transparency are currently available to some degree in military data exchanges of various regimes. They must now only be adapted, integrated into a single exchange, and further developed according to a new function and role. In this context, several existing information exchanges can be considered and either closed or markedly reduced with a new agreement, thereby reducing workload and costs. A larger, single information exchange measure will also significantly facilitate the analysis and evaluation of military data. Because the new conceptual ideas envisage no constraints, they will not limit military weapons or forces in any way against external threats outside the application area. Therefore, it no longer seems necessary to exclude certain territorial areas near the border of non-regime neighbors from transparency measures of this agreement, as in the case of Turkey (near the border of Iran, Syria and Iraq), under the legally binding CFE and the politically binding Vienna Document. 31 Furthermore, all state parties should annually notify their complete conventional holdings of the covered weapon categories and other military equipment in Europe. The notification should include deployed forces in guest states and in unrecognized entities like Transdniestre and Nagorno-Karabakh or in entities with a controversial status like Abkhazia or South Ossetia, in the area of application. In particular, Armenia should no longer hide a large amount of its forces in Nagorno-Karabakh without informing member states. This would increase transparency and accountability between Armenian and Azerbaijani forces. In the case of Georgia, the issue is even more complicated since Russia has recognized South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states whereas Georgia and all other relevant countries oppose this new status. A dual track approach seems necessary to manage such conflicts. On the one hand, Russia should have no problem with declaring its troops in these 'independent states' as deployed forces. But Georgia and Western countries could not accept this due to the fact that it could be seen as an indirect recognition of these two entities. The other countries should accept Russian figures but reject the status of these two entities in a special diplomatic note. Spain's behavior with the notification of British weapons on Gibraltar can be used as a model. Transparency, analysis and evaluation of military capabilities could here be utilized as an entirely new instrument. The old CFE Treaty prevented two sorts of military capabilities: surprise and comprehensive attacks between alliances. But the new approach is not intended to limit or prevent military capabilities per se, as some might wrongly assume. It merely offers a new opportunity to receive more information on the quality of military forces. The main purpose of this measure is to show other participants the capabilities of conventional forces in order to enhance accountability and confidence. The evaluation of military capabilities will be a purely national assessment and will generally not be fully comparable to the assessment of other states. As long as this assessment method increases transparency, accountability and trust and thereby calms security concerns, the measure should raise no further problems. If it increases security concerns for an inspecting party, then this state would be required to communicate its national assessment to other state parties and convince them to deal with the issue. In the latter case, this shall be seen as a warning signal for security and stability and could potentially lead to further negotiations and regulations. The analysis and evaluation of military capabilities can also facilitate nuclear disarmament, since it could be easier to identify potential destabilizing conventional developments and asymmetries for smaller and more vulnerable nuclear forces and weapons. Answering the questions of which military capabilities should be covered and which information and data are necessary for each capability must be negotiated. The quality of confidence building depends on a sufficient number of capabilities and on the inclusion of modern capabilities that can enhance military fighting and fire power to a high degree, such as the stand-off capability or the capability of network-centric warfare operations. The number and definition of capabilities can be selected under a common sense rule. A possible list could potentially include the following military capabilities: One problem of conventional arms control is that it can only be based on countable and verifiable items and categories. Therefore, it is necessary to determine key accountable and verifiable information elements in advance for every capability in order to create a reliable and valid basis for analysis and assessment. During negotiations, it may be helpful to arrange test data exchanges and test inspections to clarify the complexity of efforts and the quality of results. • Sustainability • Deployability • Readiness • Stand- Confidence building is the most important goal of the new agreement. It should be focused on covering regional and military areas where mistrust seems particularly high. Here, some new rules and the adjustment of others can enhance confidence and accountability. Owing to the fact that Russia still fears NATO enlargement, a strengthening of the Western commitment to not deploy substantial combat forces (air and land forces) 32 in (new) member states seems necessary, as long as no new threat arises. As a reciprocal measure, Russia should be willing to accept the same restraints including possible new deployments in Belarus and Armenia. Because of the unresolved status conflict of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russia should announce constraints in these entities. The state parties shall negotiate new thresholds for the notification and observation of such deployments (including temporary deployments): new deployments and withdrawals of small units will be announced, though they should not be deemed substantial deployments. Additionally, a new threshold should be defined for substantial deployments (including rotational deployments) of land and air forces. 33 In case this threshold is reached or exceeded, an additional notification is necessary in advance, with the inclusion of a strong rationale for it. Other participants shall have the right to observe this deployment. If it lasts for a longer time, this notification must be confirmed again after three months and can be observed again by other participants. The principle goal of this measure is to prevent the deployment of significant forces. It does not establish limits for the new deployment of foreign forces that serve the interests of Baltic States, but, for all intents and purposes, has the effect of approximating a limit. A major problem of this measure could be that observations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia will be not possible as long as the status conflict is not resolved. If necessary, this rule can be extended to possible deployments of conventional weapons with strategic ranges. Due to the growing mobility of conventional land forces, the capability of concentrating forces over great distances will continue to rise. This is particularly true for NATO, EU and CSTO members. Therefore, it is important to enhance stability and security and to reduce the concerns about unusual concentrations of land forces by their advanced announcement and through multinational regular observations without the right of refusal. Every concentration of land forces within a certain territorial area that is near a border 34 involving more than five percent of the national holdings should be notified. In deployments exceeding 10 percent, the activity should be observed by a multinational inspection team. 35 Mutual politically binding 'no-increase' commitments for military forces in certain regions and areas can further strengthen this rule. 36 Such a counting rule works fine for states of similar size and forces. However, in cases where a small state like Georgia borders a large state like Russia, this rule is inappropriate. Russia has 5.000 tanks and Georgia only 180. With a five or ten percent threshold, Russia can concentrate 249 to 499 tanks near Georgia without announcing it, whereas Georgia can only concentrate 8 to 17 tanks. Here, based on the principle of reciprocity, more appropriate thresholds should be negotiated for notifications and observations near the border on a multilateral level that better balance such asymmetries. Figures for the threshold can be oriented on a battalion sized level or slightly above. Also, unusual concentrations 37 of sea forces (excluding submarines) near the coast of a state party (near or in the exclusive economic zone) beyond a defined threshold can be announced in advance and observed by a multinational observer team to enhance accountability and confidence. In such a case, observers should have the right to survey these concentrations either from the command room of the command ship and/or from a naval command center on land of the nation leading this force. Here, an observation on a command ship should be possible even on high seas, if no other opportunity exists to observe this activity. Military activities are much smaller than in the past because of the transformed force structures and the enhanced use of computer simulations for cost reasons. It therefore seems necessary to lower the thresholds for notification and observation of military activities in the Vienna Document 2011 in order to reestablish the lost level of accountability to some degree. 38 Independent, large air force activities or air-sea activities should also be announced in advance in order to enhance accountability and confidence. But, at present, it is not possible to observe large air force activities. The transit of land forces either to another country in the zone of application or through the zone of application should be notified in advance and not exceed a duration of 21 days through the zone and 42 days in the zone. 39 These, partly overlapping, security and confidence building rules offer several additional advantages: They can be used to replace the controversial flank limits (see Annex I) of the CFE Treaty, thereby fulfilling an old demand by Russia and Ukraine. They also create better early warning measures for war preparations in the case of unregulated territorial conflicts with the unusual force concentration rule and the lowered threshold of observable military activities. Additionally, they can help minimize mistrust between East Central European NATO members and Russia. On the Western side, this is particularly true for the Baltic States. These countries are also opposed to the withdrawal of American sub-strategic nuclear weapons from Europe. Malcolm Chalmers described this problem as follows: "One of the ironies in this whole debate about nonstrategic nuclear weapons in Europe is the countries that have them don't want them and the countries that don't have them want the ones who don't want them to keep them.40 " Such measures can likewise facilitate further withdrawal of U.S. sub-strategic nuclear weapons systems from Europe.Further confidence building measures can be negotiated either on a multilateral or bilateral level.They can include the following measures: 41 • one or more additional observations of small-scale military activity, particularly near a mutual border; • mutual restraints in the increase of military forces, deployed forces; • information of the deployment of new units and the introduction of new major weapons in a defined regional area; • more frequent invitations for visits to military bases of all services; • more mutual communication in military affairs, for example in regards to smallscale military activities and their regulations at the mutual border; • regular exchanges of military personnel from all services.This list of measures is surely not exhaustive.It demonstrates that there are enough means to enhance military confidence and accountability.The central question is whether there is enough political will on all concerned sides to enter into negotiations on such measures and implement them on a regular basis.Clearly it is impossible to analyze and evaluate military intentions with 100 percent certainty.But Europe has reached a stable security situation which is supported by a certain level of military dialogue and transparency.This quality in interstate relations makes it very unlikely that Europe will witness any sharp change in military intentions in the short term.Verified transparency of military intentions will strengthen this fact and thereby increase confidence.And verified information about defensive military intentions can contribute to balancing conventional military asymmetries as long as they have no impact on military stability.42 The new approach is based on some redundancy through several layers of information, analysis and evaluation of military intentions in order to increase the reliability of data.As a first layer, states should regularly disclose information about their military doctrines and defense guidelines, defense planning and defense budget.As a second layer, the regular observation of one or two of their largest military maneuvers should be allowed every two or three years with no right of refusal.In such maneuvers, military forces try to implement the goals of their military doctrines and defense guidelines.This measure goes beyond the present regulations of the Vienna document 2011, which allows the observation of military activities only in cases where certain very high thresholds are exceeded.43 Therefore, the Vienna document or a new agreement should incorporate this additional measure.It can provide observers with some knowledge as to the extent to which military forces are able to fulfill their respective national defense doctrines and guidelines.As a third layer, transparency of the structure and deployment of forces will supplement the military picture in this regard.These instruments can, altogether, grant effective insight into military intentions with sufficient reliability.The exchange of information on military doctrines and its discussion is not an entirely new measure.Many state parties, including Russia, publish their security and military doctrines voluntarily.44 Many OSCE governments have participated in the exchange and discussion of their doctrines at the OSCE High Level military doctrine seminars in 1990, 1991, 1998, 2001, 2006 and 2011 on a voluntary basis.45 Additionally, all OSCE members are obligated, according to chapter II of the Vienna Document (Defense Planning), to provide all other members with information about their military doctrine, defense policy, defense planning and defense budget (Vienna Document 2011: Cypher 15.1 -15.4.4.2).Information and discussion of military doctrines are not only important for reasons of transparency but also a necessary precondition for greater military cooperation.So it would not seem to require a very large leap to do these things on a slightly more regulated and enhanced basis and in a regular exchange with other states.Up until now, there has been no obligation for an information exchange on defense guidelines.However, a few states, like Germany (Defense Policy Guidelines 2011) and the USA, publish their defense guidelines on a voluntary basis.In the future, the term 'defense policy and doctrine' in the Vienna Document (Vienna Document 2011: Cypher 15.1) can be extended to 'defense policy, guidelines and doctrine' to cover defense guidelines and, in the annex of the document, the definition of these guidelines and their contents could be presented.Within the defined initial phase of a new agreement, all participating states should exchange their newest military doctrines and defense guidelines.In order to reduce efforts and costs, they should only confirm the newest doctrine and guidelines in the following annual information exchange, being that most states revise them only after a major change of the security situation or after elections, and not every year.Every official revision of a military doctrine and a defense guideline should be recorded in the following annual information exchange.The CFE Treaty has the aim of verifying current holdings of covered weapon systems and evaluating their compliance with existing ceilings and limitations for each participant.Because the new approach has no limitations or ceilings, the new objective is different: it will only verify the notified actual holdings with some additional information.The current practice of verification raises several problems for a future agreement.Russia has largely reduced the number of conventional arms control inspectors on account of suspending the CFE Treaty at the end of 2007 and has had no interest in raising the number to the previous level for cost reasons.Other states like the Netherlands and Great Britain have reduced their inspection agency for financial reasons as well or because they do not really believe in a future of conventional arms control.Many participants, like Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece, and Hungary have a strong interest in lowering the burden of inspection costs.An additional issue is that the inspections of Western countries are primarily aimed towards Russia and Belarus, whereas Russia is primarily interested in inspections of NATO members.And both (NATO countries and Russia) control the countries with unresolved territorial conflicts to some degree.Furthermore, NATO countries have agreed through an MOU not to inspect one another.This has created a very unbalanced structure of inspections over time.This raises the question as to whether a multilateral institution for inspections, similar to the OPCW or the IAEA, could better serve the interests of the state parties, particularly under tightened budgets and a likely growing number of participants.It would offer several advantages: Routine inspections of military potentials by the technical secretariat of the new agency based on random or on a certain key for the inspection of all participants can solve the problem of the unbalanced structure.Additionally, a multinational inspection agency would help to reduce the costs for general evaluation, observation and inspection visits.The inspection of military equipment and units and the observation of military activities for examining military intentions and the observation of military concentrations beyond certain thresholds can both be conducted by this new agency.Also, all data and information exchanges and notifications can be gathered there and distributed to the participants.But there are also some disadvantages: A multinational inspection agency cannot build confidence in the same way and with the same efficiency as is the case in direct inspections between state inspection agencies.If confidence building is a major goal for a future agreement, a multinational inspection agency seems to be less well suited.And small states that only participate by passive inspections in an inspection regime for cost reasons may be forced to pay a little bit more for a multinational inspection agency.At present, many state parties are forced to spend money for inspectors and inspections as well as for the analytical work, documentation, electronic archiving and other tasks.A central multinational agency would reduce such costs for every participant.And since all state parties would have access to the inspection reports, no duplication of an inspection would be necessary.A State can provide their inspectors and name certain experts for special inspections and/or offer a financial contribution for this new multinational verification agency according to their economic and financial situation and the agreed cost sharing.As mentioned before, only the inspection of certain military capabilities should be conducted by a lead nation, being that such inspections are rare and need special expertise that a multinational institution presumably cannot provide in a cost-effective manner.Such direct inspections would also have a heightened effect for confidence building and would lower this disadvantage of a multinational agency.In the past, the U.S. has always opposed such a multinational institution for several reasons: First, it was not willing to transfer such important control and steering rights to an external institution and, secondly, it feared it could strengthen conventional arms control too much and thereby further weaken NATO.But under the current situation, when most participants are forced to reduce their budget deficits, a multinational verification agency seems to be more cost effective.The U.S. government can further demonstrate its strong commitment to conventional arms control and conventional stability with its political support for such an agency and thereby increase its credibility for its Global Zero goal of nuclear weapons.However, verification of conventional military forces of a state party near the border of countries which do not participate in the regime can be difficult or even impossible if they are involved in current operational missions that concern a state or states outside the agreement.In such a case, special verification exceptions may be necessary for defined territorial areas or zones (as little as possible) which verge on non-regime neighbors.In order to keep this possible loophole as limited as possible, all special verification exceptions should always be announced and this information should be repeated after a certain timeframe of three or six months.The notification of such exceptional events, which should, in principle, be as short and small as possible, should include details about their duration, the excluded area and the reason for it.A prolongation of this exception should be possible.Inspections of naval forces need special regulations since they are too expensive on or above the high seas and can seriously hamper ongoing sea operations.Furthermore, the control of sea forces on the international high seas does not seem possible in a reliable manner even by use of the Open Skies Treaty.46 For these reasons they have been excluded here.Inspections of naval forces should be possible in European home ports only.Here, arms control regulations should not make a distinction between national and multinational forces and rather cover both categories.In 2012, Germany voluntarily invited observers to a visit of a marine base under the Vienna Document 2011 in the city of Kiel, including the visit of ships, which demonstrated that observation and verification of marine forces are possible at their home port locations (German FSC-Invitation 18 February 2012).However, this raises difficulties for the U.S. and Canadian navies since they have no home ports for their conventional vessels, ships and submarines in Europe.47 For this reason, U.S. and Canadian vessels, ships and submarines that have no home port in Europe but are deployed and/or operate in European waters should be inspected in European ports as well, with consent of the host state.This measure would not completely serve the principle of reciprocity, but otherwise Canada and the USA would be forced to open their homeports on their territory along the Atlantic for inspections.If a state party demands a ship inspection from another participant in its homeport(s), the inspected party should consent within a certain timeframe of up to six months, as vessels, ships and submarines can stay outside of their homeports for several months during operational missions and any interruption would be to costly.This is also the reason why vessels, ships and submarines should be excluded from challenge inspections.They may not be possible in most cases, or would be too expensive and can seriously affect ongoing operations of the concerned sea unit.Inspection of military capabilities is a new challenge.A new system of regular, annual data exchange should provide all the information necessary for verification of capabilities.For example, information as to transportation capability of forces is an important contributing factor for the analysis and evaluation of military capability, of sustainability, or intervention capability.Therefore, military transportation equipment from all services, which generally do not have combat missions and may not be heavily armed, should be defined, included and counted on a regular basis.Further voluntary data should be possible if one state is not fully satisfied with the results of such special inspection.Due to the much higher requirements, the frequency of capability inspections should be limited.Every active state party should have the right to one or two of these capability inspections within a time period of three to five years and every passive state party is not obliged to accept more than three inspections within the same time period in order to reduce workload and costs.Capability inspections can include several military bases, installations and sites at the same time and/or consecutively.Such measures do not compare with a simple inspection of weapon systems and other military equipment in one or two military bases presently called Objects of Verification (OoVs).Capability inspections should only be conducted under the responsibility of a lead nation and can be accompanied by inspectors and experts from other nations as well as a representative from the proposed multinational verification agency.The reason for this procedure was mentioned earlier in this report.Capability inspections require highly educated special experts who are usually too expensive for permanent duty in an international agency.Capability inspections need some time for preparation and cannot be arranged overnight.For this reason, they cannot be a part of challenge inspections.The new conceptual ideas of verified transparency demand a novel way of thinking about conventional arms control.Being that they are based on a certain degree of confidence, limitations would no longer seem necessary.The combination of verified military potentials, verified intentions and additional confidence and security building measures can substitute military limitations to a high degree, though perhaps not completely.The extent to which limitations are actually necessary needs to be further discussed, particularly in relation to military security of the unregulated territorial conflicts and for areas where they might be important for maintaining regional stability.The extension of transparency by the integration of additional force and weapon categories, along with their support equipment, via the introduction of the analysis and evaluation of military capabilities and intentions is aimed at the main problem of European security: the growing mistrust, particularly in Russia.It should serve to alleviate the vicious circle of mutual growing mistrust and enhance military accountability and confidence on all sides.The analysis and evaluation of military capabilities can also facilitate the identification of new military instabilities.48 The new confidence and security building measures strengthen war prevention and crisis stability, especially for state parties with unregulated territorial conflicts through the advanced announcement and observation of unusual force concentrations or deployments.Furthermore, these measures can functionally replace the controversial flank rule or flank limits.The new deployment rule would also increase military accountability for NATO enlargement.If significant land or air force combat troops were deployed in new member states, it would have to be notified in 48 See Grossman, Elaine M., Do Advanced Conventional Weapons Make Nuclear War More Likely?in: NTI Global Security Newswire 22 August 2012, in: www.nti.org/gsn/article/jury-out-do-advancedconventional-weapons-make-nuclear-war-more-likely/ (28.2.2013).advance, justified with convincing arguments and regularly observed in order to prevent such deployments.Russia and others members must accept the same rule in order to enhance the security of their neighbors.The establishment of the proposed new verification agency could be a strong commitment for the future of conventional arms control in Europe.It could contribute in overcoming many structural problems of the current verification system and help to reduce the costs of verification.The debate about the conceptual ideas of verified transparency has been initiated.Discussions should now be broadened in order to extend the discussion and learn from its pros and cons.The new instruments of verified transparency of military capabilities and the verified transparency of military intentions surely need further discussion to answer some remaining questions.Are they really necessary and how should they be structured?Is it possible to identify sufficiently detailed elements which are countable and verifiable for all the mentioned military capabilities?To what extent will they actually improve the qualitative assessment and knowledge about military forces?To which degree will it be possible and necessary to include naval forces related to European security in these new conceptual ideas?Should conventional missile defense be a part of a future conventional arms control agreement or separately regulated through measures of military cooperation?Should verification be organized in a new multinational verification agency or should the present structure of national organization be maintained?There are many questions which must be discussed on a government and expert level if the new conceptual ideas of verified transparency or elements can become a part of a novel alliance concept and future negotiations.Should this come to fruition, it would be worthwhile to establish several international experts groups alongside government talks.They could discuss selected questions in further detail and develop possible solutions and propose them to the track I level.With the election of President Obama for a second term and the nomination of Chuck Hagel as the new head of the Defense Department and John Kerry as the new head of the State Department, the future fate of conventional arms control looks a little bit more hopeful.Conventional arms control still has a small chance of successful revival.The conventional military superiority of the U.S. is not necessarily an obstacle to an agreement since both Russia and the U.S. have a common interest in keeping the security situation in Europe stable and calm in order to have more military flexibility in Asia, the Middle East and other less stable areas.European states, deeply challenged by their financial and economic problems, should also welcome a new conventional arms control agreement since it will help them reduce costs.However, a major hurdle for further talks on conventional arms control is the perspective of conventional missile defense in Europe.For Russia, it is the litmus test for future arms control.49 President Obama must offer more transparency and accountability of conventional missile defense in Europe (Pifer 2012: 2-3) as he hinted to the previous Russian President Medvedev in Seoul in March 2012.After the re-election of Obama, Moscow has lowered its demands for constraints on missile defense and it no longer insists on legally binding obligations.50 The next meeting between Obama and Putin in 2013 will show if the reset in arms control will continue and Obama can offer more flexibility in missile defense in order to revive conventional arms control talks.Following five years of Russian suspension of the CFE Treaty, there is a growing need to revive transparency of conventional Russian forces.Verification of Russian forces through Open Skies and the Vienna Document do not offer the same quality of information.In particular, smaller states like Georgia, Azerbaijan and the Baltic States should have a greater interest in receiving more information about Russian conventional force modernization efforts.Even Eastern Central European alliance members and other state parties should recognize that we cannot solve our security problems in Europe by the Western alliance alone and exclude Russia, particularly under tightened budgets in Europe and the USA.This is only possible with a cooperative approach.The same is true for many unregulated territorial conflicts in Europe.Without Russia, no stable political regulation seems possible.A new arms control agreement could improve the outlook for a possible political solution to these territorial conflicts more than without.Therefore, Western countries should take Russian security concerns seriously and look for some common solutions.A future conventional arms control agreement could reestablish lost confidence, strengthen the OSCE and ease cooperation in other areas as well (Möckli 2012: 1-4) .Conventional arms control in and for Europe thus needs more political attention in the next years; we could otherwise let this instrument slip from our hands and cause global Nuclear Zero to remain a distant dream.Annex II: Main elements of the Vienna Document 2011 The Vienna Document on Confidence and Security Building Measures was first approved in 1990 and further updated in 1992, 1994, 1999, and 2011 .The latest update contains only small technical improvements (see last mechanism).A major adaptation to the present security situation in Europe is still pending.Currently, the Vienna Document contains 12 major mechanisms: The Annual Exchange of Military Information obliges all participants to publicize the command structure and the weapons of land and air forces based on single military units, including armored vehicles with antitank missile launchers and non-active units.The relocation of units and activation of non-active units beyond certain thresholds must be indicated in advance.It also covers the planned introduction and deployment of new major weapon systems and their figures.The annual exchange of information on Defense Planning provides data on size, structure, training and equipment of armed forces (including naval forces), as well as defence policy, doctrines and budgets in the medium and long term.A request for clarification is possible and all participants are encouraged to provide voluntarily additional information.The mechanism for Risk Reduction allows every participant to ask for clarification, consultation and co-operation with regard to unusual military activities within 48 hours.Additionally, a voluntary visit is possible to dispel concerns about military activities.Furthermore, a co-operative mechanism exists for the reporting and clarification of hazardous incidents of a military nature.The number and quality of Military Contacts should be further strengthened among others by a visit of one air base within a five year period.New major weapon systems should be demonstrated to all other participants and programs for regular contacts (such as seminars, cultural and sports events) and military co-operation should be developed.A Prior Notification of Certain Military Activities is necessary 42 days in advance, if they involve at least 9,000 soldiers or 250 tanks, or 250 artillery pieces or 500 armored combat vehicles (ACVs).If 200 or more sorties of combat aircraft are to be flown during such an activity, this must be also indicated.Additionally, an amphibious landing, heliborne landing or parachute assault activity with at least 3,000 soldiers must be notified in advance.An Observation of Certain Military Activities is allowed if they involve at least 13,000 soldiers, 300 tanks, 500 ACVs or 250 artillery pieces.Further, an observation is allowed for amphibious landing, heliborne landing or parachute assault activities with at least 3,500 soldiers.For further details, see Treaty on Open Skies, in: www.osce.org/library/14127 (28.2.2013).The Treaty entered into force on January 1, 2002 and has the following members: Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, the Russian Federation, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and the United States.3For further details, see Vienna Document on Confidence and Security Building Measures 2011, in:www.osce.org/fsc/86597 (28.2.2013).Since 1990, this politically binding document has been updated several times in 1992, 1994, 1999 and 2011.A short Annex II contains the main elements of the Document.4National limits constrained the major conventional weapon categories of the land and air forces of a State Party in the entire application area.Territorial limits constrained national and foreign deployed land The official name was "Framework for negotiations to strengthen and to modernize the conventional arms control regime in Europe".All NATO states participated in the informal "to 36 format" talks.8See statement by Grigory Berdennikov, Russian envoy at the IAEA: "Our position is that in order to move forward [in nuclear and conventional arms cuts] we should implement the existing agreements [especially in the framework of the New START treaty], […]. But how are we supposed to move forward if the United States refuses to curb its missile defenses?" cited : N.N., U.S. missile defense hinder new arms cuts -Russia, in: RIA Novosti, 30.6.2012, in: http://en.rian.ru/russia/20120630/174322372.html (28.2.2013).9 See Goodman, David, Microphone Catches a Candid Obama, in: New York Times 26 March 2012, in: www.nytimes.com/2012/03/27/us/politics/obama-caught-on-microphone-telling-medvedev-of-flexibility.html (26.3.2012).10The author does not describe any official position or proposal of the German government and he alone bears responsibility for the entire contents of this report.He cordially thanks Giorgio Franceschini, Annette Schaper, Niklas Schörnig, Caroline Fehl and Rüdiger Hartmann for their helpful comments on earlier drafts and Nick Gemmell for his language editing.Every CFE data exchange from the United Kingdom which contains military data on Gibraltar is answered by a diplomatic note from Spain refusing the territorial claim by London.Vandiver, John/Sven, Jennifer, Panetta: 2 army combat brigades will leave Europe, in: Stars and Stripes, 12 January 2012, in: www.stripes.com/news/panetta-2-army-combat-brigades-will-leave-europe-1.165867 (28.2.2013).See Willis, Amy: Mitt Romney: Russia is America's 'number one geopolitical foe', in: The Telegraph, 27 March 2012, in: www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/us-election/9168533/Mitt-Romney-Russia-is-Americas-number-one-geopolitical-foe.html# (15.6.2012).14The CFE Treaty regime was not well suited to preventing this war for several reasons: First, the war started as an internal violent conflict, whereas CFE is only meant to prevent interstate wars.Secondly, Russia had suspended its CFE implementation in December 2007, so it could no longer be used to inspect Russian forces in advance.Thirdly, the leader of a CFE inspection in Georgia in June 2008 missed the opportunity to give a stronger political signal against a possible war(Schmidt 2009: 22).Serbia, and not Kosovo, is a state party of the Sub-regional Arms Control Agreement of 1996, which may be integrated into a future conventional arms control regime in Europe.See Preamble of the CFE Treaty, in: www.acq.osd.mil/tc/treaties/cfe/text.htm#preamble (28.2.2013).See Article 1, aCFE, in: www.acq.osd.mil/tc/treaties/acfe/adap_treaty.htm#intro(28.2.2013).20See the Azerbaijani First Deputy Speaker of Parliament Ziyafat Asgarov, who emphasized that Azerbaijan will use all means to free occupied lands.See "Azerbaijan to use all means to free occupied lands", in: Today.Az 9 July 2012, in: www.today.az/print/news/ politics/110061.html (9.7.2012).21In 2011, the Netherlands tabled a proposal in a similar direction for an update of the Vienna Document to clarify concerns about unusual military activities.See "OSCE Inspection for Clarification on military Activities giving rise to concern, The Netherlands," in: FSC.AIAM/12/11, March 1, 2011.Efforts to lower the threshold for the notification of military activities are also going into a similar direction: France, Albania, Denmark, Estonia, Spain, Finland, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Sweden want to lower the threshold to 5,000 troops, 100 tanks, 200 ACVs, 80 artillery pieces.In: FSC.DEL/107/10/Rev.2/Corr.1, 2 February 2010.See Preamble of the CFE Treaty, in: www.acq.osd.mil/tc/treaties/cfe/text.htm#preamble (28.2.2013).See Cernenko, Elena/Safronov, Ivan, No breakthrough on nuclear arms control, in: Russia Beyond the Headlines 18th February 2013, in: http://rbth.ru/international/2013/02/18/no_breakthroughs_ on_nuclear_arms_reduction_23009.html (18.2.2013).27 Since 2010, there have been bilateral talks between Russia and the U.S. on a code of conduct for cyber security.See Gorman, Siobhan, U.S. Backs Talks on Cyber Warfare, in: Wall Street Journal, 4 June 2010, in: http://online.wsj.com/article/ SB10001424052748703340904575284964215965730.html# (4.6.10).28 It is in the logic of verified transparency to cover conventional missile defense in Europe, but this does not exclude a separate regulation (such as by military cooperation) for conventional missile defense in Europe outside a new conventional arms control agreement.Turkey is also a member of the Open Skies Treaty, which covers, in contrast to CFE and Vienna Document, the whole territory of the country including all islands.Observation flights can only be changed or canceled if the observed party cannot guarantee flight safety.See NATO Statement on CFE, Cypher 10,Brussels, 8 December 1998, in: www.nato.int/docu/pr/1998/ p98-141e.htm (28.2.2013 and also Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation signed in Paris 27 May 1997, Part IV Political Military Matters, in: www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_25468.htm (28.2.2013).In 2008 NATO countries withdraw this commitment for the air forces.See NAC Statement on CFE, Cypher 5, Brussels, 28 March 2008 in: www.nato.int/docu/pr/2008/p08-047e.html (28.2.2013).33 In 2008, Russia proposed that the deployment of a brigade, combat wing, attack helicopter battalion or 41 tanks, 188 ACVs, 90 artillery pieces, 24 combat aircraft or 24 attack helicopters could meet the definition of substantial combat forces (Antonov/Ajumov 2012: 44).NATO countries admit their readiness to develop a definition for substantial combat forces with Russia upon an agreement of the parallel action package.See NAC Statement on CFE, Brussels, 28 March 2008, Cypher 5 (see Fn. 32).34 Russia and Kazakhstan have accepted similar restraints through the Agreement between the Russian Federation, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan and China on Mutual Reduction of Military Forces in Border Regions (Moscow, 24 April 1997) towards China (Agreement on Mutual Reduction of Military Forces in Border Regions 1997).This measure can further be strengthened by the request of a concerned state party to convene a conference of all state parties.It is based on Article 8 (B) and Article 19, 2 of aCFE, in: www.acq.osd.mil/ tc/treaties/acfe/adap_treaty.htm (1.3.2013).36With the signature of the adapted CFE Treaty, several states accepted special politically binding restraints in sensitive areas (such as Russia in the Oblast Pskov and Kaliningrad) in Istanbul in 1999.However, the value of these special commitments seems questionable in that the adapted treaty has never entered into This measure is based on the transit rule of the adapted CFE Treaty, Art. 5, 3; in: www.acq.osd.mil/tc/ treaties/acfe/adap_treaty.htm (28.2.2013).40Citation: Oswald, Rachel, "NATO Should Use Summit to Address U.S. Tactical Nukes in Europe, Experts Say," in.Global security newswire, 11 May 2012, in: www.nti.org/gsn/article/nato-should-use-summitaddress-us-tactical-nukes-europe-experts-say/ (11.5.2013).41In this context, it should be noted that Poland and some other East Central European countries have several bilateral agreements with their neighbours for additional confidence building measures.There exists no common definition of 'military stability' in spite of the fact that this term plays an important role for all state parties.It depends on the present security issue and the development of a common view on it to come to a common definition of military stability.43Observations of military activities are only possible if the following thresholds are reached: 13,000 troops, 300 tanks, 500 ACVs, 250 artillery pieces or 3,500 troops for amphibious landing, heliborne landing or parachute assault.See Vienna Document 2011, Cypher (47.7).44 For example Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Russia, Spain, Turkey, and the USA have voluntarily published their doctrines.45 See Vienna Document 2011, Cypher (15.7) and OSCE Press Release, Seminar on Military Doctrine promotes transparency, openness, Vienna, 14 February 2006, in: www.osce.org/fsc/47108 (28.2.2013).See Statement by Andrey Denisov, First Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation, at the Opening of the 11th European Conference on Security and Defense, Berlin, November 27, 2012, in: www.mid.ru/ brp_4.nsf/0/3FEF48B1980462A544257AC400293E26 (28.2.2013).This region consists on both sides of Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary and Poland.52 This region additionally includes, on both sides, Italy, France, the United Kingdom, Denmark and the former Soviet military districts Baltic, Byelorussia, Carpathian and Kiev with separate limits for the district of Kiev.53 This region further includes, on both sides, Spain, Portugal and the former Soviet military districts Moscow and Volga-Ural.54 This region consists, on both sides, of Iceland, Norway, Greece, Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, and the former Soviet military districts of Leningrad, Odessa, Transcaucasus and North Caucasus.	The main political problem for European security is now the growing mistrust of Russia among Western countries and the growing mistrust of Western countries among a more authoritarian Russian leadership.With the end of the Cold War, conventional arms control has contributed to the greatly reduced threat of interstate war in Europe through the reduction of conventional forces.Then again, military unaccountability and unpredictability seem to be increasing for Russia with the enlargement of NATO and the planned development of conventional missile defense in Europe.The adapted CFE Treaty, signed at the end of the 1990s, should be able to constrain the growing unaccountability and potential instability caused by alliance enlargement through its innovative and more rigid limitation system; but it has not yet entered into force.During the last decade, progress on conventional arms control was blocked by conservative arms control adversaries in the Bush administration and other countries that linked progress along these lines almost exclusively with the regulation of the unresolved territorial conflicts in the Caucasus.Obama tried to remove this blockade by resetting U.S.-Russia relations in arms control.The new START Treaty has been an initial success but in spite of some preliminary efforts, the reset has not had an impact on conventional arms control so far.The decision by NATO in Lisbon 2010 to establish a conventional missile defense capability against a possible future threat of nuclear-tipped missiles from Iran, in combination with U.S. defense plans for prompt conventional global strike capability and, more importantly, a conventional long-rage strike capability by bombers and ships, have all raised Russian concerns about the future stability of its nuclear deterrence forces.Russia suspended the implementation of the outdated CFE Treaty at the end of 2007 as a warning signal to NATO and stopped its talks after few months about the modernization of conventional arms control three years later in May 2011.A conservative U.S. Congress blocked the political maneuverability of U.S. President Obama with regard to missile defense before his second election, so progress on this issue could be not expected.Since then, it seems Russia has taken conventional arms control as a hostage for further progress on cooperation in missile defense.With the re-election of Obama, the reset of U.S.-Russia relations in missile defense and conventional arms control is still pending.Progress on the controversial issue of missile defense seems to be a precondition to revive the political reset and initiate new talks on the modernization of conventional arms control.However, the previous attempt in autumn 2007 to marginally update the adapted CFE Treaty and ratify it then will no longer work.Too much will have changed in security policy and military technological developments in the next years.A new approach is necessary; one that focuses on the growing mistrust of Russia.It should cover all new conventional military developments which may threaten future stability in Europe, increase the military accountability of NATO enlargement, and strengthen war prevention in the cases of the unregulated territorial conflicts.It should further contribute to Obama's new goal of Global Zero by facilitating the reduction and withdrawal of sub-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe.Germany has used this period of standstill in conventional arms control to develop new conceptual ideas in regards to 'verified transparency' for future conventional arms control in Europe and has started its own discussions.These discussions are on-going and have been deepened.It now seems the right time to participate in this discussion from a research perspective and discuss the pros and cons of these conceptual ideas, at least as far as they are currently known.The author was involved in an experts hearing and has been following the discussion closely.The report is based on these observations and presents only his personal views.Transparency is an integral tool for reducing mistrust and increasing confidence and accountability; verification of transparency strongly supports this goal.A comprehensive approach towards openness can widen this desired effect.It can likewise cover a wide range of military developments that may go on to tackle future military stability.Therefore, it seems well suited to overcome Russia's growing mistrust towards NATO.Verified transparency builds less on limitations than other options might, while comprehensive transparency reduces the demands for limitations.However, these ideas do not exclude limitations per se.They may still be necessary to prevent war and increase crisis stability in the cases of unregulated territorial conflicts, to support regional stabilization and to prevent future destabilizing military developments.The new ideas are built upon a certain level of confidence, as neither NATO nor Russia has the intention to revive Cold War military confrontations.The high budget deficit in the USA, the severe financial crisis in the EU and the growing necessity of economic reforms in Russia strongly support cooperative management of military security in Europe and should therefore receive greatly increased attention from leading politicians of all involved parties.The new ideas of verified transparency could be used with great flexibility and are based on many known elements of conventional arms control.They consist of three major complementary and mutually reinforcing elements: the verified transparency of military potentials, of military intentions, and of military capabilities.This should be supplemented by additional confidence and security building measures.Transparency of military potentials should be widened and include data on special and rapid response forces, force multipliers, and military transportation systems.The conventional sea forces of European states including U.S. and Canadian navies along with missions for European security should also be covered.They should, however, be excluded from any constraints of other forces.It is of utmost importance to heighten transparency of Western sea forces and their military capabilities in order for Russia to calm growing security concern and facilitate a reduction of Russian sub-strategic nuclear weapons, which are mainly concentrated in Russian naval forces.Transparency of military capabilities serves as a new ambitious approach to conventional arms control and would complement transparency of military potentials.It is dependent on sufficient countable and verifiable military elements of the selected capabilities and would go beyond a simple bean counting approach.All participants would have access to a realistic view of what military forces can do and what they cannot do.This new approach also offers the opportunity to discuss possible destabilizing military developments and options for their regulation if necessary.This approach is open to the realm of missile defense, but other cooperative solutions should be possible as well.Transparency of military intentions is important in that it informs others about the goals of military forces and can be compared with one's own military potentials and capabilities to enhance accountability and confidence.A layered system of openness and verification would be sufficient for this purpose.This would be based on information concerning military doctrines, defense guidelines, defense plans and defense budgets.It would include verification via regular multinational observation of one or two major military activities every two or three years for each participant.Defensive intentions can compensate for military asymmetries of conventional potentials and capabilities as long as military stability is not touched.Additional confidence and security building measures should increase the accountability of NATO enlargement, strengthen the security of East Central European states and enhance war prevention and crisis stability for states with unregulated territorial conflicts.They would also present a functional equivalent for the controversial flank limitations.Under a new deployment rule, all states would notify others of new small deployments of combat forces in advance.Any deployment of land and air forces that reaches a critical threshold for significant deployments of combat troops would require additional strong justification and should be observed regularly.The same mechanism is proposed for a concentration rule which would force all states to notify others in advance of the concentration of land forces in a defined border area if they reach a critical threshold.Such activity should be observed by multinational observers as well.If activities such as these persist for a longer time, their notification and observation should be repeated every three months.Mutual politically binding 'no-increase' commitments for military forces in certain regions and areas can further strengthen this rule.Verification is an indispensable tool of this approach.It could be strengthened by the introduction of a new multinational verification agency, similar to the OPCW or IAEA.This agency could overcome the existing structural deficits of CFE verification and save costs for many of the members.However, capability inspections should continue to be organized by national verification agencies due to the fact that the inspectors would need advanced special education, something that an international agency could not provide in a cost effective manner.Passive inspections of capabilities should be limited to two or three every three to five years for each member, owing to the time consuming preparations involved.Verification of naval forces should be conducted in European home ports and designated European ports for Canadian and U.S. forces.Institutions such as NATO, the EU, and CSTO cannot provide European security on their own.They need mutual security cooperation under the roof of the OSCE to achieve this purpose.Several existing unregulated territorial conflicts in Europe can only be resolved with and not in spite of Russia.Therefore, not blockades -as utilized in the last decade -but the modernization of conventional arms control will help create the political environment conducive to this important task.The political solution of unregulated territorial conflicts should therefore be separated from conventional arms control.Conventional arms control in Europe consists of three complementary regimes: the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty), the Open Skies Treaty, and the Vienna Document on Confidence and Security Building Measures.The CFE Treaty limits the arsenals of land and air forces in five weapon categories (tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery, attack helicopters, and combat aircraft) and the CFE 1A agreement limits military personnel.1 The aim of this treaty was to prevent any surprise or comprehensive attacks between NATO and the former Warsaw Pact members.The Open Skies Treaty covers the territory of 34 participating states between Vladivostok and Vancouver in regards to observation flights.2 It can also be used to verify all arms control regimes of the participants.The Vienna Document limits military activities and contains additional transparency and confidence-building measures to enhance the security of all 57 OSCE member states.3 This system of conventional arms control now finds itself in deep crisis and may soon come to an end.In part, this crisis is a consequence of the success of conventional arms control and the arms reductions of the CFE Treaty in the first half of the 1990s.It forced NATO and the former Warsaw Pact member countries to reduce over 70,000 weapons (Crawford 2010: 30, 32) .These reductions and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1991, followed by the break-up of the Soviet Union in the same year, have ended the large military confrontations in Europe.In light of this, is conventional arms control still necessary?However, the enlargement of NATO into Eastern Europe challenged the block-toblock structure of the CFE Treaty and raised fears in Moscow that the Western alliance could move its superior conventional forces nearer to its border, if these trends were not halted.The adapted CFE Treaty (aCFE), signed in 1999, was meant to overcome this outdated block-to-block structure and reduce such Russian fears through its new concept of more rigid national and territorial limitations.4 But Western countries ended up blocking 1 For further details, see Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, in: www.osce.org/library/14087 (28.2.2013).The treaty finally entered into force on November 9, 1992 and has the following 30 members: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Luxembourg, Moldova, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, the treaty's ratification.The Bush administration, which was averse to arms control, and many other governments linked its intentions to finding a political solution to a number of unregulated territorial conflicts 5 in the South Caucasus.This politically decoupled the ongoing process of alliance enlargement from stabilizing arms control measures completely, thereby raising suspicion and mistrust in Russia.Russian suspicion and mistrust have further been aggravated by the growing debate on missile defense in the Western alliance.Russia feared that NATO would widen its military capabilities in a second sensitive security area without any constraints or accountability.Furthermore, an unlimited Western missile defense system in Europe had the potential to one day jeopardize Russian's second strike capability (Arbatov 2011: 17) .Additionally, the enlargement of NATO towards Georgia and the Ukraine was looming on the horizon.In response, Putin suspended the CFE Treaty at the end of 2007 as a warning signal for others to take Russian security concerns more seriously.NATO's decision in 2008 to offer Georgia and the Ukraine alliance membership at a yet undetermined time raised tensions between Russia and Georgia.These tensions led to an attack by Georgia on its entity, South Ossetia, in August 2008 and the subsequent Russian intervention.Later, Moscow recognized the Georgian entities Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states.This complicates conventional arms control further since both Western states and Georgia desire to return to the territorial status quo ante before the war.In 2009, newly elected U.S. President Obama started the reset of U.S. relations towards Russia with the aim of repairing the strained relationship under the Bush administration.In this context, the revival of strategic nuclear arms control had priority for both.In 2010, the Corfu Process 6 , the OSCE summit in Astana and the NATO proposal to establish a 'Strategic Partnership' between the Alliance and Russia led the way for a start of new conventional arms control talks.But progress has become more difficult with time.The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), which enhanced the range, accuracy and efficiency of U.S. conventional weapon systems, has further increased already existing security concerns (Miasnikov 2012; Gormley 2009 ; Arbatov/Dvorkin/Oznobishchev 2012) in Russia.American military programs like the conventional long range strike (CLRS) capabilities and the controversial conventional prompt global strike (CPGS) capabilities have enhanced such Russian fears (Acton 2011: 59) .Therefore, Russia not only wants more accountability from NATO enlargement but also increased accountability on the issue of the extent to which these new conventional technological developments and future military capabilities will threaten essential security functions of its (nuclear) forces (Arbatov 2011: 23-24 ).Because the U.S. government was unable -for domestic reasons -to accept limitations of U.S. conventional ballistic missile defense capabilities in Europe or offer a legal guarantee that these means will not be used against Russian nuclear forces, Moscow was unwilling to go ahead with conventional arms control talks on a new framework agreement.7 They were suspended in May 2011 8 and, in response, the CFE Treaty members belonging to NATO suspended their annual information exchange with Russia in 2011, along with Georgia and Moldova.These developments have again changed the framework for conventional arms control.A minor update of aCFE and its prompt ratification will no longer be possible and must be replaced by a new approach (Gottemoeller 2012) .What is more, the new stalemate has provided time for discussing alternatives for conventional arms control, owing to the fact that U.S. President Obama was unable to break the Russian blockade before his re-election at the end of 2012.9 In Germany, the stalemate has been used for the development of new conceptual ideas.A procedural idea is to launch this discussion in three consecutive steps: First, it should start with talks about future principles and objectives for conventional arms control.Second, once a common understanding has been reached, the paths towards a new regime should be outlined.Finally, negotiations on the necessary instruments should follow.This report is built upon this procedural line as well: after a chapter that discusses the reasons for the current crisis, possible future principles and objectives, the ways and instruments for conventional arms control are addressed.In regards to the instruments, the author presents new conceptual ideas pertaining to 'verified transparency'.The principle purpose of this report is to introduce these new ideas to both the public and a broader international community of (academic) experts and, based on these ideas, present a flexible concept that has been developed by the author and, in turn, learn from the concept's pros and cons that will arise from subsequent discussions.The author wishes to emphasize that these are only his personal views on the matter.10 As growing mistrust between Russia and NATO is the main concern for European security, it is the primary goal of the ideas presented here to restore confidence through substantially enhanced transparency of military arsenals, capabilities and intentions and their necessary verification.Only heightened transparency that covers all major new technological developments of conventional military arsenals and capabilities can perform such a task.The new ideas are less oriented towards limitations (Nikel 2012: 11-12) and are thus based on the condition of a certain amount of confidence growing among the participating states.However, they do not exclude limitations per se, rather reduce their necessity.Verification of military arsenals, capabilities and intentions is an indispensable tool for creating sufficient trust and accountability.Most of the discussed measures are not entirely new and some may already be widely known.They can, however, be implemented in a different manner for new conventional arms control architecture.Furthermore, conceptual ideas can be structured and used in a very flexible manner for a variety of purposes.They offer a versatile toolkit for disseminating information about, analyzing, examining and evaluating military forces.Therefore, comprehensive verified transparency seems much better suited to enhancing confidence and answering the question of the extent to which military stability can be threatened by certain new military developments and capabilities.The conclusions aim to evaluate the possible political problems related to implementing these new ideas.Finally, two annexes have been added to provide an overview of the CFE Treaty and of the Vienna Document.Various developments on the political, security, and military-technical levels have converged and weakened the perspective of conventional arms control in Europe.As mentioned above, one of the major political issues is the mounting mistrust on the Russian side owing to NATO enlargement and the fact that conventional missile defense in Europe has not yet been constrained.This raises the question as to whether the U.S. and NATO are at all interested in maintaining military accountability in Europe any longer being that Russia appears too weak militarily and can therefore be downplayed.On the other hand, many Western countries are disappointed by the growing authoritarian rule in Russia and the mounting differences in regards to the ways that Moscow has managed the nuclear crisis with Iran as well as the civil war in Syria.Furthermore, Western countries complain of a lack to willingness on the part of Russia in regards to engagement in finding a solution to the unregulated territorial conflicts in Georgia, Moldova and between Armenia and Azerbaijan.But here, Western critics, in particular in the U.S. Congress, should bear in mind that internal Western territorial conflicts such as Gibraltar, between Spain and United Kingdom, 11 and Cyprus, between Turkey and Greece, are even older and have been not resolved either.The U.S. government has still not formulated any new goals while its new approach towards conventional arms control in Europe and the interagency process for a consensus on arms control have not yet been started.Within the Russian government, division over conventional arms control is growing between the foreign and defense ministries.The defense ministry currently determines arms control policies for Russia.This ministry has a much lower interest in arms control and subordinates the matter completely under its conventional force modernization plans.The foreign ministry seems to have a stronger interest in conventional arms control but has lost the prerogative.Therefore, Russia currently finds itself in a 'wait and see' mode.The crisis of conventional arms control has several additional origins.Because the large conventional military threat has disappeared in Europe, high-ranking politicians in North America and Western Europe no longer have a major interest in conventional arms control or its modernization.It seems very difficult to win their attention on this issue.As a further consequence of the diminished threat, Europe faces growing political diversity of security views, creating more difficulties for defining common goals for future conventional arms control.West European countries such as Spain, France, Great Britain, Italy and Germany generally do not fear Russia or its forces; however, small Central-Eastern European countries like the Baltic States have a different view, for understandable historical reasons.They look upon Moscow's planned conventional military modernization up to 2020 as well as new weapon and force deployments in the Russian Federation with a different perception.Outside of the alliance, states like Georgia, Moldova and Azerbaijan have tried to subordinate progress on conventional arms control to their political goal of finding a solution for their unregulated territorial conflicts first.What is more, the nature of the threat has changed.During the Cold War, the risk of interstate conflict was high in Europe.With the end of this era, the risks in other fields, namely domestic violence, civil wars and terroristic acts, have increased across Europe.But traditional arms control, which takes place on the interstate level, is less suited for the management of such risks.The crisis is further aggravated by the modern technological revolution.Conventional troops and weapons can be moved faster than in the past and the conventionalization of previous strategic nuclear delivery systems like intercontinental ballistic missiles, the coming introduction of conventional hypersonic glide vehicles within the conventional prompt global strike program of the U.S., and growing numbers of heavy bombers within the conventional long-range strike program give conventional weapons a global and strategic range.With this important distinctions between conventional and nuclear strategic weapons have begun to be blurred.The ongoing development of unmanned weapon systems like armed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), combat aircraft and armored combat vehicles, which can even be steered from other continents, is changing modern conventional warfare as well.The interrelationship between all these conventional modernization efforts and the ongoing development of cyber weapons for modern warfare is not fully understood and this further increases unaccountability, insecurity and concerns about military stability (Anthony 2012: 416) .In spite of all these negative developments there is still room for conventional arms control.The political enlargement of the Western alliance has not changed the military deployments in Europe in such a significant way.The rotational deployment of some small U.S. army and air force units in Poland, Bulgaria and Romania since 2005, the establishment of NATO's Baltic Air Policing mission since 2004, and the higher presence of NATO vessels in the Black Sea and the eastern part of the Baltic See cannot be seen as major change of its strategic orientation towards Russia.On the contrary, U.S. Forces in Europe will further reduce their footprint by the withdrawal of two brigades by the end of 2014 on account of severe budget deficit in the United States and their reorientation towards Asia.12 This question is more difficult to answer now than during the Cold War as the grave military threat has disappeared.Neither NATO nor Russia currently has the intention of attacking the other or preparing the development of military capabilities in the future.Under the present financial crisis in the United States and Europe, it would be imprudent to adopt such a policy goal.On the contrary, the present financial crisis should be seen as strong motive to go ahead with conventional arms control in order to promote and strengthen common security in Europe at the lowest possible costs and thereby use conventional arms control as a means to overcome the present financial difficulties.An agreement of mutual military restraint in Europe could also facilitate cooperation in other areas between the participants.Additional reasons for maintaining and modernizing conventional arms control also exist.Permanent military transparency and on-site verification of military forces preserve and create accountability and trust between states.On the contrary, ending military transparency and verification could increase mistrust and unaccountability and thereby enhance security concerns in Europe once again.Mutual suspicions would return and undermine efforts towards security and stability in Europe.A major threat lies in the mere existence of military forces and their development.The central question is whether or not they will be used solely for defensive purposes or if they will also be utilized for offensive goals.This is a question of military intentions and what a state intends to do with its forces.As long as the intentions are purely defensive, they should not pose any security issues for others, even if a state possesses large forces.But offensive intentions are also a possibility.It is therefore imperative to have sufficient information about intentions and have the ability to assess them in a credible and reliable way.Here, the interrelationship between military intentions and military capabilities comes into play.The capabilities of military forces can also be either more defensive or offensive.If defensive intentions are congruent with the military capabilities of forces, this set-up should prove least threatening.If offensive intentions correspond with offensive military capabilities, this poses a high potential threat to others.Also, a certain mix of offensive and defensive military capabilities can raise security concerns and threaten stability, if defensive capabilities of one side largely outbalance the offensive capabilities of the adversary, especially if the offensive capabilities of the first can allow a preemptive strike.Even the assumption that one state will follow this path can raise security concerns and mistrust.Examples of such a perception are Russia and China, who look with growing mistrust to conventional missile defense capabilities of the United States and also to new conventional offensive capabilities such as 'conventional prompt global strike' and 'conventional long range strike'.Here, a mere regional arms control approach to stabilize these new capabilities will not work.But in the case of conventional missile defense in Europe, a regional approach might be possible as long as the system defends only European territory against short and medium range missiles.In reality, a purely defensive or offensive orientation is rare; often there is a mix of defensive and offensive intentions and military capabilities which create ambivalence of threat perceptions and assessments.These 'mixed signal' can still generate insecurity, mistrust and contribute to the security dilemma.The acceptance and implementation of arms control can reduce the ambivalence of threat perceptions, promote confidence and thereby further strengthen war prevention and crisis stability.Notwithstanding the fact that the Cold War military threat has disappeared, Europe still faces several smaller threats and risks to security.The perception of these threats is decisive and it does not really matter how rational it is.In spite of the fact that the Cold War was overcome more than twenty years ago, individuals and groups with the traditional perception that NATO and Russia are a military threat to each other still abound.Even in the newest Russian military doctrine, NATO is mentioned as the 'main threat' (RusMilDoc 2010: No.8a) and the former conservative U.S. presidential candidate, Mitt Romney, described Russia as the 'number one geopolitical foe'.13 Such perceptions cannot be overcome overnight; conventional arms control can help to surmount such views.Another threat lies in a number of unresolved territorial conflicts.As the local war in Georgia showed in 2008 14 , the unresolved territorial conflicts in Europe can cause internal violence with the risk of escalating into interstate war, thereby jeopardizing European security as long as political solutions to such conflicts are not possible.This risk still exists in Georgia, between the central state and its entities of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, in Moldova, between the central government and the entity of Transdniestre, and in Serbia, 15 between the central government and the entity of Kosovo.A similar, though not identical situation, exists between Turkey and Greece over Cyprus and an even stronger threat of war exists between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the entity Nagorno-Karabakh.The risk of war seems high in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh and very low in the case of Transdniestre and Cyprus, while the threats in the other conflicts are classified as medium.In all these examples, the outlook for an early political solution seems rather dim.Therefore, the tasks of war prevention, crisis stability and of preventive diplomacy -also by means of conventional arms control -are still very important, not only on the local and regional levels, but also on the European security level, since these conflicts can escalate into full-fledged interstate wars.Due to historical and political considerations, some small Eastern European countries have more reason to mistrust and fear Russia, thereby demanding greater military engagement from Western NATO countries and the U.S. for their territorial defense.On the other hand, Russia fears the further enlargement of the Alliance and a stronger military engagement of Western NATO countries and the U.S. near its borders.These can be the preconditions for a vicious self-fulfilling circle if it is not interrupted.Here, again, conventional arms control and military confidence building can contribute to minimizing such fears and risks and enhancing accountability, security and confidence on all sides.After the end of the Cold War, military cooperation has slowly grown between NATO and Russia.More military cooperation can also increase confidence and accountability, thereby reducing the demands for arms control.But the process of military cooperation between NATO and Russia is still in its early stages and cannot currently provide the same security performance as a conventional arms control regime.Therefore, we need both military cooperation and arms control in tandem in order to enhance and stabilize security in Europe (Richter 2011: 3).Finally, the swelling interest in long term goals of reducing nuclear weapons to zero increases the importance of conventional military forces, conventional deterrence, and the asymmetries in this field for European security and the stability of nuclear deterrence.Russia compensates for its perceived conventional military inferiority in Europe with a much higher number of sub-strategic nuclear weapons in its European areas (Arbartov/ Kaliadine 2012: 40).Without the preservation and modernization of conventional arms control, it seems impossible to imagine how all these asymmetries and potential instabilities can be managed in a stable and accountable way that reassure and support a stable and secure process of regional and global nuclear disarmament (Acton 2011: 76, 77) .The preservation and modernization of conventional arms control is also an argument for promoting the latter in other regions of the world with greater credibility.The principles of the Helsinki Decalogue (1975) form the basis of cooperative security and arms control in Europe.16 Sovereign equality, refraining from the threat or use of force, inviolability of frontiers, territorial integrity of states, and the peaceful settlement of disputes are still important principles.They are supplemented by other principles such as the indivisibility of security, the freedom of states to choose their own security arrangements (Charter of Paris 1990), and the principle of reciprocity.In principle, all OSCE participating states in Europe should have the right to enter into and to participate in a future European arms control regime.In particular, this should cover all states which are members of security institutions in Europe (NATO, CSTO 17 and EU).However, the above-mentioned variance in the security situation in Europe raises the question of whether it is still possible to gain the same level of security for all participants by using the same means of arms control in the whole of Europe.Or, does it seem more appropriate to maintain a similar or equal level of security by adapting the means of arms control to changes in security?In the latter case, the principle of indivisible security should be reinterpreted for the outcome of security.If such a reinterpretation is acceptable, it would be important that all arms control elements that manage security issues with varied means should have equal value in an overall agreement.The old CFE Treaty was designed to establish parity and stability on a lower level between the two alliances (groups of states parties) in order to prevent a 'surprise attack' or a 'large scale offensive action'.18 Russia still has an interest in maintaining a certain level of parity vis-á-vis NATO since this would constrain the enlargement of the alliance.But NATO countries have rejected such proposals, as they will supposedly not significantly contribute to more stability, according to the Alliance.With the existence of one enlarged alliance, one smaller, less stable Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the European Union (EU), and an additional mix of larger and smaller independent states, the principle of parity is no longer applicable or valid for the whole of Europe.But the case is different on the regional level: The adaptation of the CFE Treaty upon the dissolution of the Soviet Union by the Tashkent Agreement in Mai 1992 supported the armistice agreements mediated by Russia in the unresolved territorial conflicts of Georgia, Moldova and between Armenia and Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh) to some degree.All these countries were forced to accept low weapon ceilings based on the principle of parity.Here, low limitations and the principle of parity could be still important.The objective of preventing a 'surprise attack' or 'large scale offensive action '-repeated in Article 1 of the adapted CFE Treaty -has lost its previous value for NATO and Russia.19 A large scale offensive action or a surprise attack seems very unlikely between most CFE states in Europe.But in the case of the unresolved territorial conflicts, the threat of a 'surprise attack' is real, as the Georgian military intervention against its entity South Ossetia demonstrated in 2008.Despite the government in Azerbaijan favoring a diplomatic solution for the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, there are also high-ranking Azerbaijani voices who do not exclude resorting to military force to end the conflict over the contested enclave.20 Therefore, it is strongly recommended to maintain the goal of war prevention and the goal of prevention of surprise attack for a future agreement.In this context, a new important objective will be to prevent destabilizing force concentrations of land forces between states parties.The prevention of destabilizing force concentrations supports the goal of war prevention and crisis stability.21 The prevention of destabilizing force concentrations can also enhance confidence building, security, and stability in cases where new NATO members come close or even have a direct border with Russia and in cases where large countries like Russia border small neighbors.Here, the principle of reciprocity will play an important role.Regulations that prevent threatening and destabilizing force concentrations also offer the opportunity to replace the controversial flank limitations of the CFE Treaty.The new main goal of conventional arms control should not be limited to maintaining military transparency, verification, and accountability of military potentials for all of its members.Verified transparency of military potential through the counting of military personnel, units, weapons, and other equipment alone is insufficient even if extended weapon categories and naval forces were included, as important qualitative factors would not be covered.The structure of forces, missions, and military weapons, equipment, its support and capabilities are changing.Military units are becoming smaller and more mobile and can be used far from their homeland.This has strengthened potential destabilizing intervention capabilities.Traditional military weapon systems like heavy battle tanks, armored combat vehicles and combat aircraft, mainly limited by the old CFE Treaty, will lose their value because of the improving efficiency and accuracy of modern munitions and missiles in the compound structure of intelligence, reconnaissance, communication, command and control, described as network-centric warfare capability.The growing vulnerability of such major weapon systems favors a trend towards more unmanned, smaller, semi-automatic weapon systems with stealth characteristics in future military activities.A simple increase of conventional weapon categories and the inclusion of all military services in conventional arms control would only partially match future capabilities of military forces.A more comprehensive approach to conventional arms control is necessary, one which does not only look to the strengths of selected military weapon categories.Based on the conceptual ideas of verified transparency, a new objective should also include transparency of military capabilities and transparency of military intentions.Transparency of military capabilities would go beyond the simple bean counting-approach of military potentials and include important new qualitative factors into future conventional arms control which cannot be accounted for otherwise.It would allow for a more realistic assessment of what modern conventional forces can and cannot do with regard to their doctrinal objectives.This could reduce the overestimation of military capabilities and also threat perception.Transparency of military intentions records the goals of military forces which usually determine their strength, structure and capabilities.Verified transparency of military intentions could therefore demonstrate to what extent they are congruent with military potentials, structures and capabilities.They could additionally facilitate the renunciation of limitations or reduce their value.Military intentions with a defensive orientation and military forces and structures that are not oriented towards neighbors reduce demands for limitations and strengthen the concept of verified transparency.However, verified transparency alone is always to the advantage of the strongest party militarily -currently the Western alliance (Hartmann/Schmidt 2011: 30) .Therefore, the instrument of limitations as such is still important in order to balance this advantage.Limitations seem necessary in three distinct areas: First, to strengthen war prevention and crisis stability in the cases of local unregulated territorial conflicts.Second, limitations may be necessary to prevent possible future military instabilities.Finally, several countries like Russia, Turkey, Greece, Romania and Italy still believe in limitations for different political reasons.In the case of Turkey and Greece, they support regional stabilization.Therefore, limitations may be necessary to supplement the new conceptual ideas of verified transparency and should not be seen as a contradiction to them.Hence, the CFE and aCFE objectives, "maintaining a secure and stable and balanced overall level of conventional armed forces in Europe lower than heretofore" and "of eliminating disparities prejudicial to stability and security" should be preserved.22 They represent the goal of maintaining security on the lowest possible force levels in Europe and preventing disparities which can be a risk for future stability and security.Further, NATO member states should restate their commitments to restrain from deploying substantial combat forces in the new member countries as long as Russia seems willing to accept similar constraints in Belarus, Armenia and for the controversial entities South Ossetia and Abkhazia.A very controversial objective is the principle of 'host nation consent'.It allows for the deployment of foreign troops only with the explicit consent of a host state.Russia is basically willing to accept this principle and the wording in the adapted CFE Treaty since it ratified the agreement in 2004.However, some state parties want to use this principle beyond arms control as a tool for the political regulation of their unresolved territorial conflicts.But this has stepped beyond the bounds of arms control.Therefore, the political regulation of the frozen conflicts in the Caucasus must be negotiated in the existing political institutions (Minsk Process for Nagorno-Karabakh, 5 + 2 Process for Transdniestre and Geneva Talks for South Ossetia and Abkhazia).23 Unfortunately, the recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia by Russia in 2008 has complicated this problem since it enhanced the territorial conflict between Western capitals and Moscow.However, there is no other option than to separate arms control from the political solutions of these conflicts and seek workable compromises on the implementation of the host nation consent principle at the end of the negotiations.Further, the goal of Global Zero for nuclear weapons has increased the importance of conventional asymmetries and their impact on stability in regards to nuclear deterrence.A new objective is recommended for this: Conventional arms control should contribute to nuclear disarmament and not create new obstacles to it.Finally, all OSCE member states in Europe should have the right to enter into a future European arms control regime.This shall cover all NATO, CSTO, and EU member countries and independent states.These new conceptual ideas are still in their early stages of development.Therefore, it is important to meet states and experts where they currently stand and listen to their concerns and adjust these ideas to them as far as possible.Before a multilateral discussion and negotiations over the new approach are initiated, it is important to begin with bilateral discussions.First, this makes it easier to explain the new approaches in all their facets; secondly, one can better respect the different views and concerns of the partner.Subsequently, the new approach should be discussed and developed in the Alliance before new negotiations with others can start.Who should participate in these negotiations?The answer to this question is controversial.In the previous informal talks named 'to 36 format' between December 2010 and May 2011, all 30 CFE state parties and six new NATO countries (Albania, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovenia) participated.Due to the enlargement of the alliance, these six 23 See also Rose Gottemoeller, acting head the Bureau of Arms Control and of International Security in the U.S. State Department, who said: "But, of course, international arms control agreements cannot and should not resolve all the bilateral and other problems, like the frozen conflicts you mentioned.Such agreements, can, however, build confidence between the parties to such territorial disputes and improve security in the zone of the conflicts.Another question is the future structure of conventional arms control in Europe.Should the new concept be further developed into an independent CFE follow-up agreement and should the Vienna Document 2011 (see Annex II) be adapted to it, or should the new concept be incorporated into the Vienna Document and only create a single agreement?If one integrated and politically binding agreement is the goal, it seems easier to integrate the new concept into the Vienna Document.But there is no implicit necessity for following this resolution.If a legally binding treaty has priority, two separate agreements would be necessary since only the Vienna Document is politically binding.In this case, the Vienna Document could be adapted to the new objectives of conventional arms control.The integration of enhanced transparency for military doctrines and defense guidelines should also not cause too many difficulties.A new, single, integrated comprehensive military data exchange measure could be established either in the Vienna Document or the legally binding conventional arms control agreement.In the latter case, data exchanges in the Vienna document can either be reduced or terminated to minimize future workload.What should happen to the Open Skies Treaty in this context?Due to the fact that the Open Skies Treaty is a legally binding regime, has a smaller body of membership, and can be used for transparency measures in all arms control agreements, it would be a severe mistake to try integrating it into a future conventional arms regime.But a future conventional arms control regime could try to make better use of Open Skies for the purpose of observations and inspections.This would further strengthen Open Skies.Also, a mechanism would be necessary that regulates the transfer of participants from the Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control 24 to the new European-wide Agreement, thereby covering Croatia as a NATO member.A further question is the binding character of this new agreement.Many states such as Russia, Turkey, Greece, Romania, Italy and conservative political forces in the U.S. 25 to preserve the legally binding character of conventional arms control.In principle, a legally binding treaty has higher value compared to a politically binding agreement and is therefore preferable.But ratification of a legally binding treaty would be a challenging task for several reasons: First, the divergent security views in Europe and in North America will surely increase difficulties for national ratification.Second, the management of territorial conflicts is controversial and can create an additional hurdle for ratification.Third, any new treaty will take several years to get be ratified.Fourth, the conservatives in the U.S. in particular may be very sensitive to the above-mentioned points and have the capacity to prevent ratification owning to the fact that the American constitution requires the support of two thirds of the Senate.Fifth, as the ratification of New START has shown, the price for ratification may be too high compared with any gains attained from a new agreement.Furthermore, the question of a new arms control agreement still being important enough to justify such a procedure with its inherent high risk of failure remains, along with the alternative of a multinational politically binding agreement seeming more appropriate.A multinational political agreement has more binding power than a bilateral agreement.The history of the multilateral politically binding CFE 1A agreement and the Vienna Document are good examples of this (Zellner 2012: 18) .Such agreements offer the additional advantage of entering into force immediately after their signature and would facilitate future changes.The new conceptual ideas of verified transparency would make it necessary to enlarge and redefine some known instruments, structure other means of conventional arms control in a new way and introduce new means and measures to meet the principles and objectives discussed above.But in spite of the necessary changes they should use excisting procedures, rules, measures, and means as much as possible.Here, these ideas are meant to differentiate among verified transparency of military potentials and military intentions.Verified transparency of military potentials would consist of the command structure of military forces (down to the battalion level), the arsenal of military weapons and military equipment, and (a new measure) the analysis and evaluation of military capabilities.This will make it necessary to enlarge the weapon categories and their support equipment in order to fulfill this task.Further, existing definitions of weapon categories should be adapted to their technological development.Verified transparency of military intentions would be a new instrument (see chapter 6.4).The function of existing stabilizing limitations can be replaced and strengthenedwherever possible and acceptable -by the timely notification and the multinational observation of certain military activities if they reach a commonly defined military threshold.Other observable threshold measures should be added to enhance security, accountability and confidence (see chapter 6.3).As in past, nuclear forces and weapons should be excluded from conventional arms control and dual capable weapons systems (nuclear and conventional) will only be counted and verified in their conventional role.However, Russia has a growing interest in including what it calls 'conventional strategic weapons' into future bilateral START negotiations with the U.S. 26 This is currently rejected by the U.S. government, who deems these merely "conventional weapons with strategic range (beyond 5.500 km)".It seems very likely that this controversy will have an impact on future talks on the modernization of conventional arms control in Europe.In this regard, it should be emphasized that verified transparency, in its logic, covers all conventional weapons with strategic ranges that would be deployed in and around Europe to conduct missions in and for European security, should they not otherwise be regulated.New cyber weapon systems can, to a certain degree, substitute the military tasks of conventional forces by threats and attacks against civil and military infrastructure (telecommunication, electricity, water supply).But they will be excluded here due to their very different characteristics and low transparency and must be regulated in a separate manner.27 Transparency of military potentials provides the basis for all other measures.In contrast to the CFE regime, it should be based on an extended approach to cover all relevant new technological and military developments of conventional forces which can have an impact on military security and stability.This means existing weapon categories should be redefined to include new smaller and lighter weapon types with similar or enhanced fire power, as in the case of combat vehicles.All weapon and equipment definitions should cover semi-automatic and automatic systems as in the CFE Treaty since they are set to have a growing impact on future warfare capabilities.New weapon and force categories should likewise be added.Conventional air and missile defense systems, 28 which are mobile or can be used for area defense, like Patriot or SM-3 and the Russian SA-300/-400/-500, should be included, as should short range missile systems like the Russian SS-26 Iskander as their potential counterpart.Separate information is necessary for special and rapid response forces on account of their playing the greatest role for offensive operations and interventions.This must be supplemented by transparency of military air and sealift forces which are also important for the analysis and evaluation of sustainability, deployability and intervention capability.Paramilitary forces must be covered since they offer the opportunity to circumvent transparency of regular troops, especially if weapon systems are transferred to them.On the procedural level, any update of the Protocol of Existing Type (POET) of Conventional Armaments and Military Equipment should no longer be based on the consensus of all participants in order to reduce the risk of a new blockade.29 In contrast to CFE, it is strongly recommended to move beyond the covered land and air forces and include conventional naval forces of the participants as well.Naval forces, which are not only procured for coastal defense, have a regional and global reach and can be concentrated in order to deny other states access to or from the high seas.They can further be used for the landing of land forces (marines) and also have a growing capability to threaten or attack targets at sea and on land with high precision long range cruise missiles or sea-based combat aircraft and helicopters (over 90 percent of the global land territory are in striking distance of naval weapon systems with a range of 900 nautical miles).Additionally, the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and its security are of growing value for many states with adjacent sea areas.Therefore, transparency and verification of naval forces can contribute to greater accountability and confidence building in this area too.A further argument for transparency of naval forces is that Russia has many of its substrategic nuclear weapons earmarked for its sea forces (Zagorski 2011: 17, 18) in order to balance conventional superiority of Western sea forces.More transparency of conventional naval forces increases their accountability and can thereby facilitate further reductions of naval sub-strategic nuclear weapons.Transparency measures should cover all conventional naval forces of European states and include all sea forces for the U.S. and Canada with missions/deployment in the North Atlantic and high sea areas around Europe for security tasks in Europe.The enhanced transparency of conventional military equipment is not entirely new.Since 1994, the annual 'Global Exchange of Military Information' has contained ever more information about conventional land, air and naval forces.30 Furthermore, the introduction of new major weapon systems must be notified.The Vienna Document even goes so far as to demand demonstrations of new weapon systems to other participants as a confidence-building measure (see Annex II).The 'Annual Exchange of Military Information of the Vienna Document' contains figures about active and non-active units and offers thereby basic information about mobilization capability.It also presents separate figures for land-based naval combat aircraft that were excluded from the CFE Treaty in 1991.Since 1994, the 'Annual Information Exchange on Defense Planning and Military Budgets' -now a part of the Vienna Document 2011 -contains, beyond that, additional data about transport aircraft and air defense missile systems.Additionally, it covers the 29 Since 1997, the update of this protocol has been blocked because of the consensus rule and the unresolved differences between Russia and the USA on the exact classification of certain combat vehicle types.30 It includes information about armored combat vehicles with fixed antitank missile launchers, transport helicopters, and transport aircraft, all combat aircraft (with a separate figure of combat aircraft on aircraft carriers), primary trainer aircraft, surface warships with more than 400 t displacement fully loaded and submarines with more than 50 t displacement submerged ( structure and aggregate data of naval forces, including figures on fleet strength, the medical service, and force support elements for all forces.Many elements of the necessary information for verified transparency are currently available to some degree in military data exchanges of various regimes.They must now only be adapted, integrated into a single exchange, and further developed according to a new function and role.In this context, several existing information exchanges can be considered and either closed or markedly reduced with a new agreement, thereby reducing workload and costs.A larger, single information exchange measure will also significantly facilitate the analysis and evaluation of military data.Because the new conceptual ideas envisage no constraints, they will not limit military weapons or forces in any way against external threats outside the application area.Therefore, it no longer seems necessary to exclude certain territorial areas near the border of non-regime neighbors from transparency measures of this agreement, as in the case of Turkey (near the border of Iran, Syria and Iraq), under the legally binding CFE and the politically binding Vienna Document.31 Furthermore, all state parties should annually notify their complete conventional holdings of the covered weapon categories and other military equipment in Europe.The notification should include deployed forces in guest states and in unrecognized entities like Transdniestre and Nagorno-Karabakh or in entities with a controversial status like Abkhazia or South Ossetia, in the area of application.In particular, Armenia should no longer hide a large amount of its forces in Nagorno-Karabakh without informing member states.This would increase transparency and accountability between Armenian and Azerbaijani forces.In the case of Georgia, the issue is even more complicated since Russia has recognized South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states whereas Georgia and all other relevant countries oppose this new status.A dual track approach seems necessary to manage such conflicts.On the one hand, Russia should have no problem with declaring its troops in these 'independent states' as deployed forces.But Georgia and Western countries could not accept this due to the fact that it could be seen as an indirect recognition of these two entities.The other countries should accept Russian figures but reject the status of these two entities in a special diplomatic note.Spain's behavior with the notification of British weapons on Gibraltar can be used as a model.Transparency, analysis and evaluation of military capabilities could here be utilized as an entirely new instrument.The old CFE Treaty prevented two sorts of military capabilities: surprise and comprehensive attacks between alliances.But the new approach is not intended to limit or prevent military capabilities per se, as some might wrongly assume.It merely offers a new opportunity to receive more information on the quality of military forces.The main purpose of this measure is to show other participants the capabilities of conventional forces in order to enhance accountability and confidence.The evaluation of military capabilities will be a purely national assessment and will generally not be fully comparable to the assessment of other states.As long as this assessment method increases transparency, accountability and trust and thereby calms security concerns, the measure should raise no further problems.If it increases security concerns for an inspecting party, then this state would be required to communicate its national assessment to other state parties and convince them to deal with the issue.In the latter case, this shall be seen as a warning signal for security and stability and could potentially lead to further negotiations and regulations.The analysis and evaluation of military capabilities can also facilitate nuclear disarmament, since it could be easier to identify potential destabilizing conventional developments and asymmetries for smaller and more vulnerable nuclear forces and weapons.Answering the questions of which military capabilities should be covered and which information and data are necessary for each capability must be negotiated.The quality of confidence building depends on a sufficient number of capabilities and on the inclusion of modern capabilities that can enhance military fighting and fire power to a high degree, such as the stand-off capability or the capability of network-centric warfare operations.The number and definition of capabilities can be selected under a common sense rule.A possible list could potentially include the following military capabilities: One problem of conventional arms control is that it can only be based on countable and verifiable items and categories.Therefore, it is necessary to determine key accountable and verifiable information elements in advance for every capability in order to create a reliable and valid basis for analysis and assessment.During negotiations, it may be helpful to arrange test data exchanges and test inspections to clarify the complexity of efforts and the quality of results. •Sustainability • Deployability • Readiness • Stand- Confidence building is the most important goal of the new agreement.It should be focused on covering regional and military areas where mistrust seems particularly high.Here, some new rules and the adjustment of others can enhance confidence and accountability.Owing to the fact that Russia still fears NATO enlargement, a strengthening of the Western commitment to not deploy substantial combat forces (air and land forces) 32 in (new) member states seems necessary, as long as no new threat arises.As a reciprocal measure, Russia should be willing to accept the same restraints including possible new deployments in Belarus and Armenia.Because of the unresolved status conflict of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russia should announce constraints in these entities.The state parties shall negotiate new thresholds for the notification and observation of such deployments (including temporary deployments): new deployments and withdrawals of small units will be announced, though they should not be deemed substantial deployments.Additionally, a new threshold should be defined for substantial deployments (including rotational deployments) of land and air forces.33 In case this threshold is reached or exceeded, an additional notification is necessary in advance, with the inclusion of a strong rationale for it.Other participants shall have the right to observe this deployment.If it lasts for a longer time, this notification must be confirmed again after three months and can be observed again by other participants.The principle goal of this measure is to prevent the deployment of significant forces.It does not establish limits for the new deployment of foreign forces that serve the interests of Baltic States, but, for all intents and purposes, has the effect of approximating a limit.A major problem of this measure could be that observations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia will be not possible as long as the status conflict is not resolved.If necessary, this rule can be extended to possible deployments of conventional weapons with strategic ranges.Due to the growing mobility of conventional land forces, the capability of concentrating forces over great distances will continue to rise.This is particularly true for NATO, EU and CSTO members.Therefore, it is important to enhance stability and security and to reduce the concerns about unusual concentrations of land forces by their advanced announcement and through multinational regular observations without the right of refusal.Every concentration of land forces within a certain territorial area that is near a border 34 involving more than five percent of the national holdings should be notified.In deployments exceeding 10 percent, the activity should be observed by a multinational inspection team.35 Mutual politically binding 'no-increase' commitments for military forces in certain regions and areas can further strengthen this rule.36 Such a counting rule works fine for states of similar size and forces.However, in cases where a small state like Georgia borders a large state like Russia, this rule is inappropriate.Russia has 5.000 tanks and Georgia only 180.With a five or ten percent threshold, Russia can concentrate 249 to 499 tanks near Georgia without announcing it, whereas Georgia can only concentrate 8 to 17 tanks.Here, based on the principle of reciprocity, more appropriate thresholds should be negotiated for notifications and observations near the border on a multilateral level that better balance such asymmetries.Figures for the threshold can be oriented on a battalion sized level or slightly above.Also, unusual concentrations 37 of sea forces (excluding submarines) near the coast of a state party (near or in the exclusive economic zone) beyond a defined threshold can be announced in advance and observed by a multinational observer team to enhance accountability and confidence.In such a case, observers should have the right to survey these concentrations either from the command room of the command ship and/or from a naval command center on land of the nation leading this force.Here, an observation on a command ship should be possible even on high seas, if no other opportunity exists to observe this activity.Military activities are much smaller than in the past because of the transformed force structures and the enhanced use of computer simulations for cost reasons.It therefore seems necessary to lower the thresholds for notification and observation of military activities in the Vienna Document 2011 in order to reestablish the lost level of accountability to some degree.38 Independent, large air force activities or air-sea activities should also be announced in advance in order to enhance accountability and confidence.But, at present, it is not possible to observe large air force activities.The transit of land forces either to another country in the zone of application or through the zone of application should be notified in advance and not exceed a duration of 21 days through the zone and 42 days in the zone.39 These, partly overlapping, security and confidence building rules offer several additional advantages: They can be used to replace the controversial flank limits (see Annex I) of the CFE Treaty, thereby fulfilling an old demand by Russia and Ukraine.They also create better early warning measures for war preparations in the case of unregulated territorial conflicts with the unusual force concentration rule and the lowered threshold of observable military activities.Additionally, they can help minimize mistrust between East Central European NATO members and Russia.On the Western side, this is particularly true for the Baltic States.These countries are also opposed to the withdrawal of American sub-strategic nuclear weapons from Europe.Malcolm Chalmers described this problem as follows: "One of the ironies in this whole debate about nonstrategic nuclear weapons in Europe is the countries that have them don't want them and the countries that don't have them want the ones who don't want them to keep them.40 " Such measures can likewise facilitate further withdrawal of U.S. sub-strategic nuclear weapons systems from Europe.Further confidence building measures can be negotiated either on a multilateral or bilateral level.They can include the following measures: 41 • one or more additional observations of small-scale military activity, particularly near a mutual border; • mutual restraints in the increase of military forces, deployed forces; • information of the deployment of new units and the introduction of new major weapons in a defined regional area; • more frequent invitations for visits to military bases of all services; • more mutual communication in military affairs, for example in regards to smallscale military activities and their regulations at the mutual border; • regular exchanges of military personnel from all services.This list of measures is surely not exhaustive.It demonstrates that there are enough means to enhance military confidence and accountability.The central question is whether there is enough political will on all concerned sides to enter into negotiations on such measures and implement them on a regular basis.Clearly it is impossible to analyze and evaluate military intentions with 100 percent certainty.But Europe has reached a stable security situation which is supported by a certain level of military dialogue and transparency.This quality in interstate relations makes it very unlikely that Europe will witness any sharp change in military intentions in the short term.Verified transparency of military intentions will strengthen this fact and thereby increase confidence.And verified information about defensive military intentions can contribute to balancing conventional military asymmetries as long as they have no impact on military stability.42 The new approach is based on some redundancy through several layers of information, analysis and evaluation of military intentions in order to increase the reliability of data.As a first layer, states should regularly disclose information about their military doctrines and defense guidelines, defense planning and defense budget.As a second layer, the regular observation of one or two of their largest military maneuvers should be allowed every two or three years with no right of refusal.In such maneuvers, military forces try to implement the goals of their military doctrines and defense guidelines.This measure goes beyond the present regulations of the Vienna document 2011, which allows the observation of military activities only in cases where certain very high thresholds are exceeded.43 Therefore, the Vienna document or a new agreement should incorporate this additional measure.It can provide observers with some knowledge as to the extent to which military forces are able to fulfill their respective national defense doctrines and guidelines.As a third layer, transparency of the structure and deployment of forces will supplement the military picture in this regard.These instruments can, altogether, grant effective insight into military intentions with sufficient reliability.The exchange of information on military doctrines and its discussion is not an entirely new measure.Many state parties, including Russia, publish their security and military doctrines voluntarily.44 Many OSCE governments have participated in the exchange and discussion of their doctrines at the OSCE High Level military doctrine seminars in 1990, 1991, 1998, 2001, 2006 and 2011 on a voluntary basis.45 Additionally, all OSCE members are obligated, according to chapter II of the Vienna Document (Defense Planning), to provide all other members with information about their military doctrine, defense policy, defense planning and defense budget (Vienna Document 2011: Cypher 15.1 -15.4.4.2).Information and discussion of military doctrines are not only important for reasons of transparency but also a necessary precondition for greater military cooperation.So it would not seem to require a very large leap to do these things on a slightly more regulated and enhanced basis and in a regular exchange with other states.Up until now, there has been no obligation for an information exchange on defense guidelines.However, a few states, like Germany (Defense Policy Guidelines 2011) and the USA, publish their defense guidelines on a voluntary basis.In the future, the term 'defense policy and doctrine' in the Vienna Document (Vienna Document 2011: Cypher 15.1) can be extended to 'defense policy, guidelines and doctrine' to cover defense guidelines and, in the annex of the document, the definition of these guidelines and their contents could be presented.Within the defined initial phase of a new agreement, all participating states should exchange their newest military doctrines and defense guidelines.In order to reduce efforts and costs, they should only confirm the newest doctrine and guidelines in the following annual information exchange, being that most states revise them only after a major change of the security situation or after elections, and not every year.Every official revision of a military doctrine and a defense guideline should be recorded in the following annual information exchange.The CFE Treaty has the aim of verifying current holdings of covered weapon systems and evaluating their compliance with existing ceilings and limitations for each participant.Because the new approach has no limitations or ceilings, the new objective is different: it will only verify the notified actual holdings with some additional information.The current practice of verification raises several problems for a future agreement.Russia has largely reduced the number of conventional arms control inspectors on account of suspending the CFE Treaty at the end of 2007 and has had no interest in raising the number to the previous level for cost reasons.Other states like the Netherlands and Great Britain have reduced their inspection agency for financial reasons as well or because they do not really believe in a future of conventional arms control.Many participants, like Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece, and Hungary have a strong interest in lowering the burden of inspection costs.An additional issue is that the inspections of Western countries are primarily aimed towards Russia and Belarus, whereas Russia is primarily interested in inspections of NATO members.And both (NATO countries and Russia) control the countries with unresolved territorial conflicts to some degree.Furthermore, NATO countries have agreed through an MOU not to inspect one another.This has created a very unbalanced structure of inspections over time.This raises the question as to whether a multilateral institution for inspections, similar to the OPCW or the IAEA, could better serve the interests of the state parties, particularly under tightened budgets and a likely growing number of participants.It would offer several advantages: Routine inspections of military potentials by the technical secretariat of the new agency based on random or on a certain key for the inspection of all participants can solve the problem of the unbalanced structure.Additionally, a multinational inspection agency would help to reduce the costs for general evaluation, observation and inspection visits.The inspection of military equipment and units and the observation of military activities for examining military intentions and the observation of military concentrations beyond certain thresholds can both be conducted by this new agency.Also, all data and information exchanges and notifications can be gathered there and distributed to the participants.But there are also some disadvantages: A multinational inspection agency cannot build confidence in the same way and with the same efficiency as is the case in direct inspections between state inspection agencies.If confidence building is a major goal for a future agreement, a multinational inspection agency seems to be less well suited.And small states that only participate by passive inspections in an inspection regime for cost reasons may be forced to pay a little bit more for a multinational inspection agency.At present, many state parties are forced to spend money for inspectors and inspections as well as for the analytical work, documentation, electronic archiving and other tasks.A central multinational agency would reduce such costs for every participant.And since all state parties would have access to the inspection reports, no duplication of an inspection would be necessary.A State can provide their inspectors and name certain experts for special inspections and/or offer a financial contribution for this new multinational verification agency according to their economic and financial situation and the agreed cost sharing.As mentioned before, only the inspection of certain military capabilities should be conducted by a lead nation, being that such inspections are rare and need special expertise that a multinational institution presumably cannot provide in a cost-effective manner.Such direct inspections would also have a heightened effect for confidence building and would lower this disadvantage of a multinational agency.In the past, the U.S. has always opposed such a multinational institution for several reasons: First, it was not willing to transfer such important control and steering rights to an external institution and, secondly, it feared it could strengthen conventional arms control too much and thereby further weaken NATO.But under the current situation, when most participants are forced to reduce their budget deficits, a multinational verification agency seems to be more cost effective.The U.S. government can further demonstrate its strong commitment to conventional arms control and conventional stability with its political support for such an agency and thereby increase its credibility for its Global Zero goal of nuclear weapons.However, verification of conventional military forces of a state party near the border of countries which do not participate in the regime can be difficult or even impossible if they are involved in current operational missions that concern a state or states outside the agreement.In such a case, special verification exceptions may be necessary for defined territorial areas or zones (as little as possible) which verge on non-regime neighbors.In order to keep this possible loophole as limited as possible, all special verification exceptions should always be announced and this information should be repeated after a certain timeframe of three or six months.The notification of such exceptional events, which should, in principle, be as short and small as possible, should include details about their duration, the excluded area and the reason for it.A prolongation of this exception should be possible.Inspections of naval forces need special regulations since they are too expensive on or above the high seas and can seriously hamper ongoing sea operations.Furthermore, the control of sea forces on the international high seas does not seem possible in a reliable manner even by use of the Open Skies Treaty.46 For these reasons they have been excluded here.Inspections of naval forces should be possible in European home ports only.Here, arms control regulations should not make a distinction between national and multinational forces and rather cover both categories.In 2012, Germany voluntarily invited observers to a visit of a marine base under the Vienna Document 2011 in the city of Kiel, including the visit of ships, which demonstrated that observation and verification of marine forces are possible at their home port locations (German FSC-Invitation 18 February 2012).However, this raises difficulties for the U.S. and Canadian navies since they have no home ports for their conventional vessels, ships and submarines in Europe.47 For this reason, U.S. and Canadian vessels, ships and submarines that have no home port in Europe but are deployed and/or operate in European waters should be inspected in European ports as well, with consent of the host state.This measure would not completely serve the principle of reciprocity, but otherwise Canada and the USA would be forced to open their homeports on their territory along the Atlantic for inspections.If a state party demands a ship inspection from another participant in its homeport(s), the inspected party should consent within a certain timeframe of up to six months, as vessels, ships and submarines can stay outside of their homeports for several months during operational missions and any interruption would be to costly.This is also the reason why vessels, ships and submarines should be excluded from challenge inspections.They may not be possible in most cases, or would be too expensive and can seriously affect ongoing operations of the concerned sea unit.Inspection of military capabilities is a new challenge.A new system of regular, annual data exchange should provide all the information necessary for verification of capabilities.For example, information as to transportation capability of forces is an important contributing factor for the analysis and evaluation of military capability, of sustainability, or intervention capability.Therefore, military transportation equipment from all services, which generally do not have combat missions and may not be heavily armed, should be defined, included and counted on a regular basis.Further voluntary data should be possible if one state is not fully satisfied with the results of such special inspection.Due to the much higher requirements, the frequency of capability inspections should be limited.Every active state party should have the right to one or two of these capability inspections within a time period of three to five years and every passive state party is not obliged to accept more than three inspections within the same time period in order to reduce workload and costs.Capability inspections can include several military bases, installations and sites at the same time and/or consecutively.Such measures do not compare with a simple inspection of weapon systems and other military equipment in one or two military bases presently called Objects of Verification (OoVs).Capability inspections should only be conducted under the responsibility of a lead nation and can be accompanied by inspectors and experts from other nations as well as a representative from the proposed multinational verification agency.The reason for this procedure was mentioned earlier in this report.Capability inspections require highly educated special experts who are usually too expensive for permanent duty in an international agency.Capability inspections need some time for preparation and cannot be arranged overnight.For this reason, they cannot be a part of challenge inspections.The new conceptual ideas of verified transparency demand a novel way of thinking about conventional arms control.Being that they are based on a certain degree of confidence, limitations would no longer seem necessary.The combination of verified military potentials, verified intentions and additional confidence and security building measures can substitute military limitations to a high degree, though perhaps not completely.The extent to which limitations are actually necessary needs to be further discussed, particularly in relation to military security of the unregulated territorial conflicts and for areas where they might be important for maintaining regional stability.The extension of transparency by the integration of additional force and weapon categories, along with their support equipment, via the introduction of the analysis and evaluation of military capabilities and intentions is aimed at the main problem of European security: the growing mistrust, particularly in Russia.It should serve to alleviate the vicious circle of mutual growing mistrust and enhance military accountability and confidence on all sides.The analysis and evaluation of military capabilities can also facilitate the identification of new military instabilities.48 The new confidence and security building measures strengthen war prevention and crisis stability, especially for state parties with unregulated territorial conflicts through the advanced announcement and observation of unusual force concentrations or deployments.Furthermore, these measures can functionally replace the controversial flank rule or flank limits.The new deployment rule would also increase military accountability for NATO enlargement.If significant land or air force combat troops were deployed in new member states, it would have to be notified in 48 See Grossman, Elaine M., Do Advanced Conventional Weapons Make Nuclear War More Likely?in: NTI Global Security Newswire 22 August 2012, in: www.nti.org/gsn/article/jury-out-do-advancedconventional-weapons-make-nuclear-war-more-likely/ (28.2.2013).advance, justified with convincing arguments and regularly observed in order to prevent such deployments.Russia and others members must accept the same rule in order to enhance the security of their neighbors.The establishment of the proposed new verification agency could be a strong commitment for the future of conventional arms control in Europe.It could contribute in overcoming many structural problems of the current verification system and help to reduce the costs of verification.The debate about the conceptual ideas of verified transparency has been initiated.Discussions should now be broadened in order to extend the discussion and learn from its pros and cons.The new instruments of verified transparency of military capabilities and the verified transparency of military intentions surely need further discussion to answer some remaining questions.Are they really necessary and how should they be structured?Is it possible to identify sufficiently detailed elements which are countable and verifiable for all the mentioned military capabilities?To what extent will they actually improve the qualitative assessment and knowledge about military forces?To which degree will it be possible and necessary to include naval forces related to European security in these new conceptual ideas?Should conventional missile defense be a part of a future conventional arms control agreement or separately regulated through measures of military cooperation?Should verification be organized in a new multinational verification agency or should the present structure of national organization be maintained?There are many questions which must be discussed on a government and expert level if the new conceptual ideas of verified transparency or elements can become a part of a novel alliance concept and future negotiations.Should this come to fruition, it would be worthwhile to establish several international experts groups alongside government talks.They could discuss selected questions in further detail and develop possible solutions and propose them to the track I level.With the election of President Obama for a second term and the nomination of Chuck Hagel as the new head of the Defense Department and John Kerry as the new head of the State Department, the future fate of conventional arms control looks a little bit more hopeful.Conventional arms control still has a small chance of successful revival.The conventional military superiority of the U.S. is not necessarily an obstacle to an agreement since both Russia and the U.S. have a common interest in keeping the security situation in Europe stable and calm in order to have more military flexibility in Asia, the Middle East and other less stable areas.European states, deeply challenged by their financial and economic problems, should also welcome a new conventional arms control agreement since it will help them reduce costs.However, a major hurdle for further talks on conventional arms control is the perspective of conventional missile defense in Europe.For Russia, it is the litmus test for future arms control.49 President Obama must offer more transparency and accountability of conventional missile defense in Europe (Pifer 2012: 2-3) as he hinted to the previous Russian President Medvedev in Seoul in March 2012.After the re-election of Obama, Moscow has lowered its demands for constraints on missile defense and it no longer insists on legally binding obligations.50 The next meeting between Obama and Putin in 2013 will show if the reset in arms control will continue and Obama can offer more flexibility in missile defense in order to revive conventional arms control talks.Following five years of Russian suspension of the CFE Treaty, there is a growing need to revive transparency of conventional Russian forces.Verification of Russian forces through Open Skies and the Vienna Document do not offer the same quality of information.In particular, smaller states like Georgia, Azerbaijan and the Baltic States should have a greater interest in receiving more information about Russian conventional force modernization efforts.Even Eastern Central European alliance members and other state parties should recognize that we cannot solve our security problems in Europe by the Western alliance alone and exclude Russia, particularly under tightened budgets in Europe and the USA.This is only possible with a cooperative approach.The same is true for many unregulated territorial conflicts in Europe.Without Russia, no stable political regulation seems possible.A new arms control agreement could improve the outlook for a possible political solution to these territorial conflicts more than without.Therefore, Western countries should take Russian security concerns seriously and look for some common solutions.A future conventional arms control agreement could reestablish lost confidence, strengthen the OSCE and ease cooperation in other areas as well (Möckli 2012: 1-4) .Conventional arms control in and for Europe thus needs more political attention in the next years; we could otherwise let this instrument slip from our hands and cause global Nuclear Zero to remain a distant dream.Annex II: Main elements of the Vienna Document 2011 The Vienna Document on Confidence and Security Building Measures was first approved in 1990 and further updated in 1992, 1994, 1999, and 2011 .The latest update contains only small technical improvements (see last mechanism).A major adaptation to the present security situation in Europe is still pending.Currently, the Vienna Document contains 12 major mechanisms: The Annual Exchange of Military Information obliges all participants to publicize the command structure and the weapons of land and air forces based on single military units, including armored vehicles with antitank missile launchers and non-active units.The relocation of units and activation of non-active units beyond certain thresholds must be indicated in advance.It also covers the planned introduction and deployment of new major weapon systems and their figures.The annual exchange of information on Defense Planning provides data on size, structure, training and equipment of armed forces (including naval forces), as well as defence policy, doctrines and budgets in the medium and long term.A request for clarification is possible and all participants are encouraged to provide voluntarily additional information.The mechanism for Risk Reduction allows every participant to ask for clarification, consultation and co-operation with regard to unusual military activities within 48 hours.Additionally, a voluntary visit is possible to dispel concerns about military activities.Furthermore, a co-operative mechanism exists for the reporting and clarification of hazardous incidents of a military nature.The number and quality of Military Contacts should be further strengthened among others by a visit of one air base within a five year period.New major weapon systems should be demonstrated to all other participants and programs for regular contacts (such as seminars, cultural and sports events) and military co-operation should be developed.A Prior Notification of Certain Military Activities is necessary 42 days in advance, if they involve at least 9,000 soldiers or 250 tanks, or 250 artillery pieces or 500 armored combat vehicles (ACVs).If 200 or more sorties of combat aircraft are to be flown during such an activity, this must be also indicated.Additionally, an amphibious landing, heliborne landing or parachute assault activity with at least 3,000 soldiers must be notified in advance.An Observation of Certain Military Activities is allowed if they involve at least 13,000 soldiers, 300 tanks, 500 ACVs or 250 artillery pieces.Further, an observation is allowed for amphibious landing, heliborne landing or parachute assault activities with at least 3,500 soldiers.For further details, see Treaty on Open Skies, in: www.osce.org/library/14127 (28.2.2013).The Treaty entered into force on January 1, 2002 and has the following members: Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, the Russian Federation, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and the United States.3 For further details, see Vienna Document on Confidence and Security Building Measures 2011, in:www.osce.org/fsc/86597 (28.2.2013).Since 1990, this politically binding document has been updated several times in 1992, 1994, 1999 and 2011.A short Annex II contains the main elements of the Document.4 National limits constrained the major conventional weapon categories of the land and air forces of a State Party in the entire application area.Territorial limits constrained national and foreign deployed land The official name was "Framework for negotiations to strengthen and to modernize the conventional arms control regime in Europe".All NATO states participated in the informal "to 36 format" talks.8 See statement by Grigory Berdennikov, Russian envoy at the IAEA: "Our position is that in order to move forward [in nuclear and conventional arms cuts] we should implement the existing agreements [especially in the framework of the New START treaty], […].But how are we supposed to move forward if the United States refuses to curb its missile defenses?"cited : N.N., U.S. missile defense hinder new arms cuts -Russia, in: RIA Novosti, 30.6.2012, in: http://en.rian.ru/russia/20120630/174322372.html (28.2.2013).9 See Goodman, David, Microphone Catches a Candid Obama, in: New York Times 26 March 2012, in: www.nytimes.com/2012/03/27/us/politics/obama-caught-on-microphone-telling-medvedev-of-flexibility.html (26.3.2012).10 The author does not describe any official position or proposal of the German government and he alone bears responsibility for the entire contents of this report.He cordially thanks Giorgio Franceschini, Annette Schaper, Niklas Schörnig, Caroline Fehl and Rüdiger Hartmann for their helpful comments on earlier drafts and Nick Gemmell for his language editing.Every CFE data exchange from the United Kingdom which contains military data on Gibraltar is answered by a diplomatic note from Spain refusing the territorial claim by London.Vandiver, John/Sven, Jennifer, Panetta: 2 army combat brigades will leave Europe, in: Stars and Stripes, 12 January 2012, in: www.stripes.com/news/panetta-2-army-combat-brigades-will-leave-europe-1.165867 (28.2.2013).See Willis, Amy: Mitt Romney: Russia is America's 'number one geopolitical foe', in: The Telegraph, 27 March 2012, in: www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/us-election/9168533/Mitt-Romney-Russia-is-Americas-number-one-geopolitical-foe.html# (15.6.2012).14 The CFE Treaty regime was not well suited to preventing this war for several reasons: First, the war started as an internal violent conflict, whereas CFE is only meant to prevent interstate wars.Secondly, Russia had suspended its CFE implementation in December 2007, so it could no longer be used to inspect Russian forces in advance.Thirdly, the leader of a CFE inspection in Georgia in June 2008 missed the opportunity to give a stronger political signal against a possible war(Schmidt 2009: 22).Serbia, and not Kosovo, is a state party of the Sub-regional Arms Control Agreement of 1996, which may be integrated into a future conventional arms control regime in Europe.See Preamble of the CFE Treaty, in: www.acq.osd.mil/tc/treaties/cfe/text.htm#preamble (28.2.2013).See Article 1, aCFE, in: www.acq.osd.mil/tc/treaties/acfe/adap_treaty.htm#intro(28.2.2013).20 See the Azerbaijani First Deputy Speaker of Parliament Ziyafat Asgarov, who emphasized that Azerbaijan will use all means to free occupied lands.See "Azerbaijan to use all means to free occupied lands", in: Today.Az 9 July 2012, in: www.today.az/print/news/ politics/110061.html (9.7.2012).21 In 2011, the Netherlands tabled a proposal in a similar direction for an update of the Vienna Document to clarify concerns about unusual military activities.See "OSCE Inspection for Clarification on military Activities giving rise to concern, The Netherlands," in: FSC.AIAM/12/11, March 1, 2011.Efforts to lower the threshold for the notification of military activities are also going into a similar direction: France, Albania, Denmark, Estonia, Spain, Finland, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Sweden want to lower the threshold to 5,000 troops, 100 tanks, 200 ACVs, 80 artillery pieces.In: FSC.DEL/107/10/Rev.2/Corr.1, 2 February 2010.See Preamble of the CFE Treaty, in: www.acq.osd.mil/tc/treaties/cfe/text.htm#preamble (28.2.2013).See Cernenko, Elena/Safronov, Ivan, No breakthrough on nuclear arms control, in: Russia Beyond the Headlines 18th February 2013, in: http://rbth.ru/international/2013/02/18/no_breakthroughs_ on_nuclear_arms_reduction_23009.html (18.2.2013).27 Since 2010, there have been bilateral talks between Russia and the U.S. on a code of conduct for cyber security.See Gorman, Siobhan, U.S. Backs Talks on Cyber Warfare, in: Wall Street Journal, 4 June 2010, in: http://online.wsj.com/article/ SB10001424052748703340904575284964215965730.html# (4.6.10).28 It is in the logic of verified transparency to cover conventional missile defense in Europe, but this does not exclude a separate regulation (such as by military cooperation) for conventional missile defense in Europe outside a new conventional arms control agreement.Turkey is also a member of the Open Skies Treaty, which covers, in contrast to CFE and Vienna Document, the whole territory of the country including all islands.Observation flights can only be changed or canceled if the observed party cannot guarantee flight safety.See NATO Statement on CFE, Cypher 10,Brussels, 8 December 1998, in: www.nato.int/docu/pr/1998/ p98-141e.htm (28.2.2013 and also Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation signed in Paris 27 May 1997, Part IV Political Military Matters, in: www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_25468.htm (28.2.2013).In 2008 NATO countries withdraw this commitment for the air forces.See NAC Statement on CFE, Cypher 5, Brussels, 28 March 2008 in: www.nato.int/docu/pr/2008/p08-047e.html (28.2.2013).33 In 2008, Russia proposed that the deployment of a brigade, combat wing, attack helicopter battalion or 41 tanks, 188 ACVs, 90 artillery pieces, 24 combat aircraft or 24 attack helicopters could meet the definition of substantial combat forces (Antonov/Ajumov 2012: 44).NATO countries admit their readiness to develop a definition for substantial combat forces with Russia upon an agreement of the parallel action package.See NAC Statement on CFE, Brussels, 28 March 2008, Cypher 5 (see Fn.32).34 Russia and Kazakhstan have accepted similar restraints through the Agreement between the Russian Federation, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan and China on Mutual Reduction of Military Forces in Border Regions (Moscow, 24 April 1997) towards China (Agreement on Mutual Reduction of Military Forces in Border Regions 1997).This measure can further be strengthened by the request of a concerned state party to convene a conference of all state parties.It is based on Article 8 (B) and Article 19, 2 of aCFE, in: www.acq.osd.mil/ tc/treaties/acfe/adap_treaty.htm (1.3.2013).36 With the signature of the adapted CFE Treaty, several states accepted special politically binding restraints in sensitive areas (such as Russia in the Oblast Pskov and Kaliningrad) in Istanbul in 1999.However, the value of these special commitments seems questionable in that the adapted treaty has never entered into This measure is based on the transit rule of the adapted CFE Treaty, Art.5, 3; in: www.acq.osd.mil/tc/ treaties/acfe/adap_treaty.htm (28.2.2013).40 Citation: Oswald, Rachel, "NATO Should Use Summit to Address U.S. Tactical Nukes in Europe, Experts Say," in.Global security newswire, 11 May 2012, in: www.nti.org/gsn/article/nato-should-use-summitaddress-us-tactical-nukes-europe-experts-say/ (11.5.2013).41In this context, it should be noted that Poland and some other East Central European countries have several bilateral agreements with their neighbours for additional confidence building measures.There exists no common definition of 'military stability' in spite of the fact that this term plays an important role for all state parties.It depends on the present security issue and the development of a common view on it to come to a common definition of military stability.43 Observations of military activities are only possible if the following thresholds are reached: 13,000 troops, 300 tanks, 500 ACVs, 250 artillery pieces or 3,500 troops for amphibious landing, heliborne landing or parachute assault.See Vienna Document 2011, Cypher (47.7).44 For example Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Russia, Spain, Turkey, and the USA have voluntarily published their doctrines.45 See Vienna Document 2011, Cypher (15.7) and OSCE Press Release, Seminar on Military Doctrine promotes transparency, openness, Vienna, 14 February 2006, in: www.osce.org/fsc/47108 (28.2.2013).See Statement by Andrey Denisov, First Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation, at the Opening of the 11th European Conference on Security and Defense, Berlin, November 27, 2012, in: www.mid.ru/ brp_4.nsf/0/3FEF48B1980462A544257AC400293E26 (28.2.2013).This region consists on both sides of Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary and Poland.52 This region additionally includes, on both sides, Italy, France, the United Kingdom, Denmark and the former Soviet military districts Baltic, Byelorussia, Carpathian and Kiev with separate limits for the district of Kiev.53 This region further includes, on both sides, Spain, Portugal and the former Soviet military districts Moscow and Volga-Ural.54 This region consists, on both sides, of Iceland, Norway, Greece, Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, and the former Soviet military districts of Leningrad, Odessa, Transcaucasus and North Caucasus.
Poland's security strategy rests on the twin pillars of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU).As the American military presence in Europe continues to shrink, however, Poland's support for the EU has increased, benefitting from EU structural-fund transfers, expanded trade, and integration under the Schengen Agreement.Consequently, while NATO and the United States remain essential to Poland's security, today Germany is Poland's key ally on the Continent, with Polish public opinion showing for the first time in a 2012 survey a preference for Germany over the United States.2 Though positive attitudes toward the United States rebounded somewhat a year later, clearly the Polish public has become more distant in its view of America.The Obama administration's 2009 decision to cancel the George W. Bush-era missile shield whose ground interceptors were to be based in Poland was a shock to bilateral ties.Announced on the 70th anniversary of the 1939 The following National Security Outlook is the eighth in AEI's Hard Power series-a project of the Marilyn Ware Center for Security Studies that examines the state of the defense capabilities of America's allies and security partners.1 In it, Andrew Michta outlines the case of Poland, which he notes is determined both to expand its indigenous defense industrial capabilities and to increase overall defense spending.As numerous accounts of NATO defense trends over the past two decades elucidate, Poland's decision to increase defense spending is far more the exception than the rule when it comes to America's other major allies.This is largely driven, according to Michta Similarly, while Poland remains committed to NATO as the military pillar of its national security and, as such, a strong supporter of NATO's Article V tasks of collective defense, it has also become more vocal in support of the EU Common Security and Defense Policy.And again, while the United States remains Poland's principal ally and the country has been an active participant in American-led operations-with the largest being in Iraq and Afghanistan-there has been a marked decline in public support for current and future expeditionary missions, as exemplified in Warsaw's decision to not join other NATO allies in Operation Unified Protector, the 2011 Libyan military campaign.Poland's increased focus on Article V matters is tied largely to its growing concern about the resurgence of Russia's power and influence along Poland's eastern border.Since eastward NATO enlargement, especially to Ukraine, has all but vanished from US and European security policy agendas, Poland finds itself in a borderstate position within the alliance.Warsaw's perception of a changing regional power balance has brought about a new emphasis on the defense of national territory in Poland, making Warsaw refocus its attention closer to home as it plans to adapt the armed forces accordingly.Over the past five years, Poland has focused more and more on its indigenous national defense capabilities, with the government funneling resources for military modernization.Because of its history of foreign invasions, the country has a keen appreciation of the vital importance of a strong military to the nation's sovereignty and security.An old Polish saying captures well the public mood on national defense: "If you can count, ultimately count on yourself."Amidst the current protracted economic crisis in Europe and despite a 2013 slowdown in growth in Poland's own economy, Poland remains one of the EU's most dynamic countries.Today, it is its ninth-biggest economy, having increased by almost a fifth since 2009.3 And because the government is required under Polish law to spend 1.95 percent of its annual gross domestic product (GDP) on defense, a growing economy has allowed Warsaw to buck the general European trend of cutting national defense budgets (see figure1) .With increased resources, Poland's ministry of defense has launched "The Modernization Plan for the Armed Forces in the Years 2013-2022"-the country's most ambitious program to date, which will include new ships, helicopters, tanks and armored personnel carriers, additional aircraft, and most importantly, new air and missile defenses.4 The antiballistic (ABM) system is the most significant of Poland's military modernization efforts in terms of planned dedicated resources.The estimated cost of Poland's ABM program is set between $4 and $6 billion, making it the largest acquisition program in the country's history.In mid-2013, however, with the economy slowing, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk was forced to revise the government's budget, resulting in a 10 percent cut to the defense budget.5 Despite these reductions, Minister of Defense Tomasz Siemoniak has emphasized that the country's strategic projects will be protected, announcing in late September 2013 that military modernization will reach PLN 91.5 billion (approximately $30 billion) through 2022, covering 14 specific programs.Consistent with Poland's desire to develop its military capabilities, the Polish government has renewed its focus on modernizing and expanding the country's indigenous defense industrial sector.In fall 2013, the government began the process of consolidating Poland's defense industry into a unified Polish Defense Group [Polska Grupa Zbrojeniowa (PGZ)] with the expectation that it would improve the sector's efficiency and competitiveness.The PGZ will combine the flagship Polish Defense Holding [Polski Holding Obronny, formerly Bumar] with Huta Stalowa Wola, among others.The effort has just begun, so it is too early to judge its ultimate impact on the industry.But the decision indicates the seriousness of the government's commitment to modernizing the defense sector and to making it more competitive in international markets.The immediate question going forward will be whether the Polish military can still leverage available resources and complete the key elements of the modernization program despite the 10 percent budget decrease.And since it is government policy that modernization be done through the Polish defense industry whenever possible, there will be considerable focus on whether those firms can in fact deliver the product the military needs, and especially whether they can partner with foreign firms to leverage synergies with the domestic sector.In short, will Poland manage to continue committing enough resources to remain one of the few countries in Europe that is still serious about military power, and thereby become a NATO ally with growing capabilities and political clout?Poland has doubled its defense spending over the past decade.Initially, the government budgeted PLN 31.4 billion on defense (approximately $10 billion) for 2013.Even with the planned 10 percent reductions in the 2013 defense budget, there has been a significant infusion of resources into the Polish armed forces.The current military modernization plan calls for spending PLN 91.5 billion through 2022 and stipulates that PLN 16 billion will be expended by 2016.The government has also restated that maintaining 1.95 percent of GDP on defense remains a priority.As part of the modernization process, Poland will establish two new high-level military commands starting January 1, 2014.6 The goal is to create a joint operational command by replacing the separate service commands, converting them into departments, and turning the general staff into a strategic planning and advisory command.The government also intends to maximize the use of the Polish defense industry with "Polonization" of the defense modernization effort tied to technology transfer from international partners as acquisition plans move forward.In addition, the government plans to spend PLN 40 billion on purchases not included in the 2014-22 operational plans.In total, Poland plans to spend approximately PLN 139 billion ($46.3 billion) on equipment modernization across the services, on added information technology capabilities, and on increasing the overall combat readiness of the Polish forces.In the process, Poland plans to build its modernization effort around 14 major programs.7 Considering the scope of programs and resources allocated, a significant challenge for the defense ministry will be to improve the acquisition process to ensure platforms and equipment are fielded; in previous years, the ministry has even returned funds to the state budget.For 2013, the Polish ministry of defense planned to increase capital expenditures to 26.2 percent of the budget-a 4.2 percent increase compared to the previous three years (see figure2) .8 The structure of the current Polish defense budget reflects the ministry's commitment to reverse the current approximate one-to-three ratio of modern-to-legacy military systems.Polish military equipment remains a mix of Soviet-era legacy systems (sometimes adapted with Western equipment) and innovative Polish designs developed in cooperation with Western firms.For example, Polish land forces maintain 901 main battle tanks, of which 128 are the older-generation German Leopard 2A4s, 232 are PT-91 Twardys (a Polish modification of the Soviet T-72), and 541 are obsolete -3 - T-72s of three different types.Likewise, Poland maintains a fleet of 1,784 armored infantry fighting vehicles (AIFV), of which more than two-thirds are legacy Soviet BMP-1s, but nearly 500 are the highly capable KTO Rosomak, a Polish version of a Finnish AIFV that has been battlefield tested in Afghanistan.To help address this problem, however, in November 2013 Poland signed an agreement to purchase from Germany an additional 105 Leopard 2A5s, plus 14 Leopard 2A4s and 200 support vehicles.9 Addressing deficiencies in air mobility also remains a priority, as Polish military helicopters are currently a combination of Soviet-era systems and the aging PZL Sokół platform and its derivatives.To do so, the army will be seeking to acquire up to 70 new helicopters.The defense ministry also plans to issue funds for new modular armored vehicles, unmanned aerial vehicles (including armed drones), self-propelled howitzers, heavy mortars, antitank missiles, and new communication equipment.The Polish navy has 5 tactical submarines (4 Germanbuilt, 1960s-era Kobben class and 1 Soviet-legacy Kilo), 2 principal surface combatants (Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates), a corvette (Polish-built ORP Kaszub class), and a number of mine warfare, mine countermeasure, patrol, amphibious, and support ships.The navy's aviation element includes two naval aviation bases, with equipment deployed in three locations.Two of those locations are home to air groups that include planes and helicopters for transport, antisubmarine, and search-and-rescue operations.The navy's modernization program includes new patrol boats, minesweepers, coastal-defense vessels, and possibly up to three submarines.10 Of the three major services, the Polish air force ranks as the most modern among post-communist states of Central Europe, averaging 160-200 flying hours per year (comparable to France's and exceeding Germany's).The air force operates three squadrons of F-16C/Ds, two squadrons of MiG-29A/UBs, and two squadrons of fighter/ground-attack Su-22M-4s.The Sukhoi aircraft have been slated for removal from service, and Poland will be looking to purchase additional Western planes or unmanned aerial vehicles.Two air-force transport squadrons fly a combination of C-130E, C-295M, and Polish PZL M-28 Bryza aircraft.The air force also operates two squadrons of transport helicopters which, as noted above, are aging platforms.On balance, the most successful air-force program so far has been the addition of F-16 jet fighters to its fleet of aircraft, accelerating the modernization process and increasing NATO interoperability.A visible sign of progress has been the opening of a US training facility in the central Polish town of Łask for rotational exercises of US and NATO aircraft.Air and missile defenses (AMD), however, remain Poland's top defense priority.A law Poland passed this year appears to guarantee stable funding for the systems.11 The program will combine a medium-range missile and air defense system and a variety of shorter-range systems with plans to expand the coverage for the country's entire territory.The government will allocate PLN 26.4 billion for AMD through 2022, with PLN 1.2 billion planned for 2014- 16.12 Overall, Poland's shopping list is extensive; some would call it overly ambitious.And while the air and missile defense budget seems protected, in light of the slowing economy and this year's reduction in planned defense expenditures there is already talk of reducing the number of helicopters in the initial order and of cuts in other procurement programs.Indeed, there are also questions as to whether-even if all the acquisition programs were fully funded-Poland's defense ministry would be able to meet its acquisition plans.Some analysts have pointed out that based on the current track record of procurement, and especially the rate of contract fulfillment in 2012, Poland may again have a shortfall from the original spending plans.13 The Polish government sees military modernization as a path to modernizing the country's defense industry.The increase in procurement funds has attracted a lot of attention from US and European defense industries-something the Polish government is determined to leverage for national defense industry modernization.Until 2013, Poland spent between 15 to 22 percent of its defense budget on equipment modernization.Poland's expeditionary missions in both Iraq and Afghanistan have highlighted the need for a better equipment kit for its forces, and the current program ultimately aims to shift about one-third of the defense budget to equipment modernization over the next decade.Here, the AMD project is seen as central not just to the national defense strategy but also to preserving and expanding Poland's indigenous defense industrial capacity.Defense Minister Tomasz Siemoniak has repeatedly made clear that any AMD solution adopted by the government will need to involve extensive cooperation with Polish defense companies.It must include both long-term partnerships and significant technology transfers.The army expects the initial components of the system to be tested in 2017 and a working system capable of defending national territory from an attack is to be in place by 2023-all procured with the direct participation of the Polish defense sector.For the Polish defense industry, this is a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to partner with the best Western firms.Eventually, the government hopes to shift up to 80 percent of future work on particular defense projects to Polish suppliers.One aspect of Polish military modernization seldom discussed is its intra-EU political dimension.As Poland undertakes its military modernization effort and defense ministry officials push for the maximum possible participation of Polish firms in plans to buy missiles, ships, helicopters, tanks, and small arms, it will run up against the growing pressure within the EU to reduce national preference in defense contracts.14 The planned purchases also seek to leverage domestic industry on smaller ticket items such as the MSBS 5.56 program to develop a new modular assault rifle for Polish forces and the Tytan program comprising a system of technologies, similar to the US Land Warrior, to be used by an individual soldier.15 This effort to maximize domestic industry participation applies to both equipment upgrades and new system purchases; however, it may meet serious obstacles considering the imbalances of expertise and capacity in the Polish defense sector, as seen in the delays in modernizing Poland's Leopard 2 tanks.The extent to which Polonization is likely to work will be best tested on high-end systems.There will be mounting pressure to give as much of the ABM work as possible to Polish companies.16 Initial competition for the AMD contract is already underway with US, French, and Israeli systems expected to emerge as the principal contenders.But the key question for Polish officials is likely to be: which of the foreign contractors can best coordinate with Polish defense firms to build a long-term and mutually beneficial partnership?Poland's level of defense spending and new acquisition programs reflects growing concern about the changing geostrategic environment in Central Europe following two landmark developments: the 2008 Bucharest NATO summit that, for all practical purposes, ended prospects of NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia, and the 2008 Russo-Georgian war that brought back the specter of conventional state-on-state conflict along Europe's periphery.NATO's refusal to offer Ukraine a Membership Action Plan, combined with Russia's growing geostrategic assertiveness, has forced Poland to revisit traditional dilemmas associated with being a boundary state along the frontier of the West.More than anything else, Russia's invasion of Georgia drove home the critical importance of having workable NATO contingency plans and sufficient capabilities to perform key national defense tasks to make those plans credible.The Nevertheless, there is a sense within Poland of a growing "transatlantic deficit" in ties between the United States and its NATO allies in Central Europe, with the United States being seen as increasingly absent from the region.In particular, the Obama administration's decision to cancel both the George W. Bush administration's plans for antimissile deployments to Poland and its own plans to do the same-along with its 2012 decision to reduce the number of American forces based in Europe-has led Poland to give more attention to its own strategic and military options should the American security guarantee grow even weaker.So while the Polish government remains committed to NATO as the core pillar of its national security, Poland is also looking for greater regional security cooperation among the Nordic, Baltic, and Central European states to bolster its own security plans.Warsaw is also actively seeking to reenergize the Weimar Triangle (Poland, France, and Germany) and the Visegrád Group (Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia).Though Poland considers the possibility of a large-scale conflict with Russia unlikely, Poland has increasingly focused on the potential of local conflicts with states close to its border.18 Here, the militarization of Russia's Kaliningrad enclave in the northeast has become a major issue.And although Poland shares alliance-wide concerns about cyber and other nontraditional security issues, regional geostrategic considerations remain paramount to how the country approaches national security.Most importantly, while Poland continues to invest in regional security cooperation, it has made it clear that better regional ties should never come at the expense of allied solidarity or weaken the NATO-wide Article V security guarantee.In 2013, Poland's National Security Bureau [Biuro Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego], an advisory body to the country's president, published a comprehensive review on Poland's strategic position.19 Without naming Russia as an outright foe, the white paper reflects Warsaw's growing preoccupation with resurgent Russian power as one of four key variables defining Poland's security (the other three being NATO, the United States, and the EU).Though not ruling out the possibility that Russia might choose a path of cooperation with the West, Poland's strategists have been skeptical about Russia's willingness to abandon its imperial aspirations, especially in light of reports that Russia has threatened to deploy 9K720 Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad and Moscow's actions in the post-Soviet "near-abroad." 20 The relationship between the two countries has been further complicated by the aftermath of the Smolensk plane crash in 2010, which killed then-president Lech Kaczyński, his wife, and more than 90 of Poland's most senior military and political leaders.Continuing problems with Russia during and after the investigation of the crash, including Moscow's refusal to return the black boxes and wreckage of the Polish aircraft, have caused further friction between the two countries and remain an important domestic political issue in Poland.Although few in Poland would argue that there is an imminent threat of aggression from Russia, Poles continue to see Russia as the principal threat to Poland's security and sovereignty.For this reason, some analysts have even suggested that if NATO solidarity continues to weaken, Poland will need to seek bilateral security agreements with the United States and Germany.21 Analysts have also been considering creating an improved conventional deterrent posture at the national level by mixing defensive and offensive systems, and adapting planning accordingly.To that end, Poland has closely followed the approach taken by the Finns, exploring the option of equipping its F-16s with stealth AGM-158 JASSM cruise missiles.Another consideration has been the possibility of purchasing tactical ballistic missiles for its Multiple Launch Rocket System launchers and other systems that would give Poland medium-and possibly long-range strategic strike capability.22 Both the 2009 Defense Strategy of the Republic of Poland and the 2013 white paper reflect an evolving consensus on defense policy.The 2009 paper emphasizes the core importance of the dual pillars of NATO and EU membership for Poland's security.Recognizing the broadening array of nonstate and unconventional threats, the strategy paper emphasizes the core importance of balancing collective defense and international crisis response.The 2013 white paper recommends an approach that combines ongoing efforts to "internationalize" Poland's security within the existing alliance structure to ensure that an attack on Poland would generate a collective allied response.And finally, the paper seeks to place Polish strategic priorities in a larger context, with uncertainty surrounding the future of the EU and with declining American involvement in Europe-all pointing to the increasing need for Poland to become self-reliant in security matters, commensurate with the country's economic and military potential.Poland has a strong military tradition, a reputation it has lived up to in Iraq and Afghanistan.Poland's expeditionary missions in Iraq in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom and in Afghanistan as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) have been instrumental in shaping today's Polish armed forces.Poland was an early participant in the 2003 Iraq military operation to oust Saddam Hussein, sending a small contingent at the start of the war and 2,500 troops for security and stability operations after the fall of Baghdad.Soon thereafter, on September 3, 2003, Poland assumed leadership of one of two multinational divisions and responsibility for a region covering five provinces.The core of the Polish-led divisions consisted of three brigades: Polish, Ukrainian, and Spanish, with military contingents and personnel from 24 other countries.Over time, the composition of the division changed with different countries offering contributions and others withdrawing their contingents.The mission evolved as well, changing from a post-conflict stability and reconstruction operation to one of combat and providing local security.Over time, the number of Polish troops deployed decreased from 2,400 to 900, with the last Polish troops withdrawing from Iraq in 2008.On balance, Poland's participation in the Iraq mission gave the armed forces invaluable experience, laying the foundation for much of the country's current modernization plans.On the political side of the ledger, however, public support for the mission rapidly declined as Poles, contrary to expectations, saw few reconstruction projects in Iraq go to Polish firms and the security situation in Iraq worsened in the immediate aftermath of the invasion.In the end, Iraq inaugurated a new, more complex phase in US-Polish relations.As Poland pulled out of Iraq, it increased its contribution to the ISAF mission.At its peak, Poland deployed 2,600 soldiers to Afghanistan, at one point assuming responsibility for the entire Afghan province of Ghazni.The mission in Afghanistan was ultimately orders of magnitude more challenging than the deployment in Iraq, both in terms of the threat environment and logistical difficulties.The Polish military is largely responsible for the mission's success, having adapted both personnel and equipment to the task.As the ISAF mission winds down, the key challenge for the Polish army is to repatriate and refurbish its equipment currently deployed in Afghanistan.Lacking indigenous capabilities for long-range lift, Poland will rely on the United States to facilitate the return of Polish equipment.As with the Iraq mission, however, the Afghanistan operation has witnessed dwindling public support.This was especially true after the Obama administration decided to scrap deployment to Poland of the antiballistic missile system and Poles began to question whether the sacrifices their military was making in Afghanistan and before that in Iraq were duly appreciated in Washington.As a result, Polish support for expeditionary operations has declined precipitously, as has overall public confidence in NATO's value to Poland's security.Polling data from a 2013 report by the German Marshall Fund of the United States suggests that when citizens of various NATO nations were asked whether NATO is still essential to their respective countries' security, Poles are 11 percentage points behind the EU average.23 In late 2013, Poland had approximately 1,940 soldiers deployed on various missions abroad, with the largest contingent deployed under ISAF in Afghanistan, followed by a contingent with the Kosovo Force, troops with the EU Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and a number of United Nations observers in Western Sahara, the Congo, Afghanistan, Kosovo, Liberia, South Sudan, and Côte d'Ivoire.Following the French campaign in Mali, Poland has also deployed trainers there.In addition, there are Polish military observers as part of the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia.The total number of Polish military troops deployed outside of Poland is expected to decline further at the end of 2014 as the ISAF mission concludes.Poland is by any measure the most successful case of postcommunist political and economic transition to market democracy in Europe.And as a relatively new member to NATO, it has made significant contributions to American and NATO military missions.But Poland is entering an era of increasing uncertainty.America's commitment to European security appears to Poland to be waning, while Russia's resurgence as a military power in the context of Europe's de facto disarmament and the economic crisis within the EU raise even greater questions about Poland's future security environment.To meet these challenges, Poland has clearly been an outlier among European NATO allies when it comes to national defense.Simply put, it is one of the few remaining European states serious about investing in its military despite the current economic crisis.As noted above, the primary focus of Poland's 10-year defense modernization plan is territorial defense rather than out-of-area capabilities, though Poland tries to balance the two with planned capabilities important to both, such as command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence as well as helicopter lift.Two key questions loom over modernization plans.The first is the potential risk associated with the desire to use Polish defense companies to carry out the bulk of the modernization effort.There is no question that giving the lion's share of the work to Polish companies has great potential benefits for industrial modernization and employment, and employment is no doubt important to the government in Warsaw as Poland approaches its next parliamentary election in 2015.However, the record of the Polish industry has been spotty, with program delays and cost overruns.The government seems aware of the risk.It has pushed to initiate the consolidation of the industry parallel with the modernization effort, as the Polish defense sector gears up for its largest contracts to date.However, the challenge will be to remain realistic about what can be achieved in the near term, recognizing that some of these companies face a steep learning curve when it comes to the kind of advanced manufacturing and systems engineering required to produce first-rate, up-todate equipment.The key will be successful partnering with top international defense firms in a way that brings about transfers of manufacturing technology and has Polish companies focusing on those parts of the program where they are most competitive.Most importantlyand politically difficult-the government will need to be prepared for a course correction in its plans should Polonization of the modernization effort not deliver equipment and weapons platforms on time and in sufficient quantities.While domestic industrial priorities are important, they cannot overshadow the strategic requirements of the Polish Armed Forces.The second question is whether the Polish economy will continue to grow at sufficient rates to sustain steady defense spending allocations to make the programs a reality.The 2013 cuts are not crippling for the Polish modernization effort, but if the government fails to stick by the 1.95 percent of GDP formula in 2014 and beyond, its ambitious program will need to be revised.The squeeze already seen in the defense budget should serve as a warning sign for the government that cutting defense-though politically seemingly less toxic than cuts in public spending-will eventually damage Poland's procurement plans and ultimately the nation's security.Hence, it will be the 2014 state budget rather than the modifications to 2013 spending that will serve as a clear indicator of whether Poland remains serious about defense modernization.With an economy that has performed better than its European neighbors, a desire to bolster and modernize its military capabilities, and a record of commitment to the transatlantic alliance, Poland continues to buck the trend when it comes America's continental security partners.And with increasing influence in the EU, Poland continues to rise in the ranks as a midsize power and, as such, grow its potential to play an even greater role in Western security affairs in the future.But the budget decisions and program choices Poland makes in the next year and over the next decade will go a long way to determining just how great a role it will in fact play.Andrew Michta would like to thank his research assistants, Jacob Foreman and Matthew Washnock, for their contribution to this study.	Poland's security strategy rests on the twin pillars of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU).As the American military presence in Europe continues to shrink, however, Poland's support for the EU has increased, benefitting from EU structural-fund transfers, expanded trade, and integration under the Schengen Agreement.Consequently, while NATO and the United States remain essential to Poland's security, today Germany is Poland's key ally on the Continent, with Polish public opinion showing for the first time in a 2012 survey a preference for Germany over the United States.2 Though positive attitudes toward the United States rebounded somewhat a year later, clearly the Polish public has become more distant in its view of America.The Obama administration's 2009 decision to cancel the George W. Bush-era missile shield whose ground interceptors were to be based in Poland was a shock to bilateral ties.Announced on the 70th anniversary of the 1939 The following National Security Outlook is the eighth in AEI's Hard Power series-a project of the Marilyn Ware Center for Security Studies that examines the state of the defense capabilities of America's allies and security partners.1 In it, Andrew Michta outlines the case of Poland, which he notes is determined both to expand its indigenous defense industrial capabilities and to increase overall defense spending.As numerous accounts of NATO defense trends over the past two decades elucidate, Poland's decision to increase defense spending is far more the exception than the rule when it comes to America's other major allies.This is largely driven, according to Michta Similarly, while Poland remains committed to NATO as the military pillar of its national security and, as such, a strong supporter of NATO's Article V tasks of collective defense, it has also become more vocal in support of the EU Common Security and Defense Policy.And again, while the United States remains Poland's principal ally and the country has been an active participant in American-led operations-with the largest being in Iraq and Afghanistan-there has been a marked decline in public support for current and future expeditionary missions, as exemplified in Warsaw's decision to not join other NATO allies in Operation Unified Protector, the 2011 Libyan military campaign.Poland's increased focus on Article V matters is tied largely to its growing concern about the resurgence of Russia's power and influence along Poland's eastern border.Since eastward NATO enlargement, especially to Ukraine, has all but vanished from US and European security policy agendas, Poland finds itself in a borderstate position within the alliance.Warsaw's perception of a changing regional power balance has brought about a new emphasis on the defense of national territory in Poland, making Warsaw refocus its attention closer to home as it plans to adapt the armed forces accordingly.Over the past five years, Poland has focused more and more on its indigenous national defense capabilities, with the government funneling resources for military modernization.Because of its history of foreign invasions, the country has a keen appreciation of the vital importance of a strong military to the nation's sovereignty and security.An old Polish saying captures well the public mood on national defense: "If you can count, ultimately count on yourself."Amidst the current protracted economic crisis in Europe and despite a 2013 slowdown in growth in Poland's own economy, Poland remains one of the EU's most dynamic countries.Today, it is its ninth-biggest economy, having increased by almost a fifth since 2009.3 And because the government is required under Polish law to spend 1.95 percent of its annual gross domestic product (GDP) on defense, a growing economy has allowed Warsaw to buck the general European trend of cutting national defense budgets (see figure 1) .With increased resources, Poland's ministry of defense has launched "The Modernization Plan for the Armed Forces in the Years 2013-2022"-the country's most ambitious program to date, which will include new ships, helicopters, tanks and armored personnel carriers, additional aircraft, and most importantly, new air and missile defenses.4 The antiballistic (ABM) system is the most significant of Poland's military modernization efforts in terms of planned dedicated resources.The estimated cost of Poland's ABM program is set between $4 and $6 billion, making it the largest acquisition program in the country's history.In mid-2013, however, with the economy slowing, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk was forced to revise the government's budget, resulting in a 10 percent cut to the defense budget.5 Despite these reductions, Minister of Defense Tomasz Siemoniak has emphasized that the country's strategic projects will be protected, announcing in late September 2013 that military modernization will reach PLN 91.5 billion (approximately $30 billion) through 2022, covering 14 specific programs.Consistent with Poland's desire to develop its military capabilities, the Polish government has renewed its focus on modernizing and expanding the country's indigenous defense industrial sector.In fall 2013, the government began the process of consolidating Poland's defense industry into a unified Polish Defense Group [Polska Grupa Zbrojeniowa (PGZ)] with the expectation that it would improve the sector's efficiency and competitiveness.The PGZ will combine the flagship Polish Defense Holding [Polski Holding Obronny, formerly Bumar] with Huta Stalowa Wola, among others.The effort has just begun, so it is too early to judge its ultimate impact on the industry.But the decision indicates the seriousness of the government's commitment to modernizing the defense sector and to making it more competitive in international markets.The immediate question going forward will be whether the Polish military can still leverage available resources and complete the key elements of the modernization program despite the 10 percent budget decrease.And since it is government policy that modernization be done through the Polish defense industry whenever possible, there will be considerable focus on whether those firms can in fact deliver the product the military needs, and especially whether they can partner with foreign firms to leverage synergies with the domestic sector.In short, will Poland manage to continue committing enough resources to remain one of the few countries in Europe that is still serious about military power, and thereby become a NATO ally with growing capabilities and political clout?Poland has doubled its defense spending over the past decade.Initially, the government budgeted PLN 31.4 billion on defense (approximately $10 billion) for 2013.Even with the planned 10 percent reductions in the 2013 defense budget, there has been a significant infusion of resources into the Polish armed forces.The current military modernization plan calls for spending PLN 91.5 billion through 2022 and stipulates that PLN 16 billion will be expended by 2016.The government has also restated that maintaining 1.95 percent of GDP on defense remains a priority.As part of the modernization process, Poland will establish two new high-level military commands starting January 1, 2014.6 The goal is to create a joint operational command by replacing the separate service commands, converting them into departments, and turning the general staff into a strategic planning and advisory command.The government also intends to maximize the use of the Polish defense industry with "Polonization" of the defense modernization effort tied to technology transfer from international partners as acquisition plans move forward.In addition, the government plans to spend PLN 40 billion on purchases not included in the 2014-22 operational plans.In total, Poland plans to spend approximately PLN 139 billion ($46.3 billion) on equipment modernization across the services, on added information technology capabilities, and on increasing the overall combat readiness of the Polish forces.In the process, Poland plans to build its modernization effort around 14 major programs.7 Considering the scope of programs and resources allocated, a significant challenge for the defense ministry will be to improve the acquisition process to ensure platforms and equipment are fielded; in previous years, the ministry has even returned funds to the state budget.For 2013, the Polish ministry of defense planned to increase capital expenditures to 26.2 percent of the budget-a 4.2 percent increase compared to the previous three years (see figure 2) .8 The structure of the current Polish defense budget reflects the ministry's commitment to reverse the current approximate one-to-three ratio of modern-to-legacy military systems.Polish military equipment remains a mix of Soviet-era legacy systems (sometimes adapted with Western equipment) and innovative Polish designs developed in cooperation with Western firms.For example, Polish land forces maintain 901 main battle tanks, of which 128 are the older-generation German Leopard 2A4s, 232 are PT-91 Twardys (a Polish modification of the Soviet T-72), and 541 are obsolete -3 - T-72s of three different types.Likewise, Poland maintains a fleet of 1,784 armored infantry fighting vehicles (AIFV), of which more than two-thirds are legacy Soviet BMP-1s, but nearly 500 are the highly capable KTO Rosomak, a Polish version of a Finnish AIFV that has been battlefield tested in Afghanistan.To help address this problem, however, in November 2013 Poland signed an agreement to purchase from Germany an additional 105 Leopard 2A5s, plus 14 Leopard 2A4s and 200 support vehicles.9 Addressing deficiencies in air mobility also remains a priority, as Polish military helicopters are currently a combination of Soviet-era systems and the aging PZL Sokół platform and its derivatives.To do so, the army will be seeking to acquire up to 70 new helicopters.The defense ministry also plans to issue funds for new modular armored vehicles, unmanned aerial vehicles (including armed drones), self-propelled howitzers, heavy mortars, antitank missiles, and new communication equipment.The Polish navy has 5 tactical submarines (4 Germanbuilt, 1960s-era Kobben class and 1 Soviet-legacy Kilo), 2 principal surface combatants (Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates), a corvette (Polish-built ORP Kaszub class), and a number of mine warfare, mine countermeasure, patrol, amphibious, and support ships.The navy's aviation element includes two naval aviation bases, with equipment deployed in three locations.Two of those locations are home to air groups that include planes and helicopters for transport, antisubmarine, and search-and-rescue operations.The navy's modernization program includes new patrol boats, minesweepers, coastal-defense vessels, and possibly up to three submarines.10 Of the three major services, the Polish air force ranks as the most modern among post-communist states of Central Europe, averaging 160-200 flying hours per year (comparable to France's and exceeding Germany's).The air force operates three squadrons of F-16C/Ds, two squadrons of MiG-29A/UBs, and two squadrons of fighter/ground-attack Su-22M-4s.The Sukhoi aircraft have been slated for removal from service, and Poland will be looking to purchase additional Western planes or unmanned aerial vehicles.Two air-force transport squadrons fly a combination of C-130E, C-295M, and Polish PZL M-28 Bryza aircraft.The air force also operates two squadrons of transport helicopters which, as noted above, are aging platforms.On balance, the most successful air-force program so far has been the addition of F-16 jet fighters to its fleet of aircraft, accelerating the modernization process and increasing NATO interoperability.A visible sign of progress has been the opening of a US training facility in the central Polish town of Łask for rotational exercises of US and NATO aircraft.Air and missile defenses (AMD), however, remain Poland's top defense priority.A law Poland passed this year appears to guarantee stable funding for the systems.11 The program will combine a medium-range missile and air defense system and a variety of shorter-range systems with plans to expand the coverage for the country's entire territory.The government will allocate PLN 26.4 billion for AMD through 2022, with PLN 1.2 billion planned for 2014- 16.12 Overall, Poland's shopping list is extensive; some would call it overly ambitious.And while the air and missile defense budget seems protected, in light of the slowing economy and this year's reduction in planned defense expenditures there is already talk of reducing the number of helicopters in the initial order and of cuts in other procurement programs.Indeed, there are also questions as to whether-even if all the acquisition programs were fully funded-Poland's defense ministry would be able to meet its acquisition plans.Some analysts have pointed out that based on the current track record of procurement, and especially the rate of contract fulfillment in 2012, Poland may again have a shortfall from the original spending plans.13 The Polish government sees military modernization as a path to modernizing the country's defense industry.The increase in procurement funds has attracted a lot of attention from US and European defense industries-something the Polish government is determined to leverage for national defense industry modernization.Until 2013, Poland spent between 15 to 22 percent of its defense budget on equipment modernization.Poland's expeditionary missions in both Iraq and Afghanistan have highlighted the need for a better equipment kit for its forces, and the current program ultimately aims to shift about one-third of the defense budget to equipment modernization over the next decade.Here, the AMD project is seen as central not just to the national defense strategy but also to preserving and expanding Poland's indigenous defense industrial capacity.Defense Minister Tomasz Siemoniak has repeatedly made clear that any AMD solution adopted by the government will need to involve extensive cooperation with Polish defense companies.It must include both long-term partnerships and significant technology transfers.The army expects the initial components of the system to be tested in 2017 and a working system capable of defending national territory from an attack is to be in place by 2023-all procured with the direct participation of the Polish defense sector.For the Polish defense industry, this is a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to partner with the best Western firms.Eventually, the government hopes to shift up to 80 percent of future work on particular defense projects to Polish suppliers.One aspect of Polish military modernization seldom discussed is its intra-EU political dimension.As Poland undertakes its military modernization effort and defense ministry officials push for the maximum possible participation of Polish firms in plans to buy missiles, ships, helicopters, tanks, and small arms, it will run up against the growing pressure within the EU to reduce national preference in defense contracts.14 The planned purchases also seek to leverage domestic industry on smaller ticket items such as the MSBS 5.56 program to develop a new modular assault rifle for Polish forces and the Tytan program comprising a system of technologies, similar to the US Land Warrior, to be used by an individual soldier.15 This effort to maximize domestic industry participation applies to both equipment upgrades and new system purchases; however, it may meet serious obstacles considering the imbalances of expertise and capacity in the Polish defense sector, as seen in the delays in modernizing Poland's Leopard 2 tanks.The extent to which Polonization is likely to work will be best tested on high-end systems.There will be mounting pressure to give as much of the ABM work as possible to Polish companies.16 Initial competition for the AMD contract is already underway with US, French, and Israeli systems expected to emerge as the principal contenders.But the key question for Polish officials is likely to be: which of the foreign contractors can best coordinate with Polish defense firms to build a long-term and mutually beneficial partnership?Poland's level of defense spending and new acquisition programs reflects growing concern about the changing geostrategic environment in Central Europe following two landmark developments: the 2008 Bucharest NATO summit that, for all practical purposes, ended prospects of NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia, and the 2008 Russo-Georgian war that brought back the specter of conventional state-on-state conflict along Europe's periphery.NATO's refusal to offer Ukraine a Membership Action Plan, combined with Russia's growing geostrategic assertiveness, has forced Poland to revisit traditional dilemmas associated with being a boundary state along the frontier of the West.More than anything else, Russia's invasion of Georgia drove home the critical importance of having workable NATO contingency plans and sufficient capabilities to perform key national defense tasks to make those plans credible.The Nevertheless, there is a sense within Poland of a growing "transatlantic deficit" in ties between the United States and its NATO allies in Central Europe, with the United States being seen as increasingly absent from the region.In particular, the Obama administration's decision to cancel both the George W. Bush administration's plans for antimissile deployments to Poland and its own plans to do the same-along with its 2012 decision to reduce the number of American forces based in Europe-has led Poland to give more attention to its own strategic and military options should the American security guarantee grow even weaker.So while the Polish government remains committed to NATO as the core pillar of its national security, Poland is also looking for greater regional security cooperation among the Nordic, Baltic, and Central European states to bolster its own security plans.Warsaw is also actively seeking to reenergize the Weimar Triangle (Poland, France, and Germany) and the Visegrád Group (Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia).Though Poland considers the possibility of a large-scale conflict with Russia unlikely, Poland has increasingly focused on the potential of local conflicts with states close to its border.18 Here, the militarization of Russia's Kaliningrad enclave in the northeast has become a major issue.And although Poland shares alliance-wide concerns about cyber and other nontraditional security issues, regional geostrategic considerations remain paramount to how the country approaches national security.Most importantly, while Poland continues to invest in regional security cooperation, it has made it clear that better regional ties should never come at the expense of allied solidarity or weaken the NATO-wide Article V security guarantee.In 2013, Poland's National Security Bureau [Biuro Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego], an advisory body to the country's president, published a comprehensive review on Poland's strategic position.19 Without naming Russia as an outright foe, the white paper reflects Warsaw's growing preoccupation with resurgent Russian power as one of four key variables defining Poland's security (the other three being NATO, the United States, and the EU).Though not ruling out the possibility that Russia might choose a path of cooperation with the West, Poland's strategists have been skeptical about Russia's willingness to abandon its imperial aspirations, especially in light of reports that Russia has threatened to deploy 9K720 Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad and Moscow's actions in the post-Soviet "near-abroad."20 The relationship between the two countries has been further complicated by the aftermath of the Smolensk plane crash in 2010, which killed then-president Lech Kaczyński, his wife, and more than 90 of Poland's most senior military and political leaders.Continuing problems with Russia during and after the investigation of the crash, including Moscow's refusal to return the black boxes and wreckage of the Polish aircraft, have caused further friction between the two countries and remain an important domestic political issue in Poland.Although few in Poland would argue that there is an imminent threat of aggression from Russia, Poles continue to see Russia as the principal threat to Poland's security and sovereignty.For this reason, some analysts have even suggested that if NATO solidarity continues to weaken, Poland will need to seek bilateral security agreements with the United States and Germany.21 Analysts have also been considering creating an improved conventional deterrent posture at the national level by mixing defensive and offensive systems, and adapting planning accordingly.To that end, Poland has closely followed the approach taken by the Finns, exploring the option of equipping its F-16s with stealth AGM-158 JASSM cruise missiles.Another consideration has been the possibility of purchasing tactical ballistic missiles for its Multiple Launch Rocket System launchers and other systems that would give Poland medium-and possibly long-range strategic strike capability.22 Both the 2009 Defense Strategy of the Republic of Poland and the 2013 white paper reflect an evolving consensus on defense policy.The 2009 paper emphasizes the core importance of the dual pillars of NATO and EU membership for Poland's security.Recognizing the broadening array of nonstate and unconventional threats, the strategy paper emphasizes the core importance of balancing collective defense and international crisis response.The 2013 white paper recommends an approach that combines ongoing efforts to "internationalize" Poland's security within the existing alliance structure to ensure that an attack on Poland would generate a collective allied response.And finally, the paper seeks to place Polish strategic priorities in a larger context, with uncertainty surrounding the future of the EU and with declining American involvement in Europe-all pointing to the increasing need for Poland to become self-reliant in security matters, commensurate with the country's economic and military potential.Poland has a strong military tradition, a reputation it has lived up to in Iraq and Afghanistan.Poland's expeditionary missions in Iraq in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom and in Afghanistan as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) have been instrumental in shaping today's Polish armed forces.Poland was an early participant in the 2003 Iraq military operation to oust Saddam Hussein, sending a small contingent at the start of the war and 2,500 troops for security and stability operations after the fall of Baghdad.Soon thereafter, on September 3, 2003, Poland assumed leadership of one of two multinational divisions and responsibility for a region covering five provinces.The core of the Polish-led divisions consisted of three brigades: Polish, Ukrainian, and Spanish, with military contingents and personnel from 24 other countries.Over time, the composition of the division changed with different countries offering contributions and others withdrawing their contingents.The mission evolved as well, changing from a post-conflict stability and reconstruction operation to one of combat and providing local security.Over time, the number of Polish troops deployed decreased from 2,400 to 900, with the last Polish troops withdrawing from Iraq in 2008.On balance, Poland's participation in the Iraq mission gave the armed forces invaluable experience, laying the foundation for much of the country's current modernization plans.On the political side of the ledger, however, public support for the mission rapidly declined as Poles, contrary to expectations, saw few reconstruction projects in Iraq go to Polish firms and the security situation in Iraq worsened in the immediate aftermath of the invasion.In the end, Iraq inaugurated a new, more complex phase in US-Polish relations.As Poland pulled out of Iraq, it increased its contribution to the ISAF mission.At its peak, Poland deployed 2,600 soldiers to Afghanistan, at one point assuming responsibility for the entire Afghan province of Ghazni.The mission in Afghanistan was ultimately orders of magnitude more challenging than the deployment in Iraq, both in terms of the threat environment and logistical difficulties.The Polish military is largely responsible for the mission's success, having adapted both personnel and equipment to the task.As the ISAF mission winds down, the key challenge for the Polish army is to repatriate and refurbish its equipment currently deployed in Afghanistan.Lacking indigenous capabilities for long-range lift, Poland will rely on the United States to facilitate the return of Polish equipment.As with the Iraq mission, however, the Afghanistan operation has witnessed dwindling public support.This was especially true after the Obama administration decided to scrap deployment to Poland of the antiballistic missile system and Poles began to question whether the sacrifices their military was making in Afghanistan and before that in Iraq were duly appreciated in Washington.As a result, Polish support for expeditionary operations has declined precipitously, as has overall public confidence in NATO's value to Poland's security.Polling data from a 2013 report by the German Marshall Fund of the United States suggests that when citizens of various NATO nations were asked whether NATO is still essential to their respective countries' security, Poles are 11 percentage points behind the EU average.23 In late 2013, Poland had approximately 1,940 soldiers deployed on various missions abroad, with the largest contingent deployed under ISAF in Afghanistan, followed by a contingent with the Kosovo Force, troops with the EU Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and a number of United Nations observers in Western Sahara, the Congo, Afghanistan, Kosovo, Liberia, South Sudan, and Côte d'Ivoire.Following the French campaign in Mali, Poland has also deployed trainers there.In addition, there are Polish military observers as part of the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia.The total number of Polish military troops deployed outside of Poland is expected to decline further at the end of 2014 as the ISAF mission concludes.Poland is by any measure the most successful case of postcommunist political and economic transition to market democracy in Europe.And as a relatively new member to NATO, it has made significant contributions to American and NATO military missions.But Poland is entering an era of increasing uncertainty.America's commitment to European security appears to Poland to be waning, while Russia's resurgence as a military power in the context of Europe's de facto disarmament and the economic crisis within the EU raise even greater questions about Poland's future security environment.To meet these challenges, Poland has clearly been an outlier among European NATO allies when it comes to national defense.Simply put, it is one of the few remaining European states serious about investing in its military despite the current economic crisis.As noted above, the primary focus of Poland's 10-year defense modernization plan is territorial defense rather than out-of-area capabilities, though Poland tries to balance the two with planned capabilities important to both, such as command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence as well as helicopter lift.Two key questions loom over modernization plans.The first is the potential risk associated with the desire to use Polish defense companies to carry out the bulk of the modernization effort.There is no question that giving the lion's share of the work to Polish companies has great potential benefits for industrial modernization and employment, and employment is no doubt important to the government in Warsaw as Poland approaches its next parliamentary election in 2015.However, the record of the Polish industry has been spotty, with program delays and cost overruns.The government seems aware of the risk.It has pushed to initiate the consolidation of the industry parallel with the modernization effort, as the Polish defense sector gears up for its largest contracts to date.However, the challenge will be to remain realistic about what can be achieved in the near term, recognizing that some of these companies face a steep learning curve when it comes to the kind of advanced manufacturing and systems engineering required to produce first-rate, up-todate equipment.The key will be successful partnering with top international defense firms in a way that brings about transfers of manufacturing technology and has Polish companies focusing on those parts of the program where they are most competitive.Most importantlyand politically difficult-the government will need to be prepared for a course correction in its plans should Polonization of the modernization effort not deliver equipment and weapons platforms on time and in sufficient quantities.While domestic industrial priorities are important, they cannot overshadow the strategic requirements of the Polish Armed Forces.The second question is whether the Polish economy will continue to grow at sufficient rates to sustain steady defense spending allocations to make the programs a reality.The 2013 cuts are not crippling for the Polish modernization effort, but if the government fails to stick by the 1.95 percent of GDP formula in 2014 and beyond, its ambitious program will need to be revised.The squeeze already seen in the defense budget should serve as a warning sign for the government that cutting defense-though politically seemingly less toxic than cuts in public spending-will eventually damage Poland's procurement plans and ultimately the nation's security.Hence, it will be the 2014 state budget rather than the modifications to 2013 spending that will serve as a clear indicator of whether Poland remains serious about defense modernization.With an economy that has performed better than its European neighbors, a desire to bolster and modernize its military capabilities, and a record of commitment to the transatlantic alliance, Poland continues to buck the trend when it comes America's continental security partners.And with increasing influence in the EU, Poland continues to rise in the ranks as a midsize power and, as such, grow its potential to play an even greater role in Western security affairs in the future.But the budget decisions and program choices Poland makes in the next year and over the next decade will go a long way to determining just how great a role it will in fact play.Andrew Michta would like to thank his research assistants, Jacob Foreman and Matthew Washnock, for their contribution to this study.
In January 2012, the Obama administration announcement of the US "rebalance" towards the Asia-Pacific sparked a variety of reactions across the globe.Following a decade of conflict in the Middle East, this strategic development seemed to signal a new direction for American foreign policy in the 21 st century.However, the intentions of rebalance have often been misunderstood, with important implications in Asia and Europe, and transatlantic perspectives on the so-called "pivot" are vital to understanding the evolution and impact of this policy shift.To this end, an all-day conference was held at the Center for International Studies and Research of Sciences Po (CERI) in Paris with the collaboration of the Association of the United States Army and the support of the Royal United Services Institute, the University of Notre Dame, and the United States Embassy in Paris.The event featured three panels of scholars and experts and a select European and American audience gathered to share their perspectives on this important topic.* The first set of panelists delved into the analysis of the origin and evolution of the policy itself, assessing its goals in the military, economic and diplomatic dimensions.Rear Admiral (retired) Michael McDevitt argued that the policy objectives adopted by the Obama administration have supported the aim of investing more of the various instruments of national power in Asia to align American foreign policy with its long-term economic interests for the 21 st century, an aim largely consistent with the "traditional balance" that has characterized US security policy vis-à-vis Asia for a century.On the other hand, Dr. Joanna Spear espoused a somewhat contrarian view, especially in reference to the military domain, suggesting that the US rebalance is merely a transitory policy that will not be sustained and arguing that American military involvement in the Asia-Pacific has been relatively meager.For his part Dr. Guillaume de Rougé insisted that besides the military sphere, the deepening of the US engagement in the multilateral diplomatic institutions and economic arrangements in East Asia has proven vital to achieve its foreign policy and economic goals in the region.Dr. Isabelle Facon's lunchtime presentation analyzed the policy's impact on Russia's foreign and defense policy interests.Russian reactions have been notably muted concerning this policy, a strategic move Russia perceives as China-focused.Furthermore, the US rebalance follows Russia's own rebalance to enhance its socio-economic development in its eastern territories and to make its policy more comprehensive with regards to Asia as a whole and less Sino-centric.Though the American strategic development is seen as useful for Russian interests such as more leverage for Moscow in Europe, the general consensus in the Kremlin seems to be that the rebalance is a liability for Russia.The second panel discussed the reactions of the countries that form the Asia-Pacific region.Dr. Emmanuel Puig focused on the opacity of China's reactions, though it seems clear that the overall consensus among PRC elites is that the "pivot" is aimed at China.He stressed China's reluctance to engage in open conflict with the US despite any threats the rebalance may pose.Dr. Guibourg Delamotte argued that Japan and South Korea seem to outwardly perceive the move in a positive light, although their respective leaderships have occasionally seemed concerned by the American willingness to adapt a more confrontational attitude towards China.Dr. Eric Frécon spoke on implications in Southeast Asia, suggesting that the rebalance has reinforced previous US efforts to encourage maritime security in the region, but has had unintended consequences that may have negative reverberations.The final panel focused on transatlantic implications, first with regards to military engagement and then concerning the consequences of the US rebalance for Europe.US Army Lieutenant Generals David Hogg and Donald Campbell emphasized that despite the reduction of American forces in Europe over the years and increasing budget constraints, the US remains committed to its partnership with Europe.This continuing engagement can be especially seen in the dramatic evolution of genuinely multinational training between the US and European allies and partners.Dr. Eva Gross explained that after the initial fear of abandonment subsided, the Europeans have drawn the conclusion that the announced rebalance should reinforce a certain sense of realism in the European-American partnership, leading Europeans to take their own security responsibilities more seriously domestically and globally.Dr. Nicola Casarini made the final presentation, offering that Europe's economic and security stakes in the Asia-Pacific can be seen as largely complementary to those of the US, but the EU is untrammeled by military allegiances and is more focused on pursuing soft power in the region.Dr. Christian Lequesne, Director of CERI at Sciences Po Paris, and Lieutenant General (retired) Guy Swan, Vice President for Education at AUSA, opened the conference with remarks emphasizing the pertinence of the issue at hand and the importance of open intellectual exchange.The significance of this dialogue was underlined due to the sense of misunderstanding often surrounding the rebalance policy announced in January 2012.They underlined the overall sense of commonality among transatlantic partners.Indeed, Lieutenant General Swan noted that the location of the conference has an important place in the history of international relations.Just outside, there is a plaque commemorating the signing of the Treaty of Paris on September 3, 1783 in the very same building (once the Hôtel d'York) with Benjamin Franklin, John Adams, and John Jay as representatives for the newly-formed United States of America, and David Hartley for the British crown.Prof. Frédéric Charillon, Director of the Institute for Strategic Research of the Military Academy (IRSEM), gave the keynote address.He started by discussing the appellation itself.Is the focus on the "pivot"-"rebalance" distinction important, or does this focus on semantics distract from the substance of the issue?In any case, both concepts suggest the notion of change in today's international affairs -change in foreign policy priorities, in the international system, in perceptions by world players, etc.This brings to light the structural dilemma at hand -namely, is the rebalance a product of the changed international system or vice versa?Finally, rebalancing involves more than two actors.Prof. Charillon insisted that despite their international statute, China and the US do not wield the power to reshape the global stage alone.This is why a transatlantic dialogue plays such a crucial role in an American policy directed at the Pacific.The redeployment of the US presence in Asia will probably not result in a Cold War-type structure.Although China can be seen as a peer competitor of the US in terms of population, power and resources, regional and global interdependence make it difficult to envisage new containment policies and zero-sum games akin to those of the Cold War era.Another reason why the strategic rebalance will not be as central as anticipated is that it is met with mixed feelings among Asian regional actors.There has been a call for a more significant American presence in the region from some states for national sovereignty motives, but including a shared overall agenda.As such, the nations of the Asia-Pacific will be consumers, not followers, of the strategic policy.Finally, although Asia is on the rise, it will not eclipse the strategic importance of other world regions, including Europe, the Middle East, Africa, etc.America's European allies remain the only partners who can share its global liberal agenda of freedom and democracy.If it is true that Asia plays an increasingly important economic and political role in the global scene, this only means more contributions will be required from Europe in terms of maritime security and negotiations.Furthermore, it is likely that Asian partners will be required in order to deal with new tensions in the Middle East, the development of new governments in Africa, and other issues sprouting in other regions.Prof. Charillon then offered some concluding remarks.Firstly, although fears that the US and China are on the path to a new Cold War will likely not be realized, there is a risk of a dual track international system, with a global multilateral power structure, but a bilateral regional competition in Asia.Secondly, there are probably too many concepts and frameworks in the region, but not enough substance.The risk is then that this will provoke various forms of nationalism among the countries of the region.The affected countries are unsure about the sustainability of the existing frameworks, leaving a general sense of insecurity.Finally, the actual challenge is not to prevent an Asian century, but rather to enter a peaceful Asian century, not to prevent new primacies, but to engender global security.Panel I: From "Pivot" to "Rebalance": 18 Months On The first panel featured scholars and experts from France, Great Britain, and the United States presenting and discussing the US strategic "rebalance" towards the Asia-Pacific region in terms of its origins, evolution and goals, and how these goals have been acted upon in various dimensions: military, diplomatic, and economic.Rear Admiral (retired) Michael McDevitt of the Center for Naval Analyses, Washington, D.C., made the first presentation.He focused on the policy objectives of the rebalance, with a specific regard towards their origin and evolution.He then analyzed the major drivers of the policy, and finally took a look at continuities and discontinuities in contrast to previous US administration policies.The Obama administration has consistently maintained the goal of investing more in Asia to align American resources with its long-term economic interests for the 21 st century.In other words, the aim is to create more jobs in the United States by selling American products in Asia.Regional stability is important to achieving this objective.To that end, the rebalance wants to ensure that the United States maintains its key role in the economic, political, and security relationships with the Asia-Pacific nations.Perhaps a better way to understand the rebalance policy is that it seeks to restore the "traditional balance" that has characterized US security policy since the Spanish American War by making certain East Asia remains a strategically important focus area for Washington, something that has not always been evident during the last decade of conflict in the Middle East.It is also important to point out that the preferred "term of art" is rebalance not pivot.According to RADM McDevitt's presentation, this policy has six aims (as highlighted by then Secretary of State Hilary Clinton): -strengthen American bilateral alliances; -deepen working relations with the rising Asian powers of China, India, Indonesia, and Vietnam; -more deeply engage with Asian multilateral institutions (this is something that Democratic Administrations have emphasized more than Republican ones), e.g. ASEAN defense ministers meetings and the East Asian Summit; -expand trade and investment, such as via the Transpacific Partnership (TPP), a continuation of Bush administration policy (this may meet with both internal and international obstacles due to the concerns of the domestic automotive lobby and the unwillingness of Asian nations to participate); -establish a more broadly-based military presence; -focus on rules and legal-based behavior in order to further the advancement of democracy and human rights, including resolving the disputes in the South China Sea diplomatically.The next important question RADM McDevitt addressed concerned US views on the place of China in this strategic development.It is often assumed that China is the main focus of the policy, and even more specifically that "containment" is the true goal of the "rebalance."Beyond US policymakers' denial that this is the case, this is unlikely because no other regional powers would be willing to take definitive sides against China, their largest trading partner and a decided geopolitical power.They are always going to live in the shadow of China.Nevertheless US policymakers deem it crucial to maintain credible military capability and presence in this dynamic region in order to balance the economic and security effects of China's rise.Another significant aspect of the rebalance strategy is the message of "reassurance," reassuring US friends and allies that the US is in East Asia for the long haul.This is intended as a corrective to a narrative that was gaining momentum in 2009-10 that America was being eclipsed by China.America was not being pushed out of East Asia and furthermore is quite capable of satisfying its security obligations to allies and friends.Another motivation behind the reassurance message is non-proliferation -Washington does not want regional allies to lose faith in their alliances with the United States and seek to independently guarantee their security, perhaps by developing nuclear weapons.The reassurance message remains a work in progress because there is still skepticism in the region about America's staying power.Finally, RADM McDevitt identified five ways in which the rebalance strategy was actually being implemented: -the substantial increase in investment of American security, economic, and diplomatic resources in Southeast Asia during the past four years -according to some estimations, to the highest levels since the Vietnam War; -a systemic response to the Chinese military efforts to attain an antiaccess/area denial (A2AD), a military concept of operations that the Chinese call "counter-intervention"; -the more assertive political expressions of what constitutes acceptable behavior in the Asian maritime domain; -the increased multilateral involvement as noted above; -and the firm refusal to negotiate with North Korea unless its nuclear program is on the Such a document has garnered a number of criticisms.It assumes those risks originate from high technology, state-based risks, as opposed to the hybrid, proxy violence challenges more likely to occur.With the birth of the policy, mention of China was taboo, despite that the policy very much concerns this major Asian power.Moreover, many geographical regions were entirely neglected, and economics is not acknowledged as a potential cause of conflict or constraint on America's actions.Finally, many seemed to embrace the NSG because of its "realism" through discussion of interstate and high technology war, but it is unclear that the document is "realist".However, there has been a decidedly lopsided approach to addressing the new missions for the US armed forces.One of the most often discussedand the clear favorite of the Navy and the Air Force -is A2AD planning, one of the four new missions.In addition to its newness, it defines clearer roles for the Navy and Air Force.Such a policy has proven easier to plan for, being a more classic "kinetic" military operational design, and as it involves sophisticated hardware it is attractive to the defense industry.And yet, it is crucial to examine how reasonable and feasible this mission is.The emerging doctrinal approach to this mission, the so-called AirSea Battle, has grown more intriguing in its effort to bring together cyber, space, and undersea aspects, and is now being looked at in a fully joint manner.However, a downside could arise if in its application this doctrine would take away or diminish the opportunity for strategic pauses in escalation.Dr. Spear presented the actual military developments of the NSG as meager, including the Navy-Marine exercises such as Dawn Blitz 2013with Canada, Japan, and New Zealand, the expansion of US forces in Australia at the Pine Gap Joint Defense Facility, and the deployment of ships to Singapore.However, most actions foreseen or announced are more future budgetary and planning focused in anticipation of more favorable economic conditions.Nonetheless, it is important to remember the already significant US military presence in the region.With the deployment of additional forces in alignment with the NSG, it looks as if the future focus will be more on nimble "swing forces" based in the US, without a substantially increased theater presence.The three facets of sustainability of such an announced policy must be taken into account: people, money, and events.In terms of personnel, as noted above, the original leaders of the policy have vacated their roles, which could be taken as signaling that the policy is not being given top priority.The recent US budgetary "sequestration" means that after obvious cuts have been made, difficult choices will remain, and there will be a lack of serious money for new expeditionary missions.Finally, events around the globe have been pulling attention away from Asia, not to mention that China in some, if not many, ways may also be a potential partner in managing global affairs.In that context, there is the concern that regional partners and allies may overcommit the USA.Dr. Guillaume de Rougé made the final presentation, focusing on US diplomatic and economic engagement in the Asia-Pacific.In order to remain anchored to Asia-Pacific, the main engine of global economic growth, the US must tame China and reaffirm its role as a legitimate regional stabilizer.US credibility is at stake, as the costs of its presence rise inexorably.Regional economic interdependencies are gradually benefitting China, while the US military guarantees and economic market share are eroding.Therefore, through the "pivot", or "rebalancing", the US testifies to the need to rethink its now twenty-year-old approach of cooperation and competition with China.Looking to recent events, US participation in the G8 shows both trans-Atlantic and trans-Pacific economic engagement, with a general increase in interest in macroeconomic issues.In the Asia-Pacific, there exists a diverse spread of economic institutions, including the TPP, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), and a variety of free trade agreements (FTAs) -though it is often difficult to distinguish between political military alliances and economic relationships.Some FTAs are between the US and its allies and partners, while others are among regional powers, such as the trilateral agreement between China, South Korea and Japan.There is also the ASEAN Economic Community Forum 2015 project (which since being launched in 2012 has perhaps proven too ambitious with a 2015 timetable) and the RCEP, the equivalent of the "ASEAN +6", which is in its fifth round of negotiation.The juxtaposition of China-led RCEP and US-led TPP has suggested to some that this is a new type of Cold War structure.However, both institutions originated in Asia itself.In the case of the TPP, there was initial support from South America, which has grown to include important participation from North America and, recently, Japan.Some TPP countries share membership in RCEP, and the organizations have ended up playing complementary roles.Interest in one has provoked increased interest in the other, despite differences in membership, scope, and ambitions.The TPP is purported to be the most important FTA in the history of the US as well as for the regional powers of the Asia-Pacific -trade has especially blossomed between Southeast and Northeast Asia in recent years.This implies an increased need for regulation and dispute settlement mechanisms, as the countries are experiencing tremendous development and associated economic shocks.These institutions are thus even more necessary, considering there is no dispute settlement process existing within ASEAN (important for conflicting continental and peninsular interests), or indeed between ASEAN and China.It is important to consider the increasingly difficulty with which economic growth can be measured, as such techniques as "made in", GDP, etc. are not reliable.Additionally, countries no longer buy what they need; they buy what they need to produce the goods they will sell.The US is the current global leader, but it will not have the same pull with China in developing favorably asymmetric conditions in FTAs.In such negotiations, China would have three primary options: play the RCEP card despite that many members are US partners or allies; play the TPP card, though there is little interest in China joining this negotiation, and it does not currently meet the requirements; and finally the World Trade Organization (WTO), taking the negotiations to the global, as opposed to regional, level.Regardless, it is important that the negotiations be multilateral and not bilateral, in terms of parties' willingness to make concessions.As for diplomatic issues, beyond North Korea and Taiwan, maritime concerns have come to the forefront, with the main near-term American diplomatic goal seeming to be the containment of China's coercive diplomacy in the South and East China Seas.This would also seem to include a more robust forward military presence; however, due to diminishing resources, this may not be feasible in the long run.There exists the desire to maintain a very visible profile vis-à-vis China as well as the basic need to maintain the freedom of navigation, which introduces private actors.In a variety of forums meeting on this issue, the US maintains a noticeable presence, but one that existed before the rebalance and likely will after.The focus on maritime issues underlines the need for China and the US to test each other's limits in order to identify the extent of their competition, outside of military issues and mostly in economic terms.This could lead to new forms of "strategic stability" between the two countries, dampening the prospect for escalation crisis and conflict, preventing major disturbance of economic growth and prosperity.In order to continue the stability sought by the rebalance policy, the US has two complementary options: the creation of an "Asian NATO", allowing the US to take the back seat, backed up by multilateral economic agreements; or a sort of "co-dominion" between the US and China, treating China as a regional superpower.The discussion following the morning panel featured a lively exchange among panelists and attendees alike.One topic was the relationship between balancing and engaging China and how this plays out in the current US discourse regarding policy implications.There are hundreds of US-China bilateral discussions among government officials (mainly economics-and security-focused).This day-to-day engagement indicates that both countries recognize the importance of a continuing dialogue.However, there is tight control from the White House, which has a vested interest in ensuring the success of the policy, and especially preventing conflict with China.One participant offered that the main American approach should be retaining ascendancy and "educating China in the rules of the game".Another participant commented on the fact that a strong US interest in Asia is nothing new, as it can be traced back to the Spanish-American War.The annexation of the Philippines served as a military and economic threequarter way house to China, even a century ago.More recently, regular engagement began in 1998 under President Clinton and has continued with in a variety of ways.One expert suggested that US involvement in the TTIP, in addition to the Pacific-focused TTP, shows a dual "pivot": trans-Atlantic and trans-Pacific.The next topic of discussion covered the US military presence in the Asia-Pacific region.One speaker insisted that although significantly increased forces in the region are not likely, there seems to be no intention to withdraw forces.Another expert commented that the US needs to figure out how to accomplish more with less, hinting at the use of "swing forces" as a solution to this issue, to which someone remarked on the importance many nations place on the number of troops deployed in a region (despite the reliance on high technology in today's world that would seem to reduce the importance of "boots on the ground").It was then claimed that the US rebalance has led to a test of US leadership by China, a Chinese effort to drive a wedge between America and its Asian allies.Consequently, US "reassurance" to its partners is crucial because a sense of weakness on the part of the US will be a detriment to its allies and raise China's already elevated confidence levels.Another expert countered that China has internal problems to concern itself with, issues that will become more apparent as the economy slows.Attendees also discussed the many facets of China's global involvement.Taking a very direct approach with engaging countries, China has interests in businesses and natural resources around the globe, especially in the developing countries that make up Africa and South America.One interlocutor noted that China treats Latin American interests with the appearance at least of respectful attention, in contrast with many Western nations.The diaspora of Chinese people was also touched on, investing China both emotionally and monetarily.Another commentator noted the irony in the fierce competition between Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOE) around the globe, suggesting they are more capitalist than the capitalists.This globalization of Chinese power gained through economic impetus brings security issues into play.With the integration of China into global markets, what is perhaps most worrisome for other world powers is that China does not explain the reasons for its actions.A final discussion looked briefly at the likelihood of the NSG having longterm strategic implications.One attendee insisted that while the policy was not intended to be applied only in the short-term, it is likely that that will be the case.Another countered that it is unlikely that NSG will be overtaken by events; QDRs rarely have long-lasting influence, and so even if the 2014 QDR counters the NSG, the American policy focus on the Asia-Pacific is likely to remain.Dr. Isabelle Facon, Senior Research Fellow at the Strategic Research Foundation in Paris, gave the lunchtime presentation focusing on how Russia is impacted by the US rebalance.Although not a part of the Asia-Pacific, as a country that spans Europe and Asia, it is implicated in the rebalance policy, and its reactions play an important role on the global stage.Perhaps most striking about Russia's reactions to the US strategic rebalance towards Asia is how quiet officials have been, in contrast to the Kremlin's sometimes harsh positions on Washington's policies in Europe and Eurasia.The first explanation Dr. Facon offered suggests that Russia has still not found out whether the American policy will impede its own rising ambitions in the region.Another possibility deals with geopolitics, Russia's basic assumption being that the US is acting primarily to contain China -in other words, Russia is not the target.A final explanation for Russia's relative silence on the "pivot" is its perception of continuity: according to Russian officials, the rebalance is hardly a break with previous policy.In general, Russian leaders are still in the process of assessing whether the strategic rebalance will be more instrumental or detrimental to their country's interests in Asia and globally.Dr. Facon also emphasized that Russia has pursued its own rebalance towards Asia, declared even before the American move, because of a motivation to develop relations and find new markets in such a dynamic theatre.Firstly, it perceives a vital need to resuscitate socio-economic development of its far eastern territories.However, Russia does not want this development to be dominated by concerns over China's growing economic presence in Russia's Far East as has occurred with the raw materials thus far.Moscow is looking to avoid the entrenchment of economic distortions that could have serious geopolitical consequences in the long run.Secondly, Russia wants to make its Asian foreign policy less Sino-centric.Previous Russian policy was dictated by necessity in reaction to China's rise and the relative weakness of Russian capabilities.Now, however, there is a new effort afoot to correct the Sino-centrism in the coming years, an effort the US rebalance may help or complicate.Dr. Facon then analyzed how the US rebalance could, in the perception of Russian leaders, prove instrumental for Russia.Moscow, for which the rebalance is essentially about containing China, first sees the move as having the potential to elevate itself in Washington's geo-political calculations if the US looks for partners or, more negatively, is willing to lessen the strengthening of Sino-Russian relations.A second possible positive consequence of the American strategic policy, in Russia's perception, is that a US focus in the Far East could mean Russia will have an expanded capacity to maneuver in Europe and maybe more leverage in regions such as the Caucasus and Ukraine if the US leaves Europe deal with the management of the strategic situation there.With these issues left to Europeans to sort out, the Russians anticipate having more say in proceedings because they see the Europeans as a weaker power.Finally the fact that the future of the Sino-Russian relationship is a source of concern in Russia makes Russian scholars and officials wonder about the possible impact of the US pivot from the point of view of Russia's willingness to strike a better balance of power with Beijing.Some scholars (liberal and Western-oriented) argue that one of the only factors preventing China from turning Russia into a pawn is the US rebalance.As such, it would be prudent for Russia to ally, or at least align, itself with the US.Without going that far, many in Moscow note that Russia and the US share the goal of balancing China (although they have uneven capabilities of shaping the situation), an objective that both consider achieving by a more active presence in the Asian sphere.However, this approach does not seem to be the generally accepted mood in Moscow due to an overall lack of trust between the former Cold War rivals.Furthermore, alignment with Washington would not be coherent with the strategy Russia has been pursuing thus far: in order to keep under control the possible negative effects for itself of China's rise, Moscow has been very careful to avoid antagonizing China, to avoid any moves which Beijing could perceive as directed against it.Dr. Facon identified one positive aspect of a stronger US presence in Asia for Russia's own agenda.It deals with China's current military posture, which is mainly focused on the Taiwan Strait, South China Sea, and Western Pacific, which is to say away from Russia.Russia anticipates that further US involvement will only encourage this trend.In general however, it seems the US rebalance is considered a liability to Russian interests.Firstly, it reduces Russia's margins for maneuver in developing a policy of multi-polarity in Asia, which is already a difficult feat.It also makes China more suspicious that Russia's moves in Asia are undertaken under American influence.Finally, an extended US presence risks triggering a long-term increase in friction and tension between the US and China, in which Russia may be faced not only with more instability in its neighborhood but also with a difficult choice between Beijing and Washington.Dr. Facon concluded by highlighting that Russia may feel "trapped" by its tendency, over the past two decades, due to its weakened power base, to constantly (and more or less skillfully) play the China card versus the US and vice versa.Following Dr. Isabelle Facon's presentation on the Russian perspectives concerning the strategic rebalance, there was a brief discussion.One participant insisted that Russia's interests in the US rebalance to Asia demonstrate its desire to remain an important figure on the world scene.Another interlocutor commented on Russo-Japanese relations, specifically regarding the revisiting of the 1956 negotiations on territorial disputes.With Prime Minister Abe again in power in Japan, it is likely that there will be further communications between Moscow and Tokyo.However, both countries face domestic debate concerning this issue.Russia finds Japan an interesting potential partner for multi-polarity in Greater Asia, for foreign investment in the Far East, and for technology transfers in Russia's effort to modernize.Because of these opportunities, it seems Russia is enthusiastic about solving these disputes.The final topic focused on Russia's feeling of isolation vis-à-vis the US, Europe, and even China and Japan.Because of these sentiments, Russian strategists feel the necessity of retaining tactical nuclear weapons, always wary of what is occurring on its periphery.In addition, President Obama's recent statement in Berlin indicating a desire for talks with Russia to reduce deployed nuclear capabilities now implicates China as an important factor for Russia's consideration, as Russia may fear that too many cuts would reduce its stature vis-à-vis China.The second panel of the day set out to establish and analyze how the American rebalance has affected regional security policies in Northeast and Southeast Asia.In particular, it examined the impact of the US policy shift on China's foreign and defense policy interests, on South Korea and Japan's relations with the US, and on the maritime security dynamics in Southeast Asia.Although it is difficult to find official statements or authoritative articles published at the time of the announcement of the rebalance in late 2011, such initial Chinese reactions as were noted to the strategic rebalance were decidedly muted and cautious.However, this relative silence was not due to a sense of surprise vis-à-vis the strategic development, but rather due to the fact that at the same time, China was entering a year of political turmoil.This exerted restraint on the expression of official opinion on foreign and domestic policy.In the meantime, non-official articles were published, often by former party leaders, which were often taken as official statements.These articles displayed a decidedly hawkish tone, demonstrating nationalistic feelings in a martial and unbalanced manner.As the principal source of Chinese responses, this sparked worry among policymakers in the US.The rhetoric complained of a return to Cold War mentality, the containment of China, the aggressiveness of the US, and the potential destabilizing effects in the region of such a policy move.The economic aspects, e.g. the TPP, were largely left out of the evaluation of the policy.With the actual announcement by President Obama, official views were increasingly published, and hawkish views waned in popularity.Now that the Chinese leadership transition has been resolved, more coherent perspectives are being expressed, although mainly in domestic conferences, with little publication of the discussions abroad.This led into the second part of Dr. Puig's presentation, in which he focused on the current Chinese perceptions of the US policy with a particular regard towards diplomacy and defense.In terms of diplomacy, the rebalance was no surprise for Chinese officials, and it even helped identify three significant issues for Chinese policy: clarify if this shift is purposefully meant to follow a confrontational path; calculate the sustainability of this strategic American move; understand whether and how this development will impact China's influence in Asia.Dr. Puig's analysis of these recent views expressed by Chinese officials drew two conclusions: -First, there is an overall coherence among Chinese policymaker views.It is assumed that the rebalance is a direct challenge to China, but it has not been interpreted as a true threat (except for commentators in the PLA).The Chinese do not see how the rebalance, or indeed the TPP, will significantly influence their power in the Asia-Pacific, though this does push China to rethink its policy in the region.-Second, the officials still seem to be puzzled by the US' strategic choice.The main queries posed have to do with the timing of the rebalance and the amount of publicity it was given: Is it too late?Why such emphasis?About six months ago Chinese diplomats began to react to the rebalance in terms of developing a new posture and narrative in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa that offers support to these regions in order to play off the abandonment they might feel from the US turn towards Asia.As such, the rebalance is perceived as an opportunity for China.A final facet of the diplomatic response is the "March West" strategy being mulled over by Beijing policymakers: instead of focusing on "zero-sum" relations with the US in the Pacific, China should focus more energy on being proactive in Central and South Asia as well as in the Middle East.As for the defense aspect, perspectives from the People's Liberation Army (PLA) see fewer opportunities coming out of the US strategic rebalance.There are few official statements, but there have been numerous criticisms of the AirSea Battle Concept (ASBC), which is seen as destabilizing, aggressive, and an explicit threat to engage China in an arms race.China understands its military inferiority to the US and perceives a threat in the ASBC against A2AD efforts.The most recent air show in China was a political display of China's increasing ability to counter US shows of strength.In general, the rebalance has fueled insecurities over the lack of operational capabilities of PLA troops, which has led to much pressure on Chinese defense industries.In sum, while China has no desire for engaging in conflict with the US over the rebalance, there is no doubt in China that the policy is focused on "balancing" China.Dr. Guibourg Delamotte, a Research Fellow at INALCO's Japanese Studies Center and Associate Research Fellow at CERI, gave the next presentation, addressing the policy's impact on Northeast Asia, specifically in Japan and on the Korean peninsula.She explained that overall, Japan and South Korea welcomed the announcement, despite an uneasiness stemming from the fact that the US is ambivalent towards China with which it wishes to engage, and which it also seeks to contain.The US rebalance had more impact on Japan's defense posture than on Korea's: Japan requires more encouragement to make even slight changes to its defense policy.However, assessing the impact of the US rebalancing as such is difficult: changes in Japan's defense policy stem from its increased fears (vis-à-vis its neighbors), rather than from the new US policy.As for US presence in Asia, the rebalancing does not imply an increase in US troops, on the contrary.The tendency for the past ten years or so has been to decrease their number.Both South Korea and Japan welcome this decrease.However, both nations realize that what it implies for them is a greater military self-reliance.Japan is for instance contemplating allowing its self-defense forces preventive strike capabilities (vis-à-vis a North Korean ballistic missile offensive) or setting up a Marine Corps (to ensure a better protection of its remote islands, vis-à-vis China).Such changes to Japan's defense posture would change nothing to the balance of the Japan-US security alliance: Japan must defend itself first, and the US provides backup, as well as nuclear deterrence.The rebalancing has had little impact on Japan's relations with the US and its allies in the region.For a number of years the US has encouraged its allies to establish links between themselves, and sought to replace the "hub and spokes" structure with a "cobweb".Japan has been eager to pursue this strategy, as it aims to counterbalance China (South Korea needs China in negotiations with North Korea and is cautious not to antagonize China).In addition, Japan has developed relations with countries in the Pacific: Australia, India, and now Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam, with important overtures to South Korea.Cooperation has also been established with the UK in terms of the exchange of sensitive information, with plans to do the same with France.The US rebalancing has done little to reduce tensions in the region.Relations between Japan and South Korea as well as South Korea and China remain largely unchanged, in spite of the fact that the US encourages cooperation between the two nations.Both countries were about to sign a defense cooperation agreement, but the signature was postponed by South Korea due to the upcoming presidential elections at the time.Nationalistic tension between South Korea and Japan has escalated in the past few years, and the two countries' relations are increasingly dominated by internal politics.The generational shift which has taken place in Japan and South Korea accounts for much of this increased tension.Leaders in both countries seek to strengthen their political bases, and South Korea welcomes the opportunity of appearing to see eye to eye with China.Recent tensions in the Korean peninsula are not attributable to the rebalancing because North Korea follows its own agenda.In conclusion, Japan and South Korea welcomed the announcement of the rebalancing, though they struggle to see what it might imply for relations with China and are waiting to see if the policy is sustainable.Dr. Eric Frécon, an Assistant Professor at the École Navale and Coordinator of the Southeast Asia Observatory at the Asia Centre, concluded the panel with a presentation on reactions from Southeast Asia, particularly concerning maritime security.In Southeast Asia the US strategic rebalance has been perceived as maintaining the continuity in recent American foreign policy in the region.Prior to the announcement of the US strategic rebalance in January 2012, there was already a formidable American presence in the Asia-Pacific waters.The strong naval posture was represented by US aircraft carrier visits, troops in the Philippines, and the recent decision to send littoral combat ships (LCS) to Singapore, for instance.These American initiatives put pressure on the nations of Southeast Asia, who were less than keen to have such an imposing American presence in the region, producing positive effects such as the Malacca Straits patrols, Eyes in the Sky air patrols, and the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA).In addressing the effects of America's rebalance on Southeast Asia, Dr. Frécon proceeded to analyze the answers to traditional and nontraditional maritime threats via defense policy and naval diplomacy, the topic of freedom of navigation, and the unexpected consequences besides maritime security.Although the rebalance was again perceived as a continuation of previous policy, it has had new impacts because of a new context.Issues such as budgetary concerns as well as domestic and international pressures have shaped how the US has been able to pursue its goals for the rebalance, and there has been considerable effort to strike a delicate balance, aiming for a light, but effective, footprint without any rolling back.It is also important to consider the complexities presented by maritime law (e.g. dealing with the tidal waters of archipelagic states).The US policy has given much attention to the prevention of traditional threats, such as A2AD, ASBC, etc., including through naval drills aimed at encouraging cooperation among nations.As for the non-traditional threats, there has been support from behind including the training law enforcement agents, provision of equipment, and sharing of intelligence.Finally, there has been much reaching out from senior leaders and participation in regional forums, renewing and updating relationships between the US and Southeast Asian countries.Dr. Frécon suggested that the freedom of navigation issue is the primary focus of the rebalance with regard to maritime topics.It has had geographical manifestations in all the choke points in Asian waters.The doctrinal manifestations can be seen in Indonesian efforts at developing sea denial, for instance.The third aspect of the effort has been the legal discussions towards a non-restrictive definition of exclusive economic zones (EEZ).Dr. Frécon identified some unexpected consequences of the rebalance outside the realm of maritime security.One such is a potential for an arms race or pressure for modernization, though there has been nothing to conclusively define the military development in the region as such.Another unintended consequence is the possibility of US partners and allies pursuing dangerous initiatives because of the perceived safety of the American umbrella, such as the Philippines reaction to the Scarborough Shoal issue in 2012.Perhaps most important is the notion of "bamboo diplomacy", i.e. bending in the wind, in this case nations shifting between catering to the US and cooperating with China.The discussion following the second panel first focused on the presentation by Dr. Guibourg Delamotte on the impact of the Rebalance on Japan and the Korean peninsula.It then opened up to topics pertaining to China, Southeast Asia and maritime security, and the strategic move's implications in Asia in general.Participants first addressed how South Korea and China are postured against Japan and the effects on the US.It was offered that South Korea realizes the centrality of the US to its security policy, and has not brought up contentious issues with China as it recognizes that this would heighten tensions.The peninsular power also depends on good relations with China for reasons of a shared border and the North Korea Six-party talks.Japan, on the other hand, is not downplaying its tensions with China.It has sought appeasement, but China has adopted a non-cooperative and confrontational stance.These postures have not had a significant impact for the US, as both South Korea and Japan clearly identify the US as their ally -as opposed to China.One participant offered that the rebalance has in fact had an impact in Japan with regards to the revision to guidelines involving such issues as the ASBC, i.e. a dramatic increase in the amount of attention aimed towards access denial.Another topic of discussion was the implications of the June 2013 Obama speech in Berlin concerning the reduction of the world's nuclear stockpiles.It was suggested that the very definition of extended deterrence is being brought into question as US allies reassess the viability of the US commitment.Indeed, South Korea and Japan are both in need of reassurance.In Japan's case, there have always been doubts about the US commitment to put itself in danger in response to an attack against Japan, and now it especially fears being neglected for China.The Japanese are aware of their need to build up their defense capabilities, which will require backup from the US, but this effort has been met with constitutional complications.A need to engage in negotiations with China before categorizing the nation as an enemy has also been identified.One interlocutor brought up the possibility that there is a sort of European, or at least French, rebalance towards the Asia-Pacific, as suggested by recent visits to the region by President François Hollande and the beginning of negotiations for an economic partnership agreement (EPA) between the EU and Japan.However, these talks are likely to be difficult due to domestic opposition.Hollande's visit has created expectations that with the adoption of an EPA, there will be greater cooperation on security issues.Nonetheless, the dialogue will only be bilateral.Furthermore, Japan is concerned that France does not share its perception of China's threat, and so France must convince Japan it shares the same strategic interests regarding the major Asian power.Participants then delved further into the issue of Japan becoming more selfreliant, with a specific regard to its constitutional restraints, and the consequences of this for South Korea as far as nuclear deterrence is concerned.The consensus was that increasing defense self-reliance has long been discussed in Japan (on the order of 50 years), but only now is it beginning to gain momentum, and changes will likely occur as incremental developments.It was offered that South Korea will have difficulty trusting Japan, especially due to internal politics and nationalism.And yet, it is unlikely that the US or indeed the P5 (the five permanent nations of the United Nations Security Council) would be in favor of Japan gaining nuclear capabilities, which is something South Korea should take into account.During the part of the discussion on China and Southeast Asia, one topic participants focused on was the broad range of actors involved in the South China Sea and the consequent problems this poses to the PRC in terms of foreign policy coordination and consistency/coherence.One participant suggested that right now Southeast Asian nations are "soft-hedging", or rowing between two reefs.On the one hand, they depend on China as an economic locomotive, but on the other, the US is crucial as a security guarantor.This playing both sides shows that there is continuity.However, the rebalance has allowed Southeast Asia some space to move, such as in the case of the democratic transition and distancing from China pursued by Myanmar.Another interlocutor brought up the issue of the shortcomings in Chinese efforts in soft power diplomacy in the past decade.Nations that successfully pursue soft power diplomacy lay hold to three primary criteria: attention, influence, and attraction.While the US is possessor of all three, China lacks attraction.This is perhaps why the rebalance has been wanted by Southeast Asian nations as well as by other regional powers like Australia, New Zealand, and Japan because it is perceived as strengthening their sovereignty.The state of Sino-Japanese relations was the next topic of discussion.Currently, the two nations do not see eye-to-eye, in a period when strong anti-Japan sentiments reign in China and strong anti-China feelings are widespread in Japan.One participant suggested that hope will come in the form of a new generation of Chinese journalists whose media outlets, though not private, are at least more open, and who can attempt to bridge the gap with Japanese journalists, breaking down propaganda with more informative articles and documentaries.One participant brought up the disputes concerning the "nine-dash line" as it applies to the exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of the Philippines and Vietnam.These EEZs are important because reports say that nearly all the oil in the region is located on the continental shelf of Vietnam and the Philippines.Although the Philippines have recently taken China to court concerning this issue, it remains to be seen how this dispute will be resolved.Attendees then discussed China's reactions to American defense training and exercise initiatives as the US seeks to implement the NSG.One interlocutor noted that a retired PLA specialist had commented that it was understood that these exercises were designed to show China that US forces in the region were operational.This led to the question of whether the PLA has reached genuine operational capability, a hotly debated topic among PLA officials.While many leaders are perhaps overly proud of the new capabilities of the PLA, others have started to be more vocal in expressing the fact that the PLA has not actually reached combat readiness.There is much internal debate regarding how to improve operational capabilities and become more mobilized.The attendees finished the discussion by returning to the topic of soft power diplomacy efforts in China.Although there was again a consensus that China does not have official soft power in terms of attention, influence, and attraction (attraction being the key shortcoming), one specialist pointed out its sort of unofficial soft power during the 1960s.This was a period when Chinese culture experienced much attraction among young Westerners, despite that diplomatic relations were much worse at the time and Mao was in power.Indeed, contemporary Chinese officials are puzzled to realize they do not fully possess soft power, but they understand that it depends upon outsiders' perceptions.Although Beijing has established the Confucius Center, many argue it has not been very successful in promoting the Chinese culture, especially as it does not focus on contemporary culture.And yet, there is a sort of unofficial soft power in that increasing numbers of Western students are learning the Chinese language and going there to study.The final panel of the day discussed the consequences of the US rebalance towards Asia for Europe.The strength and power of the relationship manifest themselves in a variety of ways.One example is the NATO declaration of Article 5 (committing each member state to consider an armed attack against one state to be an armed attack against all states) following the attacks on September 11, 2001, as initiated by the allies of the US.The American holiday Memorial Day is another striking example of the close rapport.Every year, there are ceremonies at each of the twenty American military cemeteries in Europe, where soldiers and civilians from both sides of the Atlantic gather to commemorate the sacrifices of the men and women who fought to preserve freedom and democracy.As for the evolution of the military commitment, the US remains committed to the training and military exercises with its European partners.There have been significant efforts to increase the understanding and cohesion between American and European forces.Beginning in the 1980s, the training of US troops in Europe was separate from European troops, with most intercontinental interaction occurring in the upper echelons of the militaries, i.e. little bi-or multilateral training took place.Following the fall of the Berlin Wall in the late 1980s, there was a significant reduction of US forces on the Continent and the birth of the Partnership for Peace program aimed at creating trust between NATO and the former Soviet Union.There was slightly more integration in training exercises, but it was still relatively meager.In the middle of the following decade, the ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan showcased participation from US and European troops, and there was significant intercontinental cooperation at a level never reached during the Cold War.In the future, the US strategy is to remain engaged with its European partners with a special focus on maintaining personal and professional relationships with its allies.The growing capabilities provided by defense-related technological advances will also continue to play a large role, increasing efficiency despite depleted forces.Collaboration with NATO Response Forces will be a driver to transition the US and its allies from post-Afghan 2014 to future threat environments, with a continued emphasis on interoperability.This evolution demonstrates a continued commitment by the US to the transatlantic relationship with the expectation that its European partners will also invest in their own initiatives for common defense and collective security.The generals asserted that Europe remains a cornerstone and catalyst for America's engagement in the global scene.It is crucial to focus more on such initiatives as multilateral training and the development of partner capacity.It is also interesting to note that 91% of the non-US forces in ISAF are from Europe, and much of the training occurring at US bases in Europe is multinational.This represents an important focus on interoperability and the consolidation of infrastructure, reinforcing the message of the strong US commitment to Europe.Dr. Eva Gross, a Senior Analyst at the EU Institute for Security Studies in Paris, next examined the transatlantic relationship, specifically analyzing how the strategic rebalance was perceived by Europe, the perceptions of the US role in Europe, and the current and future implications on the Atlantic Alliance.The initial European reaction to the US rebalance was often alarm and concern over the fabric of the transatlantic relationship.The announcement of the rebalance also signaled to Europeans that the time had come to take their own security responsibilities more seriously, domestically and globally.The announced "rebalance" could even be seen as indicating that alliances would no longer be valued for the sake of the partnership itself, but instead for the practical role these alliance relationships would play in evolving geopolitical realities.It also led to soul-searching reflecting on the US role in Europe and a re-evaluation of Europe's own interests in Asia.Dr. Gross emphasized the importance of considering the background in Europe at the time of the announcement of the policy.In addition to the challenges of austerity in response to the financial crisis, the value of European integration was brought into question.There was also an ongoing restructuring in Brussels following the Lisbon Treaty.Nevertheless, the US continues to have important interests in the Middle East and this indicates that the US will maintain a presence in Europe and continue close collaboration with its transatlantic allies and partners.Indeed, it can be seen from recent appointees to the second Obama administration that although the official policy is the rebalance towards Asia, there is also a focus on having experienced transatlantic advisors, thus maintaining a close US-EU rapport.From this, Dr. Gross explained that the implications for transatlantic relations are encouraging, but not altogether different than they previously were.Recent years have been marked by increasing EU-US cooperation, including Department of State-EU collaboration on post-conflict reconstruction efforts and joint engagement in theatres.This is an effort both countries can build upon in the future.Nonetheless a thread of continuity has carried through in the European effort to become more militarily self-reliant.Stagnation remains despite the implications of the pivot and the usual admonitions that Europe is not considered a partner in terms of military capability.This is due to austerity, but also importantly, to strategic culture.Dr. Nicola Casarini, also a Senior Analyst at the EU Institute for Security Studies in Paris, gave the seminar's final presentation, speaking on the impact of the rebalance on Europe's strategic and economic interests in Asia and how they are affected by a changing US strategy.He stressed that the EU is mainly a trading power.In fact, it ranks second in largest trading partners in the Asia-Pacific -behind China, but ahead of the US -meaning the EU is China's most important trading partner.Today nearly one-third of EU exports are destined for the Asian market, which offers rapidly expanding market opportunities for Europeans businesses who rank among the largest foreign investors in the region.Furthermore, the seventeen-member Eurozone holds even more power in the region as euro-dominated assets account for approximately a quarter of Asia's major economies' holdings.These holdings total at more than onethird in China, the world's largest holder.As a result, the euro is the secondary reserve currency in Asia, ahead of the yen.When it comes to the European sovereign debt crisis, the major Asian economies represent a quarter of the purchasers of European Financial Stabilization Mechanismissued bonds for the Irish and Portuguese bailout programs in 2010.Over the last fifteen years, a core group of European powers ("Core-Europe", similar in membership to the Eurozone) has developed high-tech and space technology cooperation with important Asia-Pacific actors.Core-Europe's jointly developed satellite system Galileo is based on key agreements with China, India, and South Korea.Moreover, Asia represents an up-and-coming market for increasingly export-dependent European aerospace and defense industries.The European sector has developed an important presence in the market of military equipment in South and Southeast Asia in recent years, especially in submarines, frigates, corvettes, and jet fighters.In fact, European defense firms share 7% of China's defense budget, in spite of the 1989 arms embargo against Beijing.Additionally, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Asia imports nearly half of its arms from Europe and the US, approximately 20% and 29% respectively.Europe is not a major military power in Asia, but it does play an important role in the provision of arms (even more so than the US or China) to the small countries making up Southeast Asia.Not being a hard military power, Europe has still contributed to security measures in the region as its economic interests depend on safe maritime routes and a stable environment.The EU contributes through multilateral initiatives, taking part in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), and the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO).European efforts have also made significant contributions to the furthering of democracy and peace agreements among the countries of the Asia-Pacific.Finally, Europe is the largest distributor of development aid and humanitarian assistance in the region, fitting with the EU's image as primarily being a pursuant of soft power.Dr. Casarini noted that the EU itself does not have troops in Asia, although specific member nations such as Great Britain do.Unknown to many is the fact that some European powers (Great Britain, France, and Germany, for instance) have pursued defense dialogues and military relations with the Asian allies of the US, as well as with China itself, facilitating the training of Chinese military officers and the exchanges of high level visits.Indeed Sino-French and Sino-British collaboration extend to include port calls and joint naval search and rescue exercises with the goal of building trust and exchanging information.The EU's main political interests in Asia come first as political stability, but also entail regional integration and confidence-building measures, distinguishing it from other international actors.Indeed, Europe has been instrumental in the creation of ASEAN+3, the main institutional framework promoting regional integration.Although the EU cannot offer security measures on par with those of the US, it does furnish the Asia-Pacific with a model for inter-state relations and cooperation among former rivals.In conclusion, the European Union has significant interests in Asia, and its presence is felt across the full policy spectrum, from a common currency to FTAs, space technology to arm sales.Thus, the Union could be considered a sort of minor Asian power.In spite of inescapable competition for the market shares of the region, the European political presence is very much complementary to that of the US, particularly in promoting sets of multilateral-based rules and standards.However, an important difference between the transatlantic partners exists in that Washington's strategic rebalance towards Asia is widely interpreted as being aimed at balancing China, and so by putting the focus on the reinforcement of its security alliances in the area, the US policy stands the risk of resulting in greater polarization in the realm of the Far East in addition to the emergence of zero-sum relations.In contrast, the Union's presence and policy is unhampered by military allegiances and lacks any specific target country.As such, Dr. Casarini emphasized the importance of continuing a transatlantic dialogue to further each power's understanding of the other's policy and interests in Asia in order to facilitate a more streamlined joint approach.The final discussion first addressed the transatlantic implications of the rebalance.First, one participant pointed out an area of disconnect not deeply analyzed during the third panel: the use of NATO as opposed to the EU in the discussion of European interests.It was suggested that the disconnect may stem from US participation in an old organization (NATO), which may no longer be as relevant as it once was.The original purpose of NATO was set out as threefold by NATO's first Secretary General, Lord Ismay: to keep the Russians out of Europe, the Americans involved in Europe, and the Germans down.However, the future objectives of NATO were brought into question.In contrast, another expert insisted on the commonality of NATO and the EU, not only in terms of member states, but also in terms of goals, suggesting that the two organizations complement each other on mission sets.Yet another expert commented on the growing economic, diplomatic, and security capabilities of the EU, meaning NATO is not the only organization to approach concerning European or transatlantic affairs.An attendee then brought into question the possibility of a sort of "Asian NATO".There have been efforts to this effect, but the current global context differs from that at the start of NATO in a variety of ways, most markedly because China is not the same type of power the Soviet Union represented during the Cold War.It is difficult to say whether such an organization in the Asia-Pacific is feasible, but it would have, in the view of the attendee, the potential to make significant economic and security contributions.Another participant chimed in, countering that it would be impossible to create a NATO-equivalent in Asia without Chinese membership because no nations want to be perceived as having even an implicit anti-China bias.The question of European nations taking sides with China or the US was also put on the table.One expert asserted that the EU is not in a position to take sides as things currently stand (barring an attack from China), although there is a distinct possibility that member states with sufficient capabilities can and have adopted their own policies in given cases.This inability of the EU to reach internal agreement on EU-China relations is brought about by a variety of events in the recent past, such as the unsuccessful attempts at lifting the arms embargo in the early 2000s.Thus, China represents both a threat and an opportunity to a number of European member states.Participants went on to discuss the multinational training facilities for NATO, as well as non-NATO, troops.Such a system has provided many nations with the opportunity to develop training standards.Although not all participating countries belong to NATO, this effort demonstrates their desire to be a part of a larger effort.One attendee offered that while NATO is important for purposes of interoperability, it may not always be the right tool.There are some cases where the EU civilian label may be more effective, providing the opportunity for collaboration between the organizations.Another expert commented on the previous talking point wherein European defense companies' major interests in the Chinese market were noted.It is important to remember that these same companies also have major economic interests in American markets.Recalling the 2003-05 period during which there were attempts to lift the Chinese arms embargo, there was retaliation from both the American Executive branch and Congress.Taking into consideration the industry's interests split between the Chinese and the US markets, it was thought that, for most European defense companies, the pendulum still swings in favor of the US market.One interlocutor questioned the possibility of the use of multinational capabilities, such as the forces used in Iraq and Afghanistan, for purposes of maritime security in Southeast Asia.Another insisted that such a development would be unlikely, not in terms of the strategic rebalance, but because of the current sequestration-induced budgetary challenges facing the US.	In January 2012, the Obama administration announcement of the US "rebalance" towards the Asia-Pacific sparked a variety of reactions across the globe.Following a decade of conflict in the Middle East, this strategic development seemed to signal a new direction for American foreign policy in the 21 st century.However, the intentions of rebalance have often been misunderstood, with important implications in Asia and Europe, and transatlantic perspectives on the so-called "pivot" are vital to understanding the evolution and impact of this policy shift.To this end, an all-day conference was held at the Center for International Studies and Research of Sciences Po (CERI) in Paris with the collaboration of the Association of the United States Army and the support of the Royal United Services Institute, the University of Notre Dame, and the United States Embassy in Paris.The event featured three panels of scholars and experts and a select European and American audience gathered to share their perspectives on this important topic. *The first set of panelists delved into the analysis of the origin and evolution of the policy itself, assessing its goals in the military, economic and diplomatic dimensions.Rear Admiral (retired) Michael McDevitt argued that the policy objectives adopted by the Obama administration have supported the aim of investing more of the various instruments of national power in Asia to align American foreign policy with its long-term economic interests for the 21 st century, an aim largely consistent with the "traditional balance" that has characterized US security policy vis-à-vis Asia for a century.On the other hand, Dr. Joanna Spear espoused a somewhat contrarian view, especially in reference to the military domain, suggesting that the US rebalance is merely a transitory policy that will not be sustained and arguing that American military involvement in the Asia-Pacific has been relatively meager.For his part Dr. Guillaume de Rougé insisted that besides the military sphere, the deepening of the US engagement in the multilateral diplomatic institutions and economic arrangements in East Asia has proven vital to achieve its foreign policy and economic goals in the region.Dr. Isabelle Facon's lunchtime presentation analyzed the policy's impact on Russia's foreign and defense policy interests.Russian reactions have been notably muted concerning this policy, a strategic move Russia perceives as China-focused.Furthermore, the US rebalance follows Russia's own rebalance to enhance its socio-economic development in its eastern territories and to make its policy more comprehensive with regards to Asia as a whole and less Sino-centric.Though the American strategic development is seen as useful for Russian interests such as more leverage for Moscow in Europe, the general consensus in the Kremlin seems to be that the rebalance is a liability for Russia.The second panel discussed the reactions of the countries that form the Asia-Pacific region.Dr. Emmanuel Puig focused on the opacity of China's reactions, though it seems clear that the overall consensus among PRC elites is that the "pivot" is aimed at China.He stressed China's reluctance to engage in open conflict with the US despite any threats the rebalance may pose.Dr. Guibourg Delamotte argued that Japan and South Korea seem to outwardly perceive the move in a positive light, although their respective leaderships have occasionally seemed concerned by the American willingness to adapt a more confrontational attitude towards China.Dr. Eric Frécon spoke on implications in Southeast Asia, suggesting that the rebalance has reinforced previous US efforts to encourage maritime security in the region, but has had unintended consequences that may have negative reverberations.The final panel focused on transatlantic implications, first with regards to military engagement and then concerning the consequences of the US rebalance for Europe.US Army Lieutenant Generals David Hogg and Donald Campbell emphasized that despite the reduction of American forces in Europe over the years and increasing budget constraints, the US remains committed to its partnership with Europe.This continuing engagement can be especially seen in the dramatic evolution of genuinely multinational training between the US and European allies and partners.Dr. Eva Gross explained that after the initial fear of abandonment subsided, the Europeans have drawn the conclusion that the announced rebalance should reinforce a certain sense of realism in the European-American partnership, leading Europeans to take their own security responsibilities more seriously domestically and globally.Dr. Nicola Casarini made the final presentation, offering that Europe's economic and security stakes in the Asia-Pacific can be seen as largely complementary to those of the US, but the EU is untrammeled by military allegiances and is more focused on pursuing soft power in the region.Dr. Christian Lequesne, Director of CERI at Sciences Po Paris, and Lieutenant General (retired) Guy Swan, Vice President for Education at AUSA, opened the conference with remarks emphasizing the pertinence of the issue at hand and the importance of open intellectual exchange.The significance of this dialogue was underlined due to the sense of misunderstanding often surrounding the rebalance policy announced in January 2012.They underlined the overall sense of commonality among transatlantic partners.Indeed, Lieutenant General Swan noted that the location of the conference has an important place in the history of international relations.Just outside, there is a plaque commemorating the signing of the Treaty of Paris on September 3, 1783 in the very same building (once the Hôtel d'York) with Benjamin Franklin, John Adams, and John Jay as representatives for the newly-formed United States of America, and David Hartley for the British crown.Prof. Frédéric Charillon, Director of the Institute for Strategic Research of the Military Academy (IRSEM), gave the keynote address.He started by discussing the appellation itself.Is the focus on the "pivot"-"rebalance" distinction important, or does this focus on semantics distract from the substance of the issue?In any case, both concepts suggest the notion of change in today's international affairs -change in foreign policy priorities, in the international system, in perceptions by world players, etc.This brings to light the structural dilemma at hand -namely, is the rebalance a product of the changed international system or vice versa?Finally, rebalancing involves more than two actors.Prof. Charillon insisted that despite their international statute, China and the US do not wield the power to reshape the global stage alone.This is why a transatlantic dialogue plays such a crucial role in an American policy directed at the Pacific.The redeployment of the US presence in Asia will probably not result in a Cold War-type structure.Although China can be seen as a peer competitor of the US in terms of population, power and resources, regional and global interdependence make it difficult to envisage new containment policies and zero-sum games akin to those of the Cold War era.Another reason why the strategic rebalance will not be as central as anticipated is that it is met with mixed feelings among Asian regional actors.There has been a call for a more significant American presence in the region from some states for national sovereignty motives, but including a shared overall agenda.As such, the nations of the Asia-Pacific will be consumers, not followers, of the strategic policy.Finally, although Asia is on the rise, it will not eclipse the strategic importance of other world regions, including Europe, the Middle East, Africa, etc.America's European allies remain the only partners who can share its global liberal agenda of freedom and democracy.If it is true that Asia plays an increasingly important economic and political role in the global scene, this only means more contributions will be required from Europe in terms of maritime security and negotiations.Furthermore, it is likely that Asian partners will be required in order to deal with new tensions in the Middle East, the development of new governments in Africa, and other issues sprouting in other regions.Prof. Charillon then offered some concluding remarks.Firstly, although fears that the US and China are on the path to a new Cold War will likely not be realized, there is a risk of a dual track international system, with a global multilateral power structure, but a bilateral regional competition in Asia.Secondly, there are probably too many concepts and frameworks in the region, but not enough substance.The risk is then that this will provoke various forms of nationalism among the countries of the region.The affected countries are unsure about the sustainability of the existing frameworks, leaving a general sense of insecurity.Finally, the actual challenge is not to prevent an Asian century, but rather to enter a peaceful Asian century, not to prevent new primacies, but to engender global security.Panel I: From "Pivot" to "Rebalance": 18 Months On The first panel featured scholars and experts from France, Great Britain, and the United States presenting and discussing the US strategic "rebalance" towards the Asia-Pacific region in terms of its origins, evolution and goals, and how these goals have been acted upon in various dimensions: military, diplomatic, and economic.Rear Admiral (retired) Michael McDevitt of the Center for Naval Analyses, Washington, D.C., made the first presentation.He focused on the policy objectives of the rebalance, with a specific regard towards their origin and evolution.He then analyzed the major drivers of the policy, and finally took a look at continuities and discontinuities in contrast to previous US administration policies.The Obama administration has consistently maintained the goal of investing more in Asia to align American resources with its long-term economic interests for the 21 st century.In other words, the aim is to create more jobs in the United States by selling American products in Asia.Regional stability is important to achieving this objective.To that end, the rebalance wants to ensure that the United States maintains its key role in the economic, political, and security relationships with the Asia-Pacific nations.Perhaps a better way to understand the rebalance policy is that it seeks to restore the "traditional balance" that has characterized US security policy since the Spanish American War by making certain East Asia remains a strategically important focus area for Washington, something that has not always been evident during the last decade of conflict in the Middle East.It is also important to point out that the preferred "term of art" is rebalance not pivot.According to RADM McDevitt's presentation, this policy has six aims (as highlighted by then Secretary of State Hilary Clinton): -strengthen American bilateral alliances; -deepen working relations with the rising Asian powers of China, India, Indonesia, and Vietnam; -more deeply engage with Asian multilateral institutions (this is something that Democratic Administrations have emphasized more than Republican ones), e.g. ASEAN defense ministers meetings and the East Asian Summit; -expand trade and investment, such as via the Transpacific Partnership (TPP), a continuation of Bush administration policy (this may meet with both internal and international obstacles due to the concerns of the domestic automotive lobby and the unwillingness of Asian nations to participate); -establish a more broadly-based military presence; -focus on rules and legal-based behavior in order to further the advancement of democracy and human rights, including resolving the disputes in the South China Sea diplomatically.The next important question RADM McDevitt addressed concerned US views on the place of China in this strategic development.It is often assumed that China is the main focus of the policy, and even more specifically that "containment" is the true goal of the "rebalance."Beyond US policymakers' denial that this is the case, this is unlikely because no other regional powers would be willing to take definitive sides against China, their largest trading partner and a decided geopolitical power.They are always going to live in the shadow of China.Nevertheless US policymakers deem it crucial to maintain credible military capability and presence in this dynamic region in order to balance the economic and security effects of China's rise.Another significant aspect of the rebalance strategy is the message of "reassurance," reassuring US friends and allies that the US is in East Asia for the long haul.This is intended as a corrective to a narrative that was gaining momentum in 2009-10 that America was being eclipsed by China.America was not being pushed out of East Asia and furthermore is quite capable of satisfying its security obligations to allies and friends.Another motivation behind the reassurance message is non-proliferation -Washington does not want regional allies to lose faith in their alliances with the United States and seek to independently guarantee their security, perhaps by developing nuclear weapons.The reassurance message remains a work in progress because there is still skepticism in the region about America's staying power.Finally, RADM McDevitt identified five ways in which the rebalance strategy was actually being implemented: -the substantial increase in investment of American security, economic, and diplomatic resources in Southeast Asia during the past four years -according to some estimations, to the highest levels since the Vietnam War; -a systemic response to the Chinese military efforts to attain an antiaccess/area denial (A2AD), a military concept of operations that the Chinese call "counter-intervention"; -the more assertive political expressions of what constitutes acceptable behavior in the Asian maritime domain; -the increased multilateral involvement as noted above; -and the firm refusal to negotiate with North Korea unless its nuclear program is on the Such a document has garnered a number of criticisms.It assumes those risks originate from high technology, state-based risks, as opposed to the hybrid, proxy violence challenges more likely to occur.With the birth of the policy, mention of China was taboo, despite that the policy very much concerns this major Asian power.Moreover, many geographical regions were entirely neglected, and economics is not acknowledged as a potential cause of conflict or constraint on America's actions.Finally, many seemed to embrace the NSG because of its "realism" through discussion of interstate and high technology war, but it is unclear that the document is "realist".However, there has been a decidedly lopsided approach to addressing the new missions for the US armed forces.One of the most often discussedand the clear favorite of the Navy and the Air Force -is A2AD planning, one of the four new missions.In addition to its newness, it defines clearer roles for the Navy and Air Force.Such a policy has proven easier to plan for, being a more classic "kinetic" military operational design, and as it involves sophisticated hardware it is attractive to the defense industry.And yet, it is crucial to examine how reasonable and feasible this mission is.The emerging doctrinal approach to this mission, the so-called AirSea Battle, has grown more intriguing in its effort to bring together cyber, space, and undersea aspects, and is now being looked at in a fully joint manner.However, a downside could arise if in its application this doctrine would take away or diminish the opportunity for strategic pauses in escalation.Dr. Spear presented the actual military developments of the NSG as meager, including the Navy-Marine exercises such as Dawn Blitz 2013with Canada, Japan, and New Zealand, the expansion of US forces in Australia at the Pine Gap Joint Defense Facility, and the deployment of ships to Singapore.However, most actions foreseen or announced are more future budgetary and planning focused in anticipation of more favorable economic conditions.Nonetheless, it is important to remember the already significant US military presence in the region.With the deployment of additional forces in alignment with the NSG, it looks as if the future focus will be more on nimble "swing forces" based in the US, without a substantially increased theater presence.The three facets of sustainability of such an announced policy must be taken into account: people, money, and events.In terms of personnel, as noted above, the original leaders of the policy have vacated their roles, which could be taken as signaling that the policy is not being given top priority.The recent US budgetary "sequestration" means that after obvious cuts have been made, difficult choices will remain, and there will be a lack of serious money for new expeditionary missions.Finally, events around the globe have been pulling attention away from Asia, not to mention that China in some, if not many, ways may also be a potential partner in managing global affairs.In that context, there is the concern that regional partners and allies may overcommit the USA.Dr. Guillaume de Rougé made the final presentation, focusing on US diplomatic and economic engagement in the Asia-Pacific.In order to remain anchored to Asia-Pacific, the main engine of global economic growth, the US must tame China and reaffirm its role as a legitimate regional stabilizer.US credibility is at stake, as the costs of its presence rise inexorably.Regional economic interdependencies are gradually benefitting China, while the US military guarantees and economic market share are eroding.Therefore, through the "pivot", or "rebalancing", the US testifies to the need to rethink its now twenty-year-old approach of cooperation and competition with China.Looking to recent events, US participation in the G8 shows both trans-Atlantic and trans-Pacific economic engagement, with a general increase in interest in macroeconomic issues.In the Asia-Pacific, there exists a diverse spread of economic institutions, including the TPP, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), and a variety of free trade agreements (FTAs) -though it is often difficult to distinguish between political military alliances and economic relationships.Some FTAs are between the US and its allies and partners, while others are among regional powers, such as the trilateral agreement between China, South Korea and Japan.There is also the ASEAN Economic Community Forum 2015 project (which since being launched in 2012 has perhaps proven too ambitious with a 2015 timetable) and the RCEP, the equivalent of the "ASEAN +6", which is in its fifth round of negotiation.The juxtaposition of China-led RCEP and US-led TPP has suggested to some that this is a new type of Cold War structure.However, both institutions originated in Asia itself.In the case of the TPP, there was initial support from South America, which has grown to include important participation from North America and, recently, Japan.Some TPP countries share membership in RCEP, and the organizations have ended up playing complementary roles.Interest in one has provoked increased interest in the other, despite differences in membership, scope, and ambitions.The TPP is purported to be the most important FTA in the history of the US as well as for the regional powers of the Asia-Pacific -trade has especially blossomed between Southeast and Northeast Asia in recent years.This implies an increased need for regulation and dispute settlement mechanisms, as the countries are experiencing tremendous development and associated economic shocks.These institutions are thus even more necessary, considering there is no dispute settlement process existing within ASEAN (important for conflicting continental and peninsular interests), or indeed between ASEAN and China.It is important to consider the increasingly difficulty with which economic growth can be measured, as such techniques as "made in", GDP, etc.are not reliable.Additionally, countries no longer buy what they need; they buy what they need to produce the goods they will sell.The US is the current global leader, but it will not have the same pull with China in developing favorably asymmetric conditions in FTAs.In such negotiations, China would have three primary options: play the RCEP card despite that many members are US partners or allies; play the TPP card, though there is little interest in China joining this negotiation, and it does not currently meet the requirements; and finally the World Trade Organization (WTO), taking the negotiations to the global, as opposed to regional, level.Regardless, it is important that the negotiations be multilateral and not bilateral, in terms of parties' willingness to make concessions.As for diplomatic issues, beyond North Korea and Taiwan, maritime concerns have come to the forefront, with the main near-term American diplomatic goal seeming to be the containment of China's coercive diplomacy in the South and East China Seas.This would also seem to include a more robust forward military presence; however, due to diminishing resources, this may not be feasible in the long run.There exists the desire to maintain a very visible profile vis-à-vis China as well as the basic need to maintain the freedom of navigation, which introduces private actors.In a variety of forums meeting on this issue, the US maintains a noticeable presence, but one that existed before the rebalance and likely will after.The focus on maritime issues underlines the need for China and the US to test each other's limits in order to identify the extent of their competition, outside of military issues and mostly in economic terms.This could lead to new forms of "strategic stability" between the two countries, dampening the prospect for escalation crisis and conflict, preventing major disturbance of economic growth and prosperity.In order to continue the stability sought by the rebalance policy, the US has two complementary options: the creation of an "Asian NATO", allowing the US to take the back seat, backed up by multilateral economic agreements; or a sort of "co-dominion" between the US and China, treating China as a regional superpower.The discussion following the morning panel featured a lively exchange among panelists and attendees alike.One topic was the relationship between balancing and engaging China and how this plays out in the current US discourse regarding policy implications.There are hundreds of US-China bilateral discussions among government officials (mainly economics-and security-focused).This day-to-day engagement indicates that both countries recognize the importance of a continuing dialogue.However, there is tight control from the White House, which has a vested interest in ensuring the success of the policy, and especially preventing conflict with China.One participant offered that the main American approach should be retaining ascendancy and "educating China in the rules of the game".Another participant commented on the fact that a strong US interest in Asia is nothing new, as it can be traced back to the Spanish-American War.The annexation of the Philippines served as a military and economic threequarter way house to China, even a century ago.More recently, regular engagement began in 1998 under President Clinton and has continued with in a variety of ways.One expert suggested that US involvement in the TTIP, in addition to the Pacific-focused TTP, shows a dual "pivot": trans-Atlantic and trans-Pacific.The next topic of discussion covered the US military presence in the Asia-Pacific region.One speaker insisted that although significantly increased forces in the region are not likely, there seems to be no intention to withdraw forces.Another expert commented that the US needs to figure out how to accomplish more with less, hinting at the use of "swing forces" as a solution to this issue, to which someone remarked on the importance many nations place on the number of troops deployed in a region (despite the reliance on high technology in today's world that would seem to reduce the importance of "boots on the ground").It was then claimed that the US rebalance has led to a test of US leadership by China, a Chinese effort to drive a wedge between America and its Asian allies.Consequently, US "reassurance" to its partners is crucial because a sense of weakness on the part of the US will be a detriment to its allies and raise China's already elevated confidence levels.Another expert countered that China has internal problems to concern itself with, issues that will become more apparent as the economy slows.Attendees also discussed the many facets of China's global involvement.Taking a very direct approach with engaging countries, China has interests in businesses and natural resources around the globe, especially in the developing countries that make up Africa and South America.One interlocutor noted that China treats Latin American interests with the appearance at least of respectful attention, in contrast with many Western nations.The diaspora of Chinese people was also touched on, investing China both emotionally and monetarily.Another commentator noted the irony in the fierce competition between Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOE) around the globe, suggesting they are more capitalist than the capitalists.This globalization of Chinese power gained through economic impetus brings security issues into play.With the integration of China into global markets, what is perhaps most worrisome for other world powers is that China does not explain the reasons for its actions.A final discussion looked briefly at the likelihood of the NSG having longterm strategic implications.One attendee insisted that while the policy was not intended to be applied only in the short-term, it is likely that that will be the case.Another countered that it is unlikely that NSG will be overtaken by events; QDRs rarely have long-lasting influence, and so even if the 2014 QDR counters the NSG, the American policy focus on the Asia-Pacific is likely to remain.Dr. Isabelle Facon, Senior Research Fellow at the Strategic Research Foundation in Paris, gave the lunchtime presentation focusing on how Russia is impacted by the US rebalance.Although not a part of the Asia-Pacific, as a country that spans Europe and Asia, it is implicated in the rebalance policy, and its reactions play an important role on the global stage.Perhaps most striking about Russia's reactions to the US strategic rebalance towards Asia is how quiet officials have been, in contrast to the Kremlin's sometimes harsh positions on Washington's policies in Europe and Eurasia.The first explanation Dr. Facon offered suggests that Russia has still not found out whether the American policy will impede its own rising ambitions in the region.Another possibility deals with geopolitics, Russia's basic assumption being that the US is acting primarily to contain China -in other words, Russia is not the target.A final explanation for Russia's relative silence on the "pivot" is its perception of continuity: according to Russian officials, the rebalance is hardly a break with previous policy.In general, Russian leaders are still in the process of assessing whether the strategic rebalance will be more instrumental or detrimental to their country's interests in Asia and globally.Dr. Facon also emphasized that Russia has pursued its own rebalance towards Asia, declared even before the American move, because of a motivation to develop relations and find new markets in such a dynamic theatre.Firstly, it perceives a vital need to resuscitate socio-economic development of its far eastern territories.However, Russia does not want this development to be dominated by concerns over China's growing economic presence in Russia's Far East as has occurred with the raw materials thus far.Moscow is looking to avoid the entrenchment of economic distortions that could have serious geopolitical consequences in the long run.Secondly, Russia wants to make its Asian foreign policy less Sino-centric.Previous Russian policy was dictated by necessity in reaction to China's rise and the relative weakness of Russian capabilities.Now, however, there is a new effort afoot to correct the Sino-centrism in the coming years, an effort the US rebalance may help or complicate.Dr. Facon then analyzed how the US rebalance could, in the perception of Russian leaders, prove instrumental for Russia.Moscow, for which the rebalance is essentially about containing China, first sees the move as having the potential to elevate itself in Washington's geo-political calculations if the US looks for partners or, more negatively, is willing to lessen the strengthening of Sino-Russian relations.A second possible positive consequence of the American strategic policy, in Russia's perception, is that a US focus in the Far East could mean Russia will have an expanded capacity to maneuver in Europe and maybe more leverage in regions such as the Caucasus and Ukraine if the US leaves Europe deal with the management of the strategic situation there.With these issues left to Europeans to sort out, the Russians anticipate having more say in proceedings because they see the Europeans as a weaker power.Finally the fact that the future of the Sino-Russian relationship is a source of concern in Russia makes Russian scholars and officials wonder about the possible impact of the US pivot from the point of view of Russia's willingness to strike a better balance of power with Beijing.Some scholars (liberal and Western-oriented) argue that one of the only factors preventing China from turning Russia into a pawn is the US rebalance.As such, it would be prudent for Russia to ally, or at least align, itself with the US.Without going that far, many in Moscow note that Russia and the US share the goal of balancing China (although they have uneven capabilities of shaping the situation), an objective that both consider achieving by a more active presence in the Asian sphere.However, this approach does not seem to be the generally accepted mood in Moscow due to an overall lack of trust between the former Cold War rivals.Furthermore, alignment with Washington would not be coherent with the strategy Russia has been pursuing thus far: in order to keep under control the possible negative effects for itself of China's rise, Moscow has been very careful to avoid antagonizing China, to avoid any moves which Beijing could perceive as directed against it.Dr. Facon identified one positive aspect of a stronger US presence in Asia for Russia's own agenda.It deals with China's current military posture, which is mainly focused on the Taiwan Strait, South China Sea, and Western Pacific, which is to say away from Russia.Russia anticipates that further US involvement will only encourage this trend.In general however, it seems the US rebalance is considered a liability to Russian interests.Firstly, it reduces Russia's margins for maneuver in developing a policy of multi-polarity in Asia, which is already a difficult feat.It also makes China more suspicious that Russia's moves in Asia are undertaken under American influence.Finally, an extended US presence risks triggering a long-term increase in friction and tension between the US and China, in which Russia may be faced not only with more instability in its neighborhood but also with a difficult choice between Beijing and Washington.Dr. Facon concluded by highlighting that Russia may feel "trapped" by its tendency, over the past two decades, due to its weakened power base, to constantly (and more or less skillfully) play the China card versus the US and vice versa.Following Dr. Isabelle Facon's presentation on the Russian perspectives concerning the strategic rebalance, there was a brief discussion.One participant insisted that Russia's interests in the US rebalance to Asia demonstrate its desire to remain an important figure on the world scene.Another interlocutor commented on Russo-Japanese relations, specifically regarding the revisiting of the 1956 negotiations on territorial disputes.With Prime Minister Abe again in power in Japan, it is likely that there will be further communications between Moscow and Tokyo.However, both countries face domestic debate concerning this issue.Russia finds Japan an interesting potential partner for multi-polarity in Greater Asia, for foreign investment in the Far East, and for technology transfers in Russia's effort to modernize.Because of these opportunities, it seems Russia is enthusiastic about solving these disputes.The final topic focused on Russia's feeling of isolation vis-à-vis the US, Europe, and even China and Japan.Because of these sentiments, Russian strategists feel the necessity of retaining tactical nuclear weapons, always wary of what is occurring on its periphery.In addition, President Obama's recent statement in Berlin indicating a desire for talks with Russia to reduce deployed nuclear capabilities now implicates China as an important factor for Russia's consideration, as Russia may fear that too many cuts would reduce its stature vis-à-vis China.The second panel of the day set out to establish and analyze how the American rebalance has affected regional security policies in Northeast and Southeast Asia.In particular, it examined the impact of the US policy shift on China's foreign and defense policy interests, on South Korea and Japan's relations with the US, and on the maritime security dynamics in Southeast Asia.Although it is difficult to find official statements or authoritative articles published at the time of the announcement of the rebalance in late 2011, such initial Chinese reactions as were noted to the strategic rebalance were decidedly muted and cautious.However, this relative silence was not due to a sense of surprise vis-à-vis the strategic development, but rather due to the fact that at the same time, China was entering a year of political turmoil.This exerted restraint on the expression of official opinion on foreign and domestic policy.In the meantime, non-official articles were published, often by former party leaders, which were often taken as official statements.These articles displayed a decidedly hawkish tone, demonstrating nationalistic feelings in a martial and unbalanced manner.As the principal source of Chinese responses, this sparked worry among policymakers in the US.The rhetoric complained of a return to Cold War mentality, the containment of China, the aggressiveness of the US, and the potential destabilizing effects in the region of such a policy move.The economic aspects, e.g. the TPP, were largely left out of the evaluation of the policy.With the actual announcement by President Obama, official views were increasingly published, and hawkish views waned in popularity.Now that the Chinese leadership transition has been resolved, more coherent perspectives are being expressed, although mainly in domestic conferences, with little publication of the discussions abroad.This led into the second part of Dr. Puig's presentation, in which he focused on the current Chinese perceptions of the US policy with a particular regard towards diplomacy and defense.In terms of diplomacy, the rebalance was no surprise for Chinese officials, and it even helped identify three significant issues for Chinese policy: clarify if this shift is purposefully meant to follow a confrontational path; calculate the sustainability of this strategic American move; understand whether and how this development will impact China's influence in Asia.Dr. Puig's analysis of these recent views expressed by Chinese officials drew two conclusions: -First, there is an overall coherence among Chinese policymaker views.It is assumed that the rebalance is a direct challenge to China, but it has not been interpreted as a true threat (except for commentators in the PLA).The Chinese do not see how the rebalance, or indeed the TPP, will significantly influence their power in the Asia-Pacific, though this does push China to rethink its policy in the region.-Second, the officials still seem to be puzzled by the US' strategic choice.The main queries posed have to do with the timing of the rebalance and the amount of publicity it was given: Is it too late?Why such emphasis?About six months ago Chinese diplomats began to react to the rebalance in terms of developing a new posture and narrative in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa that offers support to these regions in order to play off the abandonment they might feel from the US turn towards Asia.As such, the rebalance is perceived as an opportunity for China.A final facet of the diplomatic response is the "March West" strategy being mulled over by Beijing policymakers: instead of focusing on "zero-sum" relations with the US in the Pacific, China should focus more energy on being proactive in Central and South Asia as well as in the Middle East.As for the defense aspect, perspectives from the People's Liberation Army (PLA) see fewer opportunities coming out of the US strategic rebalance.There are few official statements, but there have been numerous criticisms of the AirSea Battle Concept (ASBC), which is seen as destabilizing, aggressive, and an explicit threat to engage China in an arms race.China understands its military inferiority to the US and perceives a threat in the ASBC against A2AD efforts.The most recent air show in China was a political display of China's increasing ability to counter US shows of strength.In general, the rebalance has fueled insecurities over the lack of operational capabilities of PLA troops, which has led to much pressure on Chinese defense industries.In sum, while China has no desire for engaging in conflict with the US over the rebalance, there is no doubt in China that the policy is focused on "balancing" China.Dr. Guibourg Delamotte, a Research Fellow at INALCO's Japanese Studies Center and Associate Research Fellow at CERI, gave the next presentation, addressing the policy's impact on Northeast Asia, specifically in Japan and on the Korean peninsula.She explained that overall, Japan and South Korea welcomed the announcement, despite an uneasiness stemming from the fact that the US is ambivalent towards China with which it wishes to engage, and which it also seeks to contain.The US rebalance had more impact on Japan's defense posture than on Korea's: Japan requires more encouragement to make even slight changes to its defense policy.However, assessing the impact of the US rebalancing as such is difficult: changes in Japan's defense policy stem from its increased fears (vis-à-vis its neighbors), rather than from the new US policy.As for US presence in Asia, the rebalancing does not imply an increase in US troops, on the contrary.The tendency for the past ten years or so has been to decrease their number.Both South Korea and Japan welcome this decrease.However, both nations realize that what it implies for them is a greater military self-reliance.Japan is for instance contemplating allowing its self-defense forces preventive strike capabilities (vis-à-vis a North Korean ballistic missile offensive) or setting up a Marine Corps (to ensure a better protection of its remote islands, vis-à-vis China).Such changes to Japan's defense posture would change nothing to the balance of the Japan-US security alliance: Japan must defend itself first, and the US provides backup, as well as nuclear deterrence.The rebalancing has had little impact on Japan's relations with the US and its allies in the region.For a number of years the US has encouraged its allies to establish links between themselves, and sought to replace the "hub and spokes" structure with a "cobweb".Japan has been eager to pursue this strategy, as it aims to counterbalance China (South Korea needs China in negotiations with North Korea and is cautious not to antagonize China).In addition, Japan has developed relations with countries in the Pacific: Australia, India, and now Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam, with important overtures to South Korea.Cooperation has also been established with the UK in terms of the exchange of sensitive information, with plans to do the same with France.The US rebalancing has done little to reduce tensions in the region.Relations between Japan and South Korea as well as South Korea and China remain largely unchanged, in spite of the fact that the US encourages cooperation between the two nations.Both countries were about to sign a defense cooperation agreement, but the signature was postponed by South Korea due to the upcoming presidential elections at the time.Nationalistic tension between South Korea and Japan has escalated in the past few years, and the two countries' relations are increasingly dominated by internal politics.The generational shift which has taken place in Japan and South Korea accounts for much of this increased tension.Leaders in both countries seek to strengthen their political bases, and South Korea welcomes the opportunity of appearing to see eye to eye with China.Recent tensions in the Korean peninsula are not attributable to the rebalancing because North Korea follows its own agenda.In conclusion, Japan and South Korea welcomed the announcement of the rebalancing, though they struggle to see what it might imply for relations with China and are waiting to see if the policy is sustainable.Dr. Eric Frécon, an Assistant Professor at the École Navale and Coordinator of the Southeast Asia Observatory at the Asia Centre, concluded the panel with a presentation on reactions from Southeast Asia, particularly concerning maritime security.In Southeast Asia the US strategic rebalance has been perceived as maintaining the continuity in recent American foreign policy in the region.Prior to the announcement of the US strategic rebalance in January 2012, there was already a formidable American presence in the Asia-Pacific waters.The strong naval posture was represented by US aircraft carrier visits, troops in the Philippines, and the recent decision to send littoral combat ships (LCS) to Singapore, for instance.These American initiatives put pressure on the nations of Southeast Asia, who were less than keen to have such an imposing American presence in the region, producing positive effects such as the Malacca Straits patrols, Eyes in the Sky air patrols, and the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA).In addressing the effects of America's rebalance on Southeast Asia, Dr. Frécon proceeded to analyze the answers to traditional and nontraditional maritime threats via defense policy and naval diplomacy, the topic of freedom of navigation, and the unexpected consequences besides maritime security.Although the rebalance was again perceived as a continuation of previous policy, it has had new impacts because of a new context.Issues such as budgetary concerns as well as domestic and international pressures have shaped how the US has been able to pursue its goals for the rebalance, and there has been considerable effort to strike a delicate balance, aiming for a light, but effective, footprint without any rolling back.It is also important to consider the complexities presented by maritime law (e.g. dealing with the tidal waters of archipelagic states).The US policy has given much attention to the prevention of traditional threats, such as A2AD, ASBC, etc.,including through naval drills aimed at encouraging cooperation among nations.As for the non-traditional threats, there has been support from behind including the training law enforcement agents, provision of equipment, and sharing of intelligence.Finally, there has been much reaching out from senior leaders and participation in regional forums, renewing and updating relationships between the US and Southeast Asian countries.Dr. Frécon suggested that the freedom of navigation issue is the primary focus of the rebalance with regard to maritime topics.It has had geographical manifestations in all the choke points in Asian waters.The doctrinal manifestations can be seen in Indonesian efforts at developing sea denial, for instance.The third aspect of the effort has been the legal discussions towards a non-restrictive definition of exclusive economic zones (EEZ).Dr. Frécon identified some unexpected consequences of the rebalance outside the realm of maritime security.One such is a potential for an arms race or pressure for modernization, though there has been nothing to conclusively define the military development in the region as such.Another unintended consequence is the possibility of US partners and allies pursuing dangerous initiatives because of the perceived safety of the American umbrella, such as the Philippines reaction to the Scarborough Shoal issue in 2012.Perhaps most important is the notion of "bamboo diplomacy", i.e. bending in the wind, in this case nations shifting between catering to the US and cooperating with China.The discussion following the second panel first focused on the presentation by Dr. Guibourg Delamotte on the impact of the Rebalance on Japan and the Korean peninsula.It then opened up to topics pertaining to China, Southeast Asia and maritime security, and the strategic move's implications in Asia in general.Participants first addressed how South Korea and China are postured against Japan and the effects on the US.It was offered that South Korea realizes the centrality of the US to its security policy, and has not brought up contentious issues with China as it recognizes that this would heighten tensions.The peninsular power also depends on good relations with China for reasons of a shared border and the North Korea Six-party talks.Japan, on the other hand, is not downplaying its tensions with China.It has sought appeasement, but China has adopted a non-cooperative and confrontational stance.These postures have not had a significant impact for the US, as both South Korea and Japan clearly identify the US as their ally -as opposed to China.One participant offered that the rebalance has in fact had an impact in Japan with regards to the revision to guidelines involving such issues as the ASBC, i.e. a dramatic increase in the amount of attention aimed towards access denial.Another topic of discussion was the implications of the June 2013 Obama speech in Berlin concerning the reduction of the world's nuclear stockpiles.It was suggested that the very definition of extended deterrence is being brought into question as US allies reassess the viability of the US commitment.Indeed, South Korea and Japan are both in need of reassurance.In Japan's case, there have always been doubts about the US commitment to put itself in danger in response to an attack against Japan, and now it especially fears being neglected for China.The Japanese are aware of their need to build up their defense capabilities, which will require backup from the US, but this effort has been met with constitutional complications.A need to engage in negotiations with China before categorizing the nation as an enemy has also been identified.One interlocutor brought up the possibility that there is a sort of European, or at least French, rebalance towards the Asia-Pacific, as suggested by recent visits to the region by President François Hollande and the beginning of negotiations for an economic partnership agreement (EPA) between the EU and Japan.However, these talks are likely to be difficult due to domestic opposition.Hollande's visit has created expectations that with the adoption of an EPA, there will be greater cooperation on security issues.Nonetheless, the dialogue will only be bilateral.Furthermore, Japan is concerned that France does not share its perception of China's threat, and so France must convince Japan it shares the same strategic interests regarding the major Asian power.Participants then delved further into the issue of Japan becoming more selfreliant, with a specific regard to its constitutional restraints, and the consequences of this for South Korea as far as nuclear deterrence is concerned.The consensus was that increasing defense self-reliance has long been discussed in Japan (on the order of 50 years), but only now is it beginning to gain momentum, and changes will likely occur as incremental developments.It was offered that South Korea will have difficulty trusting Japan, especially due to internal politics and nationalism.And yet, it is unlikely that the US or indeed the P5 (the five permanent nations of the United Nations Security Council) would be in favor of Japan gaining nuclear capabilities, which is something South Korea should take into account.During the part of the discussion on China and Southeast Asia, one topic participants focused on was the broad range of actors involved in the South China Sea and the consequent problems this poses to the PRC in terms of foreign policy coordination and consistency/coherence.One participant suggested that right now Southeast Asian nations are "soft-hedging", or rowing between two reefs.On the one hand, they depend on China as an economic locomotive, but on the other, the US is crucial as a security guarantor.This playing both sides shows that there is continuity.However, the rebalance has allowed Southeast Asia some space to move, such as in the case of the democratic transition and distancing from China pursued by Myanmar.Another interlocutor brought up the issue of the shortcomings in Chinese efforts in soft power diplomacy in the past decade.Nations that successfully pursue soft power diplomacy lay hold to three primary criteria: attention, influence, and attraction.While the US is possessor of all three, China lacks attraction.This is perhaps why the rebalance has been wanted by Southeast Asian nations as well as by other regional powers like Australia, New Zealand, and Japan because it is perceived as strengthening their sovereignty.The state of Sino-Japanese relations was the next topic of discussion.Currently, the two nations do not see eye-to-eye, in a period when strong anti-Japan sentiments reign in China and strong anti-China feelings are widespread in Japan.One participant suggested that hope will come in the form of a new generation of Chinese journalists whose media outlets, though not private, are at least more open, and who can attempt to bridge the gap with Japanese journalists, breaking down propaganda with more informative articles and documentaries.One participant brought up the disputes concerning the "nine-dash line" as it applies to the exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of the Philippines and Vietnam.These EEZs are important because reports say that nearly all the oil in the region is located on the continental shelf of Vietnam and the Philippines.Although the Philippines have recently taken China to court concerning this issue, it remains to be seen how this dispute will be resolved.Attendees then discussed China's reactions to American defense training and exercise initiatives as the US seeks to implement the NSG.One interlocutor noted that a retired PLA specialist had commented that it was understood that these exercises were designed to show China that US forces in the region were operational.This led to the question of whether the PLA has reached genuine operational capability, a hotly debated topic among PLA officials.While many leaders are perhaps overly proud of the new capabilities of the PLA, others have started to be more vocal in expressing the fact that the PLA has not actually reached combat readiness.There is much internal debate regarding how to improve operational capabilities and become more mobilized.The attendees finished the discussion by returning to the topic of soft power diplomacy efforts in China.Although there was again a consensus that China does not have official soft power in terms of attention, influence, and attraction (attraction being the key shortcoming), one specialist pointed out its sort of unofficial soft power during the 1960s.This was a period when Chinese culture experienced much attraction among young Westerners, despite that diplomatic relations were much worse at the time and Mao was in power.Indeed, contemporary Chinese officials are puzzled to realize they do not fully possess soft power, but they understand that it depends upon outsiders' perceptions.Although Beijing has established the Confucius Center, many argue it has not been very successful in promoting the Chinese culture, especially as it does not focus on contemporary culture.And yet, there is a sort of unofficial soft power in that increasing numbers of Western students are learning the Chinese language and going there to study.The final panel of the day discussed the consequences of the US rebalance towards Asia for Europe.The strength and power of the relationship manifest themselves in a variety of ways.One example is the NATO declaration of Article 5 (committing each member state to consider an armed attack against one state to be an armed attack against all states) following the attacks on September 11, 2001, as initiated by the allies of the US.The American holiday Memorial Day is another striking example of the close rapport.Every year, there are ceremonies at each of the twenty American military cemeteries in Europe, where soldiers and civilians from both sides of the Atlantic gather to commemorate the sacrifices of the men and women who fought to preserve freedom and democracy.As for the evolution of the military commitment, the US remains committed to the training and military exercises with its European partners.There have been significant efforts to increase the understanding and cohesion between American and European forces.Beginning in the 1980s, the training of US troops in Europe was separate from European troops, with most intercontinental interaction occurring in the upper echelons of the militaries, i.e. little bi-or multilateral training took place.Following the fall of the Berlin Wall in the late 1980s, there was a significant reduction of US forces on the Continent and the birth of the Partnership for Peace program aimed at creating trust between NATO and the former Soviet Union.There was slightly more integration in training exercises, but it was still relatively meager.In the middle of the following decade, the ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan showcased participation from US and European troops, and there was significant intercontinental cooperation at a level never reached during the Cold War.In the future, the US strategy is to remain engaged with its European partners with a special focus on maintaining personal and professional relationships with its allies.The growing capabilities provided by defense-related technological advances will also continue to play a large role, increasing efficiency despite depleted forces.Collaboration with NATO Response Forces will be a driver to transition the US and its allies from post-Afghan 2014 to future threat environments, with a continued emphasis on interoperability.This evolution demonstrates a continued commitment by the US to the transatlantic relationship with the expectation that its European partners will also invest in their own initiatives for common defense and collective security.The generals asserted that Europe remains a cornerstone and catalyst for America's engagement in the global scene.It is crucial to focus more on such initiatives as multilateral training and the development of partner capacity.It is also interesting to note that 91% of the non-US forces in ISAF are from Europe, and much of the training occurring at US bases in Europe is multinational.This represents an important focus on interoperability and the consolidation of infrastructure, reinforcing the message of the strong US commitment to Europe.Dr. Eva Gross, a Senior Analyst at the EU Institute for Security Studies in Paris, next examined the transatlantic relationship, specifically analyzing how the strategic rebalance was perceived by Europe, the perceptions of the US role in Europe, and the current and future implications on the Atlantic Alliance.The initial European reaction to the US rebalance was often alarm and concern over the fabric of the transatlantic relationship.The announcement of the rebalance also signaled to Europeans that the time had come to take their own security responsibilities more seriously, domestically and globally.The announced "rebalance" could even be seen as indicating that alliances would no longer be valued for the sake of the partnership itself, but instead for the practical role these alliance relationships would play in evolving geopolitical realities.It also led to soul-searching reflecting on the US role in Europe and a re-evaluation of Europe's own interests in Asia.Dr. Gross emphasized the importance of considering the background in Europe at the time of the announcement of the policy.In addition to the challenges of austerity in response to the financial crisis, the value of European integration was brought into question.There was also an ongoing restructuring in Brussels following the Lisbon Treaty.Nevertheless, the US continues to have important interests in the Middle East and this indicates that the US will maintain a presence in Europe and continue close collaboration with its transatlantic allies and partners.Indeed, it can be seen from recent appointees to the second Obama administration that although the official policy is the rebalance towards Asia, there is also a focus on having experienced transatlantic advisors, thus maintaining a close US-EU rapport.From this, Dr. Gross explained that the implications for transatlantic relations are encouraging, but not altogether different than they previously were.Recent years have been marked by increasing EU-US cooperation, including Department of State-EU collaboration on post-conflict reconstruction efforts and joint engagement in theatres.This is an effort both countries can build upon in the future.Nonetheless a thread of continuity has carried through in the European effort to become more militarily self-reliant.Stagnation remains despite the implications of the pivot and the usual admonitions that Europe is not considered a partner in terms of military capability.This is due to austerity, but also importantly, to strategic culture.Dr. Nicola Casarini, also a Senior Analyst at the EU Institute for Security Studies in Paris, gave the seminar's final presentation, speaking on the impact of the rebalance on Europe's strategic and economic interests in Asia and how they are affected by a changing US strategy.He stressed that the EU is mainly a trading power.In fact, it ranks second in largest trading partners in the Asia-Pacific -behind China, but ahead of the US -meaning the EU is China's most important trading partner.Today nearly one-third of EU exports are destined for the Asian market, which offers rapidly expanding market opportunities for Europeans businesses who rank among the largest foreign investors in the region.Furthermore, the seventeen-member Eurozone holds even more power in the region as euro-dominated assets account for approximately a quarter of Asia's major economies' holdings.These holdings total at more than onethird in China, the world's largest holder.As a result, the euro is the secondary reserve currency in Asia, ahead of the yen.When it comes to the European sovereign debt crisis, the major Asian economies represent a quarter of the purchasers of European Financial Stabilization Mechanismissued bonds for the Irish and Portuguese bailout programs in 2010.Over the last fifteen years, a core group of European powers ("Core-Europe", similar in membership to the Eurozone) has developed high-tech and space technology cooperation with important Asia-Pacific actors.Core-Europe's jointly developed satellite system Galileo is based on key agreements with China, India, and South Korea.Moreover, Asia represents an up-and-coming market for increasingly export-dependent European aerospace and defense industries.The European sector has developed an important presence in the market of military equipment in South and Southeast Asia in recent years, especially in submarines, frigates, corvettes, and jet fighters.In fact, European defense firms share 7% of China's defense budget, in spite of the 1989 arms embargo against Beijing.Additionally, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Asia imports nearly half of its arms from Europe and the US, approximately 20% and 29% respectively.Europe is not a major military power in Asia, but it does play an important role in the provision of arms (even more so than the US or China) to the small countries making up Southeast Asia.Not being a hard military power, Europe has still contributed to security measures in the region as its economic interests depend on safe maritime routes and a stable environment.The EU contributes through multilateral initiatives, taking part in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), and the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO).European efforts have also made significant contributions to the furthering of democracy and peace agreements among the countries of the Asia-Pacific.Finally, Europe is the largest distributor of development aid and humanitarian assistance in the region, fitting with the EU's image as primarily being a pursuant of soft power.Dr. Casarini noted that the EU itself does not have troops in Asia, although specific member nations such as Great Britain do.Unknown to many is the fact that some European powers (Great Britain, France, and Germany, for instance) have pursued defense dialogues and military relations with the Asian allies of the US, as well as with China itself, facilitating the training of Chinese military officers and the exchanges of high level visits.Indeed Sino-French and Sino-British collaboration extend to include port calls and joint naval search and rescue exercises with the goal of building trust and exchanging information.The EU's main political interests in Asia come first as political stability, but also entail regional integration and confidence-building measures, distinguishing it from other international actors.Indeed, Europe has been instrumental in the creation of ASEAN+3, the main institutional framework promoting regional integration.Although the EU cannot offer security measures on par with those of the US, it does furnish the Asia-Pacific with a model for inter-state relations and cooperation among former rivals.In conclusion, the European Union has significant interests in Asia, and its presence is felt across the full policy spectrum, from a common currency to FTAs, space technology to arm sales.Thus, the Union could be considered a sort of minor Asian power.In spite of inescapable competition for the market shares of the region, the European political presence is very much complementary to that of the US, particularly in promoting sets of multilateral-based rules and standards.However, an important difference between the transatlantic partners exists in that Washington's strategic rebalance towards Asia is widely interpreted as being aimed at balancing China, and so by putting the focus on the reinforcement of its security alliances in the area, the US policy stands the risk of resulting in greater polarization in the realm of the Far East in addition to the emergence of zero-sum relations.In contrast, the Union's presence and policy is unhampered by military allegiances and lacks any specific target country.As such, Dr. Casarini emphasized the importance of continuing a transatlantic dialogue to further each power's understanding of the other's policy and interests in Asia in order to facilitate a more streamlined joint approach.The final discussion first addressed the transatlantic implications of the rebalance.First, one participant pointed out an area of disconnect not deeply analyzed during the third panel: the use of NATO as opposed to the EU in the discussion of European interests.It was suggested that the disconnect may stem from US participation in an old organization (NATO), which may no longer be as relevant as it once was.The original purpose of NATO was set out as threefold by NATO's first Secretary General, Lord Ismay: to keep the Russians out of Europe, the Americans involved in Europe, and the Germans down.However, the future objectives of NATO were brought into question.In contrast, another expert insisted on the commonality of NATO and the EU, not only in terms of member states, but also in terms of goals, suggesting that the two organizations complement each other on mission sets.Yet another expert commented on the growing economic, diplomatic, and security capabilities of the EU, meaning NATO is not the only organization to approach concerning European or transatlantic affairs.An attendee then brought into question the possibility of a sort of "Asian NATO".There have been efforts to this effect, but the current global context differs from that at the start of NATO in a variety of ways, most markedly because China is not the same type of power the Soviet Union represented during the Cold War.It is difficult to say whether such an organization in the Asia-Pacific is feasible, but it would have, in the view of the attendee, the potential to make significant economic and security contributions.Another participant chimed in, countering that it would be impossible to create a NATO-equivalent in Asia without Chinese membership because no nations want to be perceived as having even an implicit anti-China bias.The question of European nations taking sides with China or the US was also put on the table.One expert asserted that the EU is not in a position to take sides as things currently stand (barring an attack from China), although there is a distinct possibility that member states with sufficient capabilities can and have adopted their own policies in given cases.This inability of the EU to reach internal agreement on EU-China relations is brought about by a variety of events in the recent past, such as the unsuccessful attempts at lifting the arms embargo in the early 2000s.Thus, China represents both a threat and an opportunity to a number of European member states.Participants went on to discuss the multinational training facilities for NATO, as well as non-NATO, troops.Such a system has provided many nations with the opportunity to develop training standards.Although not all participating countries belong to NATO, this effort demonstrates their desire to be a part of a larger effort.One attendee offered that while NATO is important for purposes of interoperability, it may not always be the right tool.There are some cases where the EU civilian label may be more effective, providing the opportunity for collaboration between the organizations.Another expert commented on the previous talking point wherein European defense companies' major interests in the Chinese market were noted.It is important to remember that these same companies also have major economic interests in American markets.Recalling the 2003-05 period during which there were attempts to lift the Chinese arms embargo, there was retaliation from both the American Executive branch and Congress.Taking into consideration the industry's interests split between the Chinese and the US markets, it was thought that, for most European defense companies, the pendulum still swings in favor of the US market.One interlocutor questioned the possibility of the use of multinational capabilities, such as the forces used in Iraq and Afghanistan, for purposes of maritime security in Southeast Asia.Another insisted that such a development would be unlikely, not in terms of the strategic rebalance, but because of the current sequestration-induced budgetary challenges facing the US.
In the past, trade relations between Central Asia and the Baltic countries focused mainly on logistics and transit services, given their common transportation infrastructure inherited from the Soviet period, most importantly, the rail network.However, Kazakhstan's rapidly growing economy coupled with the effects of the financial crisis on the Baltic countries have pushed the latter to search for new business opportunities and to engage more actively with the Central Asian region.Most major bilateral projects are still linked to transit, but opportunities in technology transfer, agriculture, tourism and education are also being explored.Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are all interested in developments regarding alternative energy supply routes via the Caspian Sea, but they are not directly involved with Central Asia's energy market.Security is a priority, mostly because of the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) used to transfer supplies from Baltic ports through Central Asia and the Caucasus to Afghanistan.This supply route is important for the Baltic countries from the perspective of transit, prosperity and security, especially in view of the NATO withdrawal 1 To explore the current state of bilateral relations between Central Asian and Baltic countries, interviews were conducted with the Estonian and Latvian ambassadors to Kazakhstan, Jaan Hein and Juris Maklakovs, and with the Lithuanian ambassador to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, Rokas Bernotas.from Afghanistan in 2014.The NDN could also potentially offer future trade and transit opportunities.However, these do not feature high on the current agenda and will depend on the future security and stability of Afghanistan.Central Asia is thus seen as a challenging yet promising region for the Baltic states.The dire consequences of the financial crisis in the Baltic countries have pushed the governments of the region to reconsider certain aspects of their foreign policy.Economic growth, new market opportunities and attracting foreign investment are now very high priorities.The opening of the Estonian embassy in Astana in 2011 can be seen as a direct result of business lobbying to strengthen bilateral ties so as to explore trade and commercial opportunities in Kazakhstan.Kazakhstan is the main trading partner in Central Asia for all three Baltic countries.For a long time, the main commerce area was transit services and logistics, based on the inherited Soviet railway system that connects Baltic ports with Central Asia.Even now, despite attempts to explore new trade opportunities, many major bilateral commercial projects concern logistics and transit services.For example, in 2012 Lithuania launched the shuttle container train Saule (Sun).This train runs from the Klaipeda port in Lithuania to the Chinese city of Chongqing through Almaty in Kazakhstan, shortening the transportation time of goods to Almaty to eight days and establishing Klaipeda as a logistics bridge between east and west.Recent bilateral visits have indicated willingness on both sides to enter into more broad-based discussions.During Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev's visit to Estonia, aside from new transit opportunities, technology transfer, e-government and shipbuilding were also discussed.This resulted in a deal between Kazakhstan and the Estonian company BLRT to build ferryboats that will run on liquefied natural gas (LNG) in the Caspian Sea, linking Kazakh and Azerbaijani ports.Estonian entrepreneurs are also looking into the special economic zones offered by Kazakhstan, as well as examining potential cooperation on agricultural trade, cattle breeding, environmental issues, cyber crime, education and research.Latvia, along with transit services, is focused on developing cooperation in agriculture, metalwork and pharmaceuticals.In addition, several Latvian banks have a presence in Central Asia.The Kazakhs have invested in a grain terminal in Ventspils, a seaside port city in Latvia.Some of Kazakhstan's elite are also keen on purchasing properties in Latvia to take advantage of the opportunity to gain long-term residence permits in the EU.Nevertheless, commercial expansion is limited due to the distance and cost of goods transit, as well as the bureaucracy involved.Another obstacle is the fact that Latvian mid-range enterprises cannot always afford to provide the large volumes of products needed for Kazakhstan's markets.One promising solution to this problem would be the establishment of a joint-venture company, similar to the existing 'Riga Courtyard' in Moscow, which would offer a wide range of Latvian products in one shop.Lithuania has successfully entered Kazakhstan's food market, offering dairy and fish products, as well as investing in the production of soft drinks.The sale of second-hand cars, transported from Lithuania to Astana by rail, also makes up a significant part of bilateral trade.All three Baltic states are interested in building cooperation with Kazakhstan on tourism and education.The lack of direct flights between Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and Kazakhstan is viewed as the main obstacle successfully to develop tourism ties.Energy matters may become an important focus in the future.The Baltic countries are extremely dependent on Russian energy supplies and are concerned about the construction of the Nord Stream gas pipeline, which bypasses Baltic ports.Although they are not directly involved in the energy market, they are closely following developments on alternative energy supply routes from Central Asia via the Caspian to Europe.However, the construction of alternative gas routes through the Caspian, Azerbaijan and Turkey might not benefit the Baltic region, as most of the gas will most likely be bought by other EU countries before reaching the Baltic states.Lithuania is the most active on security cooperation in the region.It is the only country with a defence attaché in the region, which has led to several agreements and joint military exercises.Recently, Lithuania signed a military cooperation plan with Kazakhstan for 2013, which foresees information exchange on security matters and involvement in multinational operations and military reform.In addition, Lithuania regularly participates in the Steppe Eagle joint military exercises with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and other NATO countries.Since 1997, this initiative has been working to improve the readiness of peacekeeping units to take part in NATO-led operations.Both Lithuania and Latvia have engaged with Central Asia on 'soft' security issues such as border management, training and the rule of law, mostly within the framework of the OSCE, the UN or the EU Border management programme in Central Asia (BOMCA).Latvia has experience training Central Asian border guards and customs officers under the auspices of BOMCA.Lithuanians have participated in similar training initiatives with Afghan and Tajik border guards within the framework of the OSCE.So far, Estonia has not engaged with Central Asia in a structural way on security matters.All three Baltic countries are NATO members and have contributed troops to Afghanistan.They play an important role in the Northern Distribution Network, especially in light of the upcoming U.S. and NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014.The NDN is very important to all three Baltic countries, both in terms of their role within NATO and their security concerns as well as for transit opportunities from their ports in Tallinn, Riga and Klaipeda.Future trade and transit opportunities will very much depend on Afghanistan's security and stability.If the security situation is stable, the established transport corridor could serve as a tool to integrate Afghanistan and Central Asia into the world economy.NATO membership is seen by the Baltic nations as the foundation for their own national security, so NATO policy and concerns regarding Central Asia are fully supported by the Baltic states.In 2012, Latvia became the NATO Contact Point embassy in Kazakhstan, working to support the alliance's partnership and public diplomacy activities.Central Asia is not a priority region for Baltic states in terms of bilateral development aid.Due to financial constraints and a development focus on Afghanistan, none of the Baltic countries provides financial support for bilateral development assistance projects in Central Asia beyond a number of ad hoc initiatives.For example, Estonia has recently granted a fellowship to Tajik diplomats to study at the Estonian School of Diplomacy.The Baltic states do not have the financial or human resources to carry out bilateral development projects.But they could offer know-how on specific cost-free issues linked to awareness raising, social issues and well-being.For example, Estonia has launched a regional campaign with local authorities in Ukraine on road safety practices among children.The programme led to a significant decrease in traffic accidents involving children.This kind of projects does not need financial input, so much as a willingness to share best practices and expertise.Currently, the Estonian embassy in Astana is considering undertaking a similar project in Kazakhstan.Baltic NGOs are not very active in Central Asia and occasionally participate as invited experts in EU civil society projects.However, this area could offer many opportunities if developed further.Baltic NGOs have first-hand experience in state reform on rule of law or good governance, as well as in promoting civic participation and engagement.All three Baltic countries see education as a promising area for cooperation with Central Asia.Latvia has a long-established collaboration with Kazakhstan's technical, medical and air navigation institutes, partially due to its capacity to teach subjects in Russian.Lithuania has similar networks, mostly involving medical students.The Tallinn and Tartu Universities in Estonia have recently been included in the Bolashak programme, a national scholarship programme for Kazakh students to study abroad.All three Baltic countries are eager to strengthen cooperation between their education facilities as part of their ongoing search for new ways to attract students to their universities.Given the financial pressures at home, the Baltic countries have begun to take a closer look at Central Asia and at the business opportunities in the region, especially in Kazakhstan.Hence, bilateral relations are strongly focused on exploring and developing trade cooperation in areas such as agriculture, pharmaceuticals and shipbuilding.Education and tourism are also considered to be potentially lucrative areas of cooperation, with good foundations due to the common lingua franca and inherited infrastructure networks from the Soviet era.Energy and security are important for Baltic countries, but are difficult areas to gain leverage and do not depend on bilateral relations with Central Asia.Although Baltic countries are very interested in alternative energy supplies, they do not play a leading role in the Central Asian energy market.It is unlikely that Baltic countries will benefit from gas pipelines bypassing Russia from Central Asia via the Caspian to Europe.In terms of security, the Baltic states are very interested in the NDN because of the transit opportunities it provides.Nevertheless, the NDN depends on NATO countries in Afghanistan making transit agreements with Central Asian governments, and the Baltic countries would have difficulty influencing progress in this area.The Baltic states have valuable experience in moving from a rigid Soviet system of governance, rule of law and state-regulated economy to democracy and open market economies.Currently, this knowledge is overlooked due to the focus on trade relations.Baltic states should make use of this well-grounded, realistic and less costly expertise to engage more fully in promoting democratic reforms and economic liberalisation in Central Asia.This, in turn, would also benefit the Baltic countries.The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect the opinion of EUCAM.If you have any comments on this document or any other suggestions, please email us at eucam@gmail.com © EUCAM 2013.Edited by FRIDE.C/ Felipe IV 9, 1º derecha.28014-Madrid, España.ISSN 2174-7008 Established in 2008 as a project seeking to monitor the implementation of the EU Strategy for Central Asia, EUCAM has grown into a knowledge hub on broader Europe-Central Asia relations.Specifically, the project aims to: • Scrutinise European policies towards Central Asia, paying specific attention to security, development and the promotion of democratic values within the context of Central Asia's position in world politics; • Enhance knowledge of Europe's engagement with Central Asia through top-quality research and by raising awareness among European policy-makers and civil society representatives, as well as discuss European policies among Central Asian communities; • Expand the network of experts and institutions from European countries and Central Asian states and provide a forum to debate on European-Central Asian relations.Please follow our work on www.eucentralasia.eu.If you have any comments or suggestions, please email us at email.eucam@gmail.com FRIDE is a European think tank for global action, based in Madrid, which provides fresh and innovative thinking on Europe's role on the international stage.Our mission is to inform policy and practice in order to ensure that the EU plays a more effective role in supporting multilateralism, democratic values, security and sustainable development.We seek to engage in rigorous analysis of the difficult debates on democracy and human rights, Europe and the international system, conflict and security, and development cooperation.FRIDE benefits from political independence and the diversity of views and intellectual background of its international team.Founded in 1971, the Karelian Institute is a unit of the Faculty of Social Sciences and Business Studies of the University of Eastern Finland.It engages in basic and applied multi-disciplinary research, supports the supervision of postgraduate studies and researcher training, and participates in teaching.It focuses mainly on three thematic priorities: Borders and Russia; Ethnicity and Culture; and Regional and Rural Studies.	In the past, trade relations between Central Asia and the Baltic countries focused mainly on logistics and transit services, given their common transportation infrastructure inherited from the Soviet period, most importantly, the rail network.However, Kazakhstan's rapidly growing economy coupled with the effects of the financial crisis on the Baltic countries have pushed the latter to search for new business opportunities and to engage more actively with the Central Asian region.Most major bilateral projects are still linked to transit, but opportunities in technology transfer, agriculture, tourism and education are also being explored.Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are all interested in developments regarding alternative energy supply routes via the Caspian Sea, but they are not directly involved with Central Asia's energy market.Security is a priority, mostly because of the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) used to transfer supplies from Baltic ports through Central Asia and the Caucasus to Afghanistan.This supply route is important for the Baltic countries from the perspective of transit, prosperity and security, especially in view of the NATO withdrawal 1 To explore the current state of bilateral relations between Central Asian and Baltic countries, interviews were conducted with the Estonian and Latvian ambassadors to Kazakhstan, Jaan Hein and Juris Maklakovs, and with the Lithuanian ambassador to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, Rokas Bernotas.from Afghanistan in 2014.The NDN could also potentially offer future trade and transit opportunities.However, these do not feature high on the current agenda and will depend on the future security and stability of Afghanistan.Central Asia is thus seen as a challenging yet promising region for the Baltic states.The dire consequences of the financial crisis in the Baltic countries have pushed the governments of the region to reconsider certain aspects of their foreign policy.Economic growth, new market opportunities and attracting foreign investment are now very high priorities.The opening of the Estonian embassy in Astana in 2011 can be seen as a direct result of business lobbying to strengthen bilateral ties so as to explore trade and commercial opportunities in Kazakhstan.Kazakhstan is the main trading partner in Central Asia for all three Baltic countries.For a long time, the main commerce area was transit services and logistics, based on the inherited Soviet railway system that connects Baltic ports with Central Asia.Even now, despite attempts to explore new trade opportunities, many major bilateral commercial projects concern logistics and transit services.For example, in 2012 Lithuania launched the shuttle container train Saule (Sun).This train runs from the Klaipeda port in Lithuania to the Chinese city of Chongqing through Almaty in Kazakhstan, shortening the transportation time of goods to Almaty to eight days and establishing Klaipeda as a logistics bridge between east and west.Recent bilateral visits have indicated willingness on both sides to enter into more broad-based discussions.During Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev's visit to Estonia, aside from new transit opportunities, technology transfer, e-government and shipbuilding were also discussed.This resulted in a deal between Kazakhstan and the Estonian company BLRT to build ferryboats that will run on liquefied natural gas (LNG) in the Caspian Sea, linking Kazakh and Azerbaijani ports.Estonian entrepreneurs are also looking into the special economic zones offered by Kazakhstan, as well as examining potential cooperation on agricultural trade, cattle breeding, environmental issues, cyber crime, education and research.Latvia, along with transit services, is focused on developing cooperation in agriculture, metalwork and pharmaceuticals.In addition, several Latvian banks have a presence in Central Asia.The Kazakhs have invested in a grain terminal in Ventspils, a seaside port city in Latvia.Some of Kazakhstan's elite are also keen on purchasing properties in Latvia to take advantage of the opportunity to gain long-term residence permits in the EU.Nevertheless, commercial expansion is limited due to the distance and cost of goods transit, as well as the bureaucracy involved.Another obstacle is the fact that Latvian mid-range enterprises cannot always afford to provide the large volumes of products needed for Kazakhstan's markets.One promising solution to this problem would be the establishment of a joint-venture company, similar to the existing 'Riga Courtyard' in Moscow, which would offer a wide range of Latvian products in one shop.Lithuania has successfully entered Kazakhstan's food market, offering dairy and fish products, as well as investing in the production of soft drinks.The sale of second-hand cars, transported from Lithuania to Astana by rail, also makes up a significant part of bilateral trade.All three Baltic states are interested in building cooperation with Kazakhstan on tourism and education.The lack of direct flights between Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and Kazakhstan is viewed as the main obstacle successfully to develop tourism ties.Energy matters may become an important focus in the future.The Baltic countries are extremely dependent on Russian energy supplies and are concerned about the construction of the Nord Stream gas pipeline, which bypasses Baltic ports.Although they are not directly involved in the energy market, they are closely following developments on alternative energy supply routes from Central Asia via the Caspian to Europe.However, the construction of alternative gas routes through the Caspian, Azerbaijan and Turkey might not benefit the Baltic region, as most of the gas will most likely be bought by other EU countries before reaching the Baltic states.Lithuania is the most active on security cooperation in the region.It is the only country with a defence attaché in the region, which has led to several agreements and joint military exercises.Recently, Lithuania signed a military cooperation plan with Kazakhstan for 2013, which foresees information exchange on security matters and involvement in multinational operations and military reform.In addition, Lithuania regularly participates in the Steppe Eagle joint military exercises with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and other NATO countries.Since 1997, this initiative has been working to improve the readiness of peacekeeping units to take part in NATO-led operations.Both Lithuania and Latvia have engaged with Central Asia on 'soft' security issues such as border management, training and the rule of law, mostly within the framework of the OSCE, the UN or the EU Border management programme in Central Asia (BOMCA).Latvia has experience training Central Asian border guards and customs officers under the auspices of BOMCA.Lithuanians have participated in similar training initiatives with Afghan and Tajik border guards within the framework of the OSCE.So far, Estonia has not engaged with Central Asia in a structural way on security matters.All three Baltic countries are NATO members and have contributed troops to Afghanistan.They play an important role in the Northern Distribution Network, especially in light of the upcoming U.S. and NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014.The NDN is very important to all three Baltic countries, both in terms of their role within NATO and their security concerns as well as for transit opportunities from their ports in Tallinn, Riga and Klaipeda.Future trade and transit opportunities will very much depend on Afghanistan's security and stability.If the security situation is stable, the established transport corridor could serve as a tool to integrate Afghanistan and Central Asia into the world economy.NATO membership is seen by the Baltic nations as the foundation for their own national security, so NATO policy and concerns regarding Central Asia are fully supported by the Baltic states.In 2012, Latvia became the NATO Contact Point embassy in Kazakhstan, working to support the alliance's partnership and public diplomacy activities.Central Asia is not a priority region for Baltic states in terms of bilateral development aid.Due to financial constraints and a development focus on Afghanistan, none of the Baltic countries provides financial support for bilateral development assistance projects in Central Asia beyond a number of ad hoc initiatives.For example, Estonia has recently granted a fellowship to Tajik diplomats to study at the Estonian School of Diplomacy.The Baltic states do not have the financial or human resources to carry out bilateral development projects.But they could offer know-how on specific cost-free issues linked to awareness raising, social issues and well-being.For example, Estonia has launched a regional campaign with local authorities in Ukraine on road safety practices among children.The programme led to a significant decrease in traffic accidents involving children.This kind of projects does not need financial input, so much as a willingness to share best practices and expertise.Currently, the Estonian embassy in Astana is considering undertaking a similar project in Kazakhstan.Baltic NGOs are not very active in Central Asia and occasionally participate as invited experts in EU civil society projects.However, this area could offer many opportunities if developed further.Baltic NGOs have first-hand experience in state reform on rule of law or good governance, as well as in promoting civic participation and engagement.All three Baltic countries see education as a promising area for cooperation with Central Asia.Latvia has a long-established collaboration with Kazakhstan's technical, medical and air navigation institutes, partially due to its capacity to teach subjects in Russian.Lithuania has similar networks, mostly involving medical students.The Tallinn and Tartu Universities in Estonia have recently been included in the Bolashak programme, a national scholarship programme for Kazakh students to study abroad.All three Baltic countries are eager to strengthen cooperation between their education facilities as part of their ongoing search for new ways to attract students to their universities.Given the financial pressures at home, the Baltic countries have begun to take a closer look at Central Asia and at the business opportunities in the region, especially in Kazakhstan.Hence, bilateral relations are strongly focused on exploring and developing trade cooperation in areas such as agriculture, pharmaceuticals and shipbuilding.Education and tourism are also considered to be potentially lucrative areas of cooperation, with good foundations due to the common lingua franca and inherited infrastructure networks from the Soviet era.Energy and security are important for Baltic countries, but are difficult areas to gain leverage and do not depend on bilateral relations with Central Asia.Although Baltic countries are very interested in alternative energy supplies, they do not play a leading role in the Central Asian energy market.It is unlikely that Baltic countries will benefit from gas pipelines bypassing Russia from Central Asia via the Caspian to Europe.In terms of security, the Baltic states are very interested in the NDN because of the transit opportunities it provides.Nevertheless, the NDN depends on NATO countries in Afghanistan making transit agreements with Central Asian governments, and the Baltic countries would have difficulty influencing progress in this area.The Baltic states have valuable experience in moving from a rigid Soviet system of governance, rule of law and state-regulated economy to democracy and open market economies.Currently, this knowledge is overlooked due to the focus on trade relations.Baltic states should make use of this well-grounded, realistic and less costly expertise to engage more fully in promoting democratic reforms and economic liberalisation in Central Asia.This, in turn, would also benefit the Baltic countries.The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect the opinion of EUCAM.If you have any comments on this document or any other suggestions, please email us at eucam@gmail.com © EUCAM 2013.Edited by FRIDE.C/ Felipe IV 9, 1º derecha.28014-Madrid, España.ISSN 2174-7008 Established in 2008 as a project seeking to monitor the implementation of the EU Strategy for Central Asia, EUCAM has grown into a knowledge hub on broader Europe-Central Asia relations.Specifically, the project aims to: • Scrutinise European policies towards Central Asia, paying specific attention to security, development and the promotion of democratic values within the context of Central Asia's position in world politics; • Enhance knowledge of Europe's engagement with Central Asia through top-quality research and by raising awareness among European policy-makers and civil society representatives, as well as discuss European policies among Central Asian communities; • Expand the network of experts and institutions from European countries and Central Asian states and provide a forum to debate on European-Central Asian relations.Please follow our work on www.eucentralasia.eu.If you have any comments or suggestions, please email us at email.eucam@gmail.com FRIDE is a European think tank for global action, based in Madrid, which provides fresh and innovative thinking on Europe's role on the international stage.Our mission is to inform policy and practice in order to ensure that the EU plays a more effective role in supporting multilateralism, democratic values, security and sustainable development.We seek to engage in rigorous analysis of the difficult debates on democracy and human rights, Europe and the international system, conflict and security, and development cooperation.FRIDE benefits from political independence and the diversity of views and intellectual background of its international team.Founded in 1971, the Karelian Institute is a unit of the Faculty of Social Sciences and Business Studies of the University of Eastern Finland.It engages in basic and applied multi-disciplinary research, supports the supervision of postgraduate studies and researcher training, and participates in teaching.It focuses mainly on three thematic priorities: Borders and Russia; Ethnicity and Culture; and Regional and Rural Studies.
Russia and the U.S. have done much to strengthen global capabilities in preventing, detecting and responding to acts of nuclear terrorism including forming a Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.But determining the next steps that countries could take against this threat has been a difficult and labor-intensive process.Fresh ideas and mutual trust are lacking.This is why in October 2010 a small group of senior, retired general officers from U.S. and Russian military and intelligence agencies formed the Elbe Group.The purpose of the Elbe Group, named after the river where American and Russian forces met at the end of World War II, is to establish an open and continuous channel of communication on sensitive issues.The group is unique in that it brings together former leaders and members of the CIA and FSB, DIA and GRU, and the armed forces and internal security forces.The first issues on the agenda of the Elbe group were relevant aspects of countering the threat of nuclear terrorism -a problem that combines the scale of Cold War-era nuclear catastrophe and the unpredictability of threats of international terrorism of the 21st century.In 2011, the Elbe Group participated in a joint project of the Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and the Russian Academy of Science's Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies on the joint U.S.-Russian assessment of the threat of nuclear terrorism.The unclassified report detailed a set of factors and trends leading to the growth of the threat of nuclear terrorism and formulated recommendations on effective measures to counteract it.In the opinion of the Elbe Group, the nuclear security summits in Washington and Seoul brought to the attention of the heads of states, the international community and the public at large the need of an adequate assessment of the threat of nuclear terrorism and of taking effective measures to counteract it.It is obvious that, as the two leading nuclear powers in the world, Russia and the United States have a special responsibility to prevent nuclear and other radioactive materials from falling into the hands of terrorists.The governments of our countries could jointly take the following steps in this direction in cooperation: • To develop an assessment of the threat from nuclear terrorism to create a basis at an appropriate level for a common understanding of the threat and its various dimensions.• To define countering of nuclear terrorism as a "problematic domain" -recognizing that an effective regime for physical nuclear security should be treated as a cross-cutting issue requiring clearly defined powers and responsibilities within the governments.Effectiveness of government efforts to prevent acts of nuclear terrorism should be increased through clarification of the structure of this problematic domain.• To increase coordination between special services in the interest of providing better warning about terrorist threats with an emphasis on preventing acts of nuclear terrorism within the framework of existing bilateral and multilateral instruments.• The catastrophe at Fukushima was the result of a sudden natural disaster, but a similar event could happen again as the result of actions by intruders.There is a need to build on the existing international instruments for warning, interdiction and consequence management of such acts in nation-states.• To continue to provide comprehensive assistance and to allocate resources to establish, maintain and sustain an effective regime of nuclear security globally and in nation states.There are, of course, issues over which the members of the Elbe Group disagree but all agree that preventing nuclear terrorism is one of the priorities for joint action by our two countries.Vigorous and diligent efforts to confront common threats could facilitate development of trustbased relations between the United States and Russia making it easier to agree on other sensitive issues.Steps to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism: Recommendations Based on the U.S.-Russia Joint Threat Assessment In 2011, Harvard's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and the Russian Academy of Sciences' Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies published "The U.S. -Russia Joint Threat Assessment on Nuclear Terrorism."The assessment analyzed the means, motives, and access of would-be nuclear terrorists, and concluded that the threat of nuclear terrorism is urgent and real.The Washington and Seoul Nuclear Security Summits in 2010 and 2012 established and demonstrated a consensus among political leaders from around the world that nuclear terrorism poses a serious threat to the peace, security, and prosperity of our planet.For any country, a terrorist attack with a nuclear device would be an immediate and catastrophic disaster, and the negative effects would reverberate around the world far beyond the location and moment of the detonation.Preventing a nuclear terrorist attack requires international cooperation to secure nuclear materials, especially among those states producing nuclear materials and weapons.As the world's two greatest nuclear powers, the United States and Russia have the greatest experience and capabilities in securing nuclear materials and plants and, therefore, share a special responsibility to lead international efforts to prevent terrorists from seizing such materials and plants.The depth of convergence between U.S. and Russian vital national interests on the issue of nuclear security is best illustrated by the fact that bilateral cooperation on this issue has continued uninterrupted for more than two decades, even when relations between the two countries occasionally became frosty, as in the aftermath of the August 2008 war in Georgia.Russia and the United States have strong incentives to forge a close and trusting partnership to prevent nuclear terrorism and have made enormous progress in securing fissile material both at home and in partnership with other countries.However, to meet the evolving threat posed by those individuals intent upon using nuclear weapons for terrorist purposes, the United States and Russia need to deepen and broaden their cooperation.The 2011 "U.S. -Russia Joint Threat Assessment" offered both specific conclusions about the nature of the threat and general observations about how it might be addressed.This report builds on that foundation and analyzes the existing framework for action, cites gaps and deficiencies, and makes specific recommendations for improvement.• Nuclear terrorism is a real and urgent threat.Urgent actions are required to reduce the risk.The risk is driven by the rise of terrorists who seek to inflict unlimited damage, many of whom have sought justification for their plans in radical interpretations of Islam; by the spread of information about the decades-old technology of nuclear weapons; by the increased availability of weapons-usable nuclear materials; and by globalization, which makes it easier to move people, technologies, and materials across the world.• Making a crude nuclear bomb would not be easy, but is potentially within the capabilities of a technically sophisticated terrorist group, as numerous government studies have confirmed.Detonating a stolen nuclear weapon would likely be difficult for terrorists to accomplish, if the weapon was equipped with modern technical safeguards (such as the electronic locks known as Permissive Action Links, or PALs).Terrorists could, however, cut open a stolen nuclear weapon and make use of its nuclear material for a bomb of their own.• The nuclear material for a bomb is small and difficult to detect, making it a major challenge to stop nuclear smuggling or to recover nuclear material after it has been stolen.Hence, a primary focus in reducing the risk must be to keep nuclear material and nuclear weapons from being stolen by continually improving their security, as agreed at the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington in April 2010.• Al-Qaeda has sought nuclear weapons for almost two decades.The group has repeatedly attempted to purchase stolen nuclear material or nuclear weapons, and has repeatedly attempted to recruit nuclear expertise.Al-Qaeda reportedly conducted tests of conventional explosives for its nuclear program in the desert in Afghanistan.The group's nuclear ambitions continued after its dispersal following the fall of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.Recent writings from top al-Qaeda leadership are focused on justifying the mass slaughter of civilians, including the use of weapons of mass destruction, and are in all likelihood intended to provide a formal religious justification for nuclear use.• While there are significant gaps in coverage of the group's activities, al-Qaeda appears to have been frustrated thus far in acquiring a nuclear capability; it is unclear whether the the group has acquired weapons-usable nuclear material or the expertise needed to make such material into a bomb.Furthermore, pressure from a broad range of counter-terrorist actions probably has reduced the group's ability to manage large, complex projects, but has not eliminated the danger.However, there is no sign the group has abandoned its nuclear ambitions.On the contrary, leadership statements as recently as 2008 indicate that the intention to acquire and use nuclear weapons is as strong as ever.• Terrorist groups from the North Caucasus have in the past planned to seize a nuclear submarine armed with nuclear weapons; have carried out reconnaissance on nuclear weapon storage sites; and have repeatedly threatened to sabotage nuclear facilities or to use radiological "dirty bombs."In recent years, these groups have become more focused on an extreme Islamic objective which might be seen as justifying the use of nuclear weapons.These groups' capabilities to manage large, complex projects have also been reduced by counter-terrorist actions, though they have demonstrated a continuing ability to launch devastating attacks in Moscow and elsewhere in the Russian heartland.• The Japanese terror cult Aum Shinrikyo pursued nuclear weapons in the early 1990s, but appears to have abandoned this interest.Few other groups have shown sustained interest in acquiring nuclear weapons.There is precedent to suggest that extremist groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba or Jaish-e-Mohammed might cooperate with al-Qaeda (or that al-Qaeda and North Caucasus groups might cooperate) in pursuit of a nuclear bomb, as the Indonesian group Jemaah Islamiya (JI) rendered substantial assistance to al-Qaeda's anthrax project from roughly 1998 to 2001.• Cooperation between Russia and the United States, the two countries with the largest nuclear stockpiles and the most extensive experience in cooperation to improve nuclear security and interdict nuclear smuggling, is particularly important in reducing the danger nuclear terrorism could pose to the security of those two countries and the world.• International intelligence and law-enforcement cooperation targeted on countering nuclear smuggling and identifying and stopping terrorist nuclear plots are also important steps to reduce the danger of nuclear terrorism.• Nuclear terrorism must be addressed as part of a broader phenomenon of terrorism and extremism.Al-Qaeda and other groups draw motivation for the pursuit of WMD from the belief that escalating the conflict by inflicting mass casualties is necessary to win a perceived "clash of civilizations" between Islam and the West.• The United States and Russia must lead international efforts to encourage states to cooperate more closely to ensure terrorists do not succeed in acquiring nuclear weaponsusable material.These efforts should be closely coordinated with the United Nations (UN) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).Despite the fact that nuclear security continues to improve globally, due in part to increased investments in material, personnel, and control and accounting procedures, urgent work remains to be done to fully secure all nuclear weapons-usable materials.All stocks of nuclear weapons, HEU, and plutonium must be protected against all plausible terrorist and criminal threats, and the number of locations where these stocks exist must be reduced as much as practicable.• The image of one of the most senior scientists in Pakistan's nuclear weapons program drawing an improvised nuclear device for Osama bin Laden serves as a jarring reminder of the importance of continuing to eliminate al-Qaeda's senior leadership.The killing of Osama bin Laden is likely to damage al-Qaeda's ability to pull off a large scale WMD attack, to the extent such a plan may not have matured and there are few high level leaders in the group with the known interest in planning such attacks.But, these remaining few leaders can still serve as the key drivers of al-Qaeda's nuclear ambitions, and therefore capturing or killing them would be an important victory in the campaign to prevent nuclear terrorism.• Senior leaders should encourage and support enhanced intelligence and law-enforcement cooperation between Russia and the United States, particularly in resolving past, present, and future cases of weapons-usable nuclear material found outside of state control.• U.S.-Russian international leadership is critical in supporting the roles of intelligence and law enforcement, the IAEA, and international police organizations as appropriate.• International cooperation should encourage the development of national and jointly tailored intelligence tradecraft to detect and neutralize any existing or prospective terrorist nuclear plot, thereby strengthening interdiction and attribution, nuclear exercise cooperation, and contingency planning.Special attention should be paid to cooperation between the law-enforcement and security services of those Islamic states which are fighting terrorist organizations and constraining the actions of Islamic extremists.• The insights into al-Qaeda's strategic and operational thinking afforded by Exoneration and other discourses must be exploited to prepare for future terrorist attacks.Counterterrorism strategies too often depend on current trends shaping al-Qaeda's status and activities.This is a prescription for being once again surprised by the unanticipated Currently legal and political bases for cooperation between Russia and the United States in the prevention of nuclear terrorism consist of bilateral and multilateral treaty instruments, multilateral cooperative initiatives, UN Security Council resolutions, as well as national legislation and policies of the two countries.The most significant of these international treaty instruments include the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (with its 2005 amendment), and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.Legally binding UN Security Council Resolutions also bear on the matter, including: UNSCRs 1373 (2001) and 1540 (2004) .UNSCR 1887 (2009) is also highly relevant, though it does not establish legally binding obligations.The IAEA plays a critical role in maintaining the nuclear security regime.The agency develops recommendations and standards, reviews nuclear security measures, develops suggestions for improvement and coordination of the efforts of donor states, responds to requests of states needing assistance, conducts training and workshops, and maintains information for use by member states, such as the Illicit Trafficking Database (ITDB).The IAEA meeting on nuclear security in July 2013 and the subsequent meetings thereafter will provide an important platform for international discussion of nuclear security issues.The United States, Russia and other states make voluntary contributions to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund, provide experts for evaluation of nuclear security measures and training workshops, and more.In the multilateral political format, the existing international mechanisms help shape and strengthen the international effort to prevent nuclear terrorism.First of all these include: • The 2010 and 2012 Nuclear Security Summits; • The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI); • The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT); • Cooperation in the Financial Action Task Force (FATF); • Law enforcement efforts coordinated by Interpol; • International exchanges of best practices, including exchanges conducted under the aegis of the World Institute of Nuclear Security (WINS) and others; The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) entered into force on March 5, 1970.It is the main legal instrument for controlling proliferation of nuclear weapons.The treaty, however, does not include any provisions specifically focused on preventing nuclear terrorism or ensuring effective security for nuclear weapons and materials.The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) entered into force on February 8, 1987.Since then, 145 countries have joined this legally binding agreement.The CPPNM sets minimum standards for security of nuclear material in international transport; calls for cooperation among parties in the event of any theft of nuclear material; requires all parties to ensure that their laws impose appropriate penalties for nuclear theft and terrorism crimes; and gives each party jurisdiction to prosecute such criminals who may be captured on their territory.A 2005 amendment expanded the scope of the convention to the storage, use, and transport of nuclear materials within countries.It also established measures to protect nuclear materials and nuclear facilities against sabotage; expanded opportunities for co-operation involving information subject to confidentiality; and defined objectives and fundamental principles of physical protection.For the amendment to come into force, two-thirds of signatories need to ratify it.So far, 97 countries have ratified the amendment.The communique from the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit calls on countries to expedite ratification of the amendment to bring it into force by 2014.Also in 2005, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.Proposed by Russia to strengthen international law designed to counter terrorist threats, the April 2005 pact became the first UN convention aimed at preventing WMD terrorist attacks.The convention governs international cooperation in the investigation of acts of nuclear terrorism.It also requires punishment of those involved in such acts.It is aimed at preventing, combating, and investigating terrorist acts involving not only nuclear, but also radioactive materials as well as devices that are made with these materials.Although Russia and the United States were among the first countries to have signed the convention, as of mid-2012, the United States had not yet ratified it, though Congress was debating the necessary legislation.As the United States signed the convention, it has an obligation under international law to refrain from any action inconsistent with the object and purpose of the document.Resolution 1373 of UN Security Council was adopted September 28, 2001 (following the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001).Its provisions are mandatory for all UN member states under Article VII of the UN Charter.The purpose of the resolution is to strengthen international cooperation and national mechanisms to prevent and suppress the financing and preparation of any acts of terrorism.Of the 20 measures prescribed in the resolution, the most relevant in the context of cooperation between Russia and the United States in the prevention of nuclear terrorism, are the following: • take the necessary steps to prevent the commission of terrorist acts, including by provision of early warning to other states by exchange of information, Paragraph 2(b); • prevent those who finance, plan, facilitate or commit terrorist acts from using their respective territories for those purposes against other states or their citizens, Paragraph 2(d); • afford one another the greatest measure of assistance in connection with criminal investigations or criminal proceedings relating to the financing or support of terrorist acts, including assistance in obtaining evidence in their possession necessary for the proceedings, Paragraph 2 (f); • exchange information in accordance with international and domestic law and cooperate on administrative and judicial matters to prevent the commission of terrorist acts, Paragraph 3(b).• establish a committee to oversee implementation of the resolution, Paragraph 6. Resolution 1540 of UN Security Council was adopted on 28 April 2004.Like Resolution 1373, it is binding on all UN member states, including those who remain outside the NPT and other relevant nonproliferation treaties.The Security Council sought to create an effective barrier to prevent trade in weapons of mass destruction by non-state actors, especially with terrorist organizations.It also oversees its execution, establishing the 1540 Committee, and requires all states to report on the steps they have taken or plan to take to implement Resolution 1540.In the context of cooperation between Russia and the United States in the prevention of nuclear terrorism three mandates of Resolution 1540 are particularly salient.The Security Council decided that: • [A]ll states shall refrain from providing any form of support to non-State actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery; • [A]ll states shall take and enforce effective measures to establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery, including by establishing appropriate controls over related materials and to this end shall:(a) Develop and maintain appropriate effective measures to account for and secure such items in production, use, storage or transport;(b) Develop and maintain appropriate effective physical protection measures;(c) Develop and maintain appropriate effective border controls and law enforcement efforts to detect, deter, prevent and combat, including through international cooperation when necessary, the illicit trafficking and brokering in such items in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law;(d) Establish, develop, review and maintain appropriate effective national export and trans-shipment controls over such items, including appropriate laws and regulations to control export, transit, trans-shipment and re-export and controls on providing funds and services related to such export and trans-shipment such as financing, and transporting that would contribute to proliferation, as well as establishing end-user controls; and establishing and enforcing appropriate criminal or civil penalties for violations of such export control laws and regulations.The resolution also called on UN member states to cooperate in the efforts mandated above.Resolution 1887 of UN Security Council was adopted on September 24, 2009, and provides political support to a broad range of nonproliferation and nuclear security measures, and calls on all states to cooperate to strengthen the global effort to stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction to additional states or to terrorist groups.In the context of cooperation between Russia and the United States in the prevention of nuclear terrorism the following paragraphs of Resolution 1887 are relevant: 24. Calls upon member states to share best practices with a view to improved safety standards and nuclear security practices and raise standards of nuclear security to reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism, with the aim of securing all vulnerable nuclear material from such risks within four years; 25. Calls upon all states to manage responsibly and minimize to the greatest extent that is technically and economically feasible the use of highly enriched uranium for civilian purposes, including by working to convert research reactors and radioisotope production processes to the use of low enriched uranium fuels and targets; 28.Declares its resolve to monitor closely any situations involving the proliferation of nuclear weapons, their means of delivery or related material, including to or by non-state actors as they are defined in resolution 1540 (2004) , and, as appropriate, to take such measures as may be necessary to ensure the maintenance of international peace and security.PSI is a voluntary initiative that was launched by U.S. President George W. Bush on May 31, 2003, at an international meeting in Krakow, Poland.It is aimed at countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their means of delivery, and related materials by either states or non-state actors.PSI formed a set of "principles of interdiction," which, although not legally binding, still provide a practical basis for combating proliferation of WMD through disrupting illegal routes for supply of components, equipment and technology used in production of such weapons.More than 90 countries are now participants in PSI.Like PSI, GICNT is a voluntary initiative, launched jointly by Russian President Vladimir Putin and U.S. President George Bush in June 2006 at the summit of the G-8 in St. Petersburg.It is aimed at preventing terrorists from obtaining nuclear and radiological materials and related technologies.Russia and the United States co-chair the initiative.GICNT partners have developed principles of implementation that are applied to ensure the effectiveness of measures to combat illicit trafficking in nuclear and radioactive materials.They include commitments to: • Develop, if necessary, and improve accounting, control and physical protection for nuclear and other radioactive materials and substances (Principle 1); • Enhance security of civilian nuclear facilities (Principle 2); • Promote information sharing pertaining to the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism and their facilitation, taking appropriate measures consistent with their national law and international obligations to protect the confidentiality of any information, which they exchange in confidence (Principle 8).Since July 2006, more than 80 nations have joined the U.S. and Russia as members of the Initiative.Both Russia and the United States are also members of the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction that was established at the G-8 Kananaskis Summit in June 2002.At that summit G-8 leaders pledged to spend $20 billion over the following decade to assist Russia and the other states in securing or eliminating chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons.In June 2010, the United States and Russia joined other G-8 leaders in extending the group's Global Partnership against WMD for another ten years, with the U.S. pledging an additional $10 billion for the program.The Global Partnership has now extended its mission worldwide, with a priority on helping states around the world meet their UNSCR 1540 obligations to put in place effective anti-proliferation controls, including effective security and accounting for any nuclear weapons or materials they may have.IAEA recommendations on physical protection of nuclear materials and nuclear facilities were first published in 1972.They were developed on the basis of the experience of states that use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and contain voluntary guidelines for physical protection of nuclear materials and nuclear facilities.The latest, fifth version of the recommendations can be found in the IAEA document INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 (2011), also known as "Guidelines for Nuclear Security" (Nuclear Security Series No.13).The fifth revision makes clear that all states should put in place rules that require operators handling Category I nuclear materials to protect them against a specified set of threats known as the Design Basis Threat (DBT); it greatly expands the recommended steps to prevent sabotage of nuclear facilities, and taking into the account the possibility of suicidal terrorists, it modifies the previous recommendations that much less security is needed for fissile material that is mildly radioactive.Thus INFCIRC/225/Rev.5, significantly expands recommended measures for ensuring physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities in member states for the sake of maintaining the international regime of nuclear security.Of all the provisions of the INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 document, those in Articles 3.31-3.33 of the International Cooperation and Assistance section are most relevant to cooperation in preventing illicit trafficking in nuclear materials.In particular, Article 3.33 states that in the event of unauthorized removal, sabotage or serious threat of such action the state shall as soon as possible provide the necessary information to other states that may be affected.The IAEA provides a wide range of services to member states on request, including international peer reviews of nuclear security arrangements and a wide range of training and workshops.The most important of these services in the sphere of nuclear security are the International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS), which reviews the physical protection at a particular site designated by the requesting state, along with the broader system of nuclear security rules and procedures in that country, and the International Nuclear Security Advisory Service (INServ), which provides a broader overview of nuclear security activities in a state, identifying areas that may need improvement or more in-depth review.In recent years even advanced nuclear states have found that they can benefit from these services, and at the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit, the United States, Great Britain, and France all announced that they were hosting IPPAS reviews of their physical protection arrangements.When analysis of the results of visits by experts suggests that improvements are necessary, the IAEA works with donor states as needed to arrange funding; in some cases, the IAEA funds some upgrades itself.The communique of the nuclear security summit, which was adopted on April 13, 2010 by leaders of 47 countries, includes an appeal for strengthening of nuclear security and preventing nuclear terrorism.The document noted responsible national actions and sustained and effective international cooperation are required to succeed.The signatories joined U.S. President Barack Obama's call to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials within four years, and urged all states to agree to work together as an international community to advance nuclear security, requesting and providing assistance as needed.They also pledged to prevent non-state actors from gaining access to information and technologies needed to use nuclear material for malicious purposes.At the summit, the 47 heads of states also recognized the need to strengthen cooperation at bilateral, regional and multilateral levels in order to develop nuclear security culture and effectively prevent and respond to incidents involving illicit trafficking of nuclear material.The leaders agreed to exchange information and practices through bilateral and multilateral mechanisms in such areas as nuclear detection, forensic examination, enforcement, and development of new technologies.The communiqué pointed out that measures designed to advance security of nuclear material are also relevant for security of other radioactive materials.The second Nuclear Security Summit was held in Seoul in March 2012.It again focused on core issues, including building a global nuclear security architecture, the role of the IAEA, nuclear materials, radioactive sources, nuclear security and safety interaction, transportation security, combating illicit trafficking, nuclear forensics, nuclear security culture, information security, and international cooperation.More than 50 heads of state issued a joint communique pledging to strengthen nuclear security, reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism, and prevent unauthorized acquisition of nuclear materials.The participants agreed to continue the four-year effort securing and accounting for all vulnerable nuclear material by 2014.The Seoul Communique noted the relationship between nuclear security and nuclear safety, which was highlighted by the Fukushima accident in March 2011; it also called for robust efforts to improve both safety and security.The Seoul Summit advanced the international regime of nuclear security.A number of countries, such as Ukraine, announced that they had eliminated weapons-usable nuclear material from their territory or that they were going to get rid of particular stocks before the next summit in 2014.There were, however, disappointments too, as there were fewer new commitments than in 2012.The United States and Russia issued statements that in essence said "what we are doing is what we ought to be doing."They committed to nothing to reduce their respective nuclear weapons arsenals or weapons material or even to upgrade security in their own countries.In the bilateral realm, three U.S. , which was subsequently extended twice.Under that agreement, the United States and Russia worked together to secure fissile material in former Soviet states, replace obsolete and dangerous plutonium production reactors with fossil fuel power plants, and install radiation detectors at ports, airports, and border crossings to deter illicit trafficking in nuclear materials.The CTR umbrella agreement expired in June 2013, and has been replaced by an agreement that has a narrower scope in Russia, but allows the signatories to cooperate in assisting third countries to strengthen nuclear security.It remains to be seen, however, exactly what activities will be pursued under the new agreement.A 2004 agreement enables U.S. and Russian cooperation to refuel reactors using highly enriched uranium with low enriched uranium and repatriate fresh and spent fuel to secure storage.The two nations have also conducted an ongoing dialogue regarding reduction and consolidation of stockpiles of fissile material.Physical security upgrades at Russian nuclear weapons and material storage sites are virtually complete, although future work is necessary to sustain those improvements, and all nuclear complexes must work continually to improve their security cultures.As part of this effort, U.S. and Russian nuclear security experts have held a series of workshops to exchange best practices in particular areas, with some of these workshops including British experts as well.They have also established cooperative programs to strengthen nuclear security regulations, train appropriate personnel, and strengthen nuclear security culture.To broaden such efforts worldwide, the United States backed the formation of the World Institute for Nuclear Security, which is organized to share and promote best practices among counties through workshops and manuals.Over its short history, the World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS) has grown to hundreds of members in dozens of countries, but so far Russia has not participated in its activities.In the June 24, 2010 statement Presidents Medvedev and Obama stressed the particular importance of further enhancing cooperation in the fight against terrorism through cooperation in such fields as law enforcement, transportation security, intelligence sharing, terrorist financing, anti-terrorism technology, as well as in international fora.In addition to national legislation, the international aspects of combating nuclear terrorism are reflected in a number of policy documents adopted by Russia and the United States in recent years.In 2009-2013, Russia adopted three basic doctrinal documents: the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation Until 2020 (approved on May 12, 2009), the Military Doctrine of Russian Federation (approved on February 5, 2010), and the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (approved on February 12, 2013).All the three documents refer to combating terrorism.The international aspects of combating terrorism are best reflected in the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation.Section II of the concept refers to international terrorism as a major transborder challenge of modern times.Section III of the concept says that the Russian Federation "сomes out in favor of strengthening nuclear safety and security worldwide, in particular supports strengthening international legal mechanism in the fields of nuclear safety and prevention of nuclear terrorist attacks."This section also notes that Russia "views combating international terrorism as a crucial domestic and foreign policy task.".The concept states that this fight should be put on the international legal framework and conducted in compliance with the UN Charter.Russia's National Security Strategy also recognizes the need for international cooperation in countering terrorism, and particularly emphasizes the role of the U.S.-Russian cooperation.Strengthening counterterrorism cooperation between Russia and the United States is regarded as one of the priorities of bilateral relations, according to the strategy.The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, however, contains no references to international cooperation in combating terrorism.On the doctrine's list of major military threats, the spread of international terrorism is only number 10.This does not reflect Russia's recent experience, as in the 21st century, Russia has been subjected to many terrorist acts with grave consequences and terrorism in fact became the main threat to national security.The latest U.S. Nuclear Posture Review was released on April 10, 2010.This review contains new assessments of nuclear threats to the United States.For the first time, the review cited nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation as preeminent threats to U.S. security within the nuclear realm.Moreover, the document contains a detailed program of actions to counter the threat in the four spheres: • active implementation of the Prague initiatives announced by President Barack Obama in April 2009 which are designed to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide within four years; • accelerating efforts to convert or close research reactors using highly enriched uranium fuel and to repatriate fresh and spent fuel for secure storage in the United States or Russia; • strengthening national and international capacity to disrupt opportunities for illicit trafficking in nuclear materials, equipment, and technologies and to intercept such trafficking.In this sphere the United States intends to contribute to strengthening of national and multilateral regimes of export and border controls, as well as to financial and other mechanisms designed to combat the illegal trade in nuclear materials, equipment and technology; and, • affirmation that the U.S. is determined to hold accountable any country, terrorist group or other non-state actors that facilitate efforts by terrorists to acquire or use WMD.To this end, nuclear forensics is to be developed.The National Security Strategy of the United States, which was adopted on May 28, 2010, differs substantially from its 2006 predecessor as it puts greater emphasis on nuclear terrorism and distinguishes states from terrorists."The danger of nuclear terrorism is the greatest threat to global security. Terrorist organizations, including al-Qaeda, have engaged in efforts to develop and acquire WMD-and if successful, they are likely to use them," according to the document.The document states that there is no greater threat to the American people than weapons of mass destruction, particularly the danger posed by the pursuit of nuclear weapons by violent extremists and their proliferation to additional states.That the U.S. government has defined nuclear terrorism as a major threat to the country's national security and subordinated other nuclear threats to it, is significant.It increases the imperative for international (including U.S.-Russian) cooperation in countering the nuclear terrorism threat.The analysis of the legal frameworks and policies of the United States, Russia, and other states in the sphere of nuclear security suggests several conclusions: • A broad and robust legal and policy framework for U.S.-Russian cooperation and mutual assistance in prevention of nuclear terrorism has been developed.• Most of the established international and national legal instruments include provisions that enable Russia and the United States to work closely together in responding to the threat of nuclear terrorism, but at the same time exchange of sensitive information may be subject to certain restrictions.• Russia and the United States have assumed legal obligations in several joint and multilateral documents and launched or joined initiatives to combat the threat of nuclear terrorism.Effective implementation of these commitments and initiatives is not only in the interest of both countries, but also significantly strengthens international security, minimizing risk of nuclear attacks by terrorist groups.• While the United States and Russia are generally active participants in the international nuclear security regime, these mechanisms are deficient in one or more of the following areas: universality, enforceability, verification, and specificity.Despite the impressive array of mechanisms established to combat nuclear terrorism, several serious problems persist, requiring relentless attention and actions by the United States, Russia, and other nations.These include continuing nuclear security vulnerabilities in some countries and the continued incidents of illicit trafficking in nuclear materials, and other radioactive materials.Despite the mandates of UNSCR 1540, some countries have not yet adopted a system of strict criminal punishment for crimes committed in violation of nonproliferation and nuclear security conventions and instruments.A strict system of criminal prosecution, as well as international cooperation to find and punish the offenders, is needed to deter potential theft of nuclear materials or illicit trafficking in such materials.The problem of accounting and control over nuclear materials, and radioactive sources is yet to be solved by a number of countries.Even in the United States and Russia, there is more to be done to ensure that nuclear weapons and the materials needed to make them are effectively and sustainably secured against the full spectrum of potential adversary threats.According to the International Atomic Energy Agency and media reporting, over the past twenty years there have been a score of cases in which weapons-grade fissile material has been seized outside regulatory control.Such material has been seized in separate incidents in 2003, 2006, 2010 , and 2011 in Georgia and Moldova.While none of these seizures involved enough material to fabricate nuclear explosive devices, they are significant for two reasons.First, in many of the cases, the individuals involved claimed that the material was a sample of a large quantity available for purchase-material that might still be on the market and available to terrorists.Second, the availability of material for trafficking is conclusive proof of nuclear security vulnerabilities.Yet in all but one of the score of cases in which weapons grade fissile material was seized, most of the following facts remain unknown to the international community: where the material was stolen from; who stole it; who abetted them; how the theft was accomplished; and where the material was headed.It is evident that security improvements undertaken at hundreds of nuclear facilities around the world have lowered probability of theft of nuclear materials.At the same time until the reasons, nature, and extent of these nuclear security failures are fully understood, we cannot be fully confident of the security measures now in place.The acquired real-life experience is not the only means to improve U.S. and Russian capacity to prevent nuclear terrorism.Prospects for development and implementation of joint activities in Russia and the United States to counter the threat of nuclear terrorism can also be discerned from recent bilateral modeling of the situation with the interception of contraband nuclear material.Participants of two U.S.-Russia Security programs at Harvard in 2010 completed case studies that required attendees to play out a hypothetical scenario in which they had to interdict terrorist nuclear explosive devices headed for the United States or Russia.In their group presentations, participants, who came from senior echelons of the two countries' military establishments, unanimously settled on nuclear terrorism as a matter of urgent concern requiring both immediate and deep U.S.-Russian cooperation.The participating flag officers developed concrete joint action plans on how to solve the task of interdicting the terrorist nuclear devices en route to their countries and on how the United States and Russia could cooperate to prevent nuclear terrorism in the longer run.U.S. and Russian experts also played out an interception of contraband nuclear material during a tabletop exercise in Moscow in 2011.The event, which was managed jointly by former foreign minister of Russia Igor Ivanov and former U.S. senator Sam Nunn, was attended by Russian and American experts who had previously held high government positions and have extensive experience in law enforcement, the military, customs, international diplomacy, and cooperation with the media.The participating specialists were well versed in the political and technical aspects of nuclear security.The purpose of this simulation was to determine the readiness of Russia and the United States to respond jointly to the nuclear crisis, to understand the problems identified by the scenario, and to develop practical recommendations for improving and strengthening cooperation to combat the threat of nuclear terrorism.Participants tackled a plausible scenario requiring them to intercept two separate batches of illicitly trafficked HEU, one of which was en route to the United States.The exercise focused on challenges that the governments of Russia and the United States would encounter if coordinating a joint response to such a crisis.The exercise highlighted differences in approaches between the Russian and American officials, both in political and practical terms.These differences were due to cultural factors, different perceptions of the threat of nuclear terrorism, as well as different approaches to interaction with the media and the public.For example, experts from Russia initially preferred more restrained and cautious steps, whereas their American counterparts at once perceived the situation as a full-blown nuclear crisis.On the U.S. side, policy and operational coordination would be led by the White House, while in Russia, such efforts would be managed by the National Anti-Terrorism Committee under the direct supervision of the Director of the Federal Security Service (FSB).The exercises also revealed that standard operating procedures for cooperation between Russia and the United States to counter the threat of nuclear terrorism either do not exist or are insufficient.This could seriously hamper cooperation in the event of a real nuclear crisis.Hence, it may be appropriate to create a bilateral inter-agency task force to strengthen mechanisms for bilateral cooperation to counter the threat of nuclear terrorism.The exercise also revealed that determining the origin of illegally trafficked nuclear material would require the United States and Russia to exchange highly sensitive information, including laboratory data on intercepted nuclear materials and samples.Again, the simulation revealed that there were neither procedures nor guidelines for such exchanges.There is clearly a need for such standards to be established.Russia and the United States could form a joint technical working subgroup on nuclear forensics and a subgroup on countering of nuclear terrorism-within the framework of the the U.S.-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission's high-level inter-governmental Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Security Working Group, which would greatly simplify the process of determining the origin of illegally trafficked nuclear material.The absence of such procedures hinders achievement of results in investigating the origin of fissile material seized outside regulatory control.The exercises also highlighted the fact that the existing differences in approaches of the U.S. and Russian governments towards public information and relations can pose serious issues in the case of a real nuclear crisis, which could lead to a loss of public confidence, the spread of rumors and, consequently, panic.A Russian-American subgroup on countering nuclear terrorism could explore approaches towards informing the public in emergency situations.This subgroup could develop a general-purpose communication strategy and determine when to report to the public in such situations.The aforementioned Working Group on Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Security held its first meeting in Washington, DC on September 28-29, 2009 .At that meeting the group adopted its first Action Plan that provides for implementation of the Joint Statement on nuclear cooperation that the U.S. and Russian presidents signed on July 6, 2009 in the following 13 areas: accounting, control and physical protection of nuclear materials, nuclear fuel return, conversion of reactors, consolidation and conversion of nuclear materials, plutonium disposal, combating of illicit trafficking of nuclear materials; international safeguards system, export controls, ending production of weapons-grade plutonium; emergency response, the global initiative to combat nuclear terrorism, bilateral cooperation between Russia and United States in the field of civil nuclear energy, international cooperation framework in the field of civil nuclear energy.Building on the general approaches recommended in the 2011 "U.S. -Russia Joint Threat Assessment on Nuclear Terrorism," we recommend the following proposals for action that will improve the ability of the United States and Russia to detect, prevent, disrupt, and manage consequences of acts of nuclear terrorism: • Within the framework of the U.S.-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission's Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Security Working Group, the United States and Russia should create subgroups, led by high-ranking government officials on each side that would: 1. organize and oversee implementation of specific steps in nuclear security, intelligence, law enforcement, emergency response, and other areas that the two countries can take to reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism act.An agenda could be laid out within six months and submitted for approval by the two Presidents; 2. coordinate actions by the United States and Russia in the event of a crisis involving a credible nuclear terrorist threat.This subgroup could include representative of diplomatic , military and intelligence communities.These individuals could meet semiannually to coordinate operating procedures and plan exercises to test the cooperative approaches.As a first step, the subgroup could explore the lessons from the bilateral exercises as well as from other exercises of higher level officials and exercises conducted within framework of the initiatives; 3. develop guidelines and procedures, initially, for the sharing of information and analysis relevant to the task of nuclear forensics.In a second phase, the nuclear forensics subgroup could examine instances of seized fissile material to determine the origins of the material and begin an examination of lessons to be learned from the case, with a view to preventing future theft of nuclear material.For tracking down nuclear terrorism and illicit trafficking in nuclear materials the subgroups should include representatives of the intelligence communities as well as experts on nuclear explosive devices, terrorist groups, and illicit trafficking, and pursue an integrated approach, developing and pursuing leads in the aforementioned areas.Members of these subgroups could meet regularly, and share as much information as possible, while complying with confidentiality requirements.These teams could subsequently consider whether to merge their efforts, and how to involve other countries in these joint efforts.• The United States and Russia should each commit to continually improving their nuclear security practices, searching for and correcting vulnerabilities and strengthening the appropriate security architecture as threats change.In particular: 1. taking action to ensure that all our stocks of nuclear weapons, highly enriched uranium, and separated plutonium meet the standards of security at all times, having effective protection against the full range of potential outsider and insider threats; 2. ensuring that all our nuclear weapons, highly enriched uranium, and separated plutonium are effectively controlled and accounted for in order to immediately detect attempts to steal them, including annual, measured inventories of weapons-usable materials; 3. stipulating appropriate funding to ensure that every facility and transporter handling these stocks has the financial and personnel resources required to provide effective security and accounting for these stocks; 4. establishing programs to ensure that each organization managing these stocks has an effective security culture; 5. continuing to exchange best practices in nuclear security, including utilizing potential of the World Institute for Nuclear Security; 6. ensuring that each site and transport facility where these stocks exist has professional and appropriately paid, trained, and equipped guard forces capable, in cooperation with off-site responders, of preventing all credible threats to these stocks; 7. taking action to reduce the number of locations where nuclear weapons, highly enriched uranium, and plutonium exist to the absolute minimum required to support the ongoing military and civilian uses of these stocks.Explore possibility of ending civilian use of HEU, including production of medical isotopes; 8. achieving effective regulatory enforcement of rules that will ensure that all operators establish and maintain nuclear security and accounting systems that are effective at all times; 9. developing and implementing approaches to build international confidence without compromising sensitive information.• Drawing on their experience enhancing nuclear security under Cooperative Threat Reduction programs, the United States and Russia should exercise leadership in the nuclear sphere, working together to involve other countries in efforts to ensure high level of nuclear security, including to establish groups of countries that will take measures together to strengthen the level of nuclear security within the framework for preparation of the next Nuclear Security Summit in the Netherlands in 2014.Specific actions could include: o supporting the central role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in providing nuclear security guidance, review, and assistance to countries around the world, and the need to fund its Office of Nuclear Security appropriately; o working with other interested countries, develop mutually agreeable approaches to strengthening the global nuclear security framework, including development of approaches to continuation of the discussion of nuclear security after the summits end, and seeking as wide as possible adherence to the standards outlined above; o striving to reach agreements extending legal frameworks for continued cooperation on nuclear security, nuclear disarmament verification, consolidation of nuclear materials, nuclear forensics, safety of nuclear weapons, and other cooperative areas of mutual interest; o coordinating efforts in the sphere of national legislation in criminal prosecution for crimes committed in violations of the provisions of conventions and international instruments on nonproliferation and nuclear security.	Russia and the U.S. have done much to strengthen global capabilities in preventing, detecting and responding to acts of nuclear terrorism including forming a Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.But determining the next steps that countries could take against this threat has been a difficult and labor-intensive process.Fresh ideas and mutual trust are lacking.This is why in October 2010 a small group of senior, retired general officers from U.S. and Russian military and intelligence agencies formed the Elbe Group.The purpose of the Elbe Group, named after the river where American and Russian forces met at the end of World War II, is to establish an open and continuous channel of communication on sensitive issues.The group is unique in that it brings together former leaders and members of the CIA and FSB, DIA and GRU, and the armed forces and internal security forces.The first issues on the agenda of the Elbe group were relevant aspects of countering the threat of nuclear terrorism -a problem that combines the scale of Cold War-era nuclear catastrophe and the unpredictability of threats of international terrorism of the 21st century.In 2011, the Elbe Group participated in a joint project of the Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and the Russian Academy of Science's Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies on the joint U.S.-Russian assessment of the threat of nuclear terrorism.The unclassified report detailed a set of factors and trends leading to the growth of the threat of nuclear terrorism and formulated recommendations on effective measures to counteract it.In the opinion of the Elbe Group, the nuclear security summits in Washington and Seoul brought to the attention of the heads of states, the international community and the public at large the need of an adequate assessment of the threat of nuclear terrorism and of taking effective measures to counteract it.It is obvious that, as the two leading nuclear powers in the world, Russia and the United States have a special responsibility to prevent nuclear and other radioactive materials from falling into the hands of terrorists.The governments of our countries could jointly take the following steps in this direction in cooperation: • To develop an assessment of the threat from nuclear terrorism to create a basis at an appropriate level for a common understanding of the threat and its various dimensions. •To define countering of nuclear terrorism as a "problematic domain" -recognizing that an effective regime for physical nuclear security should be treated as a cross-cutting issue requiring clearly defined powers and responsibilities within the governments.Effectiveness of government efforts to prevent acts of nuclear terrorism should be increased through clarification of the structure of this problematic domain. •To increase coordination between special services in the interest of providing better warning about terrorist threats with an emphasis on preventing acts of nuclear terrorism within the framework of existing bilateral and multilateral instruments. •The catastrophe at Fukushima was the result of a sudden natural disaster, but a similar event could happen again as the result of actions by intruders.There is a need to build on the existing international instruments for warning, interdiction and consequence management of such acts in nation-states. •To continue to provide comprehensive assistance and to allocate resources to establish, maintain and sustain an effective regime of nuclear security globally and in nation states.There are, of course, issues over which the members of the Elbe Group disagree but all agree that preventing nuclear terrorism is one of the priorities for joint action by our two countries.Vigorous and diligent efforts to confront common threats could facilitate development of trustbased relations between the United States and Russia making it easier to agree on other sensitive issues.Steps to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism: Recommendations Based on the U.S.-Russia Joint Threat Assessment In 2011, Harvard's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and the Russian Academy of Sciences' Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies published "The U.S. -Russia Joint Threat Assessment on Nuclear Terrorism."The assessment analyzed the means, motives, and access of would-be nuclear terrorists, and concluded that the threat of nuclear terrorism is urgent and real.The Washington and Seoul Nuclear Security Summits in 2010 and 2012 established and demonstrated a consensus among political leaders from around the world that nuclear terrorism poses a serious threat to the peace, security, and prosperity of our planet.For any country, a terrorist attack with a nuclear device would be an immediate and catastrophic disaster, and the negative effects would reverberate around the world far beyond the location and moment of the detonation.Preventing a nuclear terrorist attack requires international cooperation to secure nuclear materials, especially among those states producing nuclear materials and weapons.As the world's two greatest nuclear powers, the United States and Russia have the greatest experience and capabilities in securing nuclear materials and plants and, therefore, share a special responsibility to lead international efforts to prevent terrorists from seizing such materials and plants.The depth of convergence between U.S. and Russian vital national interests on the issue of nuclear security is best illustrated by the fact that bilateral cooperation on this issue has continued uninterrupted for more than two decades, even when relations between the two countries occasionally became frosty, as in the aftermath of the August 2008 war in Georgia.Russia and the United States have strong incentives to forge a close and trusting partnership to prevent nuclear terrorism and have made enormous progress in securing fissile material both at home and in partnership with other countries.However, to meet the evolving threat posed by those individuals intent upon using nuclear weapons for terrorist purposes, the United States and Russia need to deepen and broaden their cooperation.The 2011 "U.S. -Russia Joint Threat Assessment" offered both specific conclusions about the nature of the threat and general observations about how it might be addressed.This report builds on that foundation and analyzes the existing framework for action, cites gaps and deficiencies, and makes specific recommendations for improvement. •Nuclear terrorism is a real and urgent threat.Urgent actions are required to reduce the risk.The risk is driven by the rise of terrorists who seek to inflict unlimited damage, many of whom have sought justification for their plans in radical interpretations of Islam; by the spread of information about the decades-old technology of nuclear weapons; by the increased availability of weapons-usable nuclear materials; and by globalization, which makes it easier to move people, technologies, and materials across the world. •Making a crude nuclear bomb would not be easy, but is potentially within the capabilities of a technically sophisticated terrorist group, as numerous government studies have confirmed.Detonating a stolen nuclear weapon would likely be difficult for terrorists to accomplish, if the weapon was equipped with modern technical safeguards (such as the electronic locks known as Permissive Action Links, or PALs).Terrorists could, however, cut open a stolen nuclear weapon and make use of its nuclear material for a bomb of their own. •The nuclear material for a bomb is small and difficult to detect, making it a major challenge to stop nuclear smuggling or to recover nuclear material after it has been stolen.Hence, a primary focus in reducing the risk must be to keep nuclear material and nuclear weapons from being stolen by continually improving their security, as agreed at the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington in April 2010. •Al-Qaeda has sought nuclear weapons for almost two decades.The group has repeatedly attempted to purchase stolen nuclear material or nuclear weapons, and has repeatedly attempted to recruit nuclear expertise.Al-Qaeda reportedly conducted tests of conventional explosives for its nuclear program in the desert in Afghanistan.The group's nuclear ambitions continued after its dispersal following the fall of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.Recent writings from top al-Qaeda leadership are focused on justifying the mass slaughter of civilians, including the use of weapons of mass destruction, and are in all likelihood intended to provide a formal religious justification for nuclear use. •While there are significant gaps in coverage of the group's activities, al-Qaeda appears to have been frustrated thus far in acquiring a nuclear capability; it is unclear whether the the group has acquired weapons-usable nuclear material or the expertise needed to make such material into a bomb.Furthermore, pressure from a broad range of counter-terrorist actions probably has reduced the group's ability to manage large, complex projects, but has not eliminated the danger.However, there is no sign the group has abandoned its nuclear ambitions.On the contrary, leadership statements as recently as 2008 indicate that the intention to acquire and use nuclear weapons is as strong as ever. •Terrorist groups from the North Caucasus have in the past planned to seize a nuclear submarine armed with nuclear weapons; have carried out reconnaissance on nuclear weapon storage sites; and have repeatedly threatened to sabotage nuclear facilities or to use radiological "dirty bombs."In recent years, these groups have become more focused on an extreme Islamic objective which might be seen as justifying the use of nuclear weapons.These groups' capabilities to manage large, complex projects have also been reduced by counter-terrorist actions, though they have demonstrated a continuing ability to launch devastating attacks in Moscow and elsewhere in the Russian heartland. •The Japanese terror cult Aum Shinrikyo pursued nuclear weapons in the early 1990s, but appears to have abandoned this interest.Few other groups have shown sustained interest in acquiring nuclear weapons.There is precedent to suggest that extremist groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba or Jaish-e-Mohammed might cooperate with al-Qaeda (or that al-Qaeda and North Caucasus groups might cooperate) in pursuit of a nuclear bomb, as the Indonesian group Jemaah Islamiya (JI) rendered substantial assistance to al-Qaeda's anthrax project from roughly 1998 to 2001. •Cooperation between Russia and the United States, the two countries with the largest nuclear stockpiles and the most extensive experience in cooperation to improve nuclear security and interdict nuclear smuggling, is particularly important in reducing the danger nuclear terrorism could pose to the security of those two countries and the world. •International intelligence and law-enforcement cooperation targeted on countering nuclear smuggling and identifying and stopping terrorist nuclear plots are also important steps to reduce the danger of nuclear terrorism. •Nuclear terrorism must be addressed as part of a broader phenomenon of terrorism and extremism.Al-Qaeda and other groups draw motivation for the pursuit of WMD from the belief that escalating the conflict by inflicting mass casualties is necessary to win a perceived "clash of civilizations" between Islam and the West. •The United States and Russia must lead international efforts to encourage states to cooperate more closely to ensure terrorists do not succeed in acquiring nuclear weaponsusable material.These efforts should be closely coordinated with the United Nations (UN) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).Despite the fact that nuclear security continues to improve globally, due in part to increased investments in material, personnel, and control and accounting procedures, urgent work remains to be done to fully secure all nuclear weapons-usable materials.All stocks of nuclear weapons, HEU, and plutonium must be protected against all plausible terrorist and criminal threats, and the number of locations where these stocks exist must be reduced as much as practicable. •The image of one of the most senior scientists in Pakistan's nuclear weapons program drawing an improvised nuclear device for Osama bin Laden serves as a jarring reminder of the importance of continuing to eliminate al-Qaeda's senior leadership.The killing of Osama bin Laden is likely to damage al-Qaeda's ability to pull off a large scale WMD attack, to the extent such a plan may not have matured and there are few high level leaders in the group with the known interest in planning such attacks.But, these remaining few leaders can still serve as the key drivers of al-Qaeda's nuclear ambitions, and therefore capturing or killing them would be an important victory in the campaign to prevent nuclear terrorism. •Senior leaders should encourage and support enhanced intelligence and law-enforcement cooperation between Russia and the United States, particularly in resolving past, present, and future cases of weapons-usable nuclear material found outside of state control. •U.S.-Russian international leadership is critical in supporting the roles of intelligence and law enforcement, the IAEA, and international police organizations as appropriate. •International cooperation should encourage the development of national and jointly tailored intelligence tradecraft to detect and neutralize any existing or prospective terrorist nuclear plot, thereby strengthening interdiction and attribution, nuclear exercise cooperation, and contingency planning.Special attention should be paid to cooperation between the law-enforcement and security services of those Islamic states which are fighting terrorist organizations and constraining the actions of Islamic extremists. •The insights into al-Qaeda's strategic and operational thinking afforded by Exoneration and other discourses must be exploited to prepare for future terrorist attacks.Counterterrorism strategies too often depend on current trends shaping al-Qaeda's status and activities.This is a prescription for being once again surprised by the unanticipated Currently legal and political bases for cooperation between Russia and the United States in the prevention of nuclear terrorism consist of bilateral and multilateral treaty instruments, multilateral cooperative initiatives, UN Security Council resolutions, as well as national legislation and policies of the two countries.The most significant of these international treaty instruments include the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (with its 2005 amendment), and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.Legally binding UN Security Council Resolutions also bear on the matter, including: UNSCRs 1373 (2001) and 1540 (2004) .UNSCR 1887 (2009) is also highly relevant, though it does not establish legally binding obligations.The IAEA plays a critical role in maintaining the nuclear security regime.The agency develops recommendations and standards, reviews nuclear security measures, develops suggestions for improvement and coordination of the efforts of donor states, responds to requests of states needing assistance, conducts training and workshops, and maintains information for use by member states, such as the Illicit Trafficking Database (ITDB).The IAEA meeting on nuclear security in July 2013 and the subsequent meetings thereafter will provide an important platform for international discussion of nuclear security issues.The United States, Russia and other states make voluntary contributions to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund, provide experts for evaluation of nuclear security measures and training workshops, and more.In the multilateral political format, the existing international mechanisms help shape and strengthen the international effort to prevent nuclear terrorism.First of all these include: • The 2010 and 2012 Nuclear Security Summits; • The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI); • The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT); • Cooperation in the Financial Action Task Force (FATF); • Law enforcement efforts coordinated by Interpol; • International exchanges of best practices, including exchanges conducted under the aegis of the World Institute of Nuclear Security (WINS) and others; The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) entered into force on March 5, 1970.It is the main legal instrument for controlling proliferation of nuclear weapons.The treaty, however, does not include any provisions specifically focused on preventing nuclear terrorism or ensuring effective security for nuclear weapons and materials.The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) entered into force on February 8, 1987.Since then, 145 countries have joined this legally binding agreement.The CPPNM sets minimum standards for security of nuclear material in international transport; calls for cooperation among parties in the event of any theft of nuclear material; requires all parties to ensure that their laws impose appropriate penalties for nuclear theft and terrorism crimes; and gives each party jurisdiction to prosecute such criminals who may be captured on their territory.A 2005 amendment expanded the scope of the convention to the storage, use, and transport of nuclear materials within countries.It also established measures to protect nuclear materials and nuclear facilities against sabotage; expanded opportunities for co-operation involving information subject to confidentiality; and defined objectives and fundamental principles of physical protection.For the amendment to come into force, two-thirds of signatories need to ratify it.So far, 97 countries have ratified the amendment.The communique from the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit calls on countries to expedite ratification of the amendment to bring it into force by 2014.Also in 2005, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.Proposed by Russia to strengthen international law designed to counter terrorist threats, the April 2005 pact became the first UN convention aimed at preventing WMD terrorist attacks.The convention governs international cooperation in the investigation of acts of nuclear terrorism.It also requires punishment of those involved in such acts.It is aimed at preventing, combating, and investigating terrorist acts involving not only nuclear, but also radioactive materials as well as devices that are made with these materials.Although Russia and the United States were among the first countries to have signed the convention, as of mid-2012, the United States had not yet ratified it, though Congress was debating the necessary legislation.As the United States signed the convention, it has an obligation under international law to refrain from any action inconsistent with the object and purpose of the document.Resolution 1373 of UN Security Council was adopted September 28, 2001 (following the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001).Its provisions are mandatory for all UN member states under Article VII of the UN Charter.The purpose of the resolution is to strengthen international cooperation and national mechanisms to prevent and suppress the financing and preparation of any acts of terrorism.Of the 20 measures prescribed in the resolution, the most relevant in the context of cooperation between Russia and the United States in the prevention of nuclear terrorism, are the following: • take the necessary steps to prevent the commission of terrorist acts, including by provision of early warning to other states by exchange of information, Paragraph 2 (b); • prevent those who finance, plan, facilitate or commit terrorist acts from using their respective territories for those purposes against other states or their citizens, Paragraph 2 (d); • afford one another the greatest measure of assistance in connection with criminal investigations or criminal proceedings relating to the financing or support of terrorist acts, including assistance in obtaining evidence in their possession necessary for the proceedings, Paragraph 2 (f); • exchange information in accordance with international and domestic law and cooperate on administrative and judicial matters to prevent the commission of terrorist acts, Paragraph 3 (b). •establish a committee to oversee implementation of the resolution, Paragraph 6.Resolution 1540 of UN Security Council was adopted on 28 April 2004.Like Resolution 1373, it is binding on all UN member states, including those who remain outside the NPT and other relevant nonproliferation treaties.The Security Council sought to create an effective barrier to prevent trade in weapons of mass destruction by non-state actors, especially with terrorist organizations.It also oversees its execution, establishing the 1540 Committee, and requires all states to report on the steps they have taken or plan to take to implement Resolution 1540.In the context of cooperation between Russia and the United States in the prevention of nuclear terrorism three mandates of Resolution 1540 are particularly salient.The Security Council decided that: • [A]ll states shall refrain from providing any form of support to non-State actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery; • [A]ll states shall take and enforce effective measures to establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery, including by establishing appropriate controls over related materials and to this end shall: (a) Develop and maintain appropriate effective measures to account for and secure such items in production, use, storage or transport; (b) Develop and maintain appropriate effective physical protection measures; (c) Develop and maintain appropriate effective border controls and law enforcement efforts to detect, deter, prevent and combat, including through international cooperation when necessary, the illicit trafficking and brokering in such items in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law; (d) Establish, develop, review and maintain appropriate effective national export and trans-shipment controls over such items, including appropriate laws and regulations to control export, transit, trans-shipment and re-export and controls on providing funds and services related to such export and trans-shipment such as financing, and transporting that would contribute to proliferation, as well as establishing end-user controls; and establishing and enforcing appropriate criminal or civil penalties for violations of such export control laws and regulations.The resolution also called on UN member states to cooperate in the efforts mandated above.Resolution 1887 of UN Security Council was adopted on September 24, 2009, and provides political support to a broad range of nonproliferation and nuclear security measures, and calls on all states to cooperate to strengthen the global effort to stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction to additional states or to terrorist groups.In the context of cooperation between Russia and the United States in the prevention of nuclear terrorism the following paragraphs of Resolution 1887 are relevant: 24.Calls upon member states to share best practices with a view to improved safety standards and nuclear security practices and raise standards of nuclear security to reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism, with the aim of securing all vulnerable nuclear material from such risks within four years; 25.Calls upon all states to manage responsibly and minimize to the greatest extent that is technically and economically feasible the use of highly enriched uranium for civilian purposes, including by working to convert research reactors and radioisotope production processes to the use of low enriched uranium fuels and targets; 28.Declares its resolve to monitor closely any situations involving the proliferation of nuclear weapons, their means of delivery or related material, including to or by non-state actors as they are defined in resolution 1540 (2004) , and, as appropriate, to take such measures as may be necessary to ensure the maintenance of international peace and security.PSI is a voluntary initiative that was launched by U.S. President George W. Bush on May 31, 2003, at an international meeting in Krakow, Poland.It is aimed at countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their means of delivery, and related materials by either states or non-state actors.PSI formed a set of "principles of interdiction," which, although not legally binding, still provide a practical basis for combating proliferation of WMD through disrupting illegal routes for supply of components, equipment and technology used in production of such weapons.More than 90 countries are now participants in PSI.Like PSI, GICNT is a voluntary initiative, launched jointly by Russian President Vladimir Putin and U.S. President George Bush in June 2006 at the summit of the G-8 in St. Petersburg.It is aimed at preventing terrorists from obtaining nuclear and radiological materials and related technologies.Russia and the United States co-chair the initiative.GICNT partners have developed principles of implementation that are applied to ensure the effectiveness of measures to combat illicit trafficking in nuclear and radioactive materials.They include commitments to: • Develop, if necessary, and improve accounting, control and physical protection for nuclear and other radioactive materials and substances (Principle 1); • Enhance security of civilian nuclear facilities (Principle 2); • Promote information sharing pertaining to the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism and their facilitation, taking appropriate measures consistent with their national law and international obligations to protect the confidentiality of any information, which they exchange in confidence (Principle 8).Since July 2006, more than 80 nations have joined the U.S. and Russia as members of the Initiative.Both Russia and the United States are also members of the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction that was established at the G-8 Kananaskis Summit in June 2002.At that summit G-8 leaders pledged to spend $20 billion over the following decade to assist Russia and the other states in securing or eliminating chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons.In June 2010, the United States and Russia joined other G-8 leaders in extending the group's Global Partnership against WMD for another ten years, with the U.S. pledging an additional $10 billion for the program.The Global Partnership has now extended its mission worldwide, with a priority on helping states around the world meet their UNSCR 1540 obligations to put in place effective anti-proliferation controls, including effective security and accounting for any nuclear weapons or materials they may have.IAEA recommendations on physical protection of nuclear materials and nuclear facilities were first published in 1972.They were developed on the basis of the experience of states that use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and contain voluntary guidelines for physical protection of nuclear materials and nuclear facilities.The latest, fifth version of the recommendations can be found in the IAEA document INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 (2011), also known as "Guidelines for Nuclear Security" (Nuclear Security Series No.13).The fifth revision makes clear that all states should put in place rules that require operators handling Category I nuclear materials to protect them against a specified set of threats known as the Design Basis Threat (DBT); it greatly expands the recommended steps to prevent sabotage of nuclear facilities, and taking into the account the possibility of suicidal terrorists, it modifies the previous recommendations that much less security is needed for fissile material that is mildly radioactive.Thus INFCIRC/225/Rev.5, significantly expands recommended measures for ensuring physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities in member states for the sake of maintaining the international regime of nuclear security.Of all the provisions of the INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 document, those in Articles 3.31-3.33 of the International Cooperation and Assistance section are most relevant to cooperation in preventing illicit trafficking in nuclear materials.In particular, Article 3.33 states that in the event of unauthorized removal, sabotage or serious threat of such action the state shall as soon as possible provide the necessary information to other states that may be affected.The IAEA provides a wide range of services to member states on request, including international peer reviews of nuclear security arrangements and a wide range of training and workshops.The most important of these services in the sphere of nuclear security are the International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS), which reviews the physical protection at a particular site designated by the requesting state, along with the broader system of nuclear security rules and procedures in that country, and the International Nuclear Security Advisory Service (INServ), which provides a broader overview of nuclear security activities in a state, identifying areas that may need improvement or more in-depth review.In recent years even advanced nuclear states have found that they can benefit from these services, and at the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit, the United States, Great Britain, and France all announced that they were hosting IPPAS reviews of their physical protection arrangements.When analysis of the results of visits by experts suggests that improvements are necessary, the IAEA works with donor states as needed to arrange funding; in some cases, the IAEA funds some upgrades itself.The communique of the nuclear security summit, which was adopted on April 13, 2010 by leaders of 47 countries, includes an appeal for strengthening of nuclear security and preventing nuclear terrorism.The document noted responsible national actions and sustained and effective international cooperation are required to succeed.The signatories joined U.S. President Barack Obama's call to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials within four years, and urged all states to agree to work together as an international community to advance nuclear security, requesting and providing assistance as needed.They also pledged to prevent non-state actors from gaining access to information and technologies needed to use nuclear material for malicious purposes.At the summit, the 47 heads of states also recognized the need to strengthen cooperation at bilateral, regional and multilateral levels in order to develop nuclear security culture and effectively prevent and respond to incidents involving illicit trafficking of nuclear material.The leaders agreed to exchange information and practices through bilateral and multilateral mechanisms in such areas as nuclear detection, forensic examination, enforcement, and development of new technologies.The communiqué pointed out that measures designed to advance security of nuclear material are also relevant for security of other radioactive materials.The second Nuclear Security Summit was held in Seoul in March 2012.It again focused on core issues, including building a global nuclear security architecture, the role of the IAEA, nuclear materials, radioactive sources, nuclear security and safety interaction, transportation security, combating illicit trafficking, nuclear forensics, nuclear security culture, information security, and international cooperation.More than 50 heads of state issued a joint communique pledging to strengthen nuclear security, reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism, and prevent unauthorized acquisition of nuclear materials.The participants agreed to continue the four-year effort securing and accounting for all vulnerable nuclear material by 2014.The Seoul Communique noted the relationship between nuclear security and nuclear safety, which was highlighted by the Fukushima accident in March 2011; it also called for robust efforts to improve both safety and security.The Seoul Summit advanced the international regime of nuclear security.A number of countries, such as Ukraine, announced that they had eliminated weapons-usable nuclear material from their territory or that they were going to get rid of particular stocks before the next summit in 2014.There were, however, disappointments too, as there were fewer new commitments than in 2012.The United States and Russia issued statements that in essence said "what we are doing is what we ought to be doing."They committed to nothing to reduce their respective nuclear weapons arsenals or weapons material or even to upgrade security in their own countries.In the bilateral realm, three U.S. , which was subsequently extended twice.Under that agreement, the United States and Russia worked together to secure fissile material in former Soviet states, replace obsolete and dangerous plutonium production reactors with fossil fuel power plants, and install radiation detectors at ports, airports, and border crossings to deter illicit trafficking in nuclear materials.The CTR umbrella agreement expired in June 2013, and has been replaced by an agreement that has a narrower scope in Russia, but allows the signatories to cooperate in assisting third countries to strengthen nuclear security.It remains to be seen, however, exactly what activities will be pursued under the new agreement.A 2004 agreement enables U.S. and Russian cooperation to refuel reactors using highly enriched uranium with low enriched uranium and repatriate fresh and spent fuel to secure storage.The two nations have also conducted an ongoing dialogue regarding reduction and consolidation of stockpiles of fissile material.Physical security upgrades at Russian nuclear weapons and material storage sites are virtually complete, although future work is necessary to sustain those improvements, and all nuclear complexes must work continually to improve their security cultures.As part of this effort, U.S. and Russian nuclear security experts have held a series of workshops to exchange best practices in particular areas, with some of these workshops including British experts as well.They have also established cooperative programs to strengthen nuclear security regulations, train appropriate personnel, and strengthen nuclear security culture.To broaden such efforts worldwide, the United States backed the formation of the World Institute for Nuclear Security, which is organized to share and promote best practices among counties through workshops and manuals.Over its short history, the World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS) has grown to hundreds of members in dozens of countries, but so far Russia has not participated in its activities.In the June 24, 2010 statement Presidents Medvedev and Obama stressed the particular importance of further enhancing cooperation in the fight against terrorism through cooperation in such fields as law enforcement, transportation security, intelligence sharing, terrorist financing, anti-terrorism technology, as well as in international fora.In addition to national legislation, the international aspects of combating nuclear terrorism are reflected in a number of policy documents adopted by Russia and the United States in recent years.In 2009-2013, Russia adopted three basic doctrinal documents: the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation Until 2020 (approved on May 12, 2009), the Military Doctrine of Russian Federation (approved on February 5, 2010), and the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (approved on February 12, 2013).All the three documents refer to combating terrorism.The international aspects of combating terrorism are best reflected in the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation.Section II of the concept refers to international terrorism as a major transborder challenge of modern times.Section III of the concept says that the Russian Federation "сomes out in favor of strengthening nuclear safety and security worldwide, in particular supports strengthening international legal mechanism in the fields of nuclear safety and prevention of nuclear terrorist attacks."This section also notes that Russia "views combating international terrorism as a crucial domestic and foreign policy task.".The concept states that this fight should be put on the international legal framework and conducted in compliance with the UN Charter.Russia's National Security Strategy also recognizes the need for international cooperation in countering terrorism, and particularly emphasizes the role of the U.S.-Russian cooperation.Strengthening counterterrorism cooperation between Russia and the United States is regarded as one of the priorities of bilateral relations, according to the strategy.The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, however, contains no references to international cooperation in combating terrorism.On the doctrine's list of major military threats, the spread of international terrorism is only number 10.This does not reflect Russia's recent experience, as in the 21st century, Russia has been subjected to many terrorist acts with grave consequences and terrorism in fact became the main threat to national security.The latest U.S. Nuclear Posture Review was released on April 10, 2010.This review contains new assessments of nuclear threats to the United States.For the first time, the review cited nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation as preeminent threats to U.S. security within the nuclear realm.Moreover, the document contains a detailed program of actions to counter the threat in the four spheres: • active implementation of the Prague initiatives announced by President Barack Obama in April 2009 which are designed to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide within four years; • accelerating efforts to convert or close research reactors using highly enriched uranium fuel and to repatriate fresh and spent fuel for secure storage in the United States or Russia; • strengthening national and international capacity to disrupt opportunities for illicit trafficking in nuclear materials, equipment, and technologies and to intercept such trafficking.In this sphere the United States intends to contribute to strengthening of national and multilateral regimes of export and border controls, as well as to financial and other mechanisms designed to combat the illegal trade in nuclear materials, equipment and technology; and, • affirmation that the U.S. is determined to hold accountable any country, terrorist group or other non-state actors that facilitate efforts by terrorists to acquire or use WMD.To this end, nuclear forensics is to be developed.The National Security Strategy of the United States, which was adopted on May 28, 2010, differs substantially from its 2006 predecessor as it puts greater emphasis on nuclear terrorism and distinguishes states from terrorists. "The danger of nuclear terrorism is the greatest threat to global security.Terrorist organizations, including al-Qaeda, have engaged in efforts to develop and acquire WMD-and if successful, they are likely to use them," according to the document.The document states that there is no greater threat to the American people than weapons of mass destruction, particularly the danger posed by the pursuit of nuclear weapons by violent extremists and their proliferation to additional states.That the U.S. government has defined nuclear terrorism as a major threat to the country's national security and subordinated other nuclear threats to it, is significant.It increases the imperative for international (including U.S.-Russian) cooperation in countering the nuclear terrorism threat.The analysis of the legal frameworks and policies of the United States, Russia, and other states in the sphere of nuclear security suggests several conclusions: • A broad and robust legal and policy framework for U.S.-Russian cooperation and mutual assistance in prevention of nuclear terrorism has been developed. •Most of the established international and national legal instruments include provisions that enable Russia and the United States to work closely together in responding to the threat of nuclear terrorism, but at the same time exchange of sensitive information may be subject to certain restrictions. •Russia and the United States have assumed legal obligations in several joint and multilateral documents and launched or joined initiatives to combat the threat of nuclear terrorism.Effective implementation of these commitments and initiatives is not only in the interest of both countries, but also significantly strengthens international security, minimizing risk of nuclear attacks by terrorist groups. •While the United States and Russia are generally active participants in the international nuclear security regime, these mechanisms are deficient in one or more of the following areas: universality, enforceability, verification, and specificity.Despite the impressive array of mechanisms established to combat nuclear terrorism, several serious problems persist, requiring relentless attention and actions by the United States, Russia, and other nations.These include continuing nuclear security vulnerabilities in some countries and the continued incidents of illicit trafficking in nuclear materials, and other radioactive materials.Despite the mandates of UNSCR 1540, some countries have not yet adopted a system of strict criminal punishment for crimes committed in violation of nonproliferation and nuclear security conventions and instruments.A strict system of criminal prosecution, as well as international cooperation to find and punish the offenders, is needed to deter potential theft of nuclear materials or illicit trafficking in such materials.The problem of accounting and control over nuclear materials, and radioactive sources is yet to be solved by a number of countries.Even in the United States and Russia, there is more to be done to ensure that nuclear weapons and the materials needed to make them are effectively and sustainably secured against the full spectrum of potential adversary threats.According to the International Atomic Energy Agency and media reporting, over the past twenty years there have been a score of cases in which weapons-grade fissile material has been seized outside regulatory control.Such material has been seized in separate incidents in 2003, 2006, 2010 , and 2011 in Georgia and Moldova.While none of these seizures involved enough material to fabricate nuclear explosive devices, they are significant for two reasons.First, in many of the cases, the individuals involved claimed that the material was a sample of a large quantity available for purchase-material that might still be on the market and available to terrorists.Second, the availability of material for trafficking is conclusive proof of nuclear security vulnerabilities.Yet in all but one of the score of cases in which weapons grade fissile material was seized, most of the following facts remain unknown to the international community: where the material was stolen from; who stole it; who abetted them; how the theft was accomplished; and where the material was headed.It is evident that security improvements undertaken at hundreds of nuclear facilities around the world have lowered probability of theft of nuclear materials.At the same time until the reasons, nature, and extent of these nuclear security failures are fully understood, we cannot be fully confident of the security measures now in place.The acquired real-life experience is not the only means to improve U.S. and Russian capacity to prevent nuclear terrorism.Prospects for development and implementation of joint activities in Russia and the United States to counter the threat of nuclear terrorism can also be discerned from recent bilateral modeling of the situation with the interception of contraband nuclear material.Participants of two U.S.-Russia Security programs at Harvard in 2010 completed case studies that required attendees to play out a hypothetical scenario in which they had to interdict terrorist nuclear explosive devices headed for the United States or Russia.In their group presentations, participants, who came from senior echelons of the two countries' military establishments, unanimously settled on nuclear terrorism as a matter of urgent concern requiring both immediate and deep U.S.-Russian cooperation.The participating flag officers developed concrete joint action plans on how to solve the task of interdicting the terrorist nuclear devices en route to their countries and on how the United States and Russia could cooperate to prevent nuclear terrorism in the longer run.U.S. and Russian experts also played out an interception of contraband nuclear material during a tabletop exercise in Moscow in 2011.The event, which was managed jointly by former foreign minister of Russia Igor Ivanov and former U.S. senator Sam Nunn, was attended by Russian and American experts who had previously held high government positions and have extensive experience in law enforcement, the military, customs, international diplomacy, and cooperation with the media.The participating specialists were well versed in the political and technical aspects of nuclear security.The purpose of this simulation was to determine the readiness of Russia and the United States to respond jointly to the nuclear crisis, to understand the problems identified by the scenario, and to develop practical recommendations for improving and strengthening cooperation to combat the threat of nuclear terrorism.Participants tackled a plausible scenario requiring them to intercept two separate batches of illicitly trafficked HEU, one of which was en route to the United States.The exercise focused on challenges that the governments of Russia and the United States would encounter if coordinating a joint response to such a crisis.The exercise highlighted differences in approaches between the Russian and American officials, both in political and practical terms.These differences were due to cultural factors, different perceptions of the threat of nuclear terrorism, as well as different approaches to interaction with the media and the public.For example, experts from Russia initially preferred more restrained and cautious steps, whereas their American counterparts at once perceived the situation as a full-blown nuclear crisis.On the U.S. side, policy and operational coordination would be led by the White House, while in Russia, such efforts would be managed by the National Anti-Terrorism Committee under the direct supervision of the Director of the Federal Security Service (FSB).The exercises also revealed that standard operating procedures for cooperation between Russia and the United States to counter the threat of nuclear terrorism either do not exist or are insufficient.This could seriously hamper cooperation in the event of a real nuclear crisis.Hence, it may be appropriate to create a bilateral inter-agency task force to strengthen mechanisms for bilateral cooperation to counter the threat of nuclear terrorism.The exercise also revealed that determining the origin of illegally trafficked nuclear material would require the United States and Russia to exchange highly sensitive information, including laboratory data on intercepted nuclear materials and samples.Again, the simulation revealed that there were neither procedures nor guidelines for such exchanges.There is clearly a need for such standards to be established.Russia and the United States could form a joint technical working subgroup on nuclear forensics and a subgroup on countering of nuclear terrorism-within the framework of the the U.S.-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission's high-level inter-governmental Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Security Working Group, which would greatly simplify the process of determining the origin of illegally trafficked nuclear material.The absence of such procedures hinders achievement of results in investigating the origin of fissile material seized outside regulatory control.The exercises also highlighted the fact that the existing differences in approaches of the U.S. and Russian governments towards public information and relations can pose serious issues in the case of a real nuclear crisis, which could lead to a loss of public confidence, the spread of rumors and, consequently, panic.A Russian-American subgroup on countering nuclear terrorism could explore approaches towards informing the public in emergency situations.This subgroup could develop a general-purpose communication strategy and determine when to report to the public in such situations.The aforementioned Working Group on Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Security held its first meeting in Washington, DC on September 28-29, 2009 .At that meeting the group adopted its first Action Plan that provides for implementation of the Joint Statement on nuclear cooperation that the U.S. and Russian presidents signed on July 6, 2009 in the following 13 areas: accounting, control and physical protection of nuclear materials, nuclear fuel return, conversion of reactors, consolidation and conversion of nuclear materials, plutonium disposal, combating of illicit trafficking of nuclear materials; international safeguards system, export controls, ending production of weapons-grade plutonium; emergency response, the global initiative to combat nuclear terrorism, bilateral cooperation between Russia and United States in the field of civil nuclear energy, international cooperation framework in the field of civil nuclear energy.Building on the general approaches recommended in the 2011 "U.S. -Russia Joint Threat Assessment on Nuclear Terrorism," we recommend the following proposals for action that will improve the ability of the United States and Russia to detect, prevent, disrupt, and manage consequences of acts of nuclear terrorism: • Within the framework of the U.S.-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission's Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Security Working Group, the United States and Russia should create subgroups, led by high-ranking government officials on each side that would: 1.organize and oversee implementation of specific steps in nuclear security, intelligence, law enforcement, emergency response, and other areas that the two countries can take to reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism act.An agenda could be laid out within six months and submitted for approval by the two Presidents; 2.coordinate actions by the United States and Russia in the event of a crisis involving a credible nuclear terrorist threat.This subgroup could include representative of diplomatic , military and intelligence communities.These individuals could meet semiannually to coordinate operating procedures and plan exercises to test the cooperative approaches.As a first step, the subgroup could explore the lessons from the bilateral exercises as well as from other exercises of higher level officials and exercises conducted within framework of the initiatives; 3.develop guidelines and procedures, initially, for the sharing of information and analysis relevant to the task of nuclear forensics.In a second phase, the nuclear forensics subgroup could examine instances of seized fissile material to determine the origins of the material and begin an examination of lessons to be learned from the case, with a view to preventing future theft of nuclear material.For tracking down nuclear terrorism and illicit trafficking in nuclear materials the subgroups should include representatives of the intelligence communities as well as experts on nuclear explosive devices, terrorist groups, and illicit trafficking, and pursue an integrated approach, developing and pursuing leads in the aforementioned areas.Members of these subgroups could meet regularly, and share as much information as possible, while complying with confidentiality requirements.These teams could subsequently consider whether to merge their efforts, and how to involve other countries in these joint efforts. •The United States and Russia should each commit to continually improving their nuclear security practices, searching for and correcting vulnerabilities and strengthening the appropriate security architecture as threats change.In particular: 1.taking action to ensure that all our stocks of nuclear weapons, highly enriched uranium, and separated plutonium meet the standards of security at all times, having effective protection against the full range of potential outsider and insider threats; 2.ensuring that all our nuclear weapons, highly enriched uranium, and separated plutonium are effectively controlled and accounted for in order to immediately detect attempts to steal them, including annual, measured inventories of weapons-usable materials; 3.stipulating appropriate funding to ensure that every facility and transporter handling these stocks has the financial and personnel resources required to provide effective security and accounting for these stocks; 4.establishing programs to ensure that each organization managing these stocks has an effective security culture; 5.continuing to exchange best practices in nuclear security, including utilizing potential of the World Institute for Nuclear Security; 6.ensuring that each site and transport facility where these stocks exist has professional and appropriately paid, trained, and equipped guard forces capable, in cooperation with off-site responders, of preventing all credible threats to these stocks; 7.taking action to reduce the number of locations where nuclear weapons, highly enriched uranium, and plutonium exist to the absolute minimum required to support the ongoing military and civilian uses of these stocks.Explore possibility of ending civilian use of HEU, including production of medical isotopes; 8.achieving effective regulatory enforcement of rules that will ensure that all operators establish and maintain nuclear security and accounting systems that are effective at all times; 9.developing and implementing approaches to build international confidence without compromising sensitive information. •Drawing on their experience enhancing nuclear security under Cooperative Threat Reduction programs, the United States and Russia should exercise leadership in the nuclear sphere, working together to involve other countries in efforts to ensure high level of nuclear security, including to establish groups of countries that will take measures together to strengthen the level of nuclear security within the framework for preparation of the next Nuclear Security Summit in the Netherlands in 2014.Specific actions could include: o supporting the central role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in providing nuclear security guidance, review, and assistance to countries around the world, and the need to fund its Office of Nuclear Security appropriately; o working with other interested countries, develop mutually agreeable approaches to strengthening the global nuclear security framework, including development of approaches to continuation of the discussion of nuclear security after the summits end, and seeking as wide as possible adherence to the standards outlined above; o striving to reach agreements extending legal frameworks for continued cooperation on nuclear security, nuclear disarmament verification, consolidation of nuclear materials, nuclear forensics, safety of nuclear weapons, and other cooperative areas of mutual interest; o coordinating efforts in the sphere of national legislation in criminal prosecution for crimes committed in violations of the provisions of conventions and international instruments on nonproliferation and nuclear security.
Stephen J. Cimbala Civil-military relations in the United States and in other countries reflect the professional orientations and thinking of military officers, the decision-making process, as among defense bureaucracies and other institutional players in government, and the political outcomes that result from international relations and their feedback into foreign policy decisions.In short: civil-military relations constitute an expansive subject matter, with indistinct boundaries between it and national security studies, defense and foreign policy making, military history or other sub-disciplines of interest to persons in the armed forces, government and academia.In times past, civil-military relations were thought to have a center of gravity in the legal or institutional relations between the strictly "civilian" versus "military" spheres, but modern and postmodern studies have regarded this bimodal perspective as too simplistic.It is now the apparent consensus that civil and military responsibilities at least in developed countries have considerable overlap, and, therefore, shared responsibility for success or failure in war or peace.The study of civil-military relations co-evolves with developments in the art of war in addition to social and cultural changes.As Keith F. Otterbein has noted, war and military organizations "are as important as kinship and the family, religious practices and practitioners, and the economy and modes of exchange to understanding a particular society." 1 Of the art of war, it may be said that the essential nature of war is unchanging, although the character of war changes with developments in economics, technology, culture, society, and especially, politics.2 It may also be said that since war is socially, culturally, economically, technologically and politically determined, so, too, are civil-military relations.With respect to their lasting impacts on civil-military relations, however, not all variables are equal.Defeat and victory in past wars hold "lessons learned" for the organization, training, and leadership of armed forces in future war-and for the political leadership of defeated or victorious states and non-state actors as well.If democracies are less warlike than autocratic states, as argued by some theorists, this may have to do with the greater willingness of the former to subject prior 1 Keith F. Otterbein, The Anthropology of War (Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, 2009) , p. 3.2 Relative to the study of civil-military relations, this point is emphasized in Mackubin Thomas Owens, U.S. Civil-Military Relations after 9/11: Renegotiating the Civil-Military Bargain (New York: Continuum Publishing Group, 2011), especially p. 140.wartime experiences to critical audit and examination and to hold public officials accountable to the electorate for apparent failure.The co-evolution of U.S. civil-military relations with the growing responsibilities assumed by American foreign policy since World War II has not been coincidental.The Cold War American Presidents were accorded unprecedented power in peacetime to manage the armed forces and, as well, a burgeoning national security establishment.President Eisenhower's farewell warning about the dangers of an emerging "military industrial complex" seems almost quaint by later Cold War and post-Cold War standards.With the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union, the United States found itself described in the 1990s and since as a singular military superpower.The United States accepted greater responsibility for world order and commitments to multinational peace and stability operations in Bosnia, Kosovo and elsewhere during the final decade of the twentieth century.In the first decade of the twenty-first century, the attacks of 9-11 drew American military forces into Afghanistan and, indirectly, into Iraq, whose democratization was described by the George W. Bush administration as a necessary step in the war on terror.According to one noted military historian, post-Cold War success in U.S. military operations may have unbalanced the relationship between civilian and military participants in the decision-making process: The end of the Cold War and an operational tour de force in the first Persian Gulf War cemented the military's position as the public's most trusted and esteemed institution.During the Clinton administration, the military leadership had a virtual veto over military policy, particularly the terms and conditions of interventions overseas.The power of the military has waxed and waned since the 1940s, but not a single secretary of defense has entered office trusting the armed forces to comply faithfully with his priorities rather than their own.3 The Persian Gulf War of 1991 (coalition operation Desert Storm) showed that the United States had established primacy in the conduct of information-based warfare, especially in the application of long-range precision strike, C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance), stealth, and other advanced technologies to conventional war fighting.Therefore it followed, according to the paradoxical logic of strategy, that future enemies of the United States would emphasize asymmetrical approaches, including unconventional or irregular warfare of various kinds.Insurgency and terrorism soon moved to the top of U.S. threat assessments, in addition to the various by-products of failed states that included sectarian violence, human and drug trafficking, and spreading social, economic and environmental chaos.As a result, the U.S. found itself for two decades using military force not only for the obvious purpose of battle, but also to support the reconstruction of societies and the reestablishment of governments.These post-conflict security and stability operations created challenges to sort out various aspects of U.S. and allied civilmilitary relations "on the ground": and, as well, among those security forces both military and civil that were being rebuilt in states with deposed regimes, as in Iraq and Afghanistan.4 In the post-Cold War world, U.S. and other civil-military relations would also involve issues of domestic as well as international security.Among these domestic security issues would be the balance of power among competing military and intelligence bureaucracies.Russia's security establishment in the 1990s was in a declared state of democratization and transparency, but in actual fact, the securitization of financial power and the commingling of private and public sector oligarchies led post-Soviet Russia into an unstable relationship between military and political power.Military reform was resisted by the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff throughout the years of Yeltsin's presidency and even during Putin's more defense-minded years in the same position.The Medvedev-Putin "tandem" committed itself to serious reform in the wake of military operational embarrassments during Russia's August, 2008 war against Georgia.Questions remained whether Russia could afford to replace as many conscripts with voluntary contract soldiers as planned, whether Russia could modernize both nuclear and conventional forces, and whether the Russian military would have first or later call upon scarce resources compared to internal security troops and intelligence organs.5 In turn, Russia's relations with the U.S. and NATO Europe would influence its threat perceptions and, derivatively, the balance of power among its military and other security bureaucracies.The Obama administration argued for a "reset" of relations with Russia, of which the centerpiece and starting point was the agreed New START treaty of 2010.New START was seen by its proponents as the beginning of a process of gradually improving U.S.-Russian political relations, but this favorable outcome was neither determined nor obvious.Russia, relative to its international 4 According to Andrew J. Bacevich, so-called long wars or protracted conflicts are antithetical to the values of democratic government, including "a code of military conduct that honors the principle of civilian control while keeping the officer corps free from the taint of politics."See Bacevich, "Endless war, a recipe for four-star arrogance," Washington Post, June 27, 2010, p.B01, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ article/2010/06/25/AR2010062502160_pf/ threat assessments, compartmentalized its issue areas as among economics, energy security, nuclear arms control and internal security, among others.The U.S. and Russia had overlapping and potentially favorable interests in pacifying Afghanistan and diminishing the significance of insurgency and terrorism in Central and South Asia and in the Caucasus.However, Russia has its own interest in Central Asia and its concerns about growing Chinese influence there, in addition to related "known unknowns" about China's Far Eastern objectives and military preparedness.Russia's policy-making process under Putin and Medvedev struggled to resolve upon a more rational geostrategic map underlying its threat assessments.Instead, in Russian policy statements and in official military doctrine, the U.S. and NATO have remained the principal threats of choice-although whether "threats" or "dangers" according to official rhetoric was an obviously debated point.As Stephen J. Blank has noted, with respect to Russia's civil-military relations and decision-making process with respect to national security policy and defense doctrine: Given the absence of the rule of law in the government and state, it is hardly surprising that policymaking remains personalized, haphazard, fragmented, and subject to endless and often inconclusive struggles.Neither should we be surprised that the Russian state is deficient in the means of conducting a true national strategy.6 If Russia's reaction to 9-11 was ambivalent in its embrace of the U.S. and NATO as security partners, one reason was the George W. Bush administration's assertion of U.S. options for preemptive attack against terrorists or states that sponsored terrorism and the related designation of Iraq, Iran and North Korea as an "axis of evil."After the U.S. and allied invasion of Iraq to depose the Saddam Hussein regime in 2003, over Russia's opposition and without the support of the UN Security Council, U.S.-Russian relations cooled considerably for the remainder of Putin and Bush's terms in office.The George W. Bush national security strategy not only vexed Russians, but it also created new issues for civil-military relations.Presidential candidate George W. Bush in 2000 declared an aversion to the use of U.S. armed forces in nation building, as in the 1990s.But Bush soon found himself required to sustain simultaneous post-conflict stability and reconstruction operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.Bush's ebullient Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld first denied the existence of an insurgency in Iraq, and things drifted from bad to worse until his replacement in the fall of 2006 and the arrival in January, 2007 of General David Petraeus in command of U.S. forces in Iraq.Prior to assuming command in Iraq, Petraeus had led army and inter-service reviews of U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine, and he applied the lessons learned from these studies in Iraq, apparently to considerable success in 2007-2008.However, the debate over U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine was not only a matter of military strategy but also one of high politics.When the Obama policy review of 2009 sought to define the administration's future posture on Afghanistan, it became clear that the U.S. military leadership was of more than one mind about the priority of counterinsurgency and other irregular wars in Pentagon threat assessments.7 Critics of counterinsurgency doctrine labeled the aficionados of counterinsurgency as "COINdinistas" and argued that they constituted a cult mentality that could lead astray force planning and doctrine.According to critics, U.S. armed forces trained and tasked primarily for COIN might lose their fighting edge and doctrinal clarity with respect to performing in more conventional conflicts.Critics of the COIN critics responded that it was not an either-or but a both-and: the U.S. must be prepared for conventional and unconventional conflicts.8 However, the prospect of additional Iraqs or Afghanistans did not enamor itself to the American public nor to the U.S. Congress as the mid-term elections of 2010 approached.In addition, the Pentagon projected post-2010 downsized budgets that might preclude "having it all" across the entire spectrum of military conflict.The implications for U.S. civil-military relations, with respect to preference for COIN-centric doctrine and training, as opposed to more conventional emphases, lay partly in the making of military careers and, especially, in the definition of unified or specified commands responsible for peacetime and wartime military performance.Even in fat budgetary years there are only so many billets for promotion to general officer or flag rank, and these promotions must be distributed across services and within competing service bureaucracies.As well, informal networks, among officers who have served together in key assignments or groomed one another's protégé's for eventual higher rank, exert considerable force within and outside the Pentagon.These professional and interpersonal networks are sometimes characterized by strongly felt and communally shared political views (the "fighter mafia" or the "bomber barons").In addition, these intra-service or multi-service professional networks have allies and supporters in the broader policy community, among members of Congress and elsewhere in the Executive branch, and not infrequently simpatico and support from influential think tanks and media.Examples in the case of the U.S. would be the highly influential partisans of "fourth generation warfare" and "network-centric warfare" respectively, with different Pentagon and exterior power bases.It would be remiss to give the impression that civil-military relations are a subject matter only of concern to policy-making elites or others with exceptional political influence.In democratic societies, public opinion on military and other matters provides a larger context within which elites must decide and act.In this regard, the U.S. military finds itself held in higher regard than almost any other American profession.On the other hand, the U.S. armed forces are based entirely on voluntary recruitment, obviously efficient in peacetime but controversial in time of war.In wartime the question of shared sacrifice is raised in the body politic and that issue becomes more salient as the war becomes more protracted and the casualties increase.The American public has shown little aversion to casualties in war provided the cause is just and popular and the administration has an apparent strategy for prevailing in good time.On the other hand, the U.S public turns quickly against policy makers who wander into quagmires or launch military operations for ambiguous causes.The immediately preceding discussion is a reminder that civil-military relations are an important aspect of strategy, that is, of strategy making.Colin Gray's theoretical model of strategy as a metaphorical "bridge" between the aims or ends of policy and the ways and means of military action invites civil-military relations into the discussion of strategy.Civil-military relations are important at each of the three crossroads of aims and arms: policy, strategy, and the threat or use of force in action.In the U.S., post-World War II studies of civil-military relations have included landmark contributions by Samuel Huntington, Morris Janowitz, Peter Feaver, Eliot Cohen, Sam Sarkesian, Mackubin Thomas Owens and others.Huntington's highly influential model of "subjective" versus "objective" civilian control over the armed forces has served as a focal point of departure, even for those in disagreement with his approach.9 Janowitz's "constabulary" concept, Feaver's analyses of the civil-military "problematique" and civilian control of nuclear weapons, Cohen's "unequal dialogue" between civil and military power, Sarkesian's "constructive military engagement" between politicians and soldiers, and Owens' perspective of "renegotiating the civil-military bargain" have all added important insights to Huntington's approach but not entirely superseded it.10 The study of strategy should help to educate policy makers about the uses and abuses of military art, but the practice of strategy to good effect cannot be guaranteed by improving the military education of politicians (or the political savvy of military officers).Doing strategy effectively requires a process that is both disciplined and flexible with respect to the interactions between warlord and politician.11 Examples of dysfunctional relationships fill the pages of military histories.In democratic societies, politicians from both executive and legislative branches necessarily have the last word over policy options and the resources to support them.Thus, in the United States, the armed forces answer to a civilian Secretary of Defense and President as Commander in Chief.In addition, the U.S. Congress holds the power of the purse over the military and other bureaucracies.Getting coherent strategy out of this and other democratic systems is not impossible, but the appearances cast by the work in progress are not for the squeamish.Democracies have a talent for ending up with the "right" decision in the "wrong" manner, at least from the standpoint of theory as opposed to practice.One reason that democracies appear to get better results in strategy and in civilmilitary relations than they deserve is that they are more explicitly self-correcting of recognized bad habits.The period since the end of the Cold War has been marked by increasing numbers of so-called irregular or unconventional conflicts.Many of these are based in failing or failed states and are the cross products of disintegrating political legitimacy combined with economic distress, ethno-nationalist and tribal strife, and ecological catastrophe.For outside powers attempting to mediate or otherwise conduct peacekeeping or post-conflict operations in these circumstances, civilmilitary relations take on new challenges.Armed forces must work with NGOs, local governments, tribes, militias and religious factions, among other players in the field of broken dreams.The reassembly of disaggregated states involves a patient reconstruction of their societies and a tamping down of the hostility between or among disparate cultures; that is, rethinking our approach to "war amongst the people" in Rupert Smith's characterization.More and more, we are learning that we cannot kill our way out of these complex contingency operations or amorphous wars.Civilian agencies are as important as military operations in these milieus for the effective application of strategy.But, at least in the American case, civil agencies have less of a deployable "field capability" than do military departments.Soldiers even in large number are inadequate substitutes for courts of law, entrepreneurs, engineers, local police, and "ground truth" intelligence that must come from locals.David Kilcullen's excellent book on counterinsurgency demonstrates that the U.S. and allied NATO countries are smarter about effective strategy making in complex 11 My discussion of the relationship between civil-military relations and strategy benefits considerably from Colin S. Gray, The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), especially pp. 149-57.Gray, however, is not responsible for arguments here.contingency operations than they used to be.12 The recognition that the "center of gravity" in counterinsurgency is the protection of the general population, together with the separation of noncombatant civilians from support for the insurgents, is now almost canonical in American and other military circles.Nevertheless, U.S. and allied involvement in these situations is apt to require protracted deployment and continuing frustration over the course of a decade or longer.Counterinsurgency is a competition in civil and military patience as much as anything else.Overresourcing the problem or turning up the rhetoric cannot compensate for lack of political perseverance or military steadfastness.It is all very well to observe that the U.S. might have done better in Iraq after "Mission Accomplished" had it deployed larger numbers of troops from the outset.And it may be equally valid to suggest that U.S. "influence operations" in Iraq improved gradually only after painful learning experience.Nevertheless, mass and Madison Avenue serve as icings on the proverbial cake of counterinsurgency strategy.Leaders and publics alike must be educated for the long war and the ways and means that follow from that recognition.Since all politics is about power and influence, variously defined, the study of civil-military relations partakes of politics in obvious and less apparent ways.Politics establishes the context within which geostrategic, including military, and foreign policy decisions can be made.A state can attain temporary success in the performance of operational art or tactics without having demonstrated competence in grand strategy and high policy.As examples, the Japanese empire and the Third Reich were able to run the table for a time against their World War II enemies, based on superior tactical performance and operational art.However, neither Japan nor Nazi Germany connected its early tactical success to a convincing theory of victory embodied in coherent policy and strategy for a protracted major coalition war.The lacunae in German and Japanese planning for and during World War II had something to do with their civil-military relations, contributing to a noticeable deficit in policy and strategy.In the case of Japan, Admiral Yamomoto Isoroku was virtually alone in warning against an extended war with America.In Germany, Hitler's answer to the unexpected resistance of Britain to defeat in a short war was to invade Russia (!)-double-crossing his former comrades in arms in Moscow, and ensuring that a winning coalition would be in place against Germany once the U.S. became a belligerent.An interesting question with respect to civil-military relations is whether modernizing autocracies with an Eastern or Middle Eastern way of war can benefit from the experience of Western militaries and civil-military relations.Can China's rising star be propelled by a civil-military relationship that avoids the worst of the Soviet system, enabling professional military competence within the larger communist party power structure and rule?Can India's emergence as a military great power, at least regionally, benefit from the study of past successes and failures by Western democracies in controlling their armed forces and in the formulation of policy and strategy?Will the regime in post-Soviet Russia work out a relationship with its reforming military that allows a transition to information age competence, or will Russia remain in retro with reliance on a deficient pool of conscripts, a Soviet-style view of military art, and a propensity for military threat assessments that remains mired in the Cold War (or earlier) past?And what futures portend for civil-military relations in Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and other influential regional actors in the Arab and Islamic worlds?Modern Western militaries had more or less resolved the relationship between church and state, between scepter and miter, before embarking on the industrial and later revolutions in military affairs.But some Middle Eastern and South Asian armed forces will be tasked to formulate military strategy and doctrine within a political context highly embedded in religious symbolism and, in some cases, involving the clergy in control of organs of state.A return of the Ottoman Empire is improbable, but an arc of uncertainty about civil-military relations extends across North Africa through the Eastern Mediterranean-Levant, Turkey, the Arabian Peninsula, Persia and Mesopotamia, former Soviet Central Asia, Afghanistan and Pakistan.Secular governments in some of these regions are under pressure for Islamicization of their politics, including the politicization of their security organs and militaries.Pakistan already finds itself a divided house marked by political conflict between secular pluralists and dissident Islamicists of various types, and these conflicting tendencies play out within that country's armed forces and intelligence bureaucracies.Pakistan also possesses nuclear weapons and, however ambivalent about the Taliban in Afghanistan from the U.S. and NATO perspective, cannot be avoided as the proving ground for success or failure in stabilizing a Karzai regime in Afghanistan.And speaking of nuclear weapons, the possible spread of nuclear weapons among more states in Asia and-or the Middle East raises a number of issues for civil-military relations.Space does not permit an extended discussion, but the short form of nuclear history is as follows.Through protracted trial and error, the U.S., Soviet and post-Soviet Russia, and other twentieth century nuclear powers learned important lessons about the operation, management and control of nuclear forces.Speaking broadly, nuclear weapons, launchers, and infrastructure required specialized chains of command and hierarchies of control, with "fail safe" protocols both technical and procedural to ensure against (1) the possibility of an accidental or mistaken launch of a nuclear first strike or first use; and (2) the failure of nuclear forces to carry out a successful retaliation against an enemy first strike, due to technical malfunction or flawed decision procedures.The ingredients of failure for possibility number (1), as above, included military usurpation of civilian command over the nuclear launch decision during a crisis or coup attempt.The constituent elements of failure for possibility number (2), as above, included decapitation of the political or military chains of command and disruption of procedures for delegation of authority to surviving commanders.Given the consequences of a U.S.-Soviet nuclear blowout on account of a failure of deterrence during the High Cold War, John Keegan is probably correct to refer to the tasks of nuclear-age heads of state and government and force commanders as "post-heroic" in their mission and professional orientation.They and their states are denied an honorable endgame of prevailing in battle at an acceptable cost, relative to the possible outcomes of conventional wars.The realization that nuclear strategy is therefore primarily or exclusively about the avoidance of war, instead of being about the combative use of nuclear weapons to strategic effect, may make for a controlled nuclear proliferation in which deterrence remains uncertain, but also untested in practice.However, given history's propensity for wars driven by "fear, honor and interest" as Thucydides noted, reliance on deterrence in the face of extensive nuclear weapons spread could be the equivalent of wishful thinking or gallows humor.Tutorials in civil-military relations for emerging nuclear weapons states, offered by those already members of the nuclear club, may be a "necessary evil" in order to avoid technical or political failure of nuclear command and control.Some evidence of success in this regard is apparent in Pakistan's recent reorganization of its nuclear security arrangements, doubtless with the blessing of U.S. political and military leaders and the backing of U.S. nuclear expertise.Improving civil-military relations within emerging or nascent nuclear powers implies greater clarity about "who" can enable a nuclear launch, under "what" circumstances and with "which" checks and balances, and "how" the various nuclear weapons and launchers are stored in peacetime and made ready during crises.Nuclear weapons are another reminder of the significance of the ethical dimension of civil-military relations.It is not accidental that the motto of West Point includes duty, honor and country.A sense of honor is more important to the military than it is to almost any other profession, save, perhaps, the clergy.The officer is charged with being a gentleman (or gentlewoman), but no longer on account of the correlation between military leadership and aristocracy.Instead, the officer-as-gentleman points to the nobility of purpose and the strength of character, including performance in combat, that separate the military professional from most of his or her civilian counterparts.Although, for example, academics have their honor codes of sorts (against plagiarism, for example), professors are infrequently required to be shot at as a condition for promotion and tenure.The Duke of Wellington captures this nobility of purpose and strength of character in his official Waterloo dispatch of June 19, 1815 in which he commends various officers (including wounded and killed in action) and notes: In addition to the atypical risks attendant to military leadership, there is also a lifestyle that privileges camaraderie and group cohesion-as well as a certain degree of separation from the civilian world-as opposed to individualism and competitive Darwinism on the job.But more than this, what applies to the armed forces in developed Western democracies, at least, also applies to other professions like police that are specially authorized to use force on behalf of policy.We want honorable persons to staff the empowered coercive organs of the state because, absent a certain amount of self-regulation and public oversight, armies and police forces can be debauched into oppressive instruments of authoritarian rule.Even when and where democratic control of the armed forces is established and secure, we want persons who have the physical power and legal authorization to kill to have consciences that will warn them off against murder, torture and other abuses of human rights.It is no coincidence that, during the George W. Bush administration, the persons who were most disturbed and vocal about allegations of torture and other indignities to prisoners in Iraq and other locations were American military lawyers.The dignity of humanity is an inseparable component of any military education.To see what happens when the preceding guidelines are violated, one need look no further than in those states where rising numbers of "child soldiers" are being recruited and trained to kill innocent civilians of another tribe or village.This is to sin twice: against humanity, and against humanity's most vulnerable members, whom armed forces should above all protect.When killing becomes wanton and random, armies have turned to mobs, and civilization into detritus.Distinctions between good and evil were as important to the ancient Greeks as they remain today, as Victor Davis Hanson reminds: While for the Greeks all wars presented only bad and worse choices, and were tragic in the sense of destroying the lives of young men who in peacetime had no intrinsic reason to murder one another, conflicts could still be judged as more or less good or evil depending on their causes, the nature of the fighting, and the ultimate costs and results.Some wars then were deemed better than others, and it was not all that difficult to make the necessary distinctions.14 Insights into civil-military relations also lead us into the recognition that, not only military or political leaders and their war aims, but also constitutions and polities, partake of moral excellence or failure.A highly-skilled and professional armed force, trapped within the framework of a nihilistic state and ideology, will march to ruin along with its suborned leadership.The German General Staff assumed that Hitler, once having been elected chancellor, could be domesticated by the prestige of the German Wehrmacht, the responsibilities of office, and the influence of centrist and pro-business politicians.This optimism was soon disappointed, in the fire of Hitler's demonically-inspired global ambitions and morally bankrupt definition of war aims.It is to their credit that a number of German officers chose to risk ignoring Hitler's orders for massacre or worse at the potential cost of their own lives.A smaller number resorted unsuccessfully to tyrannicide in their desperation to distinguish their professional ethos and personal moral compasses from those of the regime.Democracies offer no guaranty against abuses of civil-military relations by politicians or commanders.Checks and balances against military overthrow of constituted civilian authority have prevented coups in the U.S. and in many other developed democracies.The deficiencies of modern democracies with respect to civil-military relations are more subtle than the risk of attempted coup.The more complicated issue is whether the political class and the military leadership can be sufficiently accepting of one another's professional perspectives and collaborative in the pursuit of shared policy aims.Madeleine Albright, then U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations and later U.S. Secretary of State in the Clinton administration, once ruffled military feathers by posing the query during Cabinet discussions: what's the point of having U.S. armed forces of such outstanding competency if we are not going to use them (in controversial peacekeeping, peace operations and other unconventional conflicts)?General Colin Powell, then Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, reports that he almost had "an aneurysm" in response to this question.15 According to Peter D. Feaver and Christopher Gelpi, significant differences separate the opinions of American civilian from military elites, with respect to important questions of whether and how to use force and, in addition, with regard to the "casualty sensitivity" of the respondents.On the matter of whether and how to use force, elite military officers "are more inclined toward a realpolitik view of the use of force-willing to use force for traditional national security threats like defense of allies and of geostrategic access to vital markets but more hesitant about using force for humanitarian missions and the "less-than-vital-interest" scenarios of intervening in foreign civil wars that have dominated the global agenda in the past decade." 16 Compared to elite military officers, elite civilians who have never served in the armed forces "are somewhat more interventionist, embracing a wider range of missions for the military," and nonveteran civilian elites "are more willing to use force gradually or incrementally."Elite military officers, on the other hand, are more skeptical about gradual escalation and are more likely to prefer overwhelming or decisive force relative to the military objective.17 Feaver and Gelpi emphasize that these and other differences between civilian and military opinions are neither new nor surprising and influenced U.S. decisions on the uses of military force from early in the nineteenth century into the final decade of the twentieth century.In response to Dr. Albright, General Powell might have said: "U.S. armed forces exist for the use and threat of force on behalf of national policy. American troops are not a colonial constabulary for cabinet and expeditionary wars, but the sons and daughters of American taxpayers who prefer to see them used for just causes, supported by a clear strategy for prevailing at an acceptable cost, and with a reasonable expectation of popular and Congressional support."He might also have pointed to the "Weinberger doctrine" promulgated by President Ronald Reagan's Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger (with Powell's assistance) during the 1980s, with respect to the criteria for deciding upon and evaluating U.S. military interventions.To this, he might have added: "Although reasonable people can disagree about whether the Weinberger doctrine is too restrictive for some contingencies, the Weinberger guidelines are a necessary reminder that war is a uniquely dangerous and important decision, not only for those who risk their lives in battle, but also for states and leaders who engage in it."As Machiavelli warned, you can start wars as you prefer, but you may not be able to end them as you wish.Indeed, with respect to civil-military relations, and all else related to strategy and national security policy, U.S. and other major power militaries have in the past two decades found themselves in a vortex of responsibility for hybrid wars or complex contingencies that mix conventional and unconventional military operations with diplomacy, state and societal reconstruction, cultural adaptation, and interagency cooperation both public and private.18 As if this menu were not sufficiently complicated, the "war on terror" requires granular cooperation between civil and military intelligence providers and users, as well as across the compartments between "domestic" and "foreign" intelligence collection and estimation."Strategic intelligence" has reappeared in the U.S. lexicon, at least as a term of endearment, referring not to "strategy" as defined in prior discussion here but to topside appraisals and inter-agency coordination.19 The U.S. Department of Homeland Security alone provides challenges for the integration of in-house civil and military departments and agencies.As part of the more complicated inter-agency world after 9-11, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) supervenes over some 16 government agencies and departments, presumably sharing information and assessments in good time.Further on, the list of challenges for future U.S. and allied planners includes the disturbing recognition that "war," and strategy related to war, now occurs in at least five domains: land, sea, air, space and cyberspace.The most recent of these possible domains for warfare offers up an interesting challenge for students of civilmilitary relations and other close followers of national security policy.Is "cyberwar" really war, even if no kinetic weapons are employed?What is the chain of command for unleashing cyberwar, and against what targets is cyberwar appropriate?Does a unique cast of cyber-warriors have to be created by each arm of service, specially trained in service doctrine and traditions?What, exactly, constitutes deterrence with respect to cyber conflict, and how applicable is deterrence in this domain?20 Finally, and perhaps most meaningful for students of strategy, as related to civil-military relations: what are victory and defeat in cyberwar?Who certifies that cyber-surrender on the part of an enemy cyber attacker has taken place?Will war termination in cyberspace becoming an oxymoron, with 24/7 probing on the part of state and nonstate actors into the vitals of others' network security and information stability?The answers to the immediately preceding questions may provide fodder for numerous policy papers and dissertations.But in the actual world of policy making, they will necessitate the creation of matrix management, within and across departmental and agency lines.Geeks and gargoyles in the armed forces will need to coexist within a command climate that allows each to develop his or her professional skill set.The brute force and eternal climate of warfare (danger, exertion, uncertainty and chance, per Clausewitz) cannot be transcended, but only included in a broader appreciation of strategy and the art of war that will demand civil-military centurions of unprecedented vision and commitment.How many visionary commanders and policy makers can a country create?The answer is: as many as possible, and as soon as feasible.Otherwise, the cognitive complexity of future war, from botnets to bivouacs, will leave behind an industrial age civil-military relations in Washington and elsewhere.John Keegan may be incorrect in his assertion that battle may have abolished itself, but John Arquilla may be closer to the mark when he argues that the Pentagon is already past obsolescence.21 any given moment, bringing with them different formative experiences and views on professionalism.In this chapter, they explore how generational differences help and hamper the transmission and evolution of contemporary understandings of the military as a profession within the context of civil-military relations.They examine three interwar periods (post-World War I, post-Vietnam, and post-Gulf War) to understand the importance of teaching, learning, and mentorship in overcoming potential gaps developed due to each generation's unique socialization into the military and society.Wilson, Park, Cox and Sondheimer contend that fostering dialog concerning professionalism within the military is as important, if not more so, to civil-military relations as engaging in similar conversations with civilian counterparts.As Dale R. Herspring notes in Chapter 2, scholars working on civilmilitary relations focus excessively on the issue of control: to what degree do civil authorities control the activities of those in uniform?In fact, he argues, in established, stable political systems, the issue is not control: it is how to manage civil-military relations so that the relationship is one of "shared responsibility."Shared responsibility assumes the existence of conflict.Conflict is inevitable and good so long as it is controlled, and the military recognize the principle of civilian supremacy.According to Herspring, such a situation also assumes that civilian authorities respect the principles of military culture.In these circumstances the military feels free to express its opinion privately on issues related to national security.Conversely, if civilian authorities fail to respect military culture, conflict between military and civilian authorities will be exacerbated with a decrease in military willingness to provide and/or participate in national security decisionmaking.In this chapter, Herspring his comparative approach by focusing on civilmilitary relations in two countries: Canada and Germany.What happens to military professionalism and civil polity in cases where authoritarian or other undemocratic regimes rule?In Chapter 3, Stephen J. Blank considers the case of post-Soviet Russian civil-military relations.The contemporary situation in Russia, according to Blank, presents a unique model of undemocratic control that starkly illuminates the dangers inherent in that form of civil dominance over the armed forces.The widespread corruption of the military, the politicization of multiple military forces to check each other and to increase the means of repression at home, along with the inherent tendency towards military adventurism visible in Russian policy, suggest that this form of control presents a clear and present danger to both Russia and her interlocutors, not to mention her neighbors.Blank's findings in this chapter have sobering implications for the relationship between Russia and the United States as well as NATO, including efforts on the part of U.S. and NATO foreign offices to "reset" security relations in a more collaborative, as opposed to a more confrontational, direction.In Chapter 4, John Allen Williams argues that the international system is well into an era of conflict where the traditional notions of the "American Way of War"(clear enemy, moral clarity, conventional military focus)are decreasingly relevant.According to Williams, the United States military is especially aware of this, having sustained significant casualties in at least two wars still underway(including Iraq, where conflict will surely continue beyond the withdrawal of U.S. "combat" forces).From a civil-military relations perspective this period is notable by a partial yet massive mobilization that involves the active and reserve military components, but not the civilian society except insofar as reserve forces are now heavily involved.We have an "all recruited" military that does not reflect society in important ways, most notably the near-absence of societal elites in its ranks.Williams explores these phenomena and discuss their implications for the U.S. armed forces and for American civil-military relations in the future.In Chapter 5, Damon Coletta considers the relationship between preferred strategies for research on U.S. civil-military relations and their ability to explain future success or failure in military adaptation to new global challenges and missions.According to Coletta, civil-military relations and their effect on strategy and policy are usually investigated with an emphasis on interaction at the highest levels of decision-making.Sociologists tend to approach this problematique from the bottom up while political scientists come from the top down, devoting attention to institutional structures and leadership style rather than attitudinal gaps or political activity in the society at large.In either case, changes in the highlevel decision process are the mechanism by which civil-military relations affect strategy, policy, and eventually reform of institutional structures.Coletta notes that present military missions for the United States are undergoing profound change at low-intensity operations-counterinsurgency-and those potentially leading to the highest level of destruction-custody and maintenance of nuclear weapons.New operational tactics and coalitions plus new concerns from the national command authority are shifting the pressure points of civil-military relations as well as the kind of key cases emerging in the study of this crucial interaction.Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States government has made countering Islamic terror groups the central focus of its military and foreign policy efforts.Nevertheless, according to C. Dale Walton in Chapter 6, after nearly a decade-and despite the release of a great amount of written policy material, including several iterations of the National Security Strategy-Washington still does not have a coherent strategy that lays out a clear, realistic, and tangible longterm plan for countering terrorism and Islamist ideology more generally.In part, this fact simply reflects the difficulty of the challenges that Washington faces in countering Islamist terrorism.This also, however, is the result of a defective relationship between the civilian and uniformed components of the policymaking establishment.Walton argues that, in essence, the Executive Branch has failed, in both the Bush and Obama Administrations, to craft a "big picture" vision in which counterterrorism plays a role proportional to its importance in the overall grand strategy of the United States.The military, in turn, has remained focused on operational and tactical issues and has failed to press the Executive Branch for a clearer vision of the conflict formerly known as the Global War on Terrorism.The largely is a reflection of the U.S. military's traditional, and understandable, reluctance to involve itself in political controversies.The result, however, has been deeply unsatisfying from a strategic perspective: the vast expenditure of human and material resources has not necessarily resulted in greater security for the United States and "victory"-or even the criteria for defining victory in its unfocused counter-Islamist effort-remains elusive.In Chapter 7, expert civilian and military analysts focus on the character of the U.S. armed forces and their relationships to the larger political system, society and culture.Gary Schaub, Jr. and Faculty Researcher and Defense Analyst Adam Lowther examine the relationship between the current U.S. All-Volunteer Force(AVF)(2010)and society by posing and addressing a series of tough questions.Who serves in the military?When the United States ended conscription and began to acquire its personnel voluntarily, significant concerns were voiced.Would the military attract sufficient and appropriate personnel?Would the self-selected force reflect American society in terms of demographics, socio-economic origin, personality, and ideology?Or would the force become increasingly separate and alienated from American society, maneuver to become politically independent from civil authority, and perhaps endanger the polity?Schaub and Lowther address these issues by examining the demographic makeup of the current U.S. military, including indicators of ideology and personality.They find that, although the U.S. military is indeed a unique institution in American society, its differences have not indicated the separation and alienation feared by many.Armed forces require not only personnel and equipment of superior quality, but also a collective psyche of excellence manifest in their organizational DNA, including prevailing ideas about national security policy, grand and military strategy, and the conduct of military operations.According to expert analysts and scholars Jacob W. Kipp and Lester W. Grau in Chapter 8, the U.S. will be challenged in the present century to deal with security challenges for which no existing template suffices.The advent of network-centric warfare, and U.S. overall preeminence in information technologies, created the opportunity for rapid and decisive victory against regular armies such as those deployed by Iraq in 1991 and 2003.On the other hand, some of these same technologies, combined with unorthodox strategic thinking and operational-tactical practice, have enabled hybrid wars that blend conventional and unconventional motifs.Hezbollah's adaptive combination of regular and irregular warfare with social services and legitimate political activism offers an example of a highly capable fighting network.Therefore counterinsurgency theory and practice must contend with plural communities found within civilian populations that form the center of gravity for military strategy and operations.According to Kipp and Grau, for eight years the U.S. and its allies were committed to the conflict in Afghanistan without the benefit of a comprehensive strategy.Strategy is the responsibility of governments, not the military, but in too many instances the U.S. and other governments have abandoned their responsibility and left strategy to the generals, resulting in military-and geographic-specific strategies.One noteworthy current, and past, societal impact on the U.S. military has been the use of business management methods, not only for the improvement of administrative efficiency, but also as conceptual templates for the art of war.In Chapter 9, Milan Vego describes, analyzes and critiques the practice of adopting various business models for some important and emerging U.S. warfighting concepts.Specifically, Vego examines(1)the Wal-Mart network and network-centric warfare(NCW)/network-centric operations(NCO)and its offshoot effects-based approach to operations(EBAO),(2)"just in time" and "sense and respond" logistics-and how it was applied in Afghanistan and Iraq, (3) emphasis on efficiency vs. effectiveness in force planning (especially in the U.S. Navy), and (4) the use of various business metrics in evaluating the posthostilities/counterinsurgency phase of campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq.In so doing, the author highlights some of the more optimistic DOD expectations for the transferability of business management into force planning and execution, including the potential for disconnects among ends, ways and means.In Chapter 10, Stephen J. Cimbala examines the relationship between nuclear crisis management and information warfare or "cyberwar."Nuclear crisis management was a learned behavior for American and Soviet military and political leaders during the Cold War, with mixed results.There developed a shared recognition of the impossibility of prevailing in a nuclear war as between the two superpowers and their allies, and, therefore, in the priority of avoiding such a conflict.On the other hand, various studies of Cold War nuclear crisis management, especially those based on the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, revealed lapses in decision-making on both sides based on misperceptions, mistaken assumptions, uncertainty, "friction" à la Clausewitz, and other factors.The post-Internet world has enabled U.S. and other militaries with the capability for conducting extensive information operations, including cyberwar in support of conventional warfare or cyberdeterrence apart from war.However, the credible threat or actual carrying out of cyberwar during a nuclear crisis might exacerbate misperceptions and accelerate first-strike fears on the part of target states.Crisis managers and military operations fearful of information blackout could fell increased stress and uncertainty leading to a mistaken decision for nuclear preemption.The concluding chapter summarizes the findings of the contributors to this volume and offers additional perspective on civil-military relations in the U.S. and more broadly.The lingering dilemmas of civil-military relations post-9-11 and post-Obama's first term are in some ways new, but in other ways classic.Policy makers and warriors are, as the French say, "condemned to succeed" together, but under technological and political circumstances in the twenty-first century that will differ in detail, if not in essence, from the past.The essence of viable civil-military relations is the production of good strategic effect, within the constitutional framework of the political system for which politicians and soldiers are performing their respective arts.Strategic effect is an abstraction, crossing the boundaries between policy and military operations for the threat or use of force.For example, lost wars tend to have deleterious effects on civil-military relations, although not necessarily destructive ones.Strategic effect is concrete as well as abstract; particular, as well as general, in configuration.U.S. strategic effect in counterinsurgency, as an example, differs in its particulars from effects sought in major conventional conflicts or in nuclear deterrence.In addition, in each case of strategic failure or competent performance, the "on the ground" specificity matters: against whom, where, for what reason, and with what constraints is the United States going to war, or practicing deterrence?In this regard, U.S. deterrencedefense practices and geostrategic aims overlap with and help to determine the outcomes for civil-military relations.Richard H. Kohn, "Coming Soon: A Crisis in Civil-Military Relations," World Affairs, Winter 2008, http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/articles/2008-Winter/full-civilmilitary.html.Stephen J. Blank, "No Need to Threaten Us, We Are Frightened of Ourselves," Russia's Blueprint for a Police State, The New Security Strategy," ch.1 in The Russian Military Today and Tomorrow, edited by Blank and Weitz, pp. 19-149, citation pp. 23-4.David Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), especially chs 1-2 and 6.I propose to move, this morning, upon Nivelles and not to discontinue my operations.Your lordship will observe, that such a desperate action could not be fought, and such advantages could not be gained, without great loss; and I am sorry to add that ours have been immense.13 13The Duke of Wellington, Wellington's Official Despatch (Waterloo), in, The Book of War, edited by John Keegan (New York: Penguin Books, 2000), pp. 178-84, citation p. 182.Victor Davis Hanson, The Father of Us All: War and History, Ancient and Modern (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2010), p. 33.	Stephen J. Cimbala Civil-military relations in the United States and in other countries reflect the professional orientations and thinking of military officers, the decision-making process, as among defense bureaucracies and other institutional players in government, and the political outcomes that result from international relations and their feedback into foreign policy decisions.In short: civil-military relations constitute an expansive subject matter, with indistinct boundaries between it and national security studies, defense and foreign policy making, military history or other sub-disciplines of interest to persons in the armed forces, government and academia.In times past, civil-military relations were thought to have a center of gravity in the legal or institutional relations between the strictly "civilian" versus "military" spheres, but modern and postmodern studies have regarded this bimodal perspective as too simplistic.It is now the apparent consensus that civil and military responsibilities at least in developed countries have considerable overlap, and, therefore, shared responsibility for success or failure in war or peace.The study of civil-military relations co-evolves with developments in the art of war in addition to social and cultural changes.As Keith F. Otterbein has noted, war and military organizations "are as important as kinship and the family, religious practices and practitioners, and the economy and modes of exchange to understanding a particular society."1 Of the art of war, it may be said that the essential nature of war is unchanging, although the character of war changes with developments in economics, technology, culture, society, and especially, politics.2 It may also be said that since war is socially, culturally, economically, technologically and politically determined, so, too, are civil-military relations.With respect to their lasting impacts on civil-military relations, however, not all variables are equal.Defeat and victory in past wars hold "lessons learned" for the organization, training, and leadership of armed forces in future war-and for the political leadership of defeated or victorious states and non-state actors as well.If democracies are less warlike than autocratic states, as argued by some theorists, this may have to do with the greater willingness of the former to subject prior 1 Keith F. Otterbein, The Anthropology of War (Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, 2009) , p. 3.2 Relative to the study of civil-military relations, this point is emphasized in Mackubin Thomas Owens, U.S. Civil-Military Relations after 9/11: Renegotiating the Civil-Military Bargain (New York: Continuum Publishing Group, 2011), especially p. 140.wartime experiences to critical audit and examination and to hold public officials accountable to the electorate for apparent failure.The co-evolution of U.S. civil-military relations with the growing responsibilities assumed by American foreign policy since World War II has not been coincidental.The Cold War American Presidents were accorded unprecedented power in peacetime to manage the armed forces and, as well, a burgeoning national security establishment.President Eisenhower's farewell warning about the dangers of an emerging "military industrial complex" seems almost quaint by later Cold War and post-Cold War standards.With the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union, the United States found itself described in the 1990s and since as a singular military superpower.The United States accepted greater responsibility for world order and commitments to multinational peace and stability operations in Bosnia, Kosovo and elsewhere during the final decade of the twentieth century.In the first decade of the twenty-first century, the attacks of 9-11 drew American military forces into Afghanistan and, indirectly, into Iraq, whose democratization was described by the George W. Bush administration as a necessary step in the war on terror.According to one noted military historian, post-Cold War success in U.S. military operations may have unbalanced the relationship between civilian and military participants in the decision-making process: The end of the Cold War and an operational tour de force in the first Persian Gulf War cemented the military's position as the public's most trusted and esteemed institution.During the Clinton administration, the military leadership had a virtual veto over military policy, particularly the terms and conditions of interventions overseas.The power of the military has waxed and waned since the 1940s, but not a single secretary of defense has entered office trusting the armed forces to comply faithfully with his priorities rather than their own.3 The Persian Gulf War of 1991 (coalition operation Desert Storm) showed that the United States had established primacy in the conduct of information-based warfare, especially in the application of long-range precision strike, C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance), stealth, and other advanced technologies to conventional war fighting.Therefore it followed, according to the paradoxical logic of strategy, that future enemies of the United States would emphasize asymmetrical approaches, including unconventional or irregular warfare of various kinds.Insurgency and terrorism soon moved to the top of U.S. threat assessments, in addition to the various by-products of failed states that included sectarian violence, human and drug trafficking, and spreading social, economic and environmental chaos.As a result, the U.S. found itself for two decades using military force not only for the obvious purpose of battle, but also to support the reconstruction of societies and the reestablishment of governments.These post-conflict security and stability operations created challenges to sort out various aspects of U.S. and allied civilmilitary relations "on the ground": and, as well, among those security forces both military and civil that were being rebuilt in states with deposed regimes, as in Iraq and Afghanistan.4 In the post-Cold War world, U.S. and other civil-military relations would also involve issues of domestic as well as international security.Among these domestic security issues would be the balance of power among competing military and intelligence bureaucracies.Russia's security establishment in the 1990s was in a declared state of democratization and transparency, but in actual fact, the securitization of financial power and the commingling of private and public sector oligarchies led post-Soviet Russia into an unstable relationship between military and political power.Military reform was resisted by the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff throughout the years of Yeltsin's presidency and even during Putin's more defense-minded years in the same position.The Medvedev-Putin "tandem" committed itself to serious reform in the wake of military operational embarrassments during Russia's August, 2008 war against Georgia.Questions remained whether Russia could afford to replace as many conscripts with voluntary contract soldiers as planned, whether Russia could modernize both nuclear and conventional forces, and whether the Russian military would have first or later call upon scarce resources compared to internal security troops and intelligence organs.5 In turn, Russia's relations with the U.S. and NATO Europe would influence its threat perceptions and, derivatively, the balance of power among its military and other security bureaucracies.The Obama administration argued for a "reset" of relations with Russia, of which the centerpiece and starting point was the agreed New START treaty of 2010.New START was seen by its proponents as the beginning of a process of gradually improving U.S.-Russian political relations, but this favorable outcome was neither determined nor obvious.Russia, relative to its international 4 According to Andrew J. Bacevich, so-called long wars or protracted conflicts are antithetical to the values of democratic government, including "a code of military conduct that honors the principle of civilian control while keeping the officer corps free from the taint of politics."See Bacevich, "Endless war, a recipe for four-star arrogance," Washington Post, June 27, 2010, p. B01, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ article/2010/06/25/AR2010062502160_pf/ threat assessments, compartmentalized its issue areas as among economics, energy security, nuclear arms control and internal security, among others.The U.S. and Russia had overlapping and potentially favorable interests in pacifying Afghanistan and diminishing the significance of insurgency and terrorism in Central and South Asia and in the Caucasus.However, Russia has its own interest in Central Asia and its concerns about growing Chinese influence there, in addition to related "known unknowns" about China's Far Eastern objectives and military preparedness.Russia's policy-making process under Putin and Medvedev struggled to resolve upon a more rational geostrategic map underlying its threat assessments.Instead, in Russian policy statements and in official military doctrine, the U.S. and NATO have remained the principal threats of choice-although whether "threats" or "dangers" according to official rhetoric was an obviously debated point.As Stephen J. Blank has noted, with respect to Russia's civil-military relations and decision-making process with respect to national security policy and defense doctrine: Given the absence of the rule of law in the government and state, it is hardly surprising that policymaking remains personalized, haphazard, fragmented, and subject to endless and often inconclusive struggles.Neither should we be surprised that the Russian state is deficient in the means of conducting a true national strategy.6 If Russia's reaction to 9-11 was ambivalent in its embrace of the U.S. and NATO as security partners, one reason was the George W. Bush administration's assertion of U.S. options for preemptive attack against terrorists or states that sponsored terrorism and the related designation of Iraq, Iran and North Korea as an "axis of evil."After the U.S. and allied invasion of Iraq to depose the Saddam Hussein regime in 2003, over Russia's opposition and without the support of the UN Security Council, U.S.-Russian relations cooled considerably for the remainder of Putin and Bush's terms in office.The George W. Bush national security strategy not only vexed Russians, but it also created new issues for civil-military relations.Presidential candidate George W. Bush in 2000 declared an aversion to the use of U.S. armed forces in nation building, as in the 1990s.But Bush soon found himself required to sustain simultaneous post-conflict stability and reconstruction operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.Bush's ebullient Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld first denied the existence of an insurgency in Iraq, and things drifted from bad to worse until his replacement in the fall of 2006 and the arrival in January, 2007 of General David Petraeus in command of U.S. forces in Iraq.Prior to assuming command in Iraq, Petraeus had led army and inter-service reviews of U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine, and he applied the lessons learned from these studies in Iraq, apparently to considerable success in 2007-2008.However, the debate over U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine was not only a matter of military strategy but also one of high politics.When the Obama policy review of 2009 sought to define the administration's future posture on Afghanistan, it became clear that the U.S. military leadership was of more than one mind about the priority of counterinsurgency and other irregular wars in Pentagon threat assessments.7 Critics of counterinsurgency doctrine labeled the aficionados of counterinsurgency as "COINdinistas" and argued that they constituted a cult mentality that could lead astray force planning and doctrine.According to critics, U.S. armed forces trained and tasked primarily for COIN might lose their fighting edge and doctrinal clarity with respect to performing in more conventional conflicts.Critics of the COIN critics responded that it was not an either-or but a both-and: the U.S. must be prepared for conventional and unconventional conflicts.8 However, the prospect of additional Iraqs or Afghanistans did not enamor itself to the American public nor to the U.S. Congress as the mid-term elections of 2010 approached.In addition, the Pentagon projected post-2010 downsized budgets that might preclude "having it all" across the entire spectrum of military conflict.The implications for U.S. civil-military relations, with respect to preference for COIN-centric doctrine and training, as opposed to more conventional emphases, lay partly in the making of military careers and, especially, in the definition of unified or specified commands responsible for peacetime and wartime military performance.Even in fat budgetary years there are only so many billets for promotion to general officer or flag rank, and these promotions must be distributed across services and within competing service bureaucracies.As well, informal networks, among officers who have served together in key assignments or groomed one another's protégé's for eventual higher rank, exert considerable force within and outside the Pentagon.These professional and interpersonal networks are sometimes characterized by strongly felt and communally shared political views (the "fighter mafia" or the "bomber barons").In addition, these intra-service or multi-service professional networks have allies and supporters in the broader policy community, among members of Congress and elsewhere in the Executive branch, and not infrequently simpatico and support from influential think tanks and media.Examples in the case of the U.S. would be the highly influential partisans of "fourth generation warfare" and "network-centric warfare" respectively, with different Pentagon and exterior power bases.It would be remiss to give the impression that civil-military relations are a subject matter only of concern to policy-making elites or others with exceptional political influence.In democratic societies, public opinion on military and other matters provides a larger context within which elites must decide and act.In this regard, the U.S. military finds itself held in higher regard than almost any other American profession.On the other hand, the U.S. armed forces are based entirely on voluntary recruitment, obviously efficient in peacetime but controversial in time of war.In wartime the question of shared sacrifice is raised in the body politic and that issue becomes more salient as the war becomes more protracted and the casualties increase.The American public has shown little aversion to casualties in war provided the cause is just and popular and the administration has an apparent strategy for prevailing in good time.On the other hand, the U.S public turns quickly against policy makers who wander into quagmires or launch military operations for ambiguous causes.The immediately preceding discussion is a reminder that civil-military relations are an important aspect of strategy, that is, of strategy making.Colin Gray's theoretical model of strategy as a metaphorical "bridge" between the aims or ends of policy and the ways and means of military action invites civil-military relations into the discussion of strategy.Civil-military relations are important at each of the three crossroads of aims and arms: policy, strategy, and the threat or use of force in action.In the U.S., post-World War II studies of civil-military relations have included landmark contributions by Samuel Huntington, Morris Janowitz, Peter Feaver, Eliot Cohen, Sam Sarkesian, Mackubin Thomas Owens and others.Huntington's highly influential model of "subjective" versus "objective" civilian control over the armed forces has served as a focal point of departure, even for those in disagreement with his approach.9 Janowitz's "constabulary" concept, Feaver's analyses of the civil-military "problematique" and civilian control of nuclear weapons, Cohen's "unequal dialogue" between civil and military power, Sarkesian's "constructive military engagement" between politicians and soldiers, and Owens' perspective of "renegotiating the civil-military bargain" have all added important insights to Huntington's approach but not entirely superseded it.10 The study of strategy should help to educate policy makers about the uses and abuses of military art, but the practice of strategy to good effect cannot be guaranteed by improving the military education of politicians (or the political savvy of military officers).Doing strategy effectively requires a process that is both disciplined and flexible with respect to the interactions between warlord and politician.11 Examples of dysfunctional relationships fill the pages of military histories.In democratic societies, politicians from both executive and legislative branches necessarily have the last word over policy options and the resources to support them.Thus, in the United States, the armed forces answer to a civilian Secretary of Defense and President as Commander in Chief.In addition, the U.S. Congress holds the power of the purse over the military and other bureaucracies.Getting coherent strategy out of this and other democratic systems is not impossible, but the appearances cast by the work in progress are not for the squeamish.Democracies have a talent for ending up with the "right" decision in the "wrong" manner, at least from the standpoint of theory as opposed to practice.One reason that democracies appear to get better results in strategy and in civilmilitary relations than they deserve is that they are more explicitly self-correcting of recognized bad habits.The period since the end of the Cold War has been marked by increasing numbers of so-called irregular or unconventional conflicts.Many of these are based in failing or failed states and are the cross products of disintegrating political legitimacy combined with economic distress, ethno-nationalist and tribal strife, and ecological catastrophe.For outside powers attempting to mediate or otherwise conduct peacekeeping or post-conflict operations in these circumstances, civilmilitary relations take on new challenges.Armed forces must work with NGOs, local governments, tribes, militias and religious factions, among other players in the field of broken dreams.The reassembly of disaggregated states involves a patient reconstruction of their societies and a tamping down of the hostility between or among disparate cultures; that is, rethinking our approach to "war amongst the people" in Rupert Smith's characterization.More and more, we are learning that we cannot kill our way out of these complex contingency operations or amorphous wars.Civilian agencies are as important as military operations in these milieus for the effective application of strategy.But, at least in the American case, civil agencies have less of a deployable "field capability" than do military departments.Soldiers even in large number are inadequate substitutes for courts of law, entrepreneurs, engineers, local police, and "ground truth" intelligence that must come from locals.David Kilcullen's excellent book on counterinsurgency demonstrates that the U.S. and allied NATO countries are smarter about effective strategy making in complex 11 My discussion of the relationship between civil-military relations and strategy benefits considerably from Colin S. Gray, The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), especially pp.149-57.Gray, however, is not responsible for arguments here.contingency operations than they used to be.12 The recognition that the "center of gravity" in counterinsurgency is the protection of the general population, together with the separation of noncombatant civilians from support for the insurgents, is now almost canonical in American and other military circles.Nevertheless, U.S. and allied involvement in these situations is apt to require protracted deployment and continuing frustration over the course of a decade or longer.Counterinsurgency is a competition in civil and military patience as much as anything else.Overresourcing the problem or turning up the rhetoric cannot compensate for lack of political perseverance or military steadfastness.It is all very well to observe that the U.S. might have done better in Iraq after "Mission Accomplished" had it deployed larger numbers of troops from the outset.And it may be equally valid to suggest that U.S. "influence operations" in Iraq improved gradually only after painful learning experience.Nevertheless, mass and Madison Avenue serve as icings on the proverbial cake of counterinsurgency strategy.Leaders and publics alike must be educated for the long war and the ways and means that follow from that recognition.Since all politics is about power and influence, variously defined, the study of civil-military relations partakes of politics in obvious and less apparent ways.Politics establishes the context within which geostrategic, including military, and foreign policy decisions can be made.A state can attain temporary success in the performance of operational art or tactics without having demonstrated competence in grand strategy and high policy.As examples, the Japanese empire and the Third Reich were able to run the table for a time against their World War II enemies, based on superior tactical performance and operational art.However, neither Japan nor Nazi Germany connected its early tactical success to a convincing theory of victory embodied in coherent policy and strategy for a protracted major coalition war.The lacunae in German and Japanese planning for and during World War II had something to do with their civil-military relations, contributing to a noticeable deficit in policy and strategy.In the case of Japan, Admiral Yamomoto Isoroku was virtually alone in warning against an extended war with America.In Germany, Hitler's answer to the unexpected resistance of Britain to defeat in a short war was to invade Russia (!)-double-crossing his former comrades in arms in Moscow, and ensuring that a winning coalition would be in place against Germany once the U.S. became a belligerent.An interesting question with respect to civil-military relations is whether modernizing autocracies with an Eastern or Middle Eastern way of war can benefit from the experience of Western militaries and civil-military relations.Can China's rising star be propelled by a civil-military relationship that avoids the worst of the Soviet system, enabling professional military competence within the larger communist party power structure and rule?Can India's emergence as a military great power, at least regionally, benefit from the study of past successes and failures by Western democracies in controlling their armed forces and in the formulation of policy and strategy?Will the regime in post-Soviet Russia work out a relationship with its reforming military that allows a transition to information age competence, or will Russia remain in retro with reliance on a deficient pool of conscripts, a Soviet-style view of military art, and a propensity for military threat assessments that remains mired in the Cold War (or earlier) past?And what futures portend for civil-military relations in Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and other influential regional actors in the Arab and Islamic worlds?Modern Western militaries had more or less resolved the relationship between church and state, between scepter and miter, before embarking on the industrial and later revolutions in military affairs.But some Middle Eastern and South Asian armed forces will be tasked to formulate military strategy and doctrine within a political context highly embedded in religious symbolism and, in some cases, involving the clergy in control of organs of state.A return of the Ottoman Empire is improbable, but an arc of uncertainty about civil-military relations extends across North Africa through the Eastern Mediterranean-Levant, Turkey, the Arabian Peninsula, Persia and Mesopotamia, former Soviet Central Asia, Afghanistan and Pakistan.Secular governments in some of these regions are under pressure for Islamicization of their politics, including the politicization of their security organs and militaries.Pakistan already finds itself a divided house marked by political conflict between secular pluralists and dissident Islamicists of various types, and these conflicting tendencies play out within that country's armed forces and intelligence bureaucracies.Pakistan also possesses nuclear weapons and, however ambivalent about the Taliban in Afghanistan from the U.S. and NATO perspective, cannot be avoided as the proving ground for success or failure in stabilizing a Karzai regime in Afghanistan.And speaking of nuclear weapons, the possible spread of nuclear weapons among more states in Asia and-or the Middle East raises a number of issues for civil-military relations.Space does not permit an extended discussion, but the short form of nuclear history is as follows.Through protracted trial and error, the U.S., Soviet and post-Soviet Russia, and other twentieth century nuclear powers learned important lessons about the operation, management and control of nuclear forces.Speaking broadly, nuclear weapons, launchers, and infrastructure required specialized chains of command and hierarchies of control, with "fail safe" protocols both technical and procedural to ensure against (1) the possibility of an accidental or mistaken launch of a nuclear first strike or first use; and (2) the failure of nuclear forces to carry out a successful retaliation against an enemy first strike, due to technical malfunction or flawed decision procedures.The ingredients of failure for possibility number (1), as above, included military usurpation of civilian command over the nuclear launch decision during a crisis or coup attempt.The constituent elements of failure for possibility number (2), as above, included decapitation of the political or military chains of command and disruption of procedures for delegation of authority to surviving commanders.Given the consequences of a U.S.-Soviet nuclear blowout on account of a failure of deterrence during the High Cold War, John Keegan is probably correct to refer to the tasks of nuclear-age heads of state and government and force commanders as "post-heroic" in their mission and professional orientation.They and their states are denied an honorable endgame of prevailing in battle at an acceptable cost, relative to the possible outcomes of conventional wars.The realization that nuclear strategy is therefore primarily or exclusively about the avoidance of war, instead of being about the combative use of nuclear weapons to strategic effect, may make for a controlled nuclear proliferation in which deterrence remains uncertain, but also untested in practice.However, given history's propensity for wars driven by "fear, honor and interest" as Thucydides noted, reliance on deterrence in the face of extensive nuclear weapons spread could be the equivalent of wishful thinking or gallows humor.Tutorials in civil-military relations for emerging nuclear weapons states, offered by those already members of the nuclear club, may be a "necessary evil" in order to avoid technical or political failure of nuclear command and control.Some evidence of success in this regard is apparent in Pakistan's recent reorganization of its nuclear security arrangements, doubtless with the blessing of U.S. political and military leaders and the backing of U.S. nuclear expertise.Improving civil-military relations within emerging or nascent nuclear powers implies greater clarity about "who" can enable a nuclear launch, under "what" circumstances and with "which" checks and balances, and "how" the various nuclear weapons and launchers are stored in peacetime and made ready during crises.Nuclear weapons are another reminder of the significance of the ethical dimension of civil-military relations.It is not accidental that the motto of West Point includes duty, honor and country.A sense of honor is more important to the military than it is to almost any other profession, save, perhaps, the clergy.The officer is charged with being a gentleman (or gentlewoman), but no longer on account of the correlation between military leadership and aristocracy.Instead, the officer-as-gentleman points to the nobility of purpose and the strength of character, including performance in combat, that separate the military professional from most of his or her civilian counterparts.Although, for example, academics have their honor codes of sorts (against plagiarism, for example), professors are infrequently required to be shot at as a condition for promotion and tenure.The Duke of Wellington captures this nobility of purpose and strength of character in his official Waterloo dispatch of June 19, 1815 in which he commends various officers (including wounded and killed in action) and notes: In addition to the atypical risks attendant to military leadership, there is also a lifestyle that privileges camaraderie and group cohesion-as well as a certain degree of separation from the civilian world-as opposed to individualism and competitive Darwinism on the job.But more than this, what applies to the armed forces in developed Western democracies, at least, also applies to other professions like police that are specially authorized to use force on behalf of policy.We want honorable persons to staff the empowered coercive organs of the state because, absent a certain amount of self-regulation and public oversight, armies and police forces can be debauched into oppressive instruments of authoritarian rule.Even when and where democratic control of the armed forces is established and secure, we want persons who have the physical power and legal authorization to kill to have consciences that will warn them off against murder, torture and other abuses of human rights.It is no coincidence that, during the George W. Bush administration, the persons who were most disturbed and vocal about allegations of torture and other indignities to prisoners in Iraq and other locations were American military lawyers.The dignity of humanity is an inseparable component of any military education.To see what happens when the preceding guidelines are violated, one need look no further than in those states where rising numbers of "child soldiers" are being recruited and trained to kill innocent civilians of another tribe or village.This is to sin twice: against humanity, and against humanity's most vulnerable members, whom armed forces should above all protect.When killing becomes wanton and random, armies have turned to mobs, and civilization into detritus.Distinctions between good and evil were as important to the ancient Greeks as they remain today, as Victor Davis Hanson reminds: While for the Greeks all wars presented only bad and worse choices, and were tragic in the sense of destroying the lives of young men who in peacetime had no intrinsic reason to murder one another, conflicts could still be judged as more or less good or evil depending on their causes, the nature of the fighting, and the ultimate costs and results.Some wars then were deemed better than others, and it was not all that difficult to make the necessary distinctions.14 Insights into civil-military relations also lead us into the recognition that, not only military or political leaders and their war aims, but also constitutions and polities, partake of moral excellence or failure.A highly-skilled and professional armed force, trapped within the framework of a nihilistic state and ideology, will march to ruin along with its suborned leadership.The German General Staff assumed that Hitler, once having been elected chancellor, could be domesticated by the prestige of the German Wehrmacht, the responsibilities of office, and the influence of centrist and pro-business politicians.This optimism was soon disappointed, in the fire of Hitler's demonically-inspired global ambitions and morally bankrupt definition of war aims.It is to their credit that a number of German officers chose to risk ignoring Hitler's orders for massacre or worse at the potential cost of their own lives.A smaller number resorted unsuccessfully to tyrannicide in their desperation to distinguish their professional ethos and personal moral compasses from those of the regime.Democracies offer no guaranty against abuses of civil-military relations by politicians or commanders.Checks and balances against military overthrow of constituted civilian authority have prevented coups in the U.S. and in many other developed democracies.The deficiencies of modern democracies with respect to civil-military relations are more subtle than the risk of attempted coup.The more complicated issue is whether the political class and the military leadership can be sufficiently accepting of one another's professional perspectives and collaborative in the pursuit of shared policy aims.Madeleine Albright, then U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations and later U.S. Secretary of State in the Clinton administration, once ruffled military feathers by posing the query during Cabinet discussions: what's the point of having U.S. armed forces of such outstanding competency if we are not going to use them (in controversial peacekeeping, peace operations and other unconventional conflicts)?General Colin Powell, then Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, reports that he almost had "an aneurysm" in response to this question.15 According to Peter D. Feaver and Christopher Gelpi, significant differences separate the opinions of American civilian from military elites, with respect to important questions of whether and how to use force and, in addition, with regard to the "casualty sensitivity" of the respondents.On the matter of whether and how to use force, elite military officers "are more inclined toward a realpolitik view of the use of force-willing to use force for traditional national security threats like defense of allies and of geostrategic access to vital markets but more hesitant about using force for humanitarian missions and the "less-than-vital-interest" scenarios of intervening in foreign civil wars that have dominated the global agenda in the past decade."16 Compared to elite military officers, elite civilians who have never served in the armed forces "are somewhat more interventionist, embracing a wider range of missions for the military," and nonveteran civilian elites "are more willing to use force gradually or incrementally."Elite military officers, on the other hand, are more skeptical about gradual escalation and are more likely to prefer overwhelming or decisive force relative to the military objective.17 Feaver and Gelpi emphasize that these and other differences between civilian and military opinions are neither new nor surprising and influenced U.S. decisions on the uses of military force from early in the nineteenth century into the final decade of the twentieth century.In response to Dr. Albright, General Powell might have said: "U.S. armed forces exist for the use and threat of force on behalf of national policy.American troops are not a colonial constabulary for cabinet and expeditionary wars, but the sons and daughters of American taxpayers who prefer to see them used for just causes, supported by a clear strategy for prevailing at an acceptable cost, and with a reasonable expectation of popular and Congressional support."He might also have pointed to the "Weinberger doctrine" promulgated by President Ronald Reagan's Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger (with Powell's assistance) during the 1980s, with respect to the criteria for deciding upon and evaluating U.S. military interventions.To this, he might have added: "Although reasonable people can disagree about whether the Weinberger doctrine is too restrictive for some contingencies, the Weinberger guidelines are a necessary reminder that war is a uniquely dangerous and important decision, not only for those who risk their lives in battle, but also for states and leaders who engage in it."As Machiavelli warned, you can start wars as you prefer, but you may not be able to end them as you wish.Indeed, with respect to civil-military relations, and all else related to strategy and national security policy, U.S. and other major power militaries have in the past two decades found themselves in a vortex of responsibility for hybrid wars or complex contingencies that mix conventional and unconventional military operations with diplomacy, state and societal reconstruction, cultural adaptation, and interagency cooperation both public and private.18 As if this menu were not sufficiently complicated, the "war on terror" requires granular cooperation between civil and military intelligence providers and users, as well as across the compartments between "domestic" and "foreign" intelligence collection and estimation. "Strategic intelligence" has reappeared in the U.S. lexicon, at least as a term of endearment, referring not to "strategy" as defined in prior discussion here but to topside appraisals and inter-agency coordination.19 The U.S. Department of Homeland Security alone provides challenges for the integration of in-house civil and military departments and agencies.As part of the more complicated inter-agency world after 9-11, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) supervenes over some 16 government agencies and departments, presumably sharing information and assessments in good time.Further on, the list of challenges for future U.S. and allied planners includes the disturbing recognition that "war," and strategy related to war, now occurs in at least five domains: land, sea, air, space and cyberspace.The most recent of these possible domains for warfare offers up an interesting challenge for students of civilmilitary relations and other close followers of national security policy.Is "cyberwar" really war, even if no kinetic weapons are employed?What is the chain of command for unleashing cyberwar, and against what targets is cyberwar appropriate?Does a unique cast of cyber-warriors have to be created by each arm of service, specially trained in service doctrine and traditions?What, exactly, constitutes deterrence with respect to cyber conflict, and how applicable is deterrence in this domain?20 Finally, and perhaps most meaningful for students of strategy, as related to civil-military relations: what are victory and defeat in cyberwar?Who certifies that cyber-surrender on the part of an enemy cyber attacker has taken place?Will war termination in cyberspace becoming an oxymoron, with 24/7 probing on the part of state and nonstate actors into the vitals of others' network security and information stability?The answers to the immediately preceding questions may provide fodder for numerous policy papers and dissertations.But in the actual world of policy making, they will necessitate the creation of matrix management, within and across departmental and agency lines.Geeks and gargoyles in the armed forces will need to coexist within a command climate that allows each to develop his or her professional skill set.The brute force and eternal climate of warfare (danger, exertion, uncertainty and chance, per Clausewitz) cannot be transcended, but only included in a broader appreciation of strategy and the art of war that will demand civil-military centurions of unprecedented vision and commitment.How many visionary commanders and policy makers can a country create?The answer is: as many as possible, and as soon as feasible.Otherwise, the cognitive complexity of future war, from botnets to bivouacs, will leave behind an industrial age civil-military relations in Washington and elsewhere.John Keegan may be incorrect in his assertion that battle may have abolished itself, but John Arquilla may be closer to the mark when he argues that the Pentagon is already past obsolescence.21 any given moment, bringing with them different formative experiences and views on professionalism.In this chapter, they explore how generational differences help and hamper the transmission and evolution of contemporary understandings of the military as a profession within the context of civil-military relations.They examine three interwar periods (post-World War I, post-Vietnam, and post-Gulf War) to understand the importance of teaching, learning, and mentorship in overcoming potential gaps developed due to each generation's unique socialization into the military and society.Wilson, Park, Cox and Sondheimer contend that fostering dialog concerning professionalism within the military is as important, if not more so, to civil-military relations as engaging in similar conversations with civilian counterparts.As Dale R. Herspring notes in Chapter 2, scholars working on civilmilitary relations focus excessively on the issue of control: to what degree do civil authorities control the activities of those in uniform?In fact, he argues, in established, stable political systems, the issue is not control: it is how to manage civil-military relations so that the relationship is one of "shared responsibility."Shared responsibility assumes the existence of conflict.Conflict is inevitable and good so long as it is controlled, and the military recognize the principle of civilian supremacy.According to Herspring, such a situation also assumes that civilian authorities respect the principles of military culture.In these circumstances the military feels free to express its opinion privately on issues related to national security.Conversely, if civilian authorities fail to respect military culture, conflict between military and civilian authorities will be exacerbated with a decrease in military willingness to provide and/or participate in national security decisionmaking.In this chapter, Herspring his comparative approach by focusing on civilmilitary relations in two countries: Canada and Germany.What happens to military professionalism and civil polity in cases where authoritarian or other undemocratic regimes rule?In Chapter 3, Stephen J. Blank considers the case of post-Soviet Russian civil-military relations.The contemporary situation in Russia, according to Blank, presents a unique model of undemocratic control that starkly illuminates the dangers inherent in that form of civil dominance over the armed forces.The widespread corruption of the military, the politicization of multiple military forces to check each other and to increase the means of repression at home, along with the inherent tendency towards military adventurism visible in Russian policy, suggest that this form of control presents a clear and present danger to both Russia and her interlocutors, not to mention her neighbors.Blank's findings in this chapter have sobering implications for the relationship between Russia and the United States as well as NATO, including efforts on the part of U.S. and NATO foreign offices to "reset" security relations in a more collaborative, as opposed to a more confrontational, direction.In Chapter 4, John Allen Williams argues that the international system is well into an era of conflict where the traditional notions of the "American Way of War" (clear enemy, moral clarity, conventional military focus) are decreasingly relevant.According to Williams, the United States military is especially aware of this, having sustained significant casualties in at least two wars still underway (including Iraq, where conflict will surely continue beyond the withdrawal of U.S. "combat" forces).From a civil-military relations perspective this period is notable by a partial yet massive mobilization that involves the active and reserve military components, but not the civilian society except insofar as reserve forces are now heavily involved.We have an "all recruited" military that does not reflect society in important ways, most notably the near-absence of societal elites in its ranks.Williams explores these phenomena and discuss their implications for the U.S. armed forces and for American civil-military relations in the future.In Chapter 5, Damon Coletta considers the relationship between preferred strategies for research on U.S. civil-military relations and their ability to explain future success or failure in military adaptation to new global challenges and missions.According to Coletta, civil-military relations and their effect on strategy and policy are usually investigated with an emphasis on interaction at the highest levels of decision-making.Sociologists tend to approach this problematique from the bottom up while political scientists come from the top down, devoting attention to institutional structures and leadership style rather than attitudinal gaps or political activity in the society at large.In either case, changes in the highlevel decision process are the mechanism by which civil-military relations affect strategy, policy, and eventually reform of institutional structures.Coletta notes that present military missions for the United States are undergoing profound change at low-intensity operations-counterinsurgency-and those potentially leading to the highest level of destruction-custody and maintenance of nuclear weapons.New operational tactics and coalitions plus new concerns from the national command authority are shifting the pressure points of civil-military relations as well as the kind of key cases emerging in the study of this crucial interaction.Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States government has made countering Islamic terror groups the central focus of its military and foreign policy efforts.Nevertheless, according to C. Dale Walton in Chapter 6, after nearly a decade-and despite the release of a great amount of written policy material, including several iterations of the National Security Strategy-Washington still does not have a coherent strategy that lays out a clear, realistic, and tangible longterm plan for countering terrorism and Islamist ideology more generally.In part, this fact simply reflects the difficulty of the challenges that Washington faces in countering Islamist terrorism.This also, however, is the result of a defective relationship between the civilian and uniformed components of the policymaking establishment.Walton argues that, in essence, the Executive Branch has failed, in both the Bush and Obama Administrations, to craft a "big picture" vision in which counterterrorism plays a role proportional to its importance in the overall grand strategy of the United States.The military, in turn, has remained focused on operational and tactical issues and has failed to press the Executive Branch for a clearer vision of the conflict formerly known as the Global War on Terrorism.The largely is a reflection of the U.S. military's traditional, and understandable, reluctance to involve itself in political controversies.The result, however, has been deeply unsatisfying from a strategic perspective: the vast expenditure of human and material resources has not necessarily resulted in greater security for the United States and "victory"-or even the criteria for defining victory in its unfocused counter-Islamist effort-remains elusive.In Chapter 7, expert civilian and military analysts focus on the character of the U.S. armed forces and their relationships to the larger political system, society and culture.Gary Schaub, Jr. and Faculty Researcher and Defense Analyst Adam Lowther examine the relationship between the current U.S. All-Volunteer Force (AVF) (2010) and society by posing and addressing a series of tough questions.Who serves in the military?When the United States ended conscription and began to acquire its personnel voluntarily, significant concerns were voiced.Would the military attract sufficient and appropriate personnel?Would the self-selected force reflect American society in terms of demographics, socio-economic origin, personality, and ideology?Or would the force become increasingly separate and alienated from American society, maneuver to become politically independent from civil authority, and perhaps endanger the polity?Schaub and Lowther address these issues by examining the demographic makeup of the current U.S. military, including indicators of ideology and personality.They find that, although the U.S. military is indeed a unique institution in American society, its differences have not indicated the separation and alienation feared by many.Armed forces require not only personnel and equipment of superior quality, but also a collective psyche of excellence manifest in their organizational DNA, including prevailing ideas about national security policy, grand and military strategy, and the conduct of military operations.According to expert analysts and scholars Jacob W. Kipp and Lester W. Grau in Chapter 8, the U.S. will be challenged in the present century to deal with security challenges for which no existing template suffices.The advent of network-centric warfare, and U.S. overall preeminence in information technologies, created the opportunity for rapid and decisive victory against regular armies such as those deployed by Iraq in 1991 and 2003.On the other hand, some of these same technologies, combined with unorthodox strategic thinking and operational-tactical practice, have enabled hybrid wars that blend conventional and unconventional motifs.Hezbollah's adaptive combination of regular and irregular warfare with social services and legitimate political activism offers an example of a highly capable fighting network.Therefore counterinsurgency theory and practice must contend with plural communities found within civilian populations that form the center of gravity for military strategy and operations.According to Kipp and Grau, for eight years the U.S. and its allies were committed to the conflict in Afghanistan without the benefit of a comprehensive strategy.Strategy is the responsibility of governments, not the military, but in too many instances the U.S. and other governments have abandoned their responsibility and left strategy to the generals, resulting in military-and geographic-specific strategies.One noteworthy current, and past, societal impact on the U.S. military has been the use of business management methods, not only for the improvement of administrative efficiency, but also as conceptual templates for the art of war.In Chapter 9, Milan Vego describes, analyzes and critiques the practice of adopting various business models for some important and emerging U.S. warfighting concepts.Specifically, Vego examines (1) the Wal-Mart network and network-centric warfare (NCW)/network-centric operations (NCO) and its offshoot effects-based approach to operations (EBAO), (2) "just in time" and "sense and respond" logistics-and how it was applied in Afghanistan and Iraq, (3) emphasis on efficiency vs. effectiveness in force planning (especially in the U.S. Navy), and (4) the use of various business metrics in evaluating the posthostilities/counterinsurgency phase of campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq.In so doing, the author highlights some of the more optimistic DOD expectations for the transferability of business management into force planning and execution, including the potential for disconnects among ends, ways and means.In Chapter 10, Stephen J. Cimbala examines the relationship between nuclear crisis management and information warfare or "cyberwar."Nuclear crisis management was a learned behavior for American and Soviet military and political leaders during the Cold War, with mixed results.There developed a shared recognition of the impossibility of prevailing in a nuclear war as between the two superpowers and their allies, and, therefore, in the priority of avoiding such a conflict.On the other hand, various studies of Cold War nuclear crisis management, especially those based on the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, revealed lapses in decision-making on both sides based on misperceptions, mistaken assumptions, uncertainty, "friction" à la Clausewitz, and other factors.The post-Internet world has enabled U.S. and other militaries with the capability for conducting extensive information operations, including cyberwar in support of conventional warfare or cyberdeterrence apart from war.However, the credible threat or actual carrying out of cyberwar during a nuclear crisis might exacerbate misperceptions and accelerate first-strike fears on the part of target states.Crisis managers and military operations fearful of information blackout could fell increased stress and uncertainty leading to a mistaken decision for nuclear preemption.The concluding chapter summarizes the findings of the contributors to this volume and offers additional perspective on civil-military relations in the U.S. and more broadly.The lingering dilemmas of civil-military relations post-9-11 and post-Obama's first term are in some ways new, but in other ways classic.Policy makers and warriors are, as the French say, "condemned to succeed" together, but under technological and political circumstances in the twenty-first century that will differ in detail, if not in essence, from the past.The essence of viable civil-military relations is the production of good strategic effect, within the constitutional framework of the political system for which politicians and soldiers are performing their respective arts.Strategic effect is an abstraction, crossing the boundaries between policy and military operations for the threat or use of force.For example, lost wars tend to have deleterious effects on civil-military relations, although not necessarily destructive ones.Strategic effect is concrete as well as abstract; particular, as well as general, in configuration.U.S. strategic effect in counterinsurgency, as an example, differs in its particulars from effects sought in major conventional conflicts or in nuclear deterrence.In addition, in each case of strategic failure or competent performance, the "on the ground" specificity matters: against whom, where, for what reason, and with what constraints is the United States going to war, or practicing deterrence?In this regard, U.S. deterrencedefense practices and geostrategic aims overlap with and help to determine the outcomes for civil-military relations.Richard H. Kohn, "Coming Soon: A Crisis in Civil-Military Relations," World Affairs, Winter 2008, http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/articles/2008-Winter/full-civilmilitary.html.Stephen J. Blank, "No Need to Threaten Us, We Are Frightened of Ourselves," Russia's Blueprint for a Police State, The New Security Strategy," ch.1 in The Russian Military Today and Tomorrow, edited by Blank and Weitz, pp.19-149, citation pp.23-4.David Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), especially chs 1-2 and 6.I propose to move, this morning, upon Nivelles and not to discontinue my operations.Your lordship will observe, that such a desperate action could not be fought, and such advantages could not be gained, without great loss; and I am sorry to add that ours have been immense.13 13 The Duke of Wellington, Wellington's Official Despatch (Waterloo), in, The Book of War, edited by John Keegan (New York: Penguin Books, 2000), pp.178-84, citation p. 182.Victor Davis Hanson, The Father of Us All: War and History, Ancient and Modern (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2010), p. 33.
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After a hiatus of several years, the Study Group Regional Stability in the South Caucasus was re-launched by the PfP Consortium and the Austrian Ministry of Defence and Sports in June 2011.Building on previous iterations of the RSSC Study Group, it held its 6th workshop at Reichenau, Austria, on November 8-11 2012.The format of the workshop was based on the successful Study Group Regional Stability in South East Europe (RSSEE), and its thematic concept aims at gradually bringing parties from the region to discuss and form policy recommendations on security issues and conflict resolution ideas starting from a high-level strategic outlook towards resolving particular issues of tension.To this end, the Study Groups in the PfP Consortium provide an apolitical forum in which to discuss the most sensitive matters in a free and informed manner.The objective is to build mutual trust in small groups of people of different backgrounds.The objective of the RSSC Study Group is to help the academic and policy-making elite of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia to build mutual trust among themselves and with other regional stakeholders, such as with participants from Russia and Turkey.The task of the Study Group is to have its members, led by the co-chairman, to identify areas of common interest pertaining to the security of the whole region and lead the workshop participants to develop pertinent and actionable security policy recommendations.One of the medium-term objectives is to lead academics and policy makers to treat the region as a single strategic entity.Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia each have their integration agendas, but the RSSC Study Group seeks to promote the value of regional integration as well.This process helps to achieve the critical long-term goal of altering conflict narratives in the region towards more constructive exchanges.In the workshop, panellists from all three South Caucasus countries were invited to present their thoughts on five key questions: 1) How can the EU (and/or NATO) engage the region without triggering a pushback from Russia?What are the possible consequences if the EU and NATO decrease their engagement in the South Caucasus?3) What are the objective factors impeding social, political and economic development in the South Caucasus?What are the consequences for stability and security in the region?4) Based on 3) above, is there a need for an "energy security convention" or a renewed commitment to regional disarmament along the lines of the CFE Treaty, or in a more general way: should there be more room for regional cooperation?What conditions of external pressures (push) and internal lure (pull) can incentivize or deter constructive change in the South Caucasus?These five questions were examined through a three-panel structure which allowed for greater precision when developing policy recommendations.Breaking a cycle of conflict and mistrust two decades in the making will not be easy, but we have been fortunate to receive expression of interest from all three South Caucasus countries, along with Russia and Turkey.This settles a key quantitative measure of success.What follows are the speaking notes of the panellists who were invited to present in Reichenau, followed by Policy Recommendations.They represent the qualitative measure of success of our 6 th RSSC SG workshop.The Policy Recommendations that follow have been taken on to conceive future workshops.This was made possible as much by the participants themselves as the organizers, sponsors and co-chair, and we are grateful for their contribution, and our gratefulness is expressed through this Study Group Information.Some of the preceding texts argue that nothing much can be done about the conflicts in the region.This opinion is mostly directed at the seemingly intractable conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno Karabakh.There two things to be said about the status quo in that conflict, in relation to the EU and NATO, and, in general, to the international community.First, the status quo should be seen as intolerable to both organizations and more should be done to develop incentives to resolve tensions there.These incentives should motivate belligerents by proposing material rewards for cooperation.At present, such rewards cannot be obtained from within the region.The status quo is intolerable because as long as the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan endures and remains frozen, the more the "idea" of a de facto independent Nagorno Karabakh becomes attractive in law.To the EU and NATO, which do not cease to repeat that territorial integrity should be respected in the spirit and letter of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, this cancels the premise that the case of the independence of Kosovo should be seen sui generis, not to be applied to other contexts.Suzanne Lalonde shows that the principle buttressing post-Cold War independence claims has been found in the principle of uti possidetis, a principle with a life of its own.Although it is legally inapplicable to the South Caucasus conflicts, international law breeds by precedent, and no matter what the international community says, the tendency is for Karabakh Armenians (and why not Abkhaz and Ossetians in the case of Georgia) to say "why not us?"And so the international community has an interest in preventing further fragmentation internationally and regionally.The reason is simple, and has been provided by Pierre Jolicoeur; if secession is to be defined as successful because it brings post-separation stability, then it is a solution which has a very poor track record, unless both parties agree mutually to a separation.So far, this has taken place in a very few cases, and the most celebrated has been that of Czechoslovakia in 1992.At the very least, the objective of the EU and NATO should be to promote the conditions for this mutuality.So far, however, the actions of the international community have only achieved such a result as to promote the status quo in the region.Armenia has an interest in keeping the conflict frozen because it increases the chances of an independent Karabakh.At the same time, a frozen conflict gives time to Azerbaijan to generate the armed forces that can buttress its negotiating position visà-vis Armenia.Having sensed this, Armenia tries to keep up with Azerbaijani defence spending at great cost to the ordinary Armenian's welfare and social development.The asymmetry between the two contenders is balanced by Russia's presence on Armenia's side, and this represents an additional burden for her.The second thing that can be said about the status quo is that it is in fact an expression of the Armenian and Azerbaijani public's fatigue with the conflict.In other words, neither the governments of Armenia or Azerbaijan are willing to visit additional hardships on their population by unthawing the conflict and resort to a shooting war.Lately, the skirmishing that has taken place along the Nagorno Karabakh trench lines has increased, but has not negatively un frozen the conflict.That is the good news.This means that the efforts at confidence-building could be more propitious if applied at the grass-roots level as opposed to official levels, even if the existing channels through the Minsk Group should remain open, despite their lack of results.Indeed, participants were keen to promote Armenian-Azerbaijani contacts at the level of constituents and civil society, but also within each society (Armenian-to-Armenian and Azerbaijani-to-Azerbaijani).The objective would be to bring greater awareness and understanding of the other's conditions, and the real causes of conflict.If one were to promote Boris Kuznetsov's idea of a "Commission on Difficult Issues" towards Armenia and Azerbaijan, improving the mutual perception of each belligerent would have to be a key objective.In this last sense, the preservation of the status quo provides room for dialogue.But dialogue can only take place if there is a perception of equality which is not merely military in nature.There needs to be the assurance that on the other side of the table, there is an individual of equal rights and who has legitimate interests, feelings and hope for a better tomorrow.For the whole region, conflicts seem to be driven by two key intangibles; an idea of sovereignty made antiquated by new conditions of integration, and leaders' personalities.First, the idea of sovereignty, which has been too long associated with control over territory, finds little meaning if the political ambitions of countries is to access the EU or NATO, or any other multilateral body where legal norms define state behaviour.This "modernist" notion of sovereignty (to take Robert Cooper's definition in his Breaking of Nations book) continues to inform policy and to guide action in the South Caucasus.The attachment to sovereignty should be less strong if a country is to submit to the legal constraints of a multilateral regime.One of the solutions should be to bring greater emphasis to the fact that obtaining membership to multilateral institutions brings less national freedom, and therefore, it matters little whether a particular piece of territory is effectively controlled or not, since it will end up in a wider geo-and economic-political framework eventually.Second, the endurance of this antiquated vision of sovereignty is also driven by the egos of the political elite.This socio-psychological complex must be surpassed, and the only way to surpass it is to help each leader develop greater returns from resolving the conflict than for continuing it.Furthermore, the leaders must be seen to be the owners of the solution.However, international life is not lived in isolation, and because ego trumps material gains, the idea of a "win-win" result, where zero-sum outcomes are substituted by solutions that improve the greater regional good, is premature.This observation may be less true in the case of Georgia vis-à-vis Russia, where the new government has recently greater openness than that of Mr. Saakashvili.However, we do not know yet whether this openness will be replicated in the case of the two break-away regions of Georgia, and will be answered positively by the authorities in Sukhumi and Tskhinvali.Indeed, leaders will need to show that they will have prevailed over the "adversary."This factor is so evident as to make any attempt at resolution apparently fruitless.The international community must therefore provide the material incentives to resolve the conflict, and help the sides articulate the outcome in positive sum gains towards their respective constituents (and diasporas).Breaking out of two decades of bitter conflict will depend on the leaders' ability to demonstrate tangible improvements in the public good, and initially, at least, this improvement can only be provided by the international community, and more specifically by the EU.The case of Georgia vis-à-vis Russia, as we have seen, seems more promising.We must lament the occurrence of the a 20 th century conflict in the 21 st century, but we must realise that it has been decisive in bringing the two sides at the negotiating table, under the auspices of a process led by major "Western" powers.As Boris Kuznetsov has said, both Russia and Georgia are to blame for the eruption of the first conventional war in the 21 st century.But other participants were adamant that other actors also had a share of (indirect) blame, namely NATO and the EU, by sending conflicting messages.International diplomacy must only promise what it can deliver if it is to remain credible.The current malaise affecting the UN and the OSCE, for example, can be traced back to their inability to make effective commitments.On the other hand, the perception of their good intention borne by the erstwhile recipients of the international organizations' favours can also be blamed.It is Georgia that has convinced itself that it would become a NATO member in short order.Alliance members have made no concrete promise of the sort.The assurance that Georgia would "one day be a member" was tempered by the fact that there was no definition of the quality of that membership, and by the statement that only NATO members will decide who gets to join.A realistic outlook would have helped Georgian decision makers that this last statement was directed at Georgia as much as at Russia.Such are the hazards of Alliance politics.In a sense, the 2008 August War serves as a stark reminder to NATO that clarity of expression brings greater credibility, and that ambiguity brings distrust, and, ultimately, fragmentation of effort, if not of commitment.The same critique can be applied to the EU, whose Eastern Partnership Initiative has been seen as lacklustre in the region.The process of conflict resolution in the South Caucasus cannot avoid identifying Russia and Turkey as critical partners of the EU and NATO.The South Caucasus countries would rather not have to deal with such great powers in their regional disputes, but the wider framework of regional security actually demands their inclusion.Russia is a prime mover of energy resources towards the EU, and a country with which NATO is actively seeking better relations.Its interests must be factored in.Turkey, for its part, has been NATO's most important ally and an important EU partner -despite its EU membership snub -because of its geostrategic location.Turkey has front row seats to all the major conflicts of the last decade; whether it be the war on terror, the 2003 Iraq war, the Syrian civil war, and Iran, not to mention its own troubles with separatist Kurds.As we have seen lately, Turkey will remain an essential interlocutor with regards to the Arab Spring developments, now in their second successive summers, falls, and now winters, as well as with the looming confrontation with Iran over her nuclear ambitions and intractable leadership.NATO and EU members will only show resolve in these crises with the benefit of international consensus, which will not obtain without Turkish and Russian assent.Without suggesting that a "deal" might be struck between these two countries and the international community at the detriment of the South Caucasus countries, it bears reminding that realism, as an operating disposition of international affairs, is a matter of great powers, not medium or soft powers.This adds greater credence to the need for Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia to find the common ground to pool their political resources and impose themselves collectively as an international actor to be reckoned with.Although we have seen that energy extraction and transport was not a driver of instability, it remains nonetheless a source of interest for the region.The same can be said for the region's position relative to the conflict with Iran, and perhaps Syria, especially now that Russia has acknowledged the moral and political bankruptcy of the latter's regime, and is now siding with major Western actors on the issue of intervention.We conclude that the South Caucasus must harmonize its relations with the international community if it is to break out of the cycle of conflict, but it must before normalize relations within the region.The solutions proposed in this workshop have focused on soft-security measures; on building better relations from the ground up (as opposed from the top down, i.e. relying on political elites), by putting emphasis on cultural, educational and commercial exchanges.It will be the task of future workshops to explore this avenue further.For now, the RSSC SG has been blessed by the profound thought from participants representing every South Caucasus country, plus a generous participation from Russian and Turkish panellists.Reconnecting with the South Caucasus You have been convened here because of your expertise on the South Caucasus, and on the themes related to the grave challenges that this region faces.I rejoice at seeing that all the countries of the region are represented here today, and I thank every one of you for taking the time off your busy schedule to come here.The objective of the Regional Stability in the South Caucasus Study Group is to develop and establish a critical mass of experts and policy-makers, as well as future policymakers, whose deep knowledge of the region's challenges will help the Austrian Ministry of European and International Affairs, as well as the Ministry of Defence and Sports formulate policy towards the region.Thanks to Austria's extensive political networks and membership in the EU and PfP, the conclusions of this workshop have a strong likelihood of finding resonance in higher spheres of international relations.By definition, the process whereby we reach our conclusions this weekend is iterative and inclusive.It is iterative because we come here with no pre-conceived ideas, no ready-made solutions to impose.It is inclusive because to reach balanced solutions, we need balanced representation, and discussions that take place in a spirit of constructive creativity and openness.I know that two decades of conflict have created tensions, and that in some cases, tensions are being keenly felt.To rise above these tensions requires courage, of which we are all endowed here.So let me say that the fortitude that is demonstrated by your presence is a step in the right direction, and I am thankful for it.To continue on this path, I believe that it is vital that we consider the value of each other's positions based on its own merits.No one person here is responsible in whole or in part to the problems of the South Caucasus, but all of us here are responsible in providing at least part of the solution.Our deliberations must be aimed at discovering the solutions when possible, or creating them anew when necessary.Let me refer to the main questions that should frame our panels: What are the incentives and deterrents to regional stability?• We will be looking for your input and feedback whether it comes from within the region, or from without.The ultimate goal is building stability through a common understanding of the challenges of the South Caucasus, and ideas on confidencebuilding measures.I truly hope that we will be able to take significant steps in that direction at least among ourselves.I am certain that the accommodation and facilities put at your disposal by the PfP Consortium and the Austrian government will help us in our task.I would now like to yield to Professor Annie Jafalian, of the Université Jean-Moulin in Lyon, France, where she is a member of the Law Faculty, in charge of lecturing and research.She specialises in conflict studies in the South Caucasus, and on energy security.The latest book that she has edited "Reassessing Security in the South Caucasus" has been published at Ashgate in 2011.Annie Jafalian Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, EU and NATO relations with the South Caucasus have gone through different periods, which could be divided into three main stages.After a period of gradual opening up to the world, the South Caucasus has gained substantial visibility in the eyes of EU and NATO decision-makers.This was particularly exemplified by the creation, in the 2000s, of "special representatives" for the region in both organizations, thereby expressing readiness for growing relations with the three regional states, i.e. Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia.But twenty years after the establishment of first cooperation frameworks, relations on both sides have also reached a certain degree of maturity.There are currently some signs that partners are entering into an era of pragmatic realignments, clarifying their positions and commitments as a consequence of the latest regional developments.Starting from the early 1990s, the first period could be called the decade of mutual discovery, when broad cooperation frameworks were established to promote economic, political and military reforms in the South Caucasus.In December 1991, the EU started providing Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) in order to support the transition to democracy and market economy.A few years later, in 1996, it strengthened its involvement in favour of stability and prosperity in the region through the conclusion of Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCA) that entered into force in 1999 for a ten-year period.1 As for NATO, it launched in 1994 its Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, aimed at increasing stability and security through cooperation in the defence sector between the Allied members and the former members of the Warsaw Pact.However, European and Euro-Atlantic institutions were rather reluctant to deeply engage in the South Caucasus, and even less in the settlement of regional conflicts.The area was then clearly perceived as a conflictridden but also small and remote zone, which hardly aroused the interests of Western countries and was regarded by Russia as its traditional sphere of influence.Even in the context of military conflicts and political instability in the South Caucasus, the EU and NATO were more concerned about and committed in the Balkans at the time.So they kept, during the 1990s, quite a low profile in the region.2 The second stage, covering the years 2000s, could be qualified as the decade of intensified institutional engagement of the EU and NATO in the South Caucasus.Over this period, the area has officially turned into a region of strategic importance, especially after September 11 th and the international fight against terrorism.For the EU, this rapprochement has also been fostered by the 2004-2007 enlargements eastwards, which brought the Caucasus much closer to Europe, and even created a common border with the region through the Black Sea.It has been boosted by "the Georgian factor" too, i.e. Georgia's official priority objective, 1 From 1991 to 2005, EC assistance to Armenia thus amounted to €380 million; assistance to Azerbaijan equaled €400 million while the one provided to Georgia reached €500 million, cf.ENPI, Armenia/Azerbaijan/Georgia, Country Strategy Papers 2007 -2013 In others words, the regional context "served to temper the Alliance's willingness to quickly get engaged in the region and pursue closer relations", cf.Regional Security in the South Caucasus: the Role of NATO, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Washington, 2004, p. 66 .For some comments on EU hesitations at the time, see Uwe Halbach, "The European Union in the South Caucasus: Story of a Hesitant Approximation", in The South Caucasus, 20 Years of Independence, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2011, 301-302.under President Mikhail Saakashvili, to become a full member of the EU and NATO.During his visit to Tbilisi in September 2012, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen indeed made a point of presenting Georgia as "a special partner" 3 , partly because of its membership aspirations.The EU and NATO's enhanced institutional involvement was based on the definition of specific interests in the South Caucasus.It was mainly driven by two core interests that may be connected with each other: access to the Caspian Sea energy resources on the one hand; security and stability in the neighbouring areas on the other hand.Starting from the early 2000s, the EU has expressed growing interest in the Caspian Sea oil and gas resources, considered as a source of diversification of energy supplies and of valuable contribution to EU energy security.In its November 2000 Green Paper, the European Commission first identified the "considerable potential for oil and gas production in the countries of the Caspian sea basin" 4 , which was then presented as a "source of non-OPEC production, extremely important" for the Union.5 After the Russian-Ukrainian gas dispute in winter 2005-2006 (and again in 2009) , the Green Paper that followed rather referred, indirectly, to the need to reduce EU energy dependence on Russia and thus called for the construction of "independent gas pipeline supplies from the Caspian region." 6 As for NATO, it did not pay a special attention to energy security at the time.However, the April 1999 Strategic Concept touched upon the issue when it mentioned that "the disruption of the flow of vital 3 "NATO Secretary General praises Georgia's progress toward NATO in visit to Tbilisi", NATO News, 6 September 2012. resources" could possibly affect the security interests of Allied members.7 In addition to energy security, stability and peace were also at stake in the EU and NATO further commitment in the South Caucasus.In its December 2003 Security Strategy, the EU listed the "violent or frozen conflicts, which also persist on our borders, [and] threaten regional stability" among the key threats, more diverse and less predictable, that Europe was mainly concerned about.8 And it stated, as a strategic objective, the need to take "a stronger and more active interest in the problems of the Southern Caucasus, which will in due course also be a neighbouring region." 9 At approximately the same time, NATO also expressed, in its communiqué following the June 2004 Istanbul Summit, its willingness "to further strengthen the Euro-Atlantic Partnership, in particular through a special focus on … the strategically important regions of the Caucasus and Central Asia." 10 These interests were then translated into new cooperation policy and tools.The creation of new positions in the EU and NATO dedicated to the South Caucasus was instrumental in the development of closer ties.In July 2003, the EU appointed a Special Representative for the South Caucasus.Its mandate has consisted in implementing EU policy, including the objective, "in accordance with existing mechanisms, to prevent conflicts in the region, to assist in the resolution of conflicts and to pre- As far as energy security is concerned, the European Commission presented the Caspian area, including Azerbaijan, as a source of "spectacular progression" of supply potential to Europe. 14 As a consequence, the area was called to form an energy corridor -the fourth one -to be reinforced with a view to further diversify and secure EU oil and gas imports. 15 So the European Commission has welcomed the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil (BTC) and gas (SCP) pipelines linking Azerbaijan to Turkey through Georgia. Azerbaijan has then turned into a new oil supplier to the EU, accounting in 2011 for 4.4% of the EU's global oil imports. 16 The BTC and SCP have thus become the pillars of a broader strategy aimed at the creation of a Southern gas corridor, potentially transforming Azerbaijan into a transit country between European gas markets and Central Asian exporting countries. In that regard, the Commission has supported new infrastructure projects -the Nabucco, ITGI and TAPinvolving different European countries and companies. These developments were a particular source of tension with Russia, as Russian gas company Gazprom itself suggested to transport Central Asian gas through its own infrastructure project, namely the South Stream gas pipeline. In August 2010, Russia signed a protocol with Armenia extending the lease of its 120 th military base in Gumri until 2044, i.e. 24 years more than what was initially agreed upon. The first lease agreement dated 1995 was indeed signed for a 25-year period, up to 2020, cf. "Russian-Armenian Talks", Kremlin.ru, 20 August 2012. Russia has been long discussing with Azerbaijan the terms of a lease agreement on the Gabala radar station, but no agreement has been reached so far. In 2010, Russia started importing 500 million cubic meters gas from Azerbaijan. These volumes have been regularly increased to reach three billion cubic meters in 2012, cf. "Russia to Double Azerbaijan Gas Imports", United Press International, 25 January 2012. As pointed out by some observers, Iran is perhaps "out of the game" in the regional political arena, but it is "still in the background". It indeed serves as an available partnership option which is used by the regional states whenever tensions arouse in their cooperation with other powers. At the local level, the South Caucasian states have also developed more self-confident domestic and foreign policies. This was particularly shown by Azerbaijan's decision in May 2011 to join the Non-Aligned Movement. 23 In other words, the South Caucasus has appeared as a more complicated area, where more players need be taken into account as soon as it comes to consider any involvement in the region. In this context, there have been -over the last years -some signs of realignment from NATO and the EU toward the states of the South Caucasus. While NATO has reaffirmed its strategic objectives in the area, it has also refrained from making any further commitment. This was especially true for the issue of Georgia's membership. The Alliance has kept its door open to Georgia but it has not provided any clear agenda toward that end. In its November 2010 Strategic Concept, the Allied members only declared "taking into account the Euro-Atlantic orientation or aspiration" of Georgia. 24 As far as energy issues are concerned, the Alliance admittedly reached a new step as it committed, in the same document, "to develop the capacity to contribute to energy security, including protection of critical infrastructure and transit areas and lines." 25 It has reiterated the "critical importance" of stable and reliable energy supplies in its May 2012 Chicago Summit declaration, while adding at the same time that these issues were "primarily the responsibility of national governments and other international organizations". As a consequence, NATO will just "closely follow" relevant developments in the field of energy security. 26 Finally, conflicts in the South Caucasus have been explicitly considered as "a matter of great concern for the Alliance." 27 Nevertheless, NATO has clearly stated that it "does not seek a direct role in the resolution of these conflicts but supports the efforts of other international organizations, which have specific mandates for their mediation roles." 28 Even though the EU has taken a higher profile in the South Caucasus, it is still divided on which strategy it should follow.In terms of gas projects, the Council approved in September 2011 the opening of talks with Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan to build a Trans-Caspian pipeline aimed at transporting Central Asian gas to the Nabucco, the ITGI and the TAP.Under these circumstances, the EU and NATO seem to be searching for a more balanced approach, based on a continued involvement coupled with a more cautious line, sometimes with some degree of reservations or reluctance to intervene.How are these developments perceived in the South Caucasus?1. Is the EU and NATO willingness to accommodate Russia and move away from a zero-sum game considered as an opportunity to play a more constructive role in the region?Or is it rather viewed as a concession made at the expense of regional states' interests, thereby changing their perceptions of the EU and NATO?2. In Conflicts in the South Caucasus are not dormant -they are active; the daily violation of ceasefire in Karabakh and the war in Georgia is the most outstanding evidence.While in the early stages of the ceasefire the risks were associated with accidental violations, the new trend -made possible by the greater consolidation of power in both states -makes the threats and risks of skirmishes are more subject to manipulations for political purposes; to advance external actor's objectives in the region, to put pressure on the other side during another round of negotiations, or to promote one's domestic agenda and to draw legitimacy from nationalistic sentiments.The entrenched institutions of the cease fire situation, which has lasted for almost two decades makes any change from the status quo in a positive direction unlikely.The negotiations on Karabakh have stalled because the Minsk Process seemingly has exhausted its highest potential to mediate and lead to a breakthrough in conflict resolution.In fact, the status quo has proved to be less risky than its possible change.Indeed, the status quo of the unresolved conflict provides a sufficient level of stability to allow Russia to maintain its traditional lever of influence over Armenia and Azerbaijan and consequently over the whole region.For Western powers tensions did not prevent major oil and transportation companies from contracting and implementing the "Deal of the Century."Thus no incentive has been created, as in case of Yugoslavia or more recently the Arab states for more decisive and concerted intervention, or to actually implement UN resolutions pertinent to the South Caucasus.However, in spite of stagnation in political affairs, there is obviously dynamism in others -such as the military.A few factors led to militarization in the region.One of them is the failure of the Caspian states to come to agreement on the security and legal status of the sea.Now every state tries to build its own naval forces, observing Russia's or Iran's unwillingness to reconcile with the new geopolitical realities.The inability to suggest an effective international framework for resolution of the South Caucasus conflicts -such as consensus-based decision mechanisms, the normative uncertainty of the OSCE framework, the unbalanced composition of the OSCE cochairmanship (France, the US and Russia), the insufficient pressure on the sides which violate international law -are the other reasons.Neither Azerbaijan and Turkey's economic embargo of Armenia resulting from the conflict (mainly due to the regional trade with Russia and Iran and extensive aid from the West) led to greater awareness in the region that colonial times are over and that if a state wants to enjoy a safe and prosperous future it should respect for the international norms of behaviour with its neighbours.The absence of economic relations between the parties in conflict was also part of non-military signals to Armenia, which violated the borders of its neighbour.This led to the fact that Azerbaijan's significant oil revenues (roughly 50 million dollars per day) have been spent on militarization of the country.On the other hand, the unresolved conflict also led to the plans for the restoration of the Medzamor atomic station in Armenia, which poses serious security challenges in an earthquake-prone area such as Caucasus.Much has been said also about the danger that uncontrolled territories pose for regional and international security in terms of trafficking and militarization due to the inaccessibility of the region to international inspectors.Geopolitically, unresolved conflicts make regional stability vulnerable to Russia's manipulation and the region is still a hostage to her interests.Although Azerbaijan's and Georgia's united efforts in the 1990s promoted NATO and EU presence in the region, Russia still retains the leverage over conflicts due to the security deficit and domestic political stagnation in the countries in conflict.The effects of the "frozen" conflicts go far beyond tensions and security risks related to the region.The case of Georgia -democracy in one separate country -is almost a success.However, with lack of resources and resulting dependence on authoritarian Azerbaijan and Russia, Georgia has limited capacity to play an important role in promotion of reforms in the region and even to sustain its own democratic achievements.Two states in conflict -Armenia and Azerbaijan -have poor record of human rights, basic freedoms, division of power and are at the end of the rating list based on the recently developed EU Integration Index.According to Freedom House Armenia is 'partly free", while Azerbaijan is a "not free" country. Both states are ruled by similar elite, which has entrenched interests in the domestic political status quo and extensively takes advantage of the "no peace -no war" situation. This includes playing the nationalistic card by the incumbents, corruption in state institutions related to the military industrial complex and security apparatus, lagging reforms in the government, and significant spending on the military. The lack of democracy often is reinforced by outside actors, who compromise their assessment of democracy progress in the countries for the sake of "stability", or any other interfering foreign policy agenda, both in Armenia and Azerbaijan. However, democracy building is an important factor in resolving major security issues in the region, as "democracies do not fight each other."The role of the EU and NATO in this regard could have been unique, as institution building in the states in transition was notably influenced by the interaction with external actors -through the mode and nature of aid policy, bilateral relations, trade, etc. At the same time, the nature of threats in the region has changed -those, caused by "weak states" were replaced by those caused by strong but repressive states. This increased the threat of radicalism, abrupt domestic instability due to the failure of evolutionary development and uncertain fate of the post-revolutionary regimes. For instance, the threat of disintegration of Georgia and Azerbaijan in the early 1990s affected stability in the region, but on the other hand the weakness of Russia allowed leaders of the same South Caucasus states to promote consolidation of their national independence and pronounce boldly the strategic course of integration in European and Euro-Atlantic structures. At the same time, while the direction of post-Soviet integration in the 1990s was mainly affected by hard security threats, this factor was complemented by institution building and the resulting political identity of the authoritarian states in the 2000s. In the case of Azerbaijan, the gradual cooling of integration aspirations was primarily caused by the inability of NATO of prioritizing its relations with Azerbaijan, as compared with Armenia, in recognition of its significant contribution to NATO-South Caucasus cooperation and of the Western states presence in the region. On the other hand the problems with Azerbaijan's Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP), which implementation dragged on indefinitely proved the reform process to be a major stumbling block on the way to integration. Thus, the emerging political identity of the state, along with hard security threats, such as the Karabakh conflict, weakened the integration momentum, and justified Azerbaijan's joining the Non-Aligned movement. NATO's policies in the South Caucasus were characterized by inconsistency. South Caucasus security policies were divided by the Karabakh conflict and relations with Russia. While Georgia and Azerbaijan expressed their intention to integrate in European and Euro-Atlantic structures, Armenia did not. Moreover, while Azerbaijani leaders -Aliyev and before him Elchibey -in a move of outstanding political courage adopted EU, US and NATO interests (through withdrawal of all former Soviet bases from its territory and granting only 10% to Russia in the major oil contract), Armenia strengthened its cooperation with Russia and continued to serve as a stronghold for Russia's interests in the region. However, neither Georgia nor Azerbaijan received preferential treatment in their relations with NATO. Azerbaijan was not "rewarded" by NATO even by political statements asserting an importance of internationally recognized borders and condemnation of their violation by Armenia. The other example was NATO's hesitation on the issue of membership for Georgia and Ukraine. NATO allies were reportedly divided on the issue of offering them the Membership Action Plan (MAP) at the 2008 Summit. Besides the factor of Russia, the slow pace of reforms of the military and in general in the country contributed to the hesitation in keeping promises regarding Ukraine and Georgia's membership. In sum, the lack of support in solving security concerns of the country like Azerbaijan, which has taken significant risks by creating conditions for the Western states to realize their interests in the region, the hesitant position of NATO regarding membership perspectives for Georgia and Ukraine and the slow pace of reforms limited NATO's influence in security of the region. The EU arrival to the South Caucasus as compared to the USA or individual states was late and her policies, much like NATO's, were inconsistent. The EU was too pre-occupied by issues of enlargement and the necessity to accommodate Russia. Thus it focused mainly on emergency situations and energy access and transportation issues. There were a few problems related to EU policy in the region. First there was an underestimation of the reform potential of the South Caucasus states, especially Azerbaijan, and their European identity which resulted in delayed support for institution building through EU programmes. The other problem was that policies were lagging behind stated strategic objectives. For instance, while pronouncing energy as a main interest in the Caspian region, the EU's diplomatic efforts were much weaker than those of Russia. The third set of problems has been inconsistency in stated objectives and the actual policy in promotion of democracy in the oil rich states, like Azerbaijan. There was permanent criticism from the side of the experts and domestic actors that the EU applied softer standards to democracy building and does not apply its mechanisms, such as conditionality, to this country, as compared to others. Last but not least is that the EU has been promoting multilateral (or trilateral) cooperation in the region -between all three states Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia-but remained passive and in a subordinate role in the resolution of the major conflict in the area. The EU stated that it supported the Minsk Process of the OSCE, which so far has not achieved any significant results. The EU's incapacity to suggest a mechanism and an effective institution for resolution of the conflict is one of the reasons of the limited role the EU can play in the security of the region. However, the EU does not utilize its major advantage -the extremely attractive nature of the EU "club" for the South Caucasus states -in the form of openness to membership perspectives. The post-Soviet history of the South Caucasus witnessed the process of consolidation of independence of two states -Azerbaijan and Georgiavis-à-vis Russia as a high risk enterprise. The leaders of both states respectively Aliyev and Shevardnadze have undertaken bold measures and policies to provide for the interests of the EU and NATO in the region. Both experienced permanent pressure in a form of attempts at coups d'états, assassinations, manipulation by secessionist groups and issues of border security. However, neither of them has ever enjoyed full-fledged military cooperation or support which would allow them to counterbalance Russia's pressure. Noticing the absence of counterbalancing support in the region and insufficient interest to regional organizations like GUAM (Georgia, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova) the states opted for individual strategies to deal with the regional security challenges. Azerbaijan has joined organizations where the power balance allowed recognizing the violation of international norms by Armenia -such as the OIC, Non -Aligned Movement and even got an observer status in African Union in 2011. The same year Azerbaijan was invited to a nonpermanent seat at the UN Security Council. Armenia continues its intense trade with Iran and Russia, with which it is closely allied militarily, and is part of the CSTO. She also depends for her survival on the transportation routes through Georgia. Georgia has chosen the way of integration to EU and NATO, and cooperates in most of the energy projects with Azerbaijan and Turkey. Thus, "frozen conflicts" continue to divide the South Caucasus, block democratic reforms, economic prosperity (first of all in Armenia), trilateral regional cooperation and integration of the region into the EU and NATO. The vicious circle of conflicts feeding the deficit of democracy and vice-versa has led to a dangerous divide in the region, pushing states in opposing directions and promoting militarization of the conflicting parties. Not all states of the South Caucasus accepted the international norms of the external relations in practice. One of the obstacles was inertia of patron-dependent behaviour of the small and poor states left since the times when Russia was determining the flow of resources between republics of the Soviet Union. In the Soviet Union, poor resources countries, such as Armenia, were enjoying support from other resource rich republics, such as Azerbaijan. This however did not lead to the sense of interdependency which usually regulates relations between independent states, as these trade and supply relations were realized through Moscow and by the decision of Gosplan. The disruption of these ties between Armenia and Azerbaijan as a result of the conflict, and afterwards joined by Turkey's embargo, was supposed to be a reminder of the regulating nature of economic relations between the independent subjects of international relations. Logically Armenia should have restrained its military involvement in Azerbaijan, which is rich and can be a beneficial provider of resources to the landlocked state. But support from Russia, and aid from Europe and the USA undermined the economic opportunities, resulting in military conflict, where Armenia openly violated internationally-recognized borders of the neighbour. Thus the perspectives of enjoying full-fledged cooperation and prosperity in Armenia only under conditions of responsible behaviour with regards to its neighbours should be promoted by the EU and NATO. This behaviour might be modelled after that of Austria during the conflict with Italy over the Tyrol area. In fact, non-interference and discouragement of the minority from secession on the neighbour's territory could be considered an internationally responsible behaviour, which would be "rewarded" by constructive cooperation between the states. Instead, NATO and the EU promote trilateral relations including economic cooperation between the states regardless of the state of affairs between them. This continues the Soviet dependence type of behaviour rather than promoting a new basis for relations between the parties as independent subjects of international relations. Any attempt to unconditional force the parties to cooperate will not lead to positive results, especially since economic cooperation is part of the bargaining tools in the Minsk Process of the OSCE. The South Caucasus is an area where none of the laws and norms of international behaviour are applied in practice. There is no a regional organization which could create a normative framework to address the violations of international law having taken place during the disputes. The problem is that those who led ethnic cleansing and mass elimination of civilians are now in power and are not brought to justice, simply because they participate in the official negotiation process. The "soft" reaction of the international community to violation and occupation by Armenia of a significant (16%-20%) part of the lands in Azerbaijan has created a sense of impunity and a precedent, which was obviously taken into account by Russia in August 2008. The only normative organization demanding unconditional withdrawal of troops from Azerbaijan territories has been the UN, but none of the five resolutions calling for withdrawal were implemented. In contrast, the OSCE Minsk group shows complete normative uncertainty allowing countries to appeal to and manipulate two principlesterritorial integrity and self-determination -and encouraging countries to find a compromise between the two principles. The justification of the mediators in this case is to call the lands (officially belonging to Azerbaijan) "disputed" (which is not the case for Georgia). There are however two clearly distinguishable elements in the conflict which are clear violation of the norms of international relations. First in the case of Russia it is the violation of Georgia's borders, and second is the case of Armenia, regarding Azerbaijan's borders. Once military gains become bargaining tools in negotiations, relations in the region lose any normative basis. The EU and NATO should direct their efforts to clearly support rules which they observe in Europe and between each other -those of inviolability of borders, protection of rights of minorities and right of displaced people to return, discourage external actors from interference and involvement in the issues of minorities in the neighbour states and discourage minorities from secessionist claims. The international community should also identify and address all cases of crimes against humanity and other violations of law. Taking into account the current power balance which does not allow bringing parties to compromise there are few possible ways out of the situation, the main principle of which is to take the solution of the conflict to the next level, which is to neutralize the major obstacles on the way to solution. As the conflicts are in essence territorial, a common perspective which would be equally attractive for all parties to the conflict and would make borders less significant could be encouraged. There have been attempts to create an open market, or trilateral "Caucasus common House", or the parliamentary cooperation, but two issues are preventing it from the success -all of the three states (or at least their populations) have a desire to integrate in a better world, rather than any uncertain Caucasus commonwealth. They prefer attachment to already successful models, which are the EU and NATO. Only by having a real perspective of such integration will the Caucasus countries be willing to delegate part of their sovereignty to a Union ruled by law and decision making based on democratic principles. This will be equally attractive to minorities, as they will be protected not only by local laws, but also have supranational guarantees of security and prosperity. While democracy is the most reliable way to resolution of conflicts, this is not a sufficient factor yet for peaceful resolution of conflict. In fact, according to Jack Snyder, democratizing societies are often torn by violent conflicts. Besides, the opponents of viewing a democracy as a factor of peaceful solution to conflicts usually refer to the possibility of election of extreme or radical leaders. Democracy however is a necessary step on the way, as it generates legitimate leadership, where power is supported by popular votes and what in turn allows the leader to compromise. On the other hand, democracy develops institutions of checks and balances and agencies which would develop alternative approaches to the resolution of conflicts. And lastly, it is democracy and freedoms that create conditions for the development of liberal values. There are some concepts and traits of liberal mindset, which are relevant for conflict resolution -tolerance, inclusiveness and equality. Transforming mindsets shaped by authoritarianism can be realized by encouraging their involvement in a greater space -integrating in European Union, globalizing through the internet or free market. With borders being increasingly challenged by information technologies, global markets and freedoms, the communities that are keeping up with the current or emerging trends will be the ones to most probably survive in this speedy transformation of the world by getting out of the provincial and modernist level and moving on to the post-modern and global world with provisional physical borders. This is the other area, where EU or NATO can help both the South Caucasus and Russia to get to the level which would allow them to escape controversies and barriers erected by modernist (or in this case Stalinist) thinking. On the Role of the EU and NATO in the South Caucasus: The View from Georgia It is easy to be sceptical about the ability of NATO and the EU (that is, the West) to contribute to greater stability and development of the South Caucasus. This scepticism is often a reaction to exaggerated expectations. So, we should probably start by getting the expectations right. NATO and the EU cannot do wonders in the region. By 'wonders' I mean three things: they (1) they cannot 'de-conflict' the conflicts, that is, they cannot bring solutions to the so-called 'frozen conflicts'; (2) they cannot turn political regimes (that are different in each country but neither of them can be described as a full democracy) into stable democracies; (3) they cannot turn poor countries into rich ones. Why is this so? The main problems are of course inherent to the countries themselves: they have the level of development, the political culture and historical legacies they have; solving a post-violent conflict by peaceful means is difficult for any country. But apart from that, this is a contested area in terms of international influence. Ambassador Philippe Lefort said that the South Caucasus is between EU and Russia; I would rather say it is between the West and Russia (US has also been active and influential here), and these two players have conflicting aims with regards to the region. The disagreement between Russia and the West over the 2008 war and the status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia is the most conspicuous -but by all means not the only -expression of this difference. One should also not forget that there are disagreements and differences within the European Union with regards to policies towards the region: some countries want the EU and NATO to be more active over Russia's objections; others prefer to keep it at arm's length. If we use the Balkans -another conflict-ridden region -as a point of comparison, the commitment of NATO and the EU, as well as their influence and capacity to bring change in the South Caucasus, are much more modest. Having said all that, I would still contend that the West is indispensable to the South Caucasus. Namely, I see an important role for NATO and the EU in three areas: (1) not allowing the conflicts to re-escalate; (2) to increase the chances for the political regimes to become more democratic than they are, and (3) increase chances for their economic development. Taking into account the lack of commitment within NATO and the EU to be strongly engaged in the region, made worse by deep internal difficulties the Union is going through, it may be proper to play devils' advocate and ask: why not to leave the region to Russia? Arguably, this might remove a bone of contention between the West and Russia. This is not a language used in official discourse in the West but we can be certain that such an idea crosses the minds of quite a few Western politicians. One strong argument against such an idea is that Russia has no resources to be a real hegemon in the region anyway: this implies both economic resources, and hard power. Russia suffers from imperial overstretch. We can see that Russia has a difficulty to take care of its own problems, and the region where this is most obvious is North Caucasus. Russia has only enough resources to play the game of a spoiler, but it has no ability to play a leading role. No less importantly, Russia also has few resources of soft power because it is not a desirable model of development. Yes, the EU is undergoing grave problems, but for peoples of the South Caucasus Europe continues to be a much more attractive model than Russia. Now I will focus on Georgia. With regards to conflicts, at this point there is no grave imminent danger for Georgia's security from its own conflicts. Under Georgia's 'own' conflicts I mean the triangle constituted by (1) Tbilisi, (2) Moscow, and (3) de facto governments in Sukhumi and Tskhinvali. Within it, the situation appears to be deeply frozen for the immediate future, which means that it is unlikely that things will get much better or much worse. Probably, the recent change of power in Tbilisi will not affect the situation much -but I will come back to this in a moment. In this sense, the August 2008 war, a tragic event as it was, may have proven to have been a stabilizing event in the long run. Georgia put this war behind her and survived, so it was an important test of statehood to be passed. It also brought greater clarity: Russia is now openly a patroncountry of Georgia's separatist regions. For obvious reasons, Georgia has no other option but to accept the status quo for the time being, but Russia has less leverage against Georgia than it used to have before the war. Theoretically, one cannot rule out Russia's military invasion -but short of that, its ability to seriously influence the situation in Georgia is rather limited. For Georgia, the greatest threats of destabilization come from its immediate neighbourhood. Namely, there are three potential conflict escalation scenarios that may have a spill over effect in Georgia: 1) resumption of military conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh; 2) possible military strikes against Iran by Israel and the USA; and 3) deterioration of security situation in North Caucasus. There is no space here to discuss each of these three scenarios in detail and in terms of their possible spill over effects for Georgia. But there is some level of consensus within Georgia's security community that there will be some in each case. Large-scale military escalation concerning Karabakh is obviously the worst nightmare, but the other two prospects are bad enough. Georgia has no capacity to influence the situation in either of those cases in order to prevent worse-case scenarios. The capacity of the West to influence the situation in the North Caucasus is very limited, but with regards to Iran and Nagorno-Karabakh it can do much more. Of course the nature of threats in these regions is very well understood and nobody needs to be reminded by the Georgians. But this demonstrates once more how important NATO and the EU are for stability in the region. In the last part of my paper, I will focus on what the recent political change in Georgia may bring to this country and the region. I will men-tion implications of this change for regional conflicts and for democratic development. This is a very recent development, so my remarks can only be tentative and preliminary. Moreover, the Georgian Dream coalition that came to power as a result of the October 1 parliamentary elections is a very diverse coalition that is only united by its opposition to the previous government, and by the personality and money of Bidzina Ivanishvili, a billionaire-turned-politician. But in his own turn, Mr Ivanishvili, who recently became Georgia's prime minister, is an untested politician and a somewhat enigmatic person, so this is an additional reason to be cautious when predicting the effect of his coming to power. But still, what happened might prove a positive development for the future of Georgia. This was a first precedent in Georgia, but also in the region at large, that power changed hands peacefully and constitutionally from the government to the opposition. Not only the result of the elections was somewhat unexpected, but also its aftermath. Most people anticipated the government party to win and the opposition not to accept defeat. Another narrative saw Saakashvili losing but also not accepting defeat. In either case, this would have implied post-election turmoil and a crisis of legitimacy of power. Therefore, there were ambivalent attitudes: the elections were seen as constituting an opening for democracy but also an opening for destabilization. So far it did only prove the former. Paradoxically, the elections had their good side for Mikheil Saakashvili and his team as well: he was vindicated in the eyes of history. Despite criticism for autocratic transgressions (some of it just and some greatly exaggerated), in the critical moment he proved himself to be a mature statesman and a democratic rather than autocratic leader. This also allowed his party to keep afloat as a democratic opposition in a new parliament. Having said all that, there is no guarantee that overall, Georgia will now progress towards a consolidated democracy. It is a widely shared concern that after the elections Georgia may follow the pattern of Ukraine: there too, the Orange coalition lost elections in peaceful and democratic elections, but under the incoming government of President Victor Yanukovich the country backtracked and became more autocratic than it used to be. There are quite a few things about Mr Ivanishvili showing that his instincts are far from democratic: he has already displayed a wish for monopolizing power as well as the spirit of retribution and witch-hunting. There are also structural challenges: it will be very difficult to balance power which is underpinned not only by administrative resources but also by Mr. Ivanishvili's immense personal fortune (roughly equal to half of the country's GDP). This does not mean, though, that Georgia is doomed to repeat the Ukrainian scenario. And here the western factor may play an important role. Why? In general, Georgia lacks many important structural preconditions for democracy. I do not only mean general socio-economic indicators: the country is quite poor, the middle class is relatively small, and about half of the people live in the countryside. There is also weak civil society development, the system of political parties hardly exists, and the dominant Church is rather influential but often takes illiberal stands. The influence of the West somewhat compensates for the lack of internal system of checks on central power. In critical moments of Georgia's political development, the West has played the role of effective (though not formal) mediator and arbiter in internal fights. It is a major moderating influence on Georgia's extremely confrontational political culture. Arguably, the influence of the West has been rather important also for making possible the peaceful transfer of power from the government to the opposition. Why is this so? The most obvious answer is: because of Georgia's commitment to join NATO and the EU, and because of the country's general western vocation that makes the majority of Georgia's people see its future as a European nation. This makes it the decisive point; will the new government keep that vocation up? Before the elections, this was major question. Saakashvili's team described Bidzina Ivanishvili as a Russian stooge. This was not just pre-election rhetoric aimed at discrediting the opponent; taking into account Ivanishvili's biography and his enigmatic nature, as well as the fact that there were quite a few openly anti-western groups in his coalition, one could have some doubts about his intended direction. However, there were no direct proofs for these allegations; therefore the government was justly criticized for this rhetoric. What can we say now? The first signs after the elections are somewhat promising. Mr. Ivanishvili and his lieutenants have made clear statements that they will continue the pro-western foreign policy of the previous government. His appointments to foreign and defence ministries, as well as the president of parliament are consistent with this. There are also signs that he actually listens to suggestions from the West. Moreover, the peaceful transfer of power created a new momentum in Georgia's relations with NATO and Europe. It is widely recognized that in October, Georgia passed a critical test of democracy so at least some objections to Georgia's further integration into the West should be lifted. It is important that there is close interaction between Georgia on the one hand and the EU and NATO on the other. This will maintain western leverage on Georgia's continuing democratic development. In contrast to that, the Georgian Dream's pre-election promises of improving relations with Russia look somewhat empty now. Russia's first reactions make it certain that it is not interested in improving relations with Georgia unless the latter makes very important strategic concessions, which means making steps towards recognizing the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and away from western integration. These are all very preliminary remarks. The coming year will be very important because it will show, which way Georgia really goes. Western players can influence that. A "Commission on Difficult Issues" to Improve Russian-Georgian Relations 1 This amazing place 2 leads us to be tolerant, patient and peaceful. I am not prepared to defend Russia's policies towards the South Caucasus, especially towards Georgia. I am convinced both States have made lots of mistakes, and much is to be learned from those mistakes, and how to develop our relationships. I would like to bring some examples on how we can improve our relations, and especially how we can affect ordinary people. We are faced with a phenomenon, after the August 2008 war; Russia has a big Georgian community concentrated mainly in Moscow and Saint-Petersburg. I noted that the number of restaurants of Georgian cuisine has rapidly increased after the August war. I counted in my district, in Saint-Petersburg, where I live, seven restaurants. Before, we had only two restaurants of Georgian cuisine. All of these restaurants are run by native Georgians, who have relatives and friends back in Georgia. And I asked them, "What do you think about our relations between our countries?"Because most of them suffered from the August 2008 consequences, they told me they would really like our relations to improve because they really need direct flights to Tbilisi from Saint-Petersburg to see their friends and relatives. They would like their friends to visit Saint-Petersburg also. They would like to develop our trade, to bring more and more Georgian goods to Russia. There was a bilateral commission established -a "Commission on Difficult Issues" -between Russia and Poland. This Commission is composed of policy makers and experts from both sides, and has two meetings per year; one in Warsaw and one in Moscow or Saint-Petersburg. Policy makers and experts discuss all the difficult issues between our countries, and try to find solutions. After that, all recommendations and considerations are submitted to Russian and Polish authorities. I am a member of this Commission and I see how we are really improving relations between Russia and Poland. For example, we also established in 2011 and 2012 a Russian-Polish Centre for Dialogue and Understanding, and its partner, the Polish-Russian Centre for Dialogue and Understanding, under the auspices of the Minister of Culture. Both Centres have their own budget, estimated at some 1 million Euros. It is not much money, but it is enough to start work, and mostly they would like to use this money to develop contacts between youth, journalists, experts, and organize events between the two countries that should improve the image of Russia in Poland, and the image of Poland in Russia. And I also hope that we will find the same solution between Russia and Georgia. As a first step we should think about establishing such a "Commission on Difficult Issues" to bring independent experts and to begin this hard work together. Forest massacre, where Soviet NKVD troops, under Josef Stalin's orders, shot more than 25000 Polish armed forces officers in the Spring of 1940 (Note of the editor). PART 2: The Role of Uti Possidetis in Determining Boundaries: Lessons for the South Caucasus The second panel of the workshop has been asked to try and identify what structural solutions might be out there to deal with particular drivers of instability in the South Caucasus region. I believe international law can be a stabilizing force and that it has an important role to play in shaping solutions. I've been asked to discuss, briefly, one particular international legal principle and to evaluate its potential impact on the conflicts plaguing the region: the uti possidetis principle. Uti possidetis is a principle bequeathed to international law by the Roman Empire. As originally defined under Roman law, uti possidetis constituted a provisional remedy between two individuals based on possession and until a final judicial determination as to ownership could be made: uti possidetis, ita possideatis (as you possess, so may you continue to possess). In the decolonization period of Latin America in the 19 th century, the principle resurfaced as a tool for determining the boundaries between the newly independent Republics. This rather obscure and neglected 'Latin American principle' was recently catapulted into the limelight by the Yugoslavia Arbritration Commission [Badinter Commission]. In its 3 rd Advisory Opinion delivered in January 1992, the Badinter Commission recommended that the internal boundaries which had divided the former Yugoslav Republics should automatically become the international boundaries of the new independent States. And the Commission declared that this conclusion followed from the principle of uti possidetis. Only a few short months later, in May 1992, the sovereigntist Parti Québécois under Jacques Parizeau commissioned five renowned international legal experts ((Franck, Higgins, Pellet, Shaw, Tomuschat)) to ad-vise the Quebec government on the question of Quebec's territorial integrity in the event of secession [Quebec Report]. Relying heavily on the Badinter Commission's novel interpretation of the colonial uti possidetis principle, the Five Experts assured the Parizeau government that in the event of secession, Quebec could assume legal entitlement under international law to its existing boundaries. In the decades since Opinion No. 3 and the Quebec Report, there have been a number of calls to extend the uti possidetis principle to other noncolonial situations, particularly in the context of secessionist claims. However, I believe that the idea that the uti possidetis principle can provide a one-size-fits-all, legally incontestable solution to all territorial disputes is an illusion. There is much to say but I will try to summarize my two main arguments. First, there is the very fundamental question of the legal status of the principle. In the Canada/Quebec context, Quebec separatists argue that in the event of a unilateral secession, the uti possidetis principle would guarantee Quebec its current provincial territory. Indeed, uti possidetis would eliminate the specter of partition, a key issue for undecided Québécois. Experts in the rest of Canada are not all in agreement: On what basis could the officials of a newly declared independent Quebec impose this particular version of the uti possidetis principle? It would certainly not be binding on the rest of Canada by virtue of an international treaty. In fact, the only way it would have this binding effect on Canadian federal authorities is if the uti possidetis principle is considered to be a customary rule of international law. That is to say, that the practice of adhering to the uti possidetis principle in the context of unilateral secessions is supported by a general and consistent State practice and moreover, that such practice is followed out of a sense of legal obligation. In preparing for this talk, I came across at least four articles that described the uti possidetis principle as a customary rule of international law and those four articles referred to its general application in the context of the decolonization of Latin America in the 19 th century in support of this conclusion. I disagree with this assessment for various reasons but in light of time constraints, I will limit my comments to a few key points. During the course of my doctoral studies on uti possidetis, I consulted many of the official Latin American instruments of the independence period and there are actually few instances where the new Republics explicitly referred to the uti possidetis principle. It is just simply not the case that it was "generally applied" by the former Iberian colonies; there is in fact no generalized practice to be discovered in the official documents. Worse, there were competing versions of the principle among the newly independent Republics; uti possedetis juris, uti possidetis de facto, uti possidetis of 1821, uti possidetis before independence, etc. States relied on one particular version of the principle in negotiations with one neighbour and then in light of political calculations, abandoned it for another version in their dealings with a second neighbour. Thus, not only is there no generalized practice, there is also no consistent practice. Also, in 19 th century Latin America, the colonial administrators knew very little about the vast Spanish and Portuguese territories under their authority. As a consequence, even when two or three newly independent States could agree on a particular version of the uti possidetis principle and accepted that the determination of their boundaries should be resolved on the basis of that principle, more often than not it proved impossible to establish where the Spanish or Portuguese line had actually been drawn; the official colonial maps and documents proved to be hopelessly flawed. Thus, even in those few arbitrations where the Parties did try to apply the uti possidetis principle, the disputes ultimately had to be resolved on the basis of other principles: equity or effective occupation or natural, geographical features. The final point about the Latin American experience with the uti possidetis principle is that the consent of all the parties involved was essential; it was never imposed on an unwilling party. The decolonization process of the African continent adds very little relevant State practice in terms of the customary nature of the uti possidetis principle. It must also be strongly emphasized that the practice considered to this point has all been colonial State practice. There is in fact, no trace of the uti possidetis principle in any of the official speeches, pronouncement or documents of the African independence period: not in the 1963 OAU Charter or the 1964 Cairo Resolution. There was no need for the African leaders to rely on the uncertain and impractical Latin American principle of uti possidetis. The combination of two classic, fundamental international legal rights -the right of selfdetermination, which was territorially defined and was granted to each colonial people as a whole, together with the right to territorial integrity -guaranteed the territorial status quo in Africa. However, in their 1992 Quebec Report the Five Experts argued that recent post-colonial State practice had revealed the existence of a generalized opinio juris in favour of the uti possidetis principle. And in support of this extension of the principle, they referred to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. Yet, it must be emphasized that in both of those cases, the dissolution of the parent State resulted from agreement and thus created no precedent for cases of contested secession. The 1991 Minsk Agreement, a key document for the transition to independence of the former USSR Republics, refers to the territorial integrity and the inviolability of existing borders within the Commonwealth and these principles are then reiterated in the Alma Ata Declaration. How can these clear and unambiguous references to such fundamental legal principles as territorial integrity and the inviolability of frontiers be treated as the application of the uti possidetis principle? To make such a claim, I feel, is to mistakenly believe that uti possidetis has become the incarnation of all the various rules and principles which contribute to the resolution of boundary issues. In addition, it also disregards fundamental rules on treaty interpretation as codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. As for the case of Yugoslavia, as long as the Slovenian and Croatian declarations of independence were characterized as secession attempts, the international community reiterated its commitment to the territorial integrity of the Yugoslav Federation. It was only after the Badinter Commission's critical and controversial finding that the process unfolding in Yugoslavia was one of dissolution and not secession that recognition was entertained and the issue of boundaries raised. Furthermore, an analysis of official pronouncements during the critical period reveals that political rather than legal considerations accounted for the ultimate solution adopted in resolving the Yugoslav crisis. Certainly there seems to be no evidence of a belief that international law dictated a particular outcome. It is therefore highly disputable whether these three post-colonial precedents meet the definition of custom. My second main argument is that even if it is accepted that the uti possidetis principle cannot be imposed on unwilling parties but rather that its application must be based on the consent or mutual agreement of all the parties involved, there is still a huge problem in terms of the outcome. As interpreted by the Badinter Commission and the Five Experts, the colonial uti possidetis has undergone a fundamental and unjustifiable transformation. In Latin America, the declared principle was respect for the colonial administrative divisions existing at the time of independence. However this commitment concerned lines dividing units which the struggle for independence had already placed under the control of new international actors. In some cases, a new State might embrace several audiencias (a Spanish administrative unit) as in the case of Colombia prior to 1830, of Mexico or of Peru. In other cases, States were formed on the basis of smaller administrative units within an audiencia as in the case of Paraguay and Uruguay. In other cases, the new State was founded on a larger unit -a vice-royalty -as in the case of Argentina. In the African context, devolution is a legal act with territorial implications. The critical point is that both in Latin America and Africa, two separate and distinct processes were at work: first, the identification of the presumptive units of statehood, whether by virtue of the principle of effec-tiveness or force of arms in the case of Latin America or the right of self-determination of colonial peoples in the case of Africa; and then, in a second phase, the determination of the boundaries of those entities through the application of various principles, including uti possidetis. As Angelet has so aptly commented, the principle of uti possidetis can only fulfil its stabilizing role on condition that the beneficiary of the principle is designated beforehand. For in the absence of such a designation, the uti possidetis principle can generate a multitude of solutions depending on whether independence is proclaimed at one or the other level of organization of the Predecessor State. Yet outside the colonial context, international law does not designate such beneficiaries. The uti possidetis principle as defined in 19 th century Latin America cannot account for the Badinter Commission's preindependence selection of the Yugoslav Republican borders and only the Republican borders as the new international boundaries. Why choose administrative boundaries between constituent republics but not administrative boundaries between autonomous provinces? No longer an afterthe-fact presumption as to the location of boundaries between States who have achieved independence, the principle is now deemed to apply in advance of formal independence and is used to determine the units entitled to achieve statehood. Why Slovenia but not Kosovo? Why the province of Quebec but not the northern lands of the Cree Indian nation? Such a discriminatory treatment of the aspirations of peoples can only have troubling consequences, as the eventual conflict in Kosovo eloquently confirmed. My conclusion is simple but I think important to ongoing negotiating processes in the South Caucasus: there is no automatic solution to the territorial question. The principle of uti possidetis is not a panacea and should not be seen as a cure-all. Indeed, Latin America and Africa bear witness to the fact that in the process of formation of new States, unchangeable administrative borders will not always maximize stability and public order. This is true also of the South Caucasus. What is perhaps needed is a return to the Roman law origins of the principle. Uti possidetis, as a provisional solution, would operate so as to preserve the status quo but only until the parties involved could resolve their competing claims. Withholding recognition until boundary issues had been peacefully resolved would constitute a powerful incentive for the arbitration of boundary disputes. A provisional status quo would help avoid conflict by providing a clear solution during the critical period. Existing boundaries would necessarily deserve consideration and some deference, but decision-makers would have the opportunity to consider whether a significantly better line could be drawn. Existing lines could be evaluated as to their suitability as international boundaries in terms of the age of the line, the process by which the line was drawn and the viability of the entities on either side of the line. Furthermore, a flexible uti possidetis principle would allow a consideration of alternatives to take into account minorities trapped within the new States and the respect of human rights. Condemnation of the use of force to change the status quo -clearly warranted in the context of Yugoslavia -need not necessarily coincide with the legal transformation of the status quo into a permanent solution by default. If the international community decides to intervene and to guarantee the boundaries of internal units in the context of the break-up of a State, then that decision -if agreed to or enforced -may have operative effect. This was essentially the outcome in Yugoslavia, where a decision initially taken only at the European level, was subsequently adopted and applied by the UN and endorsed in the Dayton Peace Accords. The crux of the matter is not to confuse this political process with pre-existing requirements of international law with regard to internal boundaries. Pierre Jolicoeur In this presentation, I will discuss some rarely studied aspects of secessionism and partitions, namely 1) the extent to which external support contributes to the success or failure of a secessionist movement; 2) secessionism as a response to the way a State manages its ethnic diversity; and 3) whether a post-partition society would be more stable than the pre-partition order. Outside support has always been seen as critical to the chances that a secessionist movement will fail or succeed (Horowitz 1985) . In particular supply in armaments, funding and bases are generally seen as decisive assets for secessionist groups in their endeavour to become independent. However, overcoming the old order is not sufficient as a definition of secessionist success. There has to be a moment that "makes authority", which is legitimate, and which legitimizes at the same time in the eyes of the separatist sympathisers, their supporters, as well as their opponents, not to mention the uncommitted members of the international community. This "moment of authority" is generated by the recognition of the new order. Obtaining international recognition is just as important, if not even more crucial for the success of secessionist movements. In addition to the psychological motivation of seeking recognition, there are practical implications as well. For instance, international recognition allows secessionist groups to join international organisations, to have access to funding from international institutions, and to participate in the club of countries in dealing with international relations. Those advan-tages are critical to future stability (both intra-national and regional) because they offer platforms for dialogue, which, in addition to consolidating the legitimacy of the new order, remove the incentive to use violence for the separatists to have their voices heard. Furthermore, the success of secession depends on the ability of the new order to shape the economic future of its constituents. In today's regimented international economic relations, access to World Bank funds or International Monetary Fund programmes, not to mention participation in the World Trade Organization are essential for prosperity, and prosperity is the best guarantor of continued stability. A contrario, secessionist groups without international recognition dwell in ambiguous situations, a sort of political purgatory where economic exchanges and international relations remain at an informal unofficial level. Often, these economic exchanges will take place in black market conditions, where smuggling can become a security risk for other international actors, prompting their intervention. Again, there is a clear line of consequence between unfulfilled national aspirations and unresolved disputes about sovereignty. These consequences affect everyone in a region, and sometimes beyond. This is why support and recognition is believed to be important in determining success of secessionist movements, insofar as success also means the future stability of the new order. In most cases, international support and recognition will explain the success or failure of secessionist enterprises. However why do some secessionist groups obtain international support and recognition while others don't? As we have seen from Suzanne Lalonde's contribution, international law is of some -but only limitedhelp. Of course there are fundamental principles of international law. It seems though that these principles are applied only as long as the states deem to do it. As much as certain countries -especially the weaker ones -and separatist groups would like it, the "rule of international law" is capricious. In most cases, geopolitics -i.e. Realism -is way more successful in explaining why a state accepts to recognise a newly created one. For instance, an interesting theory explaining the behaviour of states is the "vulnerability of the state". Vulnerability is here defined as exposure to outside pressure, to challenges to the independence of the existing order. The presence of potentially secessionist groups within a country, the weakness of a government's authority, the exposure to foreign pressures is important parts of the explanation. Because international law is of limited help and much depends on the power relations of states, there is absolutely no guarantee that a secessionist movement will obtain one day international recognition. The existence of de facto states over several decades is a perfect illustration of that phenomenon, even though the number of such de facto states is extremely limited. Most cases (Biafra, Katanga, Somaliland, Cyprus, Transdnistria… and of course some Caucasian polities) have to be considered as secessionist failures because features of international or internal relations remain unresolved. Since the end of the Second World War, Bangladesh is the only real case of successful secession, and potentially Kosovo can be considered as the most recent example of a successful secession. But again, insofar as stability is concerned, we have to factor in their ability to integrate the global economy. Lately, Kosovo and Serbia appear to have made a breakthrough in stabilising their relations by jointly monitoring their common borders. The discussion of patterns of secessionist movements would be incomplete if it focussed solely on a state's international behaviour. The internal behaviour of a state (i.e. how it deals with minority groups) is just as important. The rationale is that the absence of legitimate political space for minorities to air their grievances will be substituted by covert action, taking the form of political subversion or violence. Different experiences in this respect can teach us some important lessons useful to establish better practices in managing ethnic diversity. This leads me to introduce what certain authors refer to as the discrimination/accommodation debate (McGarry, O'Reilly, 1993 Federal institutions and decentralization (political autonomy) are sometimes thought to be slippery slopes leading to secession (Roeder 1991 , Bunce 1999 , Cornell 2002 . Others contend, however, that such institutions actually calm down, rather than nurture, separatist tendencies (Stepan 1999 , Bermeo 2002 . In other words, making space for a minority should not be seen as legitimation of its grievances, or right to separate. Scholars have made progress in understanding this "paradox" (Anderson) by analysing the conditions under which responsive policies of decentralisation have one effect rather than the other. There still is no consensus on this question. Nevertheless, a trend seems to emerge from the following analysts; Hechter (2000) argues that "…decentralization may provide cultural minorities with greater resources to engage in collective action… at the same time, it may also erode the demand for sovereignty". Kholi (1997) makes a related argument about "accommodation from a strong state increasing instability in the short term, but decreasing instability in the long term", whereas Lustic (2004) concluded that "increasing representativeness in fact decreased secessionist activity… representative institutions, even if not fully autonomous, thus seem to inhibit secessionism". At the same time, he also says that "rigorous repression can prevent mobilization, but only in the short term… at a great cost and without eliminating the threat of secessionism". Power sharing can be seen as more effective in the long term, yet it also tends to encourage larger minorities to develop "identity movements".Northern Ireland, Fiji, and Papua New Guinea are often cited as powersharing successes because they reduced the use of violence by secessionist groups by integrating and including these groups in decision-making.However, Nigeria, Lebanon, Cyprus, by contrast, are reminders that even carefully designed power-sharing institutions are far from being a panacea, and can sometimes exacerbate problems in divided societies.If we were to extend these models to the South Caucasus, we would still have no guarantee for the ultimate outcome on stability.Bakke and Wibbels (2006) argue that fiscal decentralisation increases the likelihood of ethnic rebellion when there are important income disparities across regions.In addition, they found that when a strong national party excludes ethnic regions from national governance, ethnic conflict is more likely to occur.Essentially, they showed that the effect of federalism is contingent on underlying social features, especially ethnic group concentration and regional economic inequality.All of these studies contribute to explain the incidence of secessionist movements.Institutional arguments, exploring the role of federalism, also try to answer a number of important questions including:1. Why, despite decades of federal arrangements, secession happens at certain junctures, but not at others?2. How secession can occur in the absence of federal arrangements?3. Why secession happened in pre-federal times, say from the Habsburg and Ottoman empires, where none possessed federal institutions and very few possessed autonomous any form of autonomy?In general we can say that secessionists react to the state's actions, both present and past, and not only to the state's inaction, weakness, and/or institutions.Whether state policies tend toward inclusion, status quo or exclusion is likely to influence the minority leaders' reaction ranging from secession to a less radical pursuit of autonomy.Talking about secession cannot be limited to examining the struggle for separation (vs. territorial integrity), but has also to consider scenarios of what will happen after the event of secession.In the end, that is the real definition of success.Secession, much like partition after civil war, does not resolve ethnic conflicts, but merely reorders them and may potentially create new forms of violence.One reason is that the successful independence creates incentives for new groups within the newly created state to gather and to mobilize.Another reason is that individuals often possess more than one ethnic identity from which to choose, which is likely to be influenced by the new institution setting, and the aggregation of these choices may make a country look quite different than it did before independence.Chechnya is a good example of that phenomenon, and so is the former Yugoslavia, with the region of Sandžak in Serbia, or in Macedonia, with the Presevo Valley.Because international law on recognition is thought to have a life of its own, separatist groups think they can bank on it to legitimise secession, and so the apparent ease of the process encourages further fragmentation based on ethnic identity, and not on how this ethnic group has been treated within a greater polity.This said, the problem of accommodating ethnic groups, whether long established or newly constructed, is not to be taken for granted in new states."Nationalizing states", as R. Brubaker calls them (1995) , can make life for new minorities so unbearable that the risky struggle to fight their own way out through secession becomes relatively attractive.Of course, this debate would be moot if states could more or less peacefully agree to part ways, as did Norway-Sweden or Slovakia-Czech Republic or Iceland-Denmark.This is, in fact, in law, and in practice the only way to secure future stability in secessionist contests.But states willing to part peacefully with a portion of their territory are extremely rare.Régis Genté I will speak about energy as a driver of instability in the South Caucasus.That's not an easy topic as thousands of articles were written on the subject in the last 20 years.We know that wars can happen indeed because of the energy search, the will to control export routes, etc.Could it also be the case in the South Caucasus?I will answer as a journalist, basing my opinion on some things I have observed for the last ten years in the region and pointing out some details we don't pay enough attention to, in my opinion.When I came to work in the region, ten years ago, I had the following questions in mind: why is the South Caucasus so unstable?Is it because of its hydrocarbons reserves, and the ones of the Caspian region that are or could be evacuated through the Caucasus?Would this region be so instable if it wouldn't have 3-4% of the world hydrocarbons reserves in its subsoil?Sometimes, reading the press and academic analysis, I feel that there is a prejudice to say that this instability is nurtured by the thirst for oil and gas.If we take quick look into the South Caucasus history, in the 20 th century, we see that there were three major periods of instabilities and war.Let's see if energy appetites were the cause of them: • At the end of the First World War: Even if Baku was already seen as attractive because of its oil deposits, the instability wasn't due to energy.The then instability was almost only a political and geopolitical fight, between big regional and world players.The new Bolshevik regime was trying to keep the borders it "inherited" from the Tsarist regime.The Turkish republic, after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, was trying to establish its national territory and to create a kind of Turkish sphere of influence.The Western powers, such as the UK or France, wanted to contain these two new regimes.In some extent indeed, there were also looking at the oil deposits but it was obviously not their main goal.• During the Second World War: if war came to Caucasus, it was in this case indeed because of the oil thirst.The Wehrmacht tried to pass the Caucasian mountains because it needed badly to get Baku oil.• At the end of the Cold War: The situation then is more complex, so to speak.The three Caucasian separatist conflicts were not about oil and gas.We may think that Russia was manipulating the conflict in order to keep control over the South Caucasus and the Caspian region's hydrocarbons wealth.But that's difficult to assert, because Russia at that time was then very weak, chaotic and divided on the policy to follow in the South Caucasus.Army intelligence was not thinking like the Foreign Ministry; the Foreign Ministry was not thinking like the security services' successors… which were not thinking like the Ministry of Defence, etc.But after some years, Russia having recovered, the tensions in the region became more and more about oil and gas.The West fuelled these tensions by showing a big interest for the Caspian deposits.We remember how Western experts, oil firms, or diplomats exaggerated the potential volume of reserves in the Caspian basin, speaking about 200 billion barrels while it is in reality 6 times less at least.It is in this context that the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline was built, while investors were not sure that the project would be economically sustainable.It was a political project.But again, nobody can say that this rivalry between the West and Russia was only about oil and gas, but it seems that hydrocarbons were a pretext for a geopolitical fight as a kind of prolongation of the Cold war.If now, I'm coming to what I could observe this last decade, let me speak about two events or rather series of events: The 2008 Georgian-Russian war It wasn't first of all about oil and gas.I remember how during the conflict the Russian leadership was constantly reminding the Western countries of the Kosovo recognition, the NATO bombing of Belgrade, and of the Iraq invasion.Their message was that the West should not anymore weaken Moscow in the international arena.This war was for Russia about regaining its place as a power we have to take into consideration in big decisions to be taken about the world, or at least in the wider region.The Kremlin's martial rhetoric about the South Caucasus is often motivated by the Moscow claim to get the place Russia believes it deserves in the world community.It was indeed again the case a year ago; when Moscow felt that it could lose its influence in the Middle East (Israel was speaking more about strikes on Iran while the West was asking Assad to step down in Syria).Two events, during the 2008 war, were directly connected to oil and gas.The first one is the launch of a few bombs close to the BTC, in the South of Tbilisi.Georgian authorities interpreted this bombing, which was not aiming at damaging the oil pipeline, as the sending of a message: "We can destroy your oil pipes if we want."Certainly, Russia could, but it didn't want to go into a direct confrontation with the West.That's an illustration of how the Caucasus is at the moment a place where proxy wars can happen.The second event is the train carrying oil wagons which exploded at the end of August 2008, after it ran on a mine put on the railway around Gori city.Again, it seems to have been the sending of the same clear message.It seems that 2008 war was about big politics.As Tolstoï says, in War and Peace, wars happen because of plenty of causes, and no one is the only reason of it.But obviously energy thirst can contribute heavily to fuel the flames.That's probably why in 1994, the Azeri President Heydar Aliyev did his best to include Russia in the "deal of the century", giving finally to Lukoil 10% of the Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli field.This man, who knew as nobody the Kremlin's inner logic, thought giving a share to Russia in the project was the best way not to anger Moscow and eventually push it to destabilize the South Caucasus.Let me first remind you two figures, which are strangely always underestimated.These last few years, Gazprom's volume of exports to Europe was around 30% of its production.This little one third represented about two thirds of Gazprom's income.It means that Kremlin's political ambitions are for a huge part coming from the Gazprom's sales to Europe.That's why, in my understanding, Moscow was so tough on the Nabucco issue, and consequently with the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline.I never heard any Russian official, whether politicians or energy specialists, saying a single word against the Chinese gas pipelines projects in Turkmenistan even if exports reach about 40 billion cubic meters (bcm) or more per year.For me, it is clear that Moscow is glad to see these huge amounts of gas going to East… and not to the market Gazprom wants to keep as much as possible for itself, Europe.The pipeline war, between the Nabucco/EU project and the Moscow/South Stream competitor project, is rooted in this will to keep for Russia the European market.And all the controversies, for example on the real amount of gas reserves in Turkmenistan, on the Trans-Caspian pipeline are also coming from the same reason.In 2011, there was even some threatening Russian rhetoric towards Ashgabat.It was not formulated by Russian officials, but by experts reportedly quite close to the Kremlin and Gazprom.Somebody like the Turkmen President, Gourbanguly Berdymukhamedov, probably didn't fear a Russian military invasion.But he knows how the Kremlin can play a big role to overthrow a post-Soviet president.He knows how Moscow heavily contributed to kick out the Kyrgyz President, Kurmanbek Bakiyev, in April 2010.Europe didn't understand, or didn't want to understand, what Turkmenistan has been saying since 2007, that it really wants to diversify its clientele; "everyone is welcome to take our gas at our border."When Mr. Barroso went to Baku and Ashgabat in early 2012, he encouraged the Turkmen leader to be more courageous.But what Turkmens are saying is that it is to the EU to be more courageous.Taking Turkmen gas to Turkmenistan's borders means taking it on the Eastern shores of the Caspian Sea.It means that it is Brussels who has to deal with Moscow to get an agreement to allow building a gas pipe under the Caspian Sea.Ashgabat thinks, and it is probably true, that it is too weak to challenge Moscow on such an issue.To conclude, let me remark three things: 1) Indeed energy has rarely been the main driver of instability in the South Caucasus, but it can become so potentially.2) If Europe wants to get Turkmen gas, it needs to engage Russia in a big bargain to be "allowed" to lay a gas pipeline under the Caspian Sea.For example, it supposes giving Russia the possibility to benefit from Western technology to modernize its energy industry and improve its terribly low energy efficiency.But the EU, which is divided, seems far from ready for such a discussion.What I say might change slightly with the shale gas revolution.Nobody knows at the moment what will be the impact of that revolution.But as America won't import gas anymore, who knows if they will keep a very strong position in the Caucasus to defend the "Western" pipelines projects.Who knows if Europe, which will buy more liquid natural gas (LNG) from Qatar for example, will really fight to get Turkmen gas in the future?More importantly, who knows what will Russia's strategy be to counter the shale gas revolution?The South Caucasus: Russia's Perspective Russia: Outsider and Insider to the Region What makes Russia an insider?It is geography, first of all, with the Russian North Caucasus 'internal abroad' as it is called by some experts, which is an organic part of the region, inseparable from its southern counterpart beyond the Caucasian range.There is an extremely complicated ethnic mix there with close relatives from both sides of Caucasian mountains.There are also 'divided nations' -Lezgins in southern Daghestan and northern Azerbaijan and Ossetians both in Russia (North Ossetia) and Georgia (South Ossetia).Second, there are big ethnic Caucasian diasporas not only in North Caucasus (Armenian, first of all), but everywhere in Russia including in Moscow, where number of ethnic Azeri, Georgian and Armenian nationals in total is equal or even exceeds the population of individual South Caucasian states.Finally, there are very intensive business connections, which have direct political implications.One can recall the Russian-Georgian tycoon Bedzina Ivanishvili, who became the prime minister of Georgia in October 2012, and the recent case of well-known Azeri moguls and public figures in late September 2012 establishing the Union of Azeri organizations.The North Caucasus is the remains of the former Soviet empire and many of its current problems originated in the USSR.Being an 'internal abroad' as some experts put it, it creates the biggest challenge for Russia now.There are both specific regional problems and all-Russian problems like weak institutions, huge corruption etc., which reach extreme expression in the region.Proper Caucasian problems are connected not so much with poverty, but with huge inequality, lack of social development and archaic clan social organization.The scale of problems there which have been accumulating since before the Soviet era, even in czarist time and has huge meaning.Among other things, problems can't be fixed without implementing a long-term and painful strategy which carries risks of instability.The problem is that the Russian government, being overwhelmed by short-term tactical consideration, is hardly in a position to work out and to implement such a strategy.It started in 2003, when on the eve of forthcoming presidential elections Vladimir Putin, in order to demonstrate the glorious character of his war in Chechnya, decided to install one of the Chechnya's warlords Ahmed Kadyrov.In exchange for his personal loyalty, he helped him against other warlords, which created a vision that the war is over and the situation is under control.Since that time Putin is hostage to a choice he made in 2003.Instead of trying to deal with the essence of Caucasian problems Moscow is saturating them by money, trying to buy loyalty from local elites.Not only is it ineffective, but it is counter-productive because it maintains or even increases social inequality.The Russian perspective about the Caucasus and the wider security problems of that region are provided by the Levada Centre's 2011 Annual Report.The figures that follow come from that report, and indicate the tendency of public opinion, also as it relates to the Federal authorities handling of tensions in the region.1 When answering the question whether some ethnic groups should be limited to live in Russia, respondents put 'Caucasians' in first place (39% in 2011), ahead of Chinese (30%) and those who originate from Central Asia (26%).The phobia against 'Caucasians' replaced anti-Semitism.42 per cent think that Russian authorities will never manage to provide order and peaceful life in the Caucasus, and another 38 per cent think that it is possible but in many years, while 13 per cent think that Chechnya and maybe other North Caucasian republics will secede from Russia.When answering the question whether Russian authorities can control the situation at the Caucasus the share of those answering in the affirmative (49%) almost doesn't differ from the share of those answering in the negative (40%).This is nevertheless a great amelioration as some years ago the latter dominated in a 2:1 proportion.However only 5 per cent think that Federal authorities now control the situation in the Caucasus entirely, another 29 per cent more think that the Federal level controls the situation most of all, while 43 per cent think that they control the situation to a lesser extent, and 10 per cent think that authorities don't control the situation at all.Almost two thirds (62%) think that the war in the Caucasus will continue decreasing in intensity, but that this will be a long-term process.Evidence for this tendency is provided in Table 1 .As a mean to fix problems of North Caucasus tougher control over North Caucasians coming into Russia is at first place (36%), 26 per cent would use all the Russian Army might to mercilessly crush secessionist movements forever, 18 per cent got both peaceful solution including negotiations with separatists and militants, from one side, and breaking North 1 Levada-Center Annual Report 'Public Opinion-2011', http://www.levada.ru/sites/default/files/levada_2011_0.pdf Caucasus away from Russia while maintaining open the possibility for those who want to resettle in Central Russia.With regard to Chechnya 11 per cent consider that its secession has already taken place, 23 per cent would be glad if it did take place, while 28 per cent would not worry if so, with only 12 per cent being against such an opportunity and 13 per cent more being ready to oppose such a development by all means including military.When answering the question whether life in Russia will become more or less calm and peaceful in case the North Caucasian republics secede, respondents are split half and half.With regard to the slogan 'Let's stop feeding the Caucasus' 28 per cent definitely support it with another 34 per cent rather supporting it.Another 18 per cent don't support it and only 6 per cent definitely don't support it.The knowledge concerning Russia's relations with the South Caucasus states is not that big with Armenia and Azerbaijan being in the second echelon of countries to be known as Confederation of Independent States (CIS) members (27 and 22 per cent respectfully).12 per cent of respondents were mistaken in thinking that Georgia is a CIS member as well along with Abkhazia (12%) and South Ossetia (9%).The balance of positive and negative attitude toward Georgia which has been oscillating over the last decade from +10% to -20% has reached -60% in late 2008, and now moves to0. The usual speculations about Armenia being brother in faith and a Russian bastion in the Caucasus endure.It's not so evident in public opinion where Armenia goes eighth (11%) in the list of friends and allies, with Azerbaijan being tenth (9%) and Georgia 36 th (2%) just near South Korea (2%) and Iran (1%).Georgia leads in the list of Russia's enemies (50%) being far ahead of everybody else, with Azerbaijan (5%) and Armenia being neighbours once again in 14 th and 16 th position.However the instability which arisen from the power vacuum in the region became a source of concern for Turkey.Turkey which has traditionally avoided being involved in regional politics has been drawn into volatile new conflicts in the Caucasus.Celebrations of the fall of the Soviet Union have been short-lived.The newly rediscovered Caucasian borderlands transformed the Turkish-Soviet border in an area of instability and brought the risk of a direct confrontation with Russia, reminding of the recurrent Turkish-Russian wars of the past century.The conflicts are spilling over into Turkey.Turkey discovered her own Caucasian identity and became an insider to regional dynamics.The Chechen, the Georgian-Abkhazian and the Nagorno-Karabakh wars have become part of the domestic Turkish agenda with large parts of the population showing sympathy for one or another of the conflicting sides.According to some unofficial data -censuses in Turkey don't collect any data on the ethnic descents of the population -the total number of Chechens and Abkhazians in Turkey can outweigh the populations of Chechnya and Abkhazia proper.The Diasporas can therefore emerge as powerful and unsettling lobbies within Turkey.Generally speaking, Turkey's policy towards the South Caucasian Republics aims at the strengthening of political institutions, the fostering of economic viability and military reforms.In this respect Turkey's approach to the region precedes the launch of the Euro-Atlantic integration processes.The independence, sovereignty and stability of the region are considered as important for Turkey's own security and regional ambitions.In the second half of the years 2000, economic growth and internal political stability allowed Turkey to increase considerably its external action capacities in its neighbourhood.The need to project stability beyond its borders is more than mere rhetoric in the case of Turkey.It defines a real strategic objective.Turkey's neighbourhood policy as formulated by the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Davutoglu, aims at helping to secure and nurture a peaceful, prosperous, stable and cooperative environment conducive to human development at home and its neighbourhood.This proves to be a difficult challenge in the complex and conflicting environment where Turkey is located.More specifically, five different range of factors are underlying Turkey's approach to South Caucasus: 1) Balancing of its NATO commitments; 2) The development of good neighbourly relations with Russia have indeed become the major strategic gain at the end of the Cold War; 3) the shared interest with Georgia in positioning itself as a transit hub for hydrocarbons.Furthermore Georgia has become Turkey's gateway to the rest of the Caucasus and Central Asia after the closure of its border with Armenia; 4) the sense of solidarity with Azerbaijan claimed to be based on ethnic kinship, which is conditioned domestically to a large extent by a nationalistic discourse; 5) and finally, the historically fraught relationship with Armenia and current impossibility to normalize intergovernmental relations between Ankara and Yerevan.Has Turkey been able to develop leverages powerful enough to impact positively on the regional and domestic dynamics in South Caucasus?Turkey's role in South Caucasus cannot be analyzed separately from its broader relationship with Russia.Throughout the last decade, Turkey has grown more deferential towards Russia's regional strategic interests.Turkey tries to work with rather than against Russia.Paradoxically this deferential attitude doesn't represent a limitation; it enlarges Turkey's room for manoeuvre and underlines Russia's implicit acceptance of Turkey in the post-Soviet geography.Turkey is a factor that has to be dealt with in security equations.Turkey and Azerbaijan signed a defence pact which includes a mutual assistance clause.Its signature has been possible with Russia's implicit understanding of its more symbolical aspect; this explains the latter's restrained reaction.Turkey has been acting as a security provider for the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline and by extension to Georgia; although its security-based relationship with Turkey has been overshadowed by NATO and US involvement.One can argue that the Turkish factor proved its efficiency during the 2008 war which opposed Georgia to Russia by providing security to the port of Batumi and the airport of Tbilisi.The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline became facts on the ground respectively in June 2006 and March 2007.The region matters therefore for Turkey's energy security.Turkey's actions in South Caucasus face serious limitations as long as it can't have a direct influence on the dynamics of conflict settlement.The proximity to the region is both an aide and hindrance to diplomacy.Turkey is too close to the theatre.Its capacity to use hard power is seriously restricted not much because of its lack of freedom of action and independence but because of the risks it involves.The decision to send troops across borders can have far-reaching consequences.Turkey's main contribution can be in reshaping the geopolitical discourse in the region away from a grand chessboard of great power confrontation.The future of the region depends on its re-orientation away from regional polarization.It is necessary to promote pragmaticallyoriented approaches based on self-interest and business initiatives, and to stress the importance of economic competition, rather than political confrontation and domination.The Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform announced in the context of the 2008 war could have been a significant step ahead in this respect.It is unfortunate that it had remained short-lived.Regional momentum triggered from inside can develop the much-needed sense of accountability and ownership.Inclusiveness requires a healthy communication with all without any discrimination.A pragmatic approach can help to build trust and cooperation in the context of mistrust and mutually perceived threats.Turkey has the potential to support transformation and reform processes within the societies of South Caucasus through soft power means.Turkey is the only country that can compete with the soft power of Russia in the region.Its force of attraction is based on economic growth and its liberal visa regime.Turkey has become a major destination for tourism, trade and work for people from the region.3.5 million Russians, 1.1 million Georgians, 500 000 Azerbaijanis and 72 000 Armenians visited Turkey in 2011.The nascent middle classes travelling to Turkey for work, trade or tourism become lucid enough to acknowledge the need for social and political change at home.Turkey's new strength, its experience in building a strong, modern economy and its ambition to trade and integrate with its neighbours offer a chance to bring more stability and reduce conflicts.Turkey's approach can help shape a vision of a region in which security and economic interests are pursued pragmatically by all states and citizens and within a framework of cooperation aiming at a normalization of relations.However the current state of the relations with Armenia will keep on seriously curtailing Turkey's outreach in South Caucasus.Furthermore the transformation of this soft power and force of attraction into a vector of influence to be used in the field of preventive diplomacy and mitigation of tensions requires enhanced political engagement and strategic planning.PART 3: The Internal Threats to the South Caucasus Region The main threat to the South Caucasus region comes from inside not from the outside.The region is broken into parts, some internationally recognized and some not, and the various parts challenge one another.Sometimes external actors also create challenges but Iran or Turkey, Russia, CSTO or NATO are much less challenging to the nations of the South Caucasus than Armenians are to Azerbaijanis, Azerbaijanis to Armenians, Georgians to Abkhazians, and so on.External actors are certainly aware of this fact.Everyone understands that conflicts are holding back the region's development.And therefore, Western and international players have been trying to promote the resolution of these conflicts ever since they began engaging with the region.During twenty years, efforts to resolve ethno-political conflicts have involved every kind of international body and actor in a wide variety of formats, from official negotiations to Track Two diplomacy.However, all these efforts and formats have always been inefficient.The US, the EU, NATO and the UN have -to their great surprisefound that the parties in conflict, instead of cooperating, are doing their best to prevent a settlement, although it seems to be in their best interest to cooperate.This resistance has made the regional engagement of external actors very problematic.Pressure on the political leadership of the parties in conflict -whether internationally recognized states or internationally unrecognized de facto states -does not lead to any results, because resistance to resolution efforts from inside the region remains stronger than the pressure applied from outside.Being smart and creative does not help either.The parties in conflict reject all conflict resolution scenarios, however well elaborated.They don't reject particular scenarios -they reject them in principle, because in the eyes of the parties in conflict, negotiations are either a continuation of warfare using other methods, or a useless activity imposed by the powerful external actors.Consequently, stakeholders only pretend to engage in negotiations.The result is a sometimes rather realistic but always hypocritical imitation of a peace process.Worse still, since the external players who are applying the pressure are different actors with different stakes and concerns, they always have some disagreements on how things should be done in the region.The parties in conflict soon learn to play on those disagreements in a way to make the negotiation process meaningless and make sure it does not affect the status quo in any significant way.In my opinion, this means that we cannot resolve the conflicts by just dealing with the conflicts.From numerous examples worldwide, we know already that it is wrong to see the conflicts as isolated problems that can be handled separately from other political or societal concerns.This approach is a priori doomed to failure.The problems are not just about the conflicts themselves but about the stakeholders -leaders, states and societies included.Everywhere they happen, ethno-political conflicts are deeply rooted in the political, cultural and social lives of the region.They are not random unfortunate incidents, nor are they the result of the evil will of individuals.Of course, for people involved in the conflicts, it is comforting to think that they are the fault of 'bad guys'; Soviet politicians, local post-Soviet politicians, world powers, or international cartels.This way, you don't have to accept responsibility for the conflicts, or for their resolution.Apparently, a productive scenario for external engagement in the region should involve putting the conflicts in perspective.In terms of political science, there is a logical explanation for both the origins of the conflicts and the parties' unwillingness to resolve them or to accept responsibility for them.The explanation is that ethno-political conflicts are intrinsic to the historical development stage at which the South Caucasus region now finds itself.In terms of identities and visions, the region's current develop-ment stage is rather similar to the late 18 th -early 19 th century in Western Europe, or the early 20 th century in Eastern Europe and Central Europe.At that stage, empires fall apart into nation-states.In these terms, contemporary post-Soviet society is Modernity that began here two centuries later than in the West and almost a century later than in Eastern Europe.The reason why it didn't happen earlier is that the creation of the USSR preserved -or re-created -imperialism in this part of the world, and kept it going for an extra 70 years.The emergence of nation-states never goes conflict-free.In the post-Soviet world, like in Central Europe a hundred years ago, the nationstates were ethnicity-based projects."Nations" were understood as ethnic domains, which is always problematic because ethnic groups often live on both sides of any administrative border.Besides, while changing hands from empire to empire, the South Caucasus region grew a complicated history of border-drawing and administrative divisions.As a result, some of the nation-state projects overlapped in a really bad way, with two (or more) ethnic nations claiming 'ownership' of the same territory.This means that, on the level at which they originated, the conflicts cannot be resolved.In a zero-sum game, whatever one party in conflict gains, the other party loses, and its ethno-national identity is badly damaged.Within this paradigm, there is no such thing as a good scenario for conflict resolution.The goal of a peacemaking initiative is to leave the paradigm altogether.Ideally, one needs to teleport all stakeholders from the 18 th to the 21 st century, from zero-sum-games to problem solving.However, this is a very complicated task, much more challenging than writing up conflict resolution scenarios.One could, however, say that the search for scenarios, and pressure on the stakeholders to implement them, is not just useless.The risks here are the wars that periodically break out.Although caused by very old 18 th century paradigms, the wars are fought with very modern 21 st century weapons.Each new round may be fought at a higher technical level, causing even more destruction than the wars that happened in the region in the early 1990s.When thinking of the alternatives, many peacemakers say that the region needs more democracy.If we democratize the societies, the conflicts will go away.However, in the societies of the South Caucasus, more democracy will not necessarily mean less conflict and more integration.In history, there have been situations when societies democratically elected leaders with nationalist or even aggressive agendas.The societies of the present-day South Caucasus may prove even more radical with regard to the conflicts than their leaderships are.This does not mean that we need to stop democratization in order to resolve conflicts.It means that democratic institutions, however useful, are not enough to prepare societies for resolution.Identity and culture are vital.They will need to change quite a bit before the conflicts can go away.Cross-border efforts at 'building trust' are not working either.Crossborder trade, civil society projects, educational exchange and joint activism, in a variety of spheres from women's rights to environment, all seem to involve a small circle of the same people.Participants of these projects form an international network of people who have learned to cooperate across borders but remain marginalized in their own societies.At best, these activists feel isolated from the societies; in the worst case scenarios, they are hated or even oppressed.Again, the problem is not about institutions or individuals.It's about paradigms.Changing paradigms does not require dealing with the conflicts; it requires working with the societies.Ideally, the issue is not to draw the 'right' borders but to build new, dramatically different societies.Once this happens, the developments will lie in a different paradigm, which we cannot imagine now, just like people living in 18 th -century Alsace-Lorraine were unable to imagine the role that Strasbourg would one day play in the European Union.I am not trying to say that external actors in the South Caucasus must be prepared to engage here for the next two hundred years.However, I believe that they should also give up the idea of getting things done in a year or two.In the contemporary South Caucasus, the frozen status of the conflicts is not a bad result.The preservation of the status quo in the medium or even long-term perspective is not a sign of failure.It is not a setback, but a respite, a relatively peaceful environment in which some very important things can be done to modernize societies, not just governments.The societal transformation required for changing the existing paradigms can include activities in the sphere of discourse development, education and media.The current emotional discourses around the conflicts will need to be replaced with rational ones.Very few rational thins are currently said or written about the conflicts.This will require engaging scholars but also working with the media and journalists' education and training.Cross-border projects are a good idea but they will need to change in order to become effective.The participants of these projects usually give feedback to their societies.However, most of the time they only talk to people who already support the ideas of peace and cooperation.In order for something to change, they will need to start talking to people who don't agree, such as ethnic nationalists or opponents of modernization.So far, in our countries it is normal that people with contrasting views hardly ever talk to each other.They have their own NGOs, blogs and discussion clubs.For paradigms to change, we will need to build a culture of rational informed debate between supporters of contrasting ideologies and worldviews.The societies will need to move towards a more modern and more European model, based, first, on diversity (including diverse approaches to conflict resolution) and second, on efficient mechanisms of inclusive governance.In both, European actors can help a lot.Another key step that external players can take is to put an end to the international isolation of the de facto states, so as to ensure their modernization, transformation and democratization.Something that European actors can also help us to do is to shift conflict perception into the human dimension.This way, conflicts will no longer be perceived as territorial disputes, but as problems faced by people.Overall, a good way to invest into the region is not resolving conflicts but changing people in order to create a new environment in which the conflicts can be resolved.The South Caucasus could be characterized as a producer of instability; producer as well as consumer of security.These different roles have made domestic and international politics complex and volatile.The presence of big actors having interests in the region (Russia, US, Turkey, Iran and EU) have contributed to local actors' searching for safe havens for security among these players.Armenia is oriented mostly towards Russia and partly to Iran; Georgia -mostly towards Europe and United States and Turkey; Azerbaijan has developed a special policy of balancing among practically all regional players.As professor Neil McFarlane mentioned earlier this year in Tbilisi during the PfP Consortium Annual Conference, this diversity of approaches inside and outside the region creates doubts whether the South Caucasus can be termed a case of regional integration.Perhaps it could be considered as a region (like the Balkans or Middle East), but the question remains; can it be taken as granted when it comes to regional integration?The lack of a more or less clear idea of "belonging" to a region from the countries has also created various tendencies with the process of democratization: Georgia (adhering to Western principles of liberal democracy) shows more interest in transforming its state and civil institutions according to a liberal democratic state model.Armenia has been caught between authoritarian and democratic tendencies (with manipulated elections but relatively free assembly, media and freedom of association practice).Azerbaijan has demonstrated an obvious retreat from democracy-building after 2003 with nominal freedom of media, assembly and association and constantly rigged elections.Therefore the biggest question is whether values or interests should prevail in the region, especially when it comes to Azerbaijan, which is the dominant economic player due to the rich energy resources.It is a legitimate question of Realpolitik versus Idealpolitik that, "will the West lose its power and positions (to Russia or Iran) in the region if it sticks only to its values and principles and forgets about its interests (economic and security)? Or can values and interests coexist and mutually reinforce each other? Can we be convinced that value-based politics/policies would lead eventually to basic interests being fulfilled? The oil and gas resources of Azerbaijan can be a stabilizing factor for the moment. However, in the long run, the region is yet to see the consequences of flattening, decrease or eventually termination of energy resources. The expectations that are raised due to the energy production and the security it provides for the region might explode like a balloon after the oil is over. I remember here a song by a prominent Russian dissident group DDT "Kogda zakonchitsa neft" (When the oil runs out). It's a great optimistic song about Russia's post-oil period, but I wouldn't be that positive; the prospects of the post-oil phase for Azerbaijan look more volatile. Democratic peace theory has for a long time been advocated by many in academia and among politicians. The assumption (and empirical data proves that) is that democracies do not fight each other. However, this theory does not give an answer to following questions: a) does this thinking help when we talk about non-or semi-democratic polities (among which countries actually strive for democracy and some not necessarily). It has been considered as a valid argument. Also, whether democratization is going to contribute to more peace is not certain. Russia's role in the region after 1990s has been one of keeping ethnic conflicts open and managed by the various leverages it possesses. I believe starting from the 2000s Russia restarted to employ its "cultural hegemony" (in Gramscian terms) at a moment when the Russian politi-cal culture of the ruling elite was being launched anew. Especially, the ruling elite in Azerbaijan have largely withdrawn from the track of democratization. Moreover, the presence of ethnic conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan and the occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh and neighbouring areas have created not only an open-ended military-security and humanitarian problem for the region, but it strengthened anti-democratic tendencies in both countries. The conflict has given additional tools for ruling political elites to manoeuvre so as to ensure the survival of ruling regimes. Thus, every issue of domestic politics (including democratization) is deemed to be viewed through the prism of this international conflict. This factor (along with others) has reduced the space of democratization potential in Armenia and Azerbaijan. The current situation in the region has not improved since the wars of the early 1990s came to a stalemate over Nagornyi-Karabakh between Armenia and Azerbaijan, with the two countries engaged in an arms race at least since 2006. There is evidence that the increased defence spending on the Armenian side has the consequence of denying the government the tools to address critical social issues in terms of health and nutrition. At the same time, Azerbaijan, which has rebuilt its armed forces thanks to revenues generated from its natural resources, could be in for a shock when the oil and gas reserves start dwindling in 2014. There is virtually no contact at all between the two countries besides meeting of their presidents under Russian auspices or in the framework of different conflict workshops that have however taken place years ago. In Georgia, the relationship between the central powers in Tbilisi and the breakaway entities of Abkhazia and South Ossetia has changed dramatically since the Georgian-Russian war in 2008 with the following recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states by Russia Previous contacts with the breakaway entities have stalled or are to-day functioning differently in a decreased manner in comparison to what they used to be. The 2008 war and its outcome meant for NATO and its members a visible contradiction to its Kosovo policy, for Russia an additional complicated surrounding taking into consideration her own policies towards the Northern Caucasus. Channels of communications between Moscow and Tbilisi have been opened in the wake of the French mediation following the 2008 war and take place to-day in the framework of the Geneva talks. The recent election of Mr. Ivanishvili as Prime Minister of Georgia seems to have provided the grounds for maintaining to make towards a region composed of non-members, and obedience to the will of the various NATO member States which decide on its strategic direction. In consequence, the Alliance members decide the Alliance's priorities. One of the lessons of the Georgia-Russia war of 2008 is that perceptions of security provisions and the actual delivery may differ widely. For example, the 2008 NATO Summit declaration in Bucharest stated unequivocally that "Georgia would one day be a member of NATO". This has the effect of an official promise by the organization. But this promise is mitigated by the other statement that "decision on enlargement is made by NATO members only, and not by third parties." This statement can be aimed at Russia, but it is also aimed at any candidate member, from any part, and reiterates that it is not NATO as an organization that makes such decisions, but as an Alliance (its member countries).Failure to heed this nuance reveals the depth of misperception between regional and outer regional (EU, NATO) approaches.In consequence, a possible policy recommendation could be framed in these terms:1. Manage expectations rather than letting rhetoric build an alternative reality.EU and NATO counterparts to the region should reiterate that the level of engagement of their institutions is predicated upon the political agreement within their respective structures.This process should start with the sine qua non condition of engagement, which is shared by both the EU and NATO, and, one believes, by Russia as well, namely: no war.Avoid rhetorical entrapment by instituting mild conditionality.EU and NATO, having clarified their positions with regard to the region and in consultation with Russia, could leverage their respective engagement initiatives (Eastern Partnership, IMAP, IPAP, etc.) to strengthen the commitment of the non-use of force in developing solutions to regional security challenges -if these instruments however are of interest for the parties (special case Azerbaijan).Clarify terminology.One of the Soviet Union's legacies to the post-Soviet republics is a penchant for ambiguity.Too much is read between the lines, and not enough trust is put in the value of what is actually expressed.Frankness has its value, and EU and NATO officials should not fear for their institutions' credibility by speaking plainly, even in public formats.Discussions on objective conflict resolution mechanisms have yielded that international law and the practice of state recognition had not offset the threat of instability.The international doctrine of uti possidetis, which means that one uses what they possess, and vice-versa, has evolved after the Balkan Wars of the 1990s to an ulterior meaning involving the control by an ethnic group over a specific territory can often yield to secession (external self-determination).Evidence has also been presented to show that although certain political secessions can on the surface be successful; the ensuing cascade of secessionist grievances created by newly-former minorities (in the new independent state) will perpetuate instability, and pose problems for other powers by the precedent thereby created.A seemingly evident policy recommendation imposes itself;1. Insist on mutual consent of the parties, regardless of the decision.If the internationalization (i.e. the involvement of large and legitimate international bodies, like the UN, the International Court of Justice, the OSCE or the EU) of the South Caucasus con-1 This could be the basis for a renewed program of engagement by the EU and NATO, but also of particular frameworks of youth interaction based on education exchanges aimed at clarifying recent history, building understanding of international actors' interests and international law's limits.flicts is to meet with a happy end, the involvement of international law and the practice of state recognition, if needed, should be directly linked upon the mutuality of the decision by the parties in conflict.While this seems evident, large regional powers, namely Russia and Turkey, will more easily accept an entity's decision to separate if that decision is somehow made with the consent of the (former) central authority (i.e. Baku, Tbilisi or Yerevan).It has even been suggested that "joint sovereignty" is a worthy subject to explore.2. "Commissions on Difficult Issues".Because reliance on international law may not yield the stability hoped for, it may be necessary for the parties to engage in constructive bilateral talks on their own initiative.These initiatives should be formally rewarded by the EU and NATO, and/or by great powers.The example provided by the Russia-Polish Commission is worth following, and the beginning of such contacts may be in the works between Tbilisi and Moscow, which we all applaud.Participants insisted on the fact that the conflicts in the region were protracted because of the absence of contact between parties.This is a characteristic of the Armeno-Azerbaijani conflict mostly.The desire for stability and a constructive resolution of the conflict has to come from within.This reality has helped shape the discussion as to what can be achieved, and towards which audience initiatives should be aimed.In particular, there was no consistent agreement that (mostly for Armenia and Azerbaijan), appealing to the political regimes in the region as opposed to the civil society would lead towards a relaxation of tensions.The following recommendations have been brought out: A Two-Track Approach Focusing on the Elite and Civil Society in Parallel.The political sphere in the region is also hostage to frozen conflicts.Though some political actors may depend on the continuation of conflict as a backdrop to their political power, it follows that only a change in public opinion about the conflicts can lead the political elite to adopt a more conciliatory tone.This is why the "Track 1" method of official diplomacy should be maintained by keeping the Minsk Group channels open, or strengthened by renewed engagement of other actors EU; NATO?).At the same time, efforts should be made to offer the respective public/civil society within the region access to alternative points of view on the conflicts without necessarily exposing the EU, NATO or any other actor to the charge of intervening unduly in internal affairs, which the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 prohibits.Develop Incentives for the Political Sphere.Creativity should be applied in finding ways to reward political elites for adopting less confrontational policies or agreeing to confidence-building measures to resolve their conflict.For the purpose of these policy recommendations, the definition of political elites should include the elites of the unrecognized regions, their IDPs as well as the different lobbying factions..Focus on Soft-Security Measures.Programmes should be developed to offer the South Caucasus civil society with options for economic and commercial cooperation, scientific cooperation, and trust-building through regional intercultural cooperation.These measures can take the form of educational exchange, women, youth, journalists' cooperation etc., and also involve intra-national (Armenian-to-Armenian, Azerbaijani-to-Azerbaijani and Georgian-to-Georgian) contacts aimed at redefining the conflicts that affect their respective country.The Southern Caucasus has always been an area of concern for Euro-Atlantic security.During the last two decades, the region has not always received the focus it deserved, mainly owing to other crises nearer Europe's borders.Nevertheless, the Southern Caucasus is of interest to Europe mainly in terms of energy and human security.Study Groups provide an opportunity for civil society actors and policy makers of the region to introduce practical conflict resolution ideas to each other and international actors alike.The regular gathering of experts and interested parties from the region and beyond ensure an information loop that leads to positive action.The first step is to acknowledge the achievements of our conference.I have noted three general areas of significance for the future: • First and foremost, panelists from the region have given us an updated appreciation of the challenges facing the South Caucasus, for which we are grateful.In certain cases, the input of certain great powers and organizations has not led to greater stability.The input received this weekend will help us formulate policy to suggest changes in approach that maintains the engagement, but brings about more constructive solutions.• Second, panelists dealing with international law and recognition tell us that relying on international precedents and the practice of recognizing new States is not always a guarantee of stability.The panelists outlined that even if a region is independently viable, and even if on the face of it, a region would "deserve" to be recognized, we were informed during the conference that doing so perpetuates a practice that has not proven successful in erasing regional conflict.There is a need for the region, with the support of other actors and nations, to look to additional solutions to bolster a sustainable future.• Third, we have heard of the objective factors that inhibit regional cooperation.The discussions we have had this weekend on the impact of energy security, on the plight of minorities, just to name a few, will lead to proposals that will leverage these challenges to bring forward regimes of trade cooperation and exchanges that are the basis of regional prosperity, and from there, stability and peace.To have peace, the constituents of the region must live in conditions that gives them something to cherish, something related to their human security that they would fear losing if it ever came to be threatened.Currently, the challenges remain too great to expect this outcome in the short term, and for this we have to blame the global economic downturn, and the consequences it has on the national budgets of the countries that would like to see greater regional cooperation in the South Caucasus.Over the past years Austria has contributed extensively to the PfP Consortium mainly through the Study Group on Regional Stability in South East Europe, but also in close cooperation with other study and working groups through joint workshop and publications.The South Caucasus cannot be neglected as a region any longer.The PfP Consortium and the Austrian Ministry of Defence and Sports are committed in pursuing the solutions that can be applied in real life, in a transparent and inclusive manner.So far this conference has been run in that spirit and I am very happy with the result.The more security and stability develop in the Southern Caucasus, the more countries of the region will look to be providers of security in their own neighbourhood and beyond.Mutual engagement, with due respect for regional sensitivities, is the key to decreasing tensions.In addition, the Study Group on Regional Stability in the South Caucasus will continue the tradition of taking the conclusion of its workshops and digesting them into practical and applicable advice.	After a hiatus of several years, the Study Group Regional Stability in the South Caucasus was re-launched by the PfP Consortium and the Austrian Ministry of Defence and Sports in June 2011.Building on previous iterations of the RSSC Study Group, it held its 6th workshop at Reichenau, Austria, on November 8-11 2012.The format of the workshop was based on the successful Study Group Regional Stability in South East Europe (RSSEE), and its thematic concept aims at gradually bringing parties from the region to discuss and form policy recommendations on security issues and conflict resolution ideas starting from a high-level strategic outlook towards resolving particular issues of tension.To this end, the Study Groups in the PfP Consortium provide an apolitical forum in which to discuss the most sensitive matters in a free and informed manner.The objective is to build mutual trust in small groups of people of different backgrounds.The objective of the RSSC Study Group is to help the academic and policy-making elite of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia to build mutual trust among themselves and with other regional stakeholders, such as with participants from Russia and Turkey.The task of the Study Group is to have its members, led by the co-chairman, to identify areas of common interest pertaining to the security of the whole region and lead the workshop participants to develop pertinent and actionable security policy recommendations.One of the medium-term objectives is to lead academics and policy makers to treat the region as a single strategic entity.Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia each have their integration agendas, but the RSSC Study Group seeks to promote the value of regional integration as well.This process helps to achieve the critical long-term goal of altering conflict narratives in the region towards more constructive exchanges.In the workshop, panellists from all three South Caucasus countries were invited to present their thoughts on five key questions: 1) How can the EU (and/or NATO) engage the region without triggering a pushback from Russia?What are the possible consequences if the EU and NATO decrease their engagement in the South Caucasus?3) What are the objective factors impeding social, political and economic development in the South Caucasus?What are the consequences for stability and security in the region?4) Based on 3) above, is there a need for an "energy security convention" or a renewed commitment to regional disarmament along the lines of the CFE Treaty, or in a more general way: should there be more room for regional cooperation?What conditions of external pressures (push) and internal lure (pull) can incentivize or deter constructive change in the South Caucasus?These five questions were examined through a three-panel structure which allowed for greater precision when developing policy recommendations.Breaking a cycle of conflict and mistrust two decades in the making will not be easy, but we have been fortunate to receive expression of interest from all three South Caucasus countries, along with Russia and Turkey.This settles a key quantitative measure of success.What follows are the speaking notes of the panellists who were invited to present in Reichenau, followed by Policy Recommendations.They represent the qualitative measure of success of our 6 th RSSC SG workshop.The Policy Recommendations that follow have been taken on to conceive future workshops.This was made possible as much by the participants themselves as the organizers, sponsors and co-chair, and we are grateful for their contribution, and our gratefulness is expressed through this Study Group Information.Some of the preceding texts argue that nothing much can be done about the conflicts in the region.This opinion is mostly directed at the seemingly intractable conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno Karabakh.There two things to be said about the status quo in that conflict, in relation to the EU and NATO, and, in general, to the international community.First, the status quo should be seen as intolerable to both organizations and more should be done to develop incentives to resolve tensions there.These incentives should motivate belligerents by proposing material rewards for cooperation.At present, such rewards cannot be obtained from within the region.The status quo is intolerable because as long as the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan endures and remains frozen, the more the "idea" of a de facto independent Nagorno Karabakh becomes attractive in law.To the EU and NATO, which do not cease to repeat that territorial integrity should be respected in the spirit and letter of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, this cancels the premise that the case of the independence of Kosovo should be seen sui generis, not to be applied to other contexts.Suzanne Lalonde shows that the principle buttressing post-Cold War independence claims has been found in the principle of uti possidetis, a principle with a life of its own.Although it is legally inapplicable to the South Caucasus conflicts, international law breeds by precedent, and no matter what the international community says, the tendency is for Karabakh Armenians (and why not Abkhaz and Ossetians in the case of Georgia) to say "why not us?"And so the international community has an interest in preventing further fragmentation internationally and regionally.The reason is simple, and has been provided by Pierre Jolicoeur; if secession is to be defined as successful because it brings post-separation stability, then it is a solution which has a very poor track record, unless both parties agree mutually to a separation.So far, this has taken place in a very few cases, and the most celebrated has been that of Czechoslovakia in 1992.At the very least, the objective of the EU and NATO should be to promote the conditions for this mutuality.So far, however, the actions of the international community have only achieved such a result as to promote the status quo in the region.Armenia has an interest in keeping the conflict frozen because it increases the chances of an independent Karabakh.At the same time, a frozen conflict gives time to Azerbaijan to generate the armed forces that can buttress its negotiating position visà-vis Armenia.Having sensed this, Armenia tries to keep up with Azerbaijani defence spending at great cost to the ordinary Armenian's welfare and social development.The asymmetry between the two contenders is balanced by Russia's presence on Armenia's side, and this represents an additional burden for her.The second thing that can be said about the status quo is that it is in fact an expression of the Armenian and Azerbaijani public's fatigue with the conflict.In other words, neither the governments of Armenia or Azerbaijan are willing to visit additional hardships on their population by unthawing the conflict and resort to a shooting war.Lately, the skirmishing that has taken place along the Nagorno Karabakh trench lines has increased, but has not negatively un frozen the conflict.That is the good news.This means that the efforts at confidence-building could be more propitious if applied at the grass-roots level as opposed to official levels, even if the existing channels through the Minsk Group should remain open, despite their lack of results.Indeed, participants were keen to promote Armenian-Azerbaijani contacts at the level of constituents and civil society, but also within each society (Armenian-to-Armenian and Azerbaijani-to-Azerbaijani).The objective would be to bring greater awareness and understanding of the other's conditions, and the real causes of conflict.If one were to promote Boris Kuznetsov's idea of a "Commission on Difficult Issues" towards Armenia and Azerbaijan, improving the mutual perception of each belligerent would have to be a key objective.In this last sense, the preservation of the status quo provides room for dialogue.But dialogue can only take place if there is a perception of equality which is not merely military in nature.There needs to be the assurance that on the other side of the table, there is an individual of equal rights and who has legitimate interests, feelings and hope for a better tomorrow.For the whole region, conflicts seem to be driven by two key intangibles; an idea of sovereignty made antiquated by new conditions of integration, and leaders' personalities.First, the idea of sovereignty, which has been too long associated with control over territory, finds little meaning if the political ambitions of countries is to access the EU or NATO, or any other multilateral body where legal norms define state behaviour.This "modernist" notion of sovereignty (to take Robert Cooper's definition in his Breaking of Nations book) continues to inform policy and to guide action in the South Caucasus.The attachment to sovereignty should be less strong if a country is to submit to the legal constraints of a multilateral regime.One of the solutions should be to bring greater emphasis to the fact that obtaining membership to multilateral institutions brings less national freedom, and therefore, it matters little whether a particular piece of territory is effectively controlled or not, since it will end up in a wider geo-and economic-political framework eventually.Second, the endurance of this antiquated vision of sovereignty is also driven by the egos of the political elite.This socio-psychological complex must be surpassed, and the only way to surpass it is to help each leader develop greater returns from resolving the conflict than for continuing it.Furthermore, the leaders must be seen to be the owners of the solution.However, international life is not lived in isolation, and because ego trumps material gains, the idea of a "win-win" result, where zero-sum outcomes are substituted by solutions that improve the greater regional good, is premature.This observation may be less true in the case of Georgia vis-à-vis Russia, where the new government has recently greater openness than that of Mr. Saakashvili.However, we do not know yet whether this openness will be replicated in the case of the two break-away regions of Georgia, and will be answered positively by the authorities in Sukhumi and Tskhinvali.Indeed, leaders will need to show that they will have prevailed over the "adversary."This factor is so evident as to make any attempt at resolution apparently fruitless.The international community must therefore provide the material incentives to resolve the conflict, and help the sides articulate the outcome in positive sum gains towards their respective constituents (and diasporas).Breaking out of two decades of bitter conflict will depend on the leaders' ability to demonstrate tangible improvements in the public good, and initially, at least, this improvement can only be provided by the international community, and more specifically by the EU.The case of Georgia vis-à-vis Russia, as we have seen, seems more promising.We must lament the occurrence of the a 20 th century conflict in the 21 st century, but we must realise that it has been decisive in bringing the two sides at the negotiating table, under the auspices of a process led by major "Western" powers.As Boris Kuznetsov has said, both Russia and Georgia are to blame for the eruption of the first conventional war in the 21 st century.But other participants were adamant that other actors also had a share of (indirect) blame, namely NATO and the EU, by sending conflicting messages.International diplomacy must only promise what it can deliver if it is to remain credible.The current malaise affecting the UN and the OSCE, for example, can be traced back to their inability to make effective commitments.On the other hand, the perception of their good intention borne by the erstwhile recipients of the international organizations' favours can also be blamed.It is Georgia that has convinced itself that it would become a NATO member in short order.Alliance members have made no concrete promise of the sort.The assurance that Georgia would "one day be a member" was tempered by the fact that there was no definition of the quality of that membership, and by the statement that only NATO members will decide who gets to join.A realistic outlook would have helped Georgian decision makers that this last statement was directed at Georgia as much as at Russia.Such are the hazards of Alliance politics.In a sense, the 2008 August War serves as a stark reminder to NATO that clarity of expression brings greater credibility, and that ambiguity brings distrust, and, ultimately, fragmentation of effort, if not of commitment.The same critique can be applied to the EU, whose Eastern Partnership Initiative has been seen as lacklustre in the region.The process of conflict resolution in the South Caucasus cannot avoid identifying Russia and Turkey as critical partners of the EU and NATO.The South Caucasus countries would rather not have to deal with such great powers in their regional disputes, but the wider framework of regional security actually demands their inclusion.Russia is a prime mover of energy resources towards the EU, and a country with which NATO is actively seeking better relations.Its interests must be factored in.Turkey, for its part, has been NATO's most important ally and an important EU partner -despite its EU membership snub -because of its geostrategic location.Turkey has front row seats to all the major conflicts of the last decade; whether it be the war on terror, the 2003 Iraq war, the Syrian civil war, and Iran, not to mention its own troubles with separatist Kurds.As we have seen lately, Turkey will remain an essential interlocutor with regards to the Arab Spring developments, now in their second successive summers, falls, and now winters, as well as with the looming confrontation with Iran over her nuclear ambitions and intractable leadership.NATO and EU members will only show resolve in these crises with the benefit of international consensus, which will not obtain without Turkish and Russian assent.Without suggesting that a "deal" might be struck between these two countries and the international community at the detriment of the South Caucasus countries, it bears reminding that realism, as an operating disposition of international affairs, is a matter of great powers, not medium or soft powers.This adds greater credence to the need for Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia to find the common ground to pool their political resources and impose themselves collectively as an international actor to be reckoned with.Although we have seen that energy extraction and transport was not a driver of instability, it remains nonetheless a source of interest for the region.The same can be said for the region's position relative to the conflict with Iran, and perhaps Syria, especially now that Russia has acknowledged the moral and political bankruptcy of the latter's regime, and is now siding with major Western actors on the issue of intervention.We conclude that the South Caucasus must harmonize its relations with the international community if it is to break out of the cycle of conflict, but it must before normalize relations within the region.The solutions proposed in this workshop have focused on soft-security measures; on building better relations from the ground up (as opposed from the top down, i.e. relying on political elites), by putting emphasis on cultural, educational and commercial exchanges.It will be the task of future workshops to explore this avenue further.For now, the RSSC SG has been blessed by the profound thought from participants representing every South Caucasus country, plus a generous participation from Russian and Turkish panellists.Reconnecting with the South Caucasus You have been convened here because of your expertise on the South Caucasus, and on the themes related to the grave challenges that this region faces.I rejoice at seeing that all the countries of the region are represented here today, and I thank every one of you for taking the time off your busy schedule to come here.The objective of the Regional Stability in the South Caucasus Study Group is to develop and establish a critical mass of experts and policy-makers, as well as future policymakers, whose deep knowledge of the region's challenges will help the Austrian Ministry of European and International Affairs, as well as the Ministry of Defence and Sports formulate policy towards the region.Thanks to Austria's extensive political networks and membership in the EU and PfP, the conclusions of this workshop have a strong likelihood of finding resonance in higher spheres of international relations.By definition, the process whereby we reach our conclusions this weekend is iterative and inclusive.It is iterative because we come here with no pre-conceived ideas, no ready-made solutions to impose.It is inclusive because to reach balanced solutions, we need balanced representation, and discussions that take place in a spirit of constructive creativity and openness.I know that two decades of conflict have created tensions, and that in some cases, tensions are being keenly felt.To rise above these tensions requires courage, of which we are all endowed here.So let me say that the fortitude that is demonstrated by your presence is a step in the right direction, and I am thankful for it.To continue on this path, I believe that it is vital that we consider the value of each other's positions based on its own merits.No one person here is responsible in whole or in part to the problems of the South Caucasus, but all of us here are responsible in providing at least part of the solution.Our deliberations must be aimed at discovering the solutions when possible, or creating them anew when necessary.Let me refer to the main questions that should frame our panels: What are the incentives and deterrents to regional stability? •We will be looking for your input and feedback whether it comes from within the region, or from without.The ultimate goal is building stability through a common understanding of the challenges of the South Caucasus, and ideas on confidencebuilding measures.I truly hope that we will be able to take significant steps in that direction at least among ourselves.I am certain that the accommodation and facilities put at your disposal by the PfP Consortium and the Austrian government will help us in our task.I would now like to yield to Professor Annie Jafalian, of the Université Jean-Moulin in Lyon, France, where she is a member of the Law Faculty, in charge of lecturing and research.She specialises in conflict studies in the South Caucasus, and on energy security.The latest book that she has edited "Reassessing Security in the South Caucasus" has been published at Ashgate in 2011.Annie Jafalian Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, EU and NATO relations with the South Caucasus have gone through different periods, which could be divided into three main stages.After a period of gradual opening up to the world, the South Caucasus has gained substantial visibility in the eyes of EU and NATO decision-makers.This was particularly exemplified by the creation, in the 2000s, of "special representatives" for the region in both organizations, thereby expressing readiness for growing relations with the three regional states, i.e. Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia.But twenty years after the establishment of first cooperation frameworks, relations on both sides have also reached a certain degree of maturity.There are currently some signs that partners are entering into an era of pragmatic realignments, clarifying their positions and commitments as a consequence of the latest regional developments.Starting from the early 1990s, the first period could be called the decade of mutual discovery, when broad cooperation frameworks were established to promote economic, political and military reforms in the South Caucasus.In December 1991, the EU started providing Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) in order to support the transition to democracy and market economy.A few years later, in 1996, it strengthened its involvement in favour of stability and prosperity in the region through the conclusion of Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCA) that entered into force in 1999 for a ten-year period.1 As for NATO, it launched in 1994 its Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, aimed at increasing stability and security through cooperation in the defence sector between the Allied members and the former members of the Warsaw Pact.However, European and Euro-Atlantic institutions were rather reluctant to deeply engage in the South Caucasus, and even less in the settlement of regional conflicts.The area was then clearly perceived as a conflictridden but also small and remote zone, which hardly aroused the interests of Western countries and was regarded by Russia as its traditional sphere of influence.Even in the context of military conflicts and political instability in the South Caucasus, the EU and NATO were more concerned about and committed in the Balkans at the time.So they kept, during the 1990s, quite a low profile in the region.2 The second stage, covering the years 2000s, could be qualified as the decade of intensified institutional engagement of the EU and NATO in the South Caucasus.Over this period, the area has officially turned into a region of strategic importance, especially after September 11 th and the international fight against terrorism.For the EU, this rapprochement has also been fostered by the 2004-2007 enlargements eastwards, which brought the Caucasus much closer to Europe, and even created a common border with the region through the Black Sea.It has been boosted by "the Georgian factor" too, i.e. Georgia's official priority objective, 1 From 1991 to 2005, EC assistance to Armenia thus amounted to €380 million; assistance to Azerbaijan equaled €400 million while the one provided to Georgia reached €500 million, cf.ENPI, Armenia/Azerbaijan/Georgia, Country Strategy Papers 2007 -2013 In others words, the regional context "served to temper the Alliance's willingness to quickly get engaged in the region and pursue closer relations", cf.Regional Security in the South Caucasus: the Role of NATO, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Washington, 2004, p. 66 .For some comments on EU hesitations at the time, see Uwe Halbach, "The European Union in the South Caucasus: Story of a Hesitant Approximation", in The South Caucasus, 20 Years of Independence, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2011, 301-302.under President Mikhail Saakashvili, to become a full member of the EU and NATO.During his visit to Tbilisi in September 2012, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen indeed made a point of presenting Georgia as "a special partner" 3 , partly because of its membership aspirations.The EU and NATO's enhanced institutional involvement was based on the definition of specific interests in the South Caucasus.It was mainly driven by two core interests that may be connected with each other: access to the Caspian Sea energy resources on the one hand; security and stability in the neighbouring areas on the other hand.Starting from the early 2000s, the EU has expressed growing interest in the Caspian Sea oil and gas resources, considered as a source of diversification of energy supplies and of valuable contribution to EU energy security.In its November 2000 Green Paper, the European Commission first identified the "considerable potential for oil and gas production in the countries of the Caspian sea basin" 4 , which was then presented as a "source of non-OPEC production, extremely important" for the Union.5 After the Russian-Ukrainian gas dispute in winter 2005-2006 (and again in 2009) , the Green Paper that followed rather referred, indirectly, to the need to reduce EU energy dependence on Russia and thus called for the construction of "independent gas pipeline supplies from the Caspian region."6 As for NATO, it did not pay a special attention to energy security at the time.However, the April 1999 Strategic Concept touched upon the issue when it mentioned that "the disruption of the flow of vital 3 "NATO Secretary General praises Georgia's progress toward NATO in visit to Tbilisi", NATO News, 6 September 2012.resources" could possibly affect the security interests of Allied members.7 In addition to energy security, stability and peace were also at stake in the EU and NATO further commitment in the South Caucasus.In its December 2003 Security Strategy, the EU listed the "violent or frozen conflicts, which also persist on our borders, [and] threaten regional stability" among the key threats, more diverse and less predictable, that Europe was mainly concerned about.8 And it stated, as a strategic objective, the need to take "a stronger and more active interest in the problems of the Southern Caucasus, which will in due course also be a neighbouring region."9 At approximately the same time, NATO also expressed, in its communiqué following the June 2004 Istanbul Summit, its willingness "to further strengthen the Euro-Atlantic Partnership, in particular through a special focus on … the strategically important regions of the Caucasus and Central Asia."10 These interests were then translated into new cooperation policy and tools.The creation of new positions in the EU and NATO dedicated to the South Caucasus was instrumental in the development of closer ties.In July 2003, the EU appointed a Special Representative for the South Caucasus.Its mandate has consisted in implementing EU policy, including the objective, "in accordance with existing mechanisms, to prevent conflicts in the region, to assist in the resolution of conflicts and to pre- As far as energy security is concerned, the European Commission presented the Caspian area, including Azerbaijan, as a source of "spectacular progression" of supply potential to Europe.14 As a consequence, the area was called to form an energy corridor -the fourth one -to be reinforced with a view to further diversify and secure EU oil and gas imports.15 So the European Commission has welcomed the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil (BTC) and gas (SCP) pipelines linking Azerbaijan to Turkey through Georgia.Azerbaijan has then turned into a new oil supplier to the EU, accounting in 2011 for 4.4% of the EU's global oil imports.16 The BTC and SCP have thus become the pillars of a broader strategy aimed at the creation of a Southern gas corridor, potentially transforming Azerbaijan into a transit country between European gas markets and Central Asian exporting countries.In that regard, the Commission has supported new infrastructure projects -the Nabucco, ITGI and TAPinvolving different European countries and companies.These developments were a particular source of tension with Russia, as Russian gas company Gazprom itself suggested to transport Central Asian gas through its own infrastructure project, namely the South Stream gas pipeline.In August 2010, Russia signed a protocol with Armenia extending the lease of its 120 th military base in Gumri until 2044, i.e. 24 years more than what was initially agreed upon.The first lease agreement dated 1995 was indeed signed for a 25-year period, up to 2020, cf. "Russian-Armenian Talks", Kremlin.ru, 20 August 2012.Russia has been long discussing with Azerbaijan the terms of a lease agreement on the Gabala radar station, but no agreement has been reached so far.In 2010, Russia started importing 500 million cubic meters gas from Azerbaijan.These volumes have been regularly increased to reach three billion cubic meters in 2012, cf. "Russia to Double Azerbaijan Gas Imports", United Press International, 25 January 2012.As pointed out by some observers, Iran is perhaps "out of the game" in the regional political arena, but it is "still in the background".It indeed serves as an available partnership option which is used by the regional states whenever tensions arouse in their cooperation with other powers.At the local level, the South Caucasian states have also developed more self-confident domestic and foreign policies.This was particularly shown by Azerbaijan's decision in May 2011 to join the Non-Aligned Movement.23 In other words, the South Caucasus has appeared as a more complicated area, where more players need be taken into account as soon as it comes to consider any involvement in the region.In this context, there have been -over the last years -some signs of realignment from NATO and the EU toward the states of the South Caucasus.While NATO has reaffirmed its strategic objectives in the area, it has also refrained from making any further commitment.This was especially true for the issue of Georgia's membership.The Alliance has kept its door open to Georgia but it has not provided any clear agenda toward that end.In its November 2010 Strategic Concept, the Allied members only declared "taking into account the Euro-Atlantic orientation or aspiration" of Georgia.24 As far as energy issues are concerned, the Alliance admittedly reached a new step as it committed, in the same document, "to develop the capacity to contribute to energy security, including protection of critical infrastructure and transit areas and lines."25 It has reiterated the "critical importance" of stable and reliable energy supplies in its May 2012 Chicago Summit declaration, while adding at the same time that these issues were "primarily the responsibility of national governments and other international organizations".As a consequence, NATO will just "closely follow" relevant developments in the field of energy security.26 Finally, conflicts in the South Caucasus have been explicitly considered as "a matter of great concern for the Alliance."27 Nevertheless, NATO has clearly stated that it "does not seek a direct role in the resolution of these conflicts but supports the efforts of other international organizations, which have specific mandates for their mediation roles."28 Even though the EU has taken a higher profile in the South Caucasus, it is still divided on which strategy it should follow.In terms of gas projects, the Council approved in September 2011 the opening of talks with Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan to build a Trans-Caspian pipeline aimed at transporting Central Asian gas to the Nabucco, the ITGI and the TAP.Under these circumstances, the EU and NATO seem to be searching for a more balanced approach, based on a continued involvement coupled with a more cautious line, sometimes with some degree of reservations or reluctance to intervene.How are these developments perceived in the South Caucasus?1.Is the EU and NATO willingness to accommodate Russia and move away from a zero-sum game considered as an opportunity to play a more constructive role in the region?Or is it rather viewed as a concession made at the expense of regional states' interests, thereby changing their perceptions of the EU and NATO?2.In Conflicts in the South Caucasus are not dormant -they are active; the daily violation of ceasefire in Karabakh and the war in Georgia is the most outstanding evidence.While in the early stages of the ceasefire the risks were associated with accidental violations, the new trend -made possible by the greater consolidation of power in both states -makes the threats and risks of skirmishes are more subject to manipulations for political purposes; to advance external actor's objectives in the region, to put pressure on the other side during another round of negotiations, or to promote one's domestic agenda and to draw legitimacy from nationalistic sentiments.The entrenched institutions of the cease fire situation, which has lasted for almost two decades makes any change from the status quo in a positive direction unlikely.The negotiations on Karabakh have stalled because the Minsk Process seemingly has exhausted its highest potential to mediate and lead to a breakthrough in conflict resolution.In fact, the status quo has proved to be less risky than its possible change.Indeed, the status quo of the unresolved conflict provides a sufficient level of stability to allow Russia to maintain its traditional lever of influence over Armenia and Azerbaijan and consequently over the whole region.For Western powers tensions did not prevent major oil and transportation companies from contracting and implementing the "Deal of the Century."Thus no incentive has been created, as in case of Yugoslavia or more recently the Arab states for more decisive and concerted intervention, or to actually implement UN resolutions pertinent to the South Caucasus.However, in spite of stagnation in political affairs, there is obviously dynamism in others -such as the military.A few factors led to militarization in the region.One of them is the failure of the Caspian states to come to agreement on the security and legal status of the sea.Now every state tries to build its own naval forces, observing Russia's or Iran's unwillingness to reconcile with the new geopolitical realities.The inability to suggest an effective international framework for resolution of the South Caucasus conflicts -such as consensus-based decision mechanisms, the normative uncertainty of the OSCE framework, the unbalanced composition of the OSCE cochairmanship (France, the US and Russia), the insufficient pressure on the sides which violate international law -are the other reasons.Neither Azerbaijan and Turkey's economic embargo of Armenia resulting from the conflict (mainly due to the regional trade with Russia and Iran and extensive aid from the West) led to greater awareness in the region that colonial times are over and that if a state wants to enjoy a safe and prosperous future it should respect for the international norms of behaviour with its neighbours.The absence of economic relations between the parties in conflict was also part of non-military signals to Armenia, which violated the borders of its neighbour.This led to the fact that Azerbaijan's significant oil revenues (roughly 50 million dollars per day) have been spent on militarization of the country.On the other hand, the unresolved conflict also led to the plans for the restoration of the Medzamor atomic station in Armenia, which poses serious security challenges in an earthquake-prone area such as Caucasus.Much has been said also about the danger that uncontrolled territories pose for regional and international security in terms of trafficking and militarization due to the inaccessibility of the region to international inspectors.Geopolitically, unresolved conflicts make regional stability vulnerable to Russia's manipulation and the region is still a hostage to her interests.Although Azerbaijan's and Georgia's united efforts in the 1990s promoted NATO and EU presence in the region, Russia still retains the leverage over conflicts due to the security deficit and domestic political stagnation in the countries in conflict.The effects of the "frozen" conflicts go far beyond tensions and security risks related to the region.The case of Georgia -democracy in one separate country -is almost a success.However, with lack of resources and resulting dependence on authoritarian Azerbaijan and Russia, Georgia has limited capacity to play an important role in promotion of reforms in the region and even to sustain its own democratic achievements.Two states in conflict -Armenia and Azerbaijan -have poor record of human rights, basic freedoms, division of power and are at the end of the rating list based on the recently developed EU Integration Index.According to Freedom House Armenia is 'partly free", while Azerbaijan is a "not free" country.Both states are ruled by similar elite, which has entrenched interests in the domestic political status quo and extensively takes advantage of the "no peace -no war" situation.This includes playing the nationalistic card by the incumbents, corruption in state institutions related to the military industrial complex and security apparatus, lagging reforms in the government, and significant spending on the military.The lack of democracy often is reinforced by outside actors, who compromise their assessment of democracy progress in the countries for the sake of "stability", or any other interfering foreign policy agenda, both in Armenia and Azerbaijan.However, democracy building is an important factor in resolving major security issues in the region, as "democracies do not fight each other."The role of the EU and NATO in this regard could have been unique, as institution building in the states in transition was notably influenced by the interaction with external actors -through the mode and nature of aid policy, bilateral relations, trade, etc.At the same time, the nature of threats in the region has changed -those, caused by "weak states" were replaced by those caused by strong but repressive states.This increased the threat of radicalism, abrupt domestic instability due to the failure of evolutionary development and uncertain fate of the post-revolutionary regimes.For instance, the threat of disintegration of Georgia and Azerbaijan in the early 1990s affected stability in the region, but on the other hand the weakness of Russia allowed leaders of the same South Caucasus states to promote consolidation of their national independence and pronounce boldly the strategic course of integration in European and Euro-Atlantic structures.At the same time, while the direction of post-Soviet integration in the 1990s was mainly affected by hard security threats, this factor was complemented by institution building and the resulting political identity of the authoritarian states in the 2000s.In the case of Azerbaijan, the gradual cooling of integration aspirations was primarily caused by the inability of NATO of prioritizing its relations with Azerbaijan, as compared with Armenia, in recognition of its significant contribution to NATO-South Caucasus cooperation and of the Western states presence in the region.On the other hand the problems with Azerbaijan's Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP), which implementation dragged on indefinitely proved the reform process to be a major stumbling block on the way to integration.Thus, the emerging political identity of the state, along with hard security threats, such as the Karabakh conflict, weakened the integration momentum, and justified Azerbaijan's joining the Non-Aligned movement.NATO's policies in the South Caucasus were characterized by inconsistency.South Caucasus security policies were divided by the Karabakh conflict and relations with Russia.While Georgia and Azerbaijan expressed their intention to integrate in European and Euro-Atlantic structures, Armenia did not.Moreover, while Azerbaijani leaders -Aliyev and before him Elchibey -in a move of outstanding political courage adopted EU, US and NATO interests (through withdrawal of all former Soviet bases from its territory and granting only 10% to Russia in the major oil contract), Armenia strengthened its cooperation with Russia and continued to serve as a stronghold for Russia's interests in the region.However, neither Georgia nor Azerbaijan received preferential treatment in their relations with NATO.Azerbaijan was not "rewarded" by NATO even by political statements asserting an importance of internationally recognized borders and condemnation of their violation by Armenia.The other example was NATO's hesitation on the issue of membership for Georgia and Ukraine.NATO allies were reportedly divided on the issue of offering them the Membership Action Plan (MAP) at the 2008 Summit.Besides the factor of Russia, the slow pace of reforms of the military and in general in the country contributed to the hesitation in keeping promises regarding Ukraine and Georgia's membership.In sum, the lack of support in solving security concerns of the country like Azerbaijan, which has taken significant risks by creating conditions for the Western states to realize their interests in the region, the hesitant position of NATO regarding membership perspectives for Georgia and Ukraine and the slow pace of reforms limited NATO's influence in security of the region.The EU arrival to the South Caucasus as compared to the USA or individual states was late and her policies, much like NATO's, were inconsistent.The EU was too pre-occupied by issues of enlargement and the necessity to accommodate Russia.Thus it focused mainly on emergency situations and energy access and transportation issues.There were a few problems related to EU policy in the region.First there was an underestimation of the reform potential of the South Caucasus states, especially Azerbaijan, and their European identity which resulted in delayed support for institution building through EU programmes.The other problem was that policies were lagging behind stated strategic objectives.For instance, while pronouncing energy as a main interest in the Caspian region, the EU's diplomatic efforts were much weaker than those of Russia.The third set of problems has been inconsistency in stated objectives and the actual policy in promotion of democracy in the oil rich states, like Azerbaijan.There was permanent criticism from the side of the experts and domestic actors that the EU applied softer standards to democracy building and does not apply its mechanisms, such as conditionality, to this country, as compared to others.Last but not least is that the EU has been promoting multilateral (or trilateral) cooperation in the region -between all three states Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia-but remained passive and in a subordinate role in the resolution of the major conflict in the area.The EU stated that it supported the Minsk Process of the OSCE, which so far has not achieved any significant results.The EU's incapacity to suggest a mechanism and an effective institution for resolution of the conflict is one of the reasons of the limited role the EU can play in the security of the region.However, the EU does not utilize its major advantage -the extremely attractive nature of the EU "club" for the South Caucasus states -in the form of openness to membership perspectives.The post-Soviet history of the South Caucasus witnessed the process of consolidation of independence of two states -Azerbaijan and Georgiavis-à-vis Russia as a high risk enterprise.The leaders of both states respectively Aliyev and Shevardnadze have undertaken bold measures and policies to provide for the interests of the EU and NATO in the region.Both experienced permanent pressure in a form of attempts at coups d'états, assassinations, manipulation by secessionist groups and issues of border security.However, neither of them has ever enjoyed full-fledged military cooperation or support which would allow them to counterbalance Russia's pressure.Noticing the absence of counterbalancing support in the region and insufficient interest to regional organizations like GUAM (Georgia, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova) the states opted for individual strategies to deal with the regional security challenges.Azerbaijan has joined organizations where the power balance allowed recognizing the violation of international norms by Armenia -such as the OIC, Non -Aligned Movement and even got an observer status in African Union in 2011.The same year Azerbaijan was invited to a nonpermanent seat at the UN Security Council.Armenia continues its intense trade with Iran and Russia, with which it is closely allied militarily, and is part of the CSTO.She also depends for her survival on the transportation routes through Georgia.Georgia has chosen the way of integration to EU and NATO, and cooperates in most of the energy projects with Azerbaijan and Turkey.Thus, "frozen conflicts" continue to divide the South Caucasus, block democratic reforms, economic prosperity (first of all in Armenia), trilateral regional cooperation and integration of the region into the EU and NATO.The vicious circle of conflicts feeding the deficit of democracy and vice-versa has led to a dangerous divide in the region, pushing states in opposing directions and promoting militarization of the conflicting parties.Not all states of the South Caucasus accepted the international norms of the external relations in practice.One of the obstacles was inertia of patron-dependent behaviour of the small and poor states left since the times when Russia was determining the flow of resources between republics of the Soviet Union.In the Soviet Union, poor resources countries, such as Armenia, were enjoying support from other resource rich republics, such as Azerbaijan.This however did not lead to the sense of interdependency which usually regulates relations between independent states, as these trade and supply relations were realized through Moscow and by the decision of Gosplan.The disruption of these ties between Armenia and Azerbaijan as a result of the conflict, and afterwards joined by Turkey's embargo, was supposed to be a reminder of the regulating nature of economic relations between the independent subjects of international relations.Logically Armenia should have restrained its military involvement in Azerbaijan, which is rich and can be a beneficial provider of resources to the landlocked state.But support from Russia, and aid from Europe and the USA undermined the economic opportunities, resulting in military conflict, where Armenia openly violated internationally-recognized borders of the neighbour.Thus the perspectives of enjoying full-fledged cooperation and prosperity in Armenia only under conditions of responsible behaviour with regards to its neighbours should be promoted by the EU and NATO.This behaviour might be modelled after that of Austria during the conflict with Italy over the Tyrol area.In fact, non-interference and discouragement of the minority from secession on the neighbour's territory could be considered an internationally responsible behaviour, which would be "rewarded" by constructive cooperation between the states.Instead, NATO and the EU promote trilateral relations including economic cooperation between the states regardless of the state of affairs between them.This continues the Soviet dependence type of behaviour rather than promoting a new basis for relations between the parties as independent subjects of international relations.Any attempt to unconditional force the parties to cooperate will not lead to positive results, especially since economic cooperation is part of the bargaining tools in the Minsk Process of the OSCE.The South Caucasus is an area where none of the laws and norms of international behaviour are applied in practice.There is no a regional organization which could create a normative framework to address the violations of international law having taken place during the disputes.The problem is that those who led ethnic cleansing and mass elimination of civilians are now in power and are not brought to justice, simply because they participate in the official negotiation process.The "soft" reaction of the international community to violation and occupation by Armenia of a significant (16%-20%) part of the lands in Azerbaijan has created a sense of impunity and a precedent, which was obviously taken into account by Russia in August 2008.The only normative organization demanding unconditional withdrawal of troops from Azerbaijan territories has been the UN, but none of the five resolutions calling for withdrawal were implemented.In contrast, the OSCE Minsk group shows complete normative uncertainty allowing countries to appeal to and manipulate two principlesterritorial integrity and self-determination -and encouraging countries to find a compromise between the two principles.The justification of the mediators in this case is to call the lands (officially belonging to Azerbaijan) "disputed" (which is not the case for Georgia).There are however two clearly distinguishable elements in the conflict which are clear violation of the norms of international relations.First in the case of Russia it is the violation of Georgia's borders, and second is the case of Armenia, regarding Azerbaijan's borders.Once military gains become bargaining tools in negotiations, relations in the region lose any normative basis.The EU and NATO should direct their efforts to clearly support rules which they observe in Europe and between each other -those of inviolability of borders, protection of rights of minorities and right of displaced people to return, discourage external actors from interference and involvement in the issues of minorities in the neighbour states and discourage minorities from secessionist claims.The international community should also identify and address all cases of crimes against humanity and other violations of law.Taking into account the current power balance which does not allow bringing parties to compromise there are few possible ways out of the situation, the main principle of which is to take the solution of the conflict to the next level, which is to neutralize the major obstacles on the way to solution.As the conflicts are in essence territorial, a common perspective which would be equally attractive for all parties to the conflict and would make borders less significant could be encouraged.There have been attempts to create an open market, or trilateral "Caucasus common House", or the parliamentary cooperation, but two issues are preventing it from the success -all of the three states (or at least their populations) have a desire to integrate in a better world, rather than any uncertain Caucasus commonwealth.They prefer attachment to already successful models, which are the EU and NATO.Only by having a real perspective of such integration will the Caucasus countries be willing to delegate part of their sovereignty to a Union ruled by law and decision making based on democratic principles.This will be equally attractive to minorities, as they will be protected not only by local laws, but also have supranational guarantees of security and prosperity.While democracy is the most reliable way to resolution of conflicts, this is not a sufficient factor yet for peaceful resolution of conflict.In fact, according to Jack Snyder, democratizing societies are often torn by violent conflicts.Besides, the opponents of viewing a democracy as a factor of peaceful solution to conflicts usually refer to the possibility of election of extreme or radical leaders.Democracy however is a necessary step on the way, as it generates legitimate leadership, where power is supported by popular votes and what in turn allows the leader to compromise.On the other hand, democracy develops institutions of checks and balances and agencies which would develop alternative approaches to the resolution of conflicts.And lastly, it is democracy and freedoms that create conditions for the development of liberal values.There are some concepts and traits of liberal mindset, which are relevant for conflict resolution -tolerance, inclusiveness and equality.Transforming mindsets shaped by authoritarianism can be realized by encouraging their involvement in a greater space -integrating in European Union, globalizing through the internet or free market.With borders being increasingly challenged by information technologies, global markets and freedoms, the communities that are keeping up with the current or emerging trends will be the ones to most probably survive in this speedy transformation of the world by getting out of the provincial and modernist level and moving on to the post-modern and global world with provisional physical borders.This is the other area, where EU or NATO can help both the South Caucasus and Russia to get to the level which would allow them to escape controversies and barriers erected by modernist (or in this case Stalinist) thinking.On the Role of the EU and NATO in the South Caucasus: The View from Georgia It is easy to be sceptical about the ability of NATO and the EU (that is, the West) to contribute to greater stability and development of the South Caucasus.This scepticism is often a reaction to exaggerated expectations.So, we should probably start by getting the expectations right.NATO and the EU cannot do wonders in the region.By 'wonders' I mean three things: they (1) they cannot 'de-conflict' the conflicts, that is, they cannot bring solutions to the so-called 'frozen conflicts'; (2) they cannot turn political regimes (that are different in each country but neither of them can be described as a full democracy) into stable democracies; (3) they cannot turn poor countries into rich ones.Why is this so?The main problems are of course inherent to the countries themselves: they have the level of development, the political culture and historical legacies they have; solving a post-violent conflict by peaceful means is difficult for any country.But apart from that, this is a contested area in terms of international influence.Ambassador Philippe Lefort said that the South Caucasus is between EU and Russia; I would rather say it is between the West and Russia (US has also been active and influential here), and these two players have conflicting aims with regards to the region.The disagreement between Russia and the West over the 2008 war and the status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia is the most conspicuous -but by all means not the only -expression of this difference.One should also not forget that there are disagreements and differences within the European Union with regards to policies towards the region: some countries want the EU and NATO to be more active over Russia's objections; others prefer to keep it at arm's length.If we use the Balkans -another conflict-ridden region -as a point of comparison, the commitment of NATO and the EU, as well as their influence and capacity to bring change in the South Caucasus, are much more modest.Having said all that, I would still contend that the West is indispensable to the South Caucasus.Namely, I see an important role for NATO and the EU in three areas: (1) not allowing the conflicts to re-escalate; (2) to increase the chances for the political regimes to become more democratic than they are, and (3) increase chances for their economic development.Taking into account the lack of commitment within NATO and the EU to be strongly engaged in the region, made worse by deep internal difficulties the Union is going through, it may be proper to play devils' advocate and ask: why not to leave the region to Russia?Arguably, this might remove a bone of contention between the West and Russia.This is not a language used in official discourse in the West but we can be certain that such an idea crosses the minds of quite a few Western politicians.One strong argument against such an idea is that Russia has no resources to be a real hegemon in the region anyway: this implies both economic resources, and hard power.Russia suffers from imperial overstretch.We can see that Russia has a difficulty to take care of its own problems, and the region where this is most obvious is North Caucasus.Russia has only enough resources to play the game of a spoiler, but it has no ability to play a leading role.No less importantly, Russia also has few resources of soft power because it is not a desirable model of development.Yes, the EU is undergoing grave problems, but for peoples of the South Caucasus Europe continues to be a much more attractive model than Russia.Now I will focus on Georgia.With regards to conflicts, at this point there is no grave imminent danger for Georgia's security from its own conflicts.Under Georgia's 'own' conflicts I mean the triangle constituted by (1) Tbilisi, (2) Moscow, and (3) de facto governments in Sukhumi and Tskhinvali.Within it, the situation appears to be deeply frozen for the immediate future, which means that it is unlikely that things will get much better or much worse.Probably, the recent change of power in Tbilisi will not affect the situation much -but I will come back to this in a moment.In this sense, the August 2008 war, a tragic event as it was, may have proven to have been a stabilizing event in the long run.Georgia put this war behind her and survived, so it was an important test of statehood to be passed.It also brought greater clarity: Russia is now openly a patroncountry of Georgia's separatist regions.For obvious reasons, Georgia has no other option but to accept the status quo for the time being, but Russia has less leverage against Georgia than it used to have before the war.Theoretically, one cannot rule out Russia's military invasion -but short of that, its ability to seriously influence the situation in Georgia is rather limited.For Georgia, the greatest threats of destabilization come from its immediate neighbourhood.Namely, there are three potential conflict escalation scenarios that may have a spill over effect in Georgia: 1) resumption of military conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh; 2) possible military strikes against Iran by Israel and the USA; and 3) deterioration of security situation in North Caucasus.There is no space here to discuss each of these three scenarios in detail and in terms of their possible spill over effects for Georgia.But there is some level of consensus within Georgia's security community that there will be some in each case.Large-scale military escalation concerning Karabakh is obviously the worst nightmare, but the other two prospects are bad enough.Georgia has no capacity to influence the situation in either of those cases in order to prevent worse-case scenarios.The capacity of the West to influence the situation in the North Caucasus is very limited, but with regards to Iran and Nagorno-Karabakh it can do much more.Of course the nature of threats in these regions is very well understood and nobody needs to be reminded by the Georgians.But this demonstrates once more how important NATO and the EU are for stability in the region.In the last part of my paper, I will focus on what the recent political change in Georgia may bring to this country and the region.I will men-tion implications of this change for regional conflicts and for democratic development.This is a very recent development, so my remarks can only be tentative and preliminary.Moreover, the Georgian Dream coalition that came to power as a result of the October 1 parliamentary elections is a very diverse coalition that is only united by its opposition to the previous government, and by the personality and money of Bidzina Ivanishvili, a billionaire-turned-politician.But in his own turn, Mr Ivanishvili, who recently became Georgia's prime minister, is an untested politician and a somewhat enigmatic person, so this is an additional reason to be cautious when predicting the effect of his coming to power.But still, what happened might prove a positive development for the future of Georgia.This was a first precedent in Georgia, but also in the region at large, that power changed hands peacefully and constitutionally from the government to the opposition.Not only the result of the elections was somewhat unexpected, but also its aftermath.Most people anticipated the government party to win and the opposition not to accept defeat.Another narrative saw Saakashvili losing but also not accepting defeat.In either case, this would have implied post-election turmoil and a crisis of legitimacy of power.Therefore, there were ambivalent attitudes: the elections were seen as constituting an opening for democracy but also an opening for destabilization.So far it did only prove the former.Paradoxically, the elections had their good side for Mikheil Saakashvili and his team as well: he was vindicated in the eyes of history.Despite criticism for autocratic transgressions (some of it just and some greatly exaggerated), in the critical moment he proved himself to be a mature statesman and a democratic rather than autocratic leader.This also allowed his party to keep afloat as a democratic opposition in a new parliament.Having said all that, there is no guarantee that overall, Georgia will now progress towards a consolidated democracy.It is a widely shared concern that after the elections Georgia may follow the pattern of Ukraine: there too, the Orange coalition lost elections in peaceful and democratic elections, but under the incoming government of President Victor Yanukovich the country backtracked and became more autocratic than it used to be.There are quite a few things about Mr Ivanishvili showing that his instincts are far from democratic: he has already displayed a wish for monopolizing power as well as the spirit of retribution and witch-hunting.There are also structural challenges: it will be very difficult to balance power which is underpinned not only by administrative resources but also by Mr. Ivanishvili's immense personal fortune (roughly equal to half of the country's GDP).This does not mean, though, that Georgia is doomed to repeat the Ukrainian scenario.And here the western factor may play an important role.Why?In general, Georgia lacks many important structural preconditions for democracy.I do not only mean general socio-economic indicators: the country is quite poor, the middle class is relatively small, and about half of the people live in the countryside.There is also weak civil society development, the system of political parties hardly exists, and the dominant Church is rather influential but often takes illiberal stands.The influence of the West somewhat compensates for the lack of internal system of checks on central power.In critical moments of Georgia's political development, the West has played the role of effective (though not formal) mediator and arbiter in internal fights.It is a major moderating influence on Georgia's extremely confrontational political culture.Arguably, the influence of the West has been rather important also for making possible the peaceful transfer of power from the government to the opposition.Why is this so?The most obvious answer is: because of Georgia's commitment to join NATO and the EU, and because of the country's general western vocation that makes the majority of Georgia's people see its future as a European nation.This makes it the decisive point; will the new government keep that vocation up?Before the elections, this was major question.Saakashvili's team described Bidzina Ivanishvili as a Russian stooge.This was not just pre-election rhetoric aimed at discrediting the opponent; taking into account Ivanishvili's biography and his enigmatic nature, as well as the fact that there were quite a few openly anti-western groups in his coalition, one could have some doubts about his intended direction.However, there were no direct proofs for these allegations; therefore the government was justly criticized for this rhetoric.What can we say now?The first signs after the elections are somewhat promising.Mr. Ivanishvili and his lieutenants have made clear statements that they will continue the pro-western foreign policy of the previous government.His appointments to foreign and defence ministries, as well as the president of parliament are consistent with this.There are also signs that he actually listens to suggestions from the West.Moreover, the peaceful transfer of power created a new momentum in Georgia's relations with NATO and Europe.It is widely recognized that in October, Georgia passed a critical test of democracy so at least some objections to Georgia's further integration into the West should be lifted.It is important that there is close interaction between Georgia on the one hand and the EU and NATO on the other.This will maintain western leverage on Georgia's continuing democratic development.In contrast to that, the Georgian Dream's pre-election promises of improving relations with Russia look somewhat empty now.Russia's first reactions make it certain that it is not interested in improving relations with Georgia unless the latter makes very important strategic concessions, which means making steps towards recognizing the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and away from western integration.These are all very preliminary remarks.The coming year will be very important because it will show, which way Georgia really goes.Western players can influence that.A "Commission on Difficult Issues" to Improve Russian-Georgian Relations 1 This amazing place 2 leads us to be tolerant, patient and peaceful.I am not prepared to defend Russia's policies towards the South Caucasus, especially towards Georgia.I am convinced both States have made lots of mistakes, and much is to be learned from those mistakes, and how to develop our relationships.I would like to bring some examples on how we can improve our relations, and especially how we can affect ordinary people.We are faced with a phenomenon, after the August 2008 war; Russia has a big Georgian community concentrated mainly in Moscow and Saint-Petersburg.I noted that the number of restaurants of Georgian cuisine has rapidly increased after the August war.I counted in my district, in Saint-Petersburg, where I live, seven restaurants.Before, we had only two restaurants of Georgian cuisine.All of these restaurants are run by native Georgians, who have relatives and friends back in Georgia.And I asked them, "What do you think about our relations between our countries?"Because most of them suffered from the August 2008 consequences, they told me they would really like our relations to improve because they really need direct flights to Tbilisi from Saint-Petersburg to see their friends and relatives.They would like their friends to visit Saint-Petersburg also.They would like to develop our trade, to bring more and more Georgian goods to Russia.There was a bilateral commission established -a "Commission on Difficult Issues" -between Russia and Poland.This Commission is composed of policy makers and experts from both sides, and has two meetings per year; one in Warsaw and one in Moscow or Saint-Petersburg.Policy makers and experts discuss all the difficult issues between our countries, and try to find solutions.After that, all recommendations and considerations are submitted to Russian and Polish authorities.I am a member of this Commission and I see how we are really improving relations between Russia and Poland.For example, we also established in 2011 and 2012 a Russian-Polish Centre for Dialogue and Understanding, and its partner, the Polish-Russian Centre for Dialogue and Understanding, under the auspices of the Minister of Culture.Both Centres have their own budget, estimated at some 1 million Euros.It is not much money, but it is enough to start work, and mostly they would like to use this money to develop contacts between youth, journalists, experts, and organize events between the two countries that should improve the image of Russia in Poland, and the image of Poland in Russia.And I also hope that we will find the same solution between Russia and Georgia.As a first step we should think about establishing such a "Commission on Difficult Issues" to bring independent experts and to begin this hard work together.Forest massacre, where Soviet NKVD troops, under Josef Stalin's orders, shot more than 25000 Polish armed forces officers in the Spring of 1940 (Note of the editor).PART 2: The Role of Uti Possidetis in Determining Boundaries: Lessons for the South Caucasus The second panel of the workshop has been asked to try and identify what structural solutions might be out there to deal with particular drivers of instability in the South Caucasus region.I believe international law can be a stabilizing force and that it has an important role to play in shaping solutions.I've been asked to discuss, briefly, one particular international legal principle and to evaluate its potential impact on the conflicts plaguing the region: the uti possidetis principle.Uti possidetis is a principle bequeathed to international law by the Roman Empire.As originally defined under Roman law, uti possidetis constituted a provisional remedy between two individuals based on possession and until a final judicial determination as to ownership could be made: uti possidetis, ita possideatis (as you possess, so may you continue to possess).In the decolonization period of Latin America in the 19 th century, the principle resurfaced as a tool for determining the boundaries between the newly independent Republics.This rather obscure and neglected 'Latin American principle' was recently catapulted into the limelight by the Yugoslavia Arbritration Commission [Badinter Commission].In its 3 rd Advisory Opinion delivered in January 1992, the Badinter Commission recommended that the internal boundaries which had divided the former Yugoslav Republics should automatically become the international boundaries of the new independent States.And the Commission declared that this conclusion followed from the principle of uti possidetis.Only a few short months later, in May 1992, the sovereigntist Parti Québécois under Jacques Parizeau commissioned five renowned international legal experts ((Franck, Higgins, Pellet, Shaw, Tomuschat)) to ad-vise the Quebec government on the question of Quebec's territorial integrity in the event of secession [Quebec Report].Relying heavily on the Badinter Commission's novel interpretation of the colonial uti possidetis principle, the Five Experts assured the Parizeau government that in the event of secession, Quebec could assume legal entitlement under international law to its existing boundaries.In the decades since Opinion No.3 and the Quebec Report, there have been a number of calls to extend the uti possidetis principle to other noncolonial situations, particularly in the context of secessionist claims.However, I believe that the idea that the uti possidetis principle can provide a one-size-fits-all, legally incontestable solution to all territorial disputes is an illusion.There is much to say but I will try to summarize my two main arguments.First, there is the very fundamental question of the legal status of the principle.In the Canada/Quebec context, Quebec separatists argue that in the event of a unilateral secession, the uti possidetis principle would guarantee Quebec its current provincial territory.Indeed, uti possidetis would eliminate the specter of partition, a key issue for undecided Québécois.Experts in the rest of Canada are not all in agreement: On what basis could the officials of a newly declared independent Quebec impose this particular version of the uti possidetis principle?It would certainly not be binding on the rest of Canada by virtue of an international treaty.In fact, the only way it would have this binding effect on Canadian federal authorities is if the uti possidetis principle is considered to be a customary rule of international law.That is to say, that the practice of adhering to the uti possidetis principle in the context of unilateral secessions is supported by a general and consistent State practice and moreover, that such practice is followed out of a sense of legal obligation.In preparing for this talk, I came across at least four articles that described the uti possidetis principle as a customary rule of international law and those four articles referred to its general application in the context of the decolonization of Latin America in the 19 th century in support of this conclusion.I disagree with this assessment for various reasons but in light of time constraints, I will limit my comments to a few key points.During the course of my doctoral studies on uti possidetis, I consulted many of the official Latin American instruments of the independence period and there are actually few instances where the new Republics explicitly referred to the uti possidetis principle.It is just simply not the case that it was "generally applied" by the former Iberian colonies; there is in fact no generalized practice to be discovered in the official documents.Worse, there were competing versions of the principle among the newly independent Republics; uti possedetis juris, uti possidetis de facto, uti possidetis of 1821, uti possidetis before independence, etc.States relied on one particular version of the principle in negotiations with one neighbour and then in light of political calculations, abandoned it for another version in their dealings with a second neighbour.Thus, not only is there no generalized practice, there is also no consistent practice.Also, in 19 th century Latin America, the colonial administrators knew very little about the vast Spanish and Portuguese territories under their authority.As a consequence, even when two or three newly independent States could agree on a particular version of the uti possidetis principle and accepted that the determination of their boundaries should be resolved on the basis of that principle, more often than not it proved impossible to establish where the Spanish or Portuguese line had actually been drawn; the official colonial maps and documents proved to be hopelessly flawed.Thus, even in those few arbitrations where the Parties did try to apply the uti possidetis principle, the disputes ultimately had to be resolved on the basis of other principles: equity or effective occupation or natural, geographical features.The final point about the Latin American experience with the uti possidetis principle is that the consent of all the parties involved was essential; it was never imposed on an unwilling party.The decolonization process of the African continent adds very little relevant State practice in terms of the customary nature of the uti possidetis principle.It must also be strongly emphasized that the practice considered to this point has all been colonial State practice.There is in fact, no trace of the uti possidetis principle in any of the official speeches, pronouncement or documents of the African independence period: not in the 1963 OAU Charter or the 1964 Cairo Resolution.There was no need for the African leaders to rely on the uncertain and impractical Latin American principle of uti possidetis.The combination of two classic, fundamental international legal rights -the right of selfdetermination, which was territorially defined and was granted to each colonial people as a whole, together with the right to territorial integrity -guaranteed the territorial status quo in Africa.However, in their 1992 Quebec Report the Five Experts argued that recent post-colonial State practice had revealed the existence of a generalized opinio juris in favour of the uti possidetis principle.And in support of this extension of the principle, they referred to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia.Yet, it must be emphasized that in both of those cases, the dissolution of the parent State resulted from agreement and thus created no precedent for cases of contested secession.The 1991 Minsk Agreement, a key document for the transition to independence of the former USSR Republics, refers to the territorial integrity and the inviolability of existing borders within the Commonwealth and these principles are then reiterated in the Alma Ata Declaration.How can these clear and unambiguous references to such fundamental legal principles as territorial integrity and the inviolability of frontiers be treated as the application of the uti possidetis principle?To make such a claim, I feel, is to mistakenly believe that uti possidetis has become the incarnation of all the various rules and principles which contribute to the resolution of boundary issues.In addition, it also disregards fundamental rules on treaty interpretation as codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.As for the case of Yugoslavia, as long as the Slovenian and Croatian declarations of independence were characterized as secession attempts, the international community reiterated its commitment to the territorial integrity of the Yugoslav Federation.It was only after the Badinter Commission's critical and controversial finding that the process unfolding in Yugoslavia was one of dissolution and not secession that recognition was entertained and the issue of boundaries raised.Furthermore, an analysis of official pronouncements during the critical period reveals that political rather than legal considerations accounted for the ultimate solution adopted in resolving the Yugoslav crisis.Certainly there seems to be no evidence of a belief that international law dictated a particular outcome.It is therefore highly disputable whether these three post-colonial precedents meet the definition of custom.My second main argument is that even if it is accepted that the uti possidetis principle cannot be imposed on unwilling parties but rather that its application must be based on the consent or mutual agreement of all the parties involved, there is still a huge problem in terms of the outcome.As interpreted by the Badinter Commission and the Five Experts, the colonial uti possidetis has undergone a fundamental and unjustifiable transformation.In Latin America, the declared principle was respect for the colonial administrative divisions existing at the time of independence.However this commitment concerned lines dividing units which the struggle for independence had already placed under the control of new international actors.In some cases, a new State might embrace several audiencias (a Spanish administrative unit) as in the case of Colombia prior to 1830, of Mexico or of Peru.In other cases, States were formed on the basis of smaller administrative units within an audiencia as in the case of Paraguay and Uruguay.In other cases, the new State was founded on a larger unit -a vice-royalty -as in the case of Argentina.In the African context, devolution is a legal act with territorial implications.The critical point is that both in Latin America and Africa, two separate and distinct processes were at work: first, the identification of the presumptive units of statehood, whether by virtue of the principle of effec-tiveness or force of arms in the case of Latin America or the right of self-determination of colonial peoples in the case of Africa; and then, in a second phase, the determination of the boundaries of those entities through the application of various principles, including uti possidetis.As Angelet has so aptly commented, the principle of uti possidetis can only fulfil its stabilizing role on condition that the beneficiary of the principle is designated beforehand.For in the absence of such a designation, the uti possidetis principle can generate a multitude of solutions depending on whether independence is proclaimed at one or the other level of organization of the Predecessor State.Yet outside the colonial context, international law does not designate such beneficiaries.The uti possidetis principle as defined in 19 th century Latin America cannot account for the Badinter Commission's preindependence selection of the Yugoslav Republican borders and only the Republican borders as the new international boundaries.Why choose administrative boundaries between constituent republics but not administrative boundaries between autonomous provinces?No longer an afterthe-fact presumption as to the location of boundaries between States who have achieved independence, the principle is now deemed to apply in advance of formal independence and is used to determine the units entitled to achieve statehood.Why Slovenia but not Kosovo?Why the province of Quebec but not the northern lands of the Cree Indian nation?Such a discriminatory treatment of the aspirations of peoples can only have troubling consequences, as the eventual conflict in Kosovo eloquently confirmed.My conclusion is simple but I think important to ongoing negotiating processes in the South Caucasus: there is no automatic solution to the territorial question.The principle of uti possidetis is not a panacea and should not be seen as a cure-all.Indeed, Latin America and Africa bear witness to the fact that in the process of formation of new States, unchangeable administrative borders will not always maximize stability and public order.This is true also of the South Caucasus.What is perhaps needed is a return to the Roman law origins of the principle.Uti possidetis, as a provisional solution, would operate so as to preserve the status quo but only until the parties involved could resolve their competing claims.Withholding recognition until boundary issues had been peacefully resolved would constitute a powerful incentive for the arbitration of boundary disputes.A provisional status quo would help avoid conflict by providing a clear solution during the critical period.Existing boundaries would necessarily deserve consideration and some deference, but decision-makers would have the opportunity to consider whether a significantly better line could be drawn.Existing lines could be evaluated as to their suitability as international boundaries in terms of the age of the line, the process by which the line was drawn and the viability of the entities on either side of the line.Furthermore, a flexible uti possidetis principle would allow a consideration of alternatives to take into account minorities trapped within the new States and the respect of human rights.Condemnation of the use of force to change the status quo -clearly warranted in the context of Yugoslavia -need not necessarily coincide with the legal transformation of the status quo into a permanent solution by default.If the international community decides to intervene and to guarantee the boundaries of internal units in the context of the break-up of a State, then that decision -if agreed to or enforced -may have operative effect.This was essentially the outcome in Yugoslavia, where a decision initially taken only at the European level, was subsequently adopted and applied by the UN and endorsed in the Dayton Peace Accords.The crux of the matter is not to confuse this political process with pre-existing requirements of international law with regard to internal boundaries.Pierre Jolicoeur In this presentation, I will discuss some rarely studied aspects of secessionism and partitions, namely 1) the extent to which external support contributes to the success or failure of a secessionist movement; 2) secessionism as a response to the way a State manages its ethnic diversity; and 3) whether a post-partition society would be more stable than the pre-partition order.Outside support has always been seen as critical to the chances that a secessionist movement will fail or succeed (Horowitz 1985) .In particular supply in armaments, funding and bases are generally seen as decisive assets for secessionist groups in their endeavour to become independent.However, overcoming the old order is not sufficient as a definition of secessionist success.There has to be a moment that "makes authority", which is legitimate, and which legitimizes at the same time in the eyes of the separatist sympathisers, their supporters, as well as their opponents, not to mention the uncommitted members of the international community.This "moment of authority" is generated by the recognition of the new order.Obtaining international recognition is just as important, if not even more crucial for the success of secessionist movements.In addition to the psychological motivation of seeking recognition, there are practical implications as well.For instance, international recognition allows secessionist groups to join international organisations, to have access to funding from international institutions, and to participate in the club of countries in dealing with international relations.Those advan-tages are critical to future stability (both intra-national and regional) because they offer platforms for dialogue, which, in addition to consolidating the legitimacy of the new order, remove the incentive to use violence for the separatists to have their voices heard.Furthermore, the success of secession depends on the ability of the new order to shape the economic future of its constituents.In today's regimented international economic relations, access to World Bank funds or International Monetary Fund programmes, not to mention participation in the World Trade Organization are essential for prosperity, and prosperity is the best guarantor of continued stability.A contrario, secessionist groups without international recognition dwell in ambiguous situations, a sort of political purgatory where economic exchanges and international relations remain at an informal unofficial level.Often, these economic exchanges will take place in black market conditions, where smuggling can become a security risk for other international actors, prompting their intervention.Again, there is a clear line of consequence between unfulfilled national aspirations and unresolved disputes about sovereignty.These consequences affect everyone in a region, and sometimes beyond.This is why support and recognition is believed to be important in determining success of secessionist movements, insofar as success also means the future stability of the new order.In most cases, international support and recognition will explain the success or failure of secessionist enterprises.However why do some secessionist groups obtain international support and recognition while others don't?As we have seen from Suzanne Lalonde's contribution, international law is of some -but only limitedhelp.Of course there are fundamental principles of international law.It seems though that these principles are applied only as long as the states deem to do it.As much as certain countries -especially the weaker ones -and separatist groups would like it, the "rule of international law" is capricious.In most cases, geopolitics -i.e.Realism -is way more successful in explaining why a state accepts to recognise a newly created one.For instance, an interesting theory explaining the behaviour of states is the "vulnerability of the state".Vulnerability is here defined as exposure to outside pressure, to challenges to the independence of the existing order.The presence of potentially secessionist groups within a country, the weakness of a government's authority, the exposure to foreign pressures is important parts of the explanation.Because international law is of limited help and much depends on the power relations of states, there is absolutely no guarantee that a secessionist movement will obtain one day international recognition.The existence of de facto states over several decades is a perfect illustration of that phenomenon, even though the number of such de facto states is extremely limited.Most cases (Biafra, Katanga, Somaliland, Cyprus, Transdnistria… and of course some Caucasian polities) have to be considered as secessionist failures because features of international or internal relations remain unresolved.Since the end of the Second World War, Bangladesh is the only real case of successful secession, and potentially Kosovo can be considered as the most recent example of a successful secession.But again, insofar as stability is concerned, we have to factor in their ability to integrate the global economy.Lately, Kosovo and Serbia appear to have made a breakthrough in stabilising their relations by jointly monitoring their common borders.The discussion of patterns of secessionist movements would be incomplete if it focussed solely on a state's international behaviour.The internal behaviour of a state (i.e. how it deals with minority groups) is just as important.The rationale is that the absence of legitimate political space for minorities to air their grievances will be substituted by covert action, taking the form of political subversion or violence.Different experiences in this respect can teach us some important lessons useful to establish better practices in managing ethnic diversity.This leads me to introduce what certain authors refer to as the discrimination/accommodation debate (McGarry, O'Reilly, 1993 Federal institutions and decentralization (political autonomy) are sometimes thought to be slippery slopes leading to secession (Roeder 1991 , Bunce 1999 , Cornell 2002 .Others contend, however, that such institutions actually calm down, rather than nurture, separatist tendencies (Stepan 1999 , Bermeo 2002 .In other words, making space for a minority should not be seen as legitimation of its grievances, or right to separate.Scholars have made progress in understanding this "paradox" (Anderson) by analysing the conditions under which responsive policies of decentralisation have one effect rather than the other.There still is no consensus on this question.Nevertheless, a trend seems to emerge from the following analysts; Hechter (2000) argues that "…decentralization may provide cultural minorities with greater resources to engage in collective action… at the same time, it may also erode the demand for sovereignty".Kholi (1997) makes a related argument about "accommodation from a strong state increasing instability in the short term, but decreasing instability in the long term", whereas Lustic (2004) concluded that "increasing representativeness in fact decreased secessionist activity… representative institutions, even if not fully autonomous, thus seem to inhibit secessionism".At the same time, he also says that "rigorous repression can prevent mobilization, but only in the short term… at a great cost and without eliminating the threat of secessionism".Power sharing can be seen as more effective in the long term, yet it also tends to encourage larger minorities to develop "identity movements".Northern Ireland, Fiji, and Papua New Guinea are often cited as powersharing successes because they reduced the use of violence by secessionist groups by integrating and including these groups in decision-making.However, Nigeria, Lebanon, Cyprus, by contrast, are reminders that even carefully designed power-sharing institutions are far from being a panacea, and can sometimes exacerbate problems in divided societies.If we were to extend these models to the South Caucasus, we would still have no guarantee for the ultimate outcome on stability.Bakke and Wibbels (2006) argue that fiscal decentralisation increases the likelihood of ethnic rebellion when there are important income disparities across regions.In addition, they found that when a strong national party excludes ethnic regions from national governance, ethnic conflict is more likely to occur.Essentially, they showed that the effect of federalism is contingent on underlying social features, especially ethnic group concentration and regional economic inequality.All of these studies contribute to explain the incidence of secessionist movements.Institutional arguments, exploring the role of federalism, also try to answer a number of important questions including: 1.Why, despite decades of federal arrangements, secession happens at certain junctures, but not at others?2.How secession can occur in the absence of federal arrangements?3.Why secession happened in pre-federal times, say from the Habsburg and Ottoman empires, where none possessed federal institutions and very few possessed autonomous any form of autonomy?In general we can say that secessionists react to the state's actions, both present and past, and not only to the state's inaction, weakness, and/or institutions.Whether state policies tend toward inclusion, status quo or exclusion is likely to influence the minority leaders' reaction ranging from secession to a less radical pursuit of autonomy.Talking about secession cannot be limited to examining the struggle for separation (vs. territorial integrity), but has also to consider scenarios of what will happen after the event of secession.In the end, that is the real definition of success.Secession, much like partition after civil war, does not resolve ethnic conflicts, but merely reorders them and may potentially create new forms of violence.One reason is that the successful independence creates incentives for new groups within the newly created state to gather and to mobilize.Another reason is that individuals often possess more than one ethnic identity from which to choose, which is likely to be influenced by the new institution setting, and the aggregation of these choices may make a country look quite different than it did before independence.Chechnya is a good example of that phenomenon, and so is the former Yugoslavia, with the region of Sandžak in Serbia, or in Macedonia, with the Presevo Valley.Because international law on recognition is thought to have a life of its own, separatist groups think they can bank on it to legitimise secession, and so the apparent ease of the process encourages further fragmentation based on ethnic identity, and not on how this ethnic group has been treated within a greater polity.This said, the problem of accommodating ethnic groups, whether long established or newly constructed, is not to be taken for granted in new states. "Nationalizing states", as R. Brubaker calls them (1995) , can make life for new minorities so unbearable that the risky struggle to fight their own way out through secession becomes relatively attractive.Of course, this debate would be moot if states could more or less peacefully agree to part ways, as did Norway-Sweden or Slovakia-Czech Republic or Iceland-Denmark.This is, in fact, in law, and in practice the only way to secure future stability in secessionist contests.But states willing to part peacefully with a portion of their territory are extremely rare.Régis Genté I will speak about energy as a driver of instability in the South Caucasus.That's not an easy topic as thousands of articles were written on the subject in the last 20 years.We know that wars can happen indeed because of the energy search, the will to control export routes, etc.Could it also be the case in the South Caucasus?I will answer as a journalist, basing my opinion on some things I have observed for the last ten years in the region and pointing out some details we don't pay enough attention to, in my opinion.When I came to work in the region, ten years ago, I had the following questions in mind: why is the South Caucasus so unstable?Is it because of its hydrocarbons reserves, and the ones of the Caspian region that are or could be evacuated through the Caucasus?Would this region be so instable if it wouldn't have 3-4% of the world hydrocarbons reserves in its subsoil?Sometimes, reading the press and academic analysis, I feel that there is a prejudice to say that this instability is nurtured by the thirst for oil and gas.If we take quick look into the South Caucasus history, in the 20 th century, we see that there were three major periods of instabilities and war.Let's see if energy appetites were the cause of them: • At the end of the First World War: Even if Baku was already seen as attractive because of its oil deposits, the instability wasn't due to energy.The then instability was almost only a political and geopolitical fight, between big regional and world players.The new Bolshevik regime was trying to keep the borders it "inherited" from the Tsarist regime.The Turkish republic, after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, was trying to establish its national territory and to create a kind of Turkish sphere of influence.The Western powers, such as the UK or France, wanted to contain these two new regimes.In some extent indeed, there were also looking at the oil deposits but it was obviously not their main goal. •During the Second World War: if war came to Caucasus, it was in this case indeed because of the oil thirst.The Wehrmacht tried to pass the Caucasian mountains because it needed badly to get Baku oil. •At the end of the Cold War: The situation then is more complex, so to speak.The three Caucasian separatist conflicts were not about oil and gas.We may think that Russia was manipulating the conflict in order to keep control over the South Caucasus and the Caspian region's hydrocarbons wealth.But that's difficult to assert, because Russia at that time was then very weak, chaotic and divided on the policy to follow in the South Caucasus.Army intelligence was not thinking like the Foreign Ministry; the Foreign Ministry was not thinking like the security services' successors… which were not thinking like the Ministry of Defence, etc.But after some years, Russia having recovered, the tensions in the region became more and more about oil and gas.The West fuelled these tensions by showing a big interest for the Caspian deposits.We remember how Western experts, oil firms, or diplomats exaggerated the potential volume of reserves in the Caspian basin, speaking about 200 billion barrels while it is in reality 6 times less at least.It is in this context that the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline was built, while investors were not sure that the project would be economically sustainable.It was a political project.But again, nobody can say that this rivalry between the West and Russia was only about oil and gas, but it seems that hydrocarbons were a pretext for a geopolitical fight as a kind of prolongation of the Cold war.If now, I'm coming to what I could observe this last decade, let me speak about two events or rather series of events: The 2008 Georgian-Russian war It wasn't first of all about oil and gas.I remember how during the conflict the Russian leadership was constantly reminding the Western countries of the Kosovo recognition, the NATO bombing of Belgrade, and of the Iraq invasion.Their message was that the West should not anymore weaken Moscow in the international arena.This war was for Russia about regaining its place as a power we have to take into consideration in big decisions to be taken about the world, or at least in the wider region.The Kremlin's martial rhetoric about the South Caucasus is often motivated by the Moscow claim to get the place Russia believes it deserves in the world community.It was indeed again the case a year ago; when Moscow felt that it could lose its influence in the Middle East (Israel was speaking more about strikes on Iran while the West was asking Assad to step down in Syria).Two events, during the 2008 war, were directly connected to oil and gas.The first one is the launch of a few bombs close to the BTC, in the South of Tbilisi.Georgian authorities interpreted this bombing, which was not aiming at damaging the oil pipeline, as the sending of a message: "We can destroy your oil pipes if we want."Certainly, Russia could, but it didn't want to go into a direct confrontation with the West.That's an illustration of how the Caucasus is at the moment a place where proxy wars can happen.The second event is the train carrying oil wagons which exploded at the end of August 2008, after it ran on a mine put on the railway around Gori city.Again, it seems to have been the sending of the same clear message.It seems that 2008 war was about big politics.As Tolstoï says, in War and Peace, wars happen because of plenty of causes, and no one is the only reason of it.But obviously energy thirst can contribute heavily to fuel the flames.That's probably why in 1994, the Azeri President Heydar Aliyev did his best to include Russia in the "deal of the century", giving finally to Lukoil 10% of the Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli field.This man, who knew as nobody the Kremlin's inner logic, thought giving a share to Russia in the project was the best way not to anger Moscow and eventually push it to destabilize the South Caucasus.Let me first remind you two figures, which are strangely always underestimated.These last few years, Gazprom's volume of exports to Europe was around 30% of its production.This little one third represented about two thirds of Gazprom's income.It means that Kremlin's political ambitions are for a huge part coming from the Gazprom's sales to Europe.That's why, in my understanding, Moscow was so tough on the Nabucco issue, and consequently with the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline.I never heard any Russian official, whether politicians or energy specialists, saying a single word against the Chinese gas pipelines projects in Turkmenistan even if exports reach about 40 billion cubic meters (bcm) or more per year.For me, it is clear that Moscow is glad to see these huge amounts of gas going to East… and not to the market Gazprom wants to keep as much as possible for itself, Europe.The pipeline war, between the Nabucco/EU project and the Moscow/South Stream competitor project, is rooted in this will to keep for Russia the European market.And all the controversies, for example on the real amount of gas reserves in Turkmenistan, on the Trans-Caspian pipeline are also coming from the same reason.In 2011, there was even some threatening Russian rhetoric towards Ashgabat.It was not formulated by Russian officials, but by experts reportedly quite close to the Kremlin and Gazprom.Somebody like the Turkmen President, Gourbanguly Berdymukhamedov, probably didn't fear a Russian military invasion.But he knows how the Kremlin can play a big role to overthrow a post-Soviet president.He knows how Moscow heavily contributed to kick out the Kyrgyz President, Kurmanbek Bakiyev, in April 2010.Europe didn't understand, or didn't want to understand, what Turkmenistan has been saying since 2007, that it really wants to diversify its clientele; "everyone is welcome to take our gas at our border."When Mr. Barroso went to Baku and Ashgabat in early 2012, he encouraged the Turkmen leader to be more courageous.But what Turkmens are saying is that it is to the EU to be more courageous.Taking Turkmen gas to Turkmenistan's borders means taking it on the Eastern shores of the Caspian Sea.It means that it is Brussels who has to deal with Moscow to get an agreement to allow building a gas pipe under the Caspian Sea.Ashgabat thinks, and it is probably true, that it is too weak to challenge Moscow on such an issue.To conclude, let me remark three things: 1) Indeed energy has rarely been the main driver of instability in the South Caucasus, but it can become so potentially.2) If Europe wants to get Turkmen gas, it needs to engage Russia in a big bargain to be "allowed" to lay a gas pipeline under the Caspian Sea.For example, it supposes giving Russia the possibility to benefit from Western technology to modernize its energy industry and improve its terribly low energy efficiency.But the EU, which is divided, seems far from ready for such a discussion.What I say might change slightly with the shale gas revolution.Nobody knows at the moment what will be the impact of that revolution.But as America won't import gas anymore, who knows if they will keep a very strong position in the Caucasus to defend the "Western" pipelines projects.Who knows if Europe, which will buy more liquid natural gas (LNG) from Qatar for example, will really fight to get Turkmen gas in the future?More importantly, who knows what will Russia's strategy be to counter the shale gas revolution?The South Caucasus: Russia's Perspective Russia: Outsider and Insider to the Region What makes Russia an insider?It is geography, first of all, with the Russian North Caucasus 'internal abroad' as it is called by some experts, which is an organic part of the region, inseparable from its southern counterpart beyond the Caucasian range.There is an extremely complicated ethnic mix there with close relatives from both sides of Caucasian mountains.There are also 'divided nations' -Lezgins in southern Daghestan and northern Azerbaijan and Ossetians both in Russia (North Ossetia) and Georgia (South Ossetia).Second, there are big ethnic Caucasian diasporas not only in North Caucasus (Armenian, first of all), but everywhere in Russia including in Moscow, where number of ethnic Azeri, Georgian and Armenian nationals in total is equal or even exceeds the population of individual South Caucasian states.Finally, there are very intensive business connections, which have direct political implications.One can recall the Russian-Georgian tycoon Bedzina Ivanishvili, who became the prime minister of Georgia in October 2012, and the recent case of well-known Azeri moguls and public figures in late September 2012 establishing the Union of Azeri organizations.The North Caucasus is the remains of the former Soviet empire and many of its current problems originated in the USSR.Being an 'internal abroad' as some experts put it, it creates the biggest challenge for Russia now.There are both specific regional problems and all-Russian problems like weak institutions, huge corruption etc.,which reach extreme expression in the region.Proper Caucasian problems are connected not so much with poverty, but with huge inequality, lack of social development and archaic clan social organization.The scale of problems there which have been accumulating since before the Soviet era, even in czarist time and has huge meaning.Among other things, problems can't be fixed without implementing a long-term and painful strategy which carries risks of instability.The problem is that the Russian government, being overwhelmed by short-term tactical consideration, is hardly in a position to work out and to implement such a strategy.It started in 2003, when on the eve of forthcoming presidential elections Vladimir Putin, in order to demonstrate the glorious character of his war in Chechnya, decided to install one of the Chechnya's warlords Ahmed Kadyrov.In exchange for his personal loyalty, he helped him against other warlords, which created a vision that the war is over and the situation is under control.Since that time Putin is hostage to a choice he made in 2003.Instead of trying to deal with the essence of Caucasian problems Moscow is saturating them by money, trying to buy loyalty from local elites.Not only is it ineffective, but it is counter-productive because it maintains or even increases social inequality.The Russian perspective about the Caucasus and the wider security problems of that region are provided by the Levada Centre's 2011 Annual Report.The figures that follow come from that report, and indicate the tendency of public opinion, also as it relates to the Federal authorities handling of tensions in the region.1 When answering the question whether some ethnic groups should be limited to live in Russia, respondents put 'Caucasians' in first place (39% in 2011), ahead of Chinese (30%) and those who originate from Central Asia (26%).The phobia against 'Caucasians' replaced anti-Semitism.42 per cent think that Russian authorities will never manage to provide order and peaceful life in the Caucasus, and another 38 per cent think that it is possible but in many years, while 13 per cent think that Chechnya and maybe other North Caucasian republics will secede from Russia.When answering the question whether Russian authorities can control the situation at the Caucasus the share of those answering in the affirmative (49%) almost doesn't differ from the share of those answering in the negative (40%).This is nevertheless a great amelioration as some years ago the latter dominated in a 2:1 proportion.However only 5 per cent think that Federal authorities now control the situation in the Caucasus entirely, another 29 per cent more think that the Federal level controls the situation most of all, while 43 per cent think that they control the situation to a lesser extent, and 10 per cent think that authorities don't control the situation at all.Almost two thirds (62%) think that the war in the Caucasus will continue decreasing in intensity, but that this will be a long-term process.Evidence for this tendency is provided in Table 1 .As a mean to fix problems of North Caucasus tougher control over North Caucasians coming into Russia is at first place (36%), 26 per cent would use all the Russian Army might to mercilessly crush secessionist movements forever, 18 per cent got both peaceful solution including negotiations with separatists and militants, from one side, and breaking North 1 Levada-Center Annual Report 'Public Opinion-2011', http://www.levada.ru/sites/default/files/levada_2011_0.pdf Caucasus away from Russia while maintaining open the possibility for those who want to resettle in Central Russia.With regard to Chechnya 11 per cent consider that its secession has already taken place, 23 per cent would be glad if it did take place, while 28 per cent would not worry if so, with only 12 per cent being against such an opportunity and 13 per cent more being ready to oppose such a development by all means including military.When answering the question whether life in Russia will become more or less calm and peaceful in case the North Caucasian republics secede, respondents are split half and half.With regard to the slogan 'Let's stop feeding the Caucasus' 28 per cent definitely support it with another 34 per cent rather supporting it.Another 18 per cent don't support it and only 6 per cent definitely don't support it.The knowledge concerning Russia's relations with the South Caucasus states is not that big with Armenia and Azerbaijan being in the second echelon of countries to be known as Confederation of Independent States (CIS) members (27 and 22 per cent respectfully).12 per cent of respondents were mistaken in thinking that Georgia is a CIS member as well along with Abkhazia (12%) and South Ossetia (9%).The balance of positive and negative attitude toward Georgia which has been oscillating over the last decade from +10% to -20% has reached -60% in late 2008, and now moves to 0.The usual speculations about Armenia being brother in faith and a Russian bastion in the Caucasus endure.It's not so evident in public opinion where Armenia goes eighth (11%) in the list of friends and allies, with Azerbaijan being tenth (9%) and Georgia 36 th (2%) just near South Korea (2%) and Iran (1%).Georgia leads in the list of Russia's enemies (50%) being far ahead of everybody else, with Azerbaijan (5%) and Armenia being neighbours once again in 14 th and 16 th position.However the instability which arisen from the power vacuum in the region became a source of concern for Turkey.Turkey which has traditionally avoided being involved in regional politics has been drawn into volatile new conflicts in the Caucasus.Celebrations of the fall of the Soviet Union have been short-lived.The newly rediscovered Caucasian borderlands transformed the Turkish-Soviet border in an area of instability and brought the risk of a direct confrontation with Russia, reminding of the recurrent Turkish-Russian wars of the past century.The conflicts are spilling over into Turkey.Turkey discovered her own Caucasian identity and became an insider to regional dynamics.The Chechen, the Georgian-Abkhazian and the Nagorno-Karabakh wars have become part of the domestic Turkish agenda with large parts of the population showing sympathy for one or another of the conflicting sides.According to some unofficial data -censuses in Turkey don't collect any data on the ethnic descents of the population -the total number of Chechens and Abkhazians in Turkey can outweigh the populations of Chechnya and Abkhazia proper.The Diasporas can therefore emerge as powerful and unsettling lobbies within Turkey.Generally speaking, Turkey's policy towards the South Caucasian Republics aims at the strengthening of political institutions, the fostering of economic viability and military reforms.In this respect Turkey's approach to the region precedes the launch of the Euro-Atlantic integration processes.The independence, sovereignty and stability of the region are considered as important for Turkey's own security and regional ambitions.In the second half of the years 2000, economic growth and internal political stability allowed Turkey to increase considerably its external action capacities in its neighbourhood.The need to project stability beyond its borders is more than mere rhetoric in the case of Turkey.It defines a real strategic objective.Turkey's neighbourhood policy as formulated by the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Davutoglu, aims at helping to secure and nurture a peaceful, prosperous, stable and cooperative environment conducive to human development at home and its neighbourhood.This proves to be a difficult challenge in the complex and conflicting environment where Turkey is located.More specifically, five different range of factors are underlying Turkey's approach to South Caucasus: 1) Balancing of its NATO commitments; 2) The development of good neighbourly relations with Russia have indeed become the major strategic gain at the end of the Cold War; 3) the shared interest with Georgia in positioning itself as a transit hub for hydrocarbons.Furthermore Georgia has become Turkey's gateway to the rest of the Caucasus and Central Asia after the closure of its border with Armenia; 4) the sense of solidarity with Azerbaijan claimed to be based on ethnic kinship, which is conditioned domestically to a large extent by a nationalistic discourse; 5) and finally, the historically fraught relationship with Armenia and current impossibility to normalize intergovernmental relations between Ankara and Yerevan.Has Turkey been able to develop leverages powerful enough to impact positively on the regional and domestic dynamics in South Caucasus?Turkey's role in South Caucasus cannot be analyzed separately from its broader relationship with Russia.Throughout the last decade, Turkey has grown more deferential towards Russia's regional strategic interests.Turkey tries to work with rather than against Russia.Paradoxically this deferential attitude doesn't represent a limitation; it enlarges Turkey's room for manoeuvre and underlines Russia's implicit acceptance of Turkey in the post-Soviet geography.Turkey is a factor that has to be dealt with in security equations.Turkey and Azerbaijan signed a defence pact which includes a mutual assistance clause.Its signature has been possible with Russia's implicit understanding of its more symbolical aspect; this explains the latter's restrained reaction.Turkey has been acting as a security provider for the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline and by extension to Georgia; although its security-based relationship with Turkey has been overshadowed by NATO and US involvement.One can argue that the Turkish factor proved its efficiency during the 2008 war which opposed Georgia to Russia by providing security to the port of Batumi and the airport of Tbilisi.The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline became facts on the ground respectively in June 2006 and March 2007.The region matters therefore for Turkey's energy security.Turkey's actions in South Caucasus face serious limitations as long as it can't have a direct influence on the dynamics of conflict settlement.The proximity to the region is both an aide and hindrance to diplomacy.Turkey is too close to the theatre.Its capacity to use hard power is seriously restricted not much because of its lack of freedom of action and independence but because of the risks it involves.The decision to send troops across borders can have far-reaching consequences.Turkey's main contribution can be in reshaping the geopolitical discourse in the region away from a grand chessboard of great power confrontation.The future of the region depends on its re-orientation away from regional polarization.It is necessary to promote pragmaticallyoriented approaches based on self-interest and business initiatives, and to stress the importance of economic competition, rather than political confrontation and domination.The Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform announced in the context of the 2008 war could have been a significant step ahead in this respect.It is unfortunate that it had remained short-lived.Regional momentum triggered from inside can develop the much-needed sense of accountability and ownership.Inclusiveness requires a healthy communication with all without any discrimination.A pragmatic approach can help to build trust and cooperation in the context of mistrust and mutually perceived threats.Turkey has the potential to support transformation and reform processes within the societies of South Caucasus through soft power means.Turkey is the only country that can compete with the soft power of Russia in the region.Its force of attraction is based on economic growth and its liberal visa regime.Turkey has become a major destination for tourism, trade and work for people from the region.3.5 million Russians, 1.1 million Georgians, 500 000 Azerbaijanis and 72 000 Armenians visited Turkey in 2011.The nascent middle classes travelling to Turkey for work, trade or tourism become lucid enough to acknowledge the need for social and political change at home.Turkey's new strength, its experience in building a strong, modern economy and its ambition to trade and integrate with its neighbours offer a chance to bring more stability and reduce conflicts.Turkey's approach can help shape a vision of a region in which security and economic interests are pursued pragmatically by all states and citizens and within a framework of cooperation aiming at a normalization of relations.However the current state of the relations with Armenia will keep on seriously curtailing Turkey's outreach in South Caucasus.Furthermore the transformation of this soft power and force of attraction into a vector of influence to be used in the field of preventive diplomacy and mitigation of tensions requires enhanced political engagement and strategic planning.PART 3: The Internal Threats to the South Caucasus Region The main threat to the South Caucasus region comes from inside not from the outside.The region is broken into parts, some internationally recognized and some not, and the various parts challenge one another.Sometimes external actors also create challenges but Iran or Turkey, Russia, CSTO or NATO are much less challenging to the nations of the South Caucasus than Armenians are to Azerbaijanis, Azerbaijanis to Armenians, Georgians to Abkhazians, and so on.External actors are certainly aware of this fact.Everyone understands that conflicts are holding back the region's development.And therefore, Western and international players have been trying to promote the resolution of these conflicts ever since they began engaging with the region.During twenty years, efforts to resolve ethno-political conflicts have involved every kind of international body and actor in a wide variety of formats, from official negotiations to Track Two diplomacy.However, all these efforts and formats have always been inefficient.The US, the EU, NATO and the UN have -to their great surprisefound that the parties in conflict, instead of cooperating, are doing their best to prevent a settlement, although it seems to be in their best interest to cooperate.This resistance has made the regional engagement of external actors very problematic.Pressure on the political leadership of the parties in conflict -whether internationally recognized states or internationally unrecognized de facto states -does not lead to any results, because resistance to resolution efforts from inside the region remains stronger than the pressure applied from outside.Being smart and creative does not help either.The parties in conflict reject all conflict resolution scenarios, however well elaborated.They don't reject particular scenarios -they reject them in principle, because in the eyes of the parties in conflict, negotiations are either a continuation of warfare using other methods, or a useless activity imposed by the powerful external actors.Consequently, stakeholders only pretend to engage in negotiations.The result is a sometimes rather realistic but always hypocritical imitation of a peace process.Worse still, since the external players who are applying the pressure are different actors with different stakes and concerns, they always have some disagreements on how things should be done in the region.The parties in conflict soon learn to play on those disagreements in a way to make the negotiation process meaningless and make sure it does not affect the status quo in any significant way.In my opinion, this means that we cannot resolve the conflicts by just dealing with the conflicts.From numerous examples worldwide, we know already that it is wrong to see the conflicts as isolated problems that can be handled separately from other political or societal concerns.This approach is a priori doomed to failure.The problems are not just about the conflicts themselves but about the stakeholders -leaders, states and societies included.Everywhere they happen, ethno-political conflicts are deeply rooted in the political, cultural and social lives of the region.They are not random unfortunate incidents, nor are they the result of the evil will of individuals.Of course, for people involved in the conflicts, it is comforting to think that they are the fault of 'bad guys'; Soviet politicians, local post-Soviet politicians, world powers, or international cartels.This way, you don't have to accept responsibility for the conflicts, or for their resolution.Apparently, a productive scenario for external engagement in the region should involve putting the conflicts in perspective.In terms of political science, there is a logical explanation for both the origins of the conflicts and the parties' unwillingness to resolve them or to accept responsibility for them.The explanation is that ethno-political conflicts are intrinsic to the historical development stage at which the South Caucasus region now finds itself.In terms of identities and visions, the region's current develop-ment stage is rather similar to the late 18 th -early 19 th century in Western Europe, or the early 20 th century in Eastern Europe and Central Europe.At that stage, empires fall apart into nation-states.In these terms, contemporary post-Soviet society is Modernity that began here two centuries later than in the West and almost a century later than in Eastern Europe.The reason why it didn't happen earlier is that the creation of the USSR preserved -or re-created -imperialism in this part of the world, and kept it going for an extra 70 years.The emergence of nation-states never goes conflict-free.In the post-Soviet world, like in Central Europe a hundred years ago, the nationstates were ethnicity-based projects. "Nations" were understood as ethnic domains, which is always problematic because ethnic groups often live on both sides of any administrative border.Besides, while changing hands from empire to empire, the South Caucasus region grew a complicated history of border-drawing and administrative divisions.As a result, some of the nation-state projects overlapped in a really bad way, with two (or more) ethnic nations claiming 'ownership' of the same territory.This means that, on the level at which they originated, the conflicts cannot be resolved.In a zero-sum game, whatever one party in conflict gains, the other party loses, and its ethno-national identity is badly damaged.Within this paradigm, there is no such thing as a good scenario for conflict resolution.The goal of a peacemaking initiative is to leave the paradigm altogether.Ideally, one needs to teleport all stakeholders from the 18 th to the 21 st century, from zero-sum-games to problem solving.However, this is a very complicated task, much more challenging than writing up conflict resolution scenarios.One could, however, say that the search for scenarios, and pressure on the stakeholders to implement them, is not just useless.The risks here are the wars that periodically break out.Although caused by very old 18 th century paradigms, the wars are fought with very modern 21 st century weapons.Each new round may be fought at a higher technical level, causing even more destruction than the wars that happened in the region in the early 1990s.When thinking of the alternatives, many peacemakers say that the region needs more democracy.If we democratize the societies, the conflicts will go away.However, in the societies of the South Caucasus, more democracy will not necessarily mean less conflict and more integration.In history, there have been situations when societies democratically elected leaders with nationalist or even aggressive agendas.The societies of the present-day South Caucasus may prove even more radical with regard to the conflicts than their leaderships are.This does not mean that we need to stop democratization in order to resolve conflicts.It means that democratic institutions, however useful, are not enough to prepare societies for resolution.Identity and culture are vital.They will need to change quite a bit before the conflicts can go away.Cross-border efforts at 'building trust' are not working either.Crossborder trade, civil society projects, educational exchange and joint activism, in a variety of spheres from women's rights to environment, all seem to involve a small circle of the same people.Participants of these projects form an international network of people who have learned to cooperate across borders but remain marginalized in their own societies.At best, these activists feel isolated from the societies; in the worst case scenarios, they are hated or even oppressed.Again, the problem is not about institutions or individuals.It's about paradigms.Changing paradigms does not require dealing with the conflicts; it requires working with the societies.Ideally, the issue is not to draw the 'right' borders but to build new, dramatically different societies.Once this happens, the developments will lie in a different paradigm, which we cannot imagine now, just like people living in 18 th -century Alsace-Lorraine were unable to imagine the role that Strasbourg would one day play in the European Union.I am not trying to say that external actors in the South Caucasus must be prepared to engage here for the next two hundred years.However, I believe that they should also give up the idea of getting things done in a year or two.In the contemporary South Caucasus, the frozen status of the conflicts is not a bad result.The preservation of the status quo in the medium or even long-term perspective is not a sign of failure.It is not a setback, but a respite, a relatively peaceful environment in which some very important things can be done to modernize societies, not just governments.The societal transformation required for changing the existing paradigms can include activities in the sphere of discourse development, education and media.The current emotional discourses around the conflicts will need to be replaced with rational ones.Very few rational thins are currently said or written about the conflicts.This will require engaging scholars but also working with the media and journalists' education and training.Cross-border projects are a good idea but they will need to change in order to become effective.The participants of these projects usually give feedback to their societies.However, most of the time they only talk to people who already support the ideas of peace and cooperation.In order for something to change, they will need to start talking to people who don't agree, such as ethnic nationalists or opponents of modernization.So far, in our countries it is normal that people with contrasting views hardly ever talk to each other.They have their own NGOs, blogs and discussion clubs.For paradigms to change, we will need to build a culture of rational informed debate between supporters of contrasting ideologies and worldviews.The societies will need to move towards a more modern and more European model, based, first, on diversity (including diverse approaches to conflict resolution) and second, on efficient mechanisms of inclusive governance.In both, European actors can help a lot.Another key step that external players can take is to put an end to the international isolation of the de facto states, so as to ensure their modernization, transformation and democratization.Something that European actors can also help us to do is to shift conflict perception into the human dimension.This way, conflicts will no longer be perceived as territorial disputes, but as problems faced by people.Overall, a good way to invest into the region is not resolving conflicts but changing people in order to create a new environment in which the conflicts can be resolved.The South Caucasus could be characterized as a producer of instability; producer as well as consumer of security.These different roles have made domestic and international politics complex and volatile.The presence of big actors having interests in the region (Russia, US, Turkey, Iran and EU) have contributed to local actors' searching for safe havens for security among these players.Armenia is oriented mostly towards Russia and partly to Iran; Georgia -mostly towards Europe and United States and Turkey; Azerbaijan has developed a special policy of balancing among practically all regional players.As professor Neil McFarlane mentioned earlier this year in Tbilisi during the PfP Consortium Annual Conference, this diversity of approaches inside and outside the region creates doubts whether the South Caucasus can be termed a case of regional integration.Perhaps it could be considered as a region (like the Balkans or Middle East), but the question remains; can it be taken as granted when it comes to regional integration?The lack of a more or less clear idea of "belonging" to a region from the countries has also created various tendencies with the process of democratization: Georgia (adhering to Western principles of liberal democracy) shows more interest in transforming its state and civil institutions according to a liberal democratic state model.Armenia has been caught between authoritarian and democratic tendencies (with manipulated elections but relatively free assembly, media and freedom of association practice).Azerbaijan has demonstrated an obvious retreat from democracy-building after 2003 with nominal freedom of media, assembly and association and constantly rigged elections.Therefore the biggest question is whether values or interests should prevail in the region, especially when it comes to Azerbaijan, which is the dominant economic player due to the rich energy resources.It is a legitimate question of Realpolitik versus Idealpolitik that, "will the West lose its power and positions (to Russia or Iran) in the region if it sticks only to its values and principles and forgets about its interests (economic and security)?Or can values and interests coexist and mutually reinforce each other?Can we be convinced that value-based politics/policies would lead eventually to basic interests being fulfilled?The oil and gas resources of Azerbaijan can be a stabilizing factor for the moment.However, in the long run, the region is yet to see the consequences of flattening, decrease or eventually termination of energy resources.The expectations that are raised due to the energy production and the security it provides for the region might explode like a balloon after the oil is over.I remember here a song by a prominent Russian dissident group DDT "Kogda zakonchitsa neft" (When the oil runs out).It's a great optimistic song about Russia's post-oil period, but I wouldn't be that positive; the prospects of the post-oil phase for Azerbaijan look more volatile.Democratic peace theory has for a long time been advocated by many in academia and among politicians.The assumption (and empirical data proves that) is that democracies do not fight each other.However, this theory does not give an answer to following questions: a) does this thinking help when we talk about non-or semi-democratic polities (among which countries actually strive for democracy and some not necessarily).It has been considered as a valid argument.Also, whether democratization is going to contribute to more peace is not certain.Russia's role in the region after 1990s has been one of keeping ethnic conflicts open and managed by the various leverages it possesses.I believe starting from the 2000s Russia restarted to employ its "cultural hegemony" (in Gramscian terms) at a moment when the Russian politi-cal culture of the ruling elite was being launched anew.Especially, the ruling elite in Azerbaijan have largely withdrawn from the track of democratization.Moreover, the presence of ethnic conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan and the occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh and neighbouring areas have created not only an open-ended military-security and humanitarian problem for the region, but it strengthened anti-democratic tendencies in both countries.The conflict has given additional tools for ruling political elites to manoeuvre so as to ensure the survival of ruling regimes.Thus, every issue of domestic politics (including democratization) is deemed to be viewed through the prism of this international conflict.This factor (along with others) has reduced the space of democratization potential in Armenia and Azerbaijan.The current situation in the region has not improved since the wars of the early 1990s came to a stalemate over Nagornyi-Karabakh between Armenia and Azerbaijan, with the two countries engaged in an arms race at least since 2006.There is evidence that the increased defence spending on the Armenian side has the consequence of denying the government the tools to address critical social issues in terms of health and nutrition.At the same time, Azerbaijan, which has rebuilt its armed forces thanks to revenues generated from its natural resources, could be in for a shock when the oil and gas reserves start dwindling in 2014.There is virtually no contact at all between the two countries besides meeting of their presidents under Russian auspices or in the framework of different conflict workshops that have however taken place years ago.In Georgia, the relationship between the central powers in Tbilisi and the breakaway entities of Abkhazia and South Ossetia has changed dramatically since the Georgian-Russian war in 2008 with the following recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states by Russia Previous contacts with the breakaway entities have stalled or are to-day functioning differently in a decreased manner in comparison to what they used to be.The 2008 war and its outcome meant for NATO and its members a visible contradiction to its Kosovo policy, for Russia an additional complicated surrounding taking into consideration her own policies towards the Northern Caucasus.Channels of communications between Moscow and Tbilisi have been opened in the wake of the French mediation following the 2008 war and take place to-day in the framework of the Geneva talks.The recent election of Mr. Ivanishvili as Prime Minister of Georgia seems to have provided the grounds for maintaining to make towards a region composed of non-members, and obedience to the will of the various NATO member States which decide on its strategic direction.In consequence, the Alliance members decide the Alliance's priorities.One of the lessons of the Georgia-Russia war of 2008 is that perceptions of security provisions and the actual delivery may differ widely.For example, the 2008 NATO Summit declaration in Bucharest stated unequivocally that "Georgia would one day be a member of NATO".This has the effect of an official promise by the organization.But this promise is mitigated by the other statement that "decision on enlargement is made by NATO members only, and not by third parties."This statement can be aimed at Russia, but it is also aimed at any candidate member, from any part, and reiterates that it is not NATO as an organization that makes such decisions, but as an Alliance (its member countries).Failure to heed this nuance reveals the depth of misperception between regional and outer regional (EU, NATO) approaches.In consequence, a possible policy recommendation could be framed in these terms: 1.Manage expectations rather than letting rhetoric build an alternative reality.EU and NATO counterparts to the region should reiterate that the level of engagement of their institutions is predicated upon the political agreement within their respective structures.This process should start with the sine qua non condition of engagement, which is shared by both the EU and NATO, and, one believes, by Russia as well, namely: no war.Avoid rhetorical entrapment by instituting mild conditionality.EU and NATO, having clarified their positions with regard to the region and in consultation with Russia, could leverage their respective engagement initiatives (Eastern Partnership, IMAP, IPAP, etc.)to strengthen the commitment of the non-use of force in developing solutions to regional security challenges -if these instruments however are of interest for the parties (special case Azerbaijan).Clarify terminology.One of the Soviet Union's legacies to the post-Soviet republics is a penchant for ambiguity.Too much is read between the lines, and not enough trust is put in the value of what is actually expressed.Frankness has its value, and EU and NATO officials should not fear for their institutions' credibility by speaking plainly, even in public formats.Discussions on objective conflict resolution mechanisms have yielded that international law and the practice of state recognition had not offset the threat of instability.The international doctrine of uti possidetis, which means that one uses what they possess, and vice-versa, has evolved after the Balkan Wars of the 1990s to an ulterior meaning involving the control by an ethnic group over a specific territory can often yield to secession (external self-determination).Evidence has also been presented to show that although certain political secessions can on the surface be successful; the ensuing cascade of secessionist grievances created by newly-former minorities (in the new independent state) will perpetuate instability, and pose problems for other powers by the precedent thereby created.A seemingly evident policy recommendation imposes itself; 1.Insist on mutual consent of the parties, regardless of the decision.If the internationalization (i.e. the involvement of large and legitimate international bodies, like the UN, the International Court of Justice, the OSCE or the EU) of the South Caucasus con-1 This could be the basis for a renewed program of engagement by the EU and NATO, but also of particular frameworks of youth interaction based on education exchanges aimed at clarifying recent history, building understanding of international actors' interests and international law's limits.flicts is to meet with a happy end, the involvement of international law and the practice of state recognition, if needed, should be directly linked upon the mutuality of the decision by the parties in conflict.While this seems evident, large regional powers, namely Russia and Turkey, will more easily accept an entity's decision to separate if that decision is somehow made with the consent of the (former) central authority (i.e. Baku, Tbilisi or Yerevan).It has even been suggested that "joint sovereignty" is a worthy subject to explore.2. "Commissions on Difficult Issues".Because reliance on international law may not yield the stability hoped for, it may be necessary for the parties to engage in constructive bilateral talks on their own initiative.These initiatives should be formally rewarded by the EU and NATO, and/or by great powers.The example provided by the Russia-Polish Commission is worth following, and the beginning of such contacts may be in the works between Tbilisi and Moscow, which we all applaud.Participants insisted on the fact that the conflicts in the region were protracted because of the absence of contact between parties.This is a characteristic of the Armeno-Azerbaijani conflict mostly.The desire for stability and a constructive resolution of the conflict has to come from within.This reality has helped shape the discussion as to what can be achieved, and towards which audience initiatives should be aimed.In particular, there was no consistent agreement that (mostly for Armenia and Azerbaijan), appealing to the political regimes in the region as opposed to the civil society would lead towards a relaxation of tensions.The following recommendations have been brought out: A Two-Track Approach Focusing on the Elite and Civil Society in Parallel.The political sphere in the region is also hostage to frozen conflicts.Though some political actors may depend on the continuation of conflict as a backdrop to their political power, it follows that only a change in public opinion about the conflicts can lead the political elite to adopt a more conciliatory tone.This is why the "Track 1" method of official diplomacy should be maintained by keeping the Minsk Group channels open, or strengthened by renewed engagement of other actors EU; NATO?).At the same time, efforts should be made to offer the respective public/civil society within the region access to alternative points of view on the conflicts without necessarily exposing the EU, NATO or any other actor to the charge of intervening unduly in internal affairs, which the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 prohibits.Develop Incentives for the Political Sphere.Creativity should be applied in finding ways to reward political elites for adopting less confrontational policies or agreeing to confidence-building measures to resolve their conflict.For the purpose of these policy recommendations, the definition of political elites should include the elites of the unrecognized regions, their IDPs as well as the different lobbying factions.. Focus on Soft-Security Measures.Programmes should be developed to offer the South Caucasus civil society with options for economic and commercial cooperation, scientific cooperation, and trust-building through regional intercultural cooperation.These measures can take the form of educational exchange, women, youth, journalists' cooperation etc.,and also involve intra-national (Armenian-to-Armenian, Azerbaijani-to-Azerbaijani and Georgian-to-Georgian) contacts aimed at redefining the conflicts that affect their respective country.The Southern Caucasus has always been an area of concern for Euro-Atlantic security.During the last two decades, the region has not always received the focus it deserved, mainly owing to other crises nearer Europe's borders.Nevertheless, the Southern Caucasus is of interest to Europe mainly in terms of energy and human security.Study Groups provide an opportunity for civil society actors and policy makers of the region to introduce practical conflict resolution ideas to each other and international actors alike.The regular gathering of experts and interested parties from the region and beyond ensure an information loop that leads to positive action.The first step is to acknowledge the achievements of our conference.I have noted three general areas of significance for the future: • First and foremost, panelists from the region have given us an updated appreciation of the challenges facing the South Caucasus, for which we are grateful.In certain cases, the input of certain great powers and organizations has not led to greater stability.The input received this weekend will help us formulate policy to suggest changes in approach that maintains the engagement, but brings about more constructive solutions. •Second, panelists dealing with international law and recognition tell us that relying on international precedents and the practice of recognizing new States is not always a guarantee of stability.The panelists outlined that even if a region is independently viable, and even if on the face of it, a region would "deserve" to be recognized, we were informed during the conference that doing so perpetuates a practice that has not proven successful in erasing regional conflict.There is a need for the region, with the support of other actors and nations, to look to additional solutions to bolster a sustainable future. •Third, we have heard of the objective factors that inhibit regional cooperation.The discussions we have had this weekend on the impact of energy security, on the plight of minorities, just to name a few, will lead to proposals that will leverage these challenges to bring forward regimes of trade cooperation and exchanges that are the basis of regional prosperity, and from there, stability and peace.To have peace, the constituents of the region must live in conditions that gives them something to cherish, something related to their human security that they would fear losing if it ever came to be threatened.Currently, the challenges remain too great to expect this outcome in the short term, and for this we have to blame the global economic downturn, and the consequences it has on the national budgets of the countries that would like to see greater regional cooperation in the South Caucasus.Over the past years Austria has contributed extensively to the PfP Consortium mainly through the Study Group on Regional Stability in South East Europe, but also in close cooperation with other study and working groups through joint workshop and publications.The South Caucasus cannot be neglected as a region any longer.The PfP Consortium and the Austrian Ministry of Defence and Sports are committed in pursuing the solutions that can be applied in real life, in a transparent and inclusive manner.So far this conference has been run in that spirit and I am very happy with the result.The more security and stability develop in the Southern Caucasus, the more countries of the region will look to be providers of security in their own neighbourhood and beyond.Mutual engagement, with due respect for regional sensitivities, is the key to decreasing tensions.In addition, the Study Group on Regional Stability in the South Caucasus will continue the tradition of taking the conclusion of its workshops and digesting them into practical and applicable advice.This advice will hopefully find echo in the region, attracting the attention of new actors and future partners.Furthermore, the policy recommendations, fruit of everyone's participation here, will influence major actors in the area.The Austrian MOD appreciates very much the opportunity to collaborate within the framework of the PfP Consortium.The role of this association as a unique vehicle of international scientific research cooperation becomes evident with each workshop, through each publication.
The Egmont Papers are published by Academia Press for Egmont -The Royal Institute for International Relations.Founded in 1947 by eminent Belgian political leaders, Egmont is an independent think-tank based in Brussels.Its interdisciplinary research is conducted in a spirit of total academic freedom.A platform of quality information, a forum for debate and analysis, a melting pot of ideas in the field of international politics, Egmont's ambition -through its publications, seminars and recommendations -is to make a useful contribution to the decisionmaking process.* * * President: Viscount Etienne DAVIGNON Director-General: Marc OTTE Series Editor: Prof. Dr. Sven BISCOP When a doctor calls for a thorough examination of the state of a patient's health, he hopes that everything will turn out to be alright, but it really means that he fears there is a serious problem.Likewise, when Herman Van Rompuy called for the European Council of which he is the President to examine "the state of defence in Europe", 1 he was asking for more than a routine check-up.In this joint Egmont Paper, the Institute for European Studies of the Vrije Universiteit Brussel and the Egmont Institute offer their diagnosis.In the opening essay, Claudia Major and Christian Mölling cannot but conclude that "the state of defence in Europe" is nearing the state of emergency.The "bonsai armies" that they fear we will end up with are nice to look at -on the national day parade for example -but not of much use.In addition to the diagnosis though, we also want to propose a treatment.The method of examination proposed by Van Rompuy already hints at an important part of the cure.The fact is that we never examine "the state of defence in Europe".We assess the state of the EU's CSDP, of NATO's military posture, and of course of each of our national armed forces.But we never assess Europe's military effort in its entirety.In fact, we are unable to, simply because there is no forum where we set capability targets for "defence in Europe".On the one hand, we pretend that it is only a specific separable (and, in the minds of many capitals, small) part of our armed forces that can be dedicated to the CSDP and the achievement of its Headline Goal, the capacity to deploy up to a corps of 60,000.2 That is of course a theoretical fiction: in reality any commitment to either the CSDP or NATO or both has an impact on our entire defence budget and our entire arsenal.A decision to invest in an air-to-air refuelling project through the European Defence Agency for example implies that that sum cannot be spent in another capability area of importance for the CSDP or NATO or, usually, both, whereas once delivered the resulting air-to-air refuelling capability will be available for operations in either framework.Schemes to encourage states to join capability efforts, like the EU's Pooling & Sharing1. In his speech at the annual conference of the European Defence Agency on 22 March 2013; see http:// www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/136394.pdf.2. For many Member States it is, apparently, such a small part of their forces that they seem to equate the CSDP with the Battlegroups and have all but forgotten the Headline Goal.They also tend to forget that a Battlegroup is pretty much the numbers that the Brussels police will deploy during the actual European Council -hardly a level of ambition worthy of a continent.and NATO's Smart Defence, obviously can only make the most of opportunities to generate synergies and effects of scale if all arsenals are taken into the balance in their entirety.On the other hand, the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) supposedly does encompass (nearly) the whole of our forces, but it sets targets for individual nations in function of the targets of the Alliance as a whole, and does not separately define the level of ambition of NATO's European pillar even though it becomes increasingly likely that the European Allies will have to act alone.We are thus confronted with a curious situation.In political terms it continually is "Europe" that we refer to and expect to act.Even the US has sent a clear message to "Europe" that it should assume responsibility for the security of its own periphery and initiate the response to crises."Europe" for Washington can mean the European Allies acting through NATO, or the EU acting through the CSDP, or an ad hoc coalition of European states.Washington really no longer cares under which "European" flag we act, as long as we act and the problem is dealt with without extensive American assets being drawn in.As Luis Simón points out in his essay, the US is 'geared towards figuring out how to get the most "bang" out of a "low cost" and "light footprint" approach to European security'.In terms of defence planning however, "Europe" does not exist.If he succeeds, Van Rompuy is to be congratulated for bringing it into being.A call to look at "the state of defence in Europe" thus implicitly is a call to define a level of ambition for "Europe", against which the existing capabilities can be assessed, shortfalls identified, and priority objectives defined.As the High Representative, Catherine Ashton, states at the outset of her Final Report Preparing the December 2013 European Council on Security and Defence, this 'warrant[s] a strategic debate among Heads of State and Government. Such a debate at the top level must set priorities'.3 Put differently, the key political question that the European Council needs to address, before it can address any military-technical question, is for which types of contingencies in which parts of the world "Europe", as a matter of priority, commits to assume responsibility, and which capabilities it commits to that end.On the basis of the answer to that question all other dimensions of the European Council's broad defence agenda can be tackled -absent that answer, Europe's defence effort will still be left hanging in the air.It is often said for example that "Europe" needs its own strategic enablers, such as air-to-air refuelling and ISTAR.But to be able to do what?Air-policing in the Baltic?Air-to-ground campaigns in the Mediterra-3.Of 15 October 2013; see http://eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2013/131015_02_en.pdf.nean?Or even further afield?And at which scale?Without an answer to such questions, it is impossible to design a sensible capability mix and decide on priority capability projects.Yet, who is "Europe"?Who can define the level of ambition that serves as political guidance for operations undertaken and capabilities developed by Europeans through both NATO and the CSDP?Again, we are facing the same problem that there is today no institutionalised venue where Europeans can take decisions about their posture in NATO and the CSDP simultaneously -it is always either/or.Under these circumstances, the European Council is the best option.It is of course an EU body, but they are our Heads of State and Government, meeting in an intergovernmental setting, adopting not binding law but political declarations, and that by unanimity.Surely they, if anybody, have the legitimacy to declare that they will consider the political guidance which they agree upon to guide their governments' positions in both NATO and the CSDP?Politically, "Europe" can either mean each and every European state, or an ad hoc coalition of some of these states, or, when they make foreign and security policy together (which alas they do not do systematically enough), the EU.In political terms, "Europe" neither means the CSDP nor NATO: these are instruments, at the service of the makers of foreign and security policy.Instruments, moreover, both of which "Europe" is more likely to use in the near future than the US, in view of the "pivot" of its strategic focus to Asia.If Washington no longer takes the lead in setting strategy towards Europe's neighbourhood, the only alternative actor is Europeans collectively, i.e. the EU (for individually, no European state can defend all of its interests all of the time).The European Council thus really is the best placed to address "the state of defence in Europe".This does not in any way prejudice how, in a real-life contingency, "Europe" will undertake action: using NATO, the CSDP, other EU instruments, the UN, ad hoc coalitions or a combination thereof.Indeed, if action entails larger-scale combat operations, "Europe" will need the NATO command & control structure, which is its main asset.According to Jamie Shea, 'NATO's choice, therefore, will be to focus on high-end operations built essentially around a conventional military core structure and organised through an integrated command system'.The best way to make sure that all instruments are put to use in an integrated way, from the planning of any type of action to the post-action and long-term involvement, is to politically put any intervention under the aegis of the EU, even when acting under national or NATO command in the case of military involvement.The fact is that in almost every scenario, the European Commission and the EEAS will either from the start or eventually have to take charge of the political, economic and social dimension, regardless of how we address the military dimension -better to integrate all from the beginning there-fore under the political aegis of the Union.Furthermore, that flag still is much less controversial whereas there always are countries and regions in which it is advised not to operate under specific national flags or the NATO-label.In this context, creative use of Art. 44 of the Treaty on European Union, which is mentioned in passing in the High Representative's report and is highlighted by Margriet Drent, can provide a flexible way of circumventing the political difficulties that continue to be an obstacle to effective coordination between NATO and the EU (or between individual Member States and the EU) for operations outside the CSDP-framework.Art. 44 allows the Council to entrust the implementation of an operation to a group of Member States.When a Member State or a coalition initiates an operation using a national or the NATO command structure, the Council could retroactively recognise it as a task 'to protect the Union's values and serve its interests' (Art. 42.5), thus placing it within the political aegis of the EU, but without detracting from the command & control exercised by the Member States involved, except that they commit to 'keep the Council regularly informed of [the operation's] progress' (Art 44.2).The advantages would be manifold.The military dimension of an intervention can be fully integrated from the start with the political, economic and social dimension of which the EU is best placed to take charge (as opposed to the Libyan case, when the EU put itself out of the game and only came back in at a much later stage).The EU guise will do a lot to alleviate any suspicions of hidden national or NATO/American agendas.And the Berlin Plus mechanism, which has proved far too rigid to use effectively and 'was never designed for allowing rapid response' (Alexander Mattelaer and Jo Coelmont), can be avoided.In any case 'the need for both institutions to become more self-reliant and less dependent on the United States' is evident, as Jamie Shea stresses.That leaves the question: what are the priorities for Europe as a security provider?Ashton's report puts the emphasis on the broader neighbourhood, including the Sahel and the Horn, to which certainly the Gulf should be added, as well as the "Wider North", where "the EU until now remains merely an observer" (James Rogers).This is where "strategic autonomy must materialise first": a bold statement which the European Council can render more explicit, for what exactly it wanted to achieve in its neighbourhood "has hitherto remained rather vague" (Margarita Šešelgyt ).This is where Europe commits to take the lead in maintaining peace and security, i.e. to initiate the necessary response to security problems, including prevention, as well as intervention, with partners if possible but alone if necessary.Further on the report refers to the soon to be adopted Maritime Security Strategy, which should of course be integrated in the priorities.Should contributing to the collective security system of the UN not be a priority too, in line with the EU's commitment to "effective multilateralism"?All three priorities go hand in hand.'Pivoting to Asia [ourselves] without strengthening our position in our immediate neighbourhood would be reckless and dangerous', Jonathan Holslag states, but Luis Simón equally rightly points out that 'to confine [ourselves] to a defensive mind-set and a "neighbourhood-only" approach' would be 'a fatal mistake'.The next step is one that is curiously absent from the debate: to translate these priorities into a military level of ambition.Which capabilities are we willing to commit?How many troops do we want to be able to deploy and which permanent strategic reserve do we want to maintain?Which strategic enablers does this require?First, Europe needs a permanent strategic reserve: the ability to mount a decisive air campaign and to deploy up to an army corps, as a single force if necessary, for combat operations in Europe's broader neighbourhood, over and above all on-going operations.This de facto "double Headline Goal" may seem fanciful, but it is but the reflection of the rate of deployment of the last decade.Second, it needs maritime power: the ability to achieve command of the sea in the broader neighbourhood, while maintaining a global naval presence in order to permanently engage with partners, notably in Asia and the Arctic.Finally, in the "post-pivot" era it needs regional strategic autonomy: acquiring all strategic enablers, including air and maritime transport, air-to-air refuelling, and ISTAR, to allow for major army, air and naval operations in the broader neighbourhood without reliance on American assets.This is the nature of the decisions that need to be taken and can then in turn be elaborated in the 'strategic level Defence Roadmap, approved by the European Council, setting out specific targets and timelines' that Ashton calls for -which, in addition, should include a budget as well.Based on a re-defined level of ambition, the Defence Roadmap will ipso facto provide the starting point for the update of the EDA's Capability Development Plan (expected by the autumn of 2014), as well as the "overarching framework" for the various regional and functional clusters that Ashton further recommends.The targets that Europe collectively sets itself in this Roadmap can then be incorporated as such, as an additional level, in the NDPP.Since we cannot 'continue to rely on the US to plug all gaping holes in [our] defence posture', such a "parallel planning cycle" is a necessity, Alexander Mattelaer and Jo Coelmont stress.'Joint defence planning among partners' is indeed 'the added value of genuine Pooling and Sharing [emphasis added]' as they emphasise in their second essay.The stark reality is though that until now most of the time most states make but paper commitments to NATO and the CSDP both and that neither the NDPP nor the Headline Goal has much impact on national defence.This is why Ashton is right to also call for a 'robust follow-up process', including perhaps a "European semester on defence".Without guarantees that notably budgets allocated to collective capability projects will not be affected by future national budget cuts, the level of trust necessary to launch such projects in the first place cannot be achieved.At the same time, 'it is perhaps necessary to think of other possible avenues for defence-relevant financing', such as the European Investment Bank, as Daniel Fiott creatively proposes.'Equally significant is the [Commission's] proposal for EU-owned dual use capabilities', 4 adds Margriet Drent, which Member States would do well not to discard too easily -money should trump turf wars.A robust ambition requires robust follow-up.The December 2013 European Council will surely not satisfy all expectations, which are very great -but then the challenge is great too.The European Council has already generated a new dynamic in the debate, including on ideas and notions which hitherto were not part of the official discussion.We hope that our collection of essays can be a useful contribution -and we definitely promise that we will provide robust follow-up too.4. In its July 2013 Communication A New Deal for European Defence.Towards a More Competititve and Efficient Defence and Security Sector.COM(2013)542/2; see http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/ defence/files/communication_defence_en.pdf.In 2009, Europe's fiscal crisis hit the already long existing European defence decadence, i.e. the unwillingness of most EU Member States to generate appropriate portions of capability for defence.These two developments melted into a new paradigm: the defence economic imperative.It means that the decisions that Europeans take on military capabilities are less an expression of their long-term strategic priorities but one of immediate budget restrictions.We coined the term "Bonsai Armies" to grasp a dwindling European military might inherent in this development, which results in tiny, pretty and complete, but eventually incapable armies.Looking at the current state of European defence, we fear that the Member States may have misunderstood our concept: this was meant as a warning, not as a blue print.There are two long-term repercussions of austerity for the defence budgets of European states: first, defence expenditures in Europe are dwindling, and will continue to do so.Member States continue painting positive budget futures, yet, the effects of the fiscal crisis will continue to impact for another decade or so.Moreover, inflation will turn into a net loss of buying power for what currently looks (only) like stagnation.Budget estimates arrive at a decrease (2011-2020) from 220 to 195 to 147 billion (11-33%).Second, divergence is growing among the Europeans.Behind the overall budget squeeze hides an increasing imbalance.As some budgets are more affected by cuts than others, also the individual contributions to European defence change.The result is a growing divide among Member States: within the 2008-2013 timeframe defence spending diverged among Member States between a 40% increase and a 40% decrease.Moreover, the imbalance has a regional flavour: the cuts are heavier in the East than in the West.Every additional per cent of cuts brings EU states closer to a red line from whereon military forces and equipment cannot form a relevant capability.This is especially because Member States shrink the size of their armies but do not increase their efficiencies.With their current activities, states accelerate achieving what they fear most, that is, dependence.To be able to intervene militarily European states are becoming more dependent on each other than they have ever been before.Beyond some spectacular cuts, the budget pressure is continuously breaking small bricks out of the wall of European defence.Because there is no concept for military burden-sharing that would frame these developments, every state chooses to specialise individually in the area it can afford -but not in what is needed to stay capable as Europe.Expensive capabilities like aircrafts, helicopters and satellites are likely to become less and less available for all.The uncontrolled cutting of military capabilities also reduces the possibilities of cooperation.It creates more collective capability gaps (e.g. RPASs) but at the same time keeps often outdated surplus material in other areas (such as tanks).These mosaic stones of the individual changes in Europe eventually result in an overall picture according to which the Member States have significantly lowered their willingness and/or ability to deploy and sustain military forces.The levels of ambition shrunk by roughly 25% between 2008-2013.Shrinking forces mean fewer operations.Yet, more importantly, changes in quality reduce the ability to conduct complex operations: brigade formations are key to those operations as they provide the necessary backbone -Command and Control frameworks with the associated enablers.Their availability is shrinking from 20 to 15 and fewer countries hold them.As less and less smaller states can deploy on their own, they become ever more dependent on those few who can still provide the operational framework they can plug-in to.While the austerity measures of governments have already affected industries, the more serious impact is still to come: European countries will soon have significantly less programmes and equipment -hence less earnings for industries through production and services, and more overcapacities.This is the outcome of the tension between ongoing nationalist political approaches to the defence industry and the inevitably growing globalisation of this business.Industries react to this by reducing their share of defence business, or by transferring it outside Europe through exports.These have become a lifeline for the defence industry.Key components, technologies and raw materials have to be imported from outside Europe.Hence, rather than enjoying strategic autonomy, European armed forces have to live with non-European dependencies in their supply lines.These dependencies are likely to increase: the EDTIB may further shrink, since the domestic consolidation into national champions, which some states favour, prevents a further Europeanisation.While militarily the defence crisis increases the dependence between the Member States, it deeply divides them politically.Because of national risk perspectives, but also the style and size of cuts in budget, equipment and personnel differ considerably among the Member States, the latter are less and less able (and willing) to define and implement a common defence policy within the EU framework.The increasing inability or unwillingness of some states to contribute to joint operations reduces interoperability and expands the inner-European capability and modernisation gap.Vice versa, contributions can only come from the shrinking group of willing and capable EU members.This creates centrifugal dynamics: those who no longer contribute do not subscribe to common policies because they cannot shape it -those who still contribute are not interested in giving "free riders" a say in where and how to implement policies.Member States have devoted a considerable amount of rhetoric to defence cooperation and launched several processes to serve it.This applies especially to political frameworks like Weimar or Visegrad.Yet, tangible results tend to result from shared military interests, and not from political declarations.Successful projects like Air-to-Air Refuelling do not reflect a common effort to improve collective capabilities for defence but rather the highest common denominator among national interests.Such smallest possible, yet necessary, islands of cooperation for a single equipment area are not adequate for the quality of the problems -because the latter are structural and exist across the whole system of capabilities.Instead, this current patchwork without a framework risks wasting resources and duplicating efforts, while maintaining gaps.Austerity increases intra-European defence dependence.Yet, the conception of sovereignty that Member States still maintain does not allow them to recognise these dependencies and thus hinders the Europeans to manage them.Sovereignty is for most Member States not about being capable of acting effectively in order to solve problems of their societies.Rather, it means staying master of the final decision, even if this prevents or diminishes the development of a (European) capability that could engage with their own problems.Hence, Member States prefer autonomy over capability.By doing so, whether consciously or not, Member States actually pretend to be individually able to deal with security risks and threats and keep those away from their territory, people and political system.It is thus only logical that with such a conception of sovereignty in mind, EU members avoid talking about and engaging in cooperation and specialisation.Accepting specialisation would mean acknowledging that they can no longer assure the national core of defence tasks alone.Recognising cooperation inflicts similar headaches: governments would have to admit that their ability to decide and act in security policy does not carry enough weight in view of current security problems.Yet, states also insist on their individual right to decide because, they argue, they cannot entirely trust their partners: they fear being left alone in an operation because a partner decides to withdraw; not being able to engage in an operation, as a partner with important capabilities decides not to participate; and giving others, who do not make any contributions of their own to security, the opportunity to free ride.However, over 20 years of experience in NATO-and EU-operations invalidates the fear of these traps: sharing has been a daily business from Bosnia to Afghanistan and Libya, and NATO and the EU have gathered experience in managing the political and military caveats.No state would have been able to carry out these operations alone.Moreover, European states have made themselves dependent on defence industries and defence contractors: states place their sovereignty in the hands of actors that do it for profit, but they do not trust partners that agree on a common objective?Thus, states have locked themselves into a vicious circle: their clinging to national prerogatives eventually increases their dependence upon partners while also diminishing their military capacity to act.Member States have not been able to prevent capabilities from getting ever more critical, such as by increasing cooperation.Individual defence planning and cuts further the dependency.While states are rhetorically adhering to military autonomy, reality is catching up in that specialisation is already taking place in an uncontrolled way and further increases dependency.Already today European states are more dependent on each other than they have ever been before when it comes to military interventions, as demonstrated in 2011 in Libya, and again in 2013 in Mali.Sovereignty is thus the crucial element: the way European governments will conceive it will decide the future of European defence.Put differently, the future of European defence depends on whether the Europeans are able to develop an understanding of sovereignty that enables them to compromise on autonomy in order to manage their dependencies.Four scenarios are possible:1. The silent death of European defence will be the consequence if Europeans continue to neglect the dependence.The defence sector would see a decreasing effectiveness, i.e. the need for more investments.Member States would allow only for ad hoc cooperation.It would only take place if and as long as this is the only way to maintain a national capability.2. A return to the 19 th century: the current re-nationalisation of security policies points to the risk that EU states may increase these dependencies.Governments could be tempted to "sanctuarise" independence and make it the primary objective of their defence policies.Even if the governments carry on denying interdependence, defence problems will certainly not shrink to a size that national armies can manage them alone.However, military action would immediately become more difficult to organise, or even impossible.3. Towards a European Army: the other extreme would be to institutionalise dependence by transferring sovereignty to the EU.It would enable a European army type organisation of the European military forces to take place.Such a development would certainly be the most efficient way of organising defence.Yet, it is highly unlikely to materialise, for the required common political vision is missing and is not likely to arrive any time soon.4. Pooling of sovereignty: a more pragmatic approach to sovereignty would become possible if Member States would not have to agree on what to protect and where to use armed forces.Instead they would consent on the key notion of sovereignty as the following: to stay capable of problem-solving action by pursuing common political objectives.In order to regain sovereignty under the condition of dependency they would pool their problemsolving capabilities.Dependencies like responsibilities and access to capabilities would become organised through treaties.These arrangements would build on examples from two decades of operations -in which sovereignty management has been daily business.States can still pursue national levels of ambitions on top.The 2013 EU defence summit will most likely not debate the crucial "sovereignty -dependency" conundrum.Yet, its decisions will impact upon it.Governments may still have a Christmas gift: when their people tell them that they already knew that they were dependent on others, but they did not want to shock their governments by confronting them with the truth.The assumption that the US strategic "rebalancing" or "pivot" to Asia will force Europeans to take their security and that of their immediate neighbourhood more seriously has become the running theme of the forthcoming European Council on defence.By outlining the links between America's evolving defence strategy, the transatlantic relationship and Europe, this contribution seeks to place that assumption in perspective.Not only does the transatlantic relationship remain important to ensuring Europe's strategic cohesion and the stability of the broader European neighbourhood.Critically, the very success of the transatlantic relationship will largely depend on the ability of Europeans to think and act beyond its neighbourhood.The Pentagon's 2014 QDR will be a momentous one.It will have to weave together a number of hard-hitting strategic, political, technological and industrial themes.The expected withdrawal of most American and allied combat troops from Afghanistan in late 2014 will signal the declining centrality of the "War on Terror", a paradigm that has had a pervasive influence over the foreign and defence policies of the US for well over a decade.2014 will mark the emergence of a new paradigm, increasingly organised around the so-called 'rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific' region broadcasted by the 2012 Defence Strategic Guidance.5 It will fall onto the forthcoming QDR to spell out what the Asian rebalancing means in terms of force posture, structure, capability planning and, critically, how it will translate into the DoD's budget.Much of this debate will be about how new technologies and concepts can help meet China's "asymmetrical" challenge including, chiefly, its progress in the areas of A2/AD and its offensive cyber warfare capabilities.Presumably, this process shall help further animate an already undergoing trend towards long-range strike and stealthy air and undersea systems, directed energy weapons or cyber security.Another key challenge for the 2014 QDR will be to offer a blue print for US force posture and defence strategy in Central Asia post-2014.Arguments for a full military withdrawal from Afghanistan and a broader strategic retreat from Central and South Asia seem to be winning the day.However, some sort of follow-on Western military and security presence in Afghanistan will be critical to ensuring that country's stability and consolidating the progress made after more than a decade of sustained investments and efforts.The security of the broader region remains linked to the evolution of Afghanistan.And a commitment to that country's security shall have a positive effect upon the stability of other Central Asian republics and of America's relations with those countries.Despite its traditional association with the War on Terror, the increasing interdependence between Asia's maritime and continental environments makes Central (and South) Asia relevant from the perspective of the strategic rebalancing or "pivot".6 The need to strike the right balance in Asia's maritime and continental "theatres" is further complicated by ongoing instability across the Middle East, from Mali to Iran, through Libya and Syria.Critically, all these challenges will have to be tackled while the Pentagon is hit by sequestration and grapples with a constraining budgetary environment.With such a menu of big-ticket items on the table, one might legitimately wonder whether Washington will have any bandwidth left to think about Europe.However, the future of Europe and the evolution of the transatlantic relationship will have implications upon every single one of those big-ticket items and will therefore continue to be of great importance for the US.Guarded by the world's two greatest oceans and surrounded by weak and friendly neighbours, America's security depends largely on its ability to project power beyond its shores.Its advantageous geopolitical position and maritime nature give the US the kind of strategic flexibility to think of and treat the Eurasian landmass (and the world) as an integrated geopolitical unit.7 American strategic thinkers have traditionally attached special importance to the US being able to project strategic power to the most economically dynamic areas of the Eurasian "rimland", namely the European peninsula, the Persian Gulf and East Maintaining strategic access to Europe and the Middle East remains of great importance for America.10 Both regions are vital to the economic wellbeing of the US and the (US-led) international economic and monetary system.The US-EU economic relationship is the world's largest, accounting for one third of total goods and services trade and nearly half of global economic output.Total US investment in the EU is three times higher than in all of Asia; while EU investment in the US is around eight times the amount of EU investment in India and China together.11 The ongoing negotiations on a TTIP promise to further exploit the untapped potential of the transatlantic relationship.And they also bear testament to America's recognition that its growing Pacific responsibilities cannot come at the expense of its duties as an Atlantic power.The Atlantic and Pacific are as interwoven as they have ever been at the level of US geostrategy, which remains global in nature.12 Its increasing energy self-reliance may well be reducing America's direct dependence on the Middle East.However, the global nature of the oil market and the effect of supply insecurity in other major markets to which the US is wedded means Washington will for many years remain committed to promoting stability in that region.13 would come a long way in helping mitigate those countries' excessive dependence on Russia or China.Beyond Afghanistan and Central Asia, their diplomatic weight and their naval and technological potential means there are a number of ways in which Europeans can contribute to the stability of Asia's maritime environments and to the advancement of US strategic interests alongside the Indo-Pacific axis.These range from educational exchanges, joint training and exercising, weapons transfers through contributions to maritime security.16 Secretary Panetta's farewell speech in London, in which he publicly urged Europeans to 'join the US in its pivot to Asia', is an example of Washington's increasing recognition of this fact.17 In the words of former EUCOM chief Admiral Stavridis, 'Europe is today a security exporter, possessing among the most highly trained and technologically advanced militaries in the world '.18 All in all, America's considerations about force posture and defence strategy in Europe and its expectations as to the future of the transatlantic relationship are organised around three broad themes of objectives: defending the European allies against emerging external strategic challenges (i.e. ballistic missiles or cyber-attacks) and insuring them against the re-emergence of geopolitical competition alongside Europe's eastern flank; projecting US and allied power into the European periphery (i.e. the Middle East, Africa, the Indian Ocean and the Arctic); and stimulating European allies to contribute to America's global geostrategic objectives, including in Asia.The driving trend in US force posture and defence strategy in Europe is one of drawdown.Mounting pressures elsewhere oblige.But that does not mean the US will leave Europe.Insofar as it continues to have a key stake in the security of that continent and in the future of the transatlantic relationship, Washington will try to remain the chief guardian of European security and the leader of the transatlantic relationship.America's evolving force posture and defense strategy in Europe reveal important adaptations to an evolving strategic context.Three main trends are worth pointing out.The first is an evolution from "presence" to "engagement", illustrated by the growing emphasis on initiatives such as cyber-defence, BMD or training, all of which are less demanding in terms of direct US military presence.The second is the shift from a land-centred posture concentrated in Central Europe to a lighter and more flexible one.The third, and potentially the most important one, is the increasing compartmentalisation of Washington's strategic relations and partnerships in Europe, as the US leans on different European countries and sub-regional groupings for different security tasks and initiatives.This evolution relates to the resurfacing of bilateralism and sub-regional defence cooperation initiatives, such as the British-French defence agreements, Nordic Defence Cooperation or Central European Defence Cooperation.It also speaks to a broader geopolitical tendency, namely the fact that Europe and its neighbourhood are increasingly defined by a less hierarchical strategic order, one that will be more fluid and unstable than Europeans have grown accustomed to.2020. Simón, L. and Rogers, J. 2010 For well over seven decades, US forward presence and a strong transatlantic relationship have created the necessary conditions for European economic integration and political and security cooperation.Today, the strategic rise of Asia throws up a question mark over America's presence in Europe and over the future of the transatlantic relationship.While the US is unlikely to abandon Europe to its own luck, its increasing strategic interest in Asia will unavoidably result in less attention towards Europe and its surroundings.That does create a demand for greater European efforts in the realm of security.However, there is a risk that Europeans will confound this situation and embrace an alleged "US departure" as an opportunity to confine themselves to a defensive mind-set and a "neighbourhood-only" approach to security.That would prove to be a fatal mistake.As important as ensuring a balance of power in Europe was, the levels of security and prosperity Europeans have conquered since the end of the Second World War are ultimately explained by the fact that Western strategic, political and economic primacy was global in nature.Thus, while the transatlantic relationship continues to offer the most reliable framework to ensure strategic cohesion in and around Europe, the survival of the transatlantic relationship will largely depend on the ability of Europeans to join forces with the US to provide security beyond their immediate vicinity.In a world characterised by a relative transfer of wealth and power from west to east, this shall prove the ultimate test of the West's resilience -and of Europe's own future.Until the Cold War came to an end in 1990, NATO could be described as a "homeland defence" organisation.Its forces were stationed inside its borders, pointing outwards to parry incoming conventional armies.After it began to engage in the Former Yugoslavia, however, NATO changed into an organisation that projected forces well beyond its borders to deal with threats before they could reach NATO territory.Consequently, the organisation became more famous for what it was doing outside Europe than inside Europe.Operations became NATO's new raison d'être.In the last two decades, the Alliance has carried out 36 of these operations, ranging from maritime monitoring in the Adriatic, no-fly zones, close air support, air campaigns, training and mentoring and combating piracy on the high seas.In doing so, NATO has transformed itself as much as it has transformed the countries where it has deployed forces.Operations have brought NATO new partners from across the globe, new relationships with other international institutions such as the UN, the EU or the OSCE, and new military doctrines and capabilities that emphasise peacebuilding, protection of women in conflict zones and civil reconstruction alongside traditional war fighting skills.Perhaps most important of all, operations such as ISAF in Afghanistan, KFOR in Kosovo, SFOR in Bosnia or Unified Protector in Libya have been so demanding and difficult that they have served as a glue to bind Allies together in a framework of solidarity and at least imperfect burden-sharing.This has somewhat overshadowed the way in which the new security challenges of the 21 st century are inevitably giving a much larger group of Allies (16 in 1999, 28 today) different interests and priorities.In the past, there was no hiatus between NATO operations.At their high point around 2006-2007, the Alliance had two hundred thousand troops engaged beyond its borders in half a dozen simultaneous operations.As soon as one was winding down, another was building up.One operation could also facilitate another, as when NATO's naval embargo against Libya in 2011 drew on ships and command structures that had already been in the Mediterranean supporting NATO's Active Endeavour mission since shortly after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the US.Consequently, the end of the ISAF mission in Afghanistan in 2014 will place NATO in an unprecedented position.For the first time since its inception in 1949, it will not have an immediate opponent or adversary to measure itself against or to serve as a rallying point for its consultations, military planning and generation of forces.Of course, operations will continue in a more minor way in Kosovo, in the Gulf of Aden and in the Mediterranean.But they will be winding down rather than building up and many NATO Defence Ministers, such as recently the UK Defence Secretary Philip Hammond, have made it clear that, barring a new shock event like 9/11, they see very little prospect of engaging their forces overseas in the next decade or so.Wary of the human and material costs of fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan, and wary of ambitious nation-building projects that fall short of their objectives, NATO's publics have no more stomach for military humanitarianism if not tied to immediate and well proven national security interests.Any operations that do take place, such as training and security assistance for local forces, are likely to be modest and, more often than not, held in NATO countries rather than on the ground in Africa or the Middle East.Moreover, where countries do send forces, these are likely to be Special Forces for quick in/out intelligence driven operations against specific targets.As warfare moves to the shadows, countries will not seek the approval or the participation of all their EU or NATO Allies.Because NATO has focused so much on operations in recent times and has built its institutional business model largely around enhancing its ability to perform these missions, the sudden prospect of a decline in operational tempo inevitably raises questions about the Alliance's future role and value.Three basic models for the future are currently going the rounds.The first is a return to Europe and classical Article V territorial defence.This would certainly provide reassurance to Allies, particularly those in Central and Eastern Europe, who have seen Afghanistan as a diversion from NATO's core task of collective defence and who would welcome greater NATO visibility and activity along their Eastern borders, and vis-à-vis a Russia which is rapidly modernising its military forces and playing a more assertive role in its neighbourhood.Yet, at the same time, the old threat in the form of the Soviet Union is no more and the threat of armed conflict in Europe is at an all-time low.So while providing reassurance, a return to the more traditional NATO would also be compatible with declining defence budgets and a shift from conventional armies to new types of security investment such as intelligence services, beefed up police forces to fight organised or domestic terrorist crime, or reinforced frontier protection measures to keep out unwanted immigrants.The second model is one of a NATO that overhauls its business model to deal more directly with the more diverse range of 21 st century security threats.By now these have become all too familiar to security policy specialists.They are terrorism in its more fragmentary and delocalised manifestations, cyber-attacks, critical infrastructure protection, resilience to natural or man-made disasters and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the hands of a larger number of state or non-state actors.Already in its most recent Strategic Concept of November 2010, the Alliance placed greater emphasis on these "emerging security challenges" and even set up a new division inside NATO HQ to deal with them.However, the Strategic Concept did not define a level of ambition for the Alliance in these areas, nor go into much detail as to how NATO's existing assets, such as command structures and planning mechanisms, could be used to address them.Three years on, NATO has made some progress, especially in improving its capacity to detect and defend against cyber-attacks against its own internal networks and to provide a basic level of assistance and expertise to Allies to improve their cyber defences.But, at the same time, NATO has also had to recognise that these new challenges require a very different approach than conventional types of threat.The domains are not owned by states; the private sector has often a much greater role to play in analysing threats and providing the necessary capabilities.Concepts such as solidarity, Article V collective defence and deterrence and retaliation are much more difficult to pin down than when dealing with an unambiguous, massive kinetic aggression.Within NATO countries these threats are usually dealt with by intelligence services, police departments and interior ministries that are not NATO's usual interlocutors.Therefore it seems unlikely that, after ISAF, NATO can make homeland defence against asymmetric threats into a new justification for the Alliance.Even if NATO's assets can allow it to play a useful role in some of these areas, it will not be able to claim the same leading and almost exclusive responsibility that it has long enjoyed for large scale, multinational military deployments.At the same time, the EU has also taken up the same threats with its broader panoply of instruments and better capacity to integrate the civilian and military dimensions of a comprehensive approach.This will make those Allies who are also EU members wary of building capabilities inside the Alliance which they are already investing money into building within the EU.The above-mentioned considerations have thus put the main emphasis on the third model for NATO's future.This is one of an Alliance in readiness rather than in deployment, to use the terminology of NATO's Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen.This model essentially sees the future of NATO as a continuation of its past -only without the pressure of a major operation to generate the political attention and financial resources to sustain NATO's activity.The focus is to preserve all of the key structures that are necessary to rapidly regenerate future operations, on the assumption that if the past is any guide to the future and notwithstanding public weariness, there will eventually be crises which only well-equipped and trained and ready-to-go armed forces will be able to deal with.This crisis could involve the physical protection of NATO territory, for instance in the form of a missile attack, or require another projection of forces on NATO's borders or beyond.NATO's choice, therefore, will be to focus on high-end operations built essentially around a conventional military core structure and organised through an integrated command system.In a way, this is what has been achieved in Afghanistan although it has been a painful process to train forces to fight, lift caveats, make command structures more flexible and create a single communications network.As the forces leave Afghanistan, they are smaller but arguably more usable than they have been for many years and with a high degree of interoperability not only between Allies but with partner countries too.NATO has designed a Connected Forces Initiative to preserve and develop these skills.The initiative is built around an ambitious programme of live exercises and training, which are also designed to develop skills which have been neglected during the ISAF years, such as major joint operations at high intensity.Defence budget cuts post-ISAF and the general neglect of training over the past decade because of the demands of the deployment in Afghanistan, will make it a challenge for NATO to implement the Connected Forces Initiative.This will put a premium on NATO's ability to convince nations to factor NATO training needs into their national training and exercises as well as to generate forces for the exercise programme in a way that shares burdens equitably and keeps the smaller and medium-sized Allies fully engaged alongside the larger US, French and UK forces.It is very difficult to plan an ambitious exercise if commanders have no idea who will be participating with what.Moreover, keeping partners, such as Australia or New Zeeland who are on the other side of the world, engaged will also be a challenge, especially if all the training activities take place in Europe.Keeping the US engaged cannot be taken for granted either unless NATO is able to find a headquarters in the US to take on the NATO training role.This said, if the Connected Forces Initiative does not succeed, there is a real danger that four or five years on from ISAF, many of the Alliance forces will have returned to static or limited homeland defence roles and will not be able any longer to make a contribution to high-end force projection, even in niche roles.Small coalitions of the willing will become the order of the day.The second challenge is in developing capabilities.The operation in Libya as well as ISAF have consistently pointed to capability gaps and shortfalls in areas such as precision-guided munitions, intelligence surveillance, and reconnaissance (such as RPAS), counter-fire capability, and heavy lift helicopters and air transport.These shortfalls have been around for a long time but the need for NATO to plug these gaps is all the more important at a time when the US is now contributing 72% of the total NATO defence budget and is also pivoting to Asia.This has revived the burden-sharing debate in the Alliance while also making it less clear to what extent US capabilities will be available to compensate for the shortfalls in the European order of battle.NATO's military authorities have also identified a requirement for 1.4 billion of essential priority infrastructure to underpin the reinforcement, deployability and protection of NATO's deployed forces.The challenge is made more difficult still by the 15% overall reduction in European defence spending in the past decade and growing imbalances among the Europeans themselves, with France and the UK now contributing nearly 50% of overall EU defence spending.NATO has developed an ambitious goal, known as "NATO Forces 2020" for how it can acquire key multinational capabilities.The question is can it develop a political and planning process to persuade its Member States to move in the desired direction; namely to pool and share existing assets and to develop new ones collectively?Can it overcome an attachment to national sovereignty, industrial protectionism and decades of a fragmented defence and R&D market?Is the answer "Smart Defence", where small groups of Allies propose to develop a capability bottom-up; or is it "Framework Nation" or the "Menu of Choices" where the big nations take on a specific chunk of NATO's military defence and organise the contribution of small and medium-sized Allies to support that capability?It is always good to experiment with different approaches, to see which one will be the most politically and financially viable but one thing is clear: NATO will need to rapidly identify the best approach and increasingly organise its defence planning and capability development work around it.The alternative is that nations will continue to cut their defence budgets and take their decisions nationally and unilaterally with the result that NATO will have too much, in some areas (jet aircraft) and too little in others (ISR -RPAS).Thirdly, NATO will need to debate whether it keeps its military assets essentially to itself and for its own missions, or whether it is willing to act as a service organisation or facilitator on behalf of others.Traditionally, NATO has carried out training and capacity building as a consequence of its own deployments in places such as Bosnia, Kosovo or Afghanistan and as part of its exit strategy as it builds down its forces.However, Iraq, where NATO recently closed a training mission, offers an example of where NATO is able to play a post-conflict role without being involved in the initial operation.Libya, where the government has asked for NATO assistance with the development of a national guard, is an example of where NATO may be able to help some years after conducting an air campaign but without a force on the ground.If NATO is doing fewer of its own operations, this in itself does not make the world a more peaceful place.Others, such as the AU or the UN, will continue to have large numbers of forces in the field with the related need for equipment, intelligence, transport and training.What NATO has acquired in the last few years is a considerable defence infrastructure: strategic commands, military schools, specialist centres of excellence, simulation and intelligence fusion centres and top class training areas.Why would it not put all of its know-how and experience in dealing with threats such as improvised explosive devices at the service of African troops who are encountering the same problem in Mali or Somalia?NATO's extensive network of partnerships could also be brought to bear on this task as many partners also have the same military infrastructure and experience and this kind of "Good Samaritan" role would not only serve NATO's direct security interests but also be a way of sustaining its partnerships post-Afghanistan as well.Finally, relations between NATO and the EU will no doubt continue to be less than desirable because of the well-known political issues.But the declining defence budgets, the overlapping memberships and security interests and the all too present threats on the periphery of Europe will inevitably push the two institutions closer together -even without mentioning the need for both institutions to become more self-reliant and less dependent on the US.If NATO embarks on a larger training role, it will overlap with an area that the CSDP has long been dealing with and where CSDP is also expanding.If the EU, in the run up to the December 2013 European Council on Defence, wants to acquire more high-end multinational capabilities, such as RPAS or advanced sensor and intrusion mechanisms for cyber defence, it will inevitably overlap with much of the work being done in NATO.As both organisations seek to make better use of experimental formations such as EU Battlegroups or the NATO Response Force, they will both have an interest in devising common forms of certification or joint training and exercises to make optimum use of scarce funds.In the past, and notwithstanding the political obstacles, NATO and the EU were pushed together by the momentum of operations, and finding themselves on the ground together in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan or at sea in the Gulf of Aden.They will certainly be pushed together in the future by austerity and the overwhelming requirement to make defence more rational and cost-effective and to integrate further the European forces.They too must develop a common narrative to a disinterested public opinion why defence and robust armed forces still matterwhen things get rough as, from time to time, they inevitably will.While continuing their own capability and reform efforts, both the CSDP and NATO need to do more to encourage and reinforce the efforts of the other.Whatever the results of the December EU Summit, they will need to be picked up and amplified at the NATO Summit in the UK in October 2014.ALEXANDER MATTELAER AND JO COELMONT Throughout the past two decades, European armed forces have been committed to containing violent conflict.From the campaigns in the Balkans and Afghanistan to the recent emergencies in Libya and Mali, they have been called upon to "do something" and fix whatever could be fixed.In the course of this process, they have been downsized, professionalised and asked to do ever more with fewer means.What can we learn from this period of intense operational engagement?Can historical trends continue indefinitely?This essay seeks to outline the principal areas of tension that have bedevilled modern European-led operations.Military campaigns never look the same, of course, but whoever ignores past experience does so at one's peril.Multinational operations have become the rule for European militaries.At the same time, organisational vehicles for conducting such operations have multiplied.Whereas the UN represented the only peacekeeping framework at the end of the Cold War, NATO, the OSCE and the EU transformed into busy "crisis managers" with their own unique characteristics.Due to variations in terms of membership, policy competences and pre-existing expertise, each and every one of these organisations developed its own operational planning process and command culture.Ad hoc coalitions arguably represent the ultimate expression of this constant search for institutional flexibility.As a result of this trend, a dramatic change in command relationships has taken place.Operation commanders no longer report to a single national leader.Instead, they receive their strategic guidance from a diplomatic council, of which the members frequently bicker about mission objectives and financial resources.Whether talking about the UN Security Council, the North Atlantic Council or the Council of the EU, the end result is that strategic clarity is often lost and no one feels responsible for failure.Yet grand strategy and campaign design must go hand-in-hand.This does not only require that military commanders receive sufficient authority to do their job, but also that political leaders do not shy away from making difficult choices about ends, ways and means.Occasionally a strategy decided by the lowest common denominator may do the job.Frequently it does not: grand strategy is about setting political priorities and according resources accordingly.Provided that strategic clarity is safeguarded, the institutional flexibility available to Europeans represents a key asset.The EU's CSDP adds value on three accounts.Firstly, it constitutes a framework for launching crisis management operations in those parts of the world where other organisations are not welcome: think Rafah, Georgia, Aceh or Chad.Secondly, it holds the promise of synchronising the different instruments of European foreign policy.The counter-piracy operation Atalanta arguably illustrates best what the EU can deliver in terms of comprehensive action.In order to fully live up to this promise, however, it is imperative that the EEAS is endowed with greater authority to effectively coordinate these instruments and that both civilian and military instruments are appropriately resourced.Thirdly, and most fundamentally, it represents an insurance policy that Europeans can act autonomously if US leadership is absent.Given the Obama administration's decision to rebalance its strategic focus towards the Asia-Pacific region, it becomes imperative that Europe is ready to engage in the full spectrum of strategic affairs.Frankly put, this implies the collective ability to make war, should it ever prove necessary.It has become popular to rhetorically embrace the importance of preventive action and the ability to respond rapidly to unforeseen contingencies.Yet one needs to call a spade a spade.The European track record for acting preventively or rapidly is uneven at best and miserable at worst.Several European authorities accurately forecasted the degeneration of the Sahel region, yet the resulting action took so long to materialise that the conflict prevention discourse seemed farcical.The time required for setting up tiny EU operations in Africa has occasionally exceeded the eighteen-month period required for planning Operation Overlord.This is not only the EU's problem: NATO responded painfully slow to the rising tide of insurgency in Afghanistan.More than anything else, this bleak track record is the product of political disagreement.Whenever European Member States have acted quickly -in the Congo in 2003, in Lebanon in 2006 or in Libya in 2011 -it was the undisputed political willingness to act that proved to be the decisive factor.To be proficient in mounting any operational rapid response means to have access to permanent command structures endowed with the authority to engage in prudent planning (that is, without explicit political authorisation).NATO's integrated command structure effectively constitutes the Alliance's most important asset -which is now at risk of being hollowed out by blind cost-savings.If Europeans are serious about reducing their dependency on US support, it is imperative they reinvest in standing and flexible command arrangements that are useable regardless whether political direction is exercised by the North Atlantic Council or the Council of the EU.As the experience is Bosnia has shown, the old Berlin Plus arrangement was never designed for allowing rapid response and needs to be fundamentally rethought.A more Europeanised command architecture can also incorporate the EU's much-vaunted comprehensive approach in a manner that is institutionally coherent.Quite apart from being able to plan ahead, the recent crisis in Mali illustrates the importance of having well-trained troops on standby to carry out time-sensitive missions at the appropriate strategic tempo and with tactical élan.The EU Battlegroups represented a qualitative improvement on earlier force catalogues, but have not lived up to the promise of providing a useable tool.Tailored to the historical experience of the Artemis operation, the Battlegroup concept falls short of providing decision-makers with flexible options.In their current configuration, most EU Battlegroups simply lack the fighting power for any mission that goes beyond political symbolism.From a military point of view, the real answer to the present conundrum must encompass a larger set of first entry forces on standby as well as a pool of follow-on forces from which a tailor-made task force package can be generated.The list of capability shortfalls is long and well known.It ranges from mundane requirements such as tanker aircraft to the technological high-end such as cyber assets and next generation strike platforms.Put simply, most European armed forces are hitherto falling short of transforming themselves into agile, knowledge-based militaries prepared for the future.To a large extent, this is the result of the limited scope for investment in cutting-edge technologies and the increased cost of large platforms.Yet European militaries cannot forever continue to cannibalise those arsenals they acquired during the Cold War.If there is to be an industrial and material base for sustaining future campaigns of significant magnitude, this requires renewed investment.A radically new approach to defence planning is therefore needed.The revamped NATO Defence Planning Process offers a procedural template for doing so, starting from an output-oriented level of ambition and encompassing national as well as multinational capability targets.But can Europeans continue to rely on the US to plug all gaping holes in their defence posture?If not, this requires that Europeans launch a parallel planning cycle to take stock of where they stand without US support and to develop remedies accordingly.Such a European defence review could for example be organised under the auspices of the EDA.Above anything else, moreover, individual European nations need to take this collective exercise seriously, rather than treat capability targets as pie in the sky.When looking back at the recent operations in Libya and Mali, it is difficult to avoid harsh conclusions.Never did so few do so much in the name of so many.This is not sustainable.When operational solidarity is found absent, political solidarity is put into question.It is revealing that the supposedly common security and defence policy of the EU is specialising in capacity-building missions while individual Member States revert to national defence planning.This creeping renationalisation of defence efforts represents a fundamental threat to European integration as a whole.The European Heads of State and Government are presented with one final opportunity to opt for a quantum leap forward.If they do not want to see the European project unravel, they should seize it.MARGARITA ŠEŠELGYT Since the launch of the first CSDP mission in 2003, the EU has not been very eager to use its crisis management instruments in its Eastern vicinity.Two purely CSDP missions have been initiated in the region over 10 years: rule of law mission EUJUST Themis (2004) (2005) and monitoring mission EUMM (2008-), both of them in Georgia.An on-going EUBAM mission to Moldova and Ukraine (2005) was launched through the ENPI.Though in general the security situation in the region is relatively stable and therefore does not require the use of advanced crisis management instruments, three frozen conflicts if unfrozen might pose a serious challenge for EU security.Moreover they are creating a negative effect on the general developments in these Eastern neighbourhood states.The reluctance of the EU to employ its CSDP instruments in the region more actively has been determined by several reasons.First of all, the security situation in those countries did not pose an urgent need to react, except in the case of Georgia.Secondly, the Eastern neighbourhood is not equally regarded as a region of primary EU security interest by all Member States.Finally, and most importantly, Russia considers this region as a zone of its exceptional interests.Thus any political activity by any other international player in the region is perceived as a serious challenge for Russian national interests.Moreover, the main stakeholders in the region do not recognise the EU as a security player in a traditional sense, further preventing it from playing a more assertive role in the security domain of the Eastern Neighbourhood.The missions that the EU has managed to launch in the region were important in showing the EU presence and testing CFSP and CSDP instruments in the Eastern Neighbourhood, but suffered from a number of challenges which were hampering their efficiency and ability to reach their goals.First of all, CSDP instruments were poorly coordinated with the ENP instruments.Secondly, the EU lacked a strategic vision of what exactly it wanted to achieve in the region and how to best to use its various instruments for that purpose.These deficiencies have also contributed to the reluctance of the EU to rely on CSDP instruments in the region.Being a fairly modest security actor in the Eastern neighbourhood the EU nevertheless plays an increasingly important part of an economic partner and donor.During 2010-2013 the ENPI funds for the Eastern partners consisted of 1.9 billion.After the EaP summit in Warsaw in 2011 these funds were increased by 150 million for 2011-2013.The EU roots its presence in the region in the principles of the ENP, which aims to create a zone of security, stability and prosperity around the EU's borders through a Europeanisation process.In fact, this approach is quite suitable for the Eastern side of the neighbourhood as it concentrates on non-sensitive "low politics" and thereby does not provoke Russia.At the same time it provides technical assistance and financial funds essential to coping with the challenges of post-soviet societies and thus increases the security in the region in a broad sense.But it is worth admitting that despite a presumed comprehensive attitude towards security in the EU, this approach lacks comprehensiveness.The EU tries to circumvent political instruments and lacks a strategy to direct its efforts in the region towards an explicit goal.Consequently, the EU's political influence in the region has not increased significantly over the years and the overall contribution of the EU to the resolution of frozen conflicts in Eastern Europe remains somewhat vague, except probably in Transnistria.The EU has invested a lot into the resolution of this frozen conflict by employing a wide variety of the measures available: diplomatic instruments, trade, economic aid, EUBAM with 100 staff, and it seems that those efforts begin to bear fruit.Since 2012 there have been clear signs of positive progress in the Transnistrian conflict resolution process.Although it might be argued that there are also other factors behind this success, such as low ethnic tensions within the conflict or a lack of a very strong opposition on the part of the main stakeholders, the contribution of the EU has to be admitted.The challenge is that the role of the EU and the results of its involvement in frozen conflicts in the Eastern neighbourhood depend a lot on a general attitude towards the EU in a particular country.The more a country is interested in closer ties with the EU, the more demand is created for the EU's involvement, and subsequently the more progress is achieved.That explains the almost inexistent role that the EU plays in the Nagorno-Karabach conflict.The success of the EU's efforts is also exposed to the attitudes and actions of other security stakeholders in the region.Despite strong demand for the EU's presence in the settlement of the frozen conflict in Georgia and solid commitment on the EU side (over 200 civilian monitors in EUMM) the progress is hampered by the lack of cooperation on the Russian side.The EUMM is yet to be granted access to the territories of the separatist regions even more so as fortifications are currently being built on the other side of the border.It appears that Russia does not have a sincere interest in the ultimate resolution of the frozen conflicts in the region as this might destroy the instruments of its political leverage.Thus even the positive progress in Transnistria cannot be regarded as irreversible and might be stalled as a consequence of increasing Moldova's European aspirations, as warned by the highest Russian politicians before the forthcoming EaP summit in Vilnius.The political context in the region creates the conditions in which the EU cannot put too much emphasis on the instruments of the so called "high politics", including CSDP missions, and has to rely on the measures of "low politics", which create more demand for the EU's involvement.However the EU has to realise that even "low politics" has to be coordinated and have clear goals, as some of them might as well be those of "high politics".Since the revision of the ENP and the launch of EaP in 2009 the attitude towards the CSDP in the Eastern neighbourhood has been facing a gradual paradigmatic change in the EU.First of all, the ENP countries are viewed less as a problematic neighbourhood that has to be secured but more as a partner, which has to be involved in the EU's activities.Secondly, the CSDP has ceased to be considered a taboo within the cooperation initiatives between the EU and Eastern partners.The change was inspired by several processes.The first one was the launch of the EaP, which aimed to raise the level of the EU's engagement within its Eastern neighbourhood by accelerating political association and deepening economic integration, 21 as well as acknowledging aspirations of some partners to seek a closer relationship with the EU.22 The EaP foresaw new enhanced partnership agreements, such as the DCFTA and for the first time recognised the CSDP as one of the partnership areas, which provides the ground for the FPA, partners' contribution to missions and operations and their involvement in joint exercises and trainings.The second threshold was the Lisbon Treaty which has introduced quite a number of novelties for the CSDP.New institutions dedicated exclusively to the CSDP within the structures of the EEAS such as a Deputy to the HR responsible for security issues and the CMPD aggregated additional attention and more consistent interest in CSDP matters.In parallel new institutions in the EEAS have been established within the field of the ENP (an EaP division and divisions working with bilateral cooperation projects within the21. Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit, Council of the European Union, Prague, 7 May 2009, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PRES-09-78_en.htm.22. Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit, Council of the European Union, Warsaw, 29-30 September 2011, http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhood/eastern_partnership/documents/ warsaw_summit_declaration_en.pdf.CMPD).These permanent institutions have brought dynamism and a more strategic outlook in both fields.Two processes mentioned above created favourable conditions for another innovation -a new multilateral panel for cooperation in the area of the CSDP within EaP Platform I Democracy, Good Governance and Stability, which was launched on 12 June 2013 and had its first meeting on 27 September.The panel provides a working level multilateral cooperation format between the EU and EaP countries within the field of the CSDP, which has been lacking in the EU structures.The launch of the new panel is very important for the EU presence in the ENP as it allows the EU to rely on a more comprehensive approach, including hard security issues.Moreover through the link to the EaP financial instruments the panel becomes eligible for EU funding, which has previously been unavailable for CSDP initiatives.Finally, as a multilateral and consistent approach towards CSDP issues in the EaP, the panel attracts more attention to the region in general.Deputy Secretary General for the EEAS Maciej Popowski defined the essence of the current CSDP partnerships in three words: knowledge, impact and legitimacy.23 Partners are expected to bring to the EU their expertise, improve EU capabilities and increase the political legitimacy of the EU's missions and operations.These innovations have definitely created a more favourable environment for the cooperation between the EU and EaP countries.Although in the short run progress in cooperation will depend to a great extent on the willingness and ability of the EaP countries to contribute, in the long run the panel may contribute to the confidence building in the region and construction of joint perceptions and values.It is imperative though that the multilateral panel would be supported by bilateral cooperation projects, as EaP countries differ a lot among themselves and have diverse expectations towards the EU.Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine are interested in advanced general cooperation with the EU, whereas Armenia, Azerbaijan, and in particular Belarus, have more reserved attitudes.Ukraine and Moldova have signed FPAs, Georgia and Armenia are currently negotiating.Georgia and Moldova see the EU within the field of the CSDP as a contributor to their security, especially in helping to solve frozen conflicts in their territories.Ukraine on the other hand has the capabilities (including those that the EU lacks) and interest to increase its role in the EU's operations.It has already participated in several rotations of the EU Battlegroups, and new commitments are foreseen for the forthcoming rotation of the BG HELBROC in 2014 and possibly in the Visegrad Battlegroup.Ukraine has contributed to the EUPM in Bosnia Herzegovina, participates in the EUNAVFOR Atalanta and prepares to join Atalanta in 2014 with a fully supported frigate.It is important to realise these differences and use the panel as a forum for information exchange enabling all the partners to take from it what best suits their needs, as well as a platform for the development of new projects.The forthcoming EaP Summit and European Council on Defence are generating more attention than general for both the CSDP and EaP.Lithuania, which currently holds the EU Council Presidency, has made the EaP one of its main presidency priorities and is an ardent advocate of these countries in various EU formats.These developments create a favourable environment for raising CSDP and EaP related issues.Will there be anything substantially new proposed in either the EaP Summit or the EU Council on Defence on CSDP in the EaP?Current discussions in the EU institutions do not provide much ground for optimism.The EaP Summit will be devoted to political issues, such as signing and initialling Association Agreements, and will set a general direction for the cooperation between the EU and partners for several years.These directions will also influence developments in the CSDP, although the CSDP itself will not be high on the Summit agenda.The Summit declaration is not likely to offer any revolutionary changes for the CSDP, except general statements about the role of the CSDP in the region: what has been achieved since the Warsaw Summit and what lies ahead.Association Agreements include a part on the CSDP (except the one with Armenia) but they do not foresee any practical implications.The European Council on defence, on the other hand, is likely to be overshadowed by other more pressing issues for the CSDP than the EaP, such as capabilities, defence industry and general directions for the CSDP.Partnerships in the European Council (not distinguishing the EaP) will be addressed as a part of a changing paradigm in the EU to better involve its neighbours in the CSDP and to thereby increase the effectiveness and visibility of the EU's external role.It is not likely that the CSDP in the EaP will receive increased attention during the forthcoming years either, at least until the Latvian Presidency in the first part of 2015.Greek and Italian Presidencies will be putting more emphasis on the Southern part of neighbourhood.Thus the main format for innovation within the CSDP in EaP for several years will be the panel.As the institutions are already in place the success of the panel will depend on concrete initiatives and projects, which might come both from the Partnership countries and EU members.The EU at some point will have to address one potential challenge -namely how to enhance cooperation and increase partners' interests to contribute to the CSDP.On the one hand the EU benefits from its power of attraction especially in those countries which have overt or secret hopes of eventual membership; on the other hand it lacks enough "carrots" to encourage partners to join costly projects, such as participation in the CSDP missions.Ukraine contributes a lot at the moment, but its enthusiasm may fade.Moreover due to institutional regulations that favour EU capabilities and personnel in CSDP missions, partners face difficulties contributing even if they want.The dynamism in cooperation might be assured by employing a principle of positive discrimination, as contribution of the partners has a double goal, not only to increase the EU's capabilities, but also to bring those countries closer to the EU and its values through cooperation.Finally, the EU Member States and those working in the EU institutions have to always remember that progress in the Eastern neighbourhood is a long, step-by-step and not a one-way process.The EU has to be prepared for set-backs.Even though the Association Agreement with the Ukraine will be signed and the ones with Moldova and Georgia initialled, there will be no guarantee that these countries will be getting closer to the EU in the future.The process of democratisation there is still fragile.Moldova -the most pro-European and successful EU Eastern partnerwill be having parliamentary elections in November 2014, which might result in a government with a lesser interest to get closer to the EU.Thus, first of all, the EU institutions have to grasp the moment and do as much as possible until then.Secondly, employing a comprehensive approach to its involvement in the EaP the EU has to build its power of attraction, bringing the value systems of those countries closer to that of the EU.The military definitely is not the primary instrument to deploy in Europe's southern neighbourhood.Passions run high in on-going domestic disputes, which might easily spark into conflict (again), with obvious international ramifications.Meanwhile, the civil war in Syria, in which foreign volunteers, regional players and the great powers are already involved, grinds on.In this infinitely complex geopolitical situation, the impact of outside military intervention is even more unpredictable than usual.The intervention in Libya which Europeans initiated in 2011 proved as much.Necessary though it was, it directly aggravated the security situation in the Sahel, necessitating another European military operation in Mali in early 2013, not to forget Europe's civilian mission in Niger since August 2012.The military instrument (as always, of course) is thus to be used with extreme care.In fact Europe must ask itself whether it has any instruments with significant leverage in the region.The "Arab Spring" has not just left large parts of the Middle East and North Africa and beyond in turmoil.It has also demonstrated the bankruptcy of the fundamentally paternalistic positive conditionality ("good behaviour" is rewarded by the proverbial carrot) of the ENP, at least in our southern periphery.The EU never did implement it as intended, too often turning a blind eye to lack of reform or worse as long as cooperation in the fight against terrorism and illegal migration was assured.As a result the supposed partnership between both shores of the Mediterranean did not substantially affect the nature of the regimes.Today positive conditionality is in any case out of sync with the times.Especially (but not only) where people have just made a revolution, they want to decide on their own future; too heavy-handed outside meddling, no matter how benevolent, is quickly perceived as insulting.Money would not change this psychological reality, and in any case we do not have it: the economic and demographic challenges are beyond Europe's means to address alone.Before envisaging the role of the military instrument therefore, our entire strategy towards our southern neighbourhood needs urgent reassessment.The time has come to quietly abandon partnership (a notion which is abused at least as often as the word strategy) as the default mode of organising relations with our southern neighbours.By establishing partnerships with regimes before they changed, we took away much of the incentive to reform and simultaneously limited our own margin for manoeuvre, for once partnership has been declared it is difficult to maintain a critical distance.Partnership should be reserved for those States with which we share respect for the universal values on which our own society is based, and with which we can therefore systematically engage in joint action.With all other States we should maintain diplomatic relations so as to foster dialogue which ideally will produce the setting for occasional joint action.Partnership is the desired outcome -it is not the starting position.Underlying the abandonment of partnership in favour of diplomacy is the recognition that our past level of ambition was unrealistically high.We should not give up on the idea underpinning European grand strategy (as codified in the 2003 European Security Strategy): only where States equally provide for the security, prosperity and freedom of all their citizens are lasting peace and security possible.It has in fact been validated by the "Arab Spring", which has demonstrated that where States do not provide for their citizens, people will eventually revolt, violently or peacefully -and successfully or less successfully.At the same time though it has proved that such fundamental change cannot be engineered from the outside.External actors can support it if and when domestic forces align to make it happen.Until then, they can strive to have a moderating (but not usually a reforming) influence on the regime by maintaining a critical diplomatic stance and (by diplomatic and other measures) clearly signalling dissatisfaction in case of the derailing of democratic processes or severe human rights violations.The emergency brake of the Responsibility to Protect applies in the gravest cases: genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.What is a realistic level of ambition for European diplomacy then?Where a revolution has taken place (in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya) our objective is the consolidation of a more equal order.Where it has not, the objective is for domestic actors to accelerate the speed of reform in order to achieve a peaceful transition instead of violent upheaval.Our leverage to contribute to these ends may be limited, but we certainly have instruments that can help nudge developments in the right direction, even though ours may not be the decisive action.Diplomacy, to start with, which we should not forget we are actually quite good at: for example, witness Catherine Ashton's prominent (even though so far unsuccessful) mediation efforts in Egypt.Two other important instruments are the offer of technical expertise (in the police and justice as well as other sectors of government), and the creative and targeted use of financial means (for mutually beneficial investment projects, in the transport and energy sector for example, that can attract additional regional and international funds).To this, we should add an unequivocal ambition in the field of security: to prevent conflict and, where prevention fails, to terminate or at least to contain it, in order both to exercise our Responsibility to Protect people from war and to safeguard our vital interests.This is where the military instrument comes in, in support of diplomacy.That a European ambition with regard to peace and security in the region is required is indeed another clear lesson of the aftermath of the "Arab Spring".First of all, the "pivot" of the American strategic focus is evident: in none of the three recent conflicts (Libya, Mali and Syria) did Washington seek a leading role.In Libya, Europeans had to convince the US of the need to intervene, though the US then had to provide the bulk of the strategic enablers for the air campaign.The Mali scenario conformed better to US expectations: an intervention initiated and implemented by Europeans, with targeted American support (mainly ISTAR).In Syria the US had no choice but to engage once chemical weapons were used, the red line which President Obama had drawn but which he expected not to be crossed, and which was therefore intended as a diplomatic way of avoiding major US involvement.These three conflicts further highlight that in the south Europe's engagement cannot remain limited to the ENP countries.The stability of our immediate neighbours is linked to the stability of "the neighbours of the neighbours", hence our "real" neighbourhood, where our vital interests are at stake, goes beyond the Mediterranean and stretches out into the Sahel, the Horn and the Gulf.Finally, it should be clear by now that no strategy towards this "broader neighbourhood" (or towards any region, for that matter) makes sense if it does not include "hard security".Stating up front that our grand design for the neighbourhood ended where security problems began has cost us dearly in legitimacy and effectiveness.What the "pivot" means is that in this broader neighbourhood it will increasingly be up to Europe to take the lead in maintaining peace and security: to develop permanent policies of stabilisation and conflict prevention for sure, but also to initiate the response to crises, and to forge a coalition to undertake the necessary action (and, if there is no other option, to act alone).Following its mediation efforts in Egypt, Europe could first of all design a more systematic diplomatic engagement, aiming to foster cooperation between the States of the region.It is in our immediate interest to avoid new regimes having recourse to a confrontational foreign policy as a way of distracting attention from domestic challenges, as it is in the interest of all States in the Middle East to avoid escalation of the Syrian civil war, which has already turned into a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran, into a full-blown international sectarian war.Similarly, all states in the Sahel face the same challenge of roving militias in that vast territory.The military instrument has a role to play in these, notably through training missions (as they are currently training the armed forces of Somalia and Mali), which in specific cases may need to be supplemented by the provision of materiel.It would be a mistake however to assume that all problems can be solved through training.The military must therefore also provide Europe with a credible capacity for power projection: such a deterrent will strengthen our diplomacy.Vital interests and/or the Responsibility to Protect may dictate actual intervention.Inter-state war in the region, including spill-over of a civil war, surely ought to be prevented or ended.Unless the UN Security Council seizes the matter and Europe can act as part of a broader coalition, notably with the US and regional actors, intervention is unlikely however.Addressing a civil war, particularly when the Responsibility to Protect arises, is the responsibility of regional actors first and foremost, but given the limits of will and means external intervention may prove necessary.In such cases, Europe is more likely to be the only or the leading external actor, preferably still in coalition with local and regional actors, as in Libya and Mali.The government of the country in question can of course request intervention; after Libya, a UNSC mandate is much less certain.As in Syria today, but also in Georgia (2008) , the military feasibility may be constrained by the implication of external powers, by the chance that any benefits are outweighed by major negative side effects, or by an unacceptably high risk of casualties.Intervention may then be limited to preventing spill-over and possibly supporting the legitimate party in the conflict with equipment and otherwise.Assuming leadership in maintaining peace and security in our broader southern neighbourhood does not mean rushing headlong into action.It does mean taking the initiative to respond to any crisis, at the earliest possible stage, in order to prevent escalation and the need for military intervention.But if all else fails, and vital interests and the Responsibility to Protect cannot otherwise be upheld, we should not shy away from military action either.In parts of this region at least, such as the Sahel, even limited military means can make a difference: if none of the parties on the ground has any air support for example, a limited deployment on our side can tip the balance.Nevertheless it is a most sensitive region in which to intervene, which means that the cost-benefit calculation is even more difficult than usual.A coalition involving local and regional players is always advisable, in order to avoid mobilisation of public opinion against Europe.Even if our help is requested, strict political conditions and long-term follow-up are of the essence if a durable impact is to be had.It are Europe's interests that are at stake here much more than America's -in that sense it is mare nostrum.But Europe will not stabilise this region against the local actors, only with them: it is mare nostrum as much for them as for us.Asia is becoming one large playing field.The rise of China has effectively connected Central, South, Southeast, and Northeast Asia by means of roads, railways, trade, personal exchanges, and regional institutions.In the previous decade, that arena used to be characterised by growing confidence and cooperation.Six elements were important in this regard.First, most governments adhered to constructive variants of nationalism and aligned national development with globalisation.As a result, they became more integrated into the global order.Between 2000 and 2012, the share of foreign investment and trade increased from 3% to 6% and from 40% to 57%.That coincided with an expansion of intra-regional trade.The share of intra-regional exports of total Asian exports expanded from 41% to 53% between 2000 and 2012.This trend was flanked by a gradual institutionalisation of cooperation and a proliferation of regional organisations.Asian countries also came to recognise non-traditional security threats as a common challenge and turned them into an opportunity for military confidence building.All that continued to make most countries more averse to the use of force and encouraged them to show restraint in the many conflicts over borders, raw materials and regional leadership.That restraint cannot be taken for granted.There are four important elements that could lead to more conflict and instability.To begin with there is the shift in the balance of power, marked by the rise of China, the failure of South Asia, the struggling of Southeast Asia and the inevitable decline of Japan.China's ascent remains precarious and its economic growth model is unsustainable, but still it is the only major developing country that expands its industry so rapidly and advances fast in terms of technology, diplomatic influence and military prowess.In comparison, the other juggernaut, India, is struggling and falling prey to financial volatility, political fragmentation, social instability and domestic violence.The altering balance of power aggravates the traditional security dilemmas between Asian countries.Second, the growing economic distortions can cause major crises and draw pragmatic elites away from their constructive nationalism to more antagonistic variants of nationalism.Third, the increasing "militarisation" of borders and disputed areas increases the risk of mishaps that could easily escalate in a context of antagonist nationalism.Fourth, demographic pressure, demand for raw materials and environmental hazards are increasing faster than technological solutions are found.China's growth remains the main variable.If China keeps its growth on track, continues to modernise its industrial base, attains high-income status, and grad-ually rebalances its economy away from investment-and export-led growth, it could -theoretically -provide more opportunities to its Asian neighbours.The downside, however, is that the transition towards that economic leadership entails a long period -another decade or so -of diverting trade, industrial opportunities, and possibilities to create jobs.Furthermore, the economic power shift would imply a military power shift and most likely allow China to outpace the others in building up a presence in the disputed waters of the South and East China Sea.That could cause more balancing, confirm China's suspicion of nascent containment and lead to fiercer competition.If, however, China's growth were to slow down before it builds a strong domestic market, its leaders could try to secure their position domestically by shifting to antagonistic nationalism.Moreover, a sharp slowdown of Chinese economic growth could also destabilise many of the neighbouring states that depend heavily on exports to China and commodity prices.Like in China, the most probable result would be more antagonistic nationalism.Such a climate makes it of course much more difficult to prevent that tensions spiral out of control.This relates to tensions with China, but also to other conflict-prone relationships, such as India and Pakistan, Thailand and Cambodia, Indonesia and some of its neighbours, and so forth.A Chinese slowdown could unravel much of the cooperative mechanisms that developed in the previous decades.This uncertainty presents Europe with several important security challenges.First, Europe has to anticipate more economic volatility.Its social stability could be affected by more assertive industrial policies as well as economic crashes.Second, Asia's turbulent transition challenges some of our core objectives, not the least to advance peace and cooperation through multilateralism.Third, we should anticipate a spill-over of instability from Asia into our backyard.Distrust and rivalry could prompt the Asian powers to try to secure their interests unilaterally in our extended neighbourhood.Economic problems in Asia could also add to more social unrest in that area.Fourth, military conflict between the Asian powers reduces our diplomatic manoeuvrability -especially if the rift between China and its neighbours were to expand and if that would be followed by more manifest American balancing.Fifth, the American pivot to Asia demands Europe to play a more active role in stabilising its neighbourhood.That could be seen as an important opportunity, but also a threat if it continues to fail to get its act together.Sixth, the tensions in Asia might lead to a more rapid militarisation of outer space and the cyber realm.Seventh, a persistent failure of South and Central Asia to work towards prosperity and stability could create a security black hole right in between Europe and Eastern Asia.Eighth, the outbreak of a regional armed conflict would come as a major threat to a region that has no contingency plans anymore for traditional wars between states and major powers.This will be an Asian century, but it will unlikely be a century of peace.Europe should be prepared for major instability, but as long as Asia continues to grow economically, it should also be ready to reap the benefits.The first task is therefore to advance our economic interests.Europe should serve Asia's growing consumer market more from European factories, not by relocating more capacity to Asia or allowing Asian countries to divert trade by aggressive industrial policies.The second task is to make our main partnerships in Asia more effective instead of just bigger.Europe should continue to work towards a strong and balanced relationship with China.It would be a mistake to play up the China-threat.It is true that many Chinese policies are imperiling our economic interests and it is also true that its diplomatic choices are not always compatible with ours.Yet, Europe is equally challenged by the monetary and industrial policies of countries like Japan, South Korea, India, and, not the least, the US.Neither are we always on the same page with these countries in diplomatic matters.Important also is that we analyse China's role in Asian maritime disputes carefully.As regards the territorial disputes, China's claims and its interpretation of the UNCLOS are often as contentious as those of other countries, including, again, the US.Its efforts to project naval power into the Pacific are as legitimate or problematic as America's efforts to maintain military predominance in this area.It cannot be excluded that China soon or later will become more belligerent, as we cannot exclude that for most other Asian powers, but we should remain careful and balanced in our strategic choices.It is thus advised to continue to invest in our partnership with China, but also to strengthen relations with other Asian protagonists.We need to avoid here to make the mistake of trying to broaden partnerships without strengthening cooperation on core economic and political issues.Europe has too often the tendency to compensate the lack of progress by setting up more dialogues.The precondition to make this possible is that the EEAS invests more in internal action, that is, the coordination with Member States and other stakeholders to generate the maximum of influence out of our resources -economic, diplomatic, and military.In the military realm we should not allow our Asian partners to approach individual Member States for ad hoc synergies, without being able to get meaningful strategic cooperation at the European level in return.There should thus be cogent frameworks for defence cooperation at the European level within which the Member States could engage themselves.Particular attention should go to ASEAN.Europe has to work towards a more effective partnership with ASEAN, to support the region as a buffer against Asian great power rivalry, and help to prevent its further fragmentation, which will inevitably turn the grouping into a defenceless playground of great power politics.One of the most important questions is whether Europe should follow the US in pivoting to the Pacific.That would not be a smart move.Three considerations should guide Europe in its response to the US pivot.First, it should ask itself how it could get the maximum of leverage over the Asian powers.Second, it should think how it could best secure its maritime lifelines to the Pacific.Third, it has to evaluate how it can make itself most useful vis-à-vis its main partners.Taking into consideration that Europe's long-range power projection capacity will continue to be limited, that it will have limited weight to throw in the Asian balances of power, and that it faces an increasingly growing number of major security threats, the choice for Europe should be to make itself indispensible as a security actor in its extended neighbourhood, including Africa, the Middle East, Eastern Europe, and the Arctic.This is were the Asian powers are the most vulnerable, where the EU can bolster its credibility as a security provider, and strengthen its credibility in the Atlantic partnership as the US focuses more on the Pacific.Pivoting to Asia without strengthening our position in our immediate neighbourhood would be reckless and dangerous.What has to be done?First, Europe needs to re-energise its neighbourhood policy, restore its position as a capable partner of countries in that area, strengthen its role as an economic player, and regain confidence as a source of inspiration.Second, Europe must come up with an integrated policy to improve security in Africa and the Middle East.This involves local capacity building, conflict prevention, but also the ability to project power whenever new conflicts might erupt.Third, Europe needs to establish a defence perimeter that stretches from Gibraltar to the Gulf of Aden and from the Gulf of Aden to the Artic.Such a defence perimeter should consist of joint security hubs.Therefore, it can depart from existing facilities of the Member States in the Mediterranean, the Gulf, Africa, and the Indian Ocean.But it will also be essential to establish some sort of presence in the Caspian Sea Region so as to monitor and contain future instability in Central Asia.Besides these hubs, a forward naval deployment is indispensible.Europe should have a significant naval presence in the northern Atlantic, the Gulf of Guinea, the Mediterranean and around the Gulf Region (Including the Western part of the Indian ocean).Such a presence could be organised around the five aircraft carriers.These hubs and this naval presence should play an important role in building security partnerships with our neighbours and conditioning the security involvement of Asian powers.Fourth, Europe needs to limit its vulnerability to possible aggression from space and cyber.Europe thus requires the full spectrum of military capabilities.While it should be able to use its armed force constructively, to cement partnerships and so forth, it must also be able to defend itself against a spillover of instability from Asia into its neighbourhood, and from that neighbourhood into Europe itself.In other words, it has to have the upper hand in the transit zone between Europe and the surrounding arc of disquiet and be able to deny access to those "external" powers that threaten its security.In 1827, the British explorer, Sir William Parry -of the Royal Navy -set out on one of the first purposeful expeditions to locate the North Pole.Many came before and after him: many of those intrepid explorers also perished.While he went further north than anyone before him, he ultimately failed -although he lived to tell the tale.The North Pole was eventually found, but the extreme climate and the thick ice sheets prevented human penetration until the middle of the twentieth century, which, even then, was only in a military-strategic way.Over the past decade, however, particularly with the onset and acceleration of climate change, the north has started to open and scientists project that, by 2050, the Arctic Ocean will be ice free for much of the year.This is drawing increasing attention from local, regional and even global powers -Norway, Russia, Canada, the US, China and others -to assert their interests, both economic and political.However, the EU -with its own territory within the Arctic Circle and hence definitively an Arctic power -has taken less interest in the affairs of its northern proximity than it otherwise might.Its much-vaunted "Northern Dimension" and nascent "Arctic Policy" have remained hamstrung as entrenched structural economic problems and the Arab revolts have concentrated European leaders' attention on their southern rimland.Likewise, the European Commission's Joint Communication to the European Council and the European Parliament in 2008, which outlined three themes for its northern perspective -"knowledge", "responsibility" and "engagement" -has failed to drive Europeans forward.The EU has also failed to gain full membership of the Arctic Council, even though two of its Member States are part-located in the Arctic region and another has an overseas territory there.It remains merely an observer.The question arises: how can it become a power?Acquiring power necessitates a thorough understanding of geopolitics.This accounts for a way of thinking that looks at the interaction between humans and their geographic surroundings -or rather, the way that geography impedes human activities, encouraging them to develop new forms of technology to overcome those constraints.Geography is -after all -"fundamental" and "pervasive" for it 'impose[s] distinctive constraints and provide[s] distinctive opportu-nities that have profound implications for policy and strategy'.24 However, this does not necessarily mean that geography determines human possibilities, for there are many ways of reacting to geographic constraint or change.The UK and Japan, for example, are both islands, located off continents, but both developed very differently: whereas the former adopted an expansive maritime approach, the other closed in on itself for many centuries, until forced open by external powers.This is where geostrategy comes in: those societies best able to maximise their command over the natural world are likely to be more successful than those who do not.However, as Grygiel notes: '[t]he geostrategy of a state [...] is not necessarily motivated by geographic or geopolitical factors. A state may project power to a location because of ideological reasons, interest groups, or simply the whim of its leader'.25 Indeed, there is no a priori explicit linkage between strategy and geography; governments have often failed to properly link the two -perhaps best reflected by the historical case of Japan.Had the Japanese not adapted an insular geostrategic culture, they might have ended up more like the British -outward looking -and indeed, they did after the Meiji Restoration during the late nineteenth century.The point here is that to flourish economically, politically and culturally, political communities must actively seek to establish their command over the natural world and -consequentially -over rival societies.However, the urge to do this is often a consequence of some form of dislocation.In Japan's case, this occurred when the US' "Black Ships" entered the Bay of Tokyo; in Britain's case when Spanish power began to surround and endanger the home islands in the sixteenth century.Further, when one society masters new ways of altering the constraining impact of geography, or when it successfully overcomes an external threat -the region in question is likely to be altered, often irrevocably.26 A similar dynamic may now be underway in the extreme Northern Hemisphere.For much of modern history, this region was largely impenetrable.The inhospitable climate made human settlement very difficult.Any settlement that did occur was confined to the southern extremes of the region (like Scandinavia and the Baltic rim), which were part of alternative geopolitical sub-systems like Northern and Eastern Europe or the North Atlantic.Even as the invention of intercontinental bombers, ballistic missile technology and nuclear propulsion during the 1950s merged with the Arctic's pivotal position between Soviet Russia and the Western democracies, its geopolitical significance only grew due to the superpowers' nuclear strategies.Hidden by its murky depths, American, British and Soviet ballistic missile submarines found the Arctic Ocean a suitable location to lurk during the Cold War, only a handful of minutes striking distance from each others' strategic centres of gravity.The region's importance swiftly declined with the end of the Iron Curtain.After a period of relative quiet, the Arctic has started to re-emerge as a region of geopolitical intrigue.27 This is being driven by two interwoven factors:1. The dense polar ice-sheets are starting to melt, meaning that except for the winter months, the Arctic Ocean will likely be navigable by the 2050s.Should even the most moderate climate projections become a reality by the middle of the twenty-first century, it is likely that the Arctic Ocean will no longer remain such an impenetrable and inhospitable space.It will always be a very difficult environment to work and live in, especially during the winter months, but it could nonetheless emerge as an alternative transit route between the centres of economic production in North-Western Europe and North-Eastern Asia.2. As the world is becoming more multipolar, the larger surrounding powers are beginning to consider how the changing environment -both natural and geopolitical -may affect their interests in the northern zone.How will a more open and warmer north affect the geography and development of Russia, for example?These developments may transform the Arctic from an icy wilderness to the centre-piece of a new geopolitical zone.This Wider North will likely envelop many European countries, such as Denmark (and Greenland), Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, as well as the UK and the Irish Republic, given that the British Isles act as the strategic gateway between the Atlantic and Arctic Oceans.28 Germany, Poland, France and the Netherlands may also be drawn in given their proximity to the Baltic Sea and the North Sea and the requirements of their economies, i.e., unfettered access to the sea for the purposes of trade.More distant countries, like Japan, South Korea, the US and Canada, all with northern vectors, may also be drawn in.So as climate change takes its toll and as surrounding powers increase their interest in the region, what might it look like by the middle of the twentieth century?There are two main possible trajectories: Peace in the Wider North: analysts were relieved that climate change did not have the impact on the Wider North that it was originally projected to have.While the Ultra-Plinian eruption of an Indonesian volcano in 2026 killed millions of people, it did envelop the Earth's atmosphere in a thin layer of ash, which led to the decade-long onset of a volcanic winter.The previously melting ice actually began to refreeze, closing the Northern Sea Route and derailing Moscow's efforts to lift-up Russia's northern areas through the development of new infrastructure on the Siberian coast.In any case, the eruption left the world with many other issues to deal with -such as maintaining food supply in some regions -reducing the desire of countries to engage in geopolitics in the North.In any case, the stagnation of the Putin regime in the late 2020s further stymied Russia's ability to influence its surroundings, as the country's numerous oblasts clamoured for greater autonomy under acute agricultural and demographic pressures.Likewise, the birth of constitutional government in Beijing in the late 2030s -after the "Elders' Movement" earlier that decade -created a much less assertive China.The Chinese turned inward to refine their democratic structures and thoroughly sweep away what came to be known as the "era of repression", even as they continued to grow in wealth and power.Analysts feared that the major powers had not forgotten their interests in the North but had merely put them on the back-burner.Struggle in the Wider North: By 2040, Western hegemony had been greatly reduced, not least by a combination of climate change and the rise of non-Western counties, particularly China and Russia.With the Northern Sea Route having been opened, and human habitation of Russia's northern expanses been enabled, China was keen to extend its control over Eurasia's near-unlimited resources.The intensification of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation during the 2020s finally altered the global balance of power: the agreement reached between Beijing and Moscow was undoubtedly in China's favour, but the Russian regime -long prickly and paranoid -was determined not to "surrender" to the Euro-Atlantic structures.Backed by China's industrial strength and growing military might, Russia realised that a consumer was ready and willing to procure its resources -a consumer that did not attach multiple caveats requiring political reform.Northern and Eastern European countries looked on as the China-Russia axis solidified: a single geopolitical constellation was beginning to take control of the Eurasian heartland, exerting pressure on all fronts.The Western maritime powers -a British-French led EU, Japan, Korea and the US -had their work cut out: not only were they busy maintaining order around the southern rimlands of Eurasia, but now they were facing a rising threat to the North and East.Beijing realised that opening another geopolitical front would serve its wider agenda in the Indo-Pacific, particularly in South-East Asia, by splitting the West's dwindling resources.It actively supported the Russians' northern policy, providing Moscow with the latest weapons systems, safe in the knowledge that Russia could never again challenge Chinese power.By 2050, two hostile blocs looked on at one another.Preparing for the Emergence of the "Wider North" Whatever future takes hold in the upper Northern Hemisphere, the EU and its Member States are unlikely to remain unaffected.Should the Wider North emerge as an integrated geopolitical space, sucking in several powerful external countries, Europeans must be ready and waiting.Rather than a reactive policy, which kicks in after something goes wrong, Europeans require a more assertive, integrated and preventative approach that places their needs and interests at the forefront.Shrewd diplomatic action is needed, but this is not by itself enough.Military capabilities -and the techno-industrial base required to support them -are essential to undergird diplomacy, much like a police force does its part to uphold the law.29 More than that, military capabilities act as a restraint on other powers' calculations and actions, particularly those like Russia, which continues to see international relations through the lens of the "modern".In this respect, Europeans could not do nothing better than to remember the insights of the naval strategist, Alfred Thayer Mahan, who proclaimed that: '[f]orce is never more operative than when it is known to exist but is not brandished'.30 Unfortunately, few Europeans -even the UK and France -possess significant projection forces that are suitable for patrols or operations in the northern extremes.Norway has some capable and sophisticated military instruments, but not in a number sufficient to undergird European interests.Vol.195, No. 674: p. 31.forward planning.If the Wider North takes shape, Europeans will need to bolster the cold weather capacities of their armed forces to facilitate patrols and operations in the icy extremes, to establish and sustain a European presence, or to support smaller partners and allies and to deter foreign aggression against the EU's northern perimeters.Most importantly, enhanced situational awareness will be crucial in the years ahead, not least as other non-European, even non-Western powers, seek to muscle in and make their voices count.JO COELMONT AND ALEXANDER MATTELAER Military capabilities cannot be discussed in isolation of the geostrategic environment, for they refer to the ability to achieve specific effects that are ultimately determined by political reality.The European capability development process can therefore not make abstraction of budgetary austerity, the turmoil following the Arab Spring or the US "pivot" to the Asia Pacific.These developments may indeed suggest that European defence approaches a state of emergency.This conclusion, however, is only a snapshot of the present.To understand where we are going requires knowing where we have been.Such a historical perspective makes clear we are witnessing a dramatic increase in the importance of strategic assets.In fact, the future acquisition of major defence systems is critically dependent on political desperation.Sovereignty only means as much as one's ability to act permits, and this ability is dwindling fast across the European continent.Desperate times therefore call for desperate measures: the reconstitution of sovereignty as the collective ability of European nations to bring military power to bear.In the middle of the Cold War, it was deemed unacceptable to spend less than 4% of GDP on defence.Even in these days of relative plenty for defence planners, a transatlantic division of labour was firmly in place.European states generally concentrated their defence efforts on generating sufficient numbers of tactical assets, be it fighter squadrons or mechanised brigades.In turn, the US, and to a limited extent the UK and France, invested a large share of their resources in strategic assets, such as expeditionary logistics, C4ISTAR systems and long-range (nuclear) strike platforms.Together, Europeans and Americans maintained an integrated command structure for imbuing NATO's common defence clause with real meaning.This package provided the baseline from which post-Cold War defence planning must inevitably depart.For European planners, the political urge to cash in on the so-called "peace dividend" was paradoxically accompanied by a drive towards greater expeditionary deployability of a shrinking pool of tactical assets.Ever since the 1998 Saint Malo accords, it was clear that Europeans suffered from important strategic shortfalls limiting their ability to act -be it autonomously or as equal partner of the US.The post-9/11 defence spending spree in Washington allowed for these shortfalls to be systematically covered, even if it also deepened the transatlantic gap in terms of military technology.As such, European militaries could continue to play the role of US military subcontractors in places as far away as Afghanistan.The transatlantic division of labour therefore continued well into the post-Cold War period.In many ways this trend culminated in the air campaign over Libya: an intervention initiated by European ambitions was critically reliant on US strategic assets.This dependency not only ranged from tomahawk missiles to suppress enemy air defences to RPASs to collect intelligence as far as the operational front office was concerned.It applied equally to back office functions of the logistical support and command structures (think tanker aircraft and combined air operation centres).The US pivot to the Asia-Pacific region and the changing character of the operational environment are turning this longstanding division of labour upside down.The American willingness to pick up the slack is diminishing just as the operational importance of strategic enablers increases.This entails a true paradigm shift for European defence planners.The future availability of sufficient strategic assets will determine the European ability to act, be it nationally or collectively.And -surprise, surprise -this debate is intimately intertwined with the future of the European defence industry.As the spiralling cost of hi-tech defence systems is driving unit prices up, order numbers are going down, casting a long shadow over an industrial sector that is responsible for driving technological innovation forward.So far, European capitals have responded to this emerging paradigm shift by putting forward the slogan of pooling and sharing.But before issuing yet another clarion call, let us look in the mirror.Pooling and sharing was launched because the original project -establishing PESCO -failed.In fact, the underlying idea of pooling and sharing has been around since the 1970s, if not earlier.Moreover, pooling and sharing cannot possibly compensate for the huge amount of budget cuts national defence has had to swallow recently.As the former Director-General of the EUMS Ton van Osch has stated, the combined European defence cuts are approximately one hundred times the size of the expected benefits of currently agreed pooling and sharing initiatives.Far too many of these individual projects are concerned with marginal savings in the field of tactical capabilities.In political terms, pooling and sharing is effectively used as a means to camouflage the imminent loss of sovereignty.Faced with another round of cuts, Europeans planners attempt to muddle through once more.With some notable exceptions, it is still business as usual -at least for now.This is not to say that pooling and sharing has no potential.When looking at the development and purchasing cost of satellite systems, future air systems and major naval platforms, it is not rocket science to understand that European states can get much more value for money if they spend their Euros together.Some states are already going pragmatically forward in fields such as air transport.The challenge is to move forward with European answers to the full list of strategic shortfalls.The fragmented nature of the European defence market is only sustainable as long as industrial answers can match operational requirements within the available budgetary envelope.In an era of falling defence expenditures, this means that deeper European cooperation is unavoidable.The added value of genuine pooling and sharing therefore resides in the spontaneous emergence of joint defence planning among partners.And if one is indeed willing to risk a quantum leap forward in terms of coordinating European defence planning, the era of austerity need not mean the end of sovereignty, on the contrary.This is of course a matter of political insight and acting accordingly.Perhaps Jean Claude Juncker was talking about more than economic reforms when he stated that 'we all know what to do, we just don't know how to get re-elected after we've done it.'The history of European integration is based on the application of the Monnet method and the principle of subsidiarity, i.e. the allocation of policy competences to the lowest possible level.The former assumed the shape of economic integration only after the proposal for establishing a European defence community had been defeated.It is therefore highly symbolic that the theme of European defence has crept back on the policy agenda six decades onwards.The latter assumes a five-step process to be followed before specific policy competences are uploaded to the European level.The first requirement is that it must be beyond reasonable doubt that the European level would bring greater efficiency.Second, there must be a significant amount of damage suffered already.Third, the damage must be of such magnitude that it cannot be hidden from public view.Fourth, the political class must reach a state of desperation: nothing focuses the mind like the prospect of a hanging.Fifth and finally, there must be no possible alternative left.So where are we with European defence?It becomes increasingly difficult to mask the dire state of affairs behind the smokescreen of pooling and sharing.Shell-shocked by austerity, anyone interested in defence issues is near a state of despair.Under the pressure of the US pivot, Europe is now drifting towards the fifth level.For now European states are experimenting with the last possible alternative: that of regional clusters.It is no coincidence that the Lancaster House Treaties provided the first attempts at pooling and sharing of strategic assets like carrier groups and satellite communications.It is questionable however, that these clusters will be able to bring about the required critical mass for investing in the development of sufficient strategic assets.The question therefore becomes: can the European Heads of State and Government now muster the will to make the quantum leap first imagined by René Pleven?A Question of Timing?The upcoming European Council on defence presents the first opportunity in many years to come to terms with these thorny issues.As the defence theme has now been put on the agenda, a considerable risk has been taken already.It is now all too easy to point out that the pooling and sharing emperor has no more than a fig leaf for clothing.On the bright side, the summit creates an opportunity to provide considerable impetus to the work of the European institutions in the realm of defence.Top-down steering of the institutional staff work is required to overcome the ubiquitous turf wars and bureaucratic gridlock.The EEAS may need reminding that the comprehensive approach is not meant to prevent the EU from growing military teeth.Similarly, the Commission's efforts in safeguarding the EDTIB deserve the support of Member States.A purely market-based approach to the European defence industry is of course flawed: as defence assets ultimately qualify as the bedrock of state sovereignty, a strategic mindset is needed.The fundamental purpose of the European defence industry is to generate the toolkit required for defending Europe's vital interests -all else is secondary.Yet the puzzle remains: how to square defence integration with the idea of state sovereignty?The answer is surprisingly simply.Under current levels of defence investment, national sovereignty is eroding to no more than a shadow of its former self.What is the ability to act of a state that has become utterly dependent on strategic enablers provided by the US, now a self-declared weary policeman?European sovereignty, if it is to mean anything substantive, must be rebuilt at a level commensurate with the magnitude of the common problem that needs to be resolved.Together, Europeans can generate the minimum mass required to hold their ground on the global level.On their own, they represent no more than the proverbial grass whereupon elephants fight.At the end of the day, on their own or even in clusters, Europeans cannot pool their strategic shortfalls.They can only share the frustration about their collective inability to act."Is there really no alternative?", the sceptics may ask.There is, in fact, one logical alternative remaining.It is the full revamping of national defence efforts, which in turn requires vastly greater investment -which even then may not suffice.This also amounts to betting the farm on European integration, for it represents the undoing of the original gamble of coal and steel.Europe's leaders must reflect long and hard about the options they have left.Defence establishments and national industries alike suggest that time is running out.Showdown, ladies and gentlemen!The rationale for any DTIB is to supply governments with cost efficient and high performance military equipment.DTIBs are the essential link between industry and the military; between the overalls of the factory and the camouflage of the battlefield.Without industrial capacities the production of military capabilities, as they relate to national security, both in terms of defence and force projection, is impossible.Defence firms are critical to the defence-industrial supply chain, as in Europe it is firms that largely conduct R&D activities and ultimately have the financial and human capital to develop military capabilities.Given that governments are dependent on the defence-industrial supply-chain for the accoutrement of capabilities essential to national security, and by virtue of governments being the largest consumers of military equipment, defence markets are unique in that governments tend to play a key ownership role in defence firms.Yet some national DTIBs have come under increasing strain as the costs of equipment increase and defence budgets decrease -a combination that is making it harder for some states to maintain capabilities and production capacities commensurate with national security.Governments privilege their own DTIB as this is perceived to be a way to maintain security of supply, support national firms and protect jobs.Despite this truism, however, the "European" DTIB (EDTIB) has emerged as a policy idea in response to defence market pressures.The idea behind the EDTIB is to overcome market fragmentation by harmonising government demand where possible, promoting multinational capability programmes, ensuring security of supply and maintaining and encouraging jobs, innovation and growth.Regulatory efforts by the European Commission have also sought to forge an EDTIB and EDEM by promoting defence market liberalisation.Whether a genuine EDTIB or EDEM actually exists, however, is a point of debate.The December Council meeting will necessarily have to address the ideas surrounding the EDTIB.While the associated debates are most likely to be marked by political entrenchment, any serious dialogue will focus on two intertwined problems associated with putting demand on a sustainable footing so as to ensure cost-efficient supply.One problem relates to whether European states can show a modicum of collective political leadership that results in a serious strategic blueprint; one which gives clearer signals to firms as to the shape and extent of future demand.The other problem relates to waning investment by governments in defence R&D and capability development programmes.According to Eurostat, for example, total EU27 GBAORD in defence -in terms of budget provisions and not actual expenditure -decreased from 9.7 billion in 2007 to 4.3 billion in 2011 (a decrease of 5.4 billion in 4 years).This short essay lists, in no particular order of preference, five specific but potentially feasible future work areas that could help address these two issues.National budgets are unlikely to yield greater resources for military capability development or for military R&D in the short to medium term.Yet, spending on defence is a critical hallmark of national sovereignty -indeed, to provide for defence is the ultimate raison d'être for governments -and so some degree of budgetary cooperation between Member States (less likely) or some form of innovation using common funds (potentially feasible) for defence will be required.To cushion such defence spending shortfalls there has been talk of using the EU's structural funds and financial tools where possible to support SMEs, regional clusters and the development of new technologies such as unmanned aerial vehicles.While such avenues should be explored, the use of purely Community mechanisms does raise certain restrictions and political frictions.Indeed, Community-based financial instruments cannot be used for strictly military purposes; the EU budget will not fund, say, an aircraft carrier project.Further still, some hesitantly believe that the use of Community funds will increase the hand of the European Commission in defence policy.Given these restrictions and political frictions, it is perhaps necessary to think of other possible avenues for defence-relevant financing.In this regard, little attention has so far been given to the potential role of the European Investment Bank (EIB).Indeed, the Bank holds 242 billion of available capital and is able to borrow off of capital markets -in 2012 alone it made loans worth 52 billion.Unlike the EU Budget, and in line with Article 309 of the TFEU, there is no restriction on the EIB lending to the European defence sector, albeit with one exception: investments must yield a return.Indeed, utilising EIB loans could ensure a change of mind-set in the defence sector, as profitable projects would be underwritten by the EIB; thus reducing inefficiencies and emphasising value for money.EIB loans could be a lifeline to the EDA -the only EU-level body actively engaged in military capability development projects -which has seen its operational budget cut over successive years.Europe is the world's largest trading bloc and the continent is dependent on importing and exporting supplies of goods over the high seas and oceans.Yet, Europe's collective naval industrial capacities and capabilities are under pressure.The industrial and strategic competitiveness of Europe's naval sector is of the utmost importance.The Commission estimates that there are approximately 150 large shipyards in Europe, with these yards employing around 120,000 people.While certain European states maintain a competitive advantage in the production and sale of submarines and patrol boats, the costs associated with the production of naval vessels has risen on the back of increased international competition, decreased defence spending in Europe, market fragmentation along national lines, and a lack of coherence in identifying future naval capability needs.However, any restructuring of Europe's naval sector must respect national specificities.As major exporters of naval equipment, Germany, and with their domestic demand arrangements, the UK, will not be the obvious standard-bearers of European naval cooperation.France and Italy -countries facing substantial challenges, but with experience in cooperation (e.g. the Franco-Italian FREMM frigate programme) -could assume this responsibility.These governments could embark on a path that would synchronise procurement cycles and commonly identify future naval capability needs.Additionally, in tandem with relevant firms these governments could harmonise naval R&D efforts; ensure the standardisation of naval systems; exploit naval and civilian shipbuilding sector linkages and ensure -by drawing on sustained support from the Commission's structural funds -labour restructuring with an emphasis on ensuring a technically skilled and young workforce.No other group of individuals know the potential for and limitations of capability development, and how this relates to defence procurement and defence investments processes, like the individual national Directors for armaments, capabilities and R&T ("Groups of Directors").Indeed, these Directors are tuned-in to the need to deliver equipment programmes to time, budget and functionality and they have the necessary links to firms and relevant national institutions such as the ministries of defence and finance.The Groups of Directors can collectively help translate strategic objectives into armament cooperation initiatives as well as promote interoperability, harmonisation and collaboration between Member States.They also know their own member state's red lines and can pragmatically delineate possible restrictions to cooperation.Given the importance of the Groups of Directors, it is odd that they currently only meet at least twice yearly at the sub-ministerial level under EDA auspices.Even though their representatives and points of contact are involved in the policy process on a more day-to-day basis, the Groups of Directors could have a more prominent role in the development of the EDTIB.Indeed, while the Groups of Directors are hardwired into the EDA -and they will remain so -they are largely distant from the policy work that takes place in other EU institutions responsible for generating capability requirements including: the PSC; the CMPD; the EUMS and the EUMC.Bodies that identify future military capability needs and thus generate market demand.The Member States -with the EDA, Commission and the EEAS -could explore ways to better integrate the Groups of Directors into the broader defence policy work of the Union.It can be reasonably argued that an open economy and transparent procurement procedures are the most effective means of ensuring security of supply in the defence sector.Relying on the market to always ensure security of supply is risky, however.There have been many recent examples of raw material supply restrictions.Metals such as rare earth elements, titanium and platinum can be exposed to export restrictions, and such metals are key inputs in European defence-industrial production processes.The Commission's recent defence Communication proposes the monitoring of such metals as part of its Raw Materials Initiative.This is welcome news and any ideas the Commission has for recycling or substituting defence-relevant materials should be encouraged.Indeed, the Commission and EDA could jointly draw up -and revise accordingly -a "critical EDTIB inputs list" on behalf of the EU Member States.Security of supply is, however, a broader issue than just raw material supplies.Indeed, technological know-how is also a key pillar of securing the EDTIB -the loss of know-how to competitors is strategically perilous.Thus, surveillance of non-EU Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Europe's defence sector, as and when it can result in potentially harmful foreign ownership of critical defence infrastructure, is an important issue.Again, the Commission raises this point in the 2013 Communication but action by the Member States is required, especially as many of them do not currently have sufficient safeguards in place.Lastly, cyber security is also a growing issue for the defence-industrial supply-chain.To this end, the EDA and the Commission could be tasked with developing an "ESO certification" to denote prime and tier firms that actively engage in supply-chain monitoring and that implement data handling security measures.A modern EDTIB should be characterised by initiatives that improve the quality of Europe's armed forces in the field, that ensure maximum operational efficiency, that link up firms with government and EU institutions and that draw on technological advances made in the civilian sector wherever necessary.Improving the energy efficiency of Europe's armed forces and ministries of defence would tick all of these boxes.According to the Commission, Europe's militaries are the biggest public consumers of energy in the EU.The EDA surmises that the armed services of one member state alone consumes as much electricity as a large city, and that the EDA's 27 Member States in turn consume the equivalent of a small EU nation's electricity usage and spend over 1 billion annually in the process.This is not even to speak of what Europe's militaries spend each year on fossil fuels in operational theatres, or what levels of energy defence firms consume in production processes.Dependency on fossil fuels in operational theatres is not only costly and bad for the environment, but it is strategically imprudent given the vulnerabilities associated with transporting such fuels to the frontline.Greater use of renewable energies in the field could improve operational sustainability and autonomy, even though the introduction of such energies may not immediately reduce costs.However, energy efficiency in defence does not begin and end with the armed forces.It should also include the energy efficiency of ministries of defence; especially as it relates to their substantial land holdings.The EDA has already initiated projects to increase the use of renewable energies such as solar power on defence estates, and the Commission has signalled a willingness to bring to bear its environmental expertise in this field in the future.The Member States could now press for greater energy efficiency in Europe's defence-sector.The proposed work plans above are in no way an exhaustive list of ways to ensure the genuine formation and sustainability of an EDTIB.Instead, inkeeping with the spirit of pragmatism laid-down by European Council President Herman Van Rompuy when calling for the Defence Council meeting, the proposed work plans serve merely as some potential areas of future cooperation -indeed, some of the issues outlined are already on the agenda.Faced with the critical challenges that have long afflicted the European defence sector, it is too easy to call for more of that old, mercurial, mantra "political will".That is, of course, unless the EU Member States are willing to ultimately swallow some degree of pride and endure the economic losses that will inevitably come from a root and branch restructuring of Europe's defence markets.Such losses will come in due course at any rate, but they will be far worse through a purely national response.The European Council on Defence of December 2013 should deliver concrete results and refrain from institutional tinkering.This sentiment seems clearly reflected in the Commission Communication and the HR report on the CSDP.These documents breathe a hands-on and pragmatic approach.However, since an immature and incomplete institutional set up is part of the problem of the CSDP, institutional reforms cannot be circumvented.In addition, ensuring that European defence has the capabilities it needs, requires a different take at the role of the Commission, the EDA and the Council and their competences in generating these capabilities.And last, but not least, the Treaty of Lisbon does offer the dearly needed flexibility for a credible defence, so the articles on PESCO, the start-up fund and flexible cooperation should be addressed.In short, not only security matters, but in order to reach that security, institutions matter too.The main issue for the European Council on Defence is arguably the shortage of the right civilian and military capabilities for the EU to be a security provider and to have strategic autonomy.The keys to gaining these capabilities against the backdrop of reduced military budgets is, as mentioned in the Communication by the Commission, more cooperation and efficient use of resources.This is not new, neither is it new that the Commission is closing in on the area of defence in the EU.As both Ashton's Report and the Commission's Communication in preparation of the European Council on Defence have reiterated, the EU is a security provider.The significance of this phrase is that it does not differentiate between the EU as a provider of security for its citizens by tackling threats that affect the EU's security from the outside, but it includes a broader notion of security, protecting the security and safety of citizens regardless of the origin of the threat.Although the CSDP is the focus of the European Council, the increasing blurring of internal and external security does have implications for the security instruments needed and the institutional make up of the CSDP within the EU.The Council on Defence of this December is going to be a next step in the "communitarisation" of EU defence, slowly but surely hollowing out the exclusivity of defence as a domain of the Member States.The Commission's role in further enforcing the 2009 defence Directives to ensure market efficiency is only one indication of a larger presence of the Commission in EU defence.Further added value of the Commission stepping into the defence sector is their role in the standardisation for products that have both civilian and military applications (so called "hybrid" standards) and making sure that there is a common certification of defence products.The Commission (Internal Market & Services, Enterprise & Industry and Research & Innovation) and the EDA have worked together from the founding of EDA in 2004.However, increasingly it seems that the EDA is operating in the shadow of the much larger, more powerful and way better resourced Commission.The EDA has been functioning with its hands tied, because Member States have looked to curtail its scope and finances.Now, the Commission looks better equipped to take on generating capabilities for civil and military security purposes.Results oriented countries are confronted with the fact that their Council-Agency EDA is curtailed to the extent that the EU institution over which the Member States have the least say is gaining influence.Of great importance in the communitarisation of defence is the opening up of Commission funds for CSDP-related research.Equally significant is the proposal for EU-owned dual use capabilities to provide strategic enablers.The Commission will make a joint assessment, together with the EEAS, on which dual-use capability needs there are for security and defence policies and come up with a proposal on which capabilities could be fulfilled by 'assets directly purchased, owned and operated by the Union'.31 These could be most useful in the area of communication, RPAS, helicopters, satellite communication, imagery and surveillance.Interestingly, the new regulation of the EU Agency for border management of 2011 also enables this Agency to acquire, lease or co-own equipment with Member States.In 2013, Frontex launched a pilot project for leasing equipment.It is notable that in case of co-ownership with a member state, Frontex's regulation provides for a "model agreement" in which modalities will be agreed ensuring the periods of full availability of the coowned assets for the Agency.It seems that the 2011 Frontex regulation can be regarded as a model for how the EU could continue with owning dual-use assets to provide the whole EU security sector (including defence) with key enablers.An element which is explicitly mentioned in the Commission's Communication is the possibility of the EU-agencies' involvement in defence policies.This is of course already happening.Frontex and Europol have been lending their expertise to CSDP-missions such as EULEX Kosovo, EUBAM Moldova and EUBAM Libya.However, Agencies operating in the broad security area, such as EMSA (maritime safety), Eurojust (justice cooperation), Europol (police cooperation) and Frontex often have wider remits, better access to research funds and stricter commitments of Member States for assets that are mostly also needed by defence organisations.A closer cooperation, particularly in the area of capabilities, seems logical.All these developments have institutional consequences as they cross the exclusive and shared competences of the Commission, EU Agen- cies and EEAS institutions.The European Council of December comes too soon to fully grasp the implications.In the aftermath of the European Council the political, legal, institutional and practical consequences of the EU as a security provider in the broad sense needs to be revisited.Of course, the familiar institutional questions surrounding the CSDP are also on the table this December.The ability of the EU to anticipate and respond to each phase of a crisis life-cycle rapidly and comprehensively remains a concern.The main problem with the EU's crisis management procedures are that they take too long.The revised Crisis Management Procedures that were decided on in June 2013 tackle this to some extent by skipping a number of stages in the procedure.However, being able to do more and better advanced planning for future contingencies would increase the EU's ability to respond quickly.In fact, every assessment of the CSDP's Crisis Management Procedures leads to the same conclusion: a serious, permanent, preferably civilian-military, planning and conduct capability in Brussels is needed.However, the "H"-word is even more of a taboo than the "S"-word.The consequences of the taboo are that suboptimal compromises and small, incremental steps towards strengthening this capability are taken.One of the results of these compromises is that in March 2012, the OpsCentre was activated for the first time to coordinate the three CSDP-missions in the Horn of Africa (EUNAVFOR Atalanta, EUTM Somalia and EUCAP Nestor).The OpsCentre in Brussels is staffed by 16 personnel and functions alongside the multinationalised OHQ for Atalanta in Northwood.There had to be a first time for activation and the added value it can have for the comprehensive approach in the Horn of Africa is evident, but it is nevertheless a meagre result of the Weimar countries' (plus Spain and Italy) 2011 push for a permanent OHQ.In their frustration that the UK did not budge from its position to block a permanent command and control capability the Weimar-countries proposed to activate a dormant provision from the Treaty of Lisbon: the article on PESCO.PESCO would have allowed for a bypassing of the British veto, but as it is clearly in the interest of the EU Member States to keep the UK on board on defence matters, confrontation on the issue was avoided.The subject of a permanent planning and conduct capability remains unmentioned in the run up to the European Council.PESCO is mentioned in HR Ashton's Report, but in a very hesitant and ambivalent way.The discouraging words '[...] the appetite to move forward seems limited at this stage' is followed under the rubric "Way forward" by the intention to ' [...] interim Report articles from the Treaty to facilitate rapid decision-making in crisis management: Article 44 on entrusting a task to a group of Member States and Article 41.3 on the creation of a start-up fund. 33 Using these Articles could facilitate willing and able countries to proceed with deploying operations, while at the same time circumventing bureaucratic hurdles in getting their preparatory activities financed. As HR Ashton said in her report: '[w]e must move from discussion to delivery', but it is not coincidental that "discussion" is often equated with institutional haggling.Decisions on the institutional set up determine the direction and scope of the EU as a security provider and are therefore among the most difficult to take.The European Council should focus on those areas where results can be expected.At the same time, the institutional range of security and defence related policies is broadening considerably from the CSDP/EEAS institutions, but also to EU Agencies and the Commission.This widens the options and creates opportunities for comprehensive policies, dual-use capability generation and even Union-owned capabilities.Developing the EU as a security provider may first and foremost revolve around concrete actions, projects and capabilities, but without using the possibilities of the EU institutional architecture, the actual delivery will be difficult.Therefore, institutions do matter.	The Egmont Papers are published by Academia Press for Egmont -The Royal Institute for International Relations.Founded in 1947 by eminent Belgian political leaders, Egmont is an independent think-tank based in Brussels.Its interdisciplinary research is conducted in a spirit of total academic freedom.A platform of quality information, a forum for debate and analysis, a melting pot of ideas in the field of international politics, Egmont's ambition -through its publications, seminars and recommendations -is to make a useful contribution to the decisionmaking process. * * *President: Viscount Etienne DAVIGNON Director-General: Marc OTTE Series Editor: Prof. Dr. Sven BISCOP When a doctor calls for a thorough examination of the state of a patient's health, he hopes that everything will turn out to be alright, but it really means that he fears there is a serious problem.Likewise, when Herman Van Rompuy called for the European Council of which he is the President to examine "the state of defence in Europe", 1 he was asking for more than a routine check-up.In this joint Egmont Paper, the Institute for European Studies of the Vrije Universiteit Brussel and the Egmont Institute offer their diagnosis.In the opening essay, Claudia Major and Christian Mölling cannot but conclude that "the state of defence in Europe" is nearing the state of emergency.The "bonsai armies" that they fear we will end up with are nice to look at -on the national day parade for example -but not of much use.In addition to the diagnosis though, we also want to propose a treatment.The method of examination proposed by Van Rompuy already hints at an important part of the cure.The fact is that we never examine "the state of defence in Europe".We assess the state of the EU's CSDP, of NATO's military posture, and of course of each of our national armed forces.But we never assess Europe's military effort in its entirety.In fact, we are unable to, simply because there is no forum where we set capability targets for "defence in Europe".On the one hand, we pretend that it is only a specific separable (and, in the minds of many capitals, small) part of our armed forces that can be dedicated to the CSDP and the achievement of its Headline Goal, the capacity to deploy up to a corps of 60,000.2 That is of course a theoretical fiction: in reality any commitment to either the CSDP or NATO or both has an impact on our entire defence budget and our entire arsenal.A decision to invest in an air-to-air refuelling project through the European Defence Agency for example implies that that sum cannot be spent in another capability area of importance for the CSDP or NATO or, usually, both, whereas once delivered the resulting air-to-air refuelling capability will be available for operations in either framework.Schemes to encourage states to join capability efforts, like the EU's Pooling & Sharing 1.In his speech at the annual conference of the European Defence Agency on 22 March 2013; see http:// www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/136394.pdf.2.For many Member States it is, apparently, such a small part of their forces that they seem to equate the CSDP with the Battlegroups and have all but forgotten the Headline Goal.They also tend to forget that a Battlegroup is pretty much the numbers that the Brussels police will deploy during the actual European Council -hardly a level of ambition worthy of a continent.and NATO's Smart Defence, obviously can only make the most of opportunities to generate synergies and effects of scale if all arsenals are taken into the balance in their entirety.On the other hand, the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) supposedly does encompass (nearly) the whole of our forces, but it sets targets for individual nations in function of the targets of the Alliance as a whole, and does not separately define the level of ambition of NATO's European pillar even though it becomes increasingly likely that the European Allies will have to act alone.We are thus confronted with a curious situation.In political terms it continually is "Europe" that we refer to and expect to act.Even the US has sent a clear message to "Europe" that it should assume responsibility for the security of its own periphery and initiate the response to crises. "Europe" for Washington can mean the European Allies acting through NATO, or the EU acting through the CSDP, or an ad hoc coalition of European states.Washington really no longer cares under which "European" flag we act, as long as we act and the problem is dealt with without extensive American assets being drawn in.As Luis Simón points out in his essay, the US is 'geared towards figuring out how to get the most "bang" out of a "low cost" and "light footprint" approach to European security'.In terms of defence planning however, "Europe" does not exist.If he succeeds, Van Rompuy is to be congratulated for bringing it into being.A call to look at "the state of defence in Europe" thus implicitly is a call to define a level of ambition for "Europe", against which the existing capabilities can be assessed, shortfalls identified, and priority objectives defined.As the High Representative, Catherine Ashton, states at the outset of her Final Report Preparing the December 2013 European Council on Security and Defence, this 'warrant[s] a strategic debate among Heads of State and Government.Such a debate at the top level must set priorities'.3 Put differently, the key political question that the European Council needs to address, before it can address any military-technical question, is for which types of contingencies in which parts of the world "Europe", as a matter of priority, commits to assume responsibility, and which capabilities it commits to that end.On the basis of the answer to that question all other dimensions of the European Council's broad defence agenda can be tackled -absent that answer, Europe's defence effort will still be left hanging in the air.It is often said for example that "Europe" needs its own strategic enablers, such as air-to-air refuelling and ISTAR.But to be able to do what?Air-policing in the Baltic?Air-to-ground campaigns in the Mediterra-3.Of 15 October 2013; see http://eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2013/131015_02_en.pdf.nean?Or even further afield?And at which scale?Without an answer to such questions, it is impossible to design a sensible capability mix and decide on priority capability projects.Yet, who is "Europe"?Who can define the level of ambition that serves as political guidance for operations undertaken and capabilities developed by Europeans through both NATO and the CSDP?Again, we are facing the same problem that there is today no institutionalised venue where Europeans can take decisions about their posture in NATO and the CSDP simultaneously -it is always either/or.Under these circumstances, the European Council is the best option.It is of course an EU body, but they are our Heads of State and Government, meeting in an intergovernmental setting, adopting not binding law but political declarations, and that by unanimity.Surely they, if anybody, have the legitimacy to declare that they will consider the political guidance which they agree upon to guide their governments' positions in both NATO and the CSDP?Politically, "Europe" can either mean each and every European state, or an ad hoc coalition of some of these states, or, when they make foreign and security policy together (which alas they do not do systematically enough), the EU.In political terms, "Europe" neither means the CSDP nor NATO: these are instruments, at the service of the makers of foreign and security policy.Instruments, moreover, both of which "Europe" is more likely to use in the near future than the US, in view of the "pivot" of its strategic focus to Asia.If Washington no longer takes the lead in setting strategy towards Europe's neighbourhood, the only alternative actor is Europeans collectively, i.e. the EU (for individually, no European state can defend all of its interests all of the time).The European Council thus really is the best placed to address "the state of defence in Europe".This does not in any way prejudice how, in a real-life contingency, "Europe" will undertake action: using NATO, the CSDP, other EU instruments, the UN, ad hoc coalitions or a combination thereof.Indeed, if action entails larger-scale combat operations, "Europe" will need the NATO command & control structure, which is its main asset.According to Jamie Shea, 'NATO's choice, therefore, will be to focus on high-end operations built essentially around a conventional military core structure and organised through an integrated command system'.The best way to make sure that all instruments are put to use in an integrated way, from the planning of any type of action to the post-action and long-term involvement, is to politically put any intervention under the aegis of the EU, even when acting under national or NATO command in the case of military involvement.The fact is that in almost every scenario, the European Commission and the EEAS will either from the start or eventually have to take charge of the political, economic and social dimension, regardless of how we address the military dimension -better to integrate all from the beginning there-fore under the political aegis of the Union.Furthermore, that flag still is much less controversial whereas there always are countries and regions in which it is advised not to operate under specific national flags or the NATO-label.In this context, creative use of Art.44 of the Treaty on European Union, which is mentioned in passing in the High Representative's report and is highlighted by Margriet Drent, can provide a flexible way of circumventing the political difficulties that continue to be an obstacle to effective coordination between NATO and the EU (or between individual Member States and the EU) for operations outside the CSDP-framework.Art.44 allows the Council to entrust the implementation of an operation to a group of Member States.When a Member State or a coalition initiates an operation using a national or the NATO command structure, the Council could retroactively recognise it as a task 'to protect the Union's values and serve its interests' (Art.42.5), thus placing it within the political aegis of the EU, but without detracting from the command & control exercised by the Member States involved, except that they commit to 'keep the Council regularly informed of [the operation's] progress' (Art 44.2).The advantages would be manifold.The military dimension of an intervention can be fully integrated from the start with the political, economic and social dimension of which the EU is best placed to take charge (as opposed to the Libyan case, when the EU put itself out of the game and only came back in at a much later stage).The EU guise will do a lot to alleviate any suspicions of hidden national or NATO/American agendas.And the Berlin Plus mechanism, which has proved far too rigid to use effectively and 'was never designed for allowing rapid response' (Alexander Mattelaer and Jo Coelmont), can be avoided.In any case 'the need for both institutions to become more self-reliant and less dependent on the United States' is evident, as Jamie Shea stresses.That leaves the question: what are the priorities for Europe as a security provider?Ashton's report puts the emphasis on the broader neighbourhood, including the Sahel and the Horn, to which certainly the Gulf should be added, as well as the "Wider North", where "the EU until now remains merely an observer" (James Rogers).This is where "strategic autonomy must materialise first": a bold statement which the European Council can render more explicit, for what exactly it wanted to achieve in its neighbourhood "has hitherto remained rather vague" (Margarita Šešelgyt ).This is where Europe commits to take the lead in maintaining peace and security, i.e. to initiate the necessary response to security problems, including prevention, as well as intervention, with partners if possible but alone if necessary.Further on the report refers to the soon to be adopted Maritime Security Strategy, which should of course be integrated in the priorities.Should contributing to the collective security system of the UN not be a priority too, in line with the EU's commitment to "effective multilateralism"?All three priorities go hand in hand. 'Pivoting to Asia [ourselves] without strengthening our position in our immediate neighbourhood would be reckless and dangerous', Jonathan Holslag states, but Luis Simón equally rightly points out that 'to confine [ourselves] to a defensive mind-set and a "neighbourhood-only" approach' would be 'a fatal mistake'.The next step is one that is curiously absent from the debate: to translate these priorities into a military level of ambition.Which capabilities are we willing to commit?How many troops do we want to be able to deploy and which permanent strategic reserve do we want to maintain?Which strategic enablers does this require?First, Europe needs a permanent strategic reserve: the ability to mount a decisive air campaign and to deploy up to an army corps, as a single force if necessary, for combat operations in Europe's broader neighbourhood, over and above all on-going operations.This de facto "double Headline Goal" may seem fanciful, but it is but the reflection of the rate of deployment of the last decade.Second, it needs maritime power: the ability to achieve command of the sea in the broader neighbourhood, while maintaining a global naval presence in order to permanently engage with partners, notably in Asia and the Arctic.Finally, in the "post-pivot" era it needs regional strategic autonomy: acquiring all strategic enablers, including air and maritime transport, air-to-air refuelling, and ISTAR, to allow for major army, air and naval operations in the broader neighbourhood without reliance on American assets.This is the nature of the decisions that need to be taken and can then in turn be elaborated in the 'strategic level Defence Roadmap, approved by the European Council, setting out specific targets and timelines' that Ashton calls for -which, in addition, should include a budget as well.Based on a re-defined level of ambition, the Defence Roadmap will ipso facto provide the starting point for the update of the EDA's Capability Development Plan (expected by the autumn of 2014), as well as the "overarching framework" for the various regional and functional clusters that Ashton further recommends.The targets that Europe collectively sets itself in this Roadmap can then be incorporated as such, as an additional level, in the NDPP.Since we cannot 'continue to rely on the US to plug all gaping holes in [our] defence posture', such a "parallel planning cycle" is a necessity, Alexander Mattelaer and Jo Coelmont stress. 'Joint defence planning among partners' is indeed 'the added value of genuine Pooling and Sharing [emphasis added]' as they emphasise in their second essay.The stark reality is though that until now most of the time most states make but paper commitments to NATO and the CSDP both and that neither the NDPP nor the Headline Goal has much impact on national defence.This is why Ashton is right to also call for a 'robust follow-up process', including perhaps a "European semester on defence".Without guarantees that notably budgets allocated to collective capability projects will not be affected by future national budget cuts, the level of trust necessary to launch such projects in the first place cannot be achieved.At the same time, 'it is perhaps necessary to think of other possible avenues for defence-relevant financing', such as the European Investment Bank, as Daniel Fiott creatively proposes. 'Equally significant is the [Commission's] proposal for EU-owned dual use capabilities', 4 adds Margriet Drent, which Member States would do well not to discard too easily -money should trump turf wars.A robust ambition requires robust follow-up.The December 2013 European Council will surely not satisfy all expectations, which are very great -but then the challenge is great too.The European Council has already generated a new dynamic in the debate, including on ideas and notions which hitherto were not part of the official discussion.We hope that our collection of essays can be a useful contribution -and we definitely promise that we will provide robust follow-up too.4.In its July 2013 Communication A New Deal for European Defence.Towards a More Competititve and Efficient Defence and Security Sector.COM(2013)542/2; see http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/ defence/files/communication_defence_en.pdf.In 2009, Europe's fiscal crisis hit the already long existing European defence decadence, i.e. the unwillingness of most EU Member States to generate appropriate portions of capability for defence.These two developments melted into a new paradigm: the defence economic imperative.It means that the decisions that Europeans take on military capabilities are less an expression of their long-term strategic priorities but one of immediate budget restrictions.We coined the term "Bonsai Armies" to grasp a dwindling European military might inherent in this development, which results in tiny, pretty and complete, but eventually incapable armies.Looking at the current state of European defence, we fear that the Member States may have misunderstood our concept: this was meant as a warning, not as a blue print.There are two long-term repercussions of austerity for the defence budgets of European states: first, defence expenditures in Europe are dwindling, and will continue to do so.Member States continue painting positive budget futures, yet, the effects of the fiscal crisis will continue to impact for another decade or so.Moreover, inflation will turn into a net loss of buying power for what currently looks (only) like stagnation.Budget estimates arrive at a decrease (2011-2020) from 220 to 195 to 147 billion (11-33%).Second, divergence is growing among the Europeans.Behind the overall budget squeeze hides an increasing imbalance.As some budgets are more affected by cuts than others, also the individual contributions to European defence change.The result is a growing divide among Member States: within the 2008-2013 timeframe defence spending diverged among Member States between a 40% increase and a 40% decrease.Moreover, the imbalance has a regional flavour: the cuts are heavier in the East than in the West.Every additional per cent of cuts brings EU states closer to a red line from whereon military forces and equipment cannot form a relevant capability.This is especially because Member States shrink the size of their armies but do not increase their efficiencies.With their current activities, states accelerate achieving what they fear most, that is, dependence.To be able to intervene militarily European states are becoming more dependent on each other than they have ever been before.Beyond some spectacular cuts, the budget pressure is continuously breaking small bricks out of the wall of European defence.Because there is no concept for military burden-sharing that would frame these developments, every state chooses to specialise individually in the area it can afford -but not in what is needed to stay capable as Europe.Expensive capabilities like aircrafts, helicopters and satellites are likely to become less and less available for all.The uncontrolled cutting of military capabilities also reduces the possibilities of cooperation.It creates more collective capability gaps (e.g. RPASs) but at the same time keeps often outdated surplus material in other areas (such as tanks).These mosaic stones of the individual changes in Europe eventually result in an overall picture according to which the Member States have significantly lowered their willingness and/or ability to deploy and sustain military forces.The levels of ambition shrunk by roughly 25% between 2008-2013.Shrinking forces mean fewer operations.Yet, more importantly, changes in quality reduce the ability to conduct complex operations: brigade formations are key to those operations as they provide the necessary backbone -Command and Control frameworks with the associated enablers.Their availability is shrinking from 20 to 15 and fewer countries hold them.As less and less smaller states can deploy on their own, they become ever more dependent on those few who can still provide the operational framework they can plug-in to.While the austerity measures of governments have already affected industries, the more serious impact is still to come: European countries will soon have significantly less programmes and equipment -hence less earnings for industries through production and services, and more overcapacities.This is the outcome of the tension between ongoing nationalist political approaches to the defence industry and the inevitably growing globalisation of this business.Industries react to this by reducing their share of defence business, or by transferring it outside Europe through exports.These have become a lifeline for the defence industry.Key components, technologies and raw materials have to be imported from outside Europe.Hence, rather than enjoying strategic autonomy, European armed forces have to live with non-European dependencies in their supply lines.These dependencies are likely to increase: the EDTIB may further shrink, since the domestic consolidation into national champions, which some states favour, prevents a further Europeanisation.While militarily the defence crisis increases the dependence between the Member States, it deeply divides them politically.Because of national risk perspectives, but also the style and size of cuts in budget, equipment and personnel differ considerably among the Member States, the latter are less and less able (and willing) to define and implement a common defence policy within the EU framework.The increasing inability or unwillingness of some states to contribute to joint operations reduces interoperability and expands the inner-European capability and modernisation gap.Vice versa, contributions can only come from the shrinking group of willing and capable EU members.This creates centrifugal dynamics: those who no longer contribute do not subscribe to common policies because they cannot shape it -those who still contribute are not interested in giving "free riders" a say in where and how to implement policies.Member States have devoted a considerable amount of rhetoric to defence cooperation and launched several processes to serve it.This applies especially to political frameworks like Weimar or Visegrad.Yet, tangible results tend to result from shared military interests, and not from political declarations.Successful projects like Air-to-Air Refuelling do not reflect a common effort to improve collective capabilities for defence but rather the highest common denominator among national interests.Such smallest possible, yet necessary, islands of cooperation for a single equipment area are not adequate for the quality of the problems -because the latter are structural and exist across the whole system of capabilities.Instead, this current patchwork without a framework risks wasting resources and duplicating efforts, while maintaining gaps.Austerity increases intra-European defence dependence.Yet, the conception of sovereignty that Member States still maintain does not allow them to recognise these dependencies and thus hinders the Europeans to manage them.Sovereignty is for most Member States not about being capable of acting effectively in order to solve problems of their societies.Rather, it means staying master of the final decision, even if this prevents or diminishes the development of a (European) capability that could engage with their own problems.Hence, Member States prefer autonomy over capability.By doing so, whether consciously or not, Member States actually pretend to be individually able to deal with security risks and threats and keep those away from their territory, people and political system.It is thus only logical that with such a conception of sovereignty in mind, EU members avoid talking about and engaging in cooperation and specialisation.Accepting specialisation would mean acknowledging that they can no longer assure the national core of defence tasks alone.Recognising cooperation inflicts similar headaches: governments would have to admit that their ability to decide and act in security policy does not carry enough weight in view of current security problems.Yet, states also insist on their individual right to decide because, they argue, they cannot entirely trust their partners: they fear being left alone in an operation because a partner decides to withdraw; not being able to engage in an operation, as a partner with important capabilities decides not to participate; and giving others, who do not make any contributions of their own to security, the opportunity to free ride.However, over 20 years of experience in NATO-and EU-operations invalidates the fear of these traps: sharing has been a daily business from Bosnia to Afghanistan and Libya, and NATO and the EU have gathered experience in managing the political and military caveats.No state would have been able to carry out these operations alone.Moreover, European states have made themselves dependent on defence industries and defence contractors: states place their sovereignty in the hands of actors that do it for profit, but they do not trust partners that agree on a common objective?Thus, states have locked themselves into a vicious circle: their clinging to national prerogatives eventually increases their dependence upon partners while also diminishing their military capacity to act.Member States have not been able to prevent capabilities from getting ever more critical, such as by increasing cooperation.Individual defence planning and cuts further the dependency.While states are rhetorically adhering to military autonomy, reality is catching up in that specialisation is already taking place in an uncontrolled way and further increases dependency.Already today European states are more dependent on each other than they have ever been before when it comes to military interventions, as demonstrated in 2011 in Libya, and again in 2013 in Mali.Sovereignty is thus the crucial element: the way European governments will conceive it will decide the future of European defence.Put differently, the future of European defence depends on whether the Europeans are able to develop an understanding of sovereignty that enables them to compromise on autonomy in order to manage their dependencies.Four scenarios are possible: 1.The silent death of European defence will be the consequence if Europeans continue to neglect the dependence.The defence sector would see a decreasing effectiveness, i.e. the need for more investments.Member States would allow only for ad hoc cooperation.It would only take place if and as long as this is the only way to maintain a national capability.2.A return to the 19 th century: the current re-nationalisation of security policies points to the risk that EU states may increase these dependencies.Governments could be tempted to "sanctuarise" independence and make it the primary objective of their defence policies.Even if the governments carry on denying interdependence, defence problems will certainly not shrink to a size that national armies can manage them alone.However, military action would immediately become more difficult to organise, or even impossible.3.Towards a European Army: the other extreme would be to institutionalise dependence by transferring sovereignty to the EU.It would enable a European army type organisation of the European military forces to take place.Such a development would certainly be the most efficient way of organising defence.Yet, it is highly unlikely to materialise, for the required common political vision is missing and is not likely to arrive any time soon.4.Pooling of sovereignty: a more pragmatic approach to sovereignty would become possible if Member States would not have to agree on what to protect and where to use armed forces.Instead they would consent on the key notion of sovereignty as the following: to stay capable of problem-solving action by pursuing common political objectives.In order to regain sovereignty under the condition of dependency they would pool their problemsolving capabilities.Dependencies like responsibilities and access to capabilities would become organised through treaties.These arrangements would build on examples from two decades of operations -in which sovereignty management has been daily business.States can still pursue national levels of ambitions on top.The 2013 EU defence summit will most likely not debate the crucial "sovereignty -dependency" conundrum.Yet, its decisions will impact upon it.Governments may still have a Christmas gift: when their people tell them that they already knew that they were dependent on others, but they did not want to shock their governments by confronting them with the truth.The assumption that the US strategic "rebalancing" or "pivot" to Asia will force Europeans to take their security and that of their immediate neighbourhood more seriously has become the running theme of the forthcoming European Council on defence.By outlining the links between America's evolving defence strategy, the transatlantic relationship and Europe, this contribution seeks to place that assumption in perspective.Not only does the transatlantic relationship remain important to ensuring Europe's strategic cohesion and the stability of the broader European neighbourhood.Critically, the very success of the transatlantic relationship will largely depend on the ability of Europeans to think and act beyond its neighbourhood.The Pentagon's 2014 QDR will be a momentous one.It will have to weave together a number of hard-hitting strategic, political, technological and industrial themes.The expected withdrawal of most American and allied combat troops from Afghanistan in late 2014 will signal the declining centrality of the "War on Terror", a paradigm that has had a pervasive influence over the foreign and defence policies of the US for well over a decade.2014 will mark the emergence of a new paradigm, increasingly organised around the so-called 'rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific' region broadcasted by the 2012 Defence Strategic Guidance.5 It will fall onto the forthcoming QDR to spell out what the Asian rebalancing means in terms of force posture, structure, capability planning and, critically, how it will translate into the DoD's budget.Much of this debate will be about how new technologies and concepts can help meet China's "asymmetrical" challenge including, chiefly, its progress in the areas of A2/AD and its offensive cyber warfare capabilities.Presumably, this process shall help further animate an already undergoing trend towards long-range strike and stealthy air and undersea systems, directed energy weapons or cyber security.Another key challenge for the 2014 QDR will be to offer a blue print for US force posture and defence strategy in Central Asia post-2014.Arguments for a full military withdrawal from Afghanistan and a broader strategic retreat from Central and South Asia seem to be winning the day.However, some sort of follow-on Western military and security presence in Afghanistan will be critical to ensuring that country's stability and consolidating the progress made after more than a decade of sustained investments and efforts.The security of the broader region remains linked to the evolution of Afghanistan.And a commitment to that country's security shall have a positive effect upon the stability of other Central Asian republics and of America's relations with those countries.Despite its traditional association with the War on Terror, the increasing interdependence between Asia's maritime and continental environments makes Central (and South) Asia relevant from the perspective of the strategic rebalancing or "pivot".6 The need to strike the right balance in Asia's maritime and continental "theatres" is further complicated by ongoing instability across the Middle East, from Mali to Iran, through Libya and Syria.Critically, all these challenges will have to be tackled while the Pentagon is hit by sequestration and grapples with a constraining budgetary environment.With such a menu of big-ticket items on the table, one might legitimately wonder whether Washington will have any bandwidth left to think about Europe.However, the future of Europe and the evolution of the transatlantic relationship will have implications upon every single one of those big-ticket items and will therefore continue to be of great importance for the US.Guarded by the world's two greatest oceans and surrounded by weak and friendly neighbours, America's security depends largely on its ability to project power beyond its shores.Its advantageous geopolitical position and maritime nature give the US the kind of strategic flexibility to think of and treat the Eurasian landmass (and the world) as an integrated geopolitical unit.7 American strategic thinkers have traditionally attached special importance to the US being able to project strategic power to the most economically dynamic areas of the Eurasian "rimland", namely the European peninsula, the Persian Gulf and East Maintaining strategic access to Europe and the Middle East remains of great importance for America.10 Both regions are vital to the economic wellbeing of the US and the (US-led) international economic and monetary system.The US-EU economic relationship is the world's largest, accounting for one third of total goods and services trade and nearly half of global economic output.Total US investment in the EU is three times higher than in all of Asia; while EU investment in the US is around eight times the amount of EU investment in India and China together.11 The ongoing negotiations on a TTIP promise to further exploit the untapped potential of the transatlantic relationship.And they also bear testament to America's recognition that its growing Pacific responsibilities cannot come at the expense of its duties as an Atlantic power.The Atlantic and Pacific are as interwoven as they have ever been at the level of US geostrategy, which remains global in nature.12 Its increasing energy self-reliance may well be reducing America's direct dependence on the Middle East.However, the global nature of the oil market and the effect of supply insecurity in other major markets to which the US is wedded means Washington will for many years remain committed to promoting stability in that region.13 would come a long way in helping mitigate those countries' excessive dependence on Russia or China.Beyond Afghanistan and Central Asia, their diplomatic weight and their naval and technological potential means there are a number of ways in which Europeans can contribute to the stability of Asia's maritime environments and to the advancement of US strategic interests alongside the Indo-Pacific axis.These range from educational exchanges, joint training and exercising, weapons transfers through contributions to maritime security.16 Secretary Panetta's farewell speech in London, in which he publicly urged Europeans to 'join the US in its pivot to Asia', is an example of Washington's increasing recognition of this fact.17 In the words of former EUCOM chief Admiral Stavridis, 'Europe is today a security exporter, possessing among the most highly trained and technologically advanced militaries in the world '.18 All in all, America's considerations about force posture and defence strategy in Europe and its expectations as to the future of the transatlantic relationship are organised around three broad themes of objectives: defending the European allies against emerging external strategic challenges (i.e. ballistic missiles or cyber-attacks) and insuring them against the re-emergence of geopolitical competition alongside Europe's eastern flank; projecting US and allied power into the European periphery (i.e. the Middle East, Africa, the Indian Ocean and the Arctic); and stimulating European allies to contribute to America's global geostrategic objectives, including in Asia.The driving trend in US force posture and defence strategy in Europe is one of drawdown.Mounting pressures elsewhere oblige.But that does not mean the US will leave Europe.Insofar as it continues to have a key stake in the security of that continent and in the future of the transatlantic relationship, Washington will try to remain the chief guardian of European security and the leader of the transatlantic relationship.America's evolving force posture and defense strategy in Europe reveal important adaptations to an evolving strategic context.Three main trends are worth pointing out.The first is an evolution from "presence" to "engagement", illustrated by the growing emphasis on initiatives such as cyber-defence, BMD or training, all of which are less demanding in terms of direct US military presence.The second is the shift from a land-centred posture concentrated in Central Europe to a lighter and more flexible one.The third, and potentially the most important one, is the increasing compartmentalisation of Washington's strategic relations and partnerships in Europe, as the US leans on different European countries and sub-regional groupings for different security tasks and initiatives.This evolution relates to the resurfacing of bilateralism and sub-regional defence cooperation initiatives, such as the British-French defence agreements, Nordic Defence Cooperation or Central European Defence Cooperation.It also speaks to a broader geopolitical tendency, namely the fact that Europe and its neighbourhood are increasingly defined by a less hierarchical strategic order, one that will be more fluid and unstable than Europeans have grown accustomed to.20 20.Simón, L. and Rogers, J. 2010 For well over seven decades, US forward presence and a strong transatlantic relationship have created the necessary conditions for European economic integration and political and security cooperation.Today, the strategic rise of Asia throws up a question mark over America's presence in Europe and over the future of the transatlantic relationship.While the US is unlikely to abandon Europe to its own luck, its increasing strategic interest in Asia will unavoidably result in less attention towards Europe and its surroundings.That does create a demand for greater European efforts in the realm of security.However, there is a risk that Europeans will confound this situation and embrace an alleged "US departure" as an opportunity to confine themselves to a defensive mind-set and a "neighbourhood-only" approach to security.That would prove to be a fatal mistake.As important as ensuring a balance of power in Europe was, the levels of security and prosperity Europeans have conquered since the end of the Second World War are ultimately explained by the fact that Western strategic, political and economic primacy was global in nature.Thus, while the transatlantic relationship continues to offer the most reliable framework to ensure strategic cohesion in and around Europe, the survival of the transatlantic relationship will largely depend on the ability of Europeans to join forces with the US to provide security beyond their immediate vicinity.In a world characterised by a relative transfer of wealth and power from west to east, this shall prove the ultimate test of the West's resilience -and of Europe's own future.Until the Cold War came to an end in 1990, NATO could be described as a "homeland defence" organisation.Its forces were stationed inside its borders, pointing outwards to parry incoming conventional armies.After it began to engage in the Former Yugoslavia, however, NATO changed into an organisation that projected forces well beyond its borders to deal with threats before they could reach NATO territory.Consequently, the organisation became more famous for what it was doing outside Europe than inside Europe.Operations became NATO's new raison d'être.In the last two decades, the Alliance has carried out 36 of these operations, ranging from maritime monitoring in the Adriatic, no-fly zones, close air support, air campaigns, training and mentoring and combating piracy on the high seas.In doing so, NATO has transformed itself as much as it has transformed the countries where it has deployed forces.Operations have brought NATO new partners from across the globe, new relationships with other international institutions such as the UN, the EU or the OSCE, and new military doctrines and capabilities that emphasise peacebuilding, protection of women in conflict zones and civil reconstruction alongside traditional war fighting skills.Perhaps most important of all, operations such as ISAF in Afghanistan, KFOR in Kosovo, SFOR in Bosnia or Unified Protector in Libya have been so demanding and difficult that they have served as a glue to bind Allies together in a framework of solidarity and at least imperfect burden-sharing.This has somewhat overshadowed the way in which the new security challenges of the 21 st century are inevitably giving a much larger group of Allies (16 in 1999, 28 today) different interests and priorities.In the past, there was no hiatus between NATO operations.At their high point around 2006-2007, the Alliance had two hundred thousand troops engaged beyond its borders in half a dozen simultaneous operations.As soon as one was winding down, another was building up.One operation could also facilitate another, as when NATO's naval embargo against Libya in 2011 drew on ships and command structures that had already been in the Mediterranean supporting NATO's Active Endeavour mission since shortly after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the US.Consequently, the end of the ISAF mission in Afghanistan in 2014 will place NATO in an unprecedented position.For the first time since its inception in 1949, it will not have an immediate opponent or adversary to measure itself against or to serve as a rallying point for its consultations, military planning and generation of forces.Of course, operations will continue in a more minor way in Kosovo, in the Gulf of Aden and in the Mediterranean.But they will be winding down rather than building up and many NATO Defence Ministers, such as recently the UK Defence Secretary Philip Hammond, have made it clear that, barring a new shock event like 9/11, they see very little prospect of engaging their forces overseas in the next decade or so.Wary of the human and material costs of fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan, and wary of ambitious nation-building projects that fall short of their objectives, NATO's publics have no more stomach for military humanitarianism if not tied to immediate and well proven national security interests.Any operations that do take place, such as training and security assistance for local forces, are likely to be modest and, more often than not, held in NATO countries rather than on the ground in Africa or the Middle East.Moreover, where countries do send forces, these are likely to be Special Forces for quick in/out intelligence driven operations against specific targets.As warfare moves to the shadows, countries will not seek the approval or the participation of all their EU or NATO Allies.Because NATO has focused so much on operations in recent times and has built its institutional business model largely around enhancing its ability to perform these missions, the sudden prospect of a decline in operational tempo inevitably raises questions about the Alliance's future role and value.Three basic models for the future are currently going the rounds.The first is a return to Europe and classical Article V territorial defence.This would certainly provide reassurance to Allies, particularly those in Central and Eastern Europe, who have seen Afghanistan as a diversion from NATO's core task of collective defence and who would welcome greater NATO visibility and activity along their Eastern borders, and vis-à-vis a Russia which is rapidly modernising its military forces and playing a more assertive role in its neighbourhood.Yet, at the same time, the old threat in the form of the Soviet Union is no more and the threat of armed conflict in Europe is at an all-time low.So while providing reassurance, a return to the more traditional NATO would also be compatible with declining defence budgets and a shift from conventional armies to new types of security investment such as intelligence services, beefed up police forces to fight organised or domestic terrorist crime, or reinforced frontier protection measures to keep out unwanted immigrants.The second model is one of a NATO that overhauls its business model to deal more directly with the more diverse range of 21 st century security threats.By now these have become all too familiar to security policy specialists.They are terrorism in its more fragmentary and delocalised manifestations, cyber-attacks, critical infrastructure protection, resilience to natural or man-made disasters and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the hands of a larger number of state or non-state actors.Already in its most recent Strategic Concept of November 2010, the Alliance placed greater emphasis on these "emerging security challenges" and even set up a new division inside NATO HQ to deal with them.However, the Strategic Concept did not define a level of ambition for the Alliance in these areas, nor go into much detail as to how NATO's existing assets, such as command structures and planning mechanisms, could be used to address them.Three years on, NATO has made some progress, especially in improving its capacity to detect and defend against cyber-attacks against its own internal networks and to provide a basic level of assistance and expertise to Allies to improve their cyber defences.But, at the same time, NATO has also had to recognise that these new challenges require a very different approach than conventional types of threat.The domains are not owned by states; the private sector has often a much greater role to play in analysing threats and providing the necessary capabilities.Concepts such as solidarity, Article V collective defence and deterrence and retaliation are much more difficult to pin down than when dealing with an unambiguous, massive kinetic aggression.Within NATO countries these threats are usually dealt with by intelligence services, police departments and interior ministries that are not NATO's usual interlocutors.Therefore it seems unlikely that, after ISAF, NATO can make homeland defence against asymmetric threats into a new justification for the Alliance.Even if NATO's assets can allow it to play a useful role in some of these areas, it will not be able to claim the same leading and almost exclusive responsibility that it has long enjoyed for large scale, multinational military deployments.At the same time, the EU has also taken up the same threats with its broader panoply of instruments and better capacity to integrate the civilian and military dimensions of a comprehensive approach.This will make those Allies who are also EU members wary of building capabilities inside the Alliance which they are already investing money into building within the EU.The above-mentioned considerations have thus put the main emphasis on the third model for NATO's future.This is one of an Alliance in readiness rather than in deployment, to use the terminology of NATO's Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen.This model essentially sees the future of NATO as a continuation of its past -only without the pressure of a major operation to generate the political attention and financial resources to sustain NATO's activity.The focus is to preserve all of the key structures that are necessary to rapidly regenerate future operations, on the assumption that if the past is any guide to the future and notwithstanding public weariness, there will eventually be crises which only well-equipped and trained and ready-to-go armed forces will be able to deal with.This crisis could involve the physical protection of NATO territory, for instance in the form of a missile attack, or require another projection of forces on NATO's borders or beyond.NATO's choice, therefore, will be to focus on high-end operations built essentially around a conventional military core structure and organised through an integrated command system.In a way, this is what has been achieved in Afghanistan although it has been a painful process to train forces to fight, lift caveats, make command structures more flexible and create a single communications network.As the forces leave Afghanistan, they are smaller but arguably more usable than they have been for many years and with a high degree of interoperability not only between Allies but with partner countries too.NATO has designed a Connected Forces Initiative to preserve and develop these skills.The initiative is built around an ambitious programme of live exercises and training, which are also designed to develop skills which have been neglected during the ISAF years, such as major joint operations at high intensity.Defence budget cuts post-ISAF and the general neglect of training over the past decade because of the demands of the deployment in Afghanistan, will make it a challenge for NATO to implement the Connected Forces Initiative.This will put a premium on NATO's ability to convince nations to factor NATO training needs into their national training and exercises as well as to generate forces for the exercise programme in a way that shares burdens equitably and keeps the smaller and medium-sized Allies fully engaged alongside the larger US, French and UK forces.It is very difficult to plan an ambitious exercise if commanders have no idea who will be participating with what.Moreover, keeping partners, such as Australia or New Zeeland who are on the other side of the world, engaged will also be a challenge, especially if all the training activities take place in Europe.Keeping the US engaged cannot be taken for granted either unless NATO is able to find a headquarters in the US to take on the NATO training role.This said, if the Connected Forces Initiative does not succeed, there is a real danger that four or five years on from ISAF, many of the Alliance forces will have returned to static or limited homeland defence roles and will not be able any longer to make a contribution to high-end force projection, even in niche roles.Small coalitions of the willing will become the order of the day.The second challenge is in developing capabilities.The operation in Libya as well as ISAF have consistently pointed to capability gaps and shortfalls in areas such as precision-guided munitions, intelligence surveillance, and reconnaissance (such as RPAS), counter-fire capability, and heavy lift helicopters and air transport.These shortfalls have been around for a long time but the need for NATO to plug these gaps is all the more important at a time when the US is now contributing 72% of the total NATO defence budget and is also pivoting to Asia.This has revived the burden-sharing debate in the Alliance while also making it less clear to what extent US capabilities will be available to compensate for the shortfalls in the European order of battle.NATO's military authorities have also identified a requirement for 1.4 billion of essential priority infrastructure to underpin the reinforcement, deployability and protection of NATO's deployed forces.The challenge is made more difficult still by the 15% overall reduction in European defence spending in the past decade and growing imbalances among the Europeans themselves, with France and the UK now contributing nearly 50% of overall EU defence spending.NATO has developed an ambitious goal, known as "NATO Forces 2020" for how it can acquire key multinational capabilities.The question is can it develop a political and planning process to persuade its Member States to move in the desired direction; namely to pool and share existing assets and to develop new ones collectively?Can it overcome an attachment to national sovereignty, industrial protectionism and decades of a fragmented defence and R&D market?Is the answer "Smart Defence", where small groups of Allies propose to develop a capability bottom-up; or is it "Framework Nation" or the "Menu of Choices" where the big nations take on a specific chunk of NATO's military defence and organise the contribution of small and medium-sized Allies to support that capability?It is always good to experiment with different approaches, to see which one will be the most politically and financially viable but one thing is clear: NATO will need to rapidly identify the best approach and increasingly organise its defence planning and capability development work around it.The alternative is that nations will continue to cut their defence budgets and take their decisions nationally and unilaterally with the result that NATO will have too much, in some areas (jet aircraft) and too little in others (ISR -RPAS).Thirdly, NATO will need to debate whether it keeps its military assets essentially to itself and for its own missions, or whether it is willing to act as a service organisation or facilitator on behalf of others.Traditionally, NATO has carried out training and capacity building as a consequence of its own deployments in places such as Bosnia, Kosovo or Afghanistan and as part of its exit strategy as it builds down its forces.However, Iraq, where NATO recently closed a training mission, offers an example of where NATO is able to play a post-conflict role without being involved in the initial operation.Libya, where the government has asked for NATO assistance with the development of a national guard, is an example of where NATO may be able to help some years after conducting an air campaign but without a force on the ground.If NATO is doing fewer of its own operations, this in itself does not make the world a more peaceful place.Others, such as the AU or the UN, will continue to have large numbers of forces in the field with the related need for equipment, intelligence, transport and training.What NATO has acquired in the last few years is a considerable defence infrastructure: strategic commands, military schools, specialist centres of excellence, simulation and intelligence fusion centres and top class training areas.Why would it not put all of its know-how and experience in dealing with threats such as improvised explosive devices at the service of African troops who are encountering the same problem in Mali or Somalia?NATO's extensive network of partnerships could also be brought to bear on this task as many partners also have the same military infrastructure and experience and this kind of "Good Samaritan" role would not only serve NATO's direct security interests but also be a way of sustaining its partnerships post-Afghanistan as well.Finally, relations between NATO and the EU will no doubt continue to be less than desirable because of the well-known political issues.But the declining defence budgets, the overlapping memberships and security interests and the all too present threats on the periphery of Europe will inevitably push the two institutions closer together -even without mentioning the need for both institutions to become more self-reliant and less dependent on the US.If NATO embarks on a larger training role, it will overlap with an area that the CSDP has long been dealing with and where CSDP is also expanding.If the EU, in the run up to the December 2013 European Council on Defence, wants to acquire more high-end multinational capabilities, such as RPAS or advanced sensor and intrusion mechanisms for cyber defence, it will inevitably overlap with much of the work being done in NATO.As both organisations seek to make better use of experimental formations such as EU Battlegroups or the NATO Response Force, they will both have an interest in devising common forms of certification or joint training and exercises to make optimum use of scarce funds.In the past, and notwithstanding the political obstacles, NATO and the EU were pushed together by the momentum of operations, and finding themselves on the ground together in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan or at sea in the Gulf of Aden.They will certainly be pushed together in the future by austerity and the overwhelming requirement to make defence more rational and cost-effective and to integrate further the European forces.They too must develop a common narrative to a disinterested public opinion why defence and robust armed forces still matterwhen things get rough as, from time to time, they inevitably will.While continuing their own capability and reform efforts, both the CSDP and NATO need to do more to encourage and reinforce the efforts of the other.Whatever the results of the December EU Summit, they will need to be picked up and amplified at the NATO Summit in the UK in October 2014.ALEXANDER MATTELAER AND JO COELMONT Throughout the past two decades, European armed forces have been committed to containing violent conflict.From the campaigns in the Balkans and Afghanistan to the recent emergencies in Libya and Mali, they have been called upon to "do something" and fix whatever could be fixed.In the course of this process, they have been downsized, professionalised and asked to do ever more with fewer means.What can we learn from this period of intense operational engagement?Can historical trends continue indefinitely?This essay seeks to outline the principal areas of tension that have bedevilled modern European-led operations.Military campaigns never look the same, of course, but whoever ignores past experience does so at one's peril.Multinational operations have become the rule for European militaries.At the same time, organisational vehicles for conducting such operations have multiplied.Whereas the UN represented the only peacekeeping framework at the end of the Cold War, NATO, the OSCE and the EU transformed into busy "crisis managers" with their own unique characteristics.Due to variations in terms of membership, policy competences and pre-existing expertise, each and every one of these organisations developed its own operational planning process and command culture.Ad hoc coalitions arguably represent the ultimate expression of this constant search for institutional flexibility.As a result of this trend, a dramatic change in command relationships has taken place.Operation commanders no longer report to a single national leader.Instead, they receive their strategic guidance from a diplomatic council, of which the members frequently bicker about mission objectives and financial resources.Whether talking about the UN Security Council, the North Atlantic Council or the Council of the EU, the end result is that strategic clarity is often lost and no one feels responsible for failure.Yet grand strategy and campaign design must go hand-in-hand.This does not only require that military commanders receive sufficient authority to do their job, but also that political leaders do not shy away from making difficult choices about ends, ways and means.Occasionally a strategy decided by the lowest common denominator may do the job.Frequently it does not: grand strategy is about setting political priorities and according resources accordingly.Provided that strategic clarity is safeguarded, the institutional flexibility available to Europeans represents a key asset.The EU's CSDP adds value on three accounts.Firstly, it constitutes a framework for launching crisis management operations in those parts of the world where other organisations are not welcome: think Rafah, Georgia, Aceh or Chad.Secondly, it holds the promise of synchronising the different instruments of European foreign policy.The counter-piracy operation Atalanta arguably illustrates best what the EU can deliver in terms of comprehensive action.In order to fully live up to this promise, however, it is imperative that the EEAS is endowed with greater authority to effectively coordinate these instruments and that both civilian and military instruments are appropriately resourced.Thirdly, and most fundamentally, it represents an insurance policy that Europeans can act autonomously if US leadership is absent.Given the Obama administration's decision to rebalance its strategic focus towards the Asia-Pacific region, it becomes imperative that Europe is ready to engage in the full spectrum of strategic affairs.Frankly put, this implies the collective ability to make war, should it ever prove necessary.It has become popular to rhetorically embrace the importance of preventive action and the ability to respond rapidly to unforeseen contingencies.Yet one needs to call a spade a spade.The European track record for acting preventively or rapidly is uneven at best and miserable at worst.Several European authorities accurately forecasted the degeneration of the Sahel region, yet the resulting action took so long to materialise that the conflict prevention discourse seemed farcical.The time required for setting up tiny EU operations in Africa has occasionally exceeded the eighteen-month period required for planning Operation Overlord.This is not only the EU's problem: NATO responded painfully slow to the rising tide of insurgency in Afghanistan.More than anything else, this bleak track record is the product of political disagreement.Whenever European Member States have acted quickly -in the Congo in 2003, in Lebanon in 2006 or in Libya in 2011 -it was the undisputed political willingness to act that proved to be the decisive factor.To be proficient in mounting any operational rapid response means to have access to permanent command structures endowed with the authority to engage in prudent planning (that is, without explicit political authorisation).NATO's integrated command structure effectively constitutes the Alliance's most important asset -which is now at risk of being hollowed out by blind cost-savings.If Europeans are serious about reducing their dependency on US support, it is imperative they reinvest in standing and flexible command arrangements that are useable regardless whether political direction is exercised by the North Atlantic Council or the Council of the EU.As the experience is Bosnia has shown, the old Berlin Plus arrangement was never designed for allowing rapid response and needs to be fundamentally rethought.A more Europeanised command architecture can also incorporate the EU's much-vaunted comprehensive approach in a manner that is institutionally coherent.Quite apart from being able to plan ahead, the recent crisis in Mali illustrates the importance of having well-trained troops on standby to carry out time-sensitive missions at the appropriate strategic tempo and with tactical élan.The EU Battlegroups represented a qualitative improvement on earlier force catalogues, but have not lived up to the promise of providing a useable tool.Tailored to the historical experience of the Artemis operation, the Battlegroup concept falls short of providing decision-makers with flexible options.In their current configuration, most EU Battlegroups simply lack the fighting power for any mission that goes beyond political symbolism.From a military point of view, the real answer to the present conundrum must encompass a larger set of first entry forces on standby as well as a pool of follow-on forces from which a tailor-made task force package can be generated.The list of capability shortfalls is long and well known.It ranges from mundane requirements such as tanker aircraft to the technological high-end such as cyber assets and next generation strike platforms.Put simply, most European armed forces are hitherto falling short of transforming themselves into agile, knowledge-based militaries prepared for the future.To a large extent, this is the result of the limited scope for investment in cutting-edge technologies and the increased cost of large platforms.Yet European militaries cannot forever continue to cannibalise those arsenals they acquired during the Cold War.If there is to be an industrial and material base for sustaining future campaigns of significant magnitude, this requires renewed investment.A radically new approach to defence planning is therefore needed.The revamped NATO Defence Planning Process offers a procedural template for doing so, starting from an output-oriented level of ambition and encompassing national as well as multinational capability targets.But can Europeans continue to rely on the US to plug all gaping holes in their defence posture?If not, this requires that Europeans launch a parallel planning cycle to take stock of where they stand without US support and to develop remedies accordingly.Such a European defence review could for example be organised under the auspices of the EDA.Above anything else, moreover, individual European nations need to take this collective exercise seriously, rather than treat capability targets as pie in the sky.When looking back at the recent operations in Libya and Mali, it is difficult to avoid harsh conclusions.Never did so few do so much in the name of so many.This is not sustainable.When operational solidarity is found absent, political solidarity is put into question.It is revealing that the supposedly common security and defence policy of the EU is specialising in capacity-building missions while individual Member States revert to national defence planning.This creeping renationalisation of defence efforts represents a fundamental threat to European integration as a whole.The European Heads of State and Government are presented with one final opportunity to opt for a quantum leap forward.If they do not want to see the European project unravel, they should seize it.MARGARITA ŠEŠELGYT Since the launch of the first CSDP mission in 2003, the EU has not been very eager to use its crisis management instruments in its Eastern vicinity.Two purely CSDP missions have been initiated in the region over 10 years: rule of law mission EUJUST Themis (2004) (2005) and monitoring mission EUMM (2008-), both of them in Georgia.An on-going EUBAM mission to Moldova and Ukraine (2005) was launched through the ENPI.Though in general the security situation in the region is relatively stable and therefore does not require the use of advanced crisis management instruments, three frozen conflicts if unfrozen might pose a serious challenge for EU security.Moreover they are creating a negative effect on the general developments in these Eastern neighbourhood states.The reluctance of the EU to employ its CSDP instruments in the region more actively has been determined by several reasons.First of all, the security situation in those countries did not pose an urgent need to react, except in the case of Georgia.Secondly, the Eastern neighbourhood is not equally regarded as a region of primary EU security interest by all Member States.Finally, and most importantly, Russia considers this region as a zone of its exceptional interests.Thus any political activity by any other international player in the region is perceived as a serious challenge for Russian national interests.Moreover, the main stakeholders in the region do not recognise the EU as a security player in a traditional sense, further preventing it from playing a more assertive role in the security domain of the Eastern Neighbourhood.The missions that the EU has managed to launch in the region were important in showing the EU presence and testing CFSP and CSDP instruments in the Eastern Neighbourhood, but suffered from a number of challenges which were hampering their efficiency and ability to reach their goals.First of all, CSDP instruments were poorly coordinated with the ENP instruments.Secondly, the EU lacked a strategic vision of what exactly it wanted to achieve in the region and how to best to use its various instruments for that purpose.These deficiencies have also contributed to the reluctance of the EU to rely on CSDP instruments in the region.Being a fairly modest security actor in the Eastern neighbourhood the EU nevertheless plays an increasingly important part of an economic partner and donor.During 2010-2013 the ENPI funds for the Eastern partners consisted of 1.9 billion.After the EaP summit in Warsaw in 2011 these funds were increased by 150 million for 2011-2013.The EU roots its presence in the region in the principles of the ENP, which aims to create a zone of security, stability and prosperity around the EU's borders through a Europeanisation process.In fact, this approach is quite suitable for the Eastern side of the neighbourhood as it concentrates on non-sensitive "low politics" and thereby does not provoke Russia.At the same time it provides technical assistance and financial funds essential to coping with the challenges of post-soviet societies and thus increases the security in the region in a broad sense.But it is worth admitting that despite a presumed comprehensive attitude towards security in the EU, this approach lacks comprehensiveness.The EU tries to circumvent political instruments and lacks a strategy to direct its efforts in the region towards an explicit goal.Consequently, the EU's political influence in the region has not increased significantly over the years and the overall contribution of the EU to the resolution of frozen conflicts in Eastern Europe remains somewhat vague, except probably in Transnistria.The EU has invested a lot into the resolution of this frozen conflict by employing a wide variety of the measures available: diplomatic instruments, trade, economic aid, EUBAM with 100 staff, and it seems that those efforts begin to bear fruit.Since 2012 there have been clear signs of positive progress in the Transnistrian conflict resolution process.Although it might be argued that there are also other factors behind this success, such as low ethnic tensions within the conflict or a lack of a very strong opposition on the part of the main stakeholders, the contribution of the EU has to be admitted.The challenge is that the role of the EU and the results of its involvement in frozen conflicts in the Eastern neighbourhood depend a lot on a general attitude towards the EU in a particular country.The more a country is interested in closer ties with the EU, the more demand is created for the EU's involvement, and subsequently the more progress is achieved.That explains the almost inexistent role that the EU plays in the Nagorno-Karabach conflict.The success of the EU's efforts is also exposed to the attitudes and actions of other security stakeholders in the region.Despite strong demand for the EU's presence in the settlement of the frozen conflict in Georgia and solid commitment on the EU side (over 200 civilian monitors in EUMM) the progress is hampered by the lack of cooperation on the Russian side.The EUMM is yet to be granted access to the territories of the separatist regions even more so as fortifications are currently being built on the other side of the border.It appears that Russia does not have a sincere interest in the ultimate resolution of the frozen conflicts in the region as this might destroy the instruments of its political leverage.Thus even the positive progress in Transnistria cannot be regarded as irreversible and might be stalled as a consequence of increasing Moldova's European aspirations, as warned by the highest Russian politicians before the forthcoming EaP summit in Vilnius.The political context in the region creates the conditions in which the EU cannot put too much emphasis on the instruments of the so called "high politics", including CSDP missions, and has to rely on the measures of "low politics", which create more demand for the EU's involvement.However the EU has to realise that even "low politics" has to be coordinated and have clear goals, as some of them might as well be those of "high politics".Since the revision of the ENP and the launch of EaP in 2009 the attitude towards the CSDP in the Eastern neighbourhood has been facing a gradual paradigmatic change in the EU.First of all, the ENP countries are viewed less as a problematic neighbourhood that has to be secured but more as a partner, which has to be involved in the EU's activities.Secondly, the CSDP has ceased to be considered a taboo within the cooperation initiatives between the EU and Eastern partners.The change was inspired by several processes.The first one was the launch of the EaP, which aimed to raise the level of the EU's engagement within its Eastern neighbourhood by accelerating political association and deepening economic integration, 21 as well as acknowledging aspirations of some partners to seek a closer relationship with the EU.22 The EaP foresaw new enhanced partnership agreements, such as the DCFTA and for the first time recognised the CSDP as one of the partnership areas, which provides the ground for the FPA, partners' contribution to missions and operations and their involvement in joint exercises and trainings.The second threshold was the Lisbon Treaty which has introduced quite a number of novelties for the CSDP.New institutions dedicated exclusively to the CSDP within the structures of the EEAS such as a Deputy to the HR responsible for security issues and the CMPD aggregated additional attention and more consistent interest in CSDP matters.In parallel new institutions in the EEAS have been established within the field of the ENP (an EaP division and divisions working with bilateral cooperation projects within the 21.Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit, Council of the European Union, Prague, 7 May 2009, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PRES-09-78_en.htm.22.Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit, Council of the European Union, Warsaw, 29-30 September 2011, http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhood/eastern_partnership/documents/ warsaw_summit_declaration_en.pdf.CMPD).These permanent institutions have brought dynamism and a more strategic outlook in both fields.Two processes mentioned above created favourable conditions for another innovation -a new multilateral panel for cooperation in the area of the CSDP within EaP Platform I Democracy, Good Governance and Stability, which was launched on 12 June 2013 and had its first meeting on 27 September.The panel provides a working level multilateral cooperation format between the EU and EaP countries within the field of the CSDP, which has been lacking in the EU structures.The launch of the new panel is very important for the EU presence in the ENP as it allows the EU to rely on a more comprehensive approach, including hard security issues.Moreover through the link to the EaP financial instruments the panel becomes eligible for EU funding, which has previously been unavailable for CSDP initiatives.Finally, as a multilateral and consistent approach towards CSDP issues in the EaP, the panel attracts more attention to the region in general.Deputy Secretary General for the EEAS Maciej Popowski defined the essence of the current CSDP partnerships in three words: knowledge, impact and legitimacy.23 Partners are expected to bring to the EU their expertise, improve EU capabilities and increase the political legitimacy of the EU's missions and operations.These innovations have definitely created a more favourable environment for the cooperation between the EU and EaP countries.Although in the short run progress in cooperation will depend to a great extent on the willingness and ability of the EaP countries to contribute, in the long run the panel may contribute to the confidence building in the region and construction of joint perceptions and values.It is imperative though that the multilateral panel would be supported by bilateral cooperation projects, as EaP countries differ a lot among themselves and have diverse expectations towards the EU.Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine are interested in advanced general cooperation with the EU, whereas Armenia, Azerbaijan, and in particular Belarus, have more reserved attitudes.Ukraine and Moldova have signed FPAs, Georgia and Armenia are currently negotiating.Georgia and Moldova see the EU within the field of the CSDP as a contributor to their security, especially in helping to solve frozen conflicts in their territories.Ukraine on the other hand has the capabilities (including those that the EU lacks) and interest to increase its role in the EU's operations.It has already participated in several rotations of the EU Battlegroups, and new commitments are foreseen for the forthcoming rotation of the BG HELBROC in 2014 and possibly in the Visegrad Battlegroup.Ukraine has contributed to the EUPM in Bosnia Herzegovina, participates in the EUNAVFOR Atalanta and prepares to join Atalanta in 2014 with a fully supported frigate.It is important to realise these differences and use the panel as a forum for information exchange enabling all the partners to take from it what best suits their needs, as well as a platform for the development of new projects.The forthcoming EaP Summit and European Council on Defence are generating more attention than general for both the CSDP and EaP. Lithuania, which currently holds the EU Council Presidency, has made the EaP one of its main presidency priorities and is an ardent advocate of these countries in various EU formats.These developments create a favourable environment for raising CSDP and EaP related issues.Will there be anything substantially new proposed in either the EaP Summit or the EU Council on Defence on CSDP in the EaP?Current discussions in the EU institutions do not provide much ground for optimism.The EaP Summit will be devoted to political issues, such as signing and initialling Association Agreements, and will set a general direction for the cooperation between the EU and partners for several years.These directions will also influence developments in the CSDP, although the CSDP itself will not be high on the Summit agenda.The Summit declaration is not likely to offer any revolutionary changes for the CSDP, except general statements about the role of the CSDP in the region: what has been achieved since the Warsaw Summit and what lies ahead.Association Agreements include a part on the CSDP (except the one with Armenia) but they do not foresee any practical implications.The European Council on defence, on the other hand, is likely to be overshadowed by other more pressing issues for the CSDP than the EaP, such as capabilities, defence industry and general directions for the CSDP.Partnerships in the European Council (not distinguishing the EaP) will be addressed as a part of a changing paradigm in the EU to better involve its neighbours in the CSDP and to thereby increase the effectiveness and visibility of the EU's external role.It is not likely that the CSDP in the EaP will receive increased attention during the forthcoming years either, at least until the Latvian Presidency in the first part of 2015.Greek and Italian Presidencies will be putting more emphasis on the Southern part of neighbourhood.Thus the main format for innovation within the CSDP in EaP for several years will be the panel.As the institutions are already in place the success of the panel will depend on concrete initiatives and projects, which might come both from the Partnership countries and EU members.The EU at some point will have to address one potential challenge -namely how to enhance cooperation and increase partners' interests to contribute to the CSDP.On the one hand the EU benefits from its power of attraction especially in those countries which have overt or secret hopes of eventual membership; on the other hand it lacks enough "carrots" to encourage partners to join costly projects, such as participation in the CSDP missions.Ukraine contributes a lot at the moment, but its enthusiasm may fade.Moreover due to institutional regulations that favour EU capabilities and personnel in CSDP missions, partners face difficulties contributing even if they want.The dynamism in cooperation might be assured by employing a principle of positive discrimination, as contribution of the partners has a double goal, not only to increase the EU's capabilities, but also to bring those countries closer to the EU and its values through cooperation.Finally, the EU Member States and those working in the EU institutions have to always remember that progress in the Eastern neighbourhood is a long, step-by-step and not a one-way process.The EU has to be prepared for set-backs.Even though the Association Agreement with the Ukraine will be signed and the ones with Moldova and Georgia initialled, there will be no guarantee that these countries will be getting closer to the EU in the future.The process of democratisation there is still fragile.Moldova -the most pro-European and successful EU Eastern partnerwill be having parliamentary elections in November 2014, which might result in a government with a lesser interest to get closer to the EU.Thus, first of all, the EU institutions have to grasp the moment and do as much as possible until then.Secondly, employing a comprehensive approach to its involvement in the EaP the EU has to build its power of attraction, bringing the value systems of those countries closer to that of the EU.The military definitely is not the primary instrument to deploy in Europe's southern neighbourhood.Passions run high in on-going domestic disputes, which might easily spark into conflict (again), with obvious international ramifications.Meanwhile, the civil war in Syria, in which foreign volunteers, regional players and the great powers are already involved, grinds on.In this infinitely complex geopolitical situation, the impact of outside military intervention is even more unpredictable than usual.The intervention in Libya which Europeans initiated in 2011 proved as much.Necessary though it was, it directly aggravated the security situation in the Sahel, necessitating another European military operation in Mali in early 2013, not to forget Europe's civilian mission in Niger since August 2012.The military instrument (as always, of course) is thus to be used with extreme care.In fact Europe must ask itself whether it has any instruments with significant leverage in the region.The "Arab Spring" has not just left large parts of the Middle East and North Africa and beyond in turmoil.It has also demonstrated the bankruptcy of the fundamentally paternalistic positive conditionality ("good behaviour" is rewarded by the proverbial carrot) of the ENP, at least in our southern periphery.The EU never did implement it as intended, too often turning a blind eye to lack of reform or worse as long as cooperation in the fight against terrorism and illegal migration was assured.As a result the supposed partnership between both shores of the Mediterranean did not substantially affect the nature of the regimes.Today positive conditionality is in any case out of sync with the times.Especially (but not only) where people have just made a revolution, they want to decide on their own future; too heavy-handed outside meddling, no matter how benevolent, is quickly perceived as insulting.Money would not change this psychological reality, and in any case we do not have it: the economic and demographic challenges are beyond Europe's means to address alone.Before envisaging the role of the military instrument therefore, our entire strategy towards our southern neighbourhood needs urgent reassessment.The time has come to quietly abandon partnership (a notion which is abused at least as often as the word strategy) as the default mode of organising relations with our southern neighbours.By establishing partnerships with regimes before they changed, we took away much of the incentive to reform and simultaneously limited our own margin for manoeuvre, for once partnership has been declared it is difficult to maintain a critical distance.Partnership should be reserved for those States with which we share respect for the universal values on which our own society is based, and with which we can therefore systematically engage in joint action.With all other States we should maintain diplomatic relations so as to foster dialogue which ideally will produce the setting for occasional joint action.Partnership is the desired outcome -it is not the starting position.Underlying the abandonment of partnership in favour of diplomacy is the recognition that our past level of ambition was unrealistically high.We should not give up on the idea underpinning European grand strategy (as codified in the 2003 European Security Strategy): only where States equally provide for the security, prosperity and freedom of all their citizens are lasting peace and security possible.It has in fact been validated by the "Arab Spring", which has demonstrated that where States do not provide for their citizens, people will eventually revolt, violently or peacefully -and successfully or less successfully.At the same time though it has proved that such fundamental change cannot be engineered from the outside.External actors can support it if and when domestic forces align to make it happen.Until then, they can strive to have a moderating (but not usually a reforming) influence on the regime by maintaining a critical diplomatic stance and (by diplomatic and other measures) clearly signalling dissatisfaction in case of the derailing of democratic processes or severe human rights violations.The emergency brake of the Responsibility to Protect applies in the gravest cases: genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.What is a realistic level of ambition for European diplomacy then?Where a revolution has taken place (in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya) our objective is the consolidation of a more equal order.Where it has not, the objective is for domestic actors to accelerate the speed of reform in order to achieve a peaceful transition instead of violent upheaval.Our leverage to contribute to these ends may be limited, but we certainly have instruments that can help nudge developments in the right direction, even though ours may not be the decisive action.Diplomacy, to start with, which we should not forget we are actually quite good at: for example, witness Catherine Ashton's prominent (even though so far unsuccessful) mediation efforts in Egypt.Two other important instruments are the offer of technical expertise (in the police and justice as well as other sectors of government), and the creative and targeted use of financial means (for mutually beneficial investment projects, in the transport and energy sector for example, that can attract additional regional and international funds).To this, we should add an unequivocal ambition in the field of security: to prevent conflict and, where prevention fails, to terminate or at least to contain it, in order both to exercise our Responsibility to Protect people from war and to safeguard our vital interests.This is where the military instrument comes in, in support of diplomacy.That a European ambition with regard to peace and security in the region is required is indeed another clear lesson of the aftermath of the "Arab Spring".First of all, the "pivot" of the American strategic focus is evident: in none of the three recent conflicts (Libya, Mali and Syria) did Washington seek a leading role.In Libya, Europeans had to convince the US of the need to intervene, though the US then had to provide the bulk of the strategic enablers for the air campaign.The Mali scenario conformed better to US expectations: an intervention initiated and implemented by Europeans, with targeted American support (mainly ISTAR).In Syria the US had no choice but to engage once chemical weapons were used, the red line which President Obama had drawn but which he expected not to be crossed, and which was therefore intended as a diplomatic way of avoiding major US involvement.These three conflicts further highlight that in the south Europe's engagement cannot remain limited to the ENP countries.The stability of our immediate neighbours is linked to the stability of "the neighbours of the neighbours", hence our "real" neighbourhood, where our vital interests are at stake, goes beyond the Mediterranean and stretches out into the Sahel, the Horn and the Gulf.Finally, it should be clear by now that no strategy towards this "broader neighbourhood" (or towards any region, for that matter) makes sense if it does not include "hard security".Stating up front that our grand design for the neighbourhood ended where security problems began has cost us dearly in legitimacy and effectiveness.What the "pivot" means is that in this broader neighbourhood it will increasingly be up to Europe to take the lead in maintaining peace and security: to develop permanent policies of stabilisation and conflict prevention for sure, but also to initiate the response to crises, and to forge a coalition to undertake the necessary action (and, if there is no other option, to act alone).Following its mediation efforts in Egypt, Europe could first of all design a more systematic diplomatic engagement, aiming to foster cooperation between the States of the region.It is in our immediate interest to avoid new regimes having recourse to a confrontational foreign policy as a way of distracting attention from domestic challenges, as it is in the interest of all States in the Middle East to avoid escalation of the Syrian civil war, which has already turned into a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran, into a full-blown international sectarian war.Similarly, all states in the Sahel face the same challenge of roving militias in that vast territory.The military instrument has a role to play in these, notably through training missions (as they are currently training the armed forces of Somalia and Mali), which in specific cases may need to be supplemented by the provision of materiel.It would be a mistake however to assume that all problems can be solved through training.The military must therefore also provide Europe with a credible capacity for power projection: such a deterrent will strengthen our diplomacy.Vital interests and/or the Responsibility to Protect may dictate actual intervention.Inter-state war in the region, including spill-over of a civil war, surely ought to be prevented or ended.Unless the UN Security Council seizes the matter and Europe can act as part of a broader coalition, notably with the US and regional actors, intervention is unlikely however.Addressing a civil war, particularly when the Responsibility to Protect arises, is the responsibility of regional actors first and foremost, but given the limits of will and means external intervention may prove necessary.In such cases, Europe is more likely to be the only or the leading external actor, preferably still in coalition with local and regional actors, as in Libya and Mali.The government of the country in question can of course request intervention; after Libya, a UNSC mandate is much less certain.As in Syria today, but also in Georgia (2008) , the military feasibility may be constrained by the implication of external powers, by the chance that any benefits are outweighed by major negative side effects, or by an unacceptably high risk of casualties.Intervention may then be limited to preventing spill-over and possibly supporting the legitimate party in the conflict with equipment and otherwise.Assuming leadership in maintaining peace and security in our broader southern neighbourhood does not mean rushing headlong into action.It does mean taking the initiative to respond to any crisis, at the earliest possible stage, in order to prevent escalation and the need for military intervention.But if all else fails, and vital interests and the Responsibility to Protect cannot otherwise be upheld, we should not shy away from military action either.In parts of this region at least, such as the Sahel, even limited military means can make a difference: if none of the parties on the ground has any air support for example, a limited deployment on our side can tip the balance.Nevertheless it is a most sensitive region in which to intervene, which means that the cost-benefit calculation is even more difficult than usual.A coalition involving local and regional players is always advisable, in order to avoid mobilisation of public opinion against Europe.Even if our help is requested, strict political conditions and long-term follow-up are of the essence if a durable impact is to be had.It are Europe's interests that are at stake here much more than America's -in that sense it is mare nostrum.But Europe will not stabilise this region against the local actors, only with them: it is mare nostrum as much for them as for us.Asia is becoming one large playing field.The rise of China has effectively connected Central, South, Southeast, and Northeast Asia by means of roads, railways, trade, personal exchanges, and regional institutions.In the previous decade, that arena used to be characterised by growing confidence and cooperation.Six elements were important in this regard.First, most governments adhered to constructive variants of nationalism and aligned national development with globalisation.As a result, they became more integrated into the global order.Between 2000 and 2012, the share of foreign investment and trade increased from 3% to 6% and from 40% to 57%.That coincided with an expansion of intra-regional trade.The share of intra-regional exports of total Asian exports expanded from 41% to 53% between 2000 and 2012.This trend was flanked by a gradual institutionalisation of cooperation and a proliferation of regional organisations.Asian countries also came to recognise non-traditional security threats as a common challenge and turned them into an opportunity for military confidence building.All that continued to make most countries more averse to the use of force and encouraged them to show restraint in the many conflicts over borders, raw materials and regional leadership.That restraint cannot be taken for granted.There are four important elements that could lead to more conflict and instability.To begin with there is the shift in the balance of power, marked by the rise of China, the failure of South Asia, the struggling of Southeast Asia and the inevitable decline of Japan.China's ascent remains precarious and its economic growth model is unsustainable, but still it is the only major developing country that expands its industry so rapidly and advances fast in terms of technology, diplomatic influence and military prowess.In comparison, the other juggernaut, India, is struggling and falling prey to financial volatility, political fragmentation, social instability and domestic violence.The altering balance of power aggravates the traditional security dilemmas between Asian countries.Second, the growing economic distortions can cause major crises and draw pragmatic elites away from their constructive nationalism to more antagonistic variants of nationalism.Third, the increasing "militarisation" of borders and disputed areas increases the risk of mishaps that could easily escalate in a context of antagonist nationalism.Fourth, demographic pressure, demand for raw materials and environmental hazards are increasing faster than technological solutions are found.China's growth remains the main variable.If China keeps its growth on track, continues to modernise its industrial base, attains high-income status, and grad-ually rebalances its economy away from investment-and export-led growth, it could -theoretically -provide more opportunities to its Asian neighbours.The downside, however, is that the transition towards that economic leadership entails a long period -another decade or so -of diverting trade, industrial opportunities, and possibilities to create jobs.Furthermore, the economic power shift would imply a military power shift and most likely allow China to outpace the others in building up a presence in the disputed waters of the South and East China Sea.That could cause more balancing, confirm China's suspicion of nascent containment and lead to fiercer competition.If, however, China's growth were to slow down before it builds a strong domestic market, its leaders could try to secure their position domestically by shifting to antagonistic nationalism.Moreover, a sharp slowdown of Chinese economic growth could also destabilise many of the neighbouring states that depend heavily on exports to China and commodity prices.Like in China, the most probable result would be more antagonistic nationalism.Such a climate makes it of course much more difficult to prevent that tensions spiral out of control.This relates to tensions with China, but also to other conflict-prone relationships, such as India and Pakistan, Thailand and Cambodia, Indonesia and some of its neighbours, and so forth.A Chinese slowdown could unravel much of the cooperative mechanisms that developed in the previous decades.This uncertainty presents Europe with several important security challenges.First, Europe has to anticipate more economic volatility.Its social stability could be affected by more assertive industrial policies as well as economic crashes.Second, Asia's turbulent transition challenges some of our core objectives, not the least to advance peace and cooperation through multilateralism.Third, we should anticipate a spill-over of instability from Asia into our backyard.Distrust and rivalry could prompt the Asian powers to try to secure their interests unilaterally in our extended neighbourhood.Economic problems in Asia could also add to more social unrest in that area.Fourth, military conflict between the Asian powers reduces our diplomatic manoeuvrability -especially if the rift between China and its neighbours were to expand and if that would be followed by more manifest American balancing.Fifth, the American pivot to Asia demands Europe to play a more active role in stabilising its neighbourhood.That could be seen as an important opportunity, but also a threat if it continues to fail to get its act together.Sixth, the tensions in Asia might lead to a more rapid militarisation of outer space and the cyber realm.Seventh, a persistent failure of South and Central Asia to work towards prosperity and stability could create a security black hole right in between Europe and Eastern Asia.Eighth, the outbreak of a regional armed conflict would come as a major threat to a region that has no contingency plans anymore for traditional wars between states and major powers.This will be an Asian century, but it will unlikely be a century of peace.Europe should be prepared for major instability, but as long as Asia continues to grow economically, it should also be ready to reap the benefits.The first task is therefore to advance our economic interests.Europe should serve Asia's growing consumer market more from European factories, not by relocating more capacity to Asia or allowing Asian countries to divert trade by aggressive industrial policies.The second task is to make our main partnerships in Asia more effective instead of just bigger.Europe should continue to work towards a strong and balanced relationship with China.It would be a mistake to play up the China-threat.It is true that many Chinese policies are imperiling our economic interests and it is also true that its diplomatic choices are not always compatible with ours.Yet, Europe is equally challenged by the monetary and industrial policies of countries like Japan, South Korea, India, and, not the least, the US.Neither are we always on the same page with these countries in diplomatic matters.Important also is that we analyse China's role in Asian maritime disputes carefully.As regards the territorial disputes, China's claims and its interpretation of the UNCLOS are often as contentious as those of other countries, including, again, the US.Its efforts to project naval power into the Pacific are as legitimate or problematic as America's efforts to maintain military predominance in this area.It cannot be excluded that China soon or later will become more belligerent, as we cannot exclude that for most other Asian powers, but we should remain careful and balanced in our strategic choices.It is thus advised to continue to invest in our partnership with China, but also to strengthen relations with other Asian protagonists.We need to avoid here to make the mistake of trying to broaden partnerships without strengthening cooperation on core economic and political issues.Europe has too often the tendency to compensate the lack of progress by setting up more dialogues.The precondition to make this possible is that the EEAS invests more in internal action, that is, the coordination with Member States and other stakeholders to generate the maximum of influence out of our resources -economic, diplomatic, and military.In the military realm we should not allow our Asian partners to approach individual Member States for ad hoc synergies, without being able to get meaningful strategic cooperation at the European level in return.There should thus be cogent frameworks for defence cooperation at the European level within which the Member States could engage themselves.Particular attention should go to ASEAN.Europe has to work towards a more effective partnership with ASEAN, to support the region as a buffer against Asian great power rivalry, and help to prevent its further fragmentation, which will inevitably turn the grouping into a defenceless playground of great power politics.One of the most important questions is whether Europe should follow the US in pivoting to the Pacific.That would not be a smart move.Three considerations should guide Europe in its response to the US pivot.First, it should ask itself how it could get the maximum of leverage over the Asian powers.Second, it should think how it could best secure its maritime lifelines to the Pacific.Third, it has to evaluate how it can make itself most useful vis-à-vis its main partners.Taking into consideration that Europe's long-range power projection capacity will continue to be limited, that it will have limited weight to throw in the Asian balances of power, and that it faces an increasingly growing number of major security threats, the choice for Europe should be to make itself indispensible as a security actor in its extended neighbourhood, including Africa, the Middle East, Eastern Europe, and the Arctic.This is were the Asian powers are the most vulnerable, where the EU can bolster its credibility as a security provider, and strengthen its credibility in the Atlantic partnership as the US focuses more on the Pacific.Pivoting to Asia without strengthening our position in our immediate neighbourhood would be reckless and dangerous.What has to be done?First, Europe needs to re-energise its neighbourhood policy, restore its position as a capable partner of countries in that area, strengthen its role as an economic player, and regain confidence as a source of inspiration.Second, Europe must come up with an integrated policy to improve security in Africa and the Middle East.This involves local capacity building, conflict prevention, but also the ability to project power whenever new conflicts might erupt.Third, Europe needs to establish a defence perimeter that stretches from Gibraltar to the Gulf of Aden and from the Gulf of Aden to the Artic.Such a defence perimeter should consist of joint security hubs.Therefore, it can depart from existing facilities of the Member States in the Mediterranean, the Gulf, Africa, and the Indian Ocean.But it will also be essential to establish some sort of presence in the Caspian Sea Region so as to monitor and contain future instability in Central Asia.Besides these hubs, a forward naval deployment is indispensible.Europe should have a significant naval presence in the northern Atlantic, the Gulf of Guinea, the Mediterranean and around the Gulf Region (Including the Western part of the Indian ocean).Such a presence could be organised around the five aircraft carriers.These hubs and this naval presence should play an important role in building security partnerships with our neighbours and conditioning the security involvement of Asian powers.Fourth, Europe needs to limit its vulnerability to possible aggression from space and cyber.Europe thus requires the full spectrum of military capabilities.While it should be able to use its armed force constructively, to cement partnerships and so forth, it must also be able to defend itself against a spillover of instability from Asia into its neighbourhood, and from that neighbourhood into Europe itself.In other words, it has to have the upper hand in the transit zone between Europe and the surrounding arc of disquiet and be able to deny access to those "external" powers that threaten its security.In 1827, the British explorer, Sir William Parry -of the Royal Navy -set out on one of the first purposeful expeditions to locate the North Pole.Many came before and after him: many of those intrepid explorers also perished.While he went further north than anyone before him, he ultimately failed -although he lived to tell the tale.The North Pole was eventually found, but the extreme climate and the thick ice sheets prevented human penetration until the middle of the twentieth century, which, even then, was only in a military-strategic way.Over the past decade, however, particularly with the onset and acceleration of climate change, the north has started to open and scientists project that, by 2050, the Arctic Ocean will be ice free for much of the year.This is drawing increasing attention from local, regional and even global powers -Norway, Russia, Canada, the US, China and others -to assert their interests, both economic and political.However, the EU -with its own territory within the Arctic Circle and hence definitively an Arctic power -has taken less interest in the affairs of its northern proximity than it otherwise might.Its much-vaunted "Northern Dimension" and nascent "Arctic Policy" have remained hamstrung as entrenched structural economic problems and the Arab revolts have concentrated European leaders' attention on their southern rimland.Likewise, the European Commission's Joint Communication to the European Council and the European Parliament in 2008, which outlined three themes for its northern perspective -"knowledge", "responsibility" and "engagement" -has failed to drive Europeans forward.The EU has also failed to gain full membership of the Arctic Council, even though two of its Member States are part-located in the Arctic region and another has an overseas territory there.It remains merely an observer.The question arises: how can it become a power?Acquiring power necessitates a thorough understanding of geopolitics.This accounts for a way of thinking that looks at the interaction between humans and their geographic surroundings -or rather, the way that geography impedes human activities, encouraging them to develop new forms of technology to overcome those constraints.Geography is -after all -"fundamental" and "pervasive" for it 'impose[s] distinctive constraints and provide[s] distinctive opportu-nities that have profound implications for policy and strategy'.24 However, this does not necessarily mean that geography determines human possibilities, for there are many ways of reacting to geographic constraint or change.The UK and Japan, for example, are both islands, located off continents, but both developed very differently: whereas the former adopted an expansive maritime approach, the other closed in on itself for many centuries, until forced open by external powers.This is where geostrategy comes in: those societies best able to maximise their command over the natural world are likely to be more successful than those who do not.However, as Grygiel notes: '[t]he geostrategy of a state [...] is not necessarily motivated by geographic or geopolitical factors.A state may project power to a location because of ideological reasons, interest groups, or simply the whim of its leader'.25 Indeed, there is no a priori explicit linkage between strategy and geography; governments have often failed to properly link the two -perhaps best reflected by the historical case of Japan.Had the Japanese not adapted an insular geostrategic culture, they might have ended up more like the British -outward looking -and indeed, they did after the Meiji Restoration during the late nineteenth century.The point here is that to flourish economically, politically and culturally, political communities must actively seek to establish their command over the natural world and -consequentially -over rival societies.However, the urge to do this is often a consequence of some form of dislocation.In Japan's case, this occurred when the US' "Black Ships" entered the Bay of Tokyo; in Britain's case when Spanish power began to surround and endanger the home islands in the sixteenth century.Further, when one society masters new ways of altering the constraining impact of geography, or when it successfully overcomes an external threat -the region in question is likely to be altered, often irrevocably.26 A similar dynamic may now be underway in the extreme Northern Hemisphere.For much of modern history, this region was largely impenetrable.The inhospitable climate made human settlement very difficult.Any settlement that did occur was confined to the southern extremes of the region (like Scandinavia and the Baltic rim), which were part of alternative geopolitical sub-systems like Northern and Eastern Europe or the North Atlantic.Even as the invention of intercontinental bombers, ballistic missile technology and nuclear propulsion during the 1950s merged with the Arctic's pivotal position between Soviet Russia and the Western democracies, its geopolitical significance only grew due to the superpowers' nuclear strategies.Hidden by its murky depths, American, British and Soviet ballistic missile submarines found the Arctic Ocean a suitable location to lurk during the Cold War, only a handful of minutes striking distance from each others' strategic centres of gravity.The region's importance swiftly declined with the end of the Iron Curtain.After a period of relative quiet, the Arctic has started to re-emerge as a region of geopolitical intrigue.27 This is being driven by two interwoven factors: 1.The dense polar ice-sheets are starting to melt, meaning that except for the winter months, the Arctic Ocean will likely be navigable by the 2050s.Should even the most moderate climate projections become a reality by the middle of the twenty-first century, it is likely that the Arctic Ocean will no longer remain such an impenetrable and inhospitable space.It will always be a very difficult environment to work and live in, especially during the winter months, but it could nonetheless emerge as an alternative transit route between the centres of economic production in North-Western Europe and North-Eastern Asia.2.As the world is becoming more multipolar, the larger surrounding powers are beginning to consider how the changing environment -both natural and geopolitical -may affect their interests in the northern zone.How will a more open and warmer north affect the geography and development of Russia, for example?These developments may transform the Arctic from an icy wilderness to the centre-piece of a new geopolitical zone.This Wider North will likely envelop many European countries, such as Denmark (and Greenland), Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, as well as the UK and the Irish Republic, given that the British Isles act as the strategic gateway between the Atlantic and Arctic Oceans.28 Germany, Poland, France and the Netherlands may also be drawn in given their proximity to the Baltic Sea and the North Sea and the requirements of their economies, i.e., unfettered access to the sea for the purposes of trade.More distant countries, like Japan, South Korea, the US and Canada, all with northern vectors, may also be drawn in.So as climate change takes its toll and as surrounding powers increase their interest in the region, what might it look like by the middle of the twentieth century?There are two main possible trajectories: Peace in the Wider North: analysts were relieved that climate change did not have the impact on the Wider North that it was originally projected to have.While the Ultra-Plinian eruption of an Indonesian volcano in 2026 killed millions of people, it did envelop the Earth's atmosphere in a thin layer of ash, which led to the decade-long onset of a volcanic winter.The previously melting ice actually began to refreeze, closing the Northern Sea Route and derailing Moscow's efforts to lift-up Russia's northern areas through the development of new infrastructure on the Siberian coast.In any case, the eruption left the world with many other issues to deal with -such as maintaining food supply in some regions -reducing the desire of countries to engage in geopolitics in the North.In any case, the stagnation of the Putin regime in the late 2020s further stymied Russia's ability to influence its surroundings, as the country's numerous oblasts clamoured for greater autonomy under acute agricultural and demographic pressures.Likewise, the birth of constitutional government in Beijing in the late 2030s -after the "Elders' Movement" earlier that decade -created a much less assertive China.The Chinese turned inward to refine their democratic structures and thoroughly sweep away what came to be known as the "era of repression", even as they continued to grow in wealth and power.Analysts feared that the major powers had not forgotten their interests in the North but had merely put them on the back-burner.Struggle in the Wider North: By 2040, Western hegemony had been greatly reduced, not least by a combination of climate change and the rise of non-Western counties, particularly China and Russia.With the Northern Sea Route having been opened, and human habitation of Russia's northern expanses been enabled, China was keen to extend its control over Eurasia's near-unlimited resources.The intensification of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation during the 2020s finally altered the global balance of power: the agreement reached between Beijing and Moscow was undoubtedly in China's favour, but the Russian regime -long prickly and paranoid -was determined not to "surrender" to the Euro-Atlantic structures.Backed by China's industrial strength and growing military might, Russia realised that a consumer was ready and willing to procure its resources -a consumer that did not attach multiple caveats requiring political reform.Northern and Eastern European countries looked on as the China-Russia axis solidified: a single geopolitical constellation was beginning to take control of the Eurasian heartland, exerting pressure on all fronts.The Western maritime powers -a British-French led EU, Japan, Korea and the US -had their work cut out: not only were they busy maintaining order around the southern rimlands of Eurasia, but now they were facing a rising threat to the North and East.Beijing realised that opening another geopolitical front would serve its wider agenda in the Indo-Pacific, particularly in South-East Asia, by splitting the West's dwindling resources.It actively supported the Russians' northern policy, providing Moscow with the latest weapons systems, safe in the knowledge that Russia could never again challenge Chinese power.By 2050, two hostile blocs looked on at one another.Preparing for the Emergence of the "Wider North" Whatever future takes hold in the upper Northern Hemisphere, the EU and its Member States are unlikely to remain unaffected.Should the Wider North emerge as an integrated geopolitical space, sucking in several powerful external countries, Europeans must be ready and waiting.Rather than a reactive policy, which kicks in after something goes wrong, Europeans require a more assertive, integrated and preventative approach that places their needs and interests at the forefront.Shrewd diplomatic action is needed, but this is not by itself enough.Military capabilities -and the techno-industrial base required to support them -are essential to undergird diplomacy, much like a police force does its part to uphold the law.29 More than that, military capabilities act as a restraint on other powers' calculations and actions, particularly those like Russia, which continues to see international relations through the lens of the "modern".In this respect, Europeans could not do nothing better than to remember the insights of the naval strategist, Alfred Thayer Mahan, who proclaimed that: '[f]orce is never more operative than when it is known to exist but is not brandished'.30 Unfortunately, few Europeans -even the UK and France -possess significant projection forces that are suitable for patrols or operations in the northern extremes.Norway has some capable and sophisticated military instruments, but not in a number sufficient to undergird European interests.Vol.195, No.674: p. 31.forward planning.If the Wider North takes shape, Europeans will need to bolster the cold weather capacities of their armed forces to facilitate patrols and operations in the icy extremes, to establish and sustain a European presence, or to support smaller partners and allies and to deter foreign aggression against the EU's northern perimeters.Most importantly, enhanced situational awareness will be crucial in the years ahead, not least as other non-European, even non-Western powers, seek to muscle in and make their voices count.JO COELMONT AND ALEXANDER MATTELAER Military capabilities cannot be discussed in isolation of the geostrategic environment, for they refer to the ability to achieve specific effects that are ultimately determined by political reality.The European capability development process can therefore not make abstraction of budgetary austerity, the turmoil following the Arab Spring or the US "pivot" to the Asia Pacific.These developments may indeed suggest that European defence approaches a state of emergency.This conclusion, however, is only a snapshot of the present.To understand where we are going requires knowing where we have been.Such a historical perspective makes clear we are witnessing a dramatic increase in the importance of strategic assets.In fact, the future acquisition of major defence systems is critically dependent on political desperation.Sovereignty only means as much as one's ability to act permits, and this ability is dwindling fast across the European continent.Desperate times therefore call for desperate measures: the reconstitution of sovereignty as the collective ability of European nations to bring military power to bear.In the middle of the Cold War, it was deemed unacceptable to spend less than 4% of GDP on defence.Even in these days of relative plenty for defence planners, a transatlantic division of labour was firmly in place.European states generally concentrated their defence efforts on generating sufficient numbers of tactical assets, be it fighter squadrons or mechanised brigades.In turn, the US, and to a limited extent the UK and France, invested a large share of their resources in strategic assets, such as expeditionary logistics, C4ISTAR systems and long-range (nuclear) strike platforms.Together, Europeans and Americans maintained an integrated command structure for imbuing NATO's common defence clause with real meaning.This package provided the baseline from which post-Cold War defence planning must inevitably depart.For European planners, the political urge to cash in on the so-called "peace dividend" was paradoxically accompanied by a drive towards greater expeditionary deployability of a shrinking pool of tactical assets.Ever since the 1998 Saint Malo accords, it was clear that Europeans suffered from important strategic shortfalls limiting their ability to act -be it autonomously or as equal partner of the US.The post-9/11 defence spending spree in Washington allowed for these shortfalls to be systematically covered, even if it also deepened the transatlantic gap in terms of military technology.As such, European militaries could continue to play the role of US military subcontractors in places as far away as Afghanistan.The transatlantic division of labour therefore continued well into the post-Cold War period.In many ways this trend culminated in the air campaign over Libya: an intervention initiated by European ambitions was critically reliant on US strategic assets.This dependency not only ranged from tomahawk missiles to suppress enemy air defences to RPASs to collect intelligence as far as the operational front office was concerned.It applied equally to back office functions of the logistical support and command structures (think tanker aircraft and combined air operation centres).The US pivot to the Asia-Pacific region and the changing character of the operational environment are turning this longstanding division of labour upside down.The American willingness to pick up the slack is diminishing just as the operational importance of strategic enablers increases.This entails a true paradigm shift for European defence planners.The future availability of sufficient strategic assets will determine the European ability to act, be it nationally or collectively.And -surprise, surprise -this debate is intimately intertwined with the future of the European defence industry.As the spiralling cost of hi-tech defence systems is driving unit prices up, order numbers are going down, casting a long shadow over an industrial sector that is responsible for driving technological innovation forward.So far, European capitals have responded to this emerging paradigm shift by putting forward the slogan of pooling and sharing.But before issuing yet another clarion call, let us look in the mirror.Pooling and sharing was launched because the original project -establishing PESCO -failed.In fact, the underlying idea of pooling and sharing has been around since the 1970s, if not earlier.Moreover, pooling and sharing cannot possibly compensate for the huge amount of budget cuts national defence has had to swallow recently.As the former Director-General of the EUMS Ton van Osch has stated, the combined European defence cuts are approximately one hundred times the size of the expected benefits of currently agreed pooling and sharing initiatives.Far too many of these individual projects are concerned with marginal savings in the field of tactical capabilities.In political terms, pooling and sharing is effectively used as a means to camouflage the imminent loss of sovereignty.Faced with another round of cuts, Europeans planners attempt to muddle through once more.With some notable exceptions, it is still business as usual -at least for now.This is not to say that pooling and sharing has no potential.When looking at the development and purchasing cost of satellite systems, future air systems and major naval platforms, it is not rocket science to understand that European states can get much more value for money if they spend their Euros together.Some states are already going pragmatically forward in fields such as air transport.The challenge is to move forward with European answers to the full list of strategic shortfalls.The fragmented nature of the European defence market is only sustainable as long as industrial answers can match operational requirements within the available budgetary envelope.In an era of falling defence expenditures, this means that deeper European cooperation is unavoidable.The added value of genuine pooling and sharing therefore resides in the spontaneous emergence of joint defence planning among partners.And if one is indeed willing to risk a quantum leap forward in terms of coordinating European defence planning, the era of austerity need not mean the end of sovereignty, on the contrary.This is of course a matter of political insight and acting accordingly.Perhaps Jean Claude Juncker was talking about more than economic reforms when he stated that 'we all know what to do, we just don't know how to get re-elected after we've done it.'The history of European integration is based on the application of the Monnet method and the principle of subsidiarity, i.e. the allocation of policy competences to the lowest possible level.The former assumed the shape of economic integration only after the proposal for establishing a European defence community had been defeated.It is therefore highly symbolic that the theme of European defence has crept back on the policy agenda six decades onwards.The latter assumes a five-step process to be followed before specific policy competences are uploaded to the European level.The first requirement is that it must be beyond reasonable doubt that the European level would bring greater efficiency.Second, there must be a significant amount of damage suffered already.Third, the damage must be of such magnitude that it cannot be hidden from public view.Fourth, the political class must reach a state of desperation: nothing focuses the mind like the prospect of a hanging.Fifth and finally, there must be no possible alternative left.So where are we with European defence?It becomes increasingly difficult to mask the dire state of affairs behind the smokescreen of pooling and sharing.Shell-shocked by austerity, anyone interested in defence issues is near a state of despair.Under the pressure of the US pivot, Europe is now drifting towards the fifth level.For now European states are experimenting with the last possible alternative: that of regional clusters.It is no coincidence that the Lancaster House Treaties provided the first attempts at pooling and sharing of strategic assets like carrier groups and satellite communications.It is questionable however, that these clusters will be able to bring about the required critical mass for investing in the development of sufficient strategic assets.The question therefore becomes: can the European Heads of State and Government now muster the will to make the quantum leap first imagined by René Pleven?A Question of Timing?The upcoming European Council on defence presents the first opportunity in many years to come to terms with these thorny issues.As the defence theme has now been put on the agenda, a considerable risk has been taken already.It is now all too easy to point out that the pooling and sharing emperor has no more than a fig leaf for clothing.On the bright side, the summit creates an opportunity to provide considerable impetus to the work of the European institutions in the realm of defence.Top-down steering of the institutional staff work is required to overcome the ubiquitous turf wars and bureaucratic gridlock.The EEAS may need reminding that the comprehensive approach is not meant to prevent the EU from growing military teeth.Similarly, the Commission's efforts in safeguarding the EDTIB deserve the support of Member States.A purely market-based approach to the European defence industry is of course flawed: as defence assets ultimately qualify as the bedrock of state sovereignty, a strategic mindset is needed.The fundamental purpose of the European defence industry is to generate the toolkit required for defending Europe's vital interests -all else is secondary.Yet the puzzle remains: how to square defence integration with the idea of state sovereignty?The answer is surprisingly simply.Under current levels of defence investment, national sovereignty is eroding to no more than a shadow of its former self.What is the ability to act of a state that has become utterly dependent on strategic enablers provided by the US, now a self-declared weary policeman?European sovereignty, if it is to mean anything substantive, must be rebuilt at a level commensurate with the magnitude of the common problem that needs to be resolved.Together, Europeans can generate the minimum mass required to hold their ground on the global level.On their own, they represent no more than the proverbial grass whereupon elephants fight.At the end of the day, on their own or even in clusters, Europeans cannot pool their strategic shortfalls.They can only share the frustration about their collective inability to act. "Is there really no alternative?",the sceptics may ask.There is, in fact, one logical alternative remaining.It is the full revamping of national defence efforts, which in turn requires vastly greater investment -which even then may not suffice.This also amounts to betting the farm on European integration, for it represents the undoing of the original gamble of coal and steel.Europe's leaders must reflect long and hard about the options they have left.Defence establishments and national industries alike suggest that time is running out.Showdown, ladies and gentlemen!The rationale for any DTIB is to supply governments with cost efficient and high performance military equipment.DTIBs are the essential link between industry and the military; between the overalls of the factory and the camouflage of the battlefield.Without industrial capacities the production of military capabilities, as they relate to national security, both in terms of defence and force projection, is impossible.Defence firms are critical to the defence-industrial supply chain, as in Europe it is firms that largely conduct R&D activities and ultimately have the financial and human capital to develop military capabilities.Given that governments are dependent on the defence-industrial supply-chain for the accoutrement of capabilities essential to national security, and by virtue of governments being the largest consumers of military equipment, defence markets are unique in that governments tend to play a key ownership role in defence firms.Yet some national DTIBs have come under increasing strain as the costs of equipment increase and defence budgets decrease -a combination that is making it harder for some states to maintain capabilities and production capacities commensurate with national security.Governments privilege their own DTIB as this is perceived to be a way to maintain security of supply, support national firms and protect jobs.Despite this truism, however, the "European" DTIB (EDTIB) has emerged as a policy idea in response to defence market pressures.The idea behind the EDTIB is to overcome market fragmentation by harmonising government demand where possible, promoting multinational capability programmes, ensuring security of supply and maintaining and encouraging jobs, innovation and growth.Regulatory efforts by the European Commission have also sought to forge an EDTIB and EDEM by promoting defence market liberalisation.Whether a genuine EDTIB or EDEM actually exists, however, is a point of debate.The December Council meeting will necessarily have to address the ideas surrounding the EDTIB.While the associated debates are most likely to be marked by political entrenchment, any serious dialogue will focus on two intertwined problems associated with putting demand on a sustainable footing so as to ensure cost-efficient supply.One problem relates to whether European states can show a modicum of collective political leadership that results in a serious strategic blueprint; one which gives clearer signals to firms as to the shape and extent of future demand.The other problem relates to waning investment by governments in defence R&D and capability development programmes.According to Eurostat, for example, total EU27 GBAORD in defence -in terms of budget provisions and not actual expenditure -decreased from 9.7 billion in 2007 to 4.3 billion in 2011 (a decrease of 5.4 billion in 4 years).This short essay lists, in no particular order of preference, five specific but potentially feasible future work areas that could help address these two issues.National budgets are unlikely to yield greater resources for military capability development or for military R&D in the short to medium term.Yet, spending on defence is a critical hallmark of national sovereignty -indeed, to provide for defence is the ultimate raison d'être for governments -and so some degree of budgetary cooperation between Member States (less likely) or some form of innovation using common funds (potentially feasible) for defence will be required.To cushion such defence spending shortfalls there has been talk of using the EU's structural funds and financial tools where possible to support SMEs, regional clusters and the development of new technologies such as unmanned aerial vehicles.While such avenues should be explored, the use of purely Community mechanisms does raise certain restrictions and political frictions.Indeed, Community-based financial instruments cannot be used for strictly military purposes; the EU budget will not fund, say, an aircraft carrier project.Further still, some hesitantly believe that the use of Community funds will increase the hand of the European Commission in defence policy.Given these restrictions and political frictions, it is perhaps necessary to think of other possible avenues for defence-relevant financing.In this regard, little attention has so far been given to the potential role of the European Investment Bank (EIB).Indeed, the Bank holds 242 billion of available capital and is able to borrow off of capital markets -in 2012 alone it made loans worth 52 billion.Unlike the EU Budget, and in line with Article 309 of the TFEU, there is no restriction on the EIB lending to the European defence sector, albeit with one exception: investments must yield a return.Indeed, utilising EIB loans could ensure a change of mind-set in the defence sector, as profitable projects would be underwritten by the EIB; thus reducing inefficiencies and emphasising value for money.EIB loans could be a lifeline to the EDA -the only EU-level body actively engaged in military capability development projects -which has seen its operational budget cut over successive years.Europe is the world's largest trading bloc and the continent is dependent on importing and exporting supplies of goods over the high seas and oceans.Yet, Europe's collective naval industrial capacities and capabilities are under pressure.The industrial and strategic competitiveness of Europe's naval sector is of the utmost importance.The Commission estimates that there are approximately 150 large shipyards in Europe, with these yards employing around 120,000 people.While certain European states maintain a competitive advantage in the production and sale of submarines and patrol boats, the costs associated with the production of naval vessels has risen on the back of increased international competition, decreased defence spending in Europe, market fragmentation along national lines, and a lack of coherence in identifying future naval capability needs.However, any restructuring of Europe's naval sector must respect national specificities.As major exporters of naval equipment, Germany, and with their domestic demand arrangements, the UK, will not be the obvious standard-bearers of European naval cooperation.France and Italy -countries facing substantial challenges, but with experience in cooperation (e.g. the Franco-Italian FREMM frigate programme) -could assume this responsibility.These governments could embark on a path that would synchronise procurement cycles and commonly identify future naval capability needs.Additionally, in tandem with relevant firms these governments could harmonise naval R&D efforts; ensure the standardisation of naval systems; exploit naval and civilian shipbuilding sector linkages and ensure -by drawing on sustained support from the Commission's structural funds -labour restructuring with an emphasis on ensuring a technically skilled and young workforce.No other group of individuals know the potential for and limitations of capability development, and how this relates to defence procurement and defence investments processes, like the individual national Directors for armaments, capabilities and R&T ("Groups of Directors").Indeed, these Directors are tuned-in to the need to deliver equipment programmes to time, budget and functionality and they have the necessary links to firms and relevant national institutions such as the ministries of defence and finance.The Groups of Directors can collectively help translate strategic objectives into armament cooperation initiatives as well as promote interoperability, harmonisation and collaboration between Member States.They also know their own member state's red lines and can pragmatically delineate possible restrictions to cooperation.Given the importance of the Groups of Directors, it is odd that they currently only meet at least twice yearly at the sub-ministerial level under EDA auspices.Even though their representatives and points of contact are involved in the policy process on a more day-to-day basis, the Groups of Directors could have a more prominent role in the development of the EDTIB.Indeed, while the Groups of Directors are hardwired into the EDA -and they will remain so -they are largely distant from the policy work that takes place in other EU institutions responsible for generating capability requirements including: the PSC; the CMPD; the EUMS and the EUMC.Bodies that identify future military capability needs and thus generate market demand.The Member States -with the EDA, Commission and the EEAS -could explore ways to better integrate the Groups of Directors into the broader defence policy work of the Union.It can be reasonably argued that an open economy and transparent procurement procedures are the most effective means of ensuring security of supply in the defence sector.Relying on the market to always ensure security of supply is risky, however.There have been many recent examples of raw material supply restrictions.Metals such as rare earth elements, titanium and platinum can be exposed to export restrictions, and such metals are key inputs in European defence-industrial production processes.The Commission's recent defence Communication proposes the monitoring of such metals as part of its Raw Materials Initiative.This is welcome news and any ideas the Commission has for recycling or substituting defence-relevant materials should be encouraged.Indeed, the Commission and EDA could jointly draw up -and revise accordingly -a "critical EDTIB inputs list" on behalf of the EU Member States.Security of supply is, however, a broader issue than just raw material supplies.Indeed, technological know-how is also a key pillar of securing the EDTIB -the loss of know-how to competitors is strategically perilous.Thus, surveillance of non-EU Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Europe's defence sector, as and when it can result in potentially harmful foreign ownership of critical defence infrastructure, is an important issue.Again, the Commission raises this point in the 2013 Communication but action by the Member States is required, especially as many of them do not currently have sufficient safeguards in place.Lastly, cyber security is also a growing issue for the defence-industrial supply-chain.To this end, the EDA and the Commission could be tasked with developing an "ESO certification" to denote prime and tier firms that actively engage in supply-chain monitoring and that implement data handling security measures.A modern EDTIB should be characterised by initiatives that improve the quality of Europe's armed forces in the field, that ensure maximum operational efficiency, that link up firms with government and EU institutions and that draw on technological advances made in the civilian sector wherever necessary.Improving the energy efficiency of Europe's armed forces and ministries of defence would tick all of these boxes.According to the Commission, Europe's militaries are the biggest public consumers of energy in the EU.The EDA surmises that the armed services of one member state alone consumes as much electricity as a large city, and that the EDA's 27 Member States in turn consume the equivalent of a small EU nation's electricity usage and spend over 1 billion annually in the process.This is not even to speak of what Europe's militaries spend each year on fossil fuels in operational theatres, or what levels of energy defence firms consume in production processes.Dependency on fossil fuels in operational theatres is not only costly and bad for the environment, but it is strategically imprudent given the vulnerabilities associated with transporting such fuels to the frontline.Greater use of renewable energies in the field could improve operational sustainability and autonomy, even though the introduction of such energies may not immediately reduce costs.However, energy efficiency in defence does not begin and end with the armed forces.It should also include the energy efficiency of ministries of defence; especially as it relates to their substantial land holdings.The EDA has already initiated projects to increase the use of renewable energies such as solar power on defence estates, and the Commission has signalled a willingness to bring to bear its environmental expertise in this field in the future.The Member States could now press for greater energy efficiency in Europe's defence-sector.The proposed work plans above are in no way an exhaustive list of ways to ensure the genuine formation and sustainability of an EDTIB.Instead, inkeeping with the spirit of pragmatism laid-down by European Council President Herman Van Rompuy when calling for the Defence Council meeting, the proposed work plans serve merely as some potential areas of future cooperation -indeed, some of the issues outlined are already on the agenda.Faced with the critical challenges that have long afflicted the European defence sector, it is too easy to call for more of that old, mercurial, mantra "political will".That is, of course, unless the EU Member States are willing to ultimately swallow some degree of pride and endure the economic losses that will inevitably come from a root and branch restructuring of Europe's defence markets.Such losses will come in due course at any rate, but they will be far worse through a purely national response.The European Council on Defence of December 2013 should deliver concrete results and refrain from institutional tinkering.This sentiment seems clearly reflected in the Commission Communication and the HR report on the CSDP.These documents breathe a hands-on and pragmatic approach.However, since an immature and incomplete institutional set up is part of the problem of the CSDP, institutional reforms cannot be circumvented.In addition, ensuring that European defence has the capabilities it needs, requires a different take at the role of the Commission, the EDA and the Council and their competences in generating these capabilities.And last, but not least, the Treaty of Lisbon does offer the dearly needed flexibility for a credible defence, so the articles on PESCO, the start-up fund and flexible cooperation should be addressed.In short, not only security matters, but in order to reach that security, institutions matter too.The main issue for the European Council on Defence is arguably the shortage of the right civilian and military capabilities for the EU to be a security provider and to have strategic autonomy.The keys to gaining these capabilities against the backdrop of reduced military budgets is, as mentioned in the Communication by the Commission, more cooperation and efficient use of resources.This is not new, neither is it new that the Commission is closing in on the area of defence in the EU.As both Ashton's Report and the Commission's Communication in preparation of the European Council on Defence have reiterated, the EU is a security provider.The significance of this phrase is that it does not differentiate between the EU as a provider of security for its citizens by tackling threats that affect the EU's security from the outside, but it includes a broader notion of security, protecting the security and safety of citizens regardless of the origin of the threat.Although the CSDP is the focus of the European Council, the increasing blurring of internal and external security does have implications for the security instruments needed and the institutional make up of the CSDP within the EU.The Council on Defence of this December is going to be a next step in the "communitarisation" of EU defence, slowly but surely hollowing out the exclusivity of defence as a domain of the Member States.The Commission's role in further enforcing the 2009 defence Directives to ensure market efficiency is only one indication of a larger presence of the Commission in EU defence.Further added value of the Commission stepping into the defence sector is their role in the standardisation for products that have both civilian and military applications (so called "hybrid" standards) and making sure that there is a common certification of defence products.The Commission (Internal Market & Services, Enterprise & Industry and Research & Innovation) and the EDA have worked together from the founding of EDA in 2004.However, increasingly it seems that the EDA is operating in the shadow of the much larger, more powerful and way better resourced Commission.The EDA has been functioning with its hands tied, because Member States have looked to curtail its scope and finances.Now, the Commission looks better equipped to take on generating capabilities for civil and military security purposes.Results oriented countries are confronted with the fact that their Council-Agency EDA is curtailed to the extent that the EU institution over which the Member States have the least say is gaining influence.Of great importance in the communitarisation of defence is the opening up of Commission funds for CSDP-related research.Equally significant is the proposal for EU-owned dual use capabilities to provide strategic enablers.The Commission will make a joint assessment, together with the EEAS, on which dual-use capability needs there are for security and defence policies and come up with a proposal on which capabilities could be fulfilled by 'assets directly purchased, owned and operated by the Union'.31 These could be most useful in the area of communication, RPAS, helicopters, satellite communication, imagery and surveillance.Interestingly, the new regulation of the EU Agency for border management of 2011 also enables this Agency to acquire, lease or co-own equipment with Member States.In 2013, Frontex launched a pilot project for leasing equipment.It is notable that in case of co-ownership with a member state, Frontex's regulation provides for a "model agreement" in which modalities will be agreed ensuring the periods of full availability of the coowned assets for the Agency.It seems that the 2011 Frontex regulation can be regarded as a model for how the EU could continue with owning dual-use assets to provide the whole EU security sector (including defence) with key enablers.An element which is explicitly mentioned in the Commission's Communication is the possibility of the EU-agencies' involvement in defence policies.This is of course already happening.Frontex and Europol have been lending their expertise to CSDP-missions such as EULEX Kosovo, EUBAM Moldova and EUBAM Libya.However, Agencies operating in the broad security area, such as EMSA (maritime safety), Eurojust (justice cooperation), Europol (police cooperation) and Frontex often have wider remits, better access to research funds and stricter commitments of Member States for assets that are mostly also needed by defence organisations.A closer cooperation, particularly in the area of capabilities, seems logical.All these developments have institutional consequences as they cross the exclusive and shared competences of the Commission, EU Agen- cies and EEAS institutions.The European Council of December comes too soon to fully grasp the implications.In the aftermath of the European Council the political, legal, institutional and practical consequences of the EU as a security provider in the broad sense needs to be revisited.Of course, the familiar institutional questions surrounding the CSDP are also on the table this December.The ability of the EU to anticipate and respond to each phase of a crisis life-cycle rapidly and comprehensively remains a concern.The main problem with the EU's crisis management procedures are that they take too long.The revised Crisis Management Procedures that were decided on in June 2013 tackle this to some extent by skipping a number of stages in the procedure.However, being able to do more and better advanced planning for future contingencies would increase the EU's ability to respond quickly.In fact, every assessment of the CSDP's Crisis Management Procedures leads to the same conclusion: a serious, permanent, preferably civilian-military, planning and conduct capability in Brussels is needed.However, the "H"-word is even more of a taboo than the "S"-word.The consequences of the taboo are that suboptimal compromises and small, incremental steps towards strengthening this capability are taken.One of the results of these compromises is that in March 2012, the OpsCentre was activated for the first time to coordinate the three CSDP-missions in the Horn of Africa (EUNAVFOR Atalanta, EUTM Somalia and EUCAP Nestor).The OpsCentre in Brussels is staffed by 16 personnel and functions alongside the multinationalised OHQ for Atalanta in Northwood.There had to be a first time for activation and the added value it can have for the comprehensive approach in the Horn of Africa is evident, but it is nevertheless a meagre result of the Weimar countries' (plus Spain and Italy) 2011 push for a permanent OHQ.In their frustration that the UK did not budge from its position to block a permanent command and control capability the Weimar-countries proposed to activate a dormant provision from the Treaty of Lisbon: the article on PESCO.PESCO would have allowed for a bypassing of the British veto, but as it is clearly in the interest of the EU Member States to keep the UK on board on defence matters, confrontation on the issue was avoided.The subject of a permanent planning and conduct capability remains unmentioned in the run up to the European Council.PESCO is mentioned in HR Ashton's Report, but in a very hesitant and ambivalent way.The discouraging words '[...] the appetite to move forward seems limited at this stage' is followed under the rubric "Way forward" by the intention to ' [...] interim Report articles from the Treaty to facilitate rapid decision-making in crisis management: Article 44 on entrusting a task to a group of Member States and Article 41.3 on the creation of a start-up fund.33 Using these Articles could facilitate willing and able countries to proceed with deploying operations, while at the same time circumventing bureaucratic hurdles in getting their preparatory activities financed.As HR Ashton said in her report: '[w]e must move from discussion to delivery', but it is not coincidental that "discussion" is often equated with institutional haggling.Decisions on the institutional set up determine the direction and scope of the EU as a security provider and are therefore among the most difficult to take.The European Council should focus on those areas where results can be expected.At the same time, the institutional range of security and defence related policies is broadening considerably from the CSDP/EEAS institutions, but also to EU Agencies and the Commission.This widens the options and creates opportunities for comprehensive policies, dual-use capability generation and even Union-owned capabilities.Developing the EU as a security provider may first and foremost revolve around concrete actions, projects and capabilities, but without using the possibilities of the EU institutional architecture, the actual delivery will be difficult.Therefore, institutions do matter.
• 2022 was record-breaking on multiple fronts: -U.S.-Europe trade in goods reached an all-time high of $1.2 trillion.-U.S.-EU goods trade hit a record $909.5 billion, more than EU-China goods trade and 25% higher than U.S.-China goods trade.-U.S. company affiliates in Europe earned an estimated $325 billion, a record high, while European affiliates in the U.S. earned $151 billion, the second highest level ever.-U.S. exports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) to Europe hit their highest levels ever.The U.S. accounted for more than half of Europe's LNG imports, and Europe accounted for more than half of U.S. LNG exports to the world.• Trade alone is a misleading benchmark of international commerce; mutual investment dwarfs trade and is the real backbone of the transatlantic economy.The U.S. and Europe are each other's primary source and destination for foreign direct investment.• U.S. and European goods exports to the world (excluding intra-EU trade) accounted for 20% of global exports in 2021.But together they accounted for 66% of the outward stock and 66% of the inward stock of global FDI.Moreover, each partner has built up the great majority of that stock in the other economy.Mutual investment in the North Atlantic space is very large, dwarfs trade, and has become essential to U.S. and European jobs and prosperity.• Combined output of U.S. foreign affiliates in Europe (est. $670 billion) and of European foreign affiliates in the U.S. (est. $665 billion) in 2021 of $1.35 trillion was larger than the total output of such countries as Mexico, the Netherlands, or Indonesia.• U.S.-based foreign firms generated $347 billion in U.S. exports to the world in 2020; European firms accounted for 57% of the total.U.S-based German companies exported over $47 billion, followed by those from the UK ($42 billion) and the Netherlands ($38 billion).• U.S. foreign affiliate sales in Europe of $3.1 trillion in 2021 were 61% more than total U.S. global exports of $2.5 trillion and roughly half of total U.S. foreign affiliate sales globally.• Total transatlantic affiliate sales, estimated at $5.9 trillion in 2021, easily rank as the most integrated commercial partnership in the world.• Foreign investment and affiliate sales drive transatlantic trade.65% of U.S. imports from the EU+UK consisted of intra-firm trade in 2020 -much higher than U.S. intra-firm imports from Asia-Pacific nations (around 40%) and well above the global average (48%).Percentages are notably high for Ireland (85%), the Netherlands (74%) and Germany (69%).• Intra-firm trade also accounted for 39% of U.S. exports to the EU+UK, and 58% to the Netherlands, 38% to Germany and to the Netherlands, 35% to France and 31% to the UK.• Over many decades no place in the world has attracted more U.S. FDI than Europe.During the past decade Europe attracted 57.3% of total U.S. global investment -more than in any previous decade.We are early in this decade, but thus far, Europe's share of U.S. FDI outflows has actually increased to 64.3% of the total.Part of this dynamic reflects weakening U.S. investment flows to China.• Measured on a historic cost basis, the total stock of U.S. FDI in Europe was $4 trillion in 2021 -61% of the total U.S. global investment position and more than four times U.S. investment in the Asia-Pacific region ($957 billion).U.S. FDI in the UK alone in 2021 was over 8 times such investment in China.• New U.S. FDI in Europe in 2022 totaled $235 billion, 4% less than record-setting U.S. FDI in Europe of $244 billion in 2021.• In the first three quarters of 2022, U.S. companies invested $172 billion in Europe -10 times more than what they invested in the BRICs ($16.5 billion total in Brazil, Russia, India and China) and 26 times more than what they invested in China ($6.7 billion).THE TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMY 2023 -v • U.S. companies in the first nine months of 2022 earned an estimated $239 billion from their operations in times what they earned from operations in all of Asia.• Official figures can be misleading when it comes to the original source and the ultimate destination of FDI.For instance, Germany officially accounted for only 4% of U.S. FDI flows since 2010.Yet, much U.S. FDI flows into Germany from neighboring countries.Whereas official figures indicate that FDI stock in Germany from the U.S. in 2017 was $90 billion, "real FDI" stock from the U.S. to Germany was actually $170 billion.Similarly, "real FDI" links from Germany to the U.S. are considerably higher than official statistics might indicate.The same is true for other important bilateral investment links.• In 2020, U.S. FDI flows to nonbank holding companies in Europe rebounded sharply to $62.8 billion.Holding companies accounted for $2.9 trillion, or about 47% of the global U.S. outward FDI position of approximately $6.2 trillion, and 54% of total U.S. FDI stock in Europe.• Excluding holding companies, total U.S. FDI stock in Europe in 2020 amounted to $1.7 trillion -a much smaller figure but still more than 2.5 times larger than total U.S. investment in the Asia-Pacific region (FDI stock of $654 billion excluding holding companies).• From 2009-2021 Europe still accounted for over half of total U.S. FDI outflows globally and more than double the share to Asia when flows from holding companies are removed from the overall figures.• U.S. and UK firms accounted for 32% and 26%, respectively, of foreign acquisitions in the EU in 2021; Chinese companies accounted for 2%.• Of the top twenty global export platforms for U.S. multinationals in the world, nine are located in Europe.For U.S. companies, Ireland is the number one platform in the world from which their affiliates can reach foreign customers.Switzerland, ranked third, remains a key export platform and pan-regional distribution hub for U.S. firms.• In 2021 Europe accounted for roughly 63% -$19 trillion -of corporate America's total foreign assets globally.Largest shares: the UK (21%, $6.2 trillion in 2020) and the Netherlands (10%, $3.1 trillion in 2020).• America's asset base in Germany ($1.1 trillion in 2020) was more than a third larger than its asset base in all of South America and more than double its assets in China.• America's assets in Ireland ($2 trillion in 2020) were light years ahead of those in China ($487 billion).• Ireland has also become the number one export platform for U.S. affiliates in the entire world.Exports from U.S. affiliates based in Ireland reached $404 billion in 2020, about 5 times more than U.S. affiliate exports from China and about 3.5 times more than affiliate exports from Mexico.• Aggregate output of U.S. affiliates globally reached $1.4 trillion in 2021; Europe accounted for half.• U.S. affiliate output in Europe ($643 billion) in 2020 was 73% larger than affiliate output in the entire Asia-Pacific region ($383 billion).U.S. affiliate output in China ($78 billion) and India ($38 billion) lags behind U.S. affiliate output in the UK ($157 billion) and Ireland ($107 billion).• Sales of U.S. affiliates in Europe were roughly 70% larger than the sales of U.S. affiliates in the entire Asian region in 2020.Affiliate sales in the UK ($649 billion) were double total sales in South America.Sales in Germany ($343 billion) were roughly double combined sales in Africa and the Middle East.• Most trade today is conducted through intermediates, known as indirect trade.The United States, Germany, France and the Netherlands are four of the world's top five indirect traders.While conventional trade statistics portray China as the world's leading exporter, it ranks third in terms of indirect exports -and its share is falling.• 45 of the 50 U.S. states, including the Pacific coast's largest state of California, export more goods to Europe than to China, in many cases by a wide margin.• Texas is the top U.S. state exporter of goods to Europe, followed by California, New York, New Jersey and Illinois.• In 2021 Utah exported 11 times more goods to Europe than to China.New York exported 8 times more, Florida 6.5 times more, Maryland 4.7 times more.Illinois, Missouri and New Jersey each exported 4 times more, Pennsylvania and Kentucky 3.7 times more, and Texas 3 times more.California exported twice as many goods to Europe as to China.• Germany was the top European export market for 23 U.S. states, the UK for 9, and Belgium for 6 in 2021.Germany was also the top source of European imports for 30 U.S. states; Switzerland was the leading European supplier for 6 states.• The U.S. and Europe are the two leading services economies in the world.The U.S. is the largest single country trader in services, while the EU is the largest trader in services among all world regions.The U.S. and EU are each other's most important commercial partners and major growth markets when it comes to services trade and investment.Moreover, deep transatlantic connections in services industries, provided by mutual investment flows, are the foundation for the global competitiveness of U.S. and European services companies.• Five of the top ten export markets for U.S. services are in Europe.Europe accounted for 41% of total U.S. services exports and for 42% of total U.S. services imports in 2021.• U.S. services exports to Europe reached a record $332 billion in 2021, a sharp rise from pandemic-year 2020.The U.S. had a $101 billion trade surplus in services with Europe in 2021, compared with its $219 billion trade deficit in goods with Europe.• U.S. imports of services from Europe rebounded in 2021 to $230 billion, from $197 billion in 2020.The UK, Germany, Switzerland, Ireland, and France are top services exporters to the U.S. • EU27 services trade with the U.S. of $702.12 billion in 2021 was 6 times EU-China services trade of $115.54 billion.• Moreover, foreign affiliate sales of services, or the delivery of transatlantic services by foreign affiliates, have exploded on both sides of the Atlantic over the past few decades and become far more important than exports.• Sales of services of U.S. affiliates in Europe totaled $997 billion, or 56% of the global total, in 2020 -3 times more than U.S. services exports to Europe of $332 billion.• Services by U.S. firms based in the UK and UK companies based in the US totaled $435.4 billion in 2020 -3.4 times greater than U.S.-UK overall trade in services of $116.3 billion.The contrast is even greater in terms of U.S.-German commercial ties: services by U.S. companies based in Germany and German firms based in the U.S. totaled $252.1 billion.That's 4.1 times U.S.-German services trade of $61.4 billion.• The UK alone accounted for 30% ($274 billion) of all U.S. affiliate services sales in Europe in 2020 -more than combined U.S. affiliate services sales in Latin America and the Caribbean ($158 billion), Africa ($15 billion) and the Middle East ($26 billion).Affiliate services sales in Ireland remained quite large -$172 billion.• European affiliate sales of services in the U.S. of $666 billion in 2020 were about one-third less than U.S. affiliate sales of services in Europe.• Nonetheless, European companies are the key provider of affiliate services in the U.S. ($170 billion in 2020).German affiliates led in terms of affiliate sales of services ($170 billion), followed closely by US-based UK firms ($161 billion).• European companies operating in the U.S. generated an estimated $680 billion in services sales in 2021 -roughly 3 times more than European services exports to the U.S. of $230 billion.• Transatlantic data flows are critical to enabling the $7.1 trillion EU-U.S. economic relationship.They account for more than half of Europe's data flows and about half of U.S. data flows globally.Over 90% of EU-based firms transfer data to and from the United States.• European and U.S. cities are major hubs of cross-border digital connectivity.Europe is the global leader, with tremendous connected international capacity.Frankfurt, London, Amsterdam and Paris substantially outpace North American and Asian cities.• The United States currently accounts for over 53% of the world's operational hyperscale infrastructure, measured by critical IT load.More than one-third of U.S. hyperscale capacity is located in one state -Virginia.Virginia has far more hyperscale data center capacity than either China or all of Europe.• Transatlantic cable connections are the densest and highest capacity routes, with the highest traffic, in the world.Submarine cables in the Atlantic carry 55% more data than transpacific routes.• The U.S. and Europe are each other's most important commercial partners when it comes to digitally-enabled services.The U.S. and the EU are also the two largest net exporters of digitally-enabled services to the world.• U.S. trade in digitally-deliverable services of $963.4 billion led the world in 2021, followed by that of the UK ($677.2 billion), Ireland ($639.9 billion), Germany ($454.7 billion), China ($359.3 billion), the Netherlands ($329.2 billion), and France ($312.5 billion).• In 2021 the U.S. registered a $262.6 billion trade surplus in digitally-enabled services with the world.Its main commercial partner was Europe, to which it exported $283.3 billion in digitally-enabled services and from which it imported $134.7 billion, generating a trade surplus with Europe in this area of $148.6 billion.• U.S. exports of digitally-enabled services to Europe were more than double U.S. digitally-enabled services exports to the entire Asia-Pacific region, and more than combined digitally-enabled services exports to the Asia-Pacific, Latin America and Other Western Hemisphere, and the Middle East.• In 2020, EU member states collectively exported €1 trillion and imported €1 trillion in digitally-enabled services to countries both inside and outside the EU.Excluding intra-EU trade, EU member states exported €551 billion and imported €594.5 billion, resulting in a deficit of €43.3 billion for these services.viii -THE TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMY 2023 • Digitally-enabled services represented 61% of all EU services exports to non-EU countries and 68% of all EU services imports from non-EU countries.• In the U.S. accounted for 22% of the EU's digitallyenabled services exports to non-EU countries, and 34% of EU digitally-enabled services imports from non-EU countries.• The U.S. purchased €122.1 billion, making it the largest recipient of EU27 digitally-enabled services exports -ahead of the UK (€121.1 billion) and just slightly behind the entire region of Asia and Oceania (€138.1 billion).• Digitally-enabled services are not just exported directly, they are used in manufacturing and to produce goods and services for export.Over half of digitally-enabled services imported by the U.S. from the EU is used to produce U.S. products for export, and vice versa.• In 2020, EU member states imported just over €1 trillion in digitally-enabled services.41% originated from other EU member states.Another 20% (€204.7 billion) came from the U.S., making it the largest supplier of these services.The EU imports of these services from the U.S. were almost double imports from the UK (€114.2 billion).• Even more important than both direct and value-added trade in digitally-enabled services, however, is the delivery of digital services by U.S. and European foreign affiliates.U.S. services supplied by affiliates abroad were $1.65 trillion, roughly 2.3 times global U.S. services exports of $726.43 billion.Moreover, half of all services supplied by U.S. affiliates abroad are digitally-enabled.• 58% of the $998 billion in services provided in Europe by U.S. affiliates in 2019 was digitally-enabled.• U.S. affiliates in Europe supplied $585.5 billion in digitallyenabled services in 2019, more than double U.S. digitallyenabled exports to Europe.• European affiliates in the U.S. supplied $287 billion in digitally-enabled services in 2019, double European digitally-enabled exports to the U.S. • In 2020, Europe accounted for 72% of the $333 billion in total global information services supplied abroad by U.S. multinational corporations through their majority-owned foreign affiliates.• U.S. overseas direct investment in the "information" industry in the UK alone was 66% more than such investment in the entire Western Hemisphere outside the United States, and roughly the same as such investment in all of Asia, the Middle East and Africa combined, and 14 times such investment in China.Equivalent U.S. investment in Germany was 3.6 times more than in China.• Including all types of e-commerce, the United States was the top market in the world in 2019; online sales were 2.8 times higher than in Japan and 3.7 times higher than in China.North America and Europe accounted for six of the top 10 e-commerce countries.• North American and European countries account for 9 of the top 10, and 17 of the top 20, countries when it comes to combined digital and entrepreneurial ecosystem development.• The U.S. leads the world in international trade in products delivered through data flows, followed by the UK, France, Germany, India, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Switzerland.• European companies in the U.S. employ millions of American workers and are the largest source of onshored jobs in America.Similarly, U.S. companies in Europe employ millions of European workers and are the largest source of onshored jobs in Europe.• U.S. and European foreign affiliates directly employed an estimated 9.7 million workers in the pandemic-plagued year of 2020, 300,000 more than in 2019.Employment levels rose further in 2021 and 2022.• These figures understate overall job numbers, since they do not include -jobs supported by transatlantic trade flows; -indirect employment effects of nonequity arrangements such as strategic alliances, joint ventures, and other deals; and -indirect employment generated for distributors and suppliers.The transatlantic economy has proven to be remarkably resilient in the face of seismic shocks that have shaken the world.Despite full-blown war in the heart of Europe, ongoing pandemic uncertainties, supply chain disruptions, dramatic energy shifts, high infl ation, tightening fi nancial conditions, and tensions with China, the key drivers of the transatlantic economy -investment, trade and income -posted strong results again in 2022.These fi gures are emblematic of the dense ties that bind North America to Europe and form the solid geoeconomic and geostrategic ground from which each side of the North Atlantic can address tremors still to come in 2023 and beyond.The $7.1 trillion transatlantic economy remains the largest and wealthiest market in the world, employing 16 million workers in mutually "onshored" jobs on both sides of the Atlantic.U.S. and European economic growth is likely fi rst to slow and then to gather speed over the course of this year.Overall for 2023, the International Monetary Fund expects the U.S. economy to grow by 1.4% and the euro area to grow by 0.7%.These levels are down from 2021 and 2022, but still positive.Growth is expected to accelerate in 2024.One hinge variable is the war in Ukraine, which has replaced the pandemic as the greatest strain on global trade.1 Russia's aggression may have shaken the world economy, but it has also reinvigorated the Atlantic alliance.North American- European unity has been remarkable, exemplifi ed by tough and coordinated sanctions and export controls against Russia; herculean eff orts to wean Europe off its dangerous dependence on Russian energy; considerable sums of military, political, fi nancial and humanitarian support for Ukraine; and actions to strengthen NATO defenses.As U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen noted at the G20 Summit in November 2022, "ending Russia's war is the single best thing we can do for the global economy."We discuss Western eff orts to support Ukraine and to sanction Russia in Boxes 3 and4. The war does, however, complicate the challenges facing the world's central banks.Rarely has the world seen such aggressive monetary action from the stewards of credit.Leading the way, the U.S. Federal Reserve raised its benchmark rate seven times last year, from 0.25% to over 4%.The European Central Bank (ECB) boosted rates four times in 2022, taking the rate to 2.5% at yearend, while the Bank of England raised its rate eight times in 2022.Monetary policy works with a lag, so the residual eff ects of tighter global credit conditions (softer fi nal demand, lower capital investment, reduced earnings) will become more evident in 2023.One risk for 2023 is that central banks on both sides of the pond err on the side of keeping policies too tight for too long, as they focus on pulling headline infl ation back to target.The prospect that each side of the Atlantic might fl irt with recession in 2023 has tempered future infl ation expectations.Indeed, it seems increasingly likely that economies on both sides of the economy may be able to fi nd the elusive "soft landing," avoiding a recession entirely while also continuing to manage headline infl ation.U.S. headline infl ation, after reaching a peak of 9.1%, began to reverse in July 2022 and was running at a year-over-year rate of 6.5% in December.Slowing demand and easing supply chain constraints has helped alleviate pricing pressures on goods, while services infl ation is expected to peak in early 2023.Infl ationary pressures in Europe have also peaked, with lower energy costs helping to slow year-overyear price increases to 9.2% in December, versus 10.1% in November.Energy price caps, lower commodity prices, unclogged supply chains, and the cyclical eff ects of slower economic growth have converged to ease transatlantic infl ationary expectations.The European Commission predicts 6.4% consumer price growth and 5.6% euro area infl ation in 2023.Still, U.S. and euro area infl ation rates are well above the Fed/ECB targets of 2%.Price stability in Europe remains challenging given the war and the continent's vulnerabilities to global oil and natural gas prices.Europe has avoided a full-blown energy crisis and in less than a year accomplished a remarkable reduction in energy imports from Russia.Gas prices have largely returned to levels seen before the war but are still roughly six times higher than those across the Atlantic.We discuss the transatlantic energy economy in Chapter4. The transatlantic economy has been rattled by disturbances to the supply chains that account for over half of global trade in goods.2 While the U.S. Federal Reserve reports that the most acute disruptions have eased, supply chain pressures remain at levels far higher than prepandemic times, except for a brief fl are-up in 2011 (Table 3) .According to the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, more than three-quarters of all fi rms participating in global supply chains have implemented at least one measure to make their supply chains more resilient.3 After two tense years following the UK's departure from the EU, London and Brussels inked the "Windsor Framework" at the end of February 2023 to clarify contentious elements of the Northern Ireland protocol to the UK-EU Withdrawal Agreement.The Framework could remove a major thorn in relations and pave the way to a more robust partnership.The Withdrawal Agreement treats Northern Ireland, which is part of the UK, as being within the EU customs area, to prevent the need for a hard border on the island of Ireland.But it also required checks on goods within the UK flowing from Great Britain to Northern Ireland.This essentially created a customs border in the middle of the Irish Sea.London insisted on revisions to dispense with those checks and diminish the role of the European Court of Justice in settling disputes.Pro-UK unionists in Northern Ireland refused to take their seats in the region's elected assembly at Stormont until the issues were resolved to their liking.Northern Ireland continues to follow EU rules for goods trade, but the Windsor Framework simplifies and clarifies arrangements in five areas.First, goods within the UK coming from Great Britain to Northern Ireland will now be channeled through paperwork-light "green lanes" if destined for Northern Ireland and paperwork-heavy "red lanes" if intended for the EU.The EU will accept the UK's public health standards so agri-food can enter Northern Ireland, although those goods must be labeled "not for EU" by 2025.Second, the UK will now review most Northern Ireland subsidies so they do not have to be referred to Brussels.Third, UK domestic valueadded-tax (VAT) changes will apply to Northern Ireland.This had previously been prohibited under the Northern Ireland protocol.The UK agreed not to undercut most EU minimum VAT rates immediately, although both parties will now negotiate a list of goods where this could be possible over the next five years.Fourth, the Northern Ireland legislative assembly can now pull an "emergency brake" to stop the implementation of new or updated EU rules in "exceptional circumstances."Finally, the European Court of Justice remains the ultimate arbiter of UK-EU arrangements, despite calls by some in the UK to create instead an international arbitration mechanism, but London says that the Windsor Framework now severely circumscribes the number of EU laws that are applicable in Northern Ireland.4 The Windsor Framework could help spark the UK economy, which is the only G7 country yet to surpass its pre-Covid GDP.It could also get UK-EU relations back on track: bilateral trade has recovered to pre-pandemic levels, but the EU's trade with other major partners has rebounded far more robustly.5 As of this writing, however, it is unclear whether the Framework will find majority support within the UK Parliament or in the Northern Ireland Assembly at Stormont.Additional uncertainties also loom.Before the Windsor Framework, the two sides kept deferring deadlines for some types of customs provisions, rules-of-origin declarations, medicines labelling, and food controls, along with product conformity assessments.Now the UK has introduced a Retained EU Law Bill that proposes to review thousands of laws developed by the EU when the UK was a member, and revoke them by default by the end of 2023 unless an active decision is made to keep or adapt them.6 This portends significant further turbulence for many companies if the measure is adopted in its current form and on its current timeline.Global turmoil has led to suggestions that the world has entered a period of de-globalization.A closer look reveals that technological, policy and commercial drivers are interacting to reshape, not curtail, global fl ows.Technological drivers are accelerating globalization, while policy and commercial considerations are leading to strategies of "derisking" and diversifi cation, as we discuss in Chapter3. These drivers are carving currents that carry some risks, but far greater opportunities, for the transatlantic economy.Global fl ows of people, capital, and goods are facing steeper policy barriers, yet migration was at historic highs in 2020 and 2021, capital fl ows grew by more than 50% a year in 2019-2021, and goods fl ows hit a record high in 2021.Global trade in goods in September 2022 was 10% higher than the average for the pre-crisis year 2019, and slightly higher than the level before Russia's renewed invasion of Ukraine.Still, goods are no longer the preeminent driver of global connections; fl ows of services, international students, and intellectual property grew about twice as fast as goods fl ows in 2010-2019.Data fl ows grew by nearly 50% annually during this period, and were turbocharged during the pandemic years, as we discuss in Chapter5. 8 These fl ows are all strengths of the transatlantic economy.Knowledge-intensive and intangibleheavy global value chains are also more concentrated than others, largely in deeplyintertwined North Atlantic connections, which we explore in this book.9 North America and Europe have been among the main beneficiaries of the expansion of global flows, as we demonstrate in our annual surveys.Given the turbulence and tensions of recent years, officials on each side of the Atlantic are now acting to mitigate strategic vulnerabilities and to ensure that people and workers across our economies benefit from this increasing interconnectivity.We discuss the U.S. and EU "protect and promote" agendas in Chapter3. On each side of the Atlantic there is a rising chorus calling for "reshored" production and greater self-sufficiency.In Europe, some call for greater "sovereignty" in the digital sphere or in other sectors like medicines or critical materials.The risk is that such calls could lead to more entrenched protectionism that hampers the ability of transatlantic firms to compete fairly in markets on both sides of the pond and beyond.Particularly relevant in this context are current debates about the impact of the U.S. Inflation Reduction Act and the EU's Green Deal and related subsidy measures, which we discuss in Chapter4. Lost in these debates is the fact that U.S. and European companies over many decades have woven a dense web of deep transatlantic connections that is proving to be a strength, not a burden, for both in a more competitive and disruptive age.The transatlantic economy remains the most interconnected, robust, and resilient commercial artery in the world, as we explain in the following chapters.The transatlantic economy remains the most interconnected, robust, and resilient commercial artery in the world.THE TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMY 2023 -7 Russia's ongoing aggression against Ukraine has replaced the pandemic as the leading strain on global trade, according to BCG analysis.The war has not only devastated Ukraine, it has amplifi ed global fi nancial instabilities and supply chain distortions, wreaked havoc on food and energy markets, and generated the largest refugee crisis since World War II.Ending the war, says U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, "is the single best thing we can do for the global economy".The transatlantic partners have spearheaded international eff orts to support Ukraine.During the one year between January 24, 2022 and January 15, 2023, €143 billion in government-togovernment commitments were made to support Ukraine, according to the Kiel Institute for the World Economy.The United States has by far been the largest single bilateral supporter, having committed €73.18 billion, more than 50% of total commitments.The U.S. is not only the largest absolute donor, it is among the top donors as a share of national GDP.Total EU commitments amounted to €54.92 billion -about 75% of the U.S. level and less than one tenth of the €570 billion that European governments spent to shield their own societies from the energy shocks generated by the war.Of the total, EU member states committed €19.9 billion bilaterally, €29.92 billion through the EU Commission and Council, €3.1 billion via the European Peace Facility, and €2 billion through the European Investment Bank.If contributions via EU channels are reapportioned to the individual EU states that provided them, then the U.S. remains the largest individual donor (€73.18 billion), followed by Germany (€13.33 billion), the UK (€8.31 billion), France (€7.66 billion), Italy (€5.44 billion), and Poland (€5.02 billion).In terms of bilateral commitments in percent of donor country GDP, the top fi ve donors are Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and the United States.10 More than 10 million Ukrainians have fl ed their homes, almost 5 million of whom left the country.Poland is the leading host country, taking in over 1.56 million refugees.Germany is second (1.06 million), while the Czech Republic (486, 133) , Italy (169, 306) and Spain (161,012) rank third, fourth, and fi fth, respectively.In terms of share of population, Estonia tops the list (4.96%), the Czech Republic is second (4.54%), Moldova is third (4.15%) and Poland is fourth (4.12%).When the Kiel Institute adds estimated refugee costs to bilateral support levels, the United States remains in fi rst place (€73.18 billion), followed by Germany with (€12.96 billion, incl. €6.81 billion in refugee costs) and Poland (€11.92 billion, incl. €8.36 billion in refugee costs).In terms of fi nancial commitments, the EU institutions lead (€30.32 billion), followed by the United States (€25.11 billion), but with an important diff erence: the EU sum consists almost exclusively of loans, whereas U.S. commitments are entirely grants that do not need to be repaid.As of January 15, 2023, only 48% of the committed fi nancial aid had been disbursed.The Kiel Institute reports €13.27 billion in additional fi nancial aid by multilateral organizations like the IMF, World Bank, UN and the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).The EBRD forecasts a rise in Ukraine's GDP of 1% in 2023, which would stabilize the country's real output at around 70% of its level before Russia's February 2022 invasion.The Bank predicts 3% growth in 2024.The U.S and Canada, which traditionally have had limited economic links with Russia, curtailed practically all commercial ties.Many European economies took similarly drastic action, despite their far deeper commercial relations with Russia.EU exports to Russia halved within weeks of the outbreak of war.Many imports were banned.However, a full and abrupt cutoff of commercial ties was difficult because many European countries had grown dependent on Russian energy.For that reason, prohibitions were introduced gradually on Russian energy imports.12 One year on, Europe has accomplished the truly remarkable.It has largely weaned itself off Russian energy.Gas demand fell by more than 20% between August and December 2022, thanks to efficiency measures and lower energy use.Norway, the United States, Algeria, and Qatar stepped in to supply more gas.Five new floating LNG terminals were set up in record time, with more due to come online this year and next.By January 2023, the flow of Russian gas through pipelines to the EU+UK was almost 90% lower than a year earlier.13 The EU has now banned imports of Russian coal and other solid fossil fuels, crude oil, and refined petroleum products, with limited exceptions.Adjustable price caps have been introduced on seaborne crude oil, petroleum oils and oils obtained from bituminous minerals which originate in or are exported from Russia.The intent is to curtail Russia's oil revenues while limiting price surges and mitigating adverse consequences on energy supplies to third countries.14 The short-term impact of these measures on Russia has been mixed.The pain points are numerous.Russian living standards have eroded.Observed inflation, or how the public views price increases, is at 16%, much higher than the 12% official figure.Ten percent of the Russian workforce is without consistent work, a level comparable to the years following the dissolution of the Soviet Union.The Russian central bank projected capital flight from Russia in 2022 to total $251 billion.Finished steel output fell by 7% and commercial car production is just a fourth of what it was a year ago.Russia's monthly budget revenues from oil and gas fell in January 2023 to their lowest level since 2020 -46% below where they were a year earlier.Revenue from other sources was down by 20% in October 2022 from a year earlier, and was on a downward spiral.The Russian Finance Ministry has been forced to nearly triple its daily foreign currency sales to make up for the shortfall.Russia's 2022 budget deficit of $47 billion was its second highest deficit in the post-Soviet era.Moscow's weapons production capacity has been degraded, and it has been forced to turn to Iran for drones and drone parts, and to North Korea for artillery shells and rockets.15 In other respects, however, the Russian economy has weathered the situation better than expected.Russia's central bank avoided a catastrophic financial crisis by imposing capital controls and hiking interest rates.The IMF estimates that the Russian economy shrank 2.2% in 2022, far less than forecasts made a year ago.It expects the Russian economy to grow by 0.3% in 2023 and 2.1% in 2024.Despite international sanctions, Moscow recorded a $227 billion current account surplus in 2022.It has diverted exports of energy and other key commodities to Asian, Middle Eastern, Latin American and African states.Imports initially crashed, but then stabilized as exporters from China, Hong Kong, and Turkey stepped in.China now accounts for over 36% of Russia's imports and 20% of its exports.China and Hong Kong now supply about 40% of Russia's chips -although the U.S. Treasury says that close to half of them are proving to be defective.Chinese stateowned defense companies have been shipping navigation equipment, jamming technology and jet-fighter parts to Russian defense companies.A significant shadow trade has emerged to circumvent the sanctions.And although many companies based in G7 countries had announced plans to leave the Russian market or abandon investments there, analysts estimate that no more than 15% have actually divested one of their Russian subsidiaries.16 As time wears on, however, Russian prospects look much bleaker.Bloomberg Economics estimates that Russia's economy is on track to lose $190 billion in GDP by 2026, relative to its prewar path.Heavy government spending on the war is bleeding the Kremlin's reserves.The ruble's seeming stability relies on unsustainably strict currency controls.Energy bans and price caps are having some effect: Moscow's tax income from oil and gas in January 2023 was among its lowest monthly totals since the pandemic depths of 2020.Moscow is still selling oil to countries like India and China, but mostly at steep discounts.By some estimates, Russia is set for a $100 billion loss in its oil exports receipts and a $50 billion loss in its gas export revenues in 2023.Moreover, its landbased energy infrastructure points west; it cannot easily switch out China and India for Europe.And it will be unable to maintain, let alone expand, its energy production without Western technology.Russian planes are flying only because those on the ground have been cannibalized for parts.Hundreds of thousands of talented and educated Russian professionals are leaving the country.In the end, this vast brain drain may prove to be the most crippling for Russia's economy and society.17 See Marc Gilbert, Nikolaus Lang, Georgia Mavropoulos, and Michael McAdoo, "Protectionism, Pandemic, War, and the Future of Trade," BCG, January 17, 2023 , https://www.bcg.com/ publications/2023/protectionism-pandemic-war-and-future-of-trade.2 Uri Dadush, "The Future of Global Value Chains and the Role of the WTO," WTO Staff Working Paper ERSD-2022-11, August 2, 2022, https://www.policycenter.ma/sites/default/ files/2022-08/ersd202211_e.pdf.3 Lucas Kitzmüller, Helena Schweiger, Beata Javorcik, "The reshuffling of global supply chains is already happening," VoxEU/CEPR, November 24, 2022, https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/ reshuffling-global-supply-chains-already-happening.4 Peter Foster, Andy Bounds and Jim Pickard, "How the Windsor framework changes Northern Ireland's trading arrangements," Financial Times, February 28, 2023.5 The Economist, "Careful assembly required," January 5, 2023; John Springford, "The cost of Brexit to June 2022," Centre for European Reform, December 21, 2022; Office of Budget Responsibility, "Brexit analysis," last updated May 26, 2022, https://obr.uk/forecasts-in-depth/the-economy-forecast/brexit-analysis/.6 AmCham EU, "Two years later: Brexit's impact on US companies in Europe," January 25, 2023, https://www.amchameu.eu/blog/two-years-later-brexit%E2%80%99s-impact-uscompanies-europe.7 UK Government, "UK trade in numbers," February 17, 2023, https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/uk-trade-in-numbers/uk-trade-in-numbers-web-version.8 Janet Bush, ed., "Global flows: The ties that bind in an interconnected world," McKinsey Global Institute, November 2022; Gabriel Felbermayr, Guntram Wolff, "How Europe can share changes in the world economy," Internationale Politik Quarterly, January 4, 2023, https://ip-quarterly.com/en/how-europe-can-shape-changes-world-economy.9 Bush.10 Christoph Trebesch, et al., The Ukraine Support Tracker, Kiel Institute for the World Economy, https://www.ifw-kiel.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/-ifw/Kiel_Working_ Paper/2022/KWP_2218_Which_countries_help_Ukraine_and_how_/KWP_2218_Trebesch_et_al_Ukraine_Support_Tracker.pdf, last accessed February 21, 2023.11 European Commission, "EU sanctions against Russia explained," https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/restrictive-measures-against-russia-over-ukraine/sanctionsagainst-russia-explained/#sanctions; Nicholas Mulder, "Sanctions Against Russia Ignore the Economic Challenges Facing Ukraine," New York Times, February 9, 2023.12 Arnau Busquets Guardia and Charlie Cooper, "The delayed impact of the EU's wartime sanctions on Russia," Politico, February 2, 2023.13 Georgi Kantchev and Joe Wallace, "Europe Cuts Addiction to Russian Energy, Yet Fuel Scramble Continues," Wall Street Journal, February 3, 2023.14 Andrew Duehren, Laurence Norman and Joe Wallace, "G-7 Expands Sanctions on Russian Oil Industry," Wall Street Journal, February 3, 2023.15 "Remarks by Deputy Treasury Secretary Wally Ademo on International Sanctions Against Russia," U.S. Treasury Department, February 21, 2023; Vladimir Milov, "The Sanctions on Russia Are Working," Foreign Affairs, January 18, 2023; Politico Weekly Trade, January 30, 2023.16 Ademo; Douglas Busvine, "Western firms say they're quitting Russia. Where's the proof?," Politico, February 28, 2023; Jeffrey Sonnenfeld, et al., "The Russian Business Retreat -How the Ratings Measured Up One Year Later," SSRN, January 31, 2023, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4343547; Simon Evenett and Niccolò Pisani, "Less than Nine Percent of Western Firms Have Divested from Russia," SSRN, January 31, 2023, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4322502; "Macro note -China steps in to supply Russia," Institute of International Finance, February 1, 2023; Mulder; The Economist, "Dodged penalties," February 1, 2023; Naomi Garcia, "Trade Secrets: Exposing China-Russia Defense Trade in Global Supply Chains," C4ADS, July 15, 2022, https://c4ads.org/reports/trade-secrets/; Ian Talley and and Anthony DeBarros, "China Aids Russia's War in Ukraine, Data Shows," Wall Street Journal, February 4, 2023.17 Ademo; Milov; Guardia and Cooper; Mulder; Georgi Kantchev and Paul Hannon, "Russia to Cut Oil Output, Sending Prices Higher," Wall Street Journal, February 10, 2023; Janis Kluge, "Russian oil and gas revenue in 2022," Twitter thread, February 2, 2023, https://twitter.com/jakluge/status/1621440460408365056.Jobs, Trade and Investment: It has been a tumultuous decade for the global economy.In just over three years, the world has been stricken by a pandemic, stunned by a military confl ict in the heart of Europe, and shaken by infl ationary pressures reminiscent of the 1970s.Rarely have the challenges seemed so acute.Compounding matters, familiar patterns of globalization are shifting.Even before Russia's further invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the world economy was being splintered by great power rivalries, weaponization of interdependencies, rising barriers to trade and investment, resource protectionism, and calls for fi rms to "reshore," "near-shore," or "friend-shore" production.The pandemic amplifi ed these trends.Putin's war has sharpened them.Globalization isn't dead, but it is being refi ned and reconfi gured.U.S. and European multinationals confront a more challenging environment.Firms are not deaf or blind to the shifting contours of globalization, and are increasingly focused on building more resiliency into their supply chains and securing critical inputs to production.But this doesn't mean they are turning their backs on the world.Instead, they are diversifying their sourcing and reinforcing the foundations of their success.Most are derisking rather than decoupling.And for many, the dense transatlantic linkages they have built over decades are an anchor in the storm.The bottom line: in a world wracked by war, pandemics, soaring infl ationary pressures, and the rising gale forces of de-globalization, the two sides of the North Atlantic remain deeply intertwined and embedded in each other's markets.This is not likely to change any time soon, given the deep and entangled commercial ties that link the transatlantic economy, and the fact that shareholders and stakeholders on both sides of the pond directly benefi t from deep transatlantic integration.The fact that the United States and Europe are each embroiled in increasingly contentious commercial and geopolitical tensions with Russia and China also suggests transatlantic cooperation will endure.And the post-pandemic world of tighter energy supplies and tighter labor markets portends thicker transatlantic ties.Thanks to the dense interlinkages of investment, trade, technology, innovation and jobs that bind the two sides of the North Atlantic together, the transatlantic economy remains a central pillar of the global economy.The combined output of the United States and Europe accounted for roughly one-third of world GDP in terms of purchasing power parity in 2022.Excluding the UK, the EU27 and the United States account for a substantial 31% of world GDP -higher than the combined output of China and India (one-quarter of world GDP) and on par with the newly created combined output of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) in Asia of 31% of GDP.The transatlantic economy is not only larger than the twin giants of Asia but also signifi cantly wealthier.And because wealth matters, it's little wonder that consumers in the United States and the EU easily outspend their counterparts in China and India.As mentioned in Chapter One, the two combined accounted for 51% of global personal consumption in 2021, the last year of available data, versus a combined share of just 16.4% for China and India.Per capita incomes -a key metric of a nation's wealth -matter and on this score, it's no contest.The United States (with an estimated per capita income of roughly $69,000 in purchasing power parity terms in 2021) and the European Union (est. $48,000) are far wealthier than China ($19,000) and India ($7,000).In addition to the above, the transatlantic economy is a repository of innovation and technological advancement, and at the forefront of global foreign direct investment and global mergers and acquisitions (M&A) activity.Taken together, U.S. and European goods exports to the world (excluding intra-EU trade) accounted for 20% of global goods exports in 2021, the last year of complete data.But the two parties accounted for 66% of global inward stock of foreign direct investment and 66% of outward stock of FDI.Each partner has built up the great majority of that stock in the other economy.Mutual investment in the North Atlantic space is very large, dwarfs trade, and has become essential to U.S. and European jobs and prosperity.Over 70% of M&A purchases are by U.S. and European companies.It is no surprise, therefore, that the largest commercial artery in the world stretches across the Atlantic.Total transatlantic foreign affi liate sales were estimated at $5.9 trillion in 2021, easily ranking as the most integrated commercial partnership on account of the thick investment ties between the two parties.That said, the burgeoning middle class of the developing nations represents new sources of supply (labor) and demand (consumers) for U.S. and European fi rms.American and European companies are building out their in-country presence in the developing nations, and for good reason.Economic growth rates are still above the global average in most nations, populated with young consumers who desire Western goods and services.In addition, the technological skill levels of many developing nations are now on par with many developing nations.China, for instance, is What is often missing from this either/or picture, however, is the fact that for many U.S. and European companies, the transatlantic economy is the geo-economic base from which they can engage successfully in other parts of the world.Many European car companies, for instance, invest in the United States and then export cars made in the U.S.A. to China and other countries.U.S. services companies, in turn, use the scale off ered by their dense investment linkages across the transatlantic economy to be globally competitive when it comes to off ering services in other parts of the world.Many U.S. multinationals -for both goods and services -also use their presence in Europe to serve the markets of North Africa and the Middle East and beyond.In all of these ways, the transatlantic partnership remains important not only to the United States and Europe, but also to the world.The U.S.-European partnership is too big and too important to fail, as made all too clear when dissecting the activities of foreign affi liates on both sides of the pond.We have long made the case that when it comes to global commerce, traditional trade statistics are incomplete and misguided metrics when measuring the level of global engagement between two parties.Global commerce beats to the tune of foreign direct investment and affi liate sales, not cross-border trade.Hence, as we outline and emphasize each year in this survey, it is the activities of foreign affi liates -the foot soldiers of the transatlantic partnership -that bind the United States and Europe together.Investment, not trade, drives U.S.-European commerce.Understanding this dynamic is essential to understanding the enduring strength and importance of the transatlantic economy.Over the past years, we have outlined and examined eight key indices that off er a clear picture of the "deep integration" forces binding the U.S. and Europe together.This chapter updates those indices with the latest available data and our estimates.Each metric, in general, has ebbed and fl owed with cyclical swings in transatlantic economic activity, but has nevertheless grown in size and importance over the past decade.As standalone entities, U.S. affi liates in Europe and European affi liates in the United States are among the largest and most advanced economic forces in the world.The total output, for instance, of U.S. foreign affi liates in Europe (an estimated $670 billion in 2021) and of European foreign affi liates in the United States (estimated at $665 billion) was greater than the total gross domestic product of most countries.Combined, transatlantic affi liate output -more than $1.3 trillion -was larger than the total output of such countries as Mexico, the Netherlands, or Indonesia.By our estimation, affi liate output rebounded modestly in 2021 from the depressed levels of 2020, when transatlantic activity came to a near standstill due to the pandemic.European affi liate output in the United States rose modestly by 2%, while U.S. affi liate output in Europe rose roughly 4%.European affi liates in the United States are operating in one of the most dynamic economies in the world and are expected to boost their nearterm output again this year.And even though Europe is being challenged by the disruptions generated by the war, the eurozone economy actually grew faster than the U.S. or Chinese economy in 2022.This brighter economic outlook, amidst indications that Europe is likely to pivot successfully away from its energy dependencies on Russia, bodes well for fi rms in both the U.S. and Europe.On a global basis, the aggregate output of U.S. foreign affi liates was around $1.4 trillion in 2021, with Europe (broadly defi ned) accounting for around half of the total.According to the Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. affi liate output in Europe ($643 billion) in 2020 was 73% greater than affi liate output in the entire Asia-Pacifi c region ($383 billion).In the United States, meanwhile, European affi liates are major economic producers in their own right, with British and German fi rms of notable importance.the transatlantic economy is the geo-economic base from which they can engage successfully in other parts of the world.Asia-Pacifi c The U.S. output of British companies was $150 billion in 2020, the last year of actual data.That represents about one-quarter of the European total.For the same year, output from German affiliates operating in the United States totaled $114 billion, or nearly 20% of the European total.Off the back of strong U.S. economic growth in 2021, we estimate that output of both British and German affiliates in the U.S. rose by 5%, with the former totaling an estimated $158 billion in 2021, and the latter $120 billion.In 2020, the last year of available data, European affiliates in the United States accounted for nearly 61% of the roughly $1.1 trillion that affiliates of foreign multinationals contributed overall to U.S. aggregate production.Beyond Europe, only Canadian and Japanese investors have any real economic presence in the United States.Japanese affiliate output totaled nearly $152 billion in 2020, the last year of complete data, while Canadian affiliate output totaled $112 billion.Foreign direct investment from China had soared in the United States over the past few years, but from a relatively low base, and now is plummeting due to bilateral commercial tensions and tighter U.S. scrutiny of such investments.Chinese affiliate output in the U.S. totaled just $14 billion in 2020, less than that of Sweden ($21 billion).The global footprint of corporate America and corporate Europe is second to none, with each party each other's largest foreign investor.According to the latest figures from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. foreign assets in Europe totaled $18.7 trillion in 2020, representing roughly 63% of the global total.For 2021, we estimate that U.S. foreign assets in Europe rose modestly, by 2%, to $19 trillion as the continent emerged from the pandemic.The bulk of U.S. assets in Europe was in the United Kingdom: $6.2 trillion in 2020, the last year of available data, or around 21% of the global total.U.S. assets in the Netherlands (around $3.1 trillion) were the second largest in Europe in 2020.America's significant presence in the Netherlands reflects its strategic role as an export platform/ distribution hub for U.S. firms doing business across the continent.To this point, more than half of U.S. affiliate sales in the Netherlands are for export, particularly within the EU.Meanwhile, America's asset base in Germany topped $1.1 trillion in 2020, more than a third larger than its asset base in all of South America.America's asset base in Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary (roughly $234 billion) was greater than corporate America's assets in South Korea ($182 billion).America's assets in Ireland ($2 trillion in 2020) were light years ahead of those in China ($487 billion).Europe's stakes in the United States are also sizable and significant.Total assets of European affiliates in the United States were valued at roughly $8.3 trillion in 2020.The United Kingdom ranked first, followed by Germany, Switzerland, and French firms.In 2020, the last year of available data, European assets in the United States accounted for over 51% of all foreignowned assets in the United States.We estimate that European-owned assets in the United States rose modestly in 2021 to $8.4 trillion.same, the country composition has changed, with more investment shifting to lower-cost locales like Poland and Hungary versus high-cost economies like Germany and France.The largest employment declines were reported in the United Kingdom, with the total U.S. affi liate manufacturing workforce falling from 431,000 in 2000 to 283,000 in 2020.U.S. manufacturing employment in France dropped from 249,000 to 178,000, while a smaller decline from 388,000 to 358,000 was reported in Germany between 2000 and 2020.In terms of net gains in manufacturing jobs, Poland has been a signifi cant winner, with U.S. affi liate manufacturing employment growing almost three times, from 51,000 in 2000 to over 138,000 in 2020.Roughly 34% of all manufacturing workers employed by U.S. foreign affi liates outside the United States in 2020 were based in Europe.On a global basis, U.S. majority-owned affi liates (including banks and non-bank affi liates) employed 14 million workers in 2020, with the bulk of these workers -roughly 34% -toiling in Europe.That share is down from 41% in 2009.That decline is in part a consequence of Europe's cyclical slowdown for some years, and in part due to the fact that U.S. overseas capacity is expanding at a faster pace in faster-growing emerging markets than slowergrowth developed nations.Another factor at work: more and more U.S. fi rms are opting to stay home due to competitive wage and energy costs, as opposed to shipping more capacity abroad.The sweeping overhaul of the U.S. corporate tax code in 2017, which signifi cantly lowered America's tax rate relative to many in Europe, has spurred more investment to come home or stay in the United States.Other incentives include new subsidies for semiconductor, clean energy and infrastructure production.More on those in Chapter Six.That said, however, with the U.S. labor market at its tightest in decades, U.S. fi rms are even more dependent on European workers to drive production and sales.Most employees of U.S. affi liates in Europe live in the UK, Germany, and France.Meanwhile, U.S. majority-owned fi rms are on balance hiring more people in services activities than in manufacturing.The latter accounted for 38% of total U.S. foreign affi liate employment in Europe in 2020.The key industry in terms of manufacturing employment was transportation equipment, with U.S. affi liates employing nearly 336,000 workers, followed by chemicals (257,000).Wholesale employment was among the largest sources of services-related employment, which includes employment in such activities as logistics, trade, insurance and other related functions.Although services employment among U.S. affi liates has grown at a faster pace than manufacturing employment over the past decade, according to our estimates U.S. affi liates employed more manufacturing workers in Europe in 2021 (1.9 million) than in 1990 (1.6 million).This refl ects the EU enlargement process, and hence greater access to more manufacturing workers, and the premium U.S. fi rms place on highly skilled manufacturing workers, with Europe one of the largest sources in the world.European majority-owned foreign affiliates directly employed 4.9 million U.S. workers in 2020.We estimate the number to have reached 5 million in 2021.The top five European employers in the United States were firms from the UK (1.2 million jobs), Germany (885,000), France (740,000), the Netherlands (569,000) and Switzerland (487,000).European firms employed roughly two-thirds of all U.S. workers on the payrolls of majority-owned foreign affiliates in 2020.In the aggregate, the transatlantic workforce directly employed by U.S. and European foreign affiliates in pandemic year 2020 was roughly 9.7 million strong -300,000 more than the year before.Employment levels rebounded again in 2021, to an estimated 9.8 million, and are expected to have increased further in 2022.One reminder: as we have stressed in the past, these figures understate the employment effects of mutual investment flows, since these numbers are limited to direct employment, and do not account for indirect employment effects on nonequity arrangements such as strategic alliances, joint ventures, and other deals.Moreover, foreign employment figures do not include jobs supported by transatlantic trade flows.Trade-related employment is sizable in many U.S. states and many European nations.In the end, direct and indirect employment remains quite large.We estimate that the transatlantic workforce numbers some 14-16 million workers, counting both direct affiliate employees as well as those whose jobs are supported by transatlantic trade.Europe is by far the most important source of "onshored" jobs in America, and the United States is by far the most important source of "onshored" jobs in Europe.The United States and Europe remain primary drivers of global R&D.Yet as the globalization of R&D has gathered pace, more and more global R&D expenditures are emanating from Asia in general and China in particular.Beijing is unrelentingly focused on being a global leader in artificial intelligence, quantum computing, space exploration, cyber security, life sciences, electric vehicles, supercomputing, semiconductors and 5G wireless devices.Beijing's long-term goal is to become an "international innovation leader" by 2030 and a "world powerhouse of scientific and technological innovation" by 2050.While governments and corporations are the main drivers of R&D spending, foreign affiliates of multinationals are also in the thick of things.In fact, foreign affiliate R&D has become more prominent over the past decades as firms seek to share development costs, spread risks, and tap into the intellectual talent of other nations.Alliances, cross-licensing of intellectual property, mergers and acquisitions, and other forms of cooperation have become more prevalent characteristics of the transatlantic economy.The digital economy has become a powerful engine of greater transatlantic R&D.The complexity of scientific and technological innovation is leading innovators to partner and share costs, find complementary expertise, gain access to different technologies and knowledge quickly, and collaborate as part of "open" innovation networks.Cross-border collaboration with foreign partners can range from a simple one-way transmission of information to highly interactive and formal arrangements.Developing new products, creating new processes, and driving more innovation -all of these activities result from more collaboration between foreign suppliers and U.S. and European firms.And all of this collaboration, regardless of sector or industry, is dependent on the ability to transfer data across borders, as we discuss in Chapter5. Bilateral U.S.-EU flows in R&D are the most intense between any two international partners.In 2020, the last year of available data, U.S. affiliates spent $31.6 billion on research and development in Europe.On a global basis, Europe accounted for roughly 54% of total U.S. R&D in 2020.R&D expenditures by U.S. affiliates were the greatest in the United Kingdom ($6.0 billion), Germany ($5.7 billion), Switzerland ($5.5 billion), Ireland ($4.0 billion), Belgium ($2.2 billion) and France ($1.9 billion).These six countries accounted for nearly 80% of U.S. spending on R&D in Europe in 2020.In the United States, meanwhile, expenditures on R&D performed by majority-owned foreign affiliates totaled $71.4 billion in 2020.As in previous years, a sizable share of this R&D spending emanated from world-class leaders from Europe, given their interest in America's highly skilled labor force and world-class university system.Most of this investment by European firms took place in such researchintensive sectors as autos, energy, chemicals, and On a country basis, German-owned affi liates were the largest foreign source of R&D in the United States in 2020, spending some $12.7 billion, or 26% of the total of European R&D.Swiss fi rms ranked second, with $10.2 billion, or 21.5% of the total, followed by British fi rms, $6.6 billion or 13.5% of the total.As Source: The 2021 EU Industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard.Data as of December 2021.Note: Only companies that disclose their R&D figures according to the Scoreboard methodology can be included in the ranking.Excluded from the ranking is Amazon which, according to the Scoreboard, would be positioned at #1 in the world R&D ranking if it had separated its R&D and content investments in its annual report.While cross-border trade is a secondary means of delivery for goods and services across the Atlantic, the modes of delivery -affi liate sales and trade -should not be viewed independently.They are more complements than substitutes, since foreign investment and affi liate sales increasingly drive cross-border trade fl ows.Indeed, a substantial share of transatlantic trade is considered intrafi rm or related-party trade, which is cross-border trade that stays within the ambit of the company.Intra-fi rm or related party-trade occurs when BMW or Siemens of Germany sends parts to BMW of South Carolina or Siemens of North Carolina; when Lafarge or Michelin send intermediate components to their Midwest plants, or when General Motors or 3M ships components from Detroit, Michigan or St. Paul, Minnesota to affi liates in Germany or the UK.All of these examples are at the core of interconnected global supply chains.The tight linkages between European parent companies and their U.S. affi liates are refl ected in the fact that roughly 65% of U.S. imports from the European Union consisted of intra-fi rm trade in 2020, the last year of available data.That is much higher than the intra-fi rm imports from Pacifi c Rim nations (around 40%) and well above the global average (48%).The percentage was even higher in the case of Ireland (85%) and Germany (69%).Meanwhile, 39% of U.S. exports to the EU plus UK in 2020 represented intra-fi rm trade, but the percentage is much higher for some countries.For instance, more than half of total U.S. exports to the Netherlands (58%) was classifi ed as relatedparty trade.The comparable fi gure for Germany was 38% and for France it was 35%.Transatlantic profi ts rebounded strongly in 2021 from the depressed levels of 2020, and remained robust again in 2022.Most Western companies are in China because they seek to expand their presence in the Chinese domestic market, not because China is a cog in their extended global supply chains.China now accounts for a quarter of global sales of clothes, nearly a third of jewelry and handbags, and around two-fi fths of cars, plus a signifi cant share of packaged food, beauty products, pharmaceuticals, electronics and more.It is the world's largest market for machine tools and chemicals, and its construction industry is the largest buyer of building equipment.5 The Chinese market's overall importance to the U.S., Japanese or European economies, however, is less than generally suggested.For all listed U.S. fi rms, China accounts for just 4% of sales, according to Morgan Stanley.For Japanese and European companies, the fi gures are 6% and 8% respectively.6 The situation is diff erent for specifi c sectors and individual companies.The top 200 U.S., European and Japanese companies that disclose sales in China earned $700 billion there in 2021, or about 13% of their global sales, up from $368 billion, or 9% of sales, in 2017.Of that total, 30% was generated by technology-hardware fi rms, 26% by consumer-facing businesses, and 22% by industrial companies, with carmakers and commodity businesses also important.Thirteen multinationals reported over $10 billion of revenue a year in China, including Apple, BMW, Intel, Siemens, Tesla and Walmart.In 2022 China accounted for 25% of Tesla's global sales; 22% of Volkswagen China's global revenue; and similar percentages for Apple (19%) and Nike (18% China remains a powerhouse in goods trade.China's share of global goods exports by value increased over the course of the pandemic, to 15% by the end of 2021, from 13% in 2019, while the U.S. share slipped to 7.9% from 8.6%, Germany's share shrank to 7.3% from 7.8%, and Japan's share declined to 3.4% from 3.7%.China's gains in higherend manufactured products are eating into the global market share of countries such as Germany, which traditionally excels at making and exporting such products.State-subsidized Chinese firms are also making inroads in more technology-intensive areas that have been strengths for U.S. and various European countries.9 China accounted for 10.2% of overall EU exports in 2021, behind both the United States (18.3%) and the UK (13%), according to Eurostat.EU imports of goods from China totaled $558 billion in 2021, a more than eight-fold increase from 2000.However, China only accounted for 8.6% of EU total imports for the year ($6.5 trillion).Meanwhile, the EU accounted for 15.4% of China's goods exports in 2021.That figure is down from the levels of 2007 to 2010.European countries have very different types of commercial relationships with China.For instance, southern and eastern European countries primarily import high-tech goods from China and export raw materials, agricultural products and low-tech goods back to China.The pattern is different for Germany, France, the UK, and other northern and western European countries, which tend to export high-tech goods in exchange for critical materials and lower-end consumer products, although China's share of higher-end exports to these countries is growing.Germany is one of China's largest goods trading partners, and both German goods exports and imports to and from China have surged in past decades.However, Eurostat reports that the percentages are relatively modest as a share of either country's global total of goods exports and imports.U.S. goods trade with China also remains sizable, despite official efforts to curtail it.U.S. imports of goods from China totaled $536.8 billion in 2022, a 6.3% increase from the prior year and close to the record $538.5 billion reached in 2018.U.S. goods exports to China grew 1.6% to $153.8 billion last year, pushing total goods trade between the two countries to a record $690.6 billion.10 These numbers have reinforced a fairly widespread view that China has become the top commercial partner of the United States and of Europe.This is incorrect, for many reasons.Second, many commentators wrongly equate international commerce only with trade in goods.Trade between countries, however, doesn't just consist of trade in goods.It also includes trade in services, which most media accounts do not include.Services trade has been growing faster than goods trade.More European and American jobs depend on services than on goods, and the United States and the EU remain by far each other's top services trade partner.EU27 services trade with the U.S. of $702.12 billion in 2021 was 6 times EU-China services trade of $115.54 billion.14 Putting goods and services together, EU-US trade totaled $1.413 trillion in 2021.EU-China trade in goods and services of $938 billion was only 66% as large.In short, if you look at overall trade fl ows and not just one kind of fl ow, it is clear that the largest trading partner for the EU is actually the United States, and the largest trading partner for the United States is the EU, as it has been for decades.And while China's global trade is rising, it still accounts for only 6% of global trade.Most trade still happens between the U.S., Europe and like-minded partners, according to Capital Economics (Table 3) .Sources: Capital Economics; Neil Shearing, "World economy is fracturing, not deglobalizing," Chatham House, February 8, 2023, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2023/02/worldeconomy-fracturing-not-deglobalizing.Moreover, just as trade is more than just fl ows of goods, international commerce is more than just trade.Reducing complex commercial ties to just trade in goods and services ignores the importance of a host of additional economic ties that bind Europe and the United States in far deeper ways than those that bind either to China.15 U.S. and European commercial ties with China are each akin to a two-lane highway, whereas their commercial ties with each other are more like a twelve-lane Autobahn.The highways to and from China are full of goods.They are busy, and they are crowded.Any type of accident on a two-lane highway can really snarl traffi c -as we saw when supply chains were disrupted by the pandemic and throughout the U.S.-China tariff dispute.Alongside the China goods highway is another lane for trade in services, but that remains narrow, as we discussed earlier.A further lane for investment has been under construction for some years, but it continues to face many roadblocks, as U.S. and European offi cials sanction China for human rights abuses, express security concerns about Chinese investments, tighten investment screening and export control procedures, and as each side of the Atlantic unveils new laws and directives aimed at boosting its respective competitiveness with China.China's onerous restrictions on foreign ownership, forced technology transfer rules, opaque and politicallyinfl uenced regulatory procedures, and its own sanctions on Western offi cials and legislators all serve to further dampen inward investment fl ows.The EU-China Comprehensive Investment Agreement (CAI), inked in December 2020, remains in the deep freeze.Investment by foreign companies in China tumbled to its lowest level in 18 years in the second half of last year.16 U.S-European investment lanes, in contrast, drive a huge amount of transatlantic commerce.The U.S. accounted for almost 25% of the EU27's total outward FDI position globally in 2020 -10 times more than China, which accounted for less than 2.5% of the total.Total European stock in the United States of $3.2 trillion in 2021 was more than three times the level of comparable investment from all of Asia.Germany's total FDI stock in the United States totaled $403 billion in 2021.Chinese FDI stock in the United States was less than one-tenth of that total ($38 billion).Europe's role vis-à-vis the United States is very similar.Measured on an historic cost basis, the Global supply chain tasks, in turn, can be broken down into three types: pre-production; production; and post-production.Pre-production tasks include research and development, product design, and branding.Post-production tasks include marketing, distribution, and retailing.Conventional trade measures account for only one of these tasks: manufacturing production.They ignore both pre-and post-production, the two tasks that on average add twice as much value, and account for more jobs, than production tasks.Moreover, the firms that specialize in preand post-production also determine where these tasks take place -and those firms by and large tend to be in developed economies, including the United States and in Europe.29 The concept of trade in factor income basically adds in what is missing from conventional metrics.Doing so results in new ways of looking at global trade flows.To take an example, Apple reaps 59% of its iPhone X's value added from pre-and postproduction tasks.30 The least value-added is derived from its production tasks, which are located in China.Nonetheless, when those phones are exported to the United States and Europe, they are recorded as goods exports from China, even though most of the value accrues to a U.S. company.Moreover, Apple's additional billions in sales in China do not turn up in U.S. trade statistics.The trade-in-factor-income approach adds Apple's profits from within China to U.S. exports to China, because, as a recent Asian Development Bank (ADB)/WTO report puts it, "that is the underlying economic reality, not the accounting fiction".Doing so across all U.S. companies cuts the U.S.-China goods trade deficit by one-third.31 Intermediate tasks in global supply chains Pre-production (R&D, product development and branding Post-production (marketing, distribution and retailing) Intermediate tasks add twice as much value and account for more jobs than production tasks.This underscores the importance of intellectual property as a driver of both supply chains and investment flows.It also highlights its value as a source of income for developed economies such as the United States and Europe: 90% of the value of firms in the S&P 500 corresponds to intellectual property, which contributes twice as much to the value of trade as does physical capital.32 An additional lens through which we can understand the role of the United States and European companies in global supply chains is through indirect trade, which is the amount of trade conducted through intermediates instead of a simple direct exchange between two parties.According to the ADB/WTO, Germany, the United States, France and the Netherlands account for four of the world's top five indirect exporters.And while conventional trade statistics portray China as the world's leading exporter, it ranks third in terms of indirect exports.Moreover, its share is fallingdue to rising labor costs and the declining share of trade in China's economy.At the same time, the integration of various European and East Asian countries in cross-border supply chains is rising."Decoupling" has become a favorite buzzword to depict efforts to undo critical dependencies on suspect firms or antagonistic states.The term continues to resonate, yet it is misleading as a description of how either countries or companies are acting in this competitive and turbulent age of disruption."Decoupling" suggests completely unhooking two connected entities.A closer look reveals a more nuanced picture.Evidence is sparse that major economies have actually "decoupled" from one another.Russia has been the leading target of Western decoupling efforts over the past year, thanks to Moscow's invasion of Ukraine.But the results have been mixed, as we discuss in Chapter 1.China has been the larger focus of "decoupling" efforts, but there are only scattered signs of disentanglement in some limited technology sectors.Most countries and companies are not looking to cut the cord with China.They are "derisking," not decoupling.For governments, derisking means seeking ways to both promote trade and investment and protect core economic and security interests and human rights values.For companies, derisking means identifying strategies to maintain and expand commercial ties with China while mitigating supply chain vulnerabilities and being careful not to run afoul of growing government restrictions.The United States has informally labeled its approach the "protect and promote" agenda.The "protect" element of the policy seeks to impede technological and military advances in countries of concern, like China, Russia, North Korea and Iran.Washington's tools are tougher export controls, stricter inbound and outbound investment screening, and human rights measures such as the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act and forced labor bans in the US-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA).The "promote" strand seeks to foster innovation and use subsidies and other forms of industrial policy to maintain "as large of a lead as possible" in sectors where there is a "national security imperative," including semiconductors, quantum computing, artificial intelligence, biotechnology and clean energy.33 One key tool in the "protect" agenda is the "Entity List" of companies which must apply for permission to buy goods with potential military uses.In August 2020, the Trump administration used the FDPR to cut Chinese company Huawei off from American technology.The firm's revenues plunged by 29% in 2021 and its smartphones disappeared from the market altogether.In February 2022 the Biden administration issued additional FDPRs to cut off Russia from all U.S. elements of global technology supply chains.In October 2022, it followed these actions with severe FDPR restrictions that blocked U.S. firms from shipping high-end microchip manufacturing equipment to China and making it easier to crack down on countries that do not follow suit.Japan and the Netherlands agreed in January 2023 to join the restrictions.As a result, China is effectively barred from advanced semiconductors.35 In February 2023, US chipmakers were told that they could only receive money under the CHIPS Act if they agreed not to expand capacity in China for a decade, and not to engage in any joint research or technology licensing effort involving sensitives technologies with a "foreign entity of concern. In November 2022, the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) barred Huawei and Chinese tech company ZTE from selling equipment in the United States -the first time ever that the FCC has banned electronics equipment on national security grounds. In December 2022 the administration added another three dozen Chinese companies to the Entity List and applied the FDPR to 21 additional entities. 36 These measures are proceeding in tandem with the "promote" agenda: a $2 trillion overhaul of the U.S. economy that seeks to do many things at once: address climate change, boost manufacturing, curb dependence on China, and revive regions of the country that had been lagging.It is the largest set of U.S. industrial policies since the New Deal, embodied in three major pieces of legislation: the $1.2 trillion Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act; the $280 billion CHIPS and Science Act; and the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), which was valued initially at $396 billion, yet could be much more, since some of the tax credits it offers are not capped.The Chips and Science Act has triggered $200 billion of private investment in U.S. chipmaking capacity.37 The IRA could spur $1.7 trillion in public and private investments, according to Credit Suisse.We discuss the IRA in Chapter4. These federal outlays, which are already reshaping supply chains, are being complemented by subsidies offered by some individual states.Georgia, for instance, provided over $3 billion in financial incentives last year to two carmakers building electric vehicle factories.38 The EU's Protect and Promote Agenda While the EU and its member states do not use the phrase "protect and promote" to describe their derisking agenda, essentially this is also what they, and the UK, are doing.The EU's "protect" agenda is complicated because member states, not the European Commission, retain authority over many sensitive areas, and each tends to address dependency issues differently.When serious challenges arise, member states have shown a willingness to act.In the last year alone European governments spent €570 billion to shield their own societies from the energy shocks generated by the war.39 They guard their prerogatives jealously.Nevertheless, the EU does have tools at its disposal.It has long had the ability, if not always the will, to use trade defense instruments to impose anti-subsidy and antidumping duties on unfairly cheap imports.It has imposed a broad range of export controls on Russia, as we discuss in Chapter 1.Member states have extended the Xinjiang sanctions they first imposed in March 2021.In addition, Germany's Supply Chain Due Diligence Act, which came into force on January 1, requires companies to meet extensive obligations to ensure human rights and environment best practices in their supply chains.A related, and even more stringent, EU Supply Chain Due Diligence Directive will be debated in the European Parliament this year.Moreover, at the urging of the Commission, nearly all member states now have inward investment screening mechanisms, and some have tightened the laws they already had, as has the UK.This year the Commission is looking at ways to screen outbound investments.Finally, the EU's new Foreign Subsidies Regulation, which comes into force on July 1, 2023, empowers the Commission to prevent state-subsidized companies from producing in Europe or bidding for public procurement contracts there.While the rule was originally intended with China in mind, it could negatively affect U.S. companies deemed to be enjoying state subsidies under the IRA or related legislation.40 The EU's "promote" agenda has centered on NextGenerationEU, a €806 billion funding program to help EU member states recover and revive from the pandemic.It is the largest stimulus THE TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMY 2023 -37 package ever financed in Europe.The funds are being reinforced by elements of the EU's longterm budget, bringing the total of deployable funds to €2.018 trillion in current prices, to help create, in the EU's words, a "greener, more digital and more resilient" Europe.Elements of the package have been reshaped in response to ongoing events, particularly the need to shift away from energy dependencies on Russia.41 Debates about repurposing the funds have been reenergized by European concerns over massive cleantech subsidies being offered by China and the United States, as we discuss in Chapter4. The "promote" agenda also includes the European Chips Act, which is intended to strengthen semiconductor value chains within the EU, with a goal of achieving 20% of worldwide production capacities.While the Act boasts a budget of more than €43 billion, it has not yet been approved, and much of the money is drawn from existing EU programs, from member states, or assumed private investments.The derisking phenomenon is not confined to the U.S. and Europe.When Beijing announced its "Made in China 2025" program eight years ago, it was explicit in its ambition to free China from dependence on Western technologies and to direct massive government support to make the country a world-beater in a number of critical sectors.It has since adjusted some aspects of this effort, but the essentials remain.Beijing also proclaimed a "military-civil fusion strategy" intended to use technological advances to align its commercial and defense sectors, and prioritized the capability to master "choke point" technologies.China's current five-year plan emphasizes industrial strategies to catch up and lead in critical technology domains.U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken says Beijing's plan seeks to make "China less dependent on the world and the world more dependent on China".42 The European Chamber of Commerce in China adds that Beijing's policies are causing China to lose its "allure," as many foreign firms reconsider their China presence.Even before the pandemic and Russia's renewed aggression, many companies had grown concerned about vulnerabilities and fragilities that had been accumulating in their deeply intertwined supply chains.The subsequent conflation of so many shocks has now led to an across-the-board rethink of the hyper-globalization model.German companies were responsible for 14.6% and Japanese companies for only 8.1%.Some corporations are adopting separate supply chain models for the China and non-China markets.Apple, Yum! Brands, and McDonald's are among the companies that have split out their China business.Many are adopting "China plus one" or "China plus two" approaches: retaining existing production facilities in China, but striking additional supply deals, or setting up additional manufacturing plants, in other countries.45 Many corporations are shifting from supply chains to supply webs.They are replacing singlesourcing of critical components with multiple, and sometimes geographically diverse, suppliers so as to prioritize uninterrupted deliveries over justin-time efficiencies.By the end of 2022 almost half of companies had diversified their supplier base, and less than 15% were relying on "just-intime" deliveries.46 Vietnam has been the biggest beneficiary of this trend.Half of Google's newest Pixel phones will be made in Vietnam this year.Apple is supplementing its operations in China by producing iPads, MacBooks, AirPods and smartwatches in Vietnam.Apple's many suppliers are following.The results are impressive: high-tech goods as a share of Vietnam's exports hit 42% in 2020, up from 13% in 2010.Vietnam's economy has more than doubled in size over the past decade.47 India is also gaining from corporate diversification away from China, as multinationals invest not just in low-cost labor but in higher-end innovation activities.Between January and October 2022, India attracted 225 FDI projects in R&D activities -a third of the global total and as many projects as the U.S., UK and China combined.Its global market share of handset production, including smartphones and feature phones, grew from 9% in 2016 to 16% in 2021, whereas China's share, while still dominant, declined from 74% in 2016 to 67%.Apple and its suppliers are developing India as a source of growth and as a strategic production base, with exports intended for Europe and other markets.48 Related to these shifts is a phenomenon dubbed "near-shoring," "friend-shoring," or "ally-shoring," which means production and sourcing/shifting supply chains away from geopolitical rivals toward more politically friendly countries, or to close allies.U.S. and European officials have publicly endorsed "friend-shoring" approaches.The U.S. CHIPS Act includes provisions prioritizing partnerships with allies as well as guardrails to weaken commercial ties with China.So does the U.S. Inflation Reduction Act, although with significant discriminatory elements, as we discuss in Chapter4. The EU's still-pending Chips Act also targets "excessive dependencies" and foresees friend-shoring components such as "semiconductor international partnerships with like-minded countries."Japan, too, has offered incentive packages to U.S. Europe has reduced its dependence on Russian gas from 40% to 10% in less than one year.1 Spiking prices have fallen back to pre-war levels.Europeans used less gas, built up their strategic reserves, and switched to alternative energy sources.They benefi ted from a relatively mild winter.Critical gaps were fi lled by a surge in gas imports from other countries -notably the United States.U.S. liquefi ed natural gas (LNG) exporters supplied more than three-fourths of Europe's additional gas needs in the critical months following the outbreak of the war, and accounted for more than 50% of Europe's LNG supplies for the year as a whole.2 More than half of U.S. global LNG exports went to Europe in 2022.U.S. exporters shipped roughly 2.5 times more LNG supplies to Europe in than in 2021, and 3 times more than they supplied to all of Asia in 2022 (Table 1) Some concerns are being addressed.Used clean vehicles, which comprise 70% of the market, will benefit from tax credits and are not subject to local sourcing requirements.The new implementing rules also allow subsidies for "commercial clean vehicles" produced by European and other foreign carmakers if they are leased and not purchased, a favored option of U.S. consumers.Currently half of German electric vehicles in the United States are leased.5 Discussions continue about batteries.The IRA stipulates that batteries must meet a gradually increasing threshold of critical minerals extracted and processed in countries with "free trade agreements" with the U.S., beginning at 40% in 2023 and increasing by 10% each year through 2026.Neither the EU nor the UK has a free trade agreement with the United States.Drawing on their 2022 Minerals Security Partnership with a number of other countries, the U.S. and the EU are advancing critical materials pacts facilitating freer trade of these materials amongst signatories.These limited arrangements might qualify the EU and others as "free trade" partners, without requiring congressional approval for formal, comprehensive Free Trade Agreements.U.S. carmakers have joined their European counterparts in their concern about how fast they will be able to meet the IRA's provisions that restrict tax credits to new electric vehicles that do not include battery components or critical materials coming from "foreign entities of concern," including China, which is the source for many such materials.Some European carmakers have complained that their exports could be hit by IRA provisions limiting tax credits to manufacturers that complete "final vehicle assembly" in North America.This ignores the dense transatlantic linkages that underpin the auto industry.The main European automakers already conduct "final vehicle assembly" at their plants in the United States.Volkswagen is the largest European seller of electric vehicles in the U.S., for instance, and it produces its best-selling model in Chattanooga, Tennessee.Mercedes produces its electric EQS in Tuscaloosa, Alabama.Two of BMW's electric vehicle brands are produced at its plant in Spartanburg, South Carolina, which is bigger than its home plant in Munich.Many EU member states off er additional support measures.For instance, almost every EU country subsidizes the purchase of electric vehicles; Bruegel estimates such support totaled $6.5 billion and averaged about $6,500 per vehicle in 2022 (compared to IRA tax credits of up to $7,500 per vehicle).And while EU rules limit state aid by member governments as a way to ensure smaller and poorer states are not swamped by bigger and richer ones, those limits were loosened for the pandemic recovery and again after Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine.EU rules are now likely to be relaxed once more, at least until 2025, in response to the IRA.Bruegel concludes that EU and U.S. IRA subsidies for electric vehicles and cleantech manufacturing are roughly similar in size, and that European subsidies for renewable energy production are four times higher than subsidies foreseen by the IRA (Table 2) .These fi gures suggest that Europe's challenge is not a lack of fi nancial or state resources, but its own fragmentation and the legacy eff ects of its overreliance on cheap Russian energy.Bruegel concludes that U.S.-EU diff erences are less about the sheer size of their respective eff orts and more about how those initiatives are being rolled out.It judges IRA clean tech subsidies to be simpler, faster, and less fragmented than those in Europe, but argues that some discriminate against foreign producers, while most EU subsidies do not.IRA subsidies are focused mainly on mass deployment of current generation technologies, whereas EU-level support is more focused on spurring innovation and new technologies.Lost in the transatlantic debate about competing transatlantic subsidies is the challenge posed by China.As President von der Leyen has said, "The true pressure, the unleveling of the playing fi eld, is not our American friends, it's China -with massive hidden subsidies, with a lot of denial of access to our companies to the Chinese market and of course there is strategic shopping towards here, the European Union." 7 China invested $546 billion in the energy transition in 2022, nearly four times the amount the U.S. spent, according to Bloomberg.8 Going forward, the two parties would do well to manage those diff erences that do exist, avoid subsidy wars, mitigate their respective critical-material dependencies, and improve their attractiveness for green investments by proactively harnessing transatlantic synergies.(Table 3) .European companies are the leading source of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the U.S. energy sector (Table 4) .Signifi cant transatlantic R&D synergies remain untapped.These fi gures underscore that transatlantic risk capital can be deployed successfully by venture investors to advance clean technologies at the innovation frontier.However, full transatlantic potential is being hampered by two major gaps along the innovation lifecycle.First, the voices of innovation are absent in transatlantic policy discussions.There is no place for cleantech innovators and investors to inform and exchange views with U.S. and EU offi cials.As a result, signifi cant transatlantic R&D synergies remain untapped.The U.S. and These gaps could be addressed, and transatlantic synergies catalyzed more eff ectively, if the U.S. and the EU moved forward on the pledge made at the June 2021 U.S.-EU Summit to "work towards a Transatlantic Green Technology Alliance that would foster cooperation on the development and deployment of green technologies, as well as promote markets to scale such technologies."At the time, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said the two parties would join forces to "enable breakthrough technologies and amazing innovations to be competitive on the market." 11 Almost two years later, little progress has been made, despite the tremendous potential -and the urgency -of such an initiative.It's time for TACTA: a Transatlantic Clean Technology Alliance.12 As a platform for offi cials, demand owners, and the investor/innovation community to share perspectives and identify priorities, TACTA could highlight and support synergies among existing EU and U.S. cleantech eff orts, identify and close gaps, and prioritize innovations that reduce, rather than exacerbate their critical materials dependencies.Source: Cleantech Group.For more, see Daniel S. Hamilton, "It's time to forge a transatlantic clean technology alliance," The Hill, June 27, 2022, https://thehill.com/opinion/technology/3538332-its-time-toforge-a-transatlantic-clean-technology-alliance/, and "Zeit für transatlantische Technologieallianz," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, June 30, 2022, https://transatlanticrelations.org/ wp-content/uploads/2022/07/20220630_F.A.Z._Seite-8.pdf.The Digital Drivers of the Transatlantic Economy In most cases, digitally-driven companies are simply readjusting to post-pandemic realities and sharpening their focus on opportunities and challenges to come.Despite major job cuts, most digitally-driven companies still have more workers than they did when the pandemic began.The ten companies announcing the largest layoffs have only undone about 10% of the jobs they created during the pandemic.3 The ICT sector overall continues to record net employment gains, and scores of thousands of jobs remain unfilled.In short, the digital jet stream may no longer be stratospheric, but it is still flying high.More data was generated over the last two years than in the entirety of human history.By 2025, global data creation is projected to grow to more than 180 zettabytes.That's 180 followed by 21 zeros -over 2 billion times the Internet's size in 1997.Only about 2% of that data survives year-to-year.Still, 2% of 180 zettabytes is huge.By 2026, monthly global data traffic is expected to surge to 780 exabytes -more than three times data usage rates in 2020.4 Global internet bandwidth has tripled since 2017, even as growth slowed from a torrid pandemicdriven surge of 34% in 2020 to a more "normal" pace of 29% in 2021.5 Over 5 billion people typically spend more than 40% of their waking life online.6 More than 2 billion digital payments are made every day.7 This year, 1 in 2 companies will generate more than 40% of their revenues from digital products and services.8 GSMA Intelligence forecasts that 37.4 billion devices will be connected to the internet by 2030, up from 15.1 billion in 2021.9 The global Internet of Things (IoT) market, valued at $690.3 billion in 2021, is projected to grow to $1.5 trillion in 2026 and $1.85 trillion in 2028.10 Over the next three years, global spending on digital transformation is forecast to reach $3.4 trillion, with a five-year compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 16.3%.11 The United States is the largest market for such spending, accounting for nearly 35% of the worldwide total.Western Europe is the second largest region, accounting for nearly a quarter of all spending on digital transformation.12 The World Economic Forum estimates that 70% of the new value created in the whole economy over the next ten years will be digitally enabled.13 For the transatlantic economy a number of digital transformations bear watching.In previous surveys, we have discussed opportunities for small-and medium-sized enterprises, the evolution of 3-D printing, the emergence of Web3, and the promise of the connected factory.Each of these developments remains significant.We also discussed the metaverse, which much popular commentary treats as a fusion of virtual gaming, social networking, and entertainment.Substantial additional economic value, however, is likely to be generated by the "industrial" or "enterprise" metaverse, a world in which the distinctions between physical and digital work environments blend.In that world, nearly any More data was generated over the last two years than in the entirety of human history.The pandemic was a major accelerant of the biological revolution.A decade ago, mRNA vaccines were a dream.In 2020, they changed the world.BioNTech, Moderna, Merck, and other companies are already applying mRNA technology to deal with diseases such as malaria, tuberculosis, and HIV.In the future, mRNA drugs could be used for allergies, autoimmune conditions, individualized cancer therapies, regenerative medicine, and for a wide variety of illnesses, from fl u and heart disease to yellow fever and the Zika virus.BioNTech believes that in 15 years, one-third of all newly approved drugs will be based on mRNA.21 Many biotech fi rms have also been aff ected by post-pandemic adjustments.Many face tighter capital infl ows and have had to lay off workers.Nonetheless, the current stepback is more a fi ltering process and course correction than a secular downturn.Digital transformations continue to redefi ne health in all areas of life.3D printing is poised to revolutionize reconstructive surgery, from knee replacements to new ears.The rapid advancement of genome-editing techniques holds much promise for the fi eld of human gene therapy.Telemedicine, telepresence, and telesurgery are transforming medical techniques and generating greater cross-border trade in healthcare services.22 By 2025, 40% of the global datasphere will be in health -the largest of any sector or industry.This explosion of genetic and health data -and increasing abilities to process it -hold significant potential for scientific and medical achievement worldwide, assuming the ability to transfer data across borders, subject to certain privacy and data protection standards, is not undermined.The digital health industry is booming, with some estimates valuing the sector at more than $550 billion by 2027 and 16.5% CAGR.23 Biological breakthroughs are proceeding alongside, and sometimes interacting with, cognitive advances, led by the transformation of software and artificial intelligence.AI technologies are helping companies supercharge their online advertising, cut energy costs, predict customer behaviors, anticipate stock market movements, improve supply chains, build websites and fill in tax forms.They are approaching or surpassing human levels of performance in vision, image and speech recognition, language translation, skin cancer classification, breast cancer detection, and other domains.Over the next few years, major advances in deep learning and foundation models will lead to even more impressive AIbased applications.Over half of European and U.S. companies have adopted AI applications in their operations.24 The potential of transatlantic innovation is underscored by London-based AI company DeepMind, owned by Google parent Alphabet, which has used artificial intelligence to predict the shape of almost every known protein, a breakthrough that will significantly accelerate the time required to make biological discoveries.25 Recent findings show that AI can slash early drug discovery timelines by four years, and generate cost savings of 60%.26 While AI's positive effects could be revolutionary, it has also generated substantial concern about potential risks, ranging from automation of jobs, violations of privacy, discrimination, and the spread of fake news, to authoritarian social control and to autonomous weapons.29 Table 3 .Capital invested in purpose-driven digital companies by year and region, 2018-2022* *2022 is annualized based on actuals up to October and annualized on the basis of the three months of August to October.Source: Atomico, State of European Tech 2022, https://stateofeuropeantech.com/1.european-teach-a-new-reality/1.2-tech-motor-for-progress#C1-2-purpose-driven-tech-on-therise-again.A global assessment is off ered by the 2022 Network Readiness Index, which measures how prepared countries are to leverage the opportunities off ered by technological innovation.It does so by looking at the state of technology infrastructure, the ability of individuals, businesses, and governments to use ICT productively, how conducive the national environment is for a country's participation in the network economy, and the economic, social, and human impact of a country's participation in the network economy.Based on these metrics, Europe and North America represent 8 of the top 10 countries, and 18 of the top 25, when it comes to technology readiness and adoption ( Table 5) .Singapore and South Korea were the lone Asian countries in the top ten.36 Even though "digital globalization" evokes the image of a seamless global marketplace, digital connections are "thicker" between some continents and "thinner" between others -and they are "thickest" between North America and Europe.Due to these apples-and-oranges approaches, it is difficult to come up with a clear estimate of the overall size or value of the transatlantic digital economy.Our interest in this annual survey, however, is more on how North America and Europe connect, rather than on how they compare.With that in mind, we present five ways to look at the transatlantic digital economy.These metrics are not mutually exclusive; they are best understood as different lenses through which one can better understand the importance of transatlantic digital connections.Together, these five metrics convey one clear message: even though "digital globalization" evokes the image of a seamless global marketplace, digital connections are "thicker" between some continents and "thinner" between others -and they are "thickest" between North America and Europe.Digitalization is changing the scale, scope and speed of trade.It has lowered shipping and customs processing times.It offers alternative means of payment and finance.It has boosted trade in software design over trade in final products.It has reduced the cost of creating, copying and accessing text, video content and music.The result: trade in data, digital services, and intellectual property is booming, whereas trade in many traditional goods and services has flagged.According to McKinsey, between 2010 and 2019, trade flows linked to knowledge grew twice as fast as those of traditional goods.38 Digitalization has changed the very nature of trade.It blurs the distinction between trade in goods and services.Automakers are now also services providers; online retailers are also manufacturers.3D-printing generates products that are a mix of goods and services.Digitalization has enhanced our ability to access goods and services without owning them.39 The digital economy is dominated by services.Many services sectors that were once non-tradable -because they had to be delivered faceto-face -have become highly tradable -because they can now be delivered over long distances.40 Two metrics offer us a clearer picture of transatlantic connections in digital services.A narrow view can be had by looking at cross-border ICT services, or digital services as shorthand, which are services used to facilitate information processing and communication.41 A broader view can be taken by looking at services that can be, but are not necessarily, delivered remotely over ICT networks.These are called digitally-enabled or digitally-deliverable services: They include digital services as well as "activities that can be specified, performed, delivered, evaluated and consumed electronically." 42 Identifying potentially ICT-enabled services does not tell us with certainty whether the services are actually traded digitally.But the U.S. Commerce Department notes that "these service categories are the ones in which digital technologies present the most opportunity to transform the relationship between buyer and seller from the traditional in-person delivery mode to a digital one," which means a digital transaction is likely and thus can offer a rough indication of the potential for digital trade.43 Growth in digitally-deliverable services trade cushioned the pandemic's blow to overall services trade.Global exports of digitally-deliverable services grew from around $3.3 trillion in 2019 to $3.8 trillion in 2021.This 8.4% growth helped to offset a sharp 11.8% decline in exports of other services during this pandemic period.As a result, overall services trade fell by 3.5%, much less than would otherwise have happened.Digitallydeliverable services accounted for about 63% of global services exports.44 Germany was the top global importer of digital services in 2021, followed by the United States and France.Ireland was the top global exporter of digital services, followed by India and China (Table 6 ).Considering the broader class of digitallydeliverable services, the United States was the largest global exporter and importer in 2021 (Table 7) .As with digital services, most of the top 10 exporters and importers of digitally-deliverable services in 2021 were developed countries.Ireland's high rankings underscore both its preferred location for many multinational companies, and its high reliance on digital trade.Its imports of digitally-deliverable services were equivalent to 64%, and its exports 63%, of its GDP.Digitally-enabled services are not just exported directly, they are used in manufacturing and to produce goods and services for export.Over half of digitally-enabled services imported by the United States from the European Union (EU) is used to produce U.S. products for export, and vice versa, thus generating an additional valueadded eff ect on trade that is not easily captured in standard metrics.45 In 2021, U.S exports of digital services totaled $89.4 billion, while U.S. digital services imports were $51.2 billion, resulting in a trade in a U.S. digital services trade surplus of $38.2 billion.U.S. trade in digitally-deliverable services was much higher: exports of $613.0 billion and imports of $350.4 billion.The resulting U.S. digitallydeliverable trade surplus of $262.6 billion was $41 billion (18%) more than in 2020.46 The UK was the U.S.' top overall trading partner in digitally-deliverable services, and its largest source of digitally-deliverable services imports.Ireland maintained its position as the top recipient country for U.S. exports of digitally-deliverable services for the third year in a row.Both countries also registered the largest increases in both imports and exports of digitally-deliverable services with the United States.47 In terms of world regions, Europe and the U.S. remain each other's main commercial trading partners in digitally-deliverable services.In 2021, the United States exported $283 billion in digitally-deliverable services to Europe -more than double what it exported to the entire Asia-Pacifi c region, and more than combined U.S. exports of digitally-deliverable services to the Asia-Pacifi c ($136 billion), Latin America and other Western Hemisphere ($111 billion), and the Middle East ($17 billion).In 2020, the 27 EU member states collectively exported €1.0 trillion and imported €1.0 trillion in digitally-enabled services to countries both inside and outside the EU (See Tables 9 and 10 ).Excluding intra-EU trade, EU member states exported €551 billion and imported €594.5 billion in digitally-enabled services, resulting in a defi cit of €43.3 billion for these services.Digitally-enabled services represented 61% of all EU27 services exports to non-EU27 countries and 68% of all EU services imports from non-EU countries.In 2020, the United States accounted for 22% of the EU27's digitally-enabled services exports to non-EU27 countries, and 34% of EU27 digitally-enabled services imports from non-Europe and the U.S. remain each other's main commercial trading partners in digitally-deliverable services.EU27 countries.48 The United States purchased €122.1 billion, according to Eurostat data for 2020, making it the largest country for imports of EU27 digitally-enabled services exports -ahead of even the United Kingdom (€121.1 billion).The entire region of Asia and Oceania imported just slightly more than the U.S. (€138.1 billion).In 2020, EU member states imported just over €1.0 trillion in digitally-enabled services, according to Eurostat data.41% originated from other EU member states (See Table 10 ).Another 20% (€204.7 billion) came from the United States, making it the largest supplier of these services.The EU imports of these services from the U.S. were almost double imports from the UK (€114.2 billion).and software, underscoring how integral such transatlantic inputs are to production processes in each economy.Financial services comprise the third largest digitally-enabled services export category.The digital economy has transformed the way trade in both goods and services is conducted across the Atlantic and around the world.Even more important, however, is the delivery of digital services by U.S. and European foreign affi liates -another indicator reinforcing the importance of foreign direct investment, rather than trade, as the major driver of transatlantic commerce.Country 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 Canada 3,595 4,140 3,971 5,996 6,316 7,135 7,595 7,401 8,487 8,342 9,161 8,991 9,403 9, Electronic commerce (e-commerce), which usually refers to transactions in which goods or services are ordered over a computer network (e.g., over the Internet), off ers a second window into transatlantic digital connections.55 Here again we run into some defi nitional and data challenges.Most estimates of e-commerce do not distinguish whether such commerce is domestic or international.Many metrics do not make it clear whether they cover all modes of e-commerce or only the leading indicators of business-tobusiness (B2B) and business-to-consumer (B2C) e-commerce.Finally, there are no offi cial data on the value of cross-border e-commerce sales broken down by mode; offi cial statistics on e-commerce are sparse and usually based on surveys rather than on real data.56 Nevertheless, we can evaluate and compare many diff erent estimates and surveys that have been conducted.According to UNCTAD, global e-commerce was worth $26.7 trillion globally in 2020 -equivalent to 30% of global gross domestic product.57 When most people hear the term 'e-commerce,' they think of consumers buying things from businesses via websites, social networks, crowdsourcing platforms, or mobile apps.These business-to-consumer transactions (B2C), however, pale in comparison to businessto-business (B2B) e-commerce.In 2022 B2B e-commerce was estimated to exceed $22 trillion and account for the vast majority of global e-commerce.58 By 2028 the global B2B e-commerce market is slated to reach a value of $25.65 trillion, over three times more than the B2C market, which is expected to total $7.65 trillion.59 B2B e-commerce sales were estimated to total $1.67 trillion in the United States and $1.33 trillion in Europe in 2022, and are projected to reach $2.25 trillion and $1.8 trillion, respectively, in 2025.60 While B2B e-commerce accounts for the bulk of global e-commerce, most B2B e-commerce does not cross a border.Most B2B e-commerce users are manufacturers or wholesalers who are dependent on physically moving goods, and often heavy freight; the lack of freight digitalization ultimately poses a barrier to crossborder B2B e-commerce.The sheer volume of B2B e-commerce, however, means it still is the most important component of cross-border e-commerce sales.61 Including all types of e-commerce, the United States was the top market in the world in the pre-pandemic year of 2019, for which there is the latest comparable data.U.S. online sales there were 2.8 times higher than in Japan and 3.7 times higher than in China.North America and Europe accounted for six of the top 10 e-commerce countries (Table 15 ).China's large B2C e-commerce market refl ects its billion-plus population.China is underweight, however, when it comes to B2B e-commerce.When it comes to cross-border B2C e-commerce sales, China and the United States led in terms of total value, while the UK led in terms of B2C e-commerce as a share of overall goods exports (Table 16) .62 Cross-border e-commerce revenues (excluding travel) in Europe reached €171 billion in 2021, an increase of 17% compared to 2020.Among 16 prominent European ecommerce markets, 25.5% of total B2C turnover was cross-border in 2020, for which there is the latest comparable data.Cross-border turnover accounted for 35% or more of total ecommerce turnover for Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Norway, Portugal and Switzerland.63 One likely eff ect of Brexit, with its accompanying cross-border complications related to new tax provisions, import duties, and logistics adjustments, was that UK cross-border B2C e-commerce sales dropped by 12% in 2021, falling to €29 billion from €33 billion in 2020.The UK lost its traditional position to Germany as Europe's top cross-border B2C e-commerce country.Whereas UK retailers accounted for one of every fi ve of the top 500 European cross-border e-commerce companies in 2020, they accounted for only one in 68 in 2021 -a decline of 32%.64 Platform companies that connect individuals and companies directly to each other to trade products and services continue to reshape the U.S. and European economies, as well as the commercial connections between them.Platforms have swiftly become a prominent business model in the transatlantic and global economy, both by matching supply and demand in real time and at unprecedented scale, and by connecting code and content producers to develop applications and software such as operating systems or technology standards.65 Platform models have risen so quickly over the past two decades that by 2019, platform companies accounted for 7 of the 10 most valuable global fi rms.66 By 2025, platform models are projected to expand to around $60 trillion, or nearly one-third of all global commerce.67 Size matters in the platform economy.The biggest are U.S. companies, which account for about two-thirds of the global platform economy.Next come Chinese companies.European platform companies on average are markedly smaller than their U.S. and Chinese counterparts, and together represent only 3% of global market value (Table 17) .The dramatic rise of U.S. and Chinese platform companies has generated considerable concern among Europeans that they may be missing out on a major economic transformation.Europe certainly faces some challenges.However, size is not everything.Platform economics have rewarded entrepreneurship and the adoption of new business models.Those who can develop both their digital and their entrepreneurial ecosystems stand to profi t greatly from the platform revolution.The Digital Platform Economy Index, which draws on 112 indicators that integrate digital and entrepreneurial ecosystems gauges, goes beyond size to off er a more diff erentiated view of digital platform-based ecosystem performance (Table 18 ).According to this Index, North American and European countries account for 9 of the top 10, and 17 of the top 20, countries when it comes to combined digital and entrepreneurial ecosystem development.China's brand of state-driven capitalism ranks highly in terms of building digital ecosystems, but lags behind the leaders when it comes to digital entrepreneurship.68 The leading countries not only host digital multi-sided platforms, they rank highly in terms of digital technology entrepreneurship, digital infrastructure governance, and "digital user citizenship".In the end, it is Europe's larger ecosystem that is likely to shape its future in the platform economy.Another lens through which we can better understand transatlantic digital connections is to appreciate the role of cross-border data flows, which not only contribute more to global growth than trade in goods, they underpin and enable virtually every other kind of cross-border flow.70 Transatlantic data flows are critical to enabling the $7.1 trillion EU-U.S. economic relationship.They account for more than half of Europe's data flows and about half of U.S. data flows globally.Over 90% of EU-based firms transfer data to and from the United States.71 However, despite the broad recognition of its value, and the need to develop appropriate policy frameworks, there is still no consensus method for empirically determining the value of data.72 One reason is that data is a special resource different than goods and services.UNCTAD calls cross-border data flows "a new kind of international economic flow, which lead to a new form of global interdependence".73 Data flows are not necessarily a proxy for commercial links, since data traffic is not always related to commercial transactions.74 Knowing the volume of data flows does not necessarily provide insight on the economic value of their content.The BEA puts it succinctly: "Streaming a video might be of relatively little monetary value but use several gigabytes of data, while a financial transaction could be worth millions of dollars but use little data".75 In addition, commercial transactions do not always accompany data, and data do not always accompany commercial transactions.For instance, multinational companies often send valuable, but non-monetized, data to their affiliates.76 User-generated content on blogs and on YouTube drives very high volumes of internet traffic both within countries and across borders, but consumers pay for very little of this content.Since it does not involve a monetary transaction, the significant value that this content generates does not show up in economic or trade statistics.77 In short, data flows are commercially significant, yet their extent, as well as their commercial value, are hard to measure and are in constant flux.Transatlantic data flows account for more than half of Europe's data flows and about half of U.S. data flows globally.Data flows are critical to the transatlantic economy, yet U.S.-EU regulatory differences have generated legal uncertainties regarding the transfer of personal data.In July 2020, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) invalidated the Privacy Shield framework that enabled over 5,000 mostly small-and mediumsized enterprises to transfer personal data for commercial purposes.This prompted renewed negotiations that led to the EU-U.S. Data Privacy Framework (DPF) announced by Presidents Biden and von der Leyen in March 2022.Six months later, President Biden issued an Executive Order that strengthened principles-based privacy and civil liberties safeguards for U.S. intelligence activities, and created an independent and binding mechanism that individuals can use to challenge violations of these principles.In December, the European Commission issued a draft decision that these protections are "essentially equivalent" to those provided within the EU when the personal data of Europeans is transferred to the United States.However, such determinations are based on self-compliance certification schemes similar to those invalidated by the CJEU.As a result, the DPF, like its predecessors, is likely to face legal challenges from within the EU.78 EU-based firms transferring data to and from the U.S. Over 90% Cross-Region Data Flows Globally, the most intense and valuable crossregion data fl ows continue to run between North America and Europe.They are also almost certainly the most valuable, even if their worth is diffi cult to measure.The OECD devised metrics to determine the most active countries when it comes to delivering products across borders through data fl ows, as opposed to considering all transactions facilitated through data fl ows.It determined that the United States is a major hub for international trade in products delivered through data fl ows, and that France, Germany, India, Ireland, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom also feature heavily in trade underpinned by data, all ahead of China ( (1) "ISIC J production", or trade in products produced by firms classified in ISIC section J (Information and Communication); (2) "ISIC J products," or trade in the products mainly associated with firms classified in ISIC section J but including production by firms classified in other sectors; (3) "Digitally deliverable services," or "potentially ICT-enabled products" per UNCTAD (2015); and (4) "Digitisable products," or products within the WTO HS commodity classification per Banga (2019 The hard-wiring of the transatlantic digital landscape continues to evolve.One key development is the shift in providers of data centers and cloud-like services from European and U.S. telecommunication companies and related data-center management enterprises to "hyperscalers," mainly from the United States.Traditional data centers are centralized facilities that use computing and networking systems and equipment to store data and to enable users to access those resources.Now, the opportunity to use applications that work together via the web and the cloud has given birth to more costeff ective hyperscale data centers that can store more data and scale up or down in quick response to shifting demand for computing tasks.Many commentators simplify the term "hyperscalers" to refer to the three largest providers: Amazon Web Services (AWS), Microsoft Azure, and Google Cloud.These three fi rms account for about two-thirds of hyperscale data market share.Nonetheless, other hyperscalers include Meta, Oracle, Apple, IBM, Scaleway, Switch, Alibaba, Huawei, QTS, Digital Realty Trust, Equinix and SAP.81 Hyperscale data centers accounted for more than half of all installed data-center servers and total data center traffi c in 2021.The global hyperscale data center market is slated to grow by $107.60 billion between 2021-2025.There are now more than 700 hyperscale data centers around the world, double the amount of fi ve years ago.That number is expected to top 1,000 at the end of 2024 and reach 1,200 by the end of 2026.82 The United States currently accounts for over 53% of the world's operational hyperscale infrastructure, measured by critical IT load.83 More than one-third of U.S. hyperscale capacity is located in one state -Virginia.84 Virginia has far more hyperscale data center capacity than either China or all of Europe.Much of that is in Northern Virginia, along the border with Washington, DC.The second-largest concentration of hyperscale infrastructure is in the western United States, primarily Oregon and California.The U.S. Midwest follows, with large concentrations of hyperscale infrastructure in Iowa and Ohio.85 The other half of global hyperscale infrastructure is relatively evenly split between China, Europe, and the rest of the world.In Europe, the leading country markets for hyperscale infrastructure are Ireland and the Netherlands, followed by Germany and the UK.Two other trends have the potential to mitigate such concerns, depending on how they unfold: migration to the "edge;" and the evolution of "cloud-as-a-service" to "cloud-as-a-product".Today, most cloud computing still happens in centralized rather than decentralized data centers.By 2025, this trend will reverse: 80% of all data is expected to be processed in smart devices closer to the user, known as edge computing.A few enormous data centers may still be built, but the more pervasive reality will be the emergence of thousands of small data centers distributed more evenly across geographies.This could open opportunities for European providers to offer multi-cloud options that ensure local control over data with the amplified possibilities that come from hyperscaled connections.Cloud/edge computing is likely to be critical to the EU's ability to realize its European Green Deal, particularly in areas such as farming, mobility, buildings and manufacturing.90 These opportunities are likely to be influenced by the evolution of the cloud from being a platform on which a business runs, to becoming the product itself.Rather than considering hyperscalers as direct competitors, some European telecoms operators and companies in a range of other businesses now see their biggest opportunities in the cloud building on top of the basic infrastructure already rolled out by U.S. companies.For instance, Siemens is building an ambitious "industrial cloud platform" on top of the basic cloud infrastructure provided by AWS, to enable it to become a key player in digital industrial manufacturing services.Thales, a French defense company, has formed a company in cooperation with Google Cloud to operate three "trusted cloud" hyperscale data centers in France.Other examples include Vodaphone's multi-year strategic partnership with Google, and an alliance between AWS and European digital company Atos.91 The Digital Atlantic Seascape Land-based digital hubs are connected to seabased digital spokes -roughly 500 undersea fiber optic cables that transmit 95% of all intercontinental telecommunication traffic, carry an estimated $10 trillion worth of financial transactions every day, and serve as the backbone for the global internet.92 Elon Musk's Starlink may have popularized the idea of satellite internet, but satellites cannot compete with submarine cables when it comes to digital communication capacity, speed, or transaction time (latency).They transmit less than one-half of one percent of such traffic.93 Subsea cables serve as an additional proxy for the ties that bind continents.Despite uncertain economic growth prospects for many countries, demand for international bandwidth continues to be strong.Globally, the market for submarine fiber optic cables is estimated to reach $30.8 billion by 2026, growing at an annual rate of 14.3%.94 The transatlantic data seaway is the busiest and most competitive in the world.Submarine cables in the Atlantic already carry 55% more data than transpacific routes, and with new capacity buildout, that ratio is tilting further in favor of the Atlantic.This meteoric rise in transatlantic bandwidth growth is being driven by individuals and businesses switching to cloud and web-based services.Based on current trends, demand could outpace design capacity growth by 2025 (Table 22) .97 In 2022, total transatlantic capacity was boosted by 70% just by two new powerful transatlantic cables: Grace Hopper, which now extends 6,250 km from New York to the Cornish seaside resort town of Bude in the UK and 6,300 km from New York to Bilbao in Spain; and Amitié, which now connects Massachusetts with Bude and with Le Porge in France across 6,600 km of subsea terrain.98 The The Hyper-Providers In 2010, the vast majority of international cable capacity was used by telecommunications companies, governments, and researcheducational networks.Only 6.3% was consumed by private network providers of content and cloud services.By 2021, the numbers had flipped: content providers accounted for 69% of used international bandwidth globally and for 91% of used capacity on transatlantic routes.Moreover, the content providers now build and either wholly or partially own those cables themselves.108 They are largely responsible for the new surge in global subsea digital capacity, and their densest connections are between North America and Europe (Table 24) Bypassing the Internet The rise of private content providers as drivers of submarine cable traffic is related to yet another significant yet little understood phenomenon shaping the transatlantic digital economy: more and more companies are working to bypass the public internet as a place to do business in favor of private channels that can facilitate the direct electronic exchange of data among companies.109 This move is exponentially increasing demand for "interconnection" -direct, private digital data exchanges that bypasses the public internet -and is another fundamental driver behind the proliferation of transatlantic cable systems.Private interconnection bandwidth is not only distinct from public internet traffic, it is already 9 times larger and is slated to grow much more quickly.110 The public internet will remain a pervasive force in most people's lives and a key to digitallydelivered services, e-commerce and the platform economy.111 Yet private interconnection is rising alongside the public internet as a powerful vehicle for business.And as we have shown here, its deepest links are across the Atlantic."Cross-border data flows: Designing a global architecture for growth and innovation," Zurich Insurance, 2022, https://www.zurich.com/en/knowledge/topics/digital-data-and-cyber/whycross-border-data-flows-matter.9 GSMA Intelligence, "Digital transformation in a post-pandemic future," 2022.September 22, 2022.14 McKinsey & Co., "Digital twins: The Foundation of the enterprise metaverse," October 22, 2022, https://www.mckinsey.com/capabilities/mckinsey-digital/our-insights/digital-twins-thefoundation-of-the-enterprise-metaverse.For more, see Mark Sullivan, "What the metaverse will (and won't) be, according to 28 experts," Fast Company, October 26, 2021, https:// www.fastcompany.com/90678442/what-is-the-metaverse; The Economist, "22 emerging technologies to watch in 2022," November 8, 2021, https://www.economist.com/the-worldahead/2021/11/08/what-next-22-emerging-technologies-to-watch-in-2022.15 Simon Bentley and Tony Murdzhev, "Accelerating Sustainability With Virtual Twins," Accenture, January 26, 2021, https://www.accenture.com/us-en/blogs/industry-digitization/ accelerating-sustainability-with-virtual-twins.Also "Top 7 IoT Trends That Will Shape the Digital World in 2023," Emeritus.org, December 9, 2022, https://emeritus.org/blog/technologyprogram-iot-trends-2023/; Peter Bilello, "Outlook 2023: Digital Twins Will No Longer Be an Option," Engineering.com, November 22, 2022, https://www.engineering.com/story/outlook-2023-digital-twins-will-no-longer-be-an-option; Bishwadeep Mitra, "How Digital Twin Solutions Affect Business: The Next Digital Transformation," Emeritus, November 9, 2022, https:// emeritus.org/blog/technology-what-is-a-digital-twin/; Oliver Peckham, "Europe's Digital Twins for Earth Kick Off, Crown Jewel Supercomputers in Tow," HPCWire, October 19, 2022, https://www.hpcwire.com/2022/10/19/europes-digital-twins-for-earth-kick-off-crown-jewel-supercomputers-in-tow/; Julie Pattison-Gordon, "Can a Digital Twin of Earth Give Better Climate Insights? Government Technology, November 14, 2022, https://www.govtech.com/products/can-a-digital-twin-of-earth-give-better-climate-insights. https://www.geospatialworld. net/prime/digital-twin-of-earth-to-aid-climate-change-studies/; Bernard Marr, "The Best Examples Of Digital Twins Everyone Should Know About," Forbes, June 20, 2022, https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2022/06/20/the-best-examples-of-digital-twins-everyone-should-know-about/. 16 Pak Yiu, Dylan Loh and Francesca Regaldo, "'Crypto winter' to 'ice age'?What 2023 holds for digital assets," Nikkei Asia, December 30, 2022, https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Business-Spotlight/Crypto-winter-to-ice-age-What-2023-holds-for-digital-assets; Bank for International Settlements, "The future monetary system," June 2022, https://www.bis.org/publ/arpdf/ ar2022e3.pdf; David J. Farber and Dan Gillmor, "Cryptocurrencies remain a gamble best avoided," Nikkei Asia, February 5, 2022, https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/Cryptocurrenciesremain-a-gamble-best-avoided. 17 See Bank for International Settlements, "Using CBDCs across borders: lessons from practical experiments," June 2022, https://www.bis.org/publ/othp51.pdf; Maria Demertzis, "Is there social added value in digital currencies?"Presentation at the 10th Meeting of the Fintech Working Group, Bruegel, November 29, 2022, https://www.bruegel.org/sites/default/ files/2022-12/Retail%20CBDCs%20and%20private%20crypto%20solutions%20Presenation%20EP%20November%202022_0.pdf; Siddharth Venkataramakrishnan and Martin Arnold, "Report suggests bright future for central bank digital currencies," Financial Times, June 30, 2022. 18 U.S. Federal Reserve, "CBDC: Monetary/Digital -Money and Payments: The U.S. Dollar in the Age of Digital Transformation," January 20, 2022, https://www.federalreserve.gov/ publications/files/money-and-payments-20220120.pdf; U.S. Department of the Treasury, "The Future of Money and Payments," September, 2022, https://home.treasury.gov/system/ files/136/Future-of-Money-and-Payments.pdf; U.S. Department of the Treasury, "Assessing the Impact of New Entrant Non-bank Firms on Competition in Consumer Finance Markets," Report to the White House Competition Council, November 2022, https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/Assessing-the-Impact-of-New-Entrant-Nonbank-Firms.pdf. 19 Steven Levy, "Welcome to the Wet Hot AI Chatbot Summer," Wired, January 6, 2023; John Thornhill, "Can generative AI's stimulating powers extend to productivity?"Financial Times, January 26, 2023; Erin Griffith and Cade Metz, "A New Area of A.I. Booms, Even Amid the Tech Gloom," New York Times, January 7, 2023; Michael Chui, Roger Roberts, and Lareina Yee, "Generative AI is here: How tools like ChatGPT could change your business," McKinsey & Co., December 20, 2022, https://www.mckinsey.com/capabilities/quantumblack/our-insights/ generative-ai-is-here-how-tools-like-chatgpt-could-change-your-business. 20 See previous years of this survey. Also Daniel S. Hamilton, The Transatlantic Digital Economy 2017 (Washington, DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2017); Digital Economy Compass 2018, Statista.com, file:///C:/Users/Owner/Downloads/study_id52194_digital-economy-compass.pdf; International Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF), "The Task Ahead of US," http://www2.itif.org/2019-task-ahead.pdf. 21 Ugur Sahin and Ozlem Tureci, "The post-covid future of mRNA therapies," The Economist, November 8, 2021, https://www.economist.com/the-world-ahead/2021/11/08/ugur-sahin-and-ozlem-tureci-on-the-future-of-mrna-therapies; Gina Vitale, "Moderna/Merck cancer vaccine shows promise in trials," Chemical and Engineering News, December 20, 2022, https://cen.acs.org/pharmaceuticals/vaccines/ModernaMerck-cancer-vaccine-shows-promise/100/web/2022/12; McKinsey Global Institute, The Bio Revolution: Innovations transforming economies, societies, and our lives, May 2020, https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/life-sciences/our-insights/the-bio-revolution-innovations-transforming-economies-societies-and-our-lives. 22 Nick Webster, "How 3D printing is set to revolutionise reconstructive surgery," The National, October 7, 2022, https://www.thenationalnews.com/weekend/2022/10/07/how-3d-printingis-set-to-change-the-world-of-reconstructive-surgery/; Paul Hanaphy, "3D Printing Industry Review of the Year," 3D Printing Industry, December 24, 2022, https://3dprintingindustry.com/ news/3d-printing-industry-review-of-the-year-december-2022-219144/; Roni Caryn Rabin, "Doctors Transplant Ear of Human Cells, Made by 3-D Printer," New York Times, June 2, 2022. This overall number, while impressive, does not tell us much about the reasons for such investment or the countries where U.S. companies focus their investments. As we have stated in previous surveys, official statistics blur some important distinctions when it comes to the nature of transatlantic investment flows. Recent research, however, helps us understand better two important phenomena: "round-tripping" and "phantom FDI". Round-tripping investments go from an original investor, for instance in the United States, to an ultimate destination in a country such as Germany, but flow first from the United States to an intermediate country such as Luxembourg, and then from Luxembourg to Germany. Official statistics record this as a U.S.-Luxembourg flow or a Luxembourg-Germany flow. While Luxembourg may derive some economic benefit from that flow emanating originally from the United States, the ultimate beneficiary is in Germany. Applying this example to 2017, the year with the most recent data, official figures from the IMF indicate that FDI in Germany from the United States was around $90 billion, whereas research by economists at the IMF and University of Copenhagen that took account of these "round tripping" flows concluded that the stock of "real FDI" from the United States in Germany was actually almost $170 billion. Similarly, "real FDI" links from Germany to the United States are considerably higher than official statistics might indicate. All told, they estimated that "real FDI" bilateral links from Germany to the United States in that year topped $400 billion in 2017, whereas official statistics put that figure closer to $300 billion. This phenomenon continues to apply to these and other important bilateral investment links, such as those between the U.S. and the UK or the U.S. and France. In these and other instances, "real FDI" links are likely to be higher than standard measurements indicate. "Phantom" vs. "Real" FDI Since 2017, however, the role of off shore fi nancial centers has gradually declined, while that of large economies, particularly the United States, has increased. One contributing factor is likely to have been the U.S. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2018, which lowered incentives to keep profi ts in low-tax jurisdictions and led to a substantial U.S. repatriation of funds from foreign subsidiaries. Additionally, some fl ows to off shore fi nancial centers are likely to have been blunted by sustained international eff orts to reduce tax avoidance, like the OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profi t Shifting initiative, which has led 137 countries to reach agreement on a fair allocation of taxing rights and a global minimum eff ective tax at a uniform tax rate of 15%. In the aggregate, and extrapolating forward, about 54% of America's total FDI position in Europe was allocated to non-bank holding companies in 2020, meaning that less than half of the $3.7 trillion was invested in "real economy" industries such as mining, manufacturing, wholesale trade, fi nance, and professional and information services (See Box 6.1).Excluding holding companies, total U.S. FDI stock in Europe in 2020 amounted to $1.7 trillion -a much smaller fi gure.These fi gures illustrate the extremely volatile nature of U.S. FDI annual outfl ows.The cyclical challenge before Europe is substantial: Russia's war and energy shocks will exert considerable pressure on many economies.Consumers and businesses have been hammered by the spike in energy costs, although diversified supplies and public support mechanisms, along with falling prices, have helped alleviate some of the burden.That said, it is important to see the forest from the trees, and to recognize that, first, Europe on a standalone basis remains one of the largest and wealthiest economic entities in the world and, second, the region remains a critical cog in the corporate success of U.S. firms.Europe is home to more than 500 million people across the EU, the UK, Norway, Switzerland, Iceland and a host of eastern countries.This cohort accounted for roughly 23% of world output in 2021 -slightly lower than the U.S. share of 24%, but greater than that of China's (18%).On a purchasing power parity basis, Europe's share was greater than that of the United States but less than that of China in 2021.1950-1959 20,363 3,997 19.6 1960-1969 40,634 16,220 39.9 1970-1979 122,721 57,937 47.2 1980-1989 171,880 94,743 55.1 1990-1999 869,489 465,337 53.5 2000-2009 2,056 Investing in emerging markets such as China, India, and Brazil remains diffi cult, with indigenous barriers to growth (poor infrastructure, dearth of human capital, corruption, etc.) as well as policy headwinds (foreign exchange controls, tax preferences favoring local fi rms) reducing the overall attractiveness of these markets to multinationals.As shown in Table 5 Wealth drives consumption, with the EU+UK accounting for roughly 21% of global personal consumption expenditures in 2021.That's a lower share than that of the U.S. (30%) but well above that of China (12%), India (3.4%) and the BRICs combined (18.6%).Since 2000, personal consumption expenditures in the EU have almost doubled to roughly $9.6 trillion, representing an increasing market opportunity for large global corporations.Wealth in Europe is also correlated with a highly skilled and productive workforce, advanced innovation capabilities, and a world-class R&D infrastructure -underpinning the attractiveness of the EU to corporate America.The EU's labor force is not only more than twenty percent larger than America's; its labor force participation rate is more than ten percentage points higher (74.3%) than it is in the U.S. (62.4%).Finally, when it comes to skilled labor, Europe again leads the United States.To this point, in 2018, the last year of available data, the number of science and engineering graduates in the EU+UK totaled roughly 1 million, versus 760,000 in the U.S., according to the National Science Foundation.Since the U.S. economy is short of technology and scientifi c talent, accessing Europe's tech talent pool is critical to the long-term success of many American fi rms.Business-friendly policies surrounding property rights, the ability to obtain credit, employment regulations, starting a business and cross-border trade have been a major draw for foreign investors over the years.According to the International Institute for Management Development (IMD) latest World Competitiveness Rankings for 2022, fourteen European economies ranked in the top twenty-fi ve.Among the top ten, Denmark was ranked #1, followed by Switzerland (2), Sweden (4), the Netherlands (6), Finland (8) and Norway (9).Other factors, such as shared values, respect for the rule of law, credible institutions, advanced infrastructure, and strong fi nancial markets continue to set Europe apart when it comes to U.S. business investment.Finally, Europe continues to be a world leader when it comes to innovation and knowledgebased activities.According to the 2022 Global Innovation Index, eight European economies rank among the top 15 most innovative countries in the world (Table 6 ).(Table 6 ).Since R&D expenditures are a key driver of valueadded growth, it is interesting to note that EU-and UK-based organizations accounted for slightly more than one-fi fth of total global R&D in 2020 in purchasing-power parity terms.That lagged the share of the United States and China but exceeded the share of Japan and South Korea.Over the past two decades, China has steadily advanced its R&D capabilities, and is projected to overtake the United States as the top R&D spender in the world (Table 7) .Access to a large market On a country basis, German companies operating in Alabama represented 14% of total foreign affi liate employment in Alabama, with German multinationals supporting approximately 5,300 more jobs in 2020 than in 2012.Jobs directly supported by European investment.Total European-related jobs are likely to be higher, because these figures do not include jobs created by trade flows, indirect employment effects through distributors or suppliers, or via non-equity arrangements such as strategic alliances, joint ventures, or other deals.0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 Jobs directly supported by European investment.Total European-related jobs are likely to be higher, because these figures do not include jobs created by trade flows, indirect employment effects through distributors or suppliers, or via non-equity arrangements such as strategic alliances, joint ventures, or other deals.2012 2020 0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 Jobs directly supported by European investment.Total European-related jobs are likely to be higher, because these figures do not include jobs created by trade flows, indirect employment effects through distributors or suppliers, or via non-equity arrangements such as strategic alliances, joint ventures, or other deals.2012 2020 0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 On a country basis, U.K. companies operating in Washington D.C. represented 36% of total foreign affi liate employment in DC, with U.K. multinationals supporting approximately 1,700 fewer jobs in 2020 than in 2012.Jobs directly supported by European investment.Total European-related jobs are likely to be higher, because these figures do not include jobs created by trade flows, indirect employment effects through distributors or suppliers, or via non-equity arrangements such as strategic alliances, joint ventures, or other deals.2012 2020 0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 On a country basis, German companies operating in Georgia represented 12% of total foreign affi liate employment in Georgia, with German multinationals supporting approximately 11,000 more jobs in 2020 than in 2012.Jobs directly supported by European investment.Total European-related jobs are likely to be higher, because these figures do not include jobs created by trade flows, indirect employment effects through distributors or suppliers, or via non-equity arrangements such as strategic alliances, joint ventures, or other deals.2012 2020 0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 Jobs directly supported by European investment.Total European-related jobs are likely to be higher, because these figures do not include jobs created by trade flows, indirect employment effects through distributors or suppliers, or via non-equity arrangements such as strategic alliances, joint ventures, or other deals.0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 20% of the total 20% of the total 13% Jobs directly supported by European investment.Total European-related jobs are likely to be higher, because these figures do not include jobs created by trade flows, indirect employment effects through distributors or suppliers, or via non-equity arrangements such as strategic alliances, joint ventures, or other deals.0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 100,000 0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 100,000 Jobs directly supported by European investment.Total European-related jobs are likely to be higher, because these figures do not include jobs created by trade flows, indirect employment effects through distributors or suppliers, or via non-equity arrangements such as strategic alliances, joint ventures, or other deals.2012 2020 0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 Jobs directly supported by European investment.Total European-related jobs are likely to be higher, because these figures do not include jobs created by trade flows, indirect employment effects through distributors or suppliers, or via non-equity arrangements such as strategic alliances, joint ventures, or other deals.2012 2020 0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 Jobs directly supported by European investment.Total European-related jobs are likely to be higher, because these figures do not include jobs created by trade flows, indirect employment effects through distributors or suppliers, or via non-equity arrangements such as strategic alliances, joint ventures, or other deals.2012 2020 0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 Jobs products including transportation equipment, electronic products, chemicals and paper products.Petroleum & coal products represent 28% of Maine's total imports from Europe, followed by machinery and transportation equipment.Jobs directly supported by European investment.Total European-related jobs are likely to be higher, because these figures do not include jobs created by trade flows, indirect employment effects through distributors or suppliers, or via non-equity arrangements such as strategic alliances, joint ventures, or other deals.*Netherlands employment data suppressed to avoid disclosure of individual company data.Range of 10,000 -24,999 employees given.0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 Jobs directly supported by European investment.Total European-related jobs are likely to be higher, because these figures do not include jobs created by trade flows, indirect employment effects through distributors or suppliers, or via non-equity arrangements such as strategic alliances, joint ventures, or other deals.2012 2020 0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 Jobs directly supported by European investment.Total European-related jobs are likely to be higher, because these figures do not include jobs created by trade flows, indirect employment effects through distributors or suppliers, or via non-equity arrangements such as strategic alliances, joint ventures, or other deals.2012 2020 0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 Jobs directly supported by European investment.Total European-related jobs are likely to be higher, because these figures do not include jobs created by trade flows, indirect employment effects through distributors or suppliers, or via non-equity arrangements such as strategic alliances, joint ventures, or other deals.2012 2020 0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 Jobs directly supported by European investment.Total European-related jobs are likely to be higher, because these figures do not include jobs created by trade flows, indirect employment effects through distributors or suppliers, or via non-equity arrangements such as strategic alliances, joint ventures, or other deals.0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 * Data unavailable for latest year.Jobs (16.7%) 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 50% of the total 50% of the total 20% 10% 10% 10% Jobs directly supported by European investment.Total European-related jobs are likely to be higher, because these figures do not include jobs created by trade flows, indirect employment effects through distributors or suppliers, or via non-equity arrangements such as strategic alliances, joint ventures, or other deals.0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 Jobs directly supported by European investment.Total European-related jobs are likely to be higher, because these figures do not include jobs created by trade flows, indirect employment effects through distributors or suppliers, or via non-equity arrangements such as strategic alliances, joint ventures, or other deals.2012 2020 0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 Jobs directly supported by European investment.Total European-related jobs are likely to be higher, because these figures do not include jobs created by trade flows, indirect employment effects through distributors or suppliers, or via non-equity arrangements such as strategic alliances, joint ventures, or other deals.2012 2020 0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 2012 2020 0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 Jobs directly supported by European investment.Total European-related jobs are likely to be higher, because these figures do not include jobs created by trade flows, indirect employment effects through distributors or suppliers, or via non-equity arrangements such as strategic alliances, joint ventures, or other deals.2012 2020 0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 Jobs directly supported by European investment.Total European-related jobs are likely to be higher, because these figures do not include jobs created by trade flows, indirect employment effects through distributors or suppliers, or via non-equity arrangements such as strategic alliances, joint ventures, or other deals.2012 2020 0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 2012 2020 0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 America's direct investment position in Austria has declined since hitting a peak in 2013.Austria's investment stake in the U.S. now exceeds America's investment in Austria.However, American affi liates employed more workers in Austria than Austrian fi rms employed in the U.S. in 2021.Foreign direct investment position, historic-cost basis, 2000-2021.Note: Dotted line indicates that data has been suppressed for a particular year to avoid disclosure of individual company data.Negative FDI positions can occur when the loans from the affiliate to the parent company exceed the equity and debt investments from the parent to the affiliate, or if a foreign affiliate incurs sufficiently large losses.Foreign direct investment position, historic-cost basis, 2000-2021.Note: Dotted line indicates that data has been suppressed for a particular year to avoid disclosure of individual company data.Negative FDI positions can occur when the loans from the affiliate to the parent company exceed the equity and debt investments from the parent to the affiliate, or if a foreign affiliate incurs sufficiently large losses.Jobs directly supported by majority-owned affiliates.Estimates for 2021.Total U.S.-related jobs are likely to be higher, because these figures do not include jobs created by trade flows, indirect employment effects through distributors or suppliers, or via non-equity arrangements such as strategic alliances, joint ventures, or other deals.Cyprus FDI Position in the U.S. Foreign direct investment position, historic-cost basis, 2000-2021.Note: Dotted line indicates that data has been suppressed for a particular year to avoid disclosure of individual company data.Negative FDI positions can occur when the loans from the affiliate to the parent company exceed the equity and debt investments from the parent to the affiliate, or if a foreign affiliate incurs sufficiently large losses.Greece's investment ties with the U.S. have declined in recent years after rebounding temporarily following the global fi nancial crisis.In 2020, America's foreign direct investment position in Greece was just $300 million, down from a recent peak of $1.2 billion in 2017.Meanwhile, Greece's FDI position in the U.S. has increased in recent years.Estimated U.S. affi liate sales in Greece of $5.8 billion were three times greater than sales of Greek affi liates in the U.S. ($1.9 billion).Jobs directly supported by majority-owned affiliates.Estimates for 2021.Total U.S.-related jobs are likely to be higher, because these figures do not include jobs created by trade flows, indirect employment effects through distributors or suppliers, or via non-equity arrangements such as strategic alliances, joint ventures, or other deals.America's FDI position has been relatively fl at over the past two decades, while Italian investment in the U.S. has risen steadily, up almost 400% since 2000.In 2021, Italy benefi ted more with regards to affi liate sales, value added and employment.For example, value added by U.S. affi liates in Italy was three times the value added of Italian companies in the U.S. Also, affi liates of U.S.-owned companies supported about 150,000 more jobs in Italy than Italian multinationals supported in the U.S., according to 2021 estimates.Note: Dotted line indicates that data has been suppressed for a particular year to avoid disclosure of individual company data.*Latest year of available data.Negative FDI positions can occur when the loans from the affiliate to the parent company exceed the equity and debt investments from the parent to the affiliate, or if a foreign affiliate incurs sufficiently large losses.Note: Dotted line indicates that data has been suppressed for a particular year to avoid disclosure of individual company data.*Latest year of available data.Negative FDI positions can occur when the loans from the affiliate to the parent company exceed the equity and debt investments from the parent to the affiliate, or if a foreign affiliate incurs sufficiently large losses.Foreign direct investment position, historic-cost basis, 2000-2021.Note: Dotted line indicates that data has been suppressed for a particular year to avoid disclosure of individual company data.Malta FDI Position in the U.S. Billion $ Billion $ 3.0 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0 -0.5 3.0 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0 -0.5 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), 2021 Despite the country's tiny population (just 525,000 people), Malta has attracted a relatively large amount of foreign direct investment from the U.S.The investment position of the U.S. in Malta amounted to $2.3 billion in 2021.In addition, American investment directly supported jobs for roughly 1,700 workers in Malta, according to 2021 estimates.Meanwhile, Malta's direct investment position in the U.S. was $2.8 billion in 2021, which is markedly higher from its near-zero levels of investment prior to 2010.Jobs directly supported by majority-owned affiliates.Estimates for 2021.Total U.S.-related jobs are likely to be higher, because these figures do not include jobs created by trade flows, indirect employment effects through distributors or suppliers, or via non-equity arrangements such as strategic alliances, joint ventures, or other deals.Since 2011, the investment balance shifted in favor of the U.S., as Spain's economy was squeezed by a severe recession and resulting austerity measures.Since then, U.S. direct investment in Spain has slightly recovered, totaling $39 billion in 2021.Meanwhile, the U.S. has seen its inward FDI stock from Spain doubled since 2009.Prior to the 2020 Covid-19 recession, Spanish investment in the U.S. had increased every year since 2002.U.S. affi liates based in Spain employ about twice as many workers as Spanish affi liates employ in the U.S., according to 2021 estimates.Foreign direct investment position, historic-cost basis, 2000-2021.Note: Dotted line indicates that data has been suppressed for a particular year to avoid disclosure of individual company data.-THE TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMY 2023 1.Remarkably Resilient: The Transatlantic Economy in 2023 -THE TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMY 2023 1.Remarkably Resilient: The Transatlantic Economy in 2023 -THE TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMY 2023 1.Remarkably Resilient: The Transatlantic Economy in 2023 -THE TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMY 2023 1.Remarkably Resilient: The Transatlantic Economy in 2023 -THE TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMY 2023 -THE TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMY 2023 -THE TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMY 2023 -THE TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMY 20233.Decoupling, Derisking and Diversifying: Rethinking Russia, China and Global Supply Chains -THE TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMY 20233.Decoupling, Derisking and Diversifying: Rethinking Russia, China and Global Supply Chains -THE TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMY 2023 -THE TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMY 2023 -THE TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMY 2023 -THE TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMY 2023 -THE TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMY 2023 -THE TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMY 2023 -THE TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMY 2023 -THE TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMY 2023 -THE TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMY 2023 -THE TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMY 2023 -THE TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMY 2023 -THE TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMY 2023 -THE TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMY 2023	• 2022 was record-breaking on multiple fronts: -U.S.-Europe trade in goods reached an all-time high of $1.2 trillion.-U.S.-EU goods trade hit a record $909.5 billion, more than EU-China goods trade and 25% higher than U.S.-China goods trade.-U.S. company affiliates in Europe earned an estimated $325 billion, a record high, while European affiliates in the U.S. earned $151 billion, the second highest level ever.-U.S. exports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) to Europe hit their highest levels ever.The U.S. accounted for more than half of Europe's LNG imports, and Europe accounted for more than half of U.S. LNG exports to the world. •Trade alone is a misleading benchmark of international commerce; mutual investment dwarfs trade and is the real backbone of the transatlantic economy.The U.S. and Europe are each other's primary source and destination for foreign direct investment. •U.S. and European goods exports to the world (excluding intra-EU trade) accounted for 20% of global exports in 2021.But together they accounted for 66% of the outward stock and 66% of the inward stock of global FDI.Moreover, each partner has built up the great majority of that stock in the other economy.Mutual investment in the North Atlantic space is very large, dwarfs trade, and has become essential to U.S. and European jobs and prosperity. •Combined output of U.S. foreign affiliates in Europe (est.$670 billion) and of European foreign affiliates in the U.S. (est.$665 billion) in 2021 of $1.35 trillion was larger than the total output of such countries as Mexico, the Netherlands, or Indonesia. •U.S.-based foreign firms generated $347 billion in U.S. exports to the world in 2020; European firms accounted for 57% of the total.U.S-based German companies exported over $47 billion, followed by those from the UK ($42 billion) and the Netherlands ($38 billion). •U.S. foreign affiliate sales in Europe of $3.1 trillion in 2021 were 61% more than total U.S. global exports of $2.5 trillion and roughly half of total U.S. foreign affiliate sales globally. •Total transatlantic affiliate sales, estimated at $5.9 trillion in 2021, easily rank as the most integrated commercial partnership in the world. •Foreign investment and affiliate sales drive transatlantic trade.65% of U.S. imports from the EU+UK consisted of intra-firm trade in 2020 -much higher than U.S. intra-firm imports from Asia-Pacific nations (around 40%) and well above the global average (48%).Percentages are notably high for Ireland (85%), the Netherlands (74%) and Germany (69%). •Intra-firm trade also accounted for 39% of U.S. exports to the EU+UK, and 58% to the Netherlands, 38% to Germany and to the Netherlands, 35% to France and 31% to the UK. •Over many decades no place in the world has attracted more U.S. FDI than Europe.During the past decade Europe attracted 57.3% of total U.S. global investment -more than in any previous decade.We are early in this decade, but thus far, Europe's share of U.S. FDI outflows has actually increased to 64.3% of the total.Part of this dynamic reflects weakening U.S. investment flows to China. •Measured on a historic cost basis, the total stock of U.S. FDI in Europe was $4 trillion in 2021 -61% of the total U.S. global investment position and more than four times U.S. investment in the Asia-Pacific region ($957 billion).U.S. FDI in the UK alone in 2021 was over 8 times such investment in China. •New U.S. FDI in Europe in 2022 totaled $235 billion, 4% less than record-setting U.S. FDI in Europe of $244 billion in 2021. •In the first three quarters of 2022, U.S. companies invested $172 billion in Europe -10 times more than what they invested in the BRICs ($16.5 billion total in Brazil, Russia, India and China) and 26 times more than what they invested in China ($6.7 billion).THE TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMY 2023 -v • U.S. companies in the first nine months of 2022 earned an estimated $239 billion from their operations in times what they earned from operations in all of Asia. •Official figures can be misleading when it comes to the original source and the ultimate destination of FDI.For instance, Germany officially accounted for only 4% of U.S. FDI flows since 2010.Yet, much U.S. FDI flows into Germany from neighboring countries.Whereas official figures indicate that FDI stock in Germany from the U.S. in 2017 was $90 billion, "real FDI" stock from the U.S. to Germany was actually $170 billion.Similarly, "real FDI" links from Germany to the U.S. are considerably higher than official statistics might indicate.The same is true for other important bilateral investment links. •In 2020, U.S. FDI flows to nonbank holding companies in Europe rebounded sharply to $62.8 billion.Holding companies accounted for $2.9 trillion, or about 47% of the global U.S. outward FDI position of approximately $6.2 trillion, and 54% of total U.S. FDI stock in Europe. •Excluding holding companies, total U.S. FDI stock in Europe in 2020 amounted to $1.7 trillion -a much smaller figure but still more than 2.5 times larger than total U.S. investment in the Asia-Pacific region (FDI stock of $654 billion excluding holding companies). •From 2009-2021 Europe still accounted for over half of total U.S. FDI outflows globally and more than double the share to Asia when flows from holding companies are removed from the overall figures. •U.S. and UK firms accounted for 32% and 26%, respectively, of foreign acquisitions in the EU in 2021; Chinese companies accounted for 2%. •Of the top twenty global export platforms for U.S. multinationals in the world, nine are located in Europe.For U.S. companies, Ireland is the number one platform in the world from which their affiliates can reach foreign customers.Switzerland, ranked third, remains a key export platform and pan-regional distribution hub for U.S. firms. •In 2021 Europe accounted for roughly 63% -$19 trillion -of corporate America's total foreign assets globally.Largest shares: the UK (21%, $6.2 trillion in 2020) and the Netherlands (10%, $3.1 trillion in 2020). •America's asset base in Germany ($1.1 trillion in 2020) was more than a third larger than its asset base in all of South America and more than double its assets in China. •America's assets in Ireland ($2 trillion in 2020) were light years ahead of those in China ($487 billion). •Ireland has also become the number one export platform for U.S. affiliates in the entire world.Exports from U.S. affiliates based in Ireland reached $404 billion in 2020, about 5 times more than U.S. affiliate exports from China and about 3.5 times more than affiliate exports from Mexico. •Aggregate output of U.S. affiliates globally reached $1.4 trillion in 2021; Europe accounted for half. •U.S. affiliate output in Europe ($643 billion) in 2020 was 73% larger than affiliate output in the entire Asia-Pacific region ($383 billion).U.S. affiliate output in China ($78 billion) and India ($38 billion) lags behind U.S. affiliate output in the UK ($157 billion) and Ireland ($107 billion). •Sales of U.S. affiliates in Europe were roughly 70% larger than the sales of U.S. affiliates in the entire Asian region in 2020.Affiliate sales in the UK ($649 billion) were double total sales in South America.Sales in Germany ($343 billion) were roughly double combined sales in Africa and the Middle East. •Most trade today is conducted through intermediates, known as indirect trade.The United States, Germany, France and the Netherlands are four of the world's top five indirect traders.While conventional trade statistics portray China as the world's leading exporter, it ranks third in terms of indirect exports -and its share is falling. •45 of the 50 U.S. states, including the Pacific coast's largest state of California, export more goods to Europe than to China, in many cases by a wide margin. •Texas is the top U.S. state exporter of goods to Europe, followed by California, New York, New Jersey and Illinois. •In 2021 Utah exported 11 times more goods to Europe than to China.New York exported 8 times more, Florida 6.5 times more, Maryland 4.7 times more.Illinois, Missouri and New Jersey each exported 4 times more, Pennsylvania and Kentucky 3.7 times more, and Texas 3 times more.California exported twice as many goods to Europe as to China. •Germany was the top European export market for 23 U.S. states, the UK for 9, and Belgium for 6 in 2021.Germany was also the top source of European imports for 30 U.S. states; Switzerland was the leading European supplier for 6 states. •The U.S. and Europe are the two leading services economies in the world.The U.S. is the largest single country trader in services, while the EU is the largest trader in services among all world regions.The U.S. and EU are each other's most important commercial partners and major growth markets when it comes to services trade and investment.Moreover, deep transatlantic connections in services industries, provided by mutual investment flows, are the foundation for the global competitiveness of U.S. and European services companies. •Five of the top ten export markets for U.S. services are in Europe.Europe accounted for 41% of total U.S. services exports and for 42% of total U.S. services imports in 2021. •U.S. services exports to Europe reached a record $332 billion in 2021, a sharp rise from pandemic-year 2020.The U.S. had a $101 billion trade surplus in services with Europe in 2021, compared with its $219 billion trade deficit in goods with Europe. •U.S. imports of services from Europe rebounded in 2021 to $230 billion, from $197 billion in 2020.The UK, Germany, Switzerland, Ireland, and France are top services exporters to the U.S. • EU27 services trade with the U.S. of $702.12 billion in 2021 was 6 times EU-China services trade of $115.54 billion. •Moreover, foreign affiliate sales of services, or the delivery of transatlantic services by foreign affiliates, have exploded on both sides of the Atlantic over the past few decades and become far more important than exports. •Sales of services of U.S. affiliates in Europe totaled $997 billion, or 56% of the global total, in 2020 -3 times more than U.S. services exports to Europe of $332 billion. •Services by U.S. firms based in the UK and UK companies based in the US totaled $435.4 billion in 2020 -3.4 times greater than U.S.-UK overall trade in services of $116.3 billion.The contrast is even greater in terms of U.S.-German commercial ties: services by U.S. companies based in Germany and German firms based in the U.S. totaled $252.1 billion.That's 4.1 times U.S.-German services trade of $61.4 billion. •The UK alone accounted for 30% ($274 billion) of all U.S. affiliate services sales in Europe in 2020 -more than combined U.S. affiliate services sales in Latin America and the Caribbean ($158 billion), Africa ($15 billion) and the Middle East ($26 billion).Affiliate services sales in Ireland remained quite large -$172 billion. •European affiliate sales of services in the U.S. of $666 billion in 2020 were about one-third less than U.S. affiliate sales of services in Europe. •Nonetheless, European companies are the key provider of affiliate services in the U.S. ($170 billion in 2020).German affiliates led in terms of affiliate sales of services ($170 billion), followed closely by US-based UK firms ($161 billion). •European companies operating in the U.S. generated an estimated $680 billion in services sales in 2021 -roughly 3 times more than European services exports to the U.S. of $230 billion. •Transatlantic data flows are critical to enabling the $7.1 trillion EU-U.S. economic relationship.They account for more than half of Europe's data flows and about half of U.S. data flows globally.Over 90% of EU-based firms transfer data to and from the United States. •European and U.S. cities are major hubs of cross-border digital connectivity.Europe is the global leader, with tremendous connected international capacity.Frankfurt, London, Amsterdam and Paris substantially outpace North American and Asian cities. •The United States currently accounts for over 53% of the world's operational hyperscale infrastructure, measured by critical IT load.More than one-third of U.S. hyperscale capacity is located in one state -Virginia.Virginia has far more hyperscale data center capacity than either China or all of Europe. •Transatlantic cable connections are the densest and highest capacity routes, with the highest traffic, in the world.Submarine cables in the Atlantic carry 55% more data than transpacific routes. •The U.S. and Europe are each other's most important commercial partners when it comes to digitally-enabled services.The U.S. and the EU are also the two largest net exporters of digitally-enabled services to the world. •U.S. trade in digitally-deliverable services of $963.4 billion led the world in 2021, followed by that of the UK ($677.2 billion), Ireland ($639.9 billion), Germany ($454.7 billion), China ($359.3 billion), the Netherlands ($329.2 billion), and France ($312.5 billion). •In 2021 the U.S. registered a $262.6 billion trade surplus in digitally-enabled services with the world.Its main commercial partner was Europe, to which it exported $283.3 billion in digitally-enabled services and from which it imported $134.7 billion, generating a trade surplus with Europe in this area of $148.6 billion. •U.S. exports of digitally-enabled services to Europe were more than double U.S. digitally-enabled services exports to the entire Asia-Pacific region, and more than combined digitally-enabled services exports to the Asia-Pacific, Latin America and Other Western Hemisphere, and the Middle East. •In 2020, EU member states collectively exported €1 trillion and imported €1 trillion in digitally-enabled services to countries both inside and outside the EU.Excluding intra-EU trade, EU member states exported €551 billion and imported €594.5 billion, resulting in a deficit of €43.3 billion for these services.viii -THE TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMY 2023 • Digitally-enabled services represented 61% of all EU services exports to non-EU countries and 68% of all EU services imports from non-EU countries. •In the U.S. accounted for 22% of the EU's digitallyenabled services exports to non-EU countries, and 34% of EU digitally-enabled services imports from non-EU countries. •The U.S. purchased €122.1 billion, making it the largest recipient of EU27 digitally-enabled services exports -ahead of the UK (€121.1 billion) and just slightly behind the entire region of Asia and Oceania (€138.1 billion). •Digitally-enabled services are not just exported directly, they are used in manufacturing and to produce goods and services for export.Over half of digitally-enabled services imported by the U.S. from the EU is used to produce U.S. products for export, and vice versa. •In 2020, EU member states imported just over €1 trillion in digitally-enabled services.41% originated from other EU member states.Another 20% (€204.7 billion) came from the U.S., making it the largest supplier of these services.The EU imports of these services from the U.S. were almost double imports from the UK (€114.2 billion). •Even more important than both direct and value-added trade in digitally-enabled services, however, is the delivery of digital services by U.S. and European foreign affiliates.U.S. services supplied by affiliates abroad were $1.65 trillion, roughly 2.3 times global U.S. services exports of $726.43 billion.Moreover, half of all services supplied by U.S. affiliates abroad are digitally-enabled. •58% of the $998 billion in services provided in Europe by U.S. affiliates in 2019 was digitally-enabled. •U.S. affiliates in Europe supplied $585.5 billion in digitallyenabled services in 2019, more than double U.S. digitallyenabled exports to Europe. •European affiliates in the U.S. supplied $287 billion in digitally-enabled services in 2019, double European digitally-enabled exports to the U.S. • In 2020, Europe accounted for 72% of the $333 billion in total global information services supplied abroad by U.S. multinational corporations through their majority-owned foreign affiliates. •U.S. overseas direct investment in the "information" industry in the UK alone was 66% more than such investment in the entire Western Hemisphere outside the United States, and roughly the same as such investment in all of Asia, the Middle East and Africa combined, and 14 times such investment in China.Equivalent U.S. investment in Germany was 3.6 times more than in China. •Including all types of e-commerce, the United States was the top market in the world in 2019; online sales were 2.8 times higher than in Japan and 3.7 times higher than in China.North America and Europe accounted for six of the top 10 e-commerce countries. •North American and European countries account for 9 of the top 10, and 17 of the top 20, countries when it comes to combined digital and entrepreneurial ecosystem development. •The U.S. leads the world in international trade in products delivered through data flows, followed by the UK, France, Germany, India, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. •European companies in the U.S. employ millions of American workers and are the largest source of onshored jobs in America.Similarly, U.S. companies in Europe employ millions of European workers and are the largest source of onshored jobs in Europe. •U.S. and European foreign affiliates directly employed an estimated 9.7 million workers in the pandemic-plagued year of 2020, 300,000 more than in 2019.Employment levels rose further in 2021 and 2022. •These figures understate overall job numbers, since they do not include -jobs supported by transatlantic trade flows; -indirect employment effects of nonequity arrangements such as strategic alliances, joint ventures, and other deals; and -indirect employment generated for distributors and suppliers.The transatlantic economy has proven to be remarkably resilient in the face of seismic shocks that have shaken the world.Despite full-blown war in the heart of Europe, ongoing pandemic uncertainties, supply chain disruptions, dramatic energy shifts, high infl ation, tightening fi nancial conditions, and tensions with China, the key drivers of the transatlantic economy -investment, trade and income -posted strong results again in 2022.These fi gures are emblematic of the dense ties that bind North America to Europe and form the solid geoeconomic and geostrategic ground from which each side of the North Atlantic can address tremors still to come in 2023 and beyond.The $7.1 trillion transatlantic economy remains the largest and wealthiest market in the world, employing 16 million workers in mutually "onshored" jobs on both sides of the Atlantic.U.S. and European economic growth is likely fi rst to slow and then to gather speed over the course of this year.Overall for 2023, the International Monetary Fund expects the U.S. economy to grow by 1.4% and the euro area to grow by 0.7%.These levels are down from 2021 and 2022, but still positive.Growth is expected to accelerate in 2024.One hinge variable is the war in Ukraine, which has replaced the pandemic as the greatest strain on global trade.1 Russia's aggression may have shaken the world economy, but it has also reinvigorated the Atlantic alliance.North American- European unity has been remarkable, exemplifi ed by tough and coordinated sanctions and export controls against Russia; herculean eff orts to wean Europe off its dangerous dependence on Russian energy; considerable sums of military, political, fi nancial and humanitarian support for Ukraine; and actions to strengthen NATO defenses.As U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen noted at the G20 Summit in November 2022, "ending Russia's war is the single best thing we can do for the global economy."We discuss Western eff orts to support Ukraine and to sanction Russia in Boxes 3 and 4.The war does, however, complicate the challenges facing the world's central banks.Rarely has the world seen such aggressive monetary action from the stewards of credit.Leading the way, the U.S. Federal Reserve raised its benchmark rate seven times last year, from 0.25% to over 4%.The European Central Bank (ECB) boosted rates four times in 2022, taking the rate to 2.5% at yearend, while the Bank of England raised its rate eight times in 2022.Monetary policy works with a lag, so the residual eff ects of tighter global credit conditions (softer fi nal demand, lower capital investment, reduced earnings) will become more evident in 2023.One risk for 2023 is that central banks on both sides of the pond err on the side of keeping policies too tight for too long, as they focus on pulling headline infl ation back to target.The prospect that each side of the Atlantic might fl irt with recession in 2023 has tempered future infl ation expectations.Indeed, it seems increasingly likely that economies on both sides of the economy may be able to fi nd the elusive "soft landing," avoiding a recession entirely while also continuing to manage headline infl ation.U.S. headline infl ation, after reaching a peak of 9.1%, began to reverse in July 2022 and was running at a year-over-year rate of 6.5% in December.Slowing demand and easing supply chain constraints has helped alleviate pricing pressures on goods, while services infl ation is expected to peak in early 2023.Infl ationary pressures in Europe have also peaked, with lower energy costs helping to slow year-overyear price increases to 9.2% in December, versus 10.1% in November.Energy price caps, lower commodity prices, unclogged supply chains, and the cyclical eff ects of slower economic growth have converged to ease transatlantic infl ationary expectations.The European Commission predicts 6.4% consumer price growth and 5.6% euro area infl ation in 2023.Still, U.S. and euro area infl ation rates are well above the Fed/ECB targets of 2%.Price stability in Europe remains challenging given the war and the continent's vulnerabilities to global oil and natural gas prices.Europe has avoided a full-blown energy crisis and in less than a year accomplished a remarkable reduction in energy imports from Russia.Gas prices have largely returned to levels seen before the war but are still roughly six times higher than those across the Atlantic.We discuss the transatlantic energy economy in Chapter 4.The transatlantic economy has been rattled by disturbances to the supply chains that account for over half of global trade in goods.2 While the U.S. Federal Reserve reports that the most acute disruptions have eased, supply chain pressures remain at levels far higher than prepandemic times, except for a brief fl are-up in 2011 (Table 3) .According to the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, more than three-quarters of all fi rms participating in global supply chains have implemented at least one measure to make their supply chains more resilient.3 After two tense years following the UK's departure from the EU, London and Brussels inked the "Windsor Framework" at the end of February 2023 to clarify contentious elements of the Northern Ireland protocol to the UK-EU Withdrawal Agreement.The Framework could remove a major thorn in relations and pave the way to a more robust partnership.The Withdrawal Agreement treats Northern Ireland, which is part of the UK, as being within the EU customs area, to prevent the need for a hard border on the island of Ireland.But it also required checks on goods within the UK flowing from Great Britain to Northern Ireland.This essentially created a customs border in the middle of the Irish Sea.London insisted on revisions to dispense with those checks and diminish the role of the European Court of Justice in settling disputes.Pro-UK unionists in Northern Ireland refused to take their seats in the region's elected assembly at Stormont until the issues were resolved to their liking.Northern Ireland continues to follow EU rules for goods trade, but the Windsor Framework simplifies and clarifies arrangements in five areas.First, goods within the UK coming from Great Britain to Northern Ireland will now be channeled through paperwork-light "green lanes" if destined for Northern Ireland and paperwork-heavy "red lanes" if intended for the EU.The EU will accept the UK's public health standards so agri-food can enter Northern Ireland, although those goods must be labeled "not for EU" by 2025.Second, the UK will now review most Northern Ireland subsidies so they do not have to be referred to Brussels.Third, UK domestic valueadded-tax (VAT) changes will apply to Northern Ireland.This had previously been prohibited under the Northern Ireland protocol.The UK agreed not to undercut most EU minimum VAT rates immediately, although both parties will now negotiate a list of goods where this could be possible over the next five years.Fourth, the Northern Ireland legislative assembly can now pull an "emergency brake" to stop the implementation of new or updated EU rules in "exceptional circumstances."Finally, the European Court of Justice remains the ultimate arbiter of UK-EU arrangements, despite calls by some in the UK to create instead an international arbitration mechanism, but London says that the Windsor Framework now severely circumscribes the number of EU laws that are applicable in Northern Ireland.4 The Windsor Framework could help spark the UK economy, which is the only G7 country yet to surpass its pre-Covid GDP.It could also get UK-EU relations back on track: bilateral trade has recovered to pre-pandemic levels, but the EU's trade with other major partners has rebounded far more robustly.5 As of this writing, however, it is unclear whether the Framework will find majority support within the UK Parliament or in the Northern Ireland Assembly at Stormont.Additional uncertainties also loom.Before the Windsor Framework, the two sides kept deferring deadlines for some types of customs provisions, rules-of-origin declarations, medicines labelling, and food controls, along with product conformity assessments.Now the UK has introduced a Retained EU Law Bill that proposes to review thousands of laws developed by the EU when the UK was a member, and revoke them by default by the end of 2023 unless an active decision is made to keep or adapt them.6 This portends significant further turbulence for many companies if the measure is adopted in its current form and on its current timeline.Global turmoil has led to suggestions that the world has entered a period of de-globalization.A closer look reveals that technological, policy and commercial drivers are interacting to reshape, not curtail, global fl ows.Technological drivers are accelerating globalization, while policy and commercial considerations are leading to strategies of "derisking" and diversifi cation, as we discuss in Chapter 3.These drivers are carving currents that carry some risks, but far greater opportunities, for the transatlantic economy.Global fl ows of people, capital, and goods are facing steeper policy barriers, yet migration was at historic highs in 2020 and 2021, capital fl ows grew by more than 50% a year in 2019-2021, and goods fl ows hit a record high in 2021.Global trade in goods in September 2022 was 10% higher than the average for the pre-crisis year 2019, and slightly higher than the level before Russia's renewed invasion of Ukraine.Still, goods are no longer the preeminent driver of global connections; fl ows of services, international students, and intellectual property grew about twice as fast as goods fl ows in 2010-2019.Data fl ows grew by nearly 50% annually during this period, and were turbocharged during the pandemic years, as we discuss in Chapter 5.8 These fl ows are all strengths of the transatlantic economy.Knowledge-intensive and intangibleheavy global value chains are also more concentrated than others, largely in deeplyintertwined North Atlantic connections, which we explore in this book.9 North America and Europe have been among the main beneficiaries of the expansion of global flows, as we demonstrate in our annual surveys.Given the turbulence and tensions of recent years, officials on each side of the Atlantic are now acting to mitigate strategic vulnerabilities and to ensure that people and workers across our economies benefit from this increasing interconnectivity.We discuss the U.S. and EU "protect and promote" agendas in Chapter 3.On each side of the Atlantic there is a rising chorus calling for "reshored" production and greater self-sufficiency.In Europe, some call for greater "sovereignty" in the digital sphere or in other sectors like medicines or critical materials.The risk is that such calls could lead to more entrenched protectionism that hampers the ability of transatlantic firms to compete fairly in markets on both sides of the pond and beyond.Particularly relevant in this context are current debates about the impact of the U.S. Inflation Reduction Act and the EU's Green Deal and related subsidy measures, which we discuss in Chapter 4.Lost in these debates is the fact that U.S. and European companies over many decades have woven a dense web of deep transatlantic connections that is proving to be a strength, not a burden, for both in a more competitive and disruptive age.The transatlantic economy remains the most interconnected, robust, and resilient commercial artery in the world, as we explain in the following chapters.The transatlantic economy remains the most interconnected, robust, and resilient commercial artery in the world.THE TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMY 2023 -7 Russia's ongoing aggression against Ukraine has replaced the pandemic as the leading strain on global trade, according to BCG analysis.The war has not only devastated Ukraine, it has amplifi ed global fi nancial instabilities and supply chain distortions, wreaked havoc on food and energy markets, and generated the largest refugee crisis since World War II.Ending the war, says U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, "is the single best thing we can do for the global economy".The transatlantic partners have spearheaded international eff orts to support Ukraine.During the one year between January 24, 2022 and January 15, 2023, €143 billion in government-togovernment commitments were made to support Ukraine, according to the Kiel Institute for the World Economy.The United States has by far been the largest single bilateral supporter, having committed €73.18 billion, more than 50% of total commitments.The U.S. is not only the largest absolute donor, it is among the top donors as a share of national GDP.Total EU commitments amounted to €54.92 billion -about 75% of the U.S. level and less than one tenth of the €570 billion that European governments spent to shield their own societies from the energy shocks generated by the war.Of the total, EU member states committed €19.9 billion bilaterally, €29.92 billion through the EU Commission and Council, €3.1 billion via the European Peace Facility, and €2 billion through the European Investment Bank.If contributions via EU channels are reapportioned to the individual EU states that provided them, then the U.S. remains the largest individual donor (€73.18 billion), followed by Germany (€13.33 billion), the UK (€8.31 billion), France (€7.66 billion), Italy (€5.44 billion), and Poland (€5.02 billion).In terms of bilateral commitments in percent of donor country GDP, the top fi ve donors are Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and the United States.10 More than 10 million Ukrainians have fl ed their homes, almost 5 million of whom left the country.Poland is the leading host country, taking in over 1.56 million refugees.Germany is second (1.06 million), while the Czech Republic (486, 133) , Italy (169, 306) and Spain (161,012) rank third, fourth, and fi fth, respectively.In terms of share of population, Estonia tops the list (4.96%), the Czech Republic is second (4.54%), Moldova is third (4.15%) and Poland is fourth (4.12%).When the Kiel Institute adds estimated refugee costs to bilateral support levels, the United States remains in fi rst place (€73.18 billion), followed by Germany with (€12.96 billion, incl.€6.81 billion in refugee costs) and Poland (€11.92 billion, incl.€8.36 billion in refugee costs).In terms of fi nancial commitments, the EU institutions lead (€30.32 billion), followed by the United States (€25.11 billion), but with an important diff erence: the EU sum consists almost exclusively of loans, whereas U.S. commitments are entirely grants that do not need to be repaid.As of January 15, 2023, only 48% of the committed fi nancial aid had been disbursed.The Kiel Institute reports €13.27 billion in additional fi nancial aid by multilateral organizations like the IMF, World Bank, UN and the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).The EBRD forecasts a rise in Ukraine's GDP of 1% in 2023, which would stabilize the country's real output at around 70% of its level before Russia's February 2022 invasion.The Bank predicts 3% growth in 2024.The U.S and Canada, which traditionally have had limited economic links with Russia, curtailed practically all commercial ties.Many European economies took similarly drastic action, despite their far deeper commercial relations with Russia.EU exports to Russia halved within weeks of the outbreak of war.Many imports were banned.However, a full and abrupt cutoff of commercial ties was difficult because many European countries had grown dependent on Russian energy.For that reason, prohibitions were introduced gradually on Russian energy imports.12 One year on, Europe has accomplished the truly remarkable.It has largely weaned itself off Russian energy.Gas demand fell by more than 20% between August and December 2022, thanks to efficiency measures and lower energy use.Norway, the United States, Algeria, and Qatar stepped in to supply more gas.Five new floating LNG terminals were set up in record time, with more due to come online this year and next.By January 2023, the flow of Russian gas through pipelines to the EU+UK was almost 90% lower than a year earlier.13 The EU has now banned imports of Russian coal and other solid fossil fuels, crude oil, and refined petroleum products, with limited exceptions.Adjustable price caps have been introduced on seaborne crude oil, petroleum oils and oils obtained from bituminous minerals which originate in or are exported from Russia.The intent is to curtail Russia's oil revenues while limiting price surges and mitigating adverse consequences on energy supplies to third countries.14 The short-term impact of these measures on Russia has been mixed.The pain points are numerous.Russian living standards have eroded.Observed inflation, or how the public views price increases, is at 16%, much higher than the 12% official figure.Ten percent of the Russian workforce is without consistent work, a level comparable to the years following the dissolution of the Soviet Union.The Russian central bank projected capital flight from Russia in 2022 to total $251 billion.Finished steel output fell by 7% and commercial car production is just a fourth of what it was a year ago.Russia's monthly budget revenues from oil and gas fell in January 2023 to their lowest level since 2020 -46% below where they were a year earlier.Revenue from other sources was down by 20% in October 2022 from a year earlier, and was on a downward spiral.The Russian Finance Ministry has been forced to nearly triple its daily foreign currency sales to make up for the shortfall.Russia's 2022 budget deficit of $47 billion was its second highest deficit in the post-Soviet era.Moscow's weapons production capacity has been degraded, and it has been forced to turn to Iran for drones and drone parts, and to North Korea for artillery shells and rockets.15 In other respects, however, the Russian economy has weathered the situation better than expected.Russia's central bank avoided a catastrophic financial crisis by imposing capital controls and hiking interest rates.The IMF estimates that the Russian economy shrank 2.2% in 2022, far less than forecasts made a year ago.It expects the Russian economy to grow by 0.3% in 2023 and 2.1% in 2024.Despite international sanctions, Moscow recorded a $227 billion current account surplus in 2022.It has diverted exports of energy and other key commodities to Asian, Middle Eastern, Latin American and African states.Imports initially crashed, but then stabilized as exporters from China, Hong Kong, and Turkey stepped in.China now accounts for over 36% of Russia's imports and 20% of its exports.China and Hong Kong now supply about 40% of Russia's chips -although the U.S. Treasury says that close to half of them are proving to be defective.Chinese stateowned defense companies have been shipping navigation equipment, jamming technology and jet-fighter parts to Russian defense companies.A significant shadow trade has emerged to circumvent the sanctions.And although many companies based in G7 countries had announced plans to leave the Russian market or abandon investments there, analysts estimate that no more than 15% have actually divested one of their Russian subsidiaries.16 As time wears on, however, Russian prospects look much bleaker.Bloomberg Economics estimates that Russia's economy is on track to lose $190 billion in GDP by 2026, relative to its prewar path.Heavy government spending on the war is bleeding the Kremlin's reserves.The ruble's seeming stability relies on unsustainably strict currency controls.Energy bans and price caps are having some effect: Moscow's tax income from oil and gas in January 2023 was among its lowest monthly totals since the pandemic depths of 2020.Moscow is still selling oil to countries like India and China, but mostly at steep discounts.By some estimates, Russia is set for a $100 billion loss in its oil exports receipts and a $50 billion loss in its gas export revenues in 2023.Moreover, its landbased energy infrastructure points west; it cannot easily switch out China and India for Europe.And it will be unable to maintain, let alone expand, its energy production without Western technology.Russian planes are flying only because those on the ground have been cannibalized for parts.Hundreds of thousands of talented and educated Russian professionals are leaving the country.In the end, this vast brain drain may prove to be the most crippling for Russia's economy and society.17 See Marc Gilbert, Nikolaus Lang, Georgia Mavropoulos, and Michael McAdoo, "Protectionism, Pandemic, War, and the Future of Trade," BCG, January 17, 2023 , https://www.bcg.com/ publications/2023/protectionism-pandemic-war-and-future-of-trade.2 Uri Dadush, "The Future of Global Value Chains and the Role of the WTO," WTO Staff Working Paper ERSD-2022-11, August 2, 2022, https://www.policycenter.ma/sites/default/ files/2022-08/ersd202211_e.pdf.3 Lucas Kitzmüller, Helena Schweiger, Beata Javorcik, "The reshuffling of global supply chains is already happening," VoxEU/CEPR, November 24, 2022, https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/ reshuffling-global-supply-chains-already-happening.4 Peter Foster, Andy Bounds and Jim Pickard, "How the Windsor framework changes Northern Ireland's trading arrangements," Financial Times, February 28, 2023.5 The Economist, "Careful assembly required," January 5, 2023; John Springford, "The cost of Brexit to June 2022," Centre for European Reform, December 21, 2022; Office of Budget Responsibility, "Brexit analysis," last updated May 26, 2022, https://obr.uk/forecasts-in-depth/the-economy-forecast/brexit-analysis/. 6 AmCham EU, "Two years later: Brexit's impact on US companies in Europe," January 25, 2023, https://www.amchameu.eu/blog/two-years-later-brexit%E2%80%99s-impact-uscompanies-europe.7 UK Government, "UK trade in numbers," February 17, 2023, https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/uk-trade-in-numbers/uk-trade-in-numbers-web-version.8 Janet Bush, ed., "Global flows: The ties that bind in an interconnected world," McKinsey Global Institute, November 2022; Gabriel Felbermayr, Guntram Wolff, "How Europe can share changes in the world economy," Internationale Politik Quarterly, January 4, 2023, https://ip-quarterly.com/en/how-europe-can-shape-changes-world-economy.9 Bush.10 Christoph Trebesch, et al.,The Ukraine Support Tracker, Kiel Institute for the World Economy, https://www.ifw-kiel.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/-ifw/Kiel_Working_ Paper/2022/KWP_2218_Which_countries_help_Ukraine_and_how_/KWP_2218_Trebesch_et_al_Ukraine_Support_Tracker.pdf, last accessed February 21, 2023.11 European Commission, "EU sanctions against Russia explained," https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/restrictive-measures-against-russia-over-ukraine/sanctionsagainst-russia-explained/#sanctions; Nicholas Mulder, "Sanctions Against Russia Ignore the Economic Challenges Facing Ukraine," New York Times, February 9, 2023.12 Arnau Busquets Guardia and Charlie Cooper, "The delayed impact of the EU's wartime sanctions on Russia," Politico, February 2, 2023.13 Georgi Kantchev and Joe Wallace, "Europe Cuts Addiction to Russian Energy, Yet Fuel Scramble Continues," Wall Street Journal, February 3, 2023.14 Andrew Duehren, Laurence Norman and Joe Wallace, "G-7 Expands Sanctions on Russian Oil Industry," Wall Street Journal, February 3, 2023.15 "Remarks by Deputy Treasury Secretary Wally Ademo on International Sanctions Against Russia," U.S. Treasury Department, February 21, 2023; Vladimir Milov, "The Sanctions on Russia Are Working," Foreign Affairs, January 18, 2023; Politico Weekly Trade, January 30, 2023.16 Ademo; Douglas Busvine, "Western firms say they're quitting Russia.Where's the proof?,"Politico, February 28, 2023; Jeffrey Sonnenfeld, et al., "The Russian Business Retreat -How the Ratings Measured Up One Year Later," SSRN, January 31, 2023, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4343547; Simon Evenett and Niccolò Pisani, "Less than Nine Percent of Western Firms Have Divested from Russia," SSRN, January 31, 2023, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4322502; "Macro note -China steps in to supply Russia," Institute of International Finance, February 1, 2023; Mulder; The Economist, "Dodged penalties," February 1, 2023; Naomi Garcia, "Trade Secrets: Exposing China-Russia Defense Trade in Global Supply Chains," C4ADS, July 15, 2022, https://c4ads.org/reports/trade-secrets/; Ian Talley and and Anthony DeBarros, "China Aids Russia's War in Ukraine, Data Shows," Wall Street Journal, February 4, 2023.17 Ademo; Milov; Guardia and Cooper; Mulder; Georgi Kantchev and Paul Hannon, "Russia to Cut Oil Output, Sending Prices Higher," Wall Street Journal, February 10, 2023; Janis Kluge, "Russian oil and gas revenue in 2022," Twitter thread, February 2, 2023, https://twitter.com/jakluge/status/1621440460408365056.Jobs, Trade and Investment: It has been a tumultuous decade for the global economy.In just over three years, the world has been stricken by a pandemic, stunned by a military confl ict in the heart of Europe, and shaken by infl ationary pressures reminiscent of the 1970s.Rarely have the challenges seemed so acute.Compounding matters, familiar patterns of globalization are shifting.Even before Russia's further invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the world economy was being splintered by great power rivalries, weaponization of interdependencies, rising barriers to trade and investment, resource protectionism, and calls for fi rms to "reshore," "near-shore," or "friend-shore" production.The pandemic amplifi ed these trends.Putin's war has sharpened them.Globalization isn't dead, but it is being refi ned and reconfi gured.U.S. and European multinationals confront a more challenging environment.Firms are not deaf or blind to the shifting contours of globalization, and are increasingly focused on building more resiliency into their supply chains and securing critical inputs to production.But this doesn't mean they are turning their backs on the world.Instead, they are diversifying their sourcing and reinforcing the foundations of their success.Most are derisking rather than decoupling.And for many, the dense transatlantic linkages they have built over decades are an anchor in the storm.The bottom line: in a world wracked by war, pandemics, soaring infl ationary pressures, and the rising gale forces of de-globalization, the two sides of the North Atlantic remain deeply intertwined and embedded in each other's markets.This is not likely to change any time soon, given the deep and entangled commercial ties that link the transatlantic economy, and the fact that shareholders and stakeholders on both sides of the pond directly benefi t from deep transatlantic integration.The fact that the United States and Europe are each embroiled in increasingly contentious commercial and geopolitical tensions with Russia and China also suggests transatlantic cooperation will endure.And the post-pandemic world of tighter energy supplies and tighter labor markets portends thicker transatlantic ties.Thanks to the dense interlinkages of investment, trade, technology, innovation and jobs that bind the two sides of the North Atlantic together, the transatlantic economy remains a central pillar of the global economy.The combined output of the United States and Europe accounted for roughly one-third of world GDP in terms of purchasing power parity in 2022.Excluding the UK, the EU27 and the United States account for a substantial 31% of world GDP -higher than the combined output of China and India (one-quarter of world GDP) and on par with the newly created combined output of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) in Asia of 31% of GDP.The transatlantic economy is not only larger than the twin giants of Asia but also signifi cantly wealthier.And because wealth matters, it's little wonder that consumers in the United States and the EU easily outspend their counterparts in China and India.As mentioned in Chapter One, the two combined accounted for 51% of global personal consumption in 2021, the last year of available data, versus a combined share of just 16.4% for China and India.Per capita incomes -a key metric of a nation's wealth -matter and on this score, it's no contest.The United States (with an estimated per capita income of roughly $69,000 in purchasing power parity terms in 2021) and the European Union (est.$48,000) are far wealthier than China ($19,000) and India ($7,000).In addition to the above, the transatlantic economy is a repository of innovation and technological advancement, and at the forefront of global foreign direct investment and global mergers and acquisitions (M&A) activity.Taken together, U.S. and European goods exports to the world (excluding intra-EU trade) accounted for 20% of global goods exports in 2021, the last year of complete data.But the two parties accounted for 66% of global inward stock of foreign direct investment and 66% of outward stock of FDI.Each partner has built up the great majority of that stock in the other economy.Mutual investment in the North Atlantic space is very large, dwarfs trade, and has become essential to U.S. and European jobs and prosperity.Over 70% of M&A purchases are by U.S. and European companies.It is no surprise, therefore, that the largest commercial artery in the world stretches across the Atlantic.Total transatlantic foreign affi liate sales were estimated at $5.9 trillion in 2021, easily ranking as the most integrated commercial partnership on account of the thick investment ties between the two parties.That said, the burgeoning middle class of the developing nations represents new sources of supply (labor) and demand (consumers) for U.S. and European fi rms.American and European companies are building out their in-country presence in the developing nations, and for good reason.Economic growth rates are still above the global average in most nations, populated with young consumers who desire Western goods and services.In addition, the technological skill levels of many developing nations are now on par with many developing nations.China, for instance, is What is often missing from this either/or picture, however, is the fact that for many U.S. and European companies, the transatlantic economy is the geo-economic base from which they can engage successfully in other parts of the world.Many European car companies, for instance, invest in the United States and then export cars made in the U.S.A. to China and other countries.U.S. services companies, in turn, use the scale off ered by their dense investment linkages across the transatlantic economy to be globally competitive when it comes to off ering services in other parts of the world.Many U.S. multinationals -for both goods and services -also use their presence in Europe to serve the markets of North Africa and the Middle East and beyond.In all of these ways, the transatlantic partnership remains important not only to the United States and Europe, but also to the world.The U.S.-European partnership is too big and too important to fail, as made all too clear when dissecting the activities of foreign affi liates on both sides of the pond.We have long made the case that when it comes to global commerce, traditional trade statistics are incomplete and misguided metrics when measuring the level of global engagement between two parties.Global commerce beats to the tune of foreign direct investment and affi liate sales, not cross-border trade.Hence, as we outline and emphasize each year in this survey, it is the activities of foreign affi liates -the foot soldiers of the transatlantic partnership -that bind the United States and Europe together.Investment, not trade, drives U.S.-European commerce.Understanding this dynamic is essential to understanding the enduring strength and importance of the transatlantic economy.Over the past years, we have outlined and examined eight key indices that off er a clear picture of the "deep integration" forces binding the U.S. and Europe together.This chapter updates those indices with the latest available data and our estimates.Each metric, in general, has ebbed and fl owed with cyclical swings in transatlantic economic activity, but has nevertheless grown in size and importance over the past decade.As standalone entities, U.S. affi liates in Europe and European affi liates in the United States are among the largest and most advanced economic forces in the world.The total output, for instance, of U.S. foreign affi liates in Europe (an estimated $670 billion in 2021) and of European foreign affi liates in the United States (estimated at $665 billion) was greater than the total gross domestic product of most countries.Combined, transatlantic affi liate output -more than $1.3 trillion -was larger than the total output of such countries as Mexico, the Netherlands, or Indonesia.By our estimation, affi liate output rebounded modestly in 2021 from the depressed levels of 2020, when transatlantic activity came to a near standstill due to the pandemic.European affi liate output in the United States rose modestly by 2%, while U.S. affi liate output in Europe rose roughly 4%.European affi liates in the United States are operating in one of the most dynamic economies in the world and are expected to boost their nearterm output again this year.And even though Europe is being challenged by the disruptions generated by the war, the eurozone economy actually grew faster than the U.S. or Chinese economy in 2022.This brighter economic outlook, amidst indications that Europe is likely to pivot successfully away from its energy dependencies on Russia, bodes well for fi rms in both the U.S. and Europe.On a global basis, the aggregate output of U.S. foreign affi liates was around $1.4 trillion in 2021, with Europe (broadly defi ned) accounting for around half of the total.According to the Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. affi liate output in Europe ($643 billion) in 2020 was 73% greater than affi liate output in the entire Asia-Pacifi c region ($383 billion).In the United States, meanwhile, European affi liates are major economic producers in their own right, with British and German fi rms of notable importance.the transatlantic economy is the geo-economic base from which they can engage successfully in other parts of the world.Asia-Pacifi c The U.S. output of British companies was $150 billion in 2020, the last year of actual data.That represents about one-quarter of the European total.For the same year, output from German affiliates operating in the United States totaled $114 billion, or nearly 20% of the European total.Off the back of strong U.S. economic growth in 2021, we estimate that output of both British and German affiliates in the U.S. rose by 5%, with the former totaling an estimated $158 billion in 2021, and the latter $120 billion.In 2020, the last year of available data, European affiliates in the United States accounted for nearly 61% of the roughly $1.1 trillion that affiliates of foreign multinationals contributed overall to U.S. aggregate production.Beyond Europe, only Canadian and Japanese investors have any real economic presence in the United States.Japanese affiliate output totaled nearly $152 billion in 2020, the last year of complete data, while Canadian affiliate output totaled $112 billion.Foreign direct investment from China had soared in the United States over the past few years, but from a relatively low base, and now is plummeting due to bilateral commercial tensions and tighter U.S. scrutiny of such investments.Chinese affiliate output in the U.S. totaled just $14 billion in 2020, less than that of Sweden ($21 billion).The global footprint of corporate America and corporate Europe is second to none, with each party each other's largest foreign investor.According to the latest figures from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. foreign assets in Europe totaled $18.7 trillion in 2020, representing roughly 63% of the global total.For 2021, we estimate that U.S. foreign assets in Europe rose modestly, by 2%, to $19 trillion as the continent emerged from the pandemic.The bulk of U.S. assets in Europe was in the United Kingdom: $6.2 trillion in 2020, the last year of available data, or around 21% of the global total.U.S. assets in the Netherlands (around $3.1 trillion) were the second largest in Europe in 2020.America's significant presence in the Netherlands reflects its strategic role as an export platform/ distribution hub for U.S. firms doing business across the continent.To this point, more than half of U.S. affiliate sales in the Netherlands are for export, particularly within the EU.Meanwhile, America's asset base in Germany topped $1.1 trillion in 2020, more than a third larger than its asset base in all of South America.America's asset base in Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary (roughly $234 billion) was greater than corporate America's assets in South Korea ($182 billion).America's assets in Ireland ($2 trillion in 2020) were light years ahead of those in China ($487 billion).Europe's stakes in the United States are also sizable and significant.Total assets of European affiliates in the United States were valued at roughly $8.3 trillion in 2020.The United Kingdom ranked first, followed by Germany, Switzerland, and French firms.In 2020, the last year of available data, European assets in the United States accounted for over 51% of all foreignowned assets in the United States.We estimate that European-owned assets in the United States rose modestly in 2021 to $8.4 trillion.same, the country composition has changed, with more investment shifting to lower-cost locales like Poland and Hungary versus high-cost economies like Germany and France.The largest employment declines were reported in the United Kingdom, with the total U.S. affi liate manufacturing workforce falling from 431,000 in 2000 to 283,000 in 2020.U.S. manufacturing employment in France dropped from 249,000 to 178,000, while a smaller decline from 388,000 to 358,000 was reported in Germany between 2000 and 2020.In terms of net gains in manufacturing jobs, Poland has been a signifi cant winner, with U.S. affi liate manufacturing employment growing almost three times, from 51,000 in 2000 to over 138,000 in 2020.Roughly 34% of all manufacturing workers employed by U.S. foreign affi liates outside the United States in 2020 were based in Europe.On a global basis, U.S. majority-owned affi liates (including banks and non-bank affi liates) employed 14 million workers in 2020, with the bulk of these workers -roughly 34% -toiling in Europe.That share is down from 41% in 2009.That decline is in part a consequence of Europe's cyclical slowdown for some years, and in part due to the fact that U.S. overseas capacity is expanding at a faster pace in faster-growing emerging markets than slowergrowth developed nations.Another factor at work: more and more U.S. fi rms are opting to stay home due to competitive wage and energy costs, as opposed to shipping more capacity abroad.The sweeping overhaul of the U.S. corporate tax code in 2017, which signifi cantly lowered America's tax rate relative to many in Europe, has spurred more investment to come home or stay in the United States.Other incentives include new subsidies for semiconductor, clean energy and infrastructure production.More on those in Chapter Six.That said, however, with the U.S. labor market at its tightest in decades, U.S. fi rms are even more dependent on European workers to drive production and sales.Most employees of U.S. affi liates in Europe live in the UK, Germany, and France.Meanwhile, U.S. majority-owned fi rms are on balance hiring more people in services activities than in manufacturing.The latter accounted for 38% of total U.S. foreign affi liate employment in Europe in 2020.The key industry in terms of manufacturing employment was transportation equipment, with U.S. affi liates employing nearly 336,000 workers, followed by chemicals (257,000).Wholesale employment was among the largest sources of services-related employment, which includes employment in such activities as logistics, trade, insurance and other related functions.Although services employment among U.S. affi liates has grown at a faster pace than manufacturing employment over the past decade, according to our estimates U.S. affi liates employed more manufacturing workers in Europe in 2021 (1.9 million) than in 1990 (1.6 million).This refl ects the EU enlargement process, and hence greater access to more manufacturing workers, and the premium U.S. fi rms place on highly skilled manufacturing workers, with Europe one of the largest sources in the world.European majority-owned foreign affiliates directly employed 4.9 million U.S. workers in 2020.We estimate the number to have reached 5 million in 2021.The top five European employers in the United States were firms from the UK (1.2 million jobs), Germany (885,000), France (740,000), the Netherlands (569,000) and Switzerland (487,000).European firms employed roughly two-thirds of all U.S. workers on the payrolls of majority-owned foreign affiliates in 2020.In the aggregate, the transatlantic workforce directly employed by U.S. and European foreign affiliates in pandemic year 2020 was roughly 9.7 million strong -300,000 more than the year before.Employment levels rebounded again in 2021, to an estimated 9.8 million, and are expected to have increased further in 2022.One reminder: as we have stressed in the past, these figures understate the employment effects of mutual investment flows, since these numbers are limited to direct employment, and do not account for indirect employment effects on nonequity arrangements such as strategic alliances, joint ventures, and other deals.Moreover, foreign employment figures do not include jobs supported by transatlantic trade flows.Trade-related employment is sizable in many U.S. states and many European nations.In the end, direct and indirect employment remains quite large.We estimate that the transatlantic workforce numbers some 14-16 million workers, counting both direct affiliate employees as well as those whose jobs are supported by transatlantic trade.Europe is by far the most important source of "onshored" jobs in America, and the United States is by far the most important source of "onshored" jobs in Europe.The United States and Europe remain primary drivers of global R&D. Yet as the globalization of R&D has gathered pace, more and more global R&D expenditures are emanating from Asia in general and China in particular.Beijing is unrelentingly focused on being a global leader in artificial intelligence, quantum computing, space exploration, cyber security, life sciences, electric vehicles, supercomputing, semiconductors and 5G wireless devices.Beijing's long-term goal is to become an "international innovation leader" by 2030 and a "world powerhouse of scientific and technological innovation" by 2050.While governments and corporations are the main drivers of R&D spending, foreign affiliates of multinationals are also in the thick of things.In fact, foreign affiliate R&D has become more prominent over the past decades as firms seek to share development costs, spread risks, and tap into the intellectual talent of other nations.Alliances, cross-licensing of intellectual property, mergers and acquisitions, and other forms of cooperation have become more prevalent characteristics of the transatlantic economy.The digital economy has become a powerful engine of greater transatlantic R&D. The complexity of scientific and technological innovation is leading innovators to partner and share costs, find complementary expertise, gain access to different technologies and knowledge quickly, and collaborate as part of "open" innovation networks.Cross-border collaboration with foreign partners can range from a simple one-way transmission of information to highly interactive and formal arrangements.Developing new products, creating new processes, and driving more innovation -all of these activities result from more collaboration between foreign suppliers and U.S. and European firms.And all of this collaboration, regardless of sector or industry, is dependent on the ability to transfer data across borders, as we discuss in Chapter 5.Bilateral U.S.-EU flows in R&D are the most intense between any two international partners.In 2020, the last year of available data, U.S. affiliates spent $31.6 billion on research and development in Europe.On a global basis, Europe accounted for roughly 54% of total U.S. R&D in 2020.R&D expenditures by U.S. affiliates were the greatest in the United Kingdom ($6.0 billion), Germany ($5.7 billion), Switzerland ($5.5 billion), Ireland ($4.0 billion), Belgium ($2.2 billion) and France ($1.9 billion).These six countries accounted for nearly 80% of U.S. spending on R&D in Europe in 2020.In the United States, meanwhile, expenditures on R&D performed by majority-owned foreign affiliates totaled $71.4 billion in 2020.As in previous years, a sizable share of this R&D spending emanated from world-class leaders from Europe, given their interest in America's highly skilled labor force and world-class university system.Most of this investment by European firms took place in such researchintensive sectors as autos, energy, chemicals, and On a country basis, German-owned affi liates were the largest foreign source of R&D in the United States in 2020, spending some $12.7 billion, or 26% of the total of European R&D. Swiss fi rms ranked second, with $10.2 billion, or 21.5% of the total, followed by British fi rms, $6.6 billion or 13.5% of the total.As Source: The 2021 EU Industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard.Data as of December 2021.Note: Only companies that disclose their R&D figures according to the Scoreboard methodology can be included in the ranking.Excluded from the ranking is Amazon which, according to the Scoreboard, would be positioned at #1 in the world R&D ranking if it had separated its R&D and content investments in its annual report.While cross-border trade is a secondary means of delivery for goods and services across the Atlantic, the modes of delivery -affi liate sales and trade -should not be viewed independently.They are more complements than substitutes, since foreign investment and affi liate sales increasingly drive cross-border trade fl ows.Indeed, a substantial share of transatlantic trade is considered intrafi rm or related-party trade, which is cross-border trade that stays within the ambit of the company.Intra-fi rm or related party-trade occurs when BMW or Siemens of Germany sends parts to BMW of South Carolina or Siemens of North Carolina; when Lafarge or Michelin send intermediate components to their Midwest plants, or when General Motors or 3M ships components from Detroit, Michigan or St. Paul, Minnesota to affi liates in Germany or the UK.All of these examples are at the core of interconnected global supply chains.The tight linkages between European parent companies and their U.S. affi liates are refl ected in the fact that roughly 65% of U.S. imports from the European Union consisted of intra-fi rm trade in 2020, the last year of available data.That is much higher than the intra-fi rm imports from Pacifi c Rim nations (around 40%) and well above the global average (48%).The percentage was even higher in the case of Ireland (85%) and Germany (69%).Meanwhile, 39% of U.S. exports to the EU plus UK in 2020 represented intra-fi rm trade, but the percentage is much higher for some countries.For instance, more than half of total U.S. exports to the Netherlands (58%) was classifi ed as relatedparty trade.The comparable fi gure for Germany was 38% and for France it was 35%.Transatlantic profi ts rebounded strongly in 2021 from the depressed levels of 2020, and remained robust again in 2022.Most Western companies are in China because they seek to expand their presence in the Chinese domestic market, not because China is a cog in their extended global supply chains.China now accounts for a quarter of global sales of clothes, nearly a third of jewelry and handbags, and around two-fi fths of cars, plus a signifi cant share of packaged food, beauty products, pharmaceuticals, electronics and more.It is the world's largest market for machine tools and chemicals, and its construction industry is the largest buyer of building equipment.5 The Chinese market's overall importance to the U.S., Japanese or European economies, however, is less than generally suggested.For all listed U.S. fi rms, China accounts for just 4% of sales, according to Morgan Stanley.For Japanese and European companies, the fi gures are 6% and 8% respectively.6 The situation is diff erent for specifi c sectors and individual companies.The top 200 U.S., European and Japanese companies that disclose sales in China earned $700 billion there in 2021, or about 13% of their global sales, up from $368 billion, or 9% of sales, in 2017.Of that total, 30% was generated by technology-hardware fi rms, 26% by consumer-facing businesses, and 22% by industrial companies, with carmakers and commodity businesses also important.Thirteen multinationals reported over $10 billion of revenue a year in China, including Apple, BMW, Intel, Siemens, Tesla and Walmart.In 2022 China accounted for 25% of Tesla's global sales; 22% of Volkswagen China's global revenue; and similar percentages for Apple (19%) and Nike (18% China remains a powerhouse in goods trade.China's share of global goods exports by value increased over the course of the pandemic, to 15% by the end of 2021, from 13% in 2019, while the U.S. share slipped to 7.9% from 8.6%, Germany's share shrank to 7.3% from 7.8%, and Japan's share declined to 3.4% from 3.7%.China's gains in higherend manufactured products are eating into the global market share of countries such as Germany, which traditionally excels at making and exporting such products.State-subsidized Chinese firms are also making inroads in more technology-intensive areas that have been strengths for U.S. and various European countries.9 China accounted for 10.2% of overall EU exports in 2021, behind both the United States (18.3%) and the UK (13%), according to Eurostat.EU imports of goods from China totaled $558 billion in 2021, a more than eight-fold increase from 2000.However, China only accounted for 8.6% of EU total imports for the year ($6.5 trillion).Meanwhile, the EU accounted for 15.4% of China's goods exports in 2021.That figure is down from the levels of 2007 to 2010.European countries have very different types of commercial relationships with China.For instance, southern and eastern European countries primarily import high-tech goods from China and export raw materials, agricultural products and low-tech goods back to China.The pattern is different for Germany, France, the UK, and other northern and western European countries, which tend to export high-tech goods in exchange for critical materials and lower-end consumer products, although China's share of higher-end exports to these countries is growing.Germany is one of China's largest goods trading partners, and both German goods exports and imports to and from China have surged in past decades.However, Eurostat reports that the percentages are relatively modest as a share of either country's global total of goods exports and imports.U.S. goods trade with China also remains sizable, despite official efforts to curtail it.U.S. imports of goods from China totaled $536.8 billion in 2022, a 6.3% increase from the prior year and close to the record $538.5 billion reached in 2018.U.S. goods exports to China grew 1.6% to $153.8 billion last year, pushing total goods trade between the two countries to a record $690.6 billion.10 These numbers have reinforced a fairly widespread view that China has become the top commercial partner of the United States and of Europe.This is incorrect, for many reasons.Second, many commentators wrongly equate international commerce only with trade in goods.Trade between countries, however, doesn't just consist of trade in goods.It also includes trade in services, which most media accounts do not include.Services trade has been growing faster than goods trade.More European and American jobs depend on services than on goods, and the United States and the EU remain by far each other's top services trade partner.EU27 services trade with the U.S. of $702.12 billion in 2021 was 6 times EU-China services trade of $115.54 billion.14 Putting goods and services together, EU-US trade totaled $1.413 trillion in 2021.EU-China trade in goods and services of $938 billion was only 66% as large.In short, if you look at overall trade fl ows and not just one kind of fl ow, it is clear that the largest trading partner for the EU is actually the United States, and the largest trading partner for the United States is the EU, as it has been for decades.And while China's global trade is rising, it still accounts for only 6% of global trade.Most trade still happens between the U.S., Europe and like-minded partners, according to Capital Economics (Table 3) .Sources: Capital Economics; Neil Shearing, "World economy is fracturing, not deglobalizing," Chatham House, February 8, 2023, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2023/02/worldeconomy-fracturing-not-deglobalizing.Moreover, just as trade is more than just fl ows of goods, international commerce is more than just trade.Reducing complex commercial ties to just trade in goods and services ignores the importance of a host of additional economic ties that bind Europe and the United States in far deeper ways than those that bind either to China.15 U.S. and European commercial ties with China are each akin to a two-lane highway, whereas their commercial ties with each other are more like a twelve-lane Autobahn.The highways to and from China are full of goods.They are busy, and they are crowded.Any type of accident on a two-lane highway can really snarl traffi c -as we saw when supply chains were disrupted by the pandemic and throughout the U.S.-China tariff dispute.Alongside the China goods highway is another lane for trade in services, but that remains narrow, as we discussed earlier.A further lane for investment has been under construction for some years, but it continues to face many roadblocks, as U.S. and European offi cials sanction China for human rights abuses, express security concerns about Chinese investments, tighten investment screening and export control procedures, and as each side of the Atlantic unveils new laws and directives aimed at boosting its respective competitiveness with China.China's onerous restrictions on foreign ownership, forced technology transfer rules, opaque and politicallyinfl uenced regulatory procedures, and its own sanctions on Western offi cials and legislators all serve to further dampen inward investment fl ows.The EU-China Comprehensive Investment Agreement (CAI), inked in December 2020, remains in the deep freeze.Investment by foreign companies in China tumbled to its lowest level in 18 years in the second half of last year.16 U.S-European investment lanes, in contrast, drive a huge amount of transatlantic commerce.The U.S. accounted for almost 25% of the EU27's total outward FDI position globally in 2020 -10 times more than China, which accounted for less than 2.5% of the total.Total European stock in the United States of $3.2 trillion in 2021 was more than three times the level of comparable investment from all of Asia.Germany's total FDI stock in the United States totaled $403 billion in 2021.Chinese FDI stock in the United States was less than one-tenth of that total ($38 billion).Europe's role vis-à-vis the United States is very similar.Measured on an historic cost basis, the Global supply chain tasks, in turn, can be broken down into three types: pre-production; production; and post-production.Pre-production tasks include research and development, product design, and branding.Post-production tasks include marketing, distribution, and retailing.Conventional trade measures account for only one of these tasks: manufacturing production.They ignore both pre-and post-production, the two tasks that on average add twice as much value, and account for more jobs, than production tasks.Moreover, the firms that specialize in preand post-production also determine where these tasks take place -and those firms by and large tend to be in developed economies, including the United States and in Europe.29 The concept of trade in factor income basically adds in what is missing from conventional metrics.Doing so results in new ways of looking at global trade flows.To take an example, Apple reaps 59% of its iPhone X's value added from pre-and postproduction tasks.30 The least value-added is derived from its production tasks, which are located in China.Nonetheless, when those phones are exported to the United States and Europe, they are recorded as goods exports from China, even though most of the value accrues to a U.S. company.Moreover, Apple's additional billions in sales in China do not turn up in U.S. trade statistics.The trade-in-factor-income approach adds Apple's profits from within China to U.S. exports to China, because, as a recent Asian Development Bank (ADB)/WTO report puts it, "that is the underlying economic reality, not the accounting fiction".Doing so across all U.S. companies cuts the U.S.-China goods trade deficit by one-third.31 Intermediate tasks in global supply chains Pre-production (R&D, product development and branding Post-production (marketing, distribution and retailing) Intermediate tasks add twice as much value and account for more jobs than production tasks.This underscores the importance of intellectual property as a driver of both supply chains and investment flows.It also highlights its value as a source of income for developed economies such as the United States and Europe: 90% of the value of firms in the S&P 500 corresponds to intellectual property, which contributes twice as much to the value of trade as does physical capital.32 An additional lens through which we can understand the role of the United States and European companies in global supply chains is through indirect trade, which is the amount of trade conducted through intermediates instead of a simple direct exchange between two parties.According to the ADB/WTO, Germany, the United States, France and the Netherlands account for four of the world's top five indirect exporters.And while conventional trade statistics portray China as the world's leading exporter, it ranks third in terms of indirect exports.Moreover, its share is fallingdue to rising labor costs and the declining share of trade in China's economy.At the same time, the integration of various European and East Asian countries in cross-border supply chains is rising. "Decoupling" has become a favorite buzzword to depict efforts to undo critical dependencies on suspect firms or antagonistic states.The term continues to resonate, yet it is misleading as a description of how either countries or companies are acting in this competitive and turbulent age of disruption. "Decoupling" suggests completely unhooking two connected entities.A closer look reveals a more nuanced picture.Evidence is sparse that major economies have actually "decoupled" from one another.Russia has been the leading target of Western decoupling efforts over the past year, thanks to Moscow's invasion of Ukraine.But the results have been mixed, as we discuss in Chapter 1.China has been the larger focus of "decoupling" efforts, but there are only scattered signs of disentanglement in some limited technology sectors.Most countries and companies are not looking to cut the cord with China.They are "derisking," not decoupling.For governments, derisking means seeking ways to both promote trade and investment and protect core economic and security interests and human rights values.For companies, derisking means identifying strategies to maintain and expand commercial ties with China while mitigating supply chain vulnerabilities and being careful not to run afoul of growing government restrictions.The United States has informally labeled its approach the "protect and promote" agenda.The "protect" element of the policy seeks to impede technological and military advances in countries of concern, like China, Russia, North Korea and Iran.Washington's tools are tougher export controls, stricter inbound and outbound investment screening, and human rights measures such as the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act and forced labor bans in the US-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA).The "promote" strand seeks to foster innovation and use subsidies and other forms of industrial policy to maintain "as large of a lead as possible" in sectors where there is a "national security imperative," including semiconductors, quantum computing, artificial intelligence, biotechnology and clean energy.33 One key tool in the "protect" agenda is the "Entity List" of companies which must apply for permission to buy goods with potential military uses.In August 2020, the Trump administration used the FDPR to cut Chinese company Huawei off from American technology.The firm's revenues plunged by 29% in 2021 and its smartphones disappeared from the market altogether.In February 2022 the Biden administration issued additional FDPRs to cut off Russia from all U.S. elements of global technology supply chains.In October 2022, it followed these actions with severe FDPR restrictions that blocked U.S. firms from shipping high-end microchip manufacturing equipment to China and making it easier to crack down on countries that do not follow suit.Japan and the Netherlands agreed in January 2023 to join the restrictions.As a result, China is effectively barred from advanced semiconductors.35 In February 2023, US chipmakers were told that they could only receive money under the CHIPS Act if they agreed not to expand capacity in China for a decade, and not to engage in any joint research or technology licensing effort involving sensitives technologies with a "foreign entity of concern.In November 2022, the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) barred Huawei and Chinese tech company ZTE from selling equipment in the United States -the first time ever that the FCC has banned electronics equipment on national security grounds.In December 2022 the administration added another three dozen Chinese companies to the Entity List and applied the FDPR to 21 additional entities.36 These measures are proceeding in tandem with the "promote" agenda: a $2 trillion overhaul of the U.S. economy that seeks to do many things at once: address climate change, boost manufacturing, curb dependence on China, and revive regions of the country that had been lagging.It is the largest set of U.S. industrial policies since the New Deal, embodied in three major pieces of legislation: the $1.2 trillion Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act; the $280 billion CHIPS and Science Act; and the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), which was valued initially at $396 billion, yet could be much more, since some of the tax credits it offers are not capped.The Chips and Science Act has triggered $200 billion of private investment in U.S. chipmaking capacity.37 The IRA could spur $1.7 trillion in public and private investments, according to Credit Suisse.We discuss the IRA in Chapter 4.These federal outlays, which are already reshaping supply chains, are being complemented by subsidies offered by some individual states.Georgia, for instance, provided over $3 billion in financial incentives last year to two carmakers building electric vehicle factories.38 The EU's Protect and Promote Agenda While the EU and its member states do not use the phrase "protect and promote" to describe their derisking agenda, essentially this is also what they, and the UK, are doing.The EU's "protect" agenda is complicated because member states, not the European Commission, retain authority over many sensitive areas, and each tends to address dependency issues differently.When serious challenges arise, member states have shown a willingness to act.In the last year alone European governments spent €570 billion to shield their own societies from the energy shocks generated by the war.39 They guard their prerogatives jealously.Nevertheless, the EU does have tools at its disposal.It has long had the ability, if not always the will, to use trade defense instruments to impose anti-subsidy and antidumping duties on unfairly cheap imports.It has imposed a broad range of export controls on Russia, as we discuss in Chapter 1.Member states have extended the Xinjiang sanctions they first imposed in March 2021.In addition, Germany's Supply Chain Due Diligence Act, which came into force on January 1, requires companies to meet extensive obligations to ensure human rights and environment best practices in their supply chains.A related, and even more stringent, EU Supply Chain Due Diligence Directive will be debated in the European Parliament this year.Moreover, at the urging of the Commission, nearly all member states now have inward investment screening mechanisms, and some have tightened the laws they already had, as has the UK.This year the Commission is looking at ways to screen outbound investments.Finally, the EU's new Foreign Subsidies Regulation, which comes into force on July 1, 2023, empowers the Commission to prevent state-subsidized companies from producing in Europe or bidding for public procurement contracts there.While the rule was originally intended with China in mind, it could negatively affect U.S. companies deemed to be enjoying state subsidies under the IRA or related legislation.40 The EU's "promote" agenda has centered on NextGenerationEU, a €806 billion funding program to help EU member states recover and revive from the pandemic.It is the largest stimulus THE TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMY 2023 -37 package ever financed in Europe.The funds are being reinforced by elements of the EU's longterm budget, bringing the total of deployable funds to €2.018 trillion in current prices, to help create, in the EU's words, a "greener, more digital and more resilient" Europe.Elements of the package have been reshaped in response to ongoing events, particularly the need to shift away from energy dependencies on Russia.41 Debates about repurposing the funds have been reenergized by European concerns over massive cleantech subsidies being offered by China and the United States, as we discuss in Chapter 4.The "promote" agenda also includes the European Chips Act, which is intended to strengthen semiconductor value chains within the EU, with a goal of achieving 20% of worldwide production capacities.While the Act boasts a budget of more than €43 billion, it has not yet been approved, and much of the money is drawn from existing EU programs, from member states, or assumed private investments.The derisking phenomenon is not confined to the U.S. and Europe.When Beijing announced its "Made in China 2025" program eight years ago, it was explicit in its ambition to free China from dependence on Western technologies and to direct massive government support to make the country a world-beater in a number of critical sectors.It has since adjusted some aspects of this effort, but the essentials remain.Beijing also proclaimed a "military-civil fusion strategy" intended to use technological advances to align its commercial and defense sectors, and prioritized the capability to master "choke point" technologies.China's current five-year plan emphasizes industrial strategies to catch up and lead in critical technology domains.U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken says Beijing's plan seeks to make "China less dependent on the world and the world more dependent on China".42 The European Chamber of Commerce in China adds that Beijing's policies are causing China to lose its "allure," as many foreign firms reconsider their China presence.Even before the pandemic and Russia's renewed aggression, many companies had grown concerned about vulnerabilities and fragilities that had been accumulating in their deeply intertwined supply chains.The subsequent conflation of so many shocks has now led to an across-the-board rethink of the hyper-globalization model.German companies were responsible for 14.6% and Japanese companies for only 8.1%.Some corporations are adopting separate supply chain models for the China and non-China markets.Apple, Yum!Brands, and McDonald's are among the companies that have split out their China business.Many are adopting "China plus one" or "China plus two" approaches: retaining existing production facilities in China, but striking additional supply deals, or setting up additional manufacturing plants, in other countries.45 Many corporations are shifting from supply chains to supply webs.They are replacing singlesourcing of critical components with multiple, and sometimes geographically diverse, suppliers so as to prioritize uninterrupted deliveries over justin-time efficiencies.By the end of 2022 almost half of companies had diversified their supplier base, and less than 15% were relying on "just-intime" deliveries.46 Vietnam has been the biggest beneficiary of this trend.Half of Google's newest Pixel phones will be made in Vietnam this year.Apple is supplementing its operations in China by producing iPads, MacBooks, AirPods and smartwatches in Vietnam.Apple's many suppliers are following.The results are impressive: high-tech goods as a share of Vietnam's exports hit 42% in 2020, up from 13% in 2010.Vietnam's economy has more than doubled in size over the past decade.47 India is also gaining from corporate diversification away from China, as multinationals invest not just in low-cost labor but in higher-end innovation activities.Between January and October 2022, India attracted 225 FDI projects in R&D activities -a third of the global total and as many projects as the U.S., UK and China combined.Its global market share of handset production, including smartphones and feature phones, grew from 9% in 2016 to 16% in 2021, whereas China's share, while still dominant, declined from 74% in 2016 to 67%.Apple and its suppliers are developing India as a source of growth and as a strategic production base, with exports intended for Europe and other markets.48 Related to these shifts is a phenomenon dubbed "near-shoring," "friend-shoring," or "ally-shoring," which means production and sourcing/shifting supply chains away from geopolitical rivals toward more politically friendly countries, or to close allies.U.S. and European officials have publicly endorsed "friend-shoring" approaches.The U.S. CHIPS Act includes provisions prioritizing partnerships with allies as well as guardrails to weaken commercial ties with China.So does the U.S. Inflation Reduction Act, although with significant discriminatory elements, as we discuss in Chapter 4.The EU's still-pending Chips Act also targets "excessive dependencies" and foresees friend-shoring components such as "semiconductor international partnerships with like-minded countries."Japan, too, has offered incentive packages to U.S. Europe has reduced its dependence on Russian gas from 40% to 10% in less than one year.1 Spiking prices have fallen back to pre-war levels.Europeans used less gas, built up their strategic reserves, and switched to alternative energy sources.They benefi ted from a relatively mild winter.Critical gaps were fi lled by a surge in gas imports from other countries -notably the United States.U.S. liquefi ed natural gas (LNG) exporters supplied more than three-fourths of Europe's additional gas needs in the critical months following the outbreak of the war, and accounted for more than 50% of Europe's LNG supplies for the year as a whole.2 More than half of U.S. global LNG exports went to Europe in 2022.U.S. exporters shipped roughly 2.5 times more LNG supplies to Europe in than in 2021, and 3 times more than they supplied to all of Asia in 2022 (Table 1) Some concerns are being addressed.Used clean vehicles, which comprise 70% of the market, will benefit from tax credits and are not subject to local sourcing requirements.The new implementing rules also allow subsidies for "commercial clean vehicles" produced by European and other foreign carmakers if they are leased and not purchased, a favored option of U.S. consumers.Currently half of German electric vehicles in the United States are leased.5 Discussions continue about batteries.The IRA stipulates that batteries must meet a gradually increasing threshold of critical minerals extracted and processed in countries with "free trade agreements" with the U.S., beginning at 40% in 2023 and increasing by 10% each year through 2026.Neither the EU nor the UK has a free trade agreement with the United States.Drawing on their 2022 Minerals Security Partnership with a number of other countries, the U.S. and the EU are advancing critical materials pacts facilitating freer trade of these materials amongst signatories.These limited arrangements might qualify the EU and others as "free trade" partners, without requiring congressional approval for formal, comprehensive Free Trade Agreements.U.S. carmakers have joined their European counterparts in their concern about how fast they will be able to meet the IRA's provisions that restrict tax credits to new electric vehicles that do not include battery components or critical materials coming from "foreign entities of concern," including China, which is the source for many such materials.Some European carmakers have complained that their exports could be hit by IRA provisions limiting tax credits to manufacturers that complete "final vehicle assembly" in North America.This ignores the dense transatlantic linkages that underpin the auto industry.The main European automakers already conduct "final vehicle assembly" at their plants in the United States.Volkswagen is the largest European seller of electric vehicles in the U.S., for instance, and it produces its best-selling model in Chattanooga, Tennessee.Mercedes produces its electric EQS in Tuscaloosa, Alabama.Two of BMW's electric vehicle brands are produced at its plant in Spartanburg, South Carolina, which is bigger than its home plant in Munich.Many EU member states off er additional support measures.For instance, almost every EU country subsidizes the purchase of electric vehicles; Bruegel estimates such support totaled $6.5 billion and averaged about $6,500 per vehicle in 2022 (compared to IRA tax credits of up to $7,500 per vehicle).And while EU rules limit state aid by member governments as a way to ensure smaller and poorer states are not swamped by bigger and richer ones, those limits were loosened for the pandemic recovery and again after Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine.EU rules are now likely to be relaxed once more, at least until 2025, in response to the IRA.Bruegel concludes that EU and U.S. IRA subsidies for electric vehicles and cleantech manufacturing are roughly similar in size, and that European subsidies for renewable energy production are four times higher than subsidies foreseen by the IRA (Table 2) .These fi gures suggest that Europe's challenge is not a lack of fi nancial or state resources, but its own fragmentation and the legacy eff ects of its overreliance on cheap Russian energy.Bruegel concludes that U.S.-EU diff erences are less about the sheer size of their respective eff orts and more about how those initiatives are being rolled out.It judges IRA clean tech subsidies to be simpler, faster, and less fragmented than those in Europe, but argues that some discriminate against foreign producers, while most EU subsidies do not.IRA subsidies are focused mainly on mass deployment of current generation technologies, whereas EU-level support is more focused on spurring innovation and new technologies.Lost in the transatlantic debate about competing transatlantic subsidies is the challenge posed by China.As President von der Leyen has said, "The true pressure, the unleveling of the playing fi eld, is not our American friends, it's China -with massive hidden subsidies, with a lot of denial of access to our companies to the Chinese market and of course there is strategic shopping towards here, the European Union."7 China invested $546 billion in the energy transition in 2022, nearly four times the amount the U.S. spent, according to Bloomberg.8 Going forward, the two parties would do well to manage those diff erences that do exist, avoid subsidy wars, mitigate their respective critical-material dependencies, and improve their attractiveness for green investments by proactively harnessing transatlantic synergies. (Table 3) .European companies are the leading source of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the U.S. energy sector (Table 4) .Signifi cant transatlantic R&D synergies remain untapped.These fi gures underscore that transatlantic risk capital can be deployed successfully by venture investors to advance clean technologies at the innovation frontier.However, full transatlantic potential is being hampered by two major gaps along the innovation lifecycle.First, the voices of innovation are absent in transatlantic policy discussions.There is no place for cleantech innovators and investors to inform and exchange views with U.S. and EU offi cials.As a result, signifi cant transatlantic R&D synergies remain untapped.The U.S. and These gaps could be addressed, and transatlantic synergies catalyzed more eff ectively, if the U.S. and the EU moved forward on the pledge made at the June 2021 U.S.-EU Summit to "work towards a Transatlantic Green Technology Alliance that would foster cooperation on the development and deployment of green technologies, as well as promote markets to scale such technologies."At the time, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said the two parties would join forces to "enable breakthrough technologies and amazing innovations to be competitive on the market."11 Almost two years later, little progress has been made, despite the tremendous potential -and the urgency -of such an initiative.It's time for TACTA: a Transatlantic Clean Technology Alliance.12 As a platform for offi cials, demand owners, and the investor/innovation community to share perspectives and identify priorities, TACTA could highlight and support synergies among existing EU and U.S. cleantech eff orts, identify and close gaps, and prioritize innovations that reduce, rather than exacerbate their critical materials dependencies.Source: Cleantech Group.For more, see Daniel S. Hamilton, "It's time to forge a transatlantic clean technology alliance," The Hill, June 27, 2022, https://thehill.com/opinion/technology/3538332-its-time-toforge-a-transatlantic-clean-technology-alliance/, and "Zeit für transatlantische Technologieallianz," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, June 30, 2022, https://transatlanticrelations.org/ wp-content/uploads/2022/07/20220630_F.A.Z._Seite-8.pdf.The Digital Drivers of the Transatlantic Economy In most cases, digitally-driven companies are simply readjusting to post-pandemic realities and sharpening their focus on opportunities and challenges to come.Despite major job cuts, most digitally-driven companies still have more workers than they did when the pandemic began.The ten companies announcing the largest layoffs have only undone about 10% of the jobs they created during the pandemic.3 The ICT sector overall continues to record net employment gains, and scores of thousands of jobs remain unfilled.In short, the digital jet stream may no longer be stratospheric, but it is still flying high.More data was generated over the last two years than in the entirety of human history.By 2025, global data creation is projected to grow to more than 180 zettabytes.That's 180 followed by 21 zeros -over 2 billion times the Internet's size in 1997.Only about 2% of that data survives year-to-year.Still, 2% of 180 zettabytes is huge.By 2026, monthly global data traffic is expected to surge to 780 exabytes -more than three times data usage rates in 2020.4 Global internet bandwidth has tripled since 2017, even as growth slowed from a torrid pandemicdriven surge of 34% in 2020 to a more "normal" pace of 29% in 2021.5 Over 5 billion people typically spend more than 40% of their waking life online.6 More than 2 billion digital payments are made every day.7 This year, 1 in 2 companies will generate more than 40% of their revenues from digital products and services.8 GSMA Intelligence forecasts that 37.4 billion devices will be connected to the internet by 2030, up from 15.1 billion in 2021.9 The global Internet of Things (IoT) market, valued at $690.3 billion in 2021, is projected to grow to $1.5 trillion in 2026 and $1.85 trillion in 2028.10 Over the next three years, global spending on digital transformation is forecast to reach $3.4 trillion, with a five-year compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 16.3%.11 The United States is the largest market for such spending, accounting for nearly 35% of the worldwide total.Western Europe is the second largest region, accounting for nearly a quarter of all spending on digital transformation.12 The World Economic Forum estimates that 70% of the new value created in the whole economy over the next ten years will be digitally enabled.13 For the transatlantic economy a number of digital transformations bear watching.In previous surveys, we have discussed opportunities for small-and medium-sized enterprises, the evolution of 3-D printing, the emergence of Web3, and the promise of the connected factory.Each of these developments remains significant.We also discussed the metaverse, which much popular commentary treats as a fusion of virtual gaming, social networking, and entertainment.Substantial additional economic value, however, is likely to be generated by the "industrial" or "enterprise" metaverse, a world in which the distinctions between physical and digital work environments blend.In that world, nearly any More data was generated over the last two years than in the entirety of human history.The pandemic was a major accelerant of the biological revolution.A decade ago, mRNA vaccines were a dream.In 2020, they changed the world.BioNTech, Moderna, Merck, and other companies are already applying mRNA technology to deal with diseases such as malaria, tuberculosis, and HIV.In the future, mRNA drugs could be used for allergies, autoimmune conditions, individualized cancer therapies, regenerative medicine, and for a wide variety of illnesses, from fl u and heart disease to yellow fever and the Zika virus.BioNTech believes that in 15 years, one-third of all newly approved drugs will be based on mRNA.21 Many biotech fi rms have also been aff ected by post-pandemic adjustments.Many face tighter capital infl ows and have had to lay off workers.Nonetheless, the current stepback is more a fi ltering process and course correction than a secular downturn.Digital transformations continue to redefi ne health in all areas of life.3D printing is poised to revolutionize reconstructive surgery, from knee replacements to new ears.The rapid advancement of genome-editing techniques holds much promise for the fi eld of human gene therapy.Telemedicine, telepresence, and telesurgery are transforming medical techniques and generating greater cross-border trade in healthcare services.22 By 2025, 40% of the global datasphere will be in health -the largest of any sector or industry.This explosion of genetic and health data -and increasing abilities to process it -hold significant potential for scientific and medical achievement worldwide, assuming the ability to transfer data across borders, subject to certain privacy and data protection standards, is not undermined.The digital health industry is booming, with some estimates valuing the sector at more than $550 billion by 2027 and 16.5% CAGR.23 Biological breakthroughs are proceeding alongside, and sometimes interacting with, cognitive advances, led by the transformation of software and artificial intelligence.AI technologies are helping companies supercharge their online advertising, cut energy costs, predict customer behaviors, anticipate stock market movements, improve supply chains, build websites and fill in tax forms.They are approaching or surpassing human levels of performance in vision, image and speech recognition, language translation, skin cancer classification, breast cancer detection, and other domains.Over the next few years, major advances in deep learning and foundation models will lead to even more impressive AIbased applications.Over half of European and U.S. companies have adopted AI applications in their operations.24 The potential of transatlantic innovation is underscored by London-based AI company DeepMind, owned by Google parent Alphabet, which has used artificial intelligence to predict the shape of almost every known protein, a breakthrough that will significantly accelerate the time required to make biological discoveries.25 Recent findings show that AI can slash early drug discovery timelines by four years, and generate cost savings of 60%.26 While AI's positive effects could be revolutionary, it has also generated substantial concern about potential risks, ranging from automation of jobs, violations of privacy, discrimination, and the spread of fake news, to authoritarian social control and to autonomous weapons.29 Table 3 .Capital invested in purpose-driven digital companies by year and region, 2018-2022* *2022 is annualized based on actuals up to October and annualized on the basis of the three months of August to October.Source: Atomico, State of European Tech 2022, https://stateofeuropeantech.com/1.european-teach-a-new-reality/1.2-tech-motor-for-progress#C1-2-purpose-driven-tech-on-therise-again.A global assessment is off ered by the 2022 Network Readiness Index, which measures how prepared countries are to leverage the opportunities off ered by technological innovation.It does so by looking at the state of technology infrastructure, the ability of individuals, businesses, and governments to use ICT productively, how conducive the national environment is for a country's participation in the network economy, and the economic, social, and human impact of a country's participation in the network economy.Based on these metrics, Europe and North America represent 8 of the top 10 countries, and 18 of the top 25, when it comes to technology readiness and adoption ( Table 5) .Singapore and South Korea were the lone Asian countries in the top ten.36 Even though "digital globalization" evokes the image of a seamless global marketplace, digital connections are "thicker" between some continents and "thinner" between others -and they are "thickest" between North America and Europe.Due to these apples-and-oranges approaches, it is difficult to come up with a clear estimate of the overall size or value of the transatlantic digital economy.Our interest in this annual survey, however, is more on how North America and Europe connect, rather than on how they compare.With that in mind, we present five ways to look at the transatlantic digital economy.These metrics are not mutually exclusive; they are best understood as different lenses through which one can better understand the importance of transatlantic digital connections.Together, these five metrics convey one clear message: even though "digital globalization" evokes the image of a seamless global marketplace, digital connections are "thicker" between some continents and "thinner" between others -and they are "thickest" between North America and Europe.Digitalization is changing the scale, scope and speed of trade.It has lowered shipping and customs processing times.It offers alternative means of payment and finance.It has boosted trade in software design over trade in final products.It has reduced the cost of creating, copying and accessing text, video content and music.The result: trade in data, digital services, and intellectual property is booming, whereas trade in many traditional goods and services has flagged.According to McKinsey, between 2010 and 2019, trade flows linked to knowledge grew twice as fast as those of traditional goods.38 Digitalization has changed the very nature of trade.It blurs the distinction between trade in goods and services.Automakers are now also services providers; online retailers are also manufacturers.3D-printing generates products that are a mix of goods and services.Digitalization has enhanced our ability to access goods and services without owning them.39 The digital economy is dominated by services.Many services sectors that were once non-tradable -because they had to be delivered faceto-face -have become highly tradable -because they can now be delivered over long distances.40 Two metrics offer us a clearer picture of transatlantic connections in digital services.A narrow view can be had by looking at cross-border ICT services, or digital services as shorthand, which are services used to facilitate information processing and communication.41 A broader view can be taken by looking at services that can be, but are not necessarily, delivered remotely over ICT networks.These are called digitally-enabled or digitally-deliverable services: They include digital services as well as "activities that can be specified, performed, delivered, evaluated and consumed electronically."42 Identifying potentially ICT-enabled services does not tell us with certainty whether the services are actually traded digitally.But the U.S. Commerce Department notes that "these service categories are the ones in which digital technologies present the most opportunity to transform the relationship between buyer and seller from the traditional in-person delivery mode to a digital one," which means a digital transaction is likely and thus can offer a rough indication of the potential for digital trade.43 Growth in digitally-deliverable services trade cushioned the pandemic's blow to overall services trade.Global exports of digitally-deliverable services grew from around $3.3 trillion in 2019 to $3.8 trillion in 2021.This 8.4% growth helped to offset a sharp 11.8% decline in exports of other services during this pandemic period.As a result, overall services trade fell by 3.5%, much less than would otherwise have happened.Digitallydeliverable services accounted for about 63% of global services exports.44 Germany was the top global importer of digital services in 2021, followed by the United States and France.Ireland was the top global exporter of digital services, followed by India and China (Table 6 ).Considering the broader class of digitallydeliverable services, the United States was the largest global exporter and importer in 2021 (Table 7) .As with digital services, most of the top 10 exporters and importers of digitally-deliverable services in 2021 were developed countries.Ireland's high rankings underscore both its preferred location for many multinational companies, and its high reliance on digital trade.Its imports of digitally-deliverable services were equivalent to 64%, and its exports 63%, of its GDP.Digitally-enabled services are not just exported directly, they are used in manufacturing and to produce goods and services for export.Over half of digitally-enabled services imported by the United States from the European Union (EU) is used to produce U.S. products for export, and vice versa, thus generating an additional valueadded eff ect on trade that is not easily captured in standard metrics.45 In 2021, U.S exports of digital services totaled $89.4 billion, while U.S. digital services imports were $51.2 billion, resulting in a trade in a U.S. digital services trade surplus of $38.2 billion.U.S. trade in digitally-deliverable services was much higher: exports of $613.0 billion and imports of $350.4 billion.The resulting U.S. digitallydeliverable trade surplus of $262.6 billion was $41 billion (18%) more than in 2020.46 The UK was the U.S.' top overall trading partner in digitally-deliverable services, and its largest source of digitally-deliverable services imports.Ireland maintained its position as the top recipient country for U.S. exports of digitally-deliverable services for the third year in a row.Both countries also registered the largest increases in both imports and exports of digitally-deliverable services with the United States.47 In terms of world regions, Europe and the U.S. remain each other's main commercial trading partners in digitally-deliverable services.In 2021, the United States exported $283 billion in digitally-deliverable services to Europe -more than double what it exported to the entire Asia-Pacifi c region, and more than combined U.S. exports of digitally-deliverable services to the Asia-Pacifi c ($136 billion), Latin America and other Western Hemisphere ($111 billion), and the Middle East ($17 billion).In 2020, the 27 EU member states collectively exported €1.0 trillion and imported €1.0 trillion in digitally-enabled services to countries both inside and outside the EU (See Tables 9 and 10 ).Excluding intra-EU trade, EU member states exported €551 billion and imported €594.5 billion in digitally-enabled services, resulting in a defi cit of €43.3 billion for these services.Digitally-enabled services represented 61% of all EU27 services exports to non-EU27 countries and 68% of all EU services imports from non-EU countries.In 2020, the United States accounted for 22% of the EU27's digitally-enabled services exports to non-EU27 countries, and 34% of EU27 digitally-enabled services imports from non-Europe and the U.S. remain each other's main commercial trading partners in digitally-deliverable services.EU27 countries.48 The United States purchased €122.1 billion, according to Eurostat data for 2020, making it the largest country for imports of EU27 digitally-enabled services exports -ahead of even the United Kingdom (€121.1 billion).The entire region of Asia and Oceania imported just slightly more than the U.S. (€138.1 billion).In 2020, EU member states imported just over €1.0 trillion in digitally-enabled services, according to Eurostat data.41% originated from other EU member states (See Table 10 ).Another 20% (€204.7 billion) came from the United States, making it the largest supplier of these services.The EU imports of these services from the U.S. were almost double imports from the UK (€114.2 billion).and software, underscoring how integral such transatlantic inputs are to production processes in each economy.Financial services comprise the third largest digitally-enabled services export category.The digital economy has transformed the way trade in both goods and services is conducted across the Atlantic and around the world.Even more important, however, is the delivery of digital services by U.S. and European foreign affi liates -another indicator reinforcing the importance of foreign direct investment, rather than trade, as the major driver of transatlantic commerce.Country 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 Canada 3,595 4,140 3,971 5,996 6,316 7,135 7,595 7,401 8,487 8,342 9,161 8,991 9,403 9, Electronic commerce (e-commerce), which usually refers to transactions in which goods or services are ordered over a computer network (e.g., over the Internet), off ers a second window into transatlantic digital connections.55 Here again we run into some defi nitional and data challenges.Most estimates of e-commerce do not distinguish whether such commerce is domestic or international.Many metrics do not make it clear whether they cover all modes of e-commerce or only the leading indicators of business-tobusiness (B2B) and business-to-consumer (B2C) e-commerce.Finally, there are no offi cial data on the value of cross-border e-commerce sales broken down by mode; offi cial statistics on e-commerce are sparse and usually based on surveys rather than on real data.56 Nevertheless, we can evaluate and compare many diff erent estimates and surveys that have been conducted.According to UNCTAD, global e-commerce was worth $26.7 trillion globally in 2020 -equivalent to 30% of global gross domestic product.57 When most people hear the term 'e-commerce,' they think of consumers buying things from businesses via websites, social networks, crowdsourcing platforms, or mobile apps.These business-to-consumer transactions (B2C), however, pale in comparison to businessto-business (B2B) e-commerce.In 2022 B2B e-commerce was estimated to exceed $22 trillion and account for the vast majority of global e-commerce.58 By 2028 the global B2B e-commerce market is slated to reach a value of $25.65 trillion, over three times more than the B2C market, which is expected to total $7.65 trillion.59 B2B e-commerce sales were estimated to total $1.67 trillion in the United States and $1.33 trillion in Europe in 2022, and are projected to reach $2.25 trillion and $1.8 trillion, respectively, in 2025.60 While B2B e-commerce accounts for the bulk of global e-commerce, most B2B e-commerce does not cross a border.Most B2B e-commerce users are manufacturers or wholesalers who are dependent on physically moving goods, and often heavy freight; the lack of freight digitalization ultimately poses a barrier to crossborder B2B e-commerce.The sheer volume of B2B e-commerce, however, means it still is the most important component of cross-border e-commerce sales.61 Including all types of e-commerce, the United States was the top market in the world in the pre-pandemic year of 2019, for which there is the latest comparable data.U.S. online sales there were 2.8 times higher than in Japan and 3.7 times higher than in China.North America and Europe accounted for six of the top 10 e-commerce countries (Table 15 ).China's large B2C e-commerce market refl ects its billion-plus population.China is underweight, however, when it comes to B2B e-commerce.When it comes to cross-border B2C e-commerce sales, China and the United States led in terms of total value, while the UK led in terms of B2C e-commerce as a share of overall goods exports (Table 16) .62 Cross-border e-commerce revenues (excluding travel) in Europe reached €171 billion in 2021, an increase of 17% compared to 2020.Among 16 prominent European ecommerce markets, 25.5% of total B2C turnover was cross-border in 2020, for which there is the latest comparable data.Cross-border turnover accounted for 35% or more of total ecommerce turnover for Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Norway, Portugal and Switzerland.63 One likely eff ect of Brexit, with its accompanying cross-border complications related to new tax provisions, import duties, and logistics adjustments, was that UK cross-border B2C e-commerce sales dropped by 12% in 2021, falling to €29 billion from €33 billion in 2020.The UK lost its traditional position to Germany as Europe's top cross-border B2C e-commerce country.Whereas UK retailers accounted for one of every fi ve of the top 500 European cross-border e-commerce companies in 2020, they accounted for only one in 68 in 2021 -a decline of 32%.64 Platform companies that connect individuals and companies directly to each other to trade products and services continue to reshape the U.S. and European economies, as well as the commercial connections between them.Platforms have swiftly become a prominent business model in the transatlantic and global economy, both by matching supply and demand in real time and at unprecedented scale, and by connecting code and content producers to develop applications and software such as operating systems or technology standards.65 Platform models have risen so quickly over the past two decades that by 2019, platform companies accounted for 7 of the 10 most valuable global fi rms.66 By 2025, platform models are projected to expand to around $60 trillion, or nearly one-third of all global commerce.67 Size matters in the platform economy.The biggest are U.S. companies, which account for about two-thirds of the global platform economy.Next come Chinese companies.European platform companies on average are markedly smaller than their U.S. and Chinese counterparts, and together represent only 3% of global market value (Table 17) .The dramatic rise of U.S. and Chinese platform companies has generated considerable concern among Europeans that they may be missing out on a major economic transformation.Europe certainly faces some challenges.However, size is not everything.Platform economics have rewarded entrepreneurship and the adoption of new business models.Those who can develop both their digital and their entrepreneurial ecosystems stand to profi t greatly from the platform revolution.The Digital Platform Economy Index, which draws on 112 indicators that integrate digital and entrepreneurial ecosystems gauges, goes beyond size to off er a more diff erentiated view of digital platform-based ecosystem performance (Table 18 ).According to this Index, North American and European countries account for 9 of the top 10, and 17 of the top 20, countries when it comes to combined digital and entrepreneurial ecosystem development.China's brand of state-driven capitalism ranks highly in terms of building digital ecosystems, but lags behind the leaders when it comes to digital entrepreneurship.68 The leading countries not only host digital multi-sided platforms, they rank highly in terms of digital technology entrepreneurship, digital infrastructure governance, and "digital user citizenship".In the end, it is Europe's larger ecosystem that is likely to shape its future in the platform economy.Another lens through which we can better understand transatlantic digital connections is to appreciate the role of cross-border data flows, which not only contribute more to global growth than trade in goods, they underpin and enable virtually every other kind of cross-border flow.70 Transatlantic data flows are critical to enabling the $7.1 trillion EU-U.S. economic relationship.They account for more than half of Europe's data flows and about half of U.S. data flows globally.Over 90% of EU-based firms transfer data to and from the United States.71 However, despite the broad recognition of its value, and the need to develop appropriate policy frameworks, there is still no consensus method for empirically determining the value of data.72 One reason is that data is a special resource different than goods and services.UNCTAD calls cross-border data flows "a new kind of international economic flow, which lead to a new form of global interdependence".73 Data flows are not necessarily a proxy for commercial links, since data traffic is not always related to commercial transactions.74 Knowing the volume of data flows does not necessarily provide insight on the economic value of their content.The BEA puts it succinctly: "Streaming a video might be of relatively little monetary value but use several gigabytes of data, while a financial transaction could be worth millions of dollars but use little data".75 In addition, commercial transactions do not always accompany data, and data do not always accompany commercial transactions.For instance, multinational companies often send valuable, but non-monetized, data to their affiliates.76 User-generated content on blogs and on YouTube drives very high volumes of internet traffic both within countries and across borders, but consumers pay for very little of this content.Since it does not involve a monetary transaction, the significant value that this content generates does not show up in economic or trade statistics.77 In short, data flows are commercially significant, yet their extent, as well as their commercial value, are hard to measure and are in constant flux.Transatlantic data flows account for more than half of Europe's data flows and about half of U.S. data flows globally.Data flows are critical to the transatlantic economy, yet U.S.-EU regulatory differences have generated legal uncertainties regarding the transfer of personal data.In July 2020, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) invalidated the Privacy Shield framework that enabled over 5,000 mostly small-and mediumsized enterprises to transfer personal data for commercial purposes.This prompted renewed negotiations that led to the EU-U.S. Data Privacy Framework (DPF) announced by Presidents Biden and von der Leyen in March 2022.Six months later, President Biden issued an Executive Order that strengthened principles-based privacy and civil liberties safeguards for U.S. intelligence activities, and created an independent and binding mechanism that individuals can use to challenge violations of these principles.In December, the European Commission issued a draft decision that these protections are "essentially equivalent" to those provided within the EU when the personal data of Europeans is transferred to the United States.However, such determinations are based on self-compliance certification schemes similar to those invalidated by the CJEU.As a result, the DPF, like its predecessors, is likely to face legal challenges from within the EU.78 EU-based firms transferring data to and from the U.S. Over 90% Cross-Region Data Flows Globally, the most intense and valuable crossregion data fl ows continue to run between North America and Europe.They are also almost certainly the most valuable, even if their worth is diffi cult to measure.The OECD devised metrics to determine the most active countries when it comes to delivering products across borders through data fl ows, as opposed to considering all transactions facilitated through data fl ows.It determined that the United States is a major hub for international trade in products delivered through data fl ows, and that France, Germany, India, Ireland, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom also feature heavily in trade underpinned by data, all ahead of China ( (1) "ISIC J production", or trade in products produced by firms classified in ISIC section J (Information and Communication); (2) "ISIC J products," or trade in the products mainly associated with firms classified in ISIC section J but including production by firms classified in other sectors; (3) "Digitally deliverable services," or "potentially ICT-enabled products" per UNCTAD (2015); and (4) "Digitisable products," or products within the WTO HS commodity classification per Banga (2019 The hard-wiring of the transatlantic digital landscape continues to evolve.One key development is the shift in providers of data centers and cloud-like services from European and U.S. telecommunication companies and related data-center management enterprises to "hyperscalers," mainly from the United States.Traditional data centers are centralized facilities that use computing and networking systems and equipment to store data and to enable users to access those resources.Now, the opportunity to use applications that work together via the web and the cloud has given birth to more costeff ective hyperscale data centers that can store more data and scale up or down in quick response to shifting demand for computing tasks.Many commentators simplify the term "hyperscalers" to refer to the three largest providers: Amazon Web Services (AWS), Microsoft Azure, and Google Cloud.These three fi rms account for about two-thirds of hyperscale data market share.Nonetheless, other hyperscalers include Meta, Oracle, Apple, IBM, Scaleway, Switch, Alibaba, Huawei, QTS, Digital Realty Trust, Equinix and SAP.81 Hyperscale data centers accounted for more than half of all installed data-center servers and total data center traffi c in 2021.The global hyperscale data center market is slated to grow by $107.60 billion between 2021-2025.There are now more than 700 hyperscale data centers around the world, double the amount of fi ve years ago.That number is expected to top 1,000 at the end of 2024 and reach 1,200 by the end of 2026.82 The United States currently accounts for over 53% of the world's operational hyperscale infrastructure, measured by critical IT load.83 More than one-third of U.S. hyperscale capacity is located in one state -Virginia.84 Virginia has far more hyperscale data center capacity than either China or all of Europe.Much of that is in Northern Virginia, along the border with Washington, DC.The second-largest concentration of hyperscale infrastructure is in the western United States, primarily Oregon and California.The U.S. Midwest follows, with large concentrations of hyperscale infrastructure in Iowa and Ohio.85 The other half of global hyperscale infrastructure is relatively evenly split between China, Europe, and the rest of the world.In Europe, the leading country markets for hyperscale infrastructure are Ireland and the Netherlands, followed by Germany and the UK.Two other trends have the potential to mitigate such concerns, depending on how they unfold: migration to the "edge;" and the evolution of "cloud-as-a-service" to "cloud-as-a-product".Today, most cloud computing still happens in centralized rather than decentralized data centers.By 2025, this trend will reverse: 80% of all data is expected to be processed in smart devices closer to the user, known as edge computing.A few enormous data centers may still be built, but the more pervasive reality will be the emergence of thousands of small data centers distributed more evenly across geographies.This could open opportunities for European providers to offer multi-cloud options that ensure local control over data with the amplified possibilities that come from hyperscaled connections.Cloud/edge computing is likely to be critical to the EU's ability to realize its European Green Deal, particularly in areas such as farming, mobility, buildings and manufacturing.90 These opportunities are likely to be influenced by the evolution of the cloud from being a platform on which a business runs, to becoming the product itself.Rather than considering hyperscalers as direct competitors, some European telecoms operators and companies in a range of other businesses now see their biggest opportunities in the cloud building on top of the basic infrastructure already rolled out by U.S. companies.For instance, Siemens is building an ambitious "industrial cloud platform" on top of the basic cloud infrastructure provided by AWS, to enable it to become a key player in digital industrial manufacturing services.Thales, a French defense company, has formed a company in cooperation with Google Cloud to operate three "trusted cloud" hyperscale data centers in France.Other examples include Vodaphone's multi-year strategic partnership with Google, and an alliance between AWS and European digital company Atos.91 The Digital Atlantic Seascape Land-based digital hubs are connected to seabased digital spokes -roughly 500 undersea fiber optic cables that transmit 95% of all intercontinental telecommunication traffic, carry an estimated $10 trillion worth of financial transactions every day, and serve as the backbone for the global internet.92 Elon Musk's Starlink may have popularized the idea of satellite internet, but satellites cannot compete with submarine cables when it comes to digital communication capacity, speed, or transaction time (latency).They transmit less than one-half of one percent of such traffic.93 Subsea cables serve as an additional proxy for the ties that bind continents.Despite uncertain economic growth prospects for many countries, demand for international bandwidth continues to be strong.Globally, the market for submarine fiber optic cables is estimated to reach $30.8 billion by 2026, growing at an annual rate of 14.3%.94 The transatlantic data seaway is the busiest and most competitive in the world.Submarine cables in the Atlantic already carry 55% more data than transpacific routes, and with new capacity buildout, that ratio is tilting further in favor of the Atlantic.This meteoric rise in transatlantic bandwidth growth is being driven by individuals and businesses switching to cloud and web-based services.Based on current trends, demand could outpace design capacity growth by 2025 (Table 22) .97 In 2022, total transatlantic capacity was boosted by 70% just by two new powerful transatlantic cables: Grace Hopper, which now extends 6,250 km from New York to the Cornish seaside resort town of Bude in the UK and 6,300 km from New York to Bilbao in Spain; and Amitié, which now connects Massachusetts with Bude and with Le Porge in France across 6,600 km of subsea terrain.98 The The Hyper-Providers In 2010, the vast majority of international cable capacity was used by telecommunications companies, governments, and researcheducational networks.Only 6.3% was consumed by private network providers of content and cloud services.By 2021, the numbers had flipped: content providers accounted for 69% of used international bandwidth globally and for 91% of used capacity on transatlantic routes.Moreover, the content providers now build and either wholly or partially own those cables themselves.108 They are largely responsible for the new surge in global subsea digital capacity, and their densest connections are between North America and Europe (Table 24) Bypassing the Internet The rise of private content providers as drivers of submarine cable traffic is related to yet another significant yet little understood phenomenon shaping the transatlantic digital economy: more and more companies are working to bypass the public internet as a place to do business in favor of private channels that can facilitate the direct electronic exchange of data among companies.109 This move is exponentially increasing demand for "interconnection" -direct, private digital data exchanges that bypasses the public internet -and is another fundamental driver behind the proliferation of transatlantic cable systems.Private interconnection bandwidth is not only distinct from public internet traffic, it is already 9 times larger and is slated to grow much more quickly.110 The public internet will remain a pervasive force in most people's lives and a key to digitallydelivered services, e-commerce and the platform economy.111 Yet private interconnection is rising alongside the public internet as a powerful vehicle for business.And as we have shown here, its deepest links are across the Atlantic. "Cross-border data flows: Designing a global architecture for growth and innovation," Zurich Insurance, 2022, https://www.zurich.com/en/knowledge/topics/digital-data-and-cyber/whycross-border-data-flows-matter.9 GSMA Intelligence, "Digital transformation in a post-pandemic future," 2022.September 22, 2022.14 McKinsey & Co., "Digital twins: The Foundation of the enterprise metaverse," October 22, 2022, https://www.mckinsey.com/capabilities/mckinsey-digital/our-insights/digital-twins-thefoundation-of-the-enterprise-metaverse.For more, see Mark Sullivan, "What the metaverse will (and won't) be, according to 28 experts," Fast Company, October 26, 2021, https:// www.fastcompany.com/90678442/what-is-the-metaverse; The Economist, "22 emerging technologies to watch in 2022," November 8, 2021, https://www.economist.com/the-worldahead/2021/11/08/what-next-22-emerging-technologies-to-watch-in-2022.15 Simon Bentley and Tony Murdzhev, "Accelerating Sustainability With Virtual Twins," Accenture, January 26, 2021, https://www.accenture.com/us-en/blogs/industry-digitization/ accelerating-sustainability-with-virtual-twins.Also "Top 7 IoT Trends That Will Shape the Digital World in 2023," Emeritus.org, December 9, 2022, https://emeritus.org/blog/technologyprogram-iot-trends-2023/; Peter Bilello, "Outlook 2023: Digital Twins Will No Longer Be an Option," Engineering.com, November 22, 2022, https://www.engineering.com/story/outlook-2023-digital-twins-will-no-longer-be-an-option; Bishwadeep Mitra, "How Digital Twin Solutions Affect Business: The Next Digital Transformation," Emeritus, November 9, 2022, https:// emeritus.org/blog/technology-what-is-a-digital-twin/; Oliver Peckham, "Europe's Digital Twins for Earth Kick Off, Crown Jewel Supercomputers in Tow," HPCWire, October 19, 2022, https://www.hpcwire.com/2022/10/19/europes-digital-twins-for-earth-kick-off-crown-jewel-supercomputers-in-tow/; Julie Pattison-Gordon, "Can a Digital Twin of Earth Give Better Climate Insights?Government Technology, November 14, 2022, https://www.govtech.com/products/can-a-digital-twin-of-earth-give-better-climate-insights.https://www.geospatialworld.net/prime/digital-twin-of-earth-to-aid-climate-change-studies/; Bernard Marr, "The Best Examples Of Digital Twins Everyone Should Know About," Forbes, June 20, 2022, https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2022/06/20/the-best-examples-of-digital-twins-everyone-should-know-about/. 16 Pak Yiu, Dylan Loh and Francesca Regaldo, "'Crypto winter' to 'ice age'?What 2023 holds for digital assets," Nikkei Asia, December 30, 2022, https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Business-Spotlight/Crypto-winter-to-ice-age-What-2023-holds-for-digital-assets; Bank for International Settlements, "The future monetary system," June 2022, https://www.bis.org/publ/arpdf/ ar2022e3.pdf; David J. Farber and Dan Gillmor, "Cryptocurrencies remain a gamble best avoided," Nikkei Asia, February 5, 2022, https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/Cryptocurrenciesremain-a-gamble-best-avoided.17 See Bank for International Settlements, "Using CBDCs across borders: lessons from practical experiments," June 2022, https://www.bis.org/publ/othp51.pdf; Maria Demertzis, "Is there social added value in digital currencies?"Presentation at the 10th Meeting of the Fintech Working Group, Bruegel, November 29, 2022, https://www.bruegel.org/sites/default/ files/2022-12/Retail%20CBDCs%20and%20private%20crypto%20solutions%20Presenation%20EP%20November%202022_0.pdf; Siddharth Venkataramakrishnan and Martin Arnold, "Report suggests bright future for central bank digital currencies," Financial Times, June 30, 2022.18 U.S. Federal Reserve, "CBDC: Monetary/Digital -Money and Payments: The U.S. Dollar in the Age of Digital Transformation," January 20, 2022, https://www.federalreserve.gov/ publications/files/money-and-payments-20220120.pdf; U.S. Department of the Treasury, "The Future of Money and Payments," September, 2022, https://home.treasury.gov/system/ files/136/Future-of-Money-and-Payments.pdf; U.S. Department of the Treasury, "Assessing the Impact of New Entrant Non-bank Firms on Competition in Consumer Finance Markets," Report to the White House Competition Council, November 2022, https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/Assessing-the-Impact-of-New-Entrant-Nonbank-Firms.pdf.19 Steven Levy, "Welcome to the Wet Hot AI Chatbot Summer," Wired, January 6, 2023; John Thornhill, "Can generative AI's stimulating powers extend to productivity?"Financial Times, January 26, 2023; Erin Griffith and Cade Metz, "A New Area of A.I. Booms, Even Amid the Tech Gloom," New York Times, January 7, 2023; Michael Chui, Roger Roberts, and Lareina Yee, "Generative AI is here: How tools like ChatGPT could change your business," McKinsey & Co., December 20, 2022, https://www.mckinsey.com/capabilities/quantumblack/our-insights/ generative-ai-is-here-how-tools-like-chatgpt-could-change-your-business.20 See previous years of this survey.Also Daniel S. Hamilton, The Transatlantic Digital Economy 2017 (Washington, DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2017); Digital Economy Compass 2018, Statista.com, file:///C:/Users/Owner/Downloads/study_id52194_digital-economy-compass.pdf; International Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF), "The Task Ahead of US," http://www2.itif.org/2019-task-ahead.pdf.21 Ugur Sahin and Ozlem Tureci, "The post-covid future of mRNA therapies," The Economist, November 8, 2021, https://www.economist.com/the-world-ahead/2021/11/08/ugur-sahin-and-ozlem-tureci-on-the-future-of-mrna-therapies; Gina Vitale, "Moderna/Merck cancer vaccine shows promise in trials," Chemical and Engineering News, December 20, 2022, https://cen.acs.org/pharmaceuticals/vaccines/ModernaMerck-cancer-vaccine-shows-promise/100/web/2022/12; McKinsey Global Institute, The Bio Revolution: Innovations transforming economies, societies, and our lives, May 2020, https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/life-sciences/our-insights/the-bio-revolution-innovations-transforming-economies-societies-and-our-lives.22 Nick Webster, "How 3D printing is set to revolutionise reconstructive surgery," The National, October 7, 2022, https://www.thenationalnews.com/weekend/2022/10/07/how-3d-printingis-set-to-change-the-world-of-reconstructive-surgery/; Paul Hanaphy, "3D Printing Industry Review of the Year," 3D Printing Industry, December 24, 2022, https://3dprintingindustry.com/ news/3d-printing-industry-review-of-the-year-december-2022-219144/; Roni Caryn Rabin, "Doctors Transplant Ear of Human Cells, Made by 3-D Printer," New York Times, June 2, 2022.This overall number, while impressive, does not tell us much about the reasons for such investment or the countries where U.S. companies focus their investments.As we have stated in previous surveys, official statistics blur some important distinctions when it comes to the nature of transatlantic investment flows.Recent research, however, helps us understand better two important phenomena: "round-tripping" and "phantom FDI".Round-tripping investments go from an original investor, for instance in the United States, to an ultimate destination in a country such as Germany, but flow first from the United States to an intermediate country such as Luxembourg, and then from Luxembourg to Germany.Official statistics record this as a U.S.-Luxembourg flow or a Luxembourg-Germany flow.While Luxembourg may derive some economic benefit from that flow emanating originally from the United States, the ultimate beneficiary is in Germany.Applying this example to 2017, the year with the most recent data, official figures from the IMF indicate that FDI in Germany from the United States was around $90 billion, whereas research by economists at the IMF and University of Copenhagen that took account of these "round tripping" flows concluded that the stock of "real FDI" from the United States in Germany was actually almost $170 billion.Similarly, "real FDI" links from Germany to the United States are considerably higher than official statistics might indicate.All told, they estimated that "real FDI" bilateral links from Germany to the United States in that year topped $400 billion in 2017, whereas official statistics put that figure closer to $300 billion.This phenomenon continues to apply to these and other important bilateral investment links, such as those between the U.S. and the UK or the U.S. and France.In these and other instances, "real FDI" links are likely to be higher than standard measurements indicate. "Phantom" vs. "Real" FDI Since 2017, however, the role of off shore fi nancial centers has gradually declined, while that of large economies, particularly the United States, has increased.One contributing factor is likely to have been the U.S. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2018, which lowered incentives to keep profi ts in low-tax jurisdictions and led to a substantial U.S. repatriation of funds from foreign subsidiaries.Additionally, some fl ows to off shore fi nancial centers are likely to have been blunted by sustained international eff orts to reduce tax avoidance, like the OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profi t Shifting initiative, which has led 137 countries to reach agreement on a fair allocation of taxing rights and a global minimum eff ective tax at a uniform tax rate of 15%.In the aggregate, and extrapolating forward, about 54% of America's total FDI position in Europe was allocated to non-bank holding companies in 2020, meaning that less than half of the $3.7 trillion was invested in "real economy" industries such as mining, manufacturing, wholesale trade, fi nance, and professional and information services (See Box 6.1).Excluding holding companies, total U.S. FDI stock in Europe in 2020 amounted to $1.7 trillion -a much smaller fi gure.These fi gures illustrate the extremely volatile nature of U.S. FDI annual outfl ows.The cyclical challenge before Europe is substantial: Russia's war and energy shocks will exert considerable pressure on many economies.Consumers and businesses have been hammered by the spike in energy costs, although diversified supplies and public support mechanisms, along with falling prices, have helped alleviate some of the burden.That said, it is important to see the forest from the trees, and to recognize that, first, Europe on a standalone basis remains one of the largest and wealthiest economic entities in the world and, second, the region remains a critical cog in the corporate success of U.S. firms.Europe is home to more than 500 million people across the EU, the UK, Norway, Switzerland, Iceland and a host of eastern countries.This cohort accounted for roughly 23% of world output in 2021 -slightly lower than the U.S. share of 24%, but greater than that of China's (18%).On a purchasing power parity basis, Europe's share was greater than that of the United States but less than that of China in 2021.1950-1959 20,363 3,997 19.6 1960-1969 40,634 16,220 39.9 1970-1979 122,721 57,937 47.2 1980-1989 171,880 94,743 55.1 1990-1999 869,489 465,337 53.5 2000-2009 2,056 Investing in emerging markets such as China, India, and Brazil remains diffi cult, with indigenous barriers to growth (poor infrastructure, dearth of human capital, corruption, etc.)as well as policy headwinds (foreign exchange controls, tax preferences favoring local fi rms) reducing the overall attractiveness of these markets to multinationals.As shown in Table 5 Wealth drives consumption, with the EU+UK accounting for roughly 21% of global personal consumption expenditures in 2021.That's a lower share than that of the U.S. (30%) but well above that of China (12%), India (3.4%) and the BRICs combined (18.6%).Since 2000, personal consumption expenditures in the EU have almost doubled to roughly $9.6 trillion, representing an increasing market opportunity for large global corporations.Wealth in Europe is also correlated with a highly skilled and productive workforce, advanced innovation capabilities, and a world-class R&D infrastructure -underpinning the attractiveness of the EU to corporate America.The EU's labor force is not only more than twenty percent larger than America's; its labor force participation rate is more than ten percentage points higher (74.3%) than it is in the U.S. (62.4%).Finally, when it comes to skilled labor, Europe again leads the United States.To this point, in 2018, the last year of available data, the number of science and engineering graduates in the EU+UK totaled roughly 1 million, versus 760,000 in the U.S., according to the National Science Foundation.Since the U.S. economy is short of technology and scientifi c talent, accessing Europe's tech talent pool is critical to the long-term success of many American fi rms.Business-friendly policies surrounding property rights, the ability to obtain credit, employment regulations, starting a business and cross-border trade have been a major draw for foreign investors over the years.According to the International Institute for Management Development (IMD) latest World Competitiveness Rankings for 2022, fourteen European economies ranked in the top twenty-fi ve.Among the top ten, Denmark was ranked #1, followed by Switzerland (2), Sweden (4), the Netherlands (6), Finland (8) and Norway (9).Other factors, such as shared values, respect for the rule of law, credible institutions, advanced infrastructure, and strong fi nancial markets continue to set Europe apart when it comes to U.S. business investment.Finally, Europe continues to be a world leader when it comes to innovation and knowledgebased activities.According to the 2022 Global Innovation Index, eight European economies rank among the top 15 most innovative countries in the world (Table 6 ). (Table 6 ).Since R&D expenditures are a key driver of valueadded growth, it is interesting to note that EU-and UK-based organizations accounted for slightly more than one-fi fth of total global R&D in 2020 in purchasing-power parity terms.That lagged the share of the United States and China but exceeded the share of Japan and South Korea.Over the past two decades, China has steadily advanced its R&D capabilities, and is projected to overtake the United States as the top R&D spender in the world (Table 7) .Access to a large market On a country basis, German companies operating in Alabama represented 14% of total foreign affi liate employment in Alabama, with German multinationals supporting approximately 5,300 more jobs in 2020 than in 2012.Jobs directly supported by European investment.Total European-related jobs are likely to be higher, because these figures do not include jobs created by trade flows, indirect employment effects through distributors or suppliers, or via non-equity arrangements such as strategic alliances, joint ventures, or other deals.0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 Jobs directly supported by European investment.Total European-related jobs are likely to be higher, because these figures do not include jobs created by trade flows, indirect employment effects through distributors or suppliers, or via non-equity arrangements such as strategic alliances, joint ventures, or other deals.2012 2020 0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 Jobs directly supported by European investment.Total European-related jobs are likely to be higher, because these figures do not include jobs created by trade flows, indirect employment effects through distributors or suppliers, or via non-equity arrangements such as strategic alliances, joint ventures, or other deals.2012 2020 0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 On a country basis, U.K. companies operating in Washington D.C. represented 36% of total foreign affi liate employment in DC, with U.K. multinationals supporting approximately 1,700 fewer jobs in 2020 than in 2012.Jobs directly supported by European investment.Total European-related jobs are likely to be higher, because these figures do not include jobs created by trade flows, indirect employment effects through distributors or suppliers, or via non-equity arrangements such as strategic alliances, joint ventures, or other deals.2012 2020 0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 On a country basis, German companies operating in Georgia represented 12% of total foreign affi liate employment in Georgia, with German multinationals supporting approximately 11,000 more jobs in 2020 than in 2012.Jobs directly supported by European investment.Total European-related jobs are likely to be higher, because these figures do not include jobs created by trade flows, indirect employment effects through distributors or suppliers, or via non-equity arrangements such as strategic alliances, joint ventures, or other deals.2012 2020 0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 Jobs directly supported by European investment.Total European-related jobs are likely to be higher, because these figures do not include jobs created by trade flows, indirect employment effects through distributors or suppliers, or via non-equity arrangements such as strategic alliances, joint ventures, or other deals.0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 20% of the total 20% of the total 13% Jobs directly supported by European investment.Total European-related jobs are likely to be higher, because these figures do not include jobs created by trade flows, indirect employment effects through distributors or suppliers, or via non-equity arrangements such as strategic alliances, joint ventures, or other deals.0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 100,000 0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 100,000 Jobs directly supported by European investment.Total European-related jobs are likely to be higher, because these figures do not include jobs created by trade flows, indirect employment effects through distributors or suppliers, or via non-equity arrangements such as strategic alliances, joint ventures, or other deals.2012 2020 0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 Jobs directly supported by European investment.Total European-related jobs are likely to be higher, because these figures do not include jobs created by trade flows, indirect employment effects through distributors or suppliers, or via non-equity arrangements such as strategic alliances, joint ventures, or other deals.2012 2020 0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 Jobs directly supported by European investment.Total European-related jobs are likely to be higher, because these figures do not include jobs created by trade flows, indirect employment effects through distributors or suppliers, or via non-equity arrangements such as strategic alliances, joint ventures, or other deals.2012 2020 0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 Jobs products including transportation equipment, electronic products, chemicals and paper products.Petroleum & coal products represent 28% of Maine's total imports from Europe, followed by machinery and transportation equipment.Jobs directly supported by European investment.Total European-related jobs are likely to be higher, because these figures do not include jobs created by trade flows, indirect employment effects through distributors or suppliers, or via non-equity arrangements such as strategic alliances, joint ventures, or other deals. *Netherlands employment data suppressed to avoid disclosure of individual company data.Range of 10,000 -24,999 employees given.0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 Jobs directly supported by European investment.Total European-related jobs are likely to be higher, because these figures do not include jobs created by trade flows, indirect employment effects through distributors or suppliers, or via non-equity arrangements such as strategic alliances, joint ventures, or other deals.2012 2020 0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 Jobs directly supported by European investment.Total European-related jobs are likely to be higher, because these figures do not include jobs created by trade flows, indirect employment effects through distributors or suppliers, or via non-equity arrangements such as strategic alliances, joint ventures, or other deals.2012 2020 0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 Jobs directly supported by European investment.Total European-related jobs are likely to be higher, because these figures do not include jobs created by trade flows, indirect employment effects through distributors or suppliers, or via non-equity arrangements such as strategic alliances, joint ventures, or other deals.2012 2020 0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 Jobs directly supported by European investment.Total European-related jobs are likely to be higher, because these figures do not include jobs created by trade flows, indirect employment effects through distributors or suppliers, or via non-equity arrangements such as strategic alliances, joint ventures, or other deals.0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 * Data unavailable for latest year.Jobs (16.7%) 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 50% of the total 50% of the total 20% 10% 10% 10% Jobs directly supported by European investment.Total European-related jobs are likely to be higher, because these figures do not include jobs created by trade flows, indirect employment effects through distributors or suppliers, or via non-equity arrangements such as strategic alliances, joint ventures, or other deals.0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 Jobs directly supported by European investment.Total European-related jobs are likely to be higher, because these figures do not include jobs created by trade flows, indirect employment effects through distributors or suppliers, or via non-equity arrangements such as strategic alliances, joint ventures, or other deals.2012 2020 0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 Jobs directly supported by European investment.Total European-related jobs are likely to be higher, because these figures do not include jobs created by trade flows, indirect employment effects through distributors or suppliers, or via non-equity arrangements such as strategic alliances, joint ventures, or other deals.2012 2020 0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 2012 2020 0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 Jobs directly supported by European investment.Total European-related jobs are likely to be higher, because these figures do not include jobs created by trade flows, indirect employment effects through distributors or suppliers, or via non-equity arrangements such as strategic alliances, joint ventures, or other deals.2012 2020 0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 Jobs directly supported by European investment.Total European-related jobs are likely to be higher, because these figures do not include jobs created by trade flows, indirect employment effects through distributors or suppliers, or via non-equity arrangements such as strategic alliances, joint ventures, or other deals.2012 2020 0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 2012 2020 0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 America's direct investment position in Austria has declined since hitting a peak in 2013.Austria's investment stake in the U.S. now exceeds America's investment in Austria.However, American affi liates employed more workers in Austria than Austrian fi rms employed in the U.S. in 2021.Foreign direct investment position, historic-cost basis, 2000-2021.Note: Dotted line indicates that data has been suppressed for a particular year to avoid disclosure of individual company data.Negative FDI positions can occur when the loans from the affiliate to the parent company exceed the equity and debt investments from the parent to the affiliate, or if a foreign affiliate incurs sufficiently large losses.Foreign direct investment position, historic-cost basis, 2000-2021.Note: Dotted line indicates that data has been suppressed for a particular year to avoid disclosure of individual company data.Negative FDI positions can occur when the loans from the affiliate to the parent company exceed the equity and debt investments from the parent to the affiliate, or if a foreign affiliate incurs sufficiently large losses.Jobs directly supported by majority-owned affiliates.Estimates for 2021.Total U.S.-related jobs are likely to be higher, because these figures do not include jobs created by trade flows, indirect employment effects through distributors or suppliers, or via non-equity arrangements such as strategic alliances, joint ventures, or other deals.Cyprus FDI Position in the U.S. Foreign direct investment position, historic-cost basis, 2000-2021.Note: Dotted line indicates that data has been suppressed for a particular year to avoid disclosure of individual company data.Negative FDI positions can occur when the loans from the affiliate to the parent company exceed the equity and debt investments from the parent to the affiliate, or if a foreign affiliate incurs sufficiently large losses.Greece's investment ties with the U.S. have declined in recent years after rebounding temporarily following the global fi nancial crisis.In 2020, America's foreign direct investment position in Greece was just $300 million, down from a recent peak of $1.2 billion in 2017.Meanwhile, Greece's FDI position in the U.S. has increased in recent years.Estimated U.S. affi liate sales in Greece of $5.8 billion were three times greater than sales of Greek affi liates in the U.S. ($1.9 billion).Jobs directly supported by majority-owned affiliates.Estimates for 2021.Total U.S.-related jobs are likely to be higher, because these figures do not include jobs created by trade flows, indirect employment effects through distributors or suppliers, or via non-equity arrangements such as strategic alliances, joint ventures, or other deals.America's FDI position has been relatively fl at over the past two decades, while Italian investment in the U.S. has risen steadily, up almost 400% since 2000.In 2021, Italy benefi ted more with regards to affi liate sales, value added and employment.For example, value added by U.S. affi liates in Italy was three times the value added of Italian companies in the U.S. Also, affi liates of U.S.-owned companies supported about 150,000 more jobs in Italy than Italian multinationals supported in the U.S., according to 2021 estimates.Note: Dotted line indicates that data has been suppressed for a particular year to avoid disclosure of individual company data. *Latest year of available data.Negative FDI positions can occur when the loans from the affiliate to the parent company exceed the equity and debt investments from the parent to the affiliate, or if a foreign affiliate incurs sufficiently large losses.Note: Dotted line indicates that data has been suppressed for a particular year to avoid disclosure of individual company data. *Latest year of available data.Negative FDI positions can occur when the loans from the affiliate to the parent company exceed the equity and debt investments from the parent to the affiliate, or if a foreign affiliate incurs sufficiently large losses.Foreign direct investment position, historic-cost basis, 2000-2021.Note: Dotted line indicates that data has been suppressed for a particular year to avoid disclosure of individual company data.Malta FDI Position in the U.S. Billion $ Billion $ 3.0 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0 -0.5 3.0 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0 -0.5 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), 2021 Despite the country's tiny population (just 525,000 people), Malta has attracted a relatively large amount of foreign direct investment from the U.S. The investment position of the U.S. in Malta amounted to $2.3 billion in 2021.In addition, American investment directly supported jobs for roughly 1,700 workers in Malta, according to 2021 estimates.Meanwhile, Malta's direct investment position in the U.S. was $2.8 billion in 2021, which is markedly higher from its near-zero levels of investment prior to 2010.Jobs directly supported by majority-owned affiliates.Estimates for 2021.Total U.S.-related jobs are likely to be higher, because these figures do not include jobs created by trade flows, indirect employment effects through distributors or suppliers, or via non-equity arrangements such as strategic alliances, joint ventures, or other deals.Since 2011, the investment balance shifted in favor of the U.S., as Spain's economy was squeezed by a severe recession and resulting austerity measures.Since then, U.S. direct investment in Spain has slightly recovered, totaling $39 billion in 2021.Meanwhile, the U.S. has seen its inward FDI stock from Spain doubled since 2009.Prior to the 2020 Covid-19 recession, Spanish investment in the U.S. had increased every year since 2002.U.S. affi liates based in Spain employ about twice as many workers as Spanish affi liates employ in the U.S., according to 2021 estimates.Foreign direct investment position, historic-cost basis, 2000-2021.Note: Dotted line indicates that data has been suppressed for a particular year to avoid disclosure of individual company data.-THE TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMY 2023 1.Remarkably Resilient: The Transatlantic Economy in 2023 -THE TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMY 2023 1.Remarkably Resilient: The Transatlantic Economy in 2023 -THE TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMY 2023 1.Remarkably Resilient: The Transatlantic Economy in 2023 -THE TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMY 2023 1.Remarkably Resilient: The Transatlantic Economy in 2023 -THE TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMY 2023 -THE TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMY 2023 -THE TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMY 2023 -THE TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMY 20233.Decoupling, Derisking and Diversifying: Rethinking Russia, China and Global Supply Chains -THE TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMY 20233.Decoupling, Derisking and Diversifying: Rethinking Russia, China and Global Supply Chains -THE TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMY 2023 -THE TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMY 2023 -THE TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMY 2023 -THE TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMY 2023 -THE TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMY 2023 -THE TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMY 2023 -THE TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMY 2023 -THE TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMY 2023 -THE TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMY 2023 -THE TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMY 2023 -THE TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMY 2023 -THE TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMY 2023 -THE TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMY 2023
Sentiment Analysis and Election Prediction...........................................................51 Sentiment and Freedom .......................................................................................... 53 Hypotheses..............................................................................................................54 Hypothesis 1: Links shared on Twitter during elections of "Not Free" countries are more likely to be removed than links shared on Twitter during elections of " Free" countries..................................................................................................54 Data..................................................................................................................... 56 Analysis ............................................................................................................... 57 Significance of Study...........................................................................................58 Hypothesis 2: The Twitter networks of "Not Free" countries have more singletons, or disconnected profiles than " Free" countries................................. 58 Data..................................................................................................................... 59 Analysis ............................................................................................................... 60 Significance of Study...........................................................................................60 ..................................................................................................................... ..........................................................................................Table 6 : Top ten mentions, links and hashtags for Brazil's election........................... 42 Table 7 : Top ten links, mentions, and hashtags for Columbia 's election.................... 43 Table 8 : Top ten links, mentions, and hashtags for Egypt's election.......................... 44 Table 9 : Top ten links, mentions and hashtags for France's election. ........................ 45 Table 10 : Top ten links, mentions and hashtags in Iran's election............................. 46 Table 11 : Top ten links, mentions, and hashtags in Mexico's election....................... 46 Table 12 : Top ten links, mentions and hashtags for Russia's election........................ 47 In today's wired world, politicians have realized the value of utilizing Twitter and the cost of ignoring it. In the United States, the 100% of the Senate and 90% of the House of Representatives have verified Twitter accounts (Sharp, 2013) . Twitter is utilized in the campaigning process, to harness support for legislation and to spread information. Certain political organizations and campaigns even find ways to exploit Twitter's growth in prominence by political astroturphing. These are political campaigns disguised as grassroots behavior attempting to spread information (Ratkiewicz et. al, 2011) . This use of social media shows that campaigns understand the importance of the role of social media in influencing opinions and ultimately influencing the outcome of an election. In the election process, candidates use social media as a means to express their views and harness support. Social media's success in accumulating support is delineated by Barack Obama's success in harnessing grassroots support using social media in his 2008 presidential campaign (Rasmussen & Schoen, 2010) . While the prominence of social media, particularly Twitter, has become evident in United States elections, Twitter also plays a role in elections on a global scale. Even in less democratic systems, where the general public may believe the election to be fixed, social media is used by citizens and people to anonymously express opinions about incumbents without experiencing the repercussions common to dictatorial regimes for expressing opinions freely. Globally, Twitter has played an instrumental role in elections and has even contributed to accelerating the pace of revolutions that contribute to entire regime changes (Chebib & Sohail, 2011 ). Egypt's revolution was influenced by social media (Eltantawy & Wiest, 2011) . Western media dubbed the uprisings in Iran following the announcement of the 2009 election results, "The Twitter Revolution" (Grossman, 2009; Schleifer, 2009) . In countries like Brazil, Venezuela, France, Mexico, South Korea, France and Colombia, presidential candidates have "verified" Twitter accounts and use their Twitter pages to express their views and campaign. In Russia, political hashtags affect public sentiment towards various topics (Alexanyan et. al, 2012) . Thus, it is observed that social media plays a role in politics in countries all over the world with varying political climates. The Freedom House, a non-governmental organization that administers research and promotes democracy, political freedom and human rights globally conducts a study annually that results in the assigned "Freedom Status" of all of the countries in the world. The Freedom House assigns a Freedom Status (Free, "not free" or "partly free") to all the countries in the world and assigns 'political rights' and 'civil liberties' scores (between 1-6, 1 being most free, 6 being least).From this, I conduct an exploratory of study nine different countries with varying "freedom statuses", their tweets about presidential candidates, and the outcome of the election.With social media burgeoning with new information streams and new users, researchers can utilize these information streams to discover trends in politics.In this thesis, I conduct an exploratory study of the relationship between a country's freedom status and the twitter activity during elections.While there have been many studies exploring Twitter's role in elections (Gayo-Avello, 2012; Little, 2012; Livne et. al, 2011; O'Connor et. al, 2011) , there has been no previous study of the relationship between a country's freedom status and the Twitter activity during that election.I utilize global Twitter use to compare the relationship between tweets, freedom status of a country, and election outcome.Using a combination of network analysis, text analysis and metrics from the Freedom House, I explore the trends that emerge among nine different countries with different freedom statuses during their respective elections.Chapter 2: Review of the Literature Much previous research has been conducted on the use of social media during elections and the after math of elections.Particularly, much research has been conducted on social media use in the countries focused in this study.Below, I discuss previous research regarding Twitter use and a few of the countries in this study.Furthermore, I outline previous work that has revealed evidence of abuse such as astroturphing, spamming and "message dilution" by political entities.I discuss previous work conducted on election prediction with Twitter in the United States, as well as criticisms of election prediction using Twitter.The last four years have seen an increase of social media use during mass protests globally.Egypt's revolution, one of the uprisings involved in the Arab Spring movement, was very closely linked with the widespread use of social media, particularly Twitter use.Internet use in the Middle East varies.Based on the Internal Telecommunications Union, 24% of Egyptians use the Internet.The Mubarak regime cut access to the Internet following the January 25, 2011 protests when widespread Twitter use posed a threat to the regime.Despite limited Internet access, Egyptians were able to make use of Twitter, as demonstrated by the tweet: "RT @Dima_Khatib: Mobiles around Tahrir Square are not working any more. Blocked too. Like Internet #egypt #jan25 #cairo".Tweets like the one above demonstrate that Egyptians view Twitter as an important tool in furthering their cause to democracy and freedom (Kavanaugh et. al, 2012) .Similarly, Twitter played an important role in the 2009 Iranian election.Kavanaugh et.al (2012) discusses the reasons why Twitter was important in Iran's street protests following the 2009 Iranian elections.Protestors required immediate information in order to avoid clashes with the authorities.The government blocked access to Twitter, so the Twitter service was only available either through proxy or text message on a mobile phone.Previous research outlines the various methods dictatorial regimes employ to prevent the access to information.In countries like Egypt and Iran, the government outright blocks access to sites like Facebook and Twitter in times of protest.For example, Internet traffic dropped abruptly from and to Egypt across 80 Internet Service Providers on January 25, 2011.As a result of this government intervention, approximately 97% of Egyptian Internet traffic was lost during this time (Kavanaugh et. al, 2012) .Thomas, Greer and Paxson (2012) define "message dilution", a process that involves automated accounts posting conflicting, irrelevant and incomprehensible content with hashtags that are used by legitimate users in an attempt to "hijack" the conversation.During the most recent 2011 Russian parliamentary elections, 25,860 fraudulent Twitter accounts "injected" 440,793 tweets into legitimate conversations about the election, in an attempt to distract the conversation from the original topic.According to the geolocations of the "injected" tweets, the majority of the spam bots used to inject tweets were not located in Russia.39% of the IP addresses from which the spam bots tweeted belong to IP blacklists.This study relied on Twitter's internal spam detection algorithm to detect the spam (Thomas et. al, 2012) .This work shows that even governments in "not free" countries such as Russia understand the importance of Twitter as a political tool.While the previous section discusses "message dilution", a method employed by Russia, a "not free" country, to stifle political dissent, political campaign groups in "free" countries also attempt to use Twitter to influence public opinion.In the United States, political organizations and campaigns exploit Twitter's growth in prominence by political astroturphing.These are political campaigns disguised as grassroots behavior attempting to spread information.Rakiewtz et.al (2012) introduce a new system architecture, Truthy, to detect atroturphing and ultimately succeed in automatically detecting political memes, a term coined by Stephen Colbert to described something some claims to know that is known based on feelings, rather than facts (Ratkiewicz et. al, 2012) .In the most recent Mexican elections, the Institutional Revolutionary Party has reportedly also resorted to spam tactics.The Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) used about 10,000 bots to tweets words or phrases in an attempt to generate trending topics, popular topics discussed on Twitter.These spam bots take advantage of the existence of hashtags to make certain words or run-on phrases searchable.While all three dominant political parties utilized spamming in the Mexican presidential campaign, a Mexican web developer has created a site listing all of the spam accounts used by the PRI.The list of spam bots can be found at this url: http://santiesteban.org/adiosbots/en.html.Detecting spam, astroturphing and sybil accounts involved in "message dilution" all present the same challenges.Different strategies have been deployed for the detection of such abuse on Twitter, such as analyzing the profiles and networks of spam accounts, looking at statistical properties of accounts, and detecting spam URLs (Thomas et. al, 2012) .Many studies have attempted to predict election outcomes looking at Twitter data.A study conducted by O'Connor, Balasubramanyan, Routledge, and Smith (2010) compares the results of traditional polls with sentiment provided by the text in Twitter.Looking at the text in Twitter, this study aimed to retrieve relevant information and decide whether a Tweet expressed a positive or a negative opinion.They employed a deterministic approach and used linguistic knowledge to decide whether a tweet was positive or negative.Instances of positive-sentiment words and negative sentiment words were counted.In this study, a formula is presented to represent the day's sentiment.This formula is the ratio of positive-sentiment words over negative-sentiment words.The study found that there was a strong correlation between sentiment on Twitter and what was reflected in the polls.Though this study utilizes interesting methods to measure public opinion through Twitter, it does not look at the relationship between those sentiments expressed and election outcome.Furthermore, it is specifically focused on the United States election.I conducted this study on a global scale and look at the outcome of the election, not just public sentiment.In countries where the election is fixed and there is a likelihood of fraud, public sentiment may be inclined against the incumbent.I look at nine different countries to find trends and relationships between sentiment on Twitter and the election outcome.Twitter prediction election has its criticisms as well.Gayo-Avello (2012) has a pessimistic view of election prediction using Twitter.He mentions several flaws of using Twitter as a means to make election predictions.He states that incumbency plays a large role in elections and that "chance is not a valid baseline", that there is no robust way to count votes on Twitter, and variations of sentiment analysis do not yield a valid result (Gayo-Avella, 2012).While incumbency plays a large role in elections, some of the countries to which I look at for this study do not have incumbents (Brazil, Colombia, and Egypt) .Additionally, this study can show the degree to which incumbency influences the outcome of the election in different types of countries (countries classified as Free, "partly free", and "not free").In this study, I take the criticisms outlined above under consideration and do not aim to make predictions.However, I do aim to use previously utilized methods to conduct an exploratory study of global tweets and the role they play during elections in nine different countries.Though there is no robust and completely accurate way to "count" votes on twitter, number of mentions of a candidate, or hashtags associated with a candidate can express the sentiment of the tweeters and can ultimately aid in understanding the nature election in a particular country.Using sentiment analysis, automated analysis of tweets, analysis of networks of tweets, as well as keeping in mind abuses that occur in tweets (atroturphing, message dilution, and spamming), I aim to explore the relationship of the sentiment reflected in tweets and the election outcome as well as detect insightful trends from within the Twitter data.In this exploratory study, I aim to introduce new research designs, data collections methods and selection of subjects given the preliminary results of the various analyses conducted.The methodology utilized in this study is multifaceted and consists of various methods of analysis of data.The results yielded from the methods below, which were part of my exploratory study, and allowed me to introduce new hypotheses and research designs for new areas of research.I collected tweets occurring before the general election of each of the nine countries outlined in Table 2 for a week prior to the respective election date.Analyzing the sentiment of the tweets toward the candidates as well as the graphical structure of the networks resulting from these tweets, I also looked at the frequency of links, hashtags and mentions in these tweets.A "hashtag" is defined as a tag embedded into a tweet on Twitter prefixed with a hash sign, "#".Hashtags are used to organize topics around tweets.In this study, I explore two different types of mentions: (1) a mention is a when a Twitter handler user name embedded in a tweet is prefixed with the ampersand symbol, "@", or (2) a mention is any mention of a candidate's last name.For the second type of mention described above, for certain countries in which candidate last names were potentially ambiguous, both first and last names were queried.House were used to compare the tweets generated for all of the elections.To compile a range of countries with differing freedom levels, I used the classifications presented by Freedom House (2012).I reviewed the tweets from the countries in Table 2 during the mentioned election cycles.For presidential systems in which there are two election cycles, an initial and secondary round, I look at the election cycle that determines the winner.All of the government systems that are reviewed in this study are presidential.The freedom classifications in this study are based on the The Freedom in the World survey, an annual survey evaluates the status of global freedom.The classifications are according to two categories: civil liberties and political rights.The survey includes analytical reports and numerical ratings of 195 countries and 14 select territories.The report also includes a summary for each country of the last years major developments.The ratings are based on checklist of 10 political rights questions and 15 civil liberties questions.The questions were rated by 59 analysts and 20 senior-level academic advisors using a variety of information sources: academic analyses, foreign and domestic news reports, think tanks, nongovernmental organizations, individual professional contacts, and visits to the region.Based on these sources of information, each country is assigned a civil liberties and political rights score.These scores are averaged for each country to determine whether the country is "free", "partly free" or "not free".A country receiving an average rating between 1.0 -2.5 is considered "free", an average score of 2.0 -5.0 "partly free" and average score of 5.5-7.0, "not free" (The Freedom House).According to the Freedom House, a country can be classified as "Free", "partly free", or "Not free".These three classifications are defined by the Freedom House in its "Freedom in the World 2012" annual report.In this report, a "free" country is defined as a country "where there is open political competition, a climate of respect for civil liberties, significant independent civic life, and independent media."A "partly free" country is defined as one "in which there is limited respect for political rights and civil liberties."The freedom house concludes that "partly free" countries "suffer from an environment of corruption, weak rule of law, ethnic and religious strife, and a political landscape in which a single party enjoys dominance despite a certain degree of pluralism."Finally, a "not free" country is defined as "one where basic political rights are absent, and basic civil liberties are widely and systematically denied."The resulting metrics from the 2012 Annual Report were used as the primary Freedom House Classifications for this study.Additionally, the Freedom House offers a second set of classifications that scope the results of the research conducted in this study.Freedom House offers "internet freedom" scores.However, the Freedom House metric scores were most relevant to the research in this paper because go beyond just Internet freedom and encompass political climate and civil liberties, themes and topics reflected in the tweets in this study.These particular metrics were taken into consideration as the study was conducted.Iran is the only country in this study with an Internet freedom status of "not-free."This freedom status was reflected in the challenges I faced when collecting tweets that occurred during the Iranian election, as well as in the amount of content removed from links tweeted during the Iranian election.In order to ensure that countries were chosen that had potentially relevant (Evans, 2010) .From the nine countries explored in this study, France's 2012 election was also the only example of an election in which the incumbent lost the election.In order to select three "partly free" countries to explore for this study, I considered two criteria: twitter usage and type of political system.I selected Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela as the "partly free" Countries in this study because all three of these countries are rated as one of top twenty countries worldwide with the most Twitter users.Some of the Twitter usage in these "partly free" countries rates even higher than twitter usage in some "free" countries (Evans, 2010) .The most challenging part of the selection process was choosing countries classified as "not free" by the Freedom House.Countries that are classified as "not free" are classified as such because citizens do not have as many civil liberties or human rights as their "free" country counterparts.Lack of human rights often translates to limited access to information resources, like social media.Countries that had high Twitter usage (with respect to other "not free" countries) and had held presidential elections since 2008 were selected as "not free" countries for this study.As a result, Russia, Iran, and Egypt were selected.While some countries like Iran simply block content on social media, other countries like Russia have attempted to manipulate social media to their advantage by message dilution, discussed in the Chapter 2.The attempt by Russia to "hijack" hashtags shows that Twitter plays an influential role in Russian politics (Thomas et. al, 2012) .For this reason, I chose Russia as a "not free" country to explore as a part of this study.I chose Egypt as another representative sample of a "not free" country because Twitter played an instrumental role in the 2011 Revolution and the "Arab Spring" as well as the most recent election in Egypt (Kavanaugh et. al, 2012) .In Iran, the government blocks access to Twitter (Kavanaugh et. al 2012) .Given this censorship, the candidates of such countries often avoid using social media mainly because the general public may not be able to access it.For example, I found no Twitter usage by Iranian candidates.However, the significant role of Twitter use in Iran is demonstrated by the usage of Twitter to spread news about protests in June 2009 during the "Green Revolution".Iran's significant Twitter usage is also demonstrated by the fact that it is listed in the top twenty countries with the most Twitter users (Evans, 2010) .Though the candidates in Iran don't use Twitter, the people are very much involved, despite accessibility issues due to censorship (Burns, 2009) .For this reason, I chose to analyze Iran as one of the "not free" countries in this study.Candidate tweets were collected for six months prior to the election date.General tweets in which the content mentioned candidate names were also collected from one week prior to the election.In order to accurately collect candidate tweets, I ensured that Twitter accounts that claimed to represent the candidate were "verified" by Twitter.Not all of the candidates in this study had "verified" twitter accounts.For example, none of the Iranian or Russian candidates had "verified" twitter accounts.For countries in which I do not have candidate twitter names, I focused my analysis on tweets six months prior to election by the general public.I have chosen countries and election cycles in which Twitter played a role so that in the event of insufficient candidate twitter data, tweets by the general public will be available for analysis.From the candidate twitter accounts, three lack the "verified" tag.These positive, and very positive.These ratings are associated with the scores -2, -1, 0, 1, and 2 respectively.The sentiment score of a tweets is the average of the three scores by Mechanical Turk users.Tweets in the training set with a score less than -.25 were classified as negative, tweets with a score between -.25 and .25 were classified as neutral, and tweets with a score greater than .25 was classified as positive.I then provided this training set of pre-rated tweets to the classifier for each candidate in order to train the system.Using the classifier, I derived a sentiment classification of negative, neutral, or positive for each candidate.A total sentiment score was calculated towards each candidate by subtracting 1 from the score if the tweet was positive, adding a 1 to the score if the tweet is negative and doing nothing if a tweet was classified as neutral.This number was then divided by the total number of tweets to yield a sentiment score towards a particular candidate.to gain an additional understanding to the sentiment analysis of the content of the tweets.These three methods yielded initial promising results that allow me to introduce hypotheses and research designs further discussed in Chapter 5.Following the analysis of my results, I discovered that there is no relationship between the sentiment of a country towards the incumbent and its freedom status.Additionally I discovered that, regardless of a country's freedom status, there is no correlation between the sentiment presented towards a candidate and the outcome of an election.For each of the countries in this study, the overall sentiment towards a candidate in every tweet during an election cycle was rated as either negative, neutral, or positive towards a particular candidate by Mechanical Turk users.These ratings were used as a training set to find the overall sentiment score towards a particular candidate.A score system was derived to reflect sentiment towards the top two contenders in every election cycle.Overall sentiment scores towards each candidate of the entire tweet set during the election cycle were calculated by adding one point to the score if the sentiment score of a tweet was positive, subtracting one point if the sentiment of a tweet was negative, and doing nothing (adding zero) if the sentiment of a tweet was neutral or irrelevant.The sentiment expressed towards candidates in the "Free" countries in this study reflected that the winner of the election has a lower sentiment score than the competing candidate.(Table 13 ).The hashtag "#tcot", standing for "Top Conservatives on Twitter" is the most used hashtag.In contrast, "#tlot" (Top Liberals on Twitter) appears lowest on the list of top hashtags.In France, Nicolas Sarkozy, the incumbent at the time of the election, received a higher sentiment score than François Hollande, the winner of the election.While both candidates received positive scores, Nicolas Sarkozy received a score of .15, while François Hollande received a score of .00.In Brazil, Dilma Roussef, the winner of the election, scored a -.25, while Jose Serra, scored a .31.Even though the general sentiment towards Dilma Rousseff was negative, the election outcome did not reflect this score.Among the "free" countries in this study, all three countries (United States, Brazil, and France) reflected that the winner of the election has a lower sentiment score than the loser of the election.While the sentiment scores in the "partly free" countries in this study did not consistently reflect the winner of the election, two of the countries, Colombia and Venezuela, demonstrated that the winner of the election had a higher sentiment score than the defeated candidate.In Venezuela, Hugo Chavez scored a sentiment score of 0.62, the highest candidate sentiment score in this study, while Henrique Capriles Radonski scored a 0.28.In Colombia, Juan Manuel Santos scored a -0.01, higher than the losing candidate, Antanas Mockus, who scored a -0.06.While the scores in these two countries might indicate that the sentiment in Manuel Lopez Obrador, who scored a 0.09 and -.08 respectively.Similar to the pattern observed in the "free" countries in this study, the sentiment score of the candidate who lost the election in "not free" countries was higher than that of the candidate who won the election.Putin, the winner of the election, scored -0.07 against Gennady Zyuganov, who scored a 0.08.In all three "not free" countries, the winner of the election received a lower sentiment score than that of the loser.A similar trend was observed for "free" countries.Based on these scores, it is impossible to correlate freedom and sentiment.The sentiment scores reflected that there is no relationship between incumbency, freedom status and sentiment.Out of the nine countries in this study, Based on these scores, it is observed that there is no relationship between sentiment, incumbency and freedom status.If election predictions were made solely on the sentiments conducted in this study, only Colombia and Venezuela would yield the correct election outcome.The sentiment scores from the other election cycles reflected a more negative score for the winner of the election.The sentiment analysis of tweets in our study reflects simply that sentiment analysis of tweets cannot be used to predict election outcome.The results of the sentiment analysis conducted in this study did not yield a correlation between sentiment of overall tweets, freedom status of state, and election outcome.One reason can be attributed to a lack of sufficient tweets to calculate an accurate sentiment score for tweets.The Topsy service was used in this study to collect tweets.Topsy only yields "influential" tweets in its queries.Such queries result in tweets whose writers are influential, meaning that that they have many followers.A large percentage of tweets collected belonged to established news outlets or organizations whose tweets do not reflect the opinion of a single individual.While tweets from organizations, especially political parties, are relevant for this study, it is difficult to calculate the sentiment score of a candidate when the tweets of organizations and news agencies are included in the overall scores.In this section, I classify communities within a random sample of tweets for each of the election cycles from each of the nine countries in this study.I used the Clauset Newman Moore algorithm to cluster tweets to view visible communities within each of these sample networks (Clauset, 2004) .In the networks shown below, communities were formed based on a variety of attributes.The communities in each of these networks reveal that there are classifiable groups within each country.Communities formed according the languages used to tweet, the tweet's country of origin, or based on similar interests such as entertainment.Clustering tweets into communities aids in understanding the network and communities that form it.Clustering the network of tweets from the Egyptian election yielded three significant groups.The largest group, "G1", consisted of Arab media outlets and political organizations that tweet primarily in Arabic.The second largest community, "G2", also consisted primarily of media outlets, political activists, and political organizations, however the tweets were primarily in English and locations selfreported within the profile were not located in Egypt.The third community of tweeters that emerged during the Egyptian Election cycle was a community of Egyptian individuals primarily tweeting in Arabic from within Egypt.The individuals in this group self reported that they were tweeting from locations within Egypt.France's network consists of four main communities.The largest community, "G1" consists of Spanish media outlets reporting on the French election.Tweets from "G1" were primarily in Spanish.The second largest community, "G2" consists of French news agencies and journalists."G3" consists of personal accounts tweeting from France.The tweets in this group were primarily in French.The majority of accounts in "G4" were personal accounts or journalist accounts.These individuals self-reported that they were located in France and the majority of their tweets were in French.Iran's network of tweets yielded nine groups from the Clauset Newman Moore algorithm (including a group of tweeters that were not connected to others in the network).This group, placed on the upper left hand corner in the visualization is the largest group in the community."G1", the second largest group in this network, consists of media outlets and news figures such as: The Guardian, Ann Curry, and Anderson Cooper.For this study, these tweets were not significant because they did not represent the sentiment of Iranian citizens.One community, "G4" stood out as representing tweets from individuals in Iran.The profiles belonging to members of "G4" claimed that they live within Iran and tweeted primarily in Farsi.One individual within this group described himself as a "cyber citizen".A sentiment score was calculated for this group specifically towards both the candidates, Ahmadinejad and Mousavi.Because a majority of the tweets from the Iran election did not originate in Iran, a new sentiment score was calculated only based on the tweets in "G4".A score of -0.16 was calculated towards Ahmadinejad while a score of 0.24 was calculated towards Mousavi.These sentiment scores more accurately reflect the sentiment of Iranian tweeters than the sentiment represented in Table 3 , because the sentiment score above took into consideration tweets from all of the other communities in the network, which do not originate in Iran.The largest group, "G1" consisted of Russian news agencies and popular individuals.The tweets in "G1" were primarily in Russian.The second group, "G2", consisted of Russian news agencies like "Moscow Times" that tweeted primarily in English.The "G3" group tweeted both in English and Russian.This group's profiles belong to individuals who self-report their locations as within Russia.A fourth group, "G4", primarily consisted of individuals self reporting that they are tweeting from within Russia.The majority of tweets in "G4" were in Russian."G5" contains tweeters that primarily tweet about exit poll information.These accounts are personal and tweets are primarily in Russian.The "G6" group is a very small cluster of tweets in English.The United States network in this study can be divided into four main groups.The largest group, "G1" consists of verified individuals, journalists, and media outlets.Individuals in this group include: Barack Obama, The While House, ABC World News, The New Yorker, ABC, USA Today, Huffington Post, and BBC World.The second group, "G2" consists of more conservative individuals such as Governor Mike Huckabee, Glenn Beck, and Fox News.The "G3" group consists of primarily young tweeters who tweeted in support of Obama or against Romney.The fourth community of tweets primarily consisted of individuals tweeting in support of presidential candidate Gary Johnson.Five main communities emerged from clustering the Venezuela network tweets.The majority of tweets in groups "G1", "G2", "G3" and "G4" are in Spanish.Tweets in the group "G5" are in English.The groups "G1" and "G2" both consisted of journalists, individuals, and news media outlets that were located within Venezuela.The "G3" group consists of individuals and news agencies located in other Latin American Countries as well as other Spanish news agencies.The group "G4" consists of entertainers and younger individuals from Venezuela.The number of communities within each network varied.The country with the most amounts of communities, Brazil, is classified as a "free" country, and the country with the least amount of communities detected, Iran, is a not-free country.However, it is important to note that there is no clear correlation between the numbers of communities detected in the sample networks and freedom status of a country.A network with a high modularity indicates that the connections between Twitter users in a particular community are dense, but communities are not connected to one another.The three countries in this study with the highest modularity are the USA, Colombia, and Iran, which each hold different freedom statuses.The three countries in our study with the lowest modularity are France, Russia, and Egypt, which also hold different freedom statuses.There is no relationship between the modularity of a network and a country's freedom status.I detected no relationship between connected components (either weakly or strongly connected) and freedom statuses of countries.Brazil and Mexico, a "free" country and "partly free" country respectively, had the most strongly connected components, while Iran and France, a "not free" country and a "free" country respectively, had the least amount of strongly connected components.Table 4 : Network characteristics of the nine countries in this study.Twitter Mentions, Links, and Hashtags In order to further understand the type of information tweeters were sharing, I extracted several key pieces of information from within tweets.I counted the number of times a candidate was mentioned by name (without the formal ampersand symbol "@" allowed by Twitter).Furthermore, I extracted the most frequent links, hashtags and "@" mentions by Twitter users.Hashtags reveal the topics discussed during the elections and mentions reveal to whom tweets are being addressed.Links also reveal the kind of topics discussed.Tweets collected from Topsy were queried for all variations of candidate last names, including multiple ways of spelling as well as spelling with non-roman alphabet letters.Searching for all variations of a candidate name was particularly relevant for querying mentions of candidates in Egypt, Iran and Russia.Neither candidate Jose Serra nor Dilma Rousseff appears in the top mentions for Brazil.However, hashtags reflect support for the candidates.The top three hashtags "#voude13", "13neles" and "#soumaisdilma" are pro-Dilma hashtags, the first two relating to the Worker's party, the party to which Dilma Roussef belongs.Hashtags supporting Jose Serra also appear in the top ten most frequently tweeted hashtags: "#serra45" and "#serra".The top tweeted link is a live blogging site for Dilma and Serra's debate.Another link is for live tweeting about the candidates to TV personality, Bemvindo Sequeira.The significant role Twitter plays in Brazilian politics is reflected by the fact that there are multiple links encouraging live-tweeting in the top ten most shared links.These two links also reflect the degree of accessibility that Brazilians have to the Internet -so much so that they are able to live tweet about events as they happen.This accessibility is a reflection of Brazil's freedom status.of most frequently tagged profiles.The hashtag "#Shafik" is used more often than the hashtag for "#Morsi".The winner of the election, Enrique Peña Nieto (@EPN) is tagged most after Youtube.However the top two hashtags support Andres Manel Lopez Obrador (#panistasconAMLO and #HoyVotoPorAMLO).The third hashtag, "#yosoy132", is present areas of research where there seems to be little indication of relationships.The sentiment analysis conducted in this study reveals that sentiment does not reflect the outcome of the election.If election outcome were based purely on the sentiment score derived in this study, only Colombia and Venezuela would yield correct election outcomes.The majority of the sentiment scores in this study do not accurately correlate with the outcome of the respective elections.In the beginning of the paper, I discussed the concerns raised by Gayo-Avella regarding predicting election outcome with tweets (2012).He articulates that there is no commonly accepted way of counting votes on Twitter simply because not all tweets are trustworthy and Twitter is not representative of the entire demographic population.This trend was observed within the countries in this study.The tweets I collected from Brazil, Colombia, Egypt, France, Iran, Mexico, Russia, The United States, and Venezuela are simply not representative of the entire demographic of any of the nine countries with which we conducted sentiment analysis.Also, politically active individuals tend to tweet more, so self-selection bias is ignored.In this study, the top ten tweeters for each of the countries contributed to a significant portion of the total tweets for each of the elections.For example, tweets from the top ten tweeters in Colombia made 15.9% of the total tweets.The top ten tweeters in each of the countries in this study respectively make up less than 1% of the total profiles for each of these countries and yet they contribute significantly to the overall sentiment score.Thus the sentiment score is biased towards those who tweet more often.Election prediction using sentiment analysis prediction is not feasible, regardless of the freedom status of a country.I discovered that sentiment scores of candidates from almost all of the countries in this study were higher for the candidate that lost the election.Venezuela and Columbia were the only two exceptions to this pattern.I explored whether freedom and sentiment were related and aimed to see whether the freedom status of a country was related to the sentiment expressed towards the incumbent or towards a particular candidate.Only one of the three "not free" countries, Iran, had an incumbent for the election cycle in which we were studying.While Vladimir Putin was not an incumbent, he has previously held the presidential position in Russia and thus enjoys the same publicity and name recognition an incumbent would.Both the sentiment scores expressed towards Putin and Ahmadinejad were less than that of their competing candidates.However, this phenomenon cannot be conclusively attributed to Iran and Russia's "not free" freedom status.While the incumbents or candidates/previously serving as presidents studied in the "not free" countries all had lower sentiment scores than the candidates with which they were competing, the results were mixed for "free" and "partly free" countries.The sentiment scores for incumbents in Mexico and Venezuela are higher than the candidates with which they were competing.The sentiment scores among the "free" countries demonstrated mixed results in regards to the relationship between incumbency and sentiment score.In the United States, Barack Obama's sentiment score was less than that of Mitt Romney.In France, the incumbent, Nicolas Sarkozy, received a higher sentiment score than Francoise Hollande's sentiment score, even though Nicolas Sarkozy lost the election.While tweets from both Russia and Iran reflect a negative sentiment towards the incumbent, the varying results of the "free" countries, especially the United States sentiment score reflecting a negative sentiment towards Barack Obama show that there is no relation between sentiment score towards an incumbent and the freedom status of a country.This research is an exploratory work that revealed several insights that could lead to future research.I found promising initial results with respect to the relationship between content removed from links during an election and freedom status of a country, the number of disconnected twitter profiles in the network structure of "not free" countries, and a strong correlation between the number of times a candidate name is mentioned and the election outcome.Below, I present each hypothesis in detail along with a research design, providing evidence from my research.recently been promoted to "partly free", it shared this common characteristic with the other "not free" countries in this study.In the tweets for the Russian election, the content of the two top links has been removed.These links were collectively shared hundreds of times, but are now no longer accessible.All three "not free" countries have top links that are no longer accessible or have been removed.In contrast, with the exception of live twitter stream links that are time dependent, the majority of top links were still visible and accessible in the "partly free" and "free" countries.I stipulate that the content from links in "not free" countries are not accessible for two possible reasons.Fear of persecution may have driven a poster to voluntarily remove content posted on the web.A second possibility is coercion or being forced to remove content following persecution.During the Iranian election, the Iranian regime cracked down on Iranian bloggers and Internet activists.Similarly in Egypt, bloggers have been arrested for the content that they post (Booth, 2012) .There have been no reports of Russian arrests related to Internet activity.This might be related to the fact that Russia had less links removed than that of its "Not-Free" country counterparts, Iran and Egypt.This exploratory study provided enough evidence to suggest the following hypothesis: links shared on Twitter during elections of "not free" countries are more likely to be removed than links shared on Twitter during elections of "free" countries.To prove this hypothesis, more tweets from countries with "not free" freedom statuses and presidential elections should be collected, studied and compared to tweets from "free" countries.Below, I outline a research design that would ultimately prove whether the hypothesis above is valid.The data required to conduct this experiment would involve tweets during elections of "not free" countries.While the Topsy service could be used to collect this data, a more representative distribution of tweets would result from collecting tweets directly from Twitter.However, since these tweets must be collected in real time and thus are difficult or even impossible to access for elections that have already occurred, Topsy is the most convenient method of accessing such tweets.To conduct this study, tweets need to be collected from countries that previously have had presidential or parliamentary elections.Countries that fit these criteria include: Russia, Iran, China, Chad, Congo, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Algeria.Similarly, tweets from election cycles of "free" countries should be collected during their respective presidential elections.Examples of "free" countries with adequate Twitter usage include: The United States, France, South Korea, Argentina, Chile, Portugal, The United Kingdom and Germany (Evans, 2010) .To conduct an analysis of the data described above, the links resulting from tweets would be crawled to see if they have indeed been removed.Removed content presents itself in various ways.A broken or dead link results in the 404 or Not Found error message, which is a standard HTTP response code that indicates the web page is not accessible.However, a removed YouTube video, a removed blog post, or a removed twitter pictures will not yield a 404 error message.The host site will simply notify the user that the content has been removed.All possibilities must be considered when automatically detecting removed content from links.Once all links tweeted in "free" and "not free" countries are crawled, a conclusion can be derived as to whether content more often is removed from tweets following the elections in "not free" countries as compared to "free" countries.One challenge in such a study is that people in "not free" countries do not have equivalent access to social media like Twitter to people in "free" countries.This must be considered while conducting the study.The number of tweets yielded from an election in the Congo for example would certainly be less than the amount of tweets resulting from the United States election.The samples of tweets collected must account for such inequalities.This study is important in understanding if and why there is a correlation between a country's freedom status and amount of content removed from links following an election.Fear of persecution or self-censorship may have driven a poster or author to voluntarily remove content posted on the web.An alternative cause for removal of content can be attributed to coercion or being forced to remove content following persecution.The outlined study above can explain why this phenomenon occurs.Upon discovering which links have been removed, the sources and authors of these links can be traced.Interviews can be conducted with the authors of links, posters of videos, or bloggers to learn about the reason of removal and whether the government played a role in the removal of content.This study would aid in understanding the relationship between governments, self-censorship, and tweeters in "not free" countries.Hypothesis 2: The Twitter networks of "Not Free" countries have more singletons, or disconnected profiles than "Free" countries.Using the Clauset Newman Moore Algorithm to cluster and visualize tweets for all of the countries in this study, I found that two of the "not free" countries (Iran and Russia) had a larger community of disconnected profiles than their "partly free" and "free" counter parts.The singletons in Iran's network were part of the largest group, while the singletons in Russia were part of the second largest group.If there is indeed a correlation between the network structure of tweets during elections and the respective freedom status of a country, then Egypt should also have had a very large group of singletons.However, Egypt presents a unique case in this study.The report in which this study is based on was published in 2012, prior to the Egyptian election, but after the Egyptian revolution.The most recent freedom classifications by the Freedom house classify Egypt as "Partly free".While Egypt also has a large community of singletons in its sample network, it is not as large as Russia and Iran's community of singletons.I consider that the events that occurred in 2012 have now altered the resulting freedom status in Egypt.Egypt was promoted to "partly free" in 2013.However, its sample network still has a large community of singletons, but not as large with respect to the singletons in Iran and Russia.Based on these results, I hypothesize that "not free" countries have a large community of disconnected users tweeting about the election.Below, I describe data and analysis required to conduct an experiment to prove this hypothesis.The data required to conduct this experiment would be much like the data described for Hypothesis 1.This data could be retrieved from either Topsy or Twitter.While Topsy could be used to collect this data, tweets directly from Twitter would result in a more representative data set.However, as described above, these tweets are difficult to access and tweets from Topsy would be sufficient for such a study.To conduct this study, tweets need to be collected from the election cycles in "not free" countries with presidential or parliamentary elections.In addition to Russia and Iran, countries that fit these criteria include: China, Chad, Congo, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Algeria.Similarly, tweets from election cycles of "free" countries should be collected during their respective presidential or parliamentary elections.These countries can include the countries mentioned in Hypothesis 1: The United States, France, and Brazil in addition to South Korea, Argentina, Chile, Portugal, The United Kingdom and Germany.In order to create a network of profiles that tweet during the election, the followers and friends of the tweeters must be accessed.While finding the connections between all the tweets collected would result in a more comprehensive network, the Twitter API limits access to Twitter, and given time and API constraints, such a task would not be plausible.As done in this study, random node sampling can be used to conjure a sample network.While other sampling methods like edge sampling, forest fire sampling and snowball sampling might yield a more connected network, the aim of this study is not to study a connected network, but to compare the number of singletons in each network.For this reason, the random node sample would be the best option for this study.Once the sample network is constructed for all "free" and "not free" countries in the study, the number of singletons, or disconnected profiles can be counted and compared for all "free" and "not free" countries.This study outlined by the research design above is important because it attempts to understand if and why there are a higher number of disconnected profiles within networks for "not free" in comparison to networks for "free" countries.Upon finding a correlation, the outlined research would involve studying the disconnected profiles within the network to learn how often they tweet, if indeed they have friends and followers and to whom they are connected.Disconnected tweeters might stay disconnected in "not free" networks in order to stay anonymous to protect their safety.For example, some of the disconnected profiles in the Iran and Russia sample network did not have any tweets, despite tweeting in the past about the election.At some point, these Twitter users deleted their tweets.Such a study would prompt one to question why these tweeters opt to stay disconnected and anonymous and why have their tweets have been deleted.The number of friends and followers can be compared to the number of friends and followers of other tweeters in the network.Such a study could potentially lead to the detection of spammers who have a large amount of tweets but very few followers.The research outlined above could answer these questions and aid in understanding the networks of tweets in "not free" countries.Predicting elections using Twitter has many flaws and criticisms, as addressed by Gayo-Avella (2012).However, Tumasjan et.al (2010) concluded in his study that looking at the number of mentions of a political party came close to traditional polls and is a plausible indication of voter shares.In this study, I looked at candidate name mentions.I did not look at political party mentions because not all of the countries in this study have official political party names.However, I looked at the number of mentions of each candidate and found that, except for Brazil, mentions of a candidate are indeed indicative of the outcome of an election regardless of a country's freedom status.It is important to note that the winner of Brazil's election was female and candidate names were only queried for last names.In elections, female candidates are more likely to be referred to by their first names than male candidates (Reeves, 2009) .The data collected from Brazil revealed that "Dilma" was mentioned more than "Rousseff", thus reflecting a degree of gender bias in referring to female candidates by their first names.All of the countries reflected (except for Brazil) that the candidate with the most mentions wins the elections.Coupled with the sentiment analysis I conducted, these results show that when looking at tweets and the outcome of the election, it is not necessarily important what is being said about the candidate (many of the candidates had negative sentiment scores), but how many times a candidate is being mentioned.While it cannot be conclusively stated that the number of mentions of a candidate directly correlates with the outcome of an election globally, the results of this research indicate that such a hypothesis is indeed plausible.Below, I describe the data and analysis required to prove such a hypothesis on a global scale.For this particular study, Topsy data would not be sufficient.The data needs to be representative of all tweets during an election and not just the "influential" tweets resulted from Topsy queries.While tweets resulting from queries from the Topsy service are sufficient for some studies, a study that looks at the raw number of mentions requires data that is representative of all the tweets and thus needs to be collected directly from the source.To prove that the number of mentions correlates with the outcome of the election, data needs to be collected for election cycles of several countries.Even though this data is difficult to access because of Twitter API limitations, a selection of 10-20 countries would be sufficient for this study.To conduct an analysis of the data described above, the tweets need to be searched for mentions of the names of candidates and political party names.Mentions can include a reference to the candidate name or a direct tag using the ampersand symbol (@) if the candidate has a verified Twitter account.Different spelling variations of candidate names must be considered when searching for mentions of candidate names in different countries.Mentions through hashtags should be considered as well for such a study.Often, during elections hashtags in support of a particular candidate are shared.For example, in Brazil's election, the hashtags "#voude13" and "#13neles" do not mention Dilma Rousseff's name, but they are supporting her and the party to which she belongs.An automated method of detecting which hashtags support which candidates can count the number of hashtags in support of a candidate.For example, a tweet in favor of a particular candidate will most likely use hashtags in support of that candidate.Taking this into consideration would allow a researcher to draw a connection between an obvious hashtag in support of a candidate and one that is not so obvious.For example the hashtags "#soumaisdilma" is in obvious support of the candidate and includes the name of the candidate within the hashtag.If "#soumaisdilma", "#voude13" and "13neles" are all used in the same tweet, it can be deduced that "#voude13" and "13neles" are in favor of Dilma Roussef, the presidential candidate for the Brazilian election.These hashtags should potentially be considered in the count of mentions.In this research design, "mentions" should be redefined to include hashtags, direct tags (@) of political candidates as well as mentions.Upon conducting this search, the number of mentions for each candidate should be compared to voter shares to see how closely it correlates with the outcome of the election.While the research design above is not attempting to predict the election outcome based on the number of mentions of a candidate, it can demonstrate whether the number and type of mentions of a candidate correlates with election outcome globally.Furthermore, if such a correlation is discovered for all of the countries studied, types of mentions and their relationship with the outcome of the election can be more clearly defined.For example, in this study it was observed that in some countries, the winner of the election was tagged directly using the ampersand symbol (@), while in other countries, the winner of the election was not tagged directly but had multiple top hashtags in support of her/him.While I found that there is no relationship between sentiment expressed towards a candidate and election outcome, the initial results showed that number of mentions correlated with election outcome regardless of freedom status.In addition to mentions by name, number of hashtags (#), and direct tags (@) can be counted and compared to see the way in which users communicate about a political party or candidates and how the method of mentioning a candidate is related to the outcome of the election.This research would aid in understanding the relationship between different forms of referencing political parties and candidates on Twitter (tags, hashtags, and mentions) and the outcome of the election on a global scale.In this study, I explored the Twitter activity during nine election cycles within countries with nine different freedom statuses.In this study, I found promising initial results showing that tweets from "not free" countries are more likely to have content removed from links that are shared from the web, networks of tweets occurring during elections of "not free" countries have more disconnected profiles and that there is a strong relationship between election outcome and number of mentions of a candidate.Based on my results, I presented three hypotheses with a research design that can be pursued in future work.My results also show that the sentiment expressed towards a candidate by tweeters during an election cycle does not indicate who will win the election and that the sentiment expressed towards an incumbent does not correlate with the freedom of a given country.	Sentiment Analysis and Election Prediction........................................................... 51 Sentiment and Freedom .......................................................................................... 53 Hypotheses.............................................................................................................. 54 Hypothesis 1: Links shared on Twitter during elections of "Not Free" countries are more likely to be removed than links shared on Twitter during elections of " Free" countries. .................................................................................................54 Data..................................................................................................................... 56 Analysis ............................................................................................................... 57 Significance of Study........................................................................................... 58 Hypothesis 2: The Twitter networks of "Not Free" countries have more singletons, or disconnected profiles than " Free" countries................................. 58 Data..................................................................................................................... 59 Analysis ............................................................................................................... 60 Significance of Study........................................................................................... 60 ..................................................................................................................... .......................................................................................... Table 6 : Top ten mentions, links and hashtags for Brazil's election........................... 42 Table 7 : Top ten links, mentions, and hashtags for Columbia 's election.................... 43 Table 8 : Top ten links, mentions, and hashtags for Egypt's election.......................... 44 Table 9 : Top ten links, mentions and hashtags for France's election. ........................45 Table 10 : Top ten links, mentions and hashtags in Iran's election............................. 46 Table 11 : Top ten links, mentions, and hashtags in Mexico's election....................... 46 Table 12 : Top ten links, mentions and hashtags for Russia's election........................ 47 In today's wired world, politicians have realized the value of utilizing Twitter and the cost of ignoring it.In the United States, the 100% of the Senate and 90% of the House of Representatives have verified Twitter accounts (Sharp, 2013) .Twitter is utilized in the campaigning process, to harness support for legislation and to spread information.Certain political organizations and campaigns even find ways to exploit Twitter's growth in prominence by political astroturphing.These are political campaigns disguised as grassroots behavior attempting to spread information (Ratkiewicz et.al, 2011) .This use of social media shows that campaigns understand the importance of the role of social media in influencing opinions and ultimately influencing the outcome of an election.In the election process, candidates use social media as a means to express their views and harness support.Social media's success in accumulating support is delineated by Barack Obama's success in harnessing grassroots support using social media in his 2008 presidential campaign (Rasmussen & Schoen, 2010) .While the prominence of social media, particularly Twitter, has become evident in United States elections, Twitter also plays a role in elections on a global scale.Even in less democratic systems, where the general public may believe the election to be fixed, social media is used by citizens and people to anonymously express opinions about incumbents without experiencing the repercussions common to dictatorial regimes for expressing opinions freely.Globally, Twitter has played an instrumental role in elections and has even contributed to accelerating the pace of revolutions that contribute to entire regime changes (Chebib & Sohail, 2011 ).Egypt's revolution was influenced by social media (Eltantawy & Wiest, 2011) .Western media dubbed the uprisings in Iran following the announcement of the 2009 election results, "The Twitter Revolution" (Grossman, 2009; Schleifer, 2009) .In countries like Brazil, Venezuela, France, Mexico, South Korea, France and Colombia, presidential candidates have "verified" Twitter accounts and use their Twitter pages to express their views and campaign.In Russia, political hashtags affect public sentiment towards various topics (Alexanyan et.al, 2012) .Thus, it is observed that social media plays a role in politics in countries all over the world with varying political climates.The Freedom House, a non-governmental organization that administers research and promotes democracy, political freedom and human rights globally conducts a study annually that results in the assigned "Freedom Status" of all of the countries in the world.The Freedom House assigns a Freedom Status (Free, "not free" or "partly free") to all the countries in the world and assigns 'political rights' and 'civil liberties' scores (between 1-6, 1 being most free, 6 being least).From this, I conduct an exploratory of study nine different countries with varying "freedom statuses", their tweets about presidential candidates, and the outcome of the election.With social media burgeoning with new information streams and new users, researchers can utilize these information streams to discover trends in politics.In this thesis, I conduct an exploratory study of the relationship between a country's freedom status and the twitter activity during elections.While there have been many studies exploring Twitter's role in elections (Gayo-Avello, 2012; Little, 2012; Livne et.al, 2011; O'Connor et.al, 2011) , there has been no previous study of the relationship between a country's freedom status and the Twitter activity during that election.I utilize global Twitter use to compare the relationship between tweets, freedom status of a country, and election outcome.Using a combination of network analysis, text analysis and metrics from the Freedom House, I explore the trends that emerge among nine different countries with different freedom statuses during their respective elections.Chapter 2: Review of the Literature Much previous research has been conducted on the use of social media during elections and the after math of elections.Particularly, much research has been conducted on social media use in the countries focused in this study.Below, I discuss previous research regarding Twitter use and a few of the countries in this study.Furthermore, I outline previous work that has revealed evidence of abuse such as astroturphing, spamming and "message dilution" by political entities.I discuss previous work conducted on election prediction with Twitter in the United States, as well as criticisms of election prediction using Twitter.The last four years have seen an increase of social media use during mass protests globally.Egypt's revolution, one of the uprisings involved in the Arab Spring movement, was very closely linked with the widespread use of social media, particularly Twitter use.Internet use in the Middle East varies.Based on the Internal Telecommunications Union, 24% of Egyptians use the Internet.The Mubarak regime cut access to the Internet following the January 25, 2011 protests when widespread Twitter use posed a threat to the regime.Despite limited Internet access, Egyptians were able to make use of Twitter, as demonstrated by the tweet: "RT @Dima_Khatib: Mobiles around Tahrir Square are not working any more.Blocked too.Like Internet #egypt #jan25 #cairo".Tweets like the one above demonstrate that Egyptians view Twitter as an important tool in furthering their cause to democracy and freedom (Kavanaugh et.al, 2012) .Similarly, Twitter played an important role in the 2009 Iranian election.Kavanaugh et.al (2012) discusses the reasons why Twitter was important in Iran's street protests following the 2009 Iranian elections.Protestors required immediate information in order to avoid clashes with the authorities.The government blocked access to Twitter, so the Twitter service was only available either through proxy or text message on a mobile phone.Previous research outlines the various methods dictatorial regimes employ to prevent the access to information.In countries like Egypt and Iran, the government outright blocks access to sites like Facebook and Twitter in times of protest.For example, Internet traffic dropped abruptly from and to Egypt across 80 Internet Service Providers on January 25, 2011.As a result of this government intervention, approximately 97% of Egyptian Internet traffic was lost during this time (Kavanaugh et.al, 2012) .Thomas, Greer and Paxson (2012) define "message dilution", a process that involves automated accounts posting conflicting, irrelevant and incomprehensible content with hashtags that are used by legitimate users in an attempt to "hijack" the conversation.During the most recent 2011 Russian parliamentary elections, 25,860 fraudulent Twitter accounts "injected" 440,793 tweets into legitimate conversations about the election, in an attempt to distract the conversation from the original topic.According to the geolocations of the "injected" tweets, the majority of the spam bots used to inject tweets were not located in Russia.39% of the IP addresses from which the spam bots tweeted belong to IP blacklists.This study relied on Twitter's internal spam detection algorithm to detect the spam (Thomas et.al, 2012) .This work shows that even governments in "not free" countries such as Russia understand the importance of Twitter as a political tool.While the previous section discusses "message dilution", a method employed by Russia, a "not free" country, to stifle political dissent, political campaign groups in "free" countries also attempt to use Twitter to influence public opinion.In the United States, political organizations and campaigns exploit Twitter's growth in prominence by political astroturphing.These are political campaigns disguised as grassroots behavior attempting to spread information.Rakiewtz et.al (2012) introduce a new system architecture, Truthy, to detect atroturphing and ultimately succeed in automatically detecting political memes, a term coined by Stephen Colbert to described something some claims to know that is known based on feelings, rather than facts (Ratkiewicz et.al, 2012) .In the most recent Mexican elections, the Institutional Revolutionary Party has reportedly also resorted to spam tactics.The Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) used about 10,000 bots to tweets words or phrases in an attempt to generate trending topics, popular topics discussed on Twitter.These spam bots take advantage of the existence of hashtags to make certain words or run-on phrases searchable.While all three dominant political parties utilized spamming in the Mexican presidential campaign, a Mexican web developer has created a site listing all of the spam accounts used by the PRI.The list of spam bots can be found at this url: http://santiesteban.org/adiosbots/en.html.Detecting spam, astroturphing and sybil accounts involved in "message dilution" all present the same challenges.Different strategies have been deployed for the detection of such abuse on Twitter, such as analyzing the profiles and networks of spam accounts, looking at statistical properties of accounts, and detecting spam URLs (Thomas et.al, 2012) .Many studies have attempted to predict election outcomes looking at Twitter data.A study conducted by O'Connor, Balasubramanyan, Routledge, and Smith (2010) compares the results of traditional polls with sentiment provided by the text in Twitter.Looking at the text in Twitter, this study aimed to retrieve relevant information and decide whether a Tweet expressed a positive or a negative opinion.They employed a deterministic approach and used linguistic knowledge to decide whether a tweet was positive or negative.Instances of positive-sentiment words and negative sentiment words were counted.In this study, a formula is presented to represent the day's sentiment.This formula is the ratio of positive-sentiment words over negative-sentiment words.The study found that there was a strong correlation between sentiment on Twitter and what was reflected in the polls.Though this study utilizes interesting methods to measure public opinion through Twitter, it does not look at the relationship between those sentiments expressed and election outcome.Furthermore, it is specifically focused on the United States election.I conducted this study on a global scale and look at the outcome of the election, not just public sentiment.In countries where the election is fixed and there is a likelihood of fraud, public sentiment may be inclined against the incumbent.I look at nine different countries to find trends and relationships between sentiment on Twitter and the election outcome.Twitter prediction election has its criticisms as well.Gayo-Avello (2012) has a pessimistic view of election prediction using Twitter.He mentions several flaws of using Twitter as a means to make election predictions.He states that incumbency plays a large role in elections and that "chance is not a valid baseline", that there is no robust way to count votes on Twitter, and variations of sentiment analysis do not yield a valid result (Gayo-Avella, 2012).While incumbency plays a large role in elections, some of the countries to which I look at for this study do not have incumbents (Brazil, Colombia, and Egypt) .Additionally, this study can show the degree to which incumbency influences the outcome of the election in different types of countries (countries classified as Free, "partly free", and "not free").In this study, I take the criticisms outlined above under consideration and do not aim to make predictions.However, I do aim to use previously utilized methods to conduct an exploratory study of global tweets and the role they play during elections in nine different countries.Though there is no robust and completely accurate way to "count" votes on twitter, number of mentions of a candidate, or hashtags associated with a candidate can express the sentiment of the tweeters and can ultimately aid in understanding the nature election in a particular country.Using sentiment analysis, automated analysis of tweets, analysis of networks of tweets, as well as keeping in mind abuses that occur in tweets (atroturphing, message dilution, and spamming), I aim to explore the relationship of the sentiment reflected in tweets and the election outcome as well as detect insightful trends from within the Twitter data.In this exploratory study, I aim to introduce new research designs, data collections methods and selection of subjects given the preliminary results of the various analyses conducted.The methodology utilized in this study is multifaceted and consists of various methods of analysis of data.The results yielded from the methods below, which were part of my exploratory study, and allowed me to introduce new hypotheses and research designs for new areas of research.I collected tweets occurring before the general election of each of the nine countries outlined in Table 2 for a week prior to the respective election date.Analyzing the sentiment of the tweets toward the candidates as well as the graphical structure of the networks resulting from these tweets, I also looked at the frequency of links, hashtags and mentions in these tweets.A "hashtag" is defined as a tag embedded into a tweet on Twitter prefixed with a hash sign, "#".Hashtags are used to organize topics around tweets.In this study, I explore two different types of mentions: (1) a mention is a when a Twitter handler user name embedded in a tweet is prefixed with the ampersand symbol, "@", or (2) a mention is any mention of a candidate's last name.For the second type of mention described above, for certain countries in which candidate last names were potentially ambiguous, both first and last names were queried.House were used to compare the tweets generated for all of the elections.To compile a range of countries with differing freedom levels, I used the classifications presented by Freedom House (2012).I reviewed the tweets from the countries in Table 2 during the mentioned election cycles.For presidential systems in which there are two election cycles, an initial and secondary round, I look at the election cycle that determines the winner.All of the government systems that are reviewed in this study are presidential.The freedom classifications in this study are based on the The Freedom in the World survey, an annual survey evaluates the status of global freedom.The classifications are according to two categories: civil liberties and political rights.The survey includes analytical reports and numerical ratings of 195 countries and 14 select territories.The report also includes a summary for each country of the last years major developments.The ratings are based on checklist of 10 political rights questions and 15 civil liberties questions.The questions were rated by 59 analysts and 20 senior-level academic advisors using a variety of information sources: academic analyses, foreign and domestic news reports, think tanks, nongovernmental organizations, individual professional contacts, and visits to the region.Based on these sources of information, each country is assigned a civil liberties and political rights score.These scores are averaged for each country to determine whether the country is "free", "partly free" or "not free".A country receiving an average rating between 1.0 -2.5 is considered "free", an average score of 2.0 -5.0 "partly free" and average score of 5.5-7.0, "not free" (The Freedom House).According to the Freedom House, a country can be classified as "Free", "partly free", or "Not free".These three classifications are defined by the Freedom House in its "Freedom in the World 2012" annual report.In this report, a "free" country is defined as a country "where there is open political competition, a climate of respect for civil liberties, significant independent civic life, and independent media."A "partly free" country is defined as one "in which there is limited respect for political rights and civil liberties."The freedom house concludes that "partly free" countries "suffer from an environment of corruption, weak rule of law, ethnic and religious strife, and a political landscape in which a single party enjoys dominance despite a certain degree of pluralism."Finally, a "not free" country is defined as "one where basic political rights are absent, and basic civil liberties are widely and systematically denied."The resulting metrics from the 2012 Annual Report were used as the primary Freedom House Classifications for this study.Additionally, the Freedom House offers a second set of classifications that scope the results of the research conducted in this study.Freedom House offers "internet freedom" scores.However, the Freedom House metric scores were most relevant to the research in this paper because go beyond just Internet freedom and encompass political climate and civil liberties, themes and topics reflected in the tweets in this study.These particular metrics were taken into consideration as the study was conducted.Iran is the only country in this study with an Internet freedom status of "not-free."This freedom status was reflected in the challenges I faced when collecting tweets that occurred during the Iranian election, as well as in the amount of content removed from links tweeted during the Iranian election.In order to ensure that countries were chosen that had potentially relevant (Evans, 2010) .From the nine countries explored in this study, France's 2012 election was also the only example of an election in which the incumbent lost the election.In order to select three "partly free" countries to explore for this study, I considered two criteria: twitter usage and type of political system.I selected Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela as the "partly free" Countries in this study because all three of these countries are rated as one of top twenty countries worldwide with the most Twitter users.Some of the Twitter usage in these "partly free" countries rates even higher than twitter usage in some "free" countries (Evans, 2010) .The most challenging part of the selection process was choosing countries classified as "not free" by the Freedom House.Countries that are classified as "not free" are classified as such because citizens do not have as many civil liberties or human rights as their "free" country counterparts.Lack of human rights often translates to limited access to information resources, like social media.Countries that had high Twitter usage (with respect to other "not free" countries) and had held presidential elections since 2008 were selected as "not free" countries for this study.As a result, Russia, Iran, and Egypt were selected.While some countries like Iran simply block content on social media, other countries like Russia have attempted to manipulate social media to their advantage by message dilution, discussed in the Chapter 2.The attempt by Russia to "hijack" hashtags shows that Twitter plays an influential role in Russian politics (Thomas et.al, 2012) .For this reason, I chose Russia as a "not free" country to explore as a part of this study.I chose Egypt as another representative sample of a "not free" country because Twitter played an instrumental role in the 2011 Revolution and the "Arab Spring" as well as the most recent election in Egypt (Kavanaugh et.al, 2012) .In Iran, the government blocks access to Twitter (Kavanaugh et.al 2012) .Given this censorship, the candidates of such countries often avoid using social media mainly because the general public may not be able to access it.For example, I found no Twitter usage by Iranian candidates.However, the significant role of Twitter use in Iran is demonstrated by the usage of Twitter to spread news about protests in June 2009 during the "Green Revolution".Iran's significant Twitter usage is also demonstrated by the fact that it is listed in the top twenty countries with the most Twitter users (Evans, 2010) .Though the candidates in Iran don't use Twitter, the people are very much involved, despite accessibility issues due to censorship (Burns, 2009) .For this reason, I chose to analyze Iran as one of the "not free" countries in this study.Candidate tweets were collected for six months prior to the election date.General tweets in which the content mentioned candidate names were also collected from one week prior to the election.In order to accurately collect candidate tweets, I ensured that Twitter accounts that claimed to represent the candidate were "verified" by Twitter.Not all of the candidates in this study had "verified" twitter accounts.For example, none of the Iranian or Russian candidates had "verified" twitter accounts.For countries in which I do not have candidate twitter names, I focused my analysis on tweets six months prior to election by the general public.I have chosen countries and election cycles in which Twitter played a role so that in the event of insufficient candidate twitter data, tweets by the general public will be available for analysis.From the candidate twitter accounts, three lack the "verified" tag.These positive, and very positive.These ratings are associated with the scores -2, -1, 0, 1, and 2 respectively.The sentiment score of a tweets is the average of the three scores by Mechanical Turk users.Tweets in the training set with a score less than -.25 were classified as negative, tweets with a score between -.25 and .25 were classified as neutral, and tweets with a score greater than .25 was classified as positive.I then provided this training set of pre-rated tweets to the classifier for each candidate in order to train the system.Using the classifier, I derived a sentiment classification of negative, neutral, or positive for each candidate.A total sentiment score was calculated towards each candidate by subtracting 1 from the score if the tweet was positive, adding a 1 to the score if the tweet is negative and doing nothing if a tweet was classified as neutral.This number was then divided by the total number of tweets to yield a sentiment score towards a particular candidate.to gain an additional understanding to the sentiment analysis of the content of the tweets.These three methods yielded initial promising results that allow me to introduce hypotheses and research designs further discussed in Chapter 5.Following the analysis of my results, I discovered that there is no relationship between the sentiment of a country towards the incumbent and its freedom status.Additionally I discovered that, regardless of a country's freedom status, there is no correlation between the sentiment presented towards a candidate and the outcome of an election.For each of the countries in this study, the overall sentiment towards a candidate in every tweet during an election cycle was rated as either negative, neutral, or positive towards a particular candidate by Mechanical Turk users.These ratings were used as a training set to find the overall sentiment score towards a particular candidate.A score system was derived to reflect sentiment towards the top two contenders in every election cycle.Overall sentiment scores towards each candidate of the entire tweet set during the election cycle were calculated by adding one point to the score if the sentiment score of a tweet was positive, subtracting one point if the sentiment of a tweet was negative, and doing nothing (adding zero) if the sentiment of a tweet was neutral or irrelevant.The sentiment expressed towards candidates in the "Free" countries in this study reflected that the winner of the election has a lower sentiment score than the competing candidate. (Table 13 ).The hashtag "#tcot", standing for "Top Conservatives on Twitter" is the most used hashtag.In contrast, "#tlot" (Top Liberals on Twitter) appears lowest on the list of top hashtags.In France, Nicolas Sarkozy, the incumbent at the time of the election, received a higher sentiment score than François Hollande, the winner of the election.While both candidates received positive scores, Nicolas Sarkozy received a score of .15, while François Hollande received a score of .00.In Brazil, Dilma Roussef, the winner of the election, scored a -.25, while Jose Serra, scored a .31.Even though the general sentiment towards Dilma Rousseff was negative, the election outcome did not reflect this score.Among the "free" countries in this study, all three countries (United States, Brazil, and France) reflected that the winner of the election has a lower sentiment score than the loser of the election.While the sentiment scores in the "partly free" countries in this study did not consistently reflect the winner of the election, two of the countries, Colombia and Venezuela, demonstrated that the winner of the election had a higher sentiment score than the defeated candidate.In Venezuela, Hugo Chavez scored a sentiment score of 0.62, the highest candidate sentiment score in this study, while Henrique Capriles Radonski scored a 0.28.In Colombia, Juan Manuel Santos scored a -0.01, higher than the losing candidate, Antanas Mockus, who scored a -0.06.While the scores in these two countries might indicate that the sentiment in Manuel Lopez Obrador, who scored a 0.09 and -.08 respectively.Similar to the pattern observed in the "free" countries in this study, the sentiment score of the candidate who lost the election in "not free" countries was higher than that of the candidate who won the election.Putin, the winner of the election, scored -0.07 against Gennady Zyuganov, who scored a 0.08.In all three "not free" countries, the winner of the election received a lower sentiment score than that of the loser.A similar trend was observed for "free" countries.Based on these scores, it is impossible to correlate freedom and sentiment.The sentiment scores reflected that there is no relationship between incumbency, freedom status and sentiment.Out of the nine countries in this study, Based on these scores, it is observed that there is no relationship between sentiment, incumbency and freedom status.If election predictions were made solely on the sentiments conducted in this study, only Colombia and Venezuela would yield the correct election outcome.The sentiment scores from the other election cycles reflected a more negative score for the winner of the election.The sentiment analysis of tweets in our study reflects simply that sentiment analysis of tweets cannot be used to predict election outcome.The results of the sentiment analysis conducted in this study did not yield a correlation between sentiment of overall tweets, freedom status of state, and election outcome.One reason can be attributed to a lack of sufficient tweets to calculate an accurate sentiment score for tweets.The Topsy service was used in this study to collect tweets.Topsy only yields "influential" tweets in its queries.Such queries result in tweets whose writers are influential, meaning that that they have many followers.A large percentage of tweets collected belonged to established news outlets or organizations whose tweets do not reflect the opinion of a single individual.While tweets from organizations, especially political parties, are relevant for this study, it is difficult to calculate the sentiment score of a candidate when the tweets of organizations and news agencies are included in the overall scores.In this section, I classify communities within a random sample of tweets for each of the election cycles from each of the nine countries in this study.I used the Clauset Newman Moore algorithm to cluster tweets to view visible communities within each of these sample networks (Clauset, 2004) .In the networks shown below, communities were formed based on a variety of attributes.The communities in each of these networks reveal that there are classifiable groups within each country.Communities formed according the languages used to tweet, the tweet's country of origin, or based on similar interests such as entertainment.Clustering tweets into communities aids in understanding the network and communities that form it.Clustering the network of tweets from the Egyptian election yielded three significant groups.The largest group, "G1", consisted of Arab media outlets and political organizations that tweet primarily in Arabic.The second largest community, "G2", also consisted primarily of media outlets, political activists, and political organizations, however the tweets were primarily in English and locations selfreported within the profile were not located in Egypt.The third community of tweeters that emerged during the Egyptian Election cycle was a community of Egyptian individuals primarily tweeting in Arabic from within Egypt.The individuals in this group self reported that they were tweeting from locations within Egypt.France's network consists of four main communities.The largest community, "G1" consists of Spanish media outlets reporting on the French election.Tweets from "G1" were primarily in Spanish.The second largest community, "G2" consists of French news agencies and journalists. "G3" consists of personal accounts tweeting from France.The tweets in this group were primarily in French.The majority of accounts in "G4" were personal accounts or journalist accounts.These individuals self-reported that they were located in France and the majority of their tweets were in French.Iran's network of tweets yielded nine groups from the Clauset Newman Moore algorithm (including a group of tweeters that were not connected to others in the network).This group, placed on the upper left hand corner in the visualization is the largest group in the community. "G1", the second largest group in this network, consists of media outlets and news figures such as: The Guardian, Ann Curry, and Anderson Cooper.For this study, these tweets were not significant because they did not represent the sentiment of Iranian citizens.One community, "G4" stood out as representing tweets from individuals in Iran.The profiles belonging to members of "G4" claimed that they live within Iran and tweeted primarily in Farsi.One individual within this group described himself as a "cyber citizen".A sentiment score was calculated for this group specifically towards both the candidates, Ahmadinejad and Mousavi.Because a majority of the tweets from the Iran election did not originate in Iran, a new sentiment score was calculated only based on the tweets in "G4".A score of -0.16 was calculated towards Ahmadinejad while a score of 0.24 was calculated towards Mousavi.These sentiment scores more accurately reflect the sentiment of Iranian tweeters than the sentiment represented in Table 3 , because the sentiment score above took into consideration tweets from all of the other communities in the network, which do not originate in Iran.The largest group, "G1" consisted of Russian news agencies and popular individuals.The tweets in "G1" were primarily in Russian.The second group, "G2", consisted of Russian news agencies like "Moscow Times" that tweeted primarily in English.The "G3" group tweeted both in English and Russian.This group's profiles belong to individuals who self-report their locations as within Russia.A fourth group, "G4", primarily consisted of individuals self reporting that they are tweeting from within Russia.The majority of tweets in "G4" were in Russian. "G5" contains tweeters that primarily tweet about exit poll information.These accounts are personal and tweets are primarily in Russian.The "G6" group is a very small cluster of tweets in English.The United States network in this study can be divided into four main groups.The largest group, "G1" consists of verified individuals, journalists, and media outlets.Individuals in this group include: Barack Obama, The While House, ABC World News, The New Yorker, ABC, USA Today, Huffington Post, and BBC World.The second group, "G2" consists of more conservative individuals such as Governor Mike Huckabee, Glenn Beck, and Fox News.The "G3" group consists of primarily young tweeters who tweeted in support of Obama or against Romney.The fourth community of tweets primarily consisted of individuals tweeting in support of presidential candidate Gary Johnson.Five main communities emerged from clustering the Venezuela network tweets.The majority of tweets in groups "G1", "G2", "G3" and "G4" are in Spanish.Tweets in the group "G5" are in English.The groups "G1" and "G2" both consisted of journalists, individuals, and news media outlets that were located within Venezuela.The "G3" group consists of individuals and news agencies located in other Latin American Countries as well as other Spanish news agencies.The group "G4" consists of entertainers and younger individuals from Venezuela.The number of communities within each network varied.The country with the most amounts of communities, Brazil, is classified as a "free" country, and the country with the least amount of communities detected, Iran, is a not-free country.However, it is important to note that there is no clear correlation between the numbers of communities detected in the sample networks and freedom status of a country.A network with a high modularity indicates that the connections between Twitter users in a particular community are dense, but communities are not connected to one another.The three countries in this study with the highest modularity are the USA, Colombia, and Iran, which each hold different freedom statuses.The three countries in our study with the lowest modularity are France, Russia, and Egypt, which also hold different freedom statuses.There is no relationship between the modularity of a network and a country's freedom status.I detected no relationship between connected components (either weakly or strongly connected) and freedom statuses of countries.Brazil and Mexico, a "free" country and "partly free" country respectively, had the most strongly connected components, while Iran and France, a "not free" country and a "free" country respectively, had the least amount of strongly connected components.Table 4 : Network characteristics of the nine countries in this study.Twitter Mentions, Links, and Hashtags In order to further understand the type of information tweeters were sharing, I extracted several key pieces of information from within tweets.I counted the number of times a candidate was mentioned by name (without the formal ampersand symbol "@" allowed by Twitter).Furthermore, I extracted the most frequent links, hashtags and "@" mentions by Twitter users.Hashtags reveal the topics discussed during the elections and mentions reveal to whom tweets are being addressed.Links also reveal the kind of topics discussed.Tweets collected from Topsy were queried for all variations of candidate last names, including multiple ways of spelling as well as spelling with non-roman alphabet letters.Searching for all variations of a candidate name was particularly relevant for querying mentions of candidates in Egypt, Iran and Russia.Neither candidate Jose Serra nor Dilma Rousseff appears in the top mentions for Brazil.However, hashtags reflect support for the candidates.The top three hashtags "#voude13", "13neles" and "#soumaisdilma" are pro-Dilma hashtags, the first two relating to the Worker's party, the party to which Dilma Roussef belongs.Hashtags supporting Jose Serra also appear in the top ten most frequently tweeted hashtags: "#serra45" and "#serra".The top tweeted link is a live blogging site for Dilma and Serra's debate.Another link is for live tweeting about the candidates to TV personality, Bemvindo Sequeira.The significant role Twitter plays in Brazilian politics is reflected by the fact that there are multiple links encouraging live-tweeting in the top ten most shared links.These two links also reflect the degree of accessibility that Brazilians have to the Internet -so much so that they are able to live tweet about events as they happen.This accessibility is a reflection of Brazil's freedom status.of most frequently tagged profiles.The hashtag "#Shafik" is used more often than the hashtag for "#Morsi".The winner of the election, Enrique Peña Nieto (@EPN) is tagged most after Youtube.However the top two hashtags support Andres Manel Lopez Obrador (#panistasconAMLO and #HoyVotoPorAMLO).The third hashtag, "#yosoy132", is present areas of research where there seems to be little indication of relationships.The sentiment analysis conducted in this study reveals that sentiment does not reflect the outcome of the election.If election outcome were based purely on the sentiment score derived in this study, only Colombia and Venezuela would yield correct election outcomes.The majority of the sentiment scores in this study do not accurately correlate with the outcome of the respective elections.In the beginning of the paper, I discussed the concerns raised by Gayo-Avella regarding predicting election outcome with tweets (2012).He articulates that there is no commonly accepted way of counting votes on Twitter simply because not all tweets are trustworthy and Twitter is not representative of the entire demographic population.This trend was observed within the countries in this study.The tweets I collected from Brazil, Colombia, Egypt, France, Iran, Mexico, Russia, The United States, and Venezuela are simply not representative of the entire demographic of any of the nine countries with which we conducted sentiment analysis.Also, politically active individuals tend to tweet more, so self-selection bias is ignored.In this study, the top ten tweeters for each of the countries contributed to a significant portion of the total tweets for each of the elections.For example, tweets from the top ten tweeters in Colombia made 15.9% of the total tweets.The top ten tweeters in each of the countries in this study respectively make up less than 1% of the total profiles for each of these countries and yet they contribute significantly to the overall sentiment score.Thus the sentiment score is biased towards those who tweet more often.Election prediction using sentiment analysis prediction is not feasible, regardless of the freedom status of a country.I discovered that sentiment scores of candidates from almost all of the countries in this study were higher for the candidate that lost the election.Venezuela and Columbia were the only two exceptions to this pattern.I explored whether freedom and sentiment were related and aimed to see whether the freedom status of a country was related to the sentiment expressed towards the incumbent or towards a particular candidate.Only one of the three "not free" countries, Iran, had an incumbent for the election cycle in which we were studying.While Vladimir Putin was not an incumbent, he has previously held the presidential position in Russia and thus enjoys the same publicity and name recognition an incumbent would.Both the sentiment scores expressed towards Putin and Ahmadinejad were less than that of their competing candidates.However, this phenomenon cannot be conclusively attributed to Iran and Russia's "not free" freedom status.While the incumbents or candidates/previously serving as presidents studied in the "not free" countries all had lower sentiment scores than the candidates with which they were competing, the results were mixed for "free" and "partly free" countries.The sentiment scores for incumbents in Mexico and Venezuela are higher than the candidates with which they were competing.The sentiment scores among the "free" countries demonstrated mixed results in regards to the relationship between incumbency and sentiment score.In the United States, Barack Obama's sentiment score was less than that of Mitt Romney.In France, the incumbent, Nicolas Sarkozy, received a higher sentiment score than Francoise Hollande's sentiment score, even though Nicolas Sarkozy lost the election.While tweets from both Russia and Iran reflect a negative sentiment towards the incumbent, the varying results of the "free" countries, especially the United States sentiment score reflecting a negative sentiment towards Barack Obama show that there is no relation between sentiment score towards an incumbent and the freedom status of a country.This research is an exploratory work that revealed several insights that could lead to future research.I found promising initial results with respect to the relationship between content removed from links during an election and freedom status of a country, the number of disconnected twitter profiles in the network structure of "not free" countries, and a strong correlation between the number of times a candidate name is mentioned and the election outcome.Below, I present each hypothesis in detail along with a research design, providing evidence from my research.recently been promoted to "partly free", it shared this common characteristic with the other "not free" countries in this study.In the tweets for the Russian election, the content of the two top links has been removed.These links were collectively shared hundreds of times, but are now no longer accessible.All three "not free" countries have top links that are no longer accessible or have been removed.In contrast, with the exception of live twitter stream links that are time dependent, the majority of top links were still visible and accessible in the "partly free" and "free" countries.I stipulate that the content from links in "not free" countries are not accessible for two possible reasons.Fear of persecution may have driven a poster to voluntarily remove content posted on the web.A second possibility is coercion or being forced to remove content following persecution.During the Iranian election, the Iranian regime cracked down on Iranian bloggers and Internet activists.Similarly in Egypt, bloggers have been arrested for the content that they post (Booth, 2012) .There have been no reports of Russian arrests related to Internet activity.This might be related to the fact that Russia had less links removed than that of its "Not-Free" country counterparts, Iran and Egypt.This exploratory study provided enough evidence to suggest the following hypothesis: links shared on Twitter during elections of "not free" countries are more likely to be removed than links shared on Twitter during elections of "free" countries.To prove this hypothesis, more tweets from countries with "not free" freedom statuses and presidential elections should be collected, studied and compared to tweets from "free" countries.Below, I outline a research design that would ultimately prove whether the hypothesis above is valid.The data required to conduct this experiment would involve tweets during elections of "not free" countries.While the Topsy service could be used to collect this data, a more representative distribution of tweets would result from collecting tweets directly from Twitter.However, since these tweets must be collected in real time and thus are difficult or even impossible to access for elections that have already occurred, Topsy is the most convenient method of accessing such tweets.To conduct this study, tweets need to be collected from countries that previously have had presidential or parliamentary elections.Countries that fit these criteria include: Russia, Iran, China, Chad, Congo, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Algeria.Similarly, tweets from election cycles of "free" countries should be collected during their respective presidential elections.Examples of "free" countries with adequate Twitter usage include: The United States, France, South Korea, Argentina, Chile, Portugal, The United Kingdom and Germany (Evans, 2010) .To conduct an analysis of the data described above, the links resulting from tweets would be crawled to see if they have indeed been removed.Removed content presents itself in various ways.A broken or dead link results in the 404 or Not Found error message, which is a standard HTTP response code that indicates the web page is not accessible.However, a removed YouTube video, a removed blog post, or a removed twitter pictures will not yield a 404 error message.The host site will simply notify the user that the content has been removed.All possibilities must be considered when automatically detecting removed content from links.Once all links tweeted in "free" and "not free" countries are crawled, a conclusion can be derived as to whether content more often is removed from tweets following the elections in "not free" countries as compared to "free" countries.One challenge in such a study is that people in "not free" countries do not have equivalent access to social media like Twitter to people in "free" countries.This must be considered while conducting the study.The number of tweets yielded from an election in the Congo for example would certainly be less than the amount of tweets resulting from the United States election.The samples of tweets collected must account for such inequalities.This study is important in understanding if and why there is a correlation between a country's freedom status and amount of content removed from links following an election.Fear of persecution or self-censorship may have driven a poster or author to voluntarily remove content posted on the web.An alternative cause for removal of content can be attributed to coercion or being forced to remove content following persecution.The outlined study above can explain why this phenomenon occurs.Upon discovering which links have been removed, the sources and authors of these links can be traced.Interviews can be conducted with the authors of links, posters of videos, or bloggers to learn about the reason of removal and whether the government played a role in the removal of content.This study would aid in understanding the relationship between governments, self-censorship, and tweeters in "not free" countries.Hypothesis 2: The Twitter networks of "Not Free" countries have more singletons, or disconnected profiles than "Free" countries.Using the Clauset Newman Moore Algorithm to cluster and visualize tweets for all of the countries in this study, I found that two of the "not free" countries (Iran and Russia) had a larger community of disconnected profiles than their "partly free" and "free" counter parts.The singletons in Iran's network were part of the largest group, while the singletons in Russia were part of the second largest group.If there is indeed a correlation between the network structure of tweets during elections and the respective freedom status of a country, then Egypt should also have had a very large group of singletons.However, Egypt presents a unique case in this study.The report in which this study is based on was published in 2012, prior to the Egyptian election, but after the Egyptian revolution.The most recent freedom classifications by the Freedom house classify Egypt as "Partly free".While Egypt also has a large community of singletons in its sample network, it is not as large as Russia and Iran's community of singletons.I consider that the events that occurred in 2012 have now altered the resulting freedom status in Egypt.Egypt was promoted to "partly free" in 2013.However, its sample network still has a large community of singletons, but not as large with respect to the singletons in Iran and Russia.Based on these results, I hypothesize that "not free" countries have a large community of disconnected users tweeting about the election.Below, I describe data and analysis required to conduct an experiment to prove this hypothesis.The data required to conduct this experiment would be much like the data described for Hypothesis 1.This data could be retrieved from either Topsy or Twitter.While Topsy could be used to collect this data, tweets directly from Twitter would result in a more representative data set.However, as described above, these tweets are difficult to access and tweets from Topsy would be sufficient for such a study.To conduct this study, tweets need to be collected from the election cycles in "not free" countries with presidential or parliamentary elections.In addition to Russia and Iran, countries that fit these criteria include: China, Chad, Congo, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Algeria.Similarly, tweets from election cycles of "free" countries should be collected during their respective presidential or parliamentary elections.These countries can include the countries mentioned in Hypothesis 1: The United States, France, and Brazil in addition to South Korea, Argentina, Chile, Portugal, The United Kingdom and Germany.In order to create a network of profiles that tweet during the election, the followers and friends of the tweeters must be accessed.While finding the connections between all the tweets collected would result in a more comprehensive network, the Twitter API limits access to Twitter, and given time and API constraints, such a task would not be plausible.As done in this study, random node sampling can be used to conjure a sample network.While other sampling methods like edge sampling, forest fire sampling and snowball sampling might yield a more connected network, the aim of this study is not to study a connected network, but to compare the number of singletons in each network.For this reason, the random node sample would be the best option for this study.Once the sample network is constructed for all "free" and "not free" countries in the study, the number of singletons, or disconnected profiles can be counted and compared for all "free" and "not free" countries.This study outlined by the research design above is important because it attempts to understand if and why there are a higher number of disconnected profiles within networks for "not free" in comparison to networks for "free" countries.Upon finding a correlation, the outlined research would involve studying the disconnected profiles within the network to learn how often they tweet, if indeed they have friends and followers and to whom they are connected.Disconnected tweeters might stay disconnected in "not free" networks in order to stay anonymous to protect their safety.For example, some of the disconnected profiles in the Iran and Russia sample network did not have any tweets, despite tweeting in the past about the election.At some point, these Twitter users deleted their tweets.Such a study would prompt one to question why these tweeters opt to stay disconnected and anonymous and why have their tweets have been deleted.The number of friends and followers can be compared to the number of friends and followers of other tweeters in the network.Such a study could potentially lead to the detection of spammers who have a large amount of tweets but very few followers.The research outlined above could answer these questions and aid in understanding the networks of tweets in "not free" countries.Predicting elections using Twitter has many flaws and criticisms, as addressed by Gayo-Avella (2012).However, Tumasjan et.al (2010) concluded in his study that looking at the number of mentions of a political party came close to traditional polls and is a plausible indication of voter shares.In this study, I looked at candidate name mentions.I did not look at political party mentions because not all of the countries in this study have official political party names.However, I looked at the number of mentions of each candidate and found that, except for Brazil, mentions of a candidate are indeed indicative of the outcome of an election regardless of a country's freedom status.It is important to note that the winner of Brazil's election was female and candidate names were only queried for last names.In elections, female candidates are more likely to be referred to by their first names than male candidates (Reeves, 2009) .The data collected from Brazil revealed that "Dilma" was mentioned more than "Rousseff", thus reflecting a degree of gender bias in referring to female candidates by their first names.All of the countries reflected (except for Brazil) that the candidate with the most mentions wins the elections.Coupled with the sentiment analysis I conducted, these results show that when looking at tweets and the outcome of the election, it is not necessarily important what is being said about the candidate (many of the candidates had negative sentiment scores), but how many times a candidate is being mentioned.While it cannot be conclusively stated that the number of mentions of a candidate directly correlates with the outcome of an election globally, the results of this research indicate that such a hypothesis is indeed plausible.Below, I describe the data and analysis required to prove such a hypothesis on a global scale.For this particular study, Topsy data would not be sufficient.The data needs to be representative of all tweets during an election and not just the "influential" tweets resulted from Topsy queries.While tweets resulting from queries from the Topsy service are sufficient for some studies, a study that looks at the raw number of mentions requires data that is representative of all the tweets and thus needs to be collected directly from the source.To prove that the number of mentions correlates with the outcome of the election, data needs to be collected for election cycles of several countries.Even though this data is difficult to access because of Twitter API limitations, a selection of 10-20 countries would be sufficient for this study.To conduct an analysis of the data described above, the tweets need to be searched for mentions of the names of candidates and political party names.Mentions can include a reference to the candidate name or a direct tag using the ampersand symbol (@) if the candidate has a verified Twitter account.Different spelling variations of candidate names must be considered when searching for mentions of candidate names in different countries.Mentions through hashtags should be considered as well for such a study.Often, during elections hashtags in support of a particular candidate are shared.For example, in Brazil's election, the hashtags "#voude13" and "#13neles" do not mention Dilma Rousseff's name, but they are supporting her and the party to which she belongs.An automated method of detecting which hashtags support which candidates can count the number of hashtags in support of a candidate.For example, a tweet in favor of a particular candidate will most likely use hashtags in support of that candidate.Taking this into consideration would allow a researcher to draw a connection between an obvious hashtag in support of a candidate and one that is not so obvious.For example the hashtags "#soumaisdilma" is in obvious support of the candidate and includes the name of the candidate within the hashtag.If "#soumaisdilma", "#voude13" and "13neles" are all used in the same tweet, it can be deduced that "#voude13" and "13neles" are in favor of Dilma Roussef, the presidential candidate for the Brazilian election.These hashtags should potentially be considered in the count of mentions.In this research design, "mentions" should be redefined to include hashtags, direct tags (@) of political candidates as well as mentions.Upon conducting this search, the number of mentions for each candidate should be compared to voter shares to see how closely it correlates with the outcome of the election.While the research design above is not attempting to predict the election outcome based on the number of mentions of a candidate, it can demonstrate whether the number and type of mentions of a candidate correlates with election outcome globally.Furthermore, if such a correlation is discovered for all of the countries studied, types of mentions and their relationship with the outcome of the election can be more clearly defined.For example, in this study it was observed that in some countries, the winner of the election was tagged directly using the ampersand symbol (@), while in other countries, the winner of the election was not tagged directly but had multiple top hashtags in support of her/him.While I found that there is no relationship between sentiment expressed towards a candidate and election outcome, the initial results showed that number of mentions correlated with election outcome regardless of freedom status.In addition to mentions by name, number of hashtags (#), and direct tags (@) can be counted and compared to see the way in which users communicate about a political party or candidates and how the method of mentioning a candidate is related to the outcome of the election.This research would aid in understanding the relationship between different forms of referencing political parties and candidates on Twitter (tags, hashtags, and mentions) and the outcome of the election on a global scale.In this study, I explored the Twitter activity during nine election cycles within countries with nine different freedom statuses.In this study, I found promising initial results showing that tweets from "not free" countries are more likely to have content removed from links that are shared from the web, networks of tweets occurring during elections of "not free" countries have more disconnected profiles and that there is a strong relationship between election outcome and number of mentions of a candidate.Based on my results, I presented three hypotheses with a research design that can be pursued in future work.My results also show that the sentiment expressed towards a candidate by tweeters during an election cycle does not indicate who will win the election and that the sentiment expressed towards an incumbent does not correlate with the freedom of a given country.
out a "strategic turning point" that includes the intent for a "global presence emphasizing the Asia-Pacific and the Middle East while still ensuring our ability to maintain our defense commitments to Europe, and strengthening alliances and partnerships across all regions." 1 While comprehensive in its scope, this statement does list three global regions specifically: the Asia-Pacific, the Middle East, and Europe.Naturally, with these regions explicitly mentioned, the attention of strategists has turned to the security dynamics of these areas.However, these three regions also describe an arc that revolves around one nationthe Russian Federation.From a geopolitical standpoint, the Russian Federation thus becomes the hinge of the United States' strategic turning point.As the United States pursues the intent that "we will of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region ," 2 US strategists must consider the changing strategic environment of the Russian Federation to avoid unhinging this strategic turning point.An absence of consideration for Russian security developments creates contextual gaps and increased risk for US security strategy and policy.3 Federation.At first glance, an analysis of security policy documents and statements from politicians would seem to be an exercise in exploring propaganda rather than identifying areas of potential cooperation or conflict.After all, these documents and statements are targeted messages for both domestic and international audiences and are authored to promote certain purposes.However, promotion of purpose is the value to be found in analyzing these documents.As Michael Haas puts it, "although security documents are highly declamatory and often propagandistic . . . they are of value in assessing Moscow's security policy of today and tomorrow ." 4 Two theoretical tools created by Barry Buzan and Ole Waever provide a mechanism for exploring the ways in which security policy documents inform the identification of cooperation and conflict.The first of these tools is the concept of securitization or the process of migrating issues to the security sphere.5 Securitization moves provide the bridge between political rhetoric and potential for cooperation or conflict.The second tool is Regional Security Complex Theory or RSCT, a regional level of analysis in international relations between the domestic and global levels of analysis.6 RSCT provides the appropriate level of analysis based on the regional dynamics of the US turning point.Although reflective of the global nature of US strategic concern, the rebalance is among regional focus."Sustaining Global Leadership" outlines general US policy intentions in the regions of Europe, the Middle East, and The Pacific.These regions surround the Russian Federation which suggests that regional analysis is the appropriate level for examining the dynamics between securitization moves by the Russian Federation and the United States.Analyzing the security documents of the Russian Federation and the United States through these two theoretical tools identify areas of potential security cooperation or potential security conflict between these two nations.The approach used here begins with a description of the theoretical tools used in the analysis.Following this explanation, subsequent chapters analyze the principal security documents of the United States and Russian Federation and the securitization moves found in these documents that are most closely linked to the regions involved in the US strategic shift.First, the two most recent national security strategies are examined as a baseline to determine the issues likely to be securitization moves by each nation.Next, the military doctrines of the two nations are examined to identify the ways in which these documents amplify or inform the securitization moves in the national security documents.Finally, recent security documents and policy papers from the two nations are examined to identify any new directions or securitization moves and any continuity of issues from previous documents.Following this analysis, a conclusion identifies some of the areas of potential conflict and cooperation, presents some observations and recommendations for US policy and indicates areas for further exploration as the United States executes the rebalance.Securitization is defined as "the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with a saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects." 7 An issue becomes securitized when "the issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure." 8 In a basic sense, securitization is taking politics to the next level or bridging the gap between war -"a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means" -and politics without violence.9 For securitization to be successful it must include: the perceived reality of existential threats, a call for emergency action or undertaking such action, and effect on relations by breaking free of norms or rules.From these three criteria, "the distinguishing feature of securitization is a specific rhetorical structure." 10 The rhetorical nature of securitization is suggestive of security policy documents.Security policy documents cannot be viewed, however, as successful securitization in and of themselves.Successful securitization of an issue includes the following indicators: people killing each other in organized ways, the spending of large and/or escalating sums on armaments, populations being driven from homes in large numbers, or nations resorting to unilateral actions contrary in discernable ways to international undertakings.11 Obviously, these are not indicators from security policy documents.The feature of securitization in security policy documents then becomes securitization's antecedentthe securitizing move.A securitizing move is simply an attempt to securitize an issue.It is the discourse that presents an issue as an existential threat.It is the initial step in transitioning an issue from the realm of politics without violence towards securitization.The issue is securitized "when the audience accepts it as such" and begins to legitimize emergency measures to deal with it.The discussion of an issue in a security policy document can be interpreted as a securitization move.In security policy documents, issues are presented in a rhetorical and propagandistic context to indicate that they are not merely politics but issues of potential securitization.In subsequent chapters, an analysis of the security policy documents of the United States and the Russian Federation identifies the securitization moves of each country that interact in the regions of Europe, the Middle East, the Pacific, and the Arctic.The process of securitization moves presents a consideration in the second analytical tool used in the analysis of this paper, RSCT.Securitization moves "can easily upset orders of mutual accommodation among units." 12 On the interregional level then, securitizing moves create imbalance among neighboring regions.These securitization moves need to be analyzed in relation to each other at the regional level as suggested by RSCT.global security concerns and domestic security concerns.Establishing this level of analysis seeks to distinguish between system interplay of global powers and subsystem interplay of lesser powers."To paint a proper portrait of global security, one needs to understand both of these levels independently, as well as the interaction between them."RSCT paints its portion of the portrait by creating a blend between materialist and constructivist approaches.The materialist elements of the approach include the acceptance of bounded territoriality and the analysis of power distribution.The constructivist elements of the approach include consideration of the political process in security issues, or securitization.13 RSCT divides the globe into groups of Regional Security Complexes or RSCs.RSCs are defined as "a set of units whose major processes of securitisation, desecuritisation, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another." 14 RSCs are categorized into four types: standard, centered, great power, and supercomplexes.The Russian Federation is located 12 Buzan, Security, 26.13 Buzan and Waever, Regions and Powers, 4, 27-30.14 Buzan and Waever, Regions and Powers, 44 .Several authors whose work is cited in this study are European and use British spelling conventions for the English language.In this work, these authors' spelling will be conserved in direct quotes but the American spelling convention will be used outside of these direct quotes.in the post-Soviet RSC, relabeled here as the Eurasian RSC, and the United States in the North American RSC.Both of these RSCs are classified as centered RSCs meaning that the RSC is unipolar in the security sense and dominated by either a superpower (North American RSC) or a great power (Eurasian RSC).The other three regions identified in "Sustaining Global Leadership" fall into the European centered RSC, the Middle Eastern standard RSC, and the Asian supercomplex RSC.These classifications provide the starting point for analyzing interregional and intraregional security dynamics.15 In analyzing these dynamics RSCT utilizes several variables.The first of these is the patterns of amity and enmity present within the region.These patterns reflect the influence of historical and cultural dynamics on security interdependence and are best understood by expanding analysis in both the global and domestic directions.Another variable is the interplay of the international anarchic structure with the regional balance of power pressures and geographic proximity pressures.This interplay is a dependent variable for RSC formation but also includes subordinate mechanisms of adjacency, penetration, and overlay.Adjacency is the concept that simple geographic proximity increases security interaction.Penetration is the condition of outside powers creating security alignments with nations within an RSC.Penetration is facilitated by regional balance of power dynamics that create the space for outside actors to influence security concerns.This then links the regional security patterns into global security concerns.Overlay is a mechanism that goes beyond penetration and occurs when outside security concerns are so pervasive and overwhelming that local or regional security patterns cease operating.Overlay usually results from great power rivalry alignments with the permanent presence of external great powers' armed forces as a symptom of this mechanism.16 These variables and mechanisms provide RSCT's tools for analysis.RSCT asserts that the regional level will always play a role in security analysis, occasionally a dominant one.As mentioned above, one of RSCT's central purposes is to separate global and regional security concerns for analysis of their interaction.17 This is of particular importance in a comparative analysis between US and Russian policies.The US rebalance involves regions that it is not a part of in RSCT.The United States lacks adjacency and, as an outside influence, has the ability to withdraw.However, "superpowers by definition largely transcend the logic of geography and adjacency in their security relationships." 18 The United States, despite illustrating many of the symptoms of a declining superpower as identified by Robert Gilpin, is the only current superpower as defined by RSCT.19 This creates both challenges and advantages.At the RSCT level, US influence is largely confined to penetration and overlay attemptsthe mechanisms that compensate for its lack of adjacency.This also facilitates choice, "and this choice underpins a whole range of policy options not possessed by actors that are really 'in' their regions. " 20 When viewed through the lens of RSCT, the January 2012 US strategic turning point represents an adjustment of penetration and overlay mechanisms in the RSCs where the United States is exerting external influence.The rebalance includes increased interregional dynamics.This increase is illustrated in the shifting levels of penetration in US security policy and the potential for rivalry between China and the United States to induce overlay in East Asia.21 RSCT indicates that "strong instances of interregional dynamics may be indicators of external transformation (merger) of RSCs." 22 Thus, the dynamics introduced by the US turning point can transform all the RSCs surrounding the Eurasian RSC.Likewise, shifts in levels of penetration attempts from the Russian Federation can influence the dynamics for US attempts in these regions.In contrast to the United States, the Russian Federation is not a superpower.However, it is the great power of the centered Eurasian RSC.This has ramifications for the U.S. policy shift as, "in a centred region, the factors that drive the foreign policy of the dominant regional power are obviously of special importance." 23 Since 1991 and the collapse of the Soviet Union, security policy development in the Russian Federation has displayed four general characteristics as identified by Michael Haas: a fear of the alien or being surrounded by enemies, a desire for security buffer zones, a feeling of superiority, and a tradition of servitude to the state with no heritage of democracy.24 The interregional dynamics between the Eurasian RSC and the neighboring RSCs will be strongly influenced by Russian security policy, even at the domestic level.As Buzan and Waever point out, "especially in centered RSCs, it will very often be the domestic struggle over security in the central state that determines major developments." 25 However, within the Russian Federation, the domestic struggle for security is strongly tied to international relations.International recognition is key to the Russian Federation's identity and connects international and domestic roles.This is primarily through the leadership coterie of the Russian Federation that has maintained power for the last two decades.As Lilia Shevtsova points out, the Russian foreign policy "aim remains to keep in place a personalized power system." 26 Thus, for the leadership of the Russian Federation "the global arena is today much more important than Europe for Russia's attempts both to secure a larger role outside its region and to legitimize its regional empire." 27 The Russian Federation has a strong impetus to leverage interregional dynamics for advantage at both the global and domestic levels and motivation to find opportunities in shifting regional dynamics.Despite the importance of the Russian Federation's position as the central state in its RSC, there are limitations to how this position can be leveraged at other levels.Specifically, the Russian Federation faces a problem in that conflict within its own RSC can weaken its power in relation to other global powers.28 So, not only do shifting regional dynamics offer opportunities for advantage to the Russian Federation, they also pose threats to its regional dominance and power status.With the connection to domestic politics mentioned above, these threats can easily be perceived as existential.As a result, the United States must be careful to analyze how the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific shifts perceptions of threat.As the Congressional Strategic Posture Commission concludes, "Russian and the United States are certainly not enemies but neither are they allies. The two are strategic partners on some important international questions, but strategic competitors on others. " 29 In Buzan and Waever's RSCT analysis, they characterize the Russian Federation as unlikely to reemerge as a major player in East Asia due to domestic challenges.30 They explain this conclusion by illustrating that since the Japanese defeat of Russia in 1904 Russia in -1905 , the Soviet Union and Russian Federation have not concentrated on Asia as a primary arena.They further use this reasoning to Russia from East Asia in RSCT terms.31 In their analysis then, the importance of the Russian Federation and the Eurasian RSCT is diminished in the analysis of the Asian supercomplex.In the context of the US strategic turning point, the Russian Federation would then occupy a place of minor importance for the target RSC of the rebalance.However, there are several developing conditions that can influence this analysis in a different direction.Buzan and Waever recognize the first of these conditions, the relationship between the Russian Federation and China.Their analysis recognizes the challenges importance of Russian and Chinese adjacency, demographics, trade, and regional security alliances.Nevertheless, they characterize the interregional relationship as weak.32 In the light of the US strategic turning point, this characterization must be reconsidered.Russian relations with China in the issues listed above can have significant impact if the US rebalance to the Asia-Pacific develops a condition of overlay within the East Asian RSC subcomplex.The Russian Federation would become a key consideration, especially in connection with its Chinese security alliances, if the United States and China entered into a rivalry condition of sufficient strength to induce overlay in the Asia-Pacific region.Another condition is the emergence of the Arctic as a strategic consideration.The Arctic will be discussed in greater detail in chapter three but is introduced here as one In addition to adjacency and the emerging Arctic, there is an institutional condition that suggests Russian involvement in any US strategic moves involving neighboring regions.Shevtsova points out there is an inclination for the Russian Federation to oppose US strategic initiatives from the constraints of international prestige mentioned above.The Russian personalized power system is inherently hostile to liberal democracies, especially neighboring democracies, regardless of whether cooperation or confrontation is pursued with western powers.33 This condition suggests Russian involvement of some kind in the neighboring regions will occur through either cooperation or conflict.Finally, "Russia is a geographical concept." 34 As such, geopolitics is a condition that plays a large role in Russian foreign policy and increases sensitivity to interregional dynamics that influence the perceived sphere of influence."A continuing line in Russian external policy has always been that Russia has a legitimate influence in the former Soviet area, in which other actors, such as the West, would not be tolerated." 35 In essence, the Russian Federation considers its regional power and influence as more than simply politics but as a securitization move.These securitization moves become a central element in the analysis of these interregional dynamics.In RSCT, "it is really the relationships (the moves) that tie [securitization] together, not the particular referent objects." 36 In this case, the rebalancing of strategic concerns currently underway in the United States and the strategic developments underway in the Russian Federation are relationship adjustments or the securitizing moves that really matter in RSCT securitization.In this case, RSCT suggests that security connectedness should be analyzed in three steps: successful securitization of the issue by an actor, identification of links and interactions from this securitization, collection of links and interactions into a set of interconnected security concerns.37 In the following chapters, the securitization moves rather than actual securitization are analyzed to identify the elements of these steps already apparent.As an analysis of security policy documents, the first step of the RSCT analytical approach will often not be present.The issues are still securitization moves and the focus will be on the second step, links and interactions within the securitization moves.In some cases, issues have already been successfully securitized in one region but remain as securitization moves in other regions.The modified purpose then becomes to identify collections of links and interactions into sets of interconnected securitization move concerns rather than purely security concerns.Prior to that analysis, some relevant, general parameters of Russian securitization moves are reviewed for context.There are two general aspects of Russian securitization moves that are born out in the following, more specific analysis.First, Russian securitization moves are rooted in a confrontational heritage.Shevtsova points out that "after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Kremlin abandoned the doctrine of total military confrontation with the West, but retained aspects and symbols of militarism, which still often impose their logic on the current system." 38 This symbolic logic, inherited from the Cold War regime, lends a historical weight to Russian securitization moves that may not be fully appreciated in western circles.The second general aspect of Russian securitization moves is the nature of the current political leadership.As mentioned above, the ties between domestic and international issues run through the leadership coterie."In a quasi-imperial structure like Russia's . . . one always has to give highest priority to the inner circles because their health is the precondition for that of the next circle outward." 39 Basically, in Russia's structure, the domestic concern gains high priority because of the state power structure itself is securitized.This securitization is then projected outward to regional and global levels.There is high probability that Russian leadership would try to use foreign policy as a tool in a crisis or power struggle.For current conditions, Shevtsova warns that "in any case, the current 'reset' should not make either Russia or the outside world complacent . . . The honeymoon can continue only if the Western powers accept the Russian way of dealing with the world." 40 These two general aspects of Russian securitization moves suggest a difficult environment to conduct a strategic rebalance.On the other hand, RSCT embraces that "leaders and peoples have considerable freedom to determine what they do and do not define as security threats." 41 The material found in the following national security strategies and policy documents helps identify these definitions and lists those issues or concerns that national and military leadership are using as securitizing moves.Thus, while the ability of the United States or the Russian Federation to realize the ambitions declared in their security documents is certainly suspect, the existence of these topics in the security policy documents indicates a securitization move in that issue and the subsequent possibility of successful securitization.This analysis seeks to recognize the "patterns [that] emerge from the fact that different actors securitise differently" or rather create securitization moves differently.42 The United States and the Russian Federation use similar documents to outline their national security policy.Both nations produce a governing security document that is then further refined through military strategies, doctrine, and political statements.These documents as a whole can be viewed as part of the process of creating a securitization move and indicate the issues that a nation is more likely to securitize.Based on the policy document structure that both nations utilize, the governing security documents provide the analytical starting point for determining these securitization moves.This chapter examines the United States and Russian Federation national security strategies through comparative analysis to identify the securitization moves with links and interaction to the US strategic rebalance.The analysis of the Russian Federation national security policy is intentionally more in depth to provide context.Some of the securitization moves that are identified will be analyzed in this chapter to illustrate that the issue has relevant connection between these two nations in the current strategic environment.Other moves will be discussed in greater detail in subsequent chapters since the securitization moves for these issues are magnified by subordinate policy documents or recent political statements.focus, and the intended forums for international discourse highlight the differences between the two strategies.Conversely, a focus on domestic reform, the importance of international institutions and law, and the rhetorical attitudes towards weapons proliferation highlight similarities in strategic approaches to securitization moves.1 The SNSRF and NSS exhibit very different tones regarding the use of military force.The SNSRF is focused primarily on the military instrument of national power.This may merely reflect the fact that the Russian Federation also issues separate policy documents for foreign policy and socio-economic policy.1 These areas of similarity and difference help to establish categories for the securitization moves found within these documents.This classification structure is used in Appendix A to organize a more complete list of securitization moves found in the national security strategies.The conception of the military instrument of power as the primary means of security also finds voice in the Russian academic security policy community.In an article discussing present US conflicts, the United States is blamed for the emergence of unilateral use of force in international relations.The conclusion drawn mirrors the implicit tone of the SNSRF."It can thus be stated that only real force is recognized in the world today, a force based on a vast economic potential and battle-worthy armed forces." 5 In broad terms then, the SNSRF treats the armed forces as the solution to national security.In contrast, the NSS has a greater focus on the socio-economic instruments of national power."Simply put, we must see American innovation as a foundation of American power." 6 This is not a surprising point of view for a liberal democracy.7 Extensive discussion of economic, diplomatic, and information strategies dominate the NSS with comments about the need to maintain an effective military force filling an almost ancillary role.8 These ancillary statements about military force are also qualified when they appear."Our Armed Forces will always be a cornerstone of our security, but they must be complimented." 9 "Military force, at times, may be necessary to defend our country and allies . . . while the use of force is sometimes necessary, we will exhaust other options before war whenever we can." 10 In tone, the NSS implies that, for the United States, military force is a reluctant necessity.Another major difference between these two security documents is in the regional and domestic focus of the SNSRF compared to the global focus of the NSS.The global focus of the NSS can be seen in the discussion of concerns throughout the globe and the US role at the international level.11 The NSS addresses concerns for over forty nations by name throughout the document.Seventeen regional and international organizations are also included by name with accompanying discussion of US intentions within their framework.In agreement with this global focus, the NSS identifies common challenges that require international cooperation.These include violent extremism, nuclear proliferation, climate change, and the global economy.12 In addition to the nations, multinational organizations, and international cooperation issues named in the document, the NSS lays out a clear intent for the United States to maintain global leadership.This intent is extended to the realm of international security.The NSS states that "the United States of America will continue to underwrite global security" and "we embrace America's unique responsibility to promote international security." 13 In contrast, the SNSRF focuses more on the regional dynamics for Russian Federation security policy.The SNSRF does state the long term goal of establishing the Russian Federation as a world power; however, the document maintains a regional focus, rarely discussing concerns beyond immediate border areas.14 As Mark Galeotti observes "while on the one hand, the 2010 doctrine embodies a grudging retreat from claims to a truly global status, on the other, it articulates a much sharper and arguably more aggressive assertion of its regional power status and, indeed, its claims to hegemony in post-Soviet Eurasia." 15 Shevtsova claims that this is a reflection of a longstanding trend in Russian politics.Foreign and security policies have to pursue contradictory paths.For the outside, these policies have to create the image of Russia as a modern and responsible European state.For the inside, foreign policy has to supply constant justification for the "Besieged Fortress" mentality and secure rejection of the Western standards by the Russian society.This "driving two horses in opposite directions" is actually the agenda of Russian foreign and security policies that the Kremlin has been pursuing with great skill during the last 10 years…One could risk the conclusion that the Kremlin foreign and security policies are more influenced by domestic needs than by the logic of international relations.16 Buzan and Waever also identify this phenomenon as a primary security threat at the domestic level.A lack of recognition or a lack of a respectable international role is a threat to state identity and, therefore, has significant play at the domestic level.17 This domestic influence is further shown by the content of the SNSRF.Where the NSS discusses over forty nations by name the SNSRF discusses only six: the United States of America, Ukraine, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and the European Union.Of these nations, all share a border with the Russian Federation except the United States.Additionally, the SNSRF discusses several domestic regions by name while the NSS does not list any domestic units.States.The last of these seven, the WTO, is an international organization that currently includes both nations although, at the time the NSS and SNSRF were authored, Russia was not a member.These differences in multinational organizations discussed in the documents reinforce the regional focus of the SNSRF.The SNSRF also specifically identifies a growing trend of regional influence in conflict resolution."A tendency is developing to seek resolutions to existing problems and regulate crisis situations on a regular basis without the participation of non-regional powers." 18 In other words, regions can handle conflict themselves without the intervention of global powers.In summary, the United States views globalization as an opportunity while the Russian Federation views globalization as a threat.19 There is also a noticeable difference in the international forums that the two nations intend to use in advancing national security.As discussed above, there is little overlap between the documents in named multinational organizations.Of the four overlapping organizations, two of them are economic forums.The UN then becomes the only international forum that both recognize as legitimate for tackling regional and international security concerns.20 Beyond the UN, there is sharp divergence in recognition by name of legitimate international forums.NATO is viewed as a forum for addressing international security concerns in the NSS.21 However, NATO expansion and its assumption of global roles are considered a threat in the SNSRF.22 This securitization move will be discussed in greater depth in chapter three but the divergence itself is an important difference between the two documents.The different organizations in the SNSRF discussed above indicate a further divergence.This divergence shows an intent on the part of the Russian Federation, in pursuit of its national security objectives, to use multinational forums that exclude the United States.Explicitly, "the Collective Security Treaty Organization is regarded in the capacity of the main intergovernmental instrument called to stand against regional challenges and threats of a military-political or military-strategic character." 23 Based on this analysis, the stated intent of the two nations is to work mainly through multinational forums at the regional level that currently exclude the participation of the other nation.In addition to the differences in multinational organizations, the two documents also discuss unilateral and multilateral action.The NSS reserves the right of the United States to use unilateral force but uses language to frame this use of force within the norms of international law.24 The SNSRF, however, considers the unilateral use of force to have a negative influence on international relations and advocates the importance of multilateral institutions.25 Marcel Haas points out that this attitude is not new.Since for its use, have expanded the possibilities for the Russian Federation to reinforce its influence on the world stage." 27 Buzan and Waever point out that Russian policy has consistently opposed US unilateral action and supported multilateral approaches. 28 The NSS and SNSRF also display several similarities. The general similarities between the two documents include the importance of domestic reforms to national security, the importance of international law in government behavior, and the dangers of weapons proliferation. Both the NSS and the SNSRF recognize the importance of domestic reform efforts for national security. In the NSS, President Obama states that "our strategy starts by recognizing that our strength and influence abroad begins with the steps we take at home." 29 Likewise, the SNSRF identifies the need to ensure national security through efforts to strengthen domestic institutions and capabilities. 30 In addition to domestic reform, both documents claim international norms and law as the basis for legitimacy. The Russian Federation clearly states the intent to maintain its international relations and foreign policies within the bounds of international law. The UN Security Council is identified as a central element of this effort. 31 The United States also states a commitment to the rule of law and the necessity of efforts for international justice. 32 The third general similarity between the NSS and SNSRF is weapons proliferation. Both documents discuss the need to curtail the spread of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. Additionally, both the NSS and the SNSRF openly state the goal of a world free from nuclear weapons. The NSS goes even further and establishes a policy that no nuclear weapons will be used against non-nuclear nations in compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. This policy even extends to a pledge not to use even a threat of nuclear weapon use to nations compliant with the treaty. 33 These similarities in addition to the differences identified above provide context for analysis of these security policy documents and the securitization moves found within. The Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020 defines national security as "a condition of individual, societal, and governmental security from interior and exterior threats which allows the provision of constitutional rights, freedoms, a suitable quality and standard of life for citizens, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the stable development of the Russian Federation; the defense and security of the state." 34 Of note in that definition, is the inclusion of both interior and exterior threats to security. In addition to the definition and indicators of national security, the SNSRF includes a general identification of near and long term threats at the international level: The attention of international politics, from a long-term perspective, will be focused on ownership of energy resources, including in the Near East, the Barents Sea shelf and other Arctic regions, in the basin of the Caspian Sea, and in Central Asia. A negative influence on the international situation, from a medium-term perspective, will be rendered, as before, in the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as conflicts in the Near and Middle East, in a number of South Asian and African countries, and on the Korean peninsula. 36 This list of threats shows three themes of importance that recur throughout the document: energy security, weapons proliferation, and violent extremism. Listing energy security at the top of the list is not a coincidence. Energy, as a securitization move, will be discussed in greater depth in chapter four but the SNSRF includes significant concern for the long and medium term security implications of the economic sector and its reliance on energy. Since Putin's first term, the Russian Federation has become increasingly reliant on the energy sector as the basis of its economy. The funds brought in from this sector form a large portion of the power base available for current leadership in Moscow to maintain their power. 37 Energy security has featured prominently in Russian national security strategies since that time but it is not the only issue to enjoy continuity. 40 Based on these statements, this article appears to serve dual purposes. The first purpose is the obvious identification of issues for cooperation with the United States and these issues line up nicely with a similar list in the NSS discussed below. The second purpose is to act as a securitization move to boost Russian legitimacy and influence at the global level. So, although the statement is framed to encourage cooperation, it also emphasizes some of the securitization moves pursued by the Russian Federation. An analysis of the US securitization moves in the NSS provides comparative material for exploration of links and interactions with the securitization moves in the SNSRF. One contrast between the two is that the NSS does not display the same consistency with previous versions that the SNSRF displays. A marked difference in the current NSS from previous versions is the transition away from a focus on the military instrument of power and defense preparedness. Two other departures from previous strategies include a reemphasized focus on a whole-of-government approach to security challenges and a greater emphasis on multilateral approaches to international relations. The emphasis on multilateral approaches is also reinforced by a reduced emphasis on the pursuit of global democratization. 41 Thus, as is to be expected with a change of political party in the US administration, the current NSS represents changes to the securitization moves than those pursued by the previous administration. The new direction of the NSS has three general themes. These themes include economic renewal, comprehensive engagement, and global leadership. Together, these three themes are intended to strengthen collective action to meet security threats. 42 Within these themes, the NSS identifies four strategic interests for the United States: security, domestic and international economic prosperity, respect for universal values, and the advancement of international order. 43 The first issue to be analyzed between the NSS and SNSRF is the respective securitization moves regarding values. These securitization moves tie the cultural identity of the nations to their security concerns. Thus, it becomes a foundational consideration for any interactions between the two nations. As Alexander Wendt argues in Social Theory of International Politics "the fundamental factor in international politics is the 'distribution of ideas' in the system." 49 In this light, values take on a fundamental importance as securitization moves since their influence can, to a greater or lesser extent, influence other securitization movements undertaken by the government. The NSS claims several values as universal and states the intent to promote these values internationally. These universal values include a human right to economic opportunity, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, freedom of worship, democratic election, dignity, tolerance, equality, and justice administered fairly and equitably. Additionally, the NSS states that "nations that embrace these values for their citizens are ultimately more successfuland friendly to the United States -than those that do not ." 50 This last statement can be viewed to implicitly link the acceptance of these values to the capacity for cooperation or the level of threat that a nation presents to US interests. The SNSRF goes even further by tying the armed forces into this securitization move. One of the tasks assigned to security forces is to "provide for the preservation of a cultural and spiritual legacy." This dictum is reinforced with extensive recommendations of state action to influence culture and media. 53 The state role looms large in the Russian Federation's view of protecting cultural values. In contrast to the US values listing freedoms, the Russian values are more focused on duties. This difference is not trivial. In fact the NSS offers a pointed, if implicit, observation to the Russian Federation. "Even where some governments have adopted democratic practices, authoritarian rulers have undermined electoral processes and restricted the space for opposition and civil society, imposing a growing number of legal restrictions so as to impede the rights of people to assemble and access information." 54 While this observation is applicable to several regimes throughout the world, in light of recent events, the Russian Federation emerges as a prime example. One example of the interaction between these value securitization moves is the Russian Federation laws governing Non-governmental Organizations (NGO). These laws are not new to the Russian Federation but recent changes and clarifications to the law are indicative of a "growing number of legal restrictions so as to impede the rights of people to assemble and access information." The most recent changes to the law sharply increase the amount of information required for an organization to register with the government and operate legally. Funding from foreign sources is also prohibited unless the organization accepts classification as a "foreign agent," a term that carries negative connotations in Russian society and is an express concern of the SNSRF. 55 In sum, these measures increase government control over the activities of non-governmental entities. 54 President of the United States of America, "National Security Strategy," 35. 55 An excellent summary of the provisions of this law can be found at "NCO Law Monitor: Russia," ICNL: The International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, February 20, 2013, http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/russia.html; The SNSRF concern for NGOs is expressed in President of the Russian Federation, "The Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020". Although some human rights advocates within Russia have condemned this action, the broader mood within the Russian Federation still runs counter to the United States. 57 A January 2011 survey showed that seventy percent of the Russian population thinks that it has enemies. Forty percent name the United States as that enemy. Furthermore, "despite the reset, 65 percent consider the United States an aggressor that seeks to take control of the entire world." 58 An "us" versus "them" mentality is very strong in the Russian Federation indicating that domestic perception of this behavior is within accepted norms. 59 The securitization moves of values by these two nations are linked by their fundamental impact on other securitization moves. These securitization moves already show signs of successful securitization as shown above. While it is unlikely that these securitization moves will, of themselves, lead to other indicators of securitization (organized killing, population expulsion, or creation of an existential threat perception) they are likely to persist as an undercurrent to all other security concerns. More than just cultural differences, the national security policy documents indicate that these securitization moves are linked to perceptions of national security. The remaining two securitization moves analyzed in this chapter are both listed expressly as areas of cooperation that each nation desires with the other. On the surface, cooperation in the areas of nonproliferation and counterterrorism seem straightforward. Both nations state an intent to cooperate with the other in efforts against terrorism and extremism and in policies that oppose the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. 60 These stated intents are suggestive that the links and interactions in a connectedness analysis have already been established and cooperation is possible. However, the manner in which these issues are being securitized may be eroding these links and connections. There is a latent or growing antagonism in the interaction of these security issues. As a result, cooperative links and connections stand the chance of eroding into interactions of conflict. Both nonproliferation and counterterrorism show symptoms of this scenario. Of the two securitization moves, the symptoms of cooperation erosion are weaker for terrorism and extremism, but they do exist. The principal difference between US and Russian securitization of terrorism and violent extremism reflects one of the general differences in tone identified above. The United States treats terrorism and violent extremism in an international context while the Russian Federation treats them in a domestic and regional context. 61 A simple text analysis of the SNSRF and NSS also supports this observation. In the SNSRF, seven of the ten uses of the word terrorism and all six of the uses of the word extremism are used in a domestic or regional context. 62 The NSS, in contrast, uses the word terrorism seven of eight times in an international context and the word extremism is placed in an international context ten of eleven times. 63 The NSS paints terrorism and extremism as a global problem while the SNSRF suggests it is a domestic and regional problem. This divergence suggests that cooperation may not be as natural as expected at first glance. threatened regional security." 67 Yet, as Haas observes, "the SCO states have claimed their primacy in Central Asian regional security, but so far action by the SCO of countering the threats from Afghanistan has not taken place." 68 This reluctance in cooperation on the part of the Russian Federation is further illustrated at the international level.Cooperation with the efforts pursued by the United States has been confined largely to intelligence sharing, logistical support, and the land supply routes of the Northern Distribution Network.69 In this context, the successful securitization of this issue by each nation has not resulted in widespread cooperation.For the intended cooperation to be realized, the Russian Federation needs to pursue a securitization move of these issues at the international level or the United States needs to leverage Russian involvement at the regional level with the attendant danger of differences in the interpretation of terrorism.Otherwise, this area of cooperation can easily erode and, based on the underlying antagonism of the values securitization move, lead to an area of conflict.70 Working to strengthen the cooperation will facilitate the rebalance strategy currently being pursued by the US administration.Furthermore, the NSS identifies weapons of mass destruction, specifically a terrorist attack with a nuclear weapon, as the greatest security threat to the United States.73 On the surface this appears to be one of the strongest areas of cooperation suggested in the national security strategies.This perception is especially strong in light of the fact that both national security strategies claim to seek a world free from nuclear weapons.74 In apparent pursuit of this goal, the New START Treaty was completed within a year of the NSS being issued.75 This treaty includes further reductions in the nuclear stockpiles of the two nations and represents a significant step towards realization of the mutually stated goal.Unfortunately, other aspects of nonproliferation securitization are causing divergence on this issue.international and regional security, and shape the future force.3 The majority of the NMS is organized to discuss these four objectives and the supporting material for the securitization moves from the NSS is found within this framework.In addition to material that is related to the securitization moves of the NSS, the NMS introduces a concern that was not directly addressed previously.Principally, this is a concern about international access.This concern has become one of the fundamental strategic considerations among US military circles in their strategic approach to the Pacific rebalance.The NMS states that "anti-access strategies seek to prevent our Nation's ability to project and sustain combat power in a region, while area denial strategies seek to constrain our Nation's freedom of action within the region." 4 This introduction of the anti-access and area denial concern is reflective of the international scope of the document and informs some of the securitization moves discussed below.The anti-access and area denial concept also has direct ties to the strategic shift currently underway and is discussed further in chapter four.Similar to the NSS, the NMS contains a short paragraph relating directly to the This anti-western attitude of the MDRF is muted in its companion security policy document.The current maritime doctrine for the Russian Federation is over a decade old.Published in 2001, the Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation for the Period to 2020 lays out a comprehensive approach to maritime development that both differs from and reflects aspects of the MDRF and the SNSRF.18 The principal difference in the Maritime Doctrine is a more socio-economic focus rather than a military focus.More specific attention is placed upon economic and infrastructure development than the SNSRF or the MDRF.Additionally, the Maritime Doctrine does not contain extensive discussion on military threats or dangers.However, the military aspects of the national security policy agenda that are prevalent in the SNSRF and MDRF are in no way absent from the Maritime Doctrine.In the Maritime Doctrine, the Russian Federation Navy is described as "the main component and basis of the maritime potential of the Russian Federation." 19 intensification of the maritime activity of the Russian Federation." 21 More than a decade ago, Russian rhetoric in security policy documents began to tie the Arctic and the Pacific regions together which serves as an indication that the Russian Federation may become a more significant player in the Pacific region over the next decades. The effectiveness of these regional policies in the Maritime Doctrine is to be measured by three general criteria: the realization of the policy goals, the realization of sovereignty rights and freedom of the seas, and the ability of the military maritime component to protect the interests and security of the Russian Federation. 22 These three measures of effectiveness underscore the generation of securitization moves as a central purpose of this document. Russian Federation provide a foundation to explore specific securitization moves related to the current strategic shifts. As described earlier, the Russian Federation borders each of the regions involved in the US strategic shift. As a result, the border security securitization moves of the Russian Federation must be considered in US policy changes to avoid unintended conflict. 21 President of the Russian Federation, "The Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation to 2020" Article III (2). Author's translation. 22 President of the Russian Federation, "The Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation to 2020". Article V. Border security is one of the principal military threats outlined in the MDRF. 23 The centrality of this concern can be found in the evolution of this securitization move over the past two decades and has led to a conception of the "near abroad" as a region of words, the border security securitization move is not restricted to the immediate border or internal concerns but extends to the near abroad. Border security for the Russian Federation involves nations beyond Russia's borders, namely those nations of the former Soviet Union and where the Russian Federation claims regional influence. The MDRF considers the use of armed force to protect its citizens outside of the borders of the Russian Federation in accordance with international law and international treaties as a legitimate use of the armed forces. 26 These MDRF articles regarding the use of force to protect Russian citizens directly support the securitization move in the in the SNSRF. 27 This securitization move was the very motive claimed by the Russian Federation for its invasion of Georgia in 2008. The Russian Federation had previously issued passports to the population of South Ossetia, a Georgian province, thereby making them citizens. When Georgia attempted to suppress dissidents in the region, the Russian Federation invaded Georgia, claiming the protection of Russian citizens as justification. 28 This action met all four indicators of successful securitization for this particular move. These indicators include people killing each other in organized ways, the spending of large and/or escalating sums on armaments, populations being driven from homes in large numbers, or nations resorting to unilateral actions contrary in discernable ways to international undertakings. 29 The international response has done little to effectively counter Russia's actions. For the United States, the NSS mentions conflict in the Caucasus but both the NSS and the NMS avoid mentioning the nation of Georgia by name. 30 With the securitization of this move largely successful in Georgia, it is important to recognize that it is not confined to the Caucasus. The border securitization established in the Caucasus shows an example of how this securitization move may apply in other surrounding regions. The SNSRF offers the following as solutions to border security: The solution to the problems of security provision for the state border of the Russian Federation is achieved by creating high-technology and multifunctional border complexes, especially on the borders with the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Ukraine, Georgia, and the Azerbaijan Republic, and also by increasing the effectiveness of state border defense, particularly in the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation, the Far East, and in the Caspian sector. 31 In other words, the securitization move of border security extends to all of the regions that surround the Russian Federation. This is also one of the more likely areas of action both in the recent past and the immediate future. Buzan and Waever conclude that "the near abroad is the most obvious arena in which Russia might define a mission." 32 As the United States rebalances strategic emphasis in regions along the borders of the Russian Federation, US policy should seek to find cooperation in the definitions for these Russian missions in the "near abroad." In one of these areas US policy is clearly lacking. There is very little official US security policy in relation to the Arctic region. Both the NSS and the NMS only mention the Arctic once and only in single sentences. The NSS states that "the United States is an Arctic Nation with broad and fundamental interests in the Arctic region, where we seek to meet our national security needs, protect the environment, responsibly manage resources, account for indigenous communities, support scientific research, and strengthen international cooperation on a wide range of issues." 33 This situation has led analysts to conclude that the current US strategic approach lacks focus. The security policy documents barely mention the region and the policy directive is amorphous and confusing. Melissa Bert points out that US policy does not provide guidance to enforce laws and treaties nor does it provide adequate security policy. 36 William Edwards adds that "there is no question that the United States is behind." 37 The United States has not developed any clear securitization moves in the State support for producing icebreakers and coastal infrastructure is also found in The Foundations of Russian Federation Policy in the Arctic until 2020. 46 This policy document further outlines Russian securitization moves in the Arctic. This strategy states that the national interests of the Russian Federation in the Arctic include using the regions as a strategic resource base, preserving peace and cooperation in the Arctic, protecting the Arctic ecology, and guaranteeing the use of the Northern Sea Route. 47 The Russian Federation has already claimed sovereignty over the Northern Sea Route and other areas of the Arctic. 48 50 Bert, "The Arctic Is Now," 12. 51 Bert, "The Arctic Is Now," 2. production is estimated to reach thirty million tons of oil and 130 billion cubic meters of natural gas per year by 2030. 52 With the recognized importance of this region to the Russian Federation's strategic posture, Russia has taken an understandably proactive stance to get ahead of Western initiatives. 53 Border issues and sovereignty rights take center stage as concerns in Russian Arctic policy and the policy clearly states the intent to maintain forces capable of conducting combat operations in the region. 54 In support of this securitization move, the Russian Federation has already created a Spetsnaz brigade for Arctic operations. 55 In the context of these securitization moves and the disparity between the maturation of US and Russian policy, several analysts foresee the Arctic as a region of conflict. Because of the amount of oil and gas in the region, Haas concludes that "the Arctic region is more likely a future area where a clash between Russia and the West might occur." 56 This sentiment is echoed by Sosnin who states that "science in this region is giving way to force" and argues that the Russian Federation will be forced to undertake "moves of a military nature" to back up national interests in the Arctic. 57 This observation may be a result of the condition recognized by Bert that "all of the Arctic coastal states seem to have some military presence there now, even without any real risk of terrorism or highjacking." 58 The Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, does not share in these conclusions. He suggests that "all attempts to pump up emotions and make the arctic look like a conflict-ridden region are dishonest and counter-productive.59 The rhetoric in security policy documents certainly indicates the possibility of conflict.Since the focus of this paper is on securitization moves, it leans more towards that end of the spectrum.However, two very good arguments for why conflict is not likely can be found in Arvid Halvorsen, "When Is Russia Joining NATO? Russian Security Orientation in the Twenty-first Century" (Graduate, Air University, 2010); and Vincent Pouliot, International Security in Practice: The Politics of NATO-Russia Diplomacy, Cambridge Studies in International Relations 113 (Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 218-219, 240-241.62 Klein, "Russia's New Military Doctrine Until 2020: Indecisive Compromise between Traditionalists and Reformers," 4.63 The distinction between a military threat and a military danger were emphasized earlier in the chapter.The definitions are repeated here for convenience.A military danger is defined as a condition of interstate or intrastate relations that are characterized by an aggregation of factors capable in certain conditions of leading to the emergence of a military threat.A military threat is defined as a condition of interstate or intrastate relations that are characterized by the real possibility of an emergence of military conflict between opposing sides and by a high level of readiness of any state (group of states) or separatist (terrorist) organizations to apply military force (armed violence).This hostility towards NATO is certainly not new and seems natural from a historical context.Since the Kosovo crisis in 1999 there has been consistent rhetoric in Russian security policy documents against NATO.66 Shevtsova attributes this to the logic of the political system in the Russian Federation.One of Putin's rhetorical points to achieve power and win his first presidential election in the nineties relied on painting the West as a threat.Thus, Western alienation is necessary to keep the current Russian power system in place.67 Another perspective is offered by Anthony Kurta who argues that Russia does not feel its interests are given due respect in NATO forums.68 The resurgence of a claim on global influence in Russian security policy documents in the Putin and Medvedev eras likewise lends merit to this argument.69 Thus, the hostility of the Russian Federation towards NATO has both internal and external components.previously.This in turn ties the BMD securitization move by the United States to the strategic shifts currently underway.The statements of the NSS and NMS show two aspects to this move.First, the rhetorical intent is to strengthen regional defense.Second, the United States intends to lead the development of this capability.So far, these both of these aspects appear to be achieving success.A 2008 poll showed that 87 percent of Americans support a national missile defense system and 65 percent believe that it should extend to our allies.79 However, the Russian Federation has taken a completely opposite view of the development of BMD systems and has started securitization moves in opposition.President Putin's response to US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty was that "we consider this decision a mistake." 80 The reasons for this opposition start with nuclear weapons and strategic deterrence.Russia has increased reliance on nuclear force for national security as a result of budget constraints.The deployment of missile defense systems by the United States exacerbates this situation.It is already financially difficult for the Russian Federation to sustain its nuclear force and American BMD systems deployed to regions bordering the Eurasian RSC would cause a significant increase in the cost to maintain this foundation of national security.81 As a result, the Russian Federation views BMD as a move by the 80 Moltz, The Politics of Space Security, 269.81 Kurta et al., "The Politics of Vulnerability: China, Russia and US Missile Defense, " 8, 19.defense system, no matter how limited, will give the U.S. and almost 30 percent advantage over the other party in terms of total nuclear potential." 82 Yevgeny Sirotinin also weighs in. He states that nuclear forces "will only be able to act as an instrument of containment if they possess strategic stability . . . to be able to inflict the amount of damage unacceptable to the attacker, however difficult the circumstances." 83 BMD removes that strategic stability from Russian nuclear forces and reduces their ability for containment. A disrupted balance in nuclear deterrence could also extend beyond US-Russian relations. In addition to the Russian belief that BMD would alter the strategic balance in US favor, BMD impact relations between Russia and China. Feasible Chinese responses to BMD could alter the strategic balance between Russia and China, probably in a negative way for Russia. 84 This second order effect of BMD systems on Russian-Chinese relations could also have repercussions that extend to the Asia-Pacific region. Ultimately, the Russian Federation does not believe that BMD systems will reduce proliferation but, rather, support US efforts for a unipolar power structure. 85 The MDRF expands on these securitization moves. BMD is labelled as a primary external military danger to the Russian Federation. 87 The MDRF also emphasizes the importance of the nuclear deterrent to Russian Federation national security. Abandoning any mention of nuclear zero, this document emphasizes that "nuclear weapons will remain an important factor to prevent the outbreak of nuclear military conflicts and military conflicts applying conventional strike means." 88 Furthermore, the MDRF reserves the right of the Russian Federation to use nuclear weapons to counter nuclear or conventional existential threats. 89 One other aspect of the BMD securitization move is related to space weaponization. Joan Johnson-Freese indicates that BMD can easily be transferred into antisatellite capability. In fact, it is technologically easier to hit a satellite than another missile. 90 The Russian security policy documents do not miss this connection. Both the SNSRF and the MDRF raise concern about BMD and space weaponization in the same sentence. 91 This securitization move in the Russian Federation security policy documents reflects the Russian concern regarding shifts in the balance of nuclear weapons, conventional capabilities, and space weaponization. Federation with respect to BMD extend from Europe to Asia. They also link to areas of intended cooperation including nonproliferation and nuclear arms reduction. As a result, the strategic shifts of the United States and the Russian Federation will be impacted by this issue and the directions of these BMD securitization moves must be included in the context. Having discussed the security policy documents of these two nations and some additional securitization moves, it is time to turn to the most recent major security policy statements of the two nations and evaluate additional securitization moves that they develop. In the early months of 2012, the leaders of the Russian Federation and the United States released documents indicating updates to national security policies. In January As the title suggests, "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership" continues the theme in US security policy documents of the United States acting as a leader in the global arena. President Obama clearly states his determination that the United States will emerge from current challenges "even stronger in a manner that preserves American global leadership." 2 The document also notes the leading role of the United States in the international system for the past sixty-five years and indicates a US desire to be "the security partner of choice" with nations throughout the world. 3 In agreement with both the NSS and the NMS, "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership" continues to promote US leadership in international security. In addition to maintaining an international tone, "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership" also reemphasizes several securitization moves from the NSS and NMS. These include preventing nuclear proliferation, countering violent extremism, and the central importance of NATO to European and global security. 4 The mention of these issues that appear as securitization moves in previous documents indicate a continuity for these moves in US security policy. Unfortunately, a negative continuity with security policy documents also exists in "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership." The Arctic is not mentioned in any way. Regarding the Russian Federation specifically, "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership" states that "our engagement with Russia remains important, and we will continue to build a closer relationship in areas of mutual interest and encourage it to be a contributor across a broad range of issues." 5 While recognition of the Russian Federation in "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership" indicates at least a minimal level of consideration in the strategic shift, the guidance remains extremely amorphous and lacks cohesive direction. This ambiguous policy direction is highlighted in contrast with the other broad policy statements in the document for Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America. 6 While these policy statements address an identified weakness in the NSS, which pays scant attention to Europe and Asia in security matters, it provides little guidance with regards to the Russian Federation. 7 Based on the apparent security policies of the Russian Federation, more specific guidance is in order. With his subsequent victory, Putin ensured the opportunity for these objectives to enter the arena of securitization. In these articles Putin emphasizes the need for a strong military establishment, reinforcing the tone of the SNSRF and MDRF. Putin considers it a simple truth that "the Armed Forces must be valued . . . they must be strengthened, otherwise it will become necessary to 'feed a foreign army' or completely surrender to the servitude of bandits and international terrorists." 8 He also argues that "in a world of upheaval there is always the temptation to resolve one's problems at another's expense, through pressure and force." 9 Putin's reasoning reflects the propositions of two Russian military scholars. In 2010, Anatoly Shavayev claimed that "a state's military capacity is one of the most powerful means of attaining political goals." 10 Additionally, Tashlykov indicated that military force is becoming the common method for diffusing crises. 11 Putin's comments lend resonance to these ideas in security policy. Putin also continues the theme that, for the Russian Federation, military power is the solution. "Russia cannot rely on diplomatic and economic methods alone to resolve conflicts.Our country faces the task of sufficiently developing its military potential as part of a deterrence strategy." 12 In justifying this position, Putin lauds the efforts of the military during the decade of economic hardship at the close of the twentieth century. clearly by stating that the national debt is "the single biggest threat to our national security." 21 In other words, the need to transform the military in a way that reduces costs is starting to display the characteristics of a securitization move. This theme of reduced spending and transforming the military into a less expensive force is laced throughout "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership." In discussing US military options for Africa and Latin America, the guidance emphasizes that "wherever possible, we will develop innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives." 22 Additionally, there is a clear emphasis on using non-military means and reducing demand for US forces in stability operations. "U.S. forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations." 23 This appears to be at least a small step back from the assertion in the NSS that states "the United States remains the only nation able to project and sustain large-scale military operations over extended distances ." 24 Despite this apparent small step back, force projection is still to be used for countering area denial and anti-access strategies. In the terms of RSCT, the United States intends to maintain the capability to use penetration and overlay mechanisms to secure its interests in the RSCs surrounding the Russian Federation. A concern with economic interests, growth, and commerce is mentioned several times throughout "Sustaining U.S. Additionally, naval modernization is to focus in part on the Pacific."In this manner, the task of the next decade is inclusive of a new structure for the armed forces that can operate on the principles of new equipment. Equipment that can see farther, shoot more accurately, react quicker, than analogous systems of any potential adversary." 32 Putin clearly raises the need for this military transformation to the level of a securitization move.In explaining the need for military transformation he warns that, without transformation, Russia will definitively lose its military potential."There is only one exit -build a New Army."Additionally, Putin advocates for the resurrection of a 29 Putin, "Being Strong," February 20, 2012.Author's translation.30 Sergei G. Chekinov, "Predicting Trends in Military Art in the Initial Period of the 21st Century," Military Thought 19, no. 3 (2010): 47-48.31 Tashlykov, "General and Particular Features of Present-day Conflicts Involving the U.S. and Its Allies," 67.32 Putin, "Being Strong," February 20, 2012.Author's translation.blue-water navy for the Russian Federation and more robust aerospace defenses.He asserts that "in this question, it is impossible to be too patriotic."In accordance with this conclusion, Putin states the intent to allocate twenty-three trillion rubles to defense spending over the next decade.33 The political history of Russia over the past fifteen years illustrates that the current leadership has consolidated its hold on power.Haas points out that the main power instruments for this current Russian leadership are the military and energy.36 Thus, it is not surprising that Putin securitization moves for both issues in his policy.33 Putin, "Being Strong," February 20, 2012.Author's translation.34 http://www.freecurrencyrates.com/exchange-rate-history/USD-RUB/2012.Accessed 5 January 2013.35 Thane Gustafson argues that in Putin's view "the state remains the engine for growth and progress; the job of the oil industry is simply to provide the fuel for it."The oil industry can play an indispensable role for decades to come as a source of revenue, regional development, and geopolitical influence.37 The United States and the Russian Federation both proclaim rhetorically the intent to cooperate with each other on the international level, particularly in security concerns.However, the securitization moves in the security policy documents of both nations do not support an unequivocal conclusion that such cooperation will actually take place.Some of these securitization moves have been considered in previous chapters.This chapter will consider the potential for cooperation or conflict for these securitization moves and offer some recommendations regarding these securitization moves in the context of the current strategic shift by the United States.However, this cooperation will not be automatic.One of the main obstacles to cooperation in nonproliferation is the issue of missile defense.The subject of missile defense sends cooperation on nonproliferation into a spin.The Russian Federation relies on its nuclear arsenal for strategic stability.Andy Butfoy concludes that, for the United States, Russia will be the yardstick for US nuclear force sizing.6 This creates a condition of mutual reliance on nuclear force sizing.However, as mentioned earlier, this stability is threatened by missile defense systems from the Russian point of view.As Lumpov and Karpov conclude, "the U.S. administration appears to be in no haste to make nuclear cuts that it is going to begin and proceed with only after it is certain that its global strike and global missile defense concepts are well underway." 7 The Russian perception of missile defense systems creating a strategic imbalance will hamper efforts at nonproliferation.As a result of this situation, the United States must proceed carefully.US pursuit of missile defense strengthens the security of allies throughout the world, bolsters homeland defense, and counters anti-access and area denial strategies.8 These are necessary elements of the strategic shift, especially one intended to reduce the cost of defense commitments across multiple regions.But, as Kurta notes, the Russian Federation should be approached first.9 other interstate organizations (the European Union and NATO)." 15 In turn, the NMS states that "we will actively support closer military-to-military relations between the Alliance and Europe's non-NATO nations, some of which have reliably contributed to trans-Atlantic security for decades.," but leaves the non-NATO nations unnamed and does not explore the possibility of interaction between alliance blocks. 16 Recognition of the SCO and CSTO in future US security policy documents would extend outreach that compliments the invitation in the MDRF and indicate a desire for interaction between NATO and "NATO of the East." 17 These moves in security policy can be used to diffuse Russian rhetoric against NATO thereby removing the issue as a securitization move and returning it to the realm of politics. They can also provide a method to strengthen Afghan security in the long term and reinforce multinational efforts against terrorism and violent extremism. Joseph Collins suggest that the Russian Federation "can be helpful in a settlement or it can be a spoiler" with regards to peace in Afghanistan. 18 The United States and NATO need to pursue the former option. NATO and CSTO already cooperate in anti-drug operations in Afghanistan. 19 This effort should be expanded and include the SCO. For the Russian Federation, the CSTO and SCO are the priorities for military-political cooperation. 20 However, expanded engagement of the SCO and CSTO in Afghanistan address specific statements from Russian security policy documents. The MDRF calls for the development of relationships with international organizations that will allow Russian peacekeeping in regions of conflict. 21 Putin himself declared that "the CSTO is ready to fulfill its mission of guaranteeing stability in the Eurasian expanse." 22 While military cooperation may be extremely difficult due to political sensitivities, it should not be dismissed out of hand as a viable option for finding cooperation in the strategic shifts. 23 Involving the regional security alliances in the stabilization of Afghanistan will also relieve tensions in Russian Federation securitization moves regarding its borders. Russian sovereignty has become ingrained in the national psyche. As Shevtsova describes: Today Russia finds itself in a situation where Europe is not prepared to integrate it, and it is not prepared to give up even part of its sovereignty. On the contrary, retaining sovereignty has become the elite's most important tool for retaining power. Even Russian Westernizing liberals do not dare mention that the country might have to give up a portion of its sovereignty to supranational European structures. For the man in the street, the very idea is blasphemous, a betrayal of the Homeland. 24 This view of a strong state is not necessarily viewed askance. As Putin explains, "for Russians a strong state is not an anomaly, which should be got rid of.Quite the contrary, they see it as a source and guarantor of order and the initiator and main driving force of any change." 25 The perceived necessity of a sovereign state reinforces the need for strong border protection, including protection beyond the borders. Indeed, some scholars argue that a central part of the Russian conception of the country is its size. 26 As a result of this conception of the state, the Russian security policy documents call for protecting the rights of Russian citizens abroad and stationing troops outside the borders of the Russian Federation. 27 "Overall, Russia's military doctrine reflects the country's pretence towards acting as a hegemonial power in the post-Soviet region and indicates its readiness to use military power to achieve this goal if necessary." 28 Essentially, this extends into the other nations of the Eurasian RSC as well as the European, Middle Eastern, and Asian RSCs. Buzan and Waever point out that this is not merely expansionist tendency but a determination to play a dominant regional role. "It is unlikely that Russia even under pressure would retreat to a purely internal security agenda." 29 They also conclude that a small, semi-permanent US presence is likely to stimulate formation of independent Central Asian RSC. 30 31 As a result, "the bottom-line strategic threat is that, if Russia is to remain a great power able to both defend itself and to assert some influence globally, it needs to retain its sphere of influence in the CIS." 32 Otherwise, the potential for conflict in this region increases in probability. Due to the emerging importance of the trade routes, such a conflict could quickly spread to the European and Asian RSCs. One of the central reasons for an increased probability of conflict in the Arctic is the rich energy resources in the region. As outlined previously, Russian Federation security policy documents have created a securitization move regarding energy and the exploitation of energy resources constitutes a principal source of power for the current regime. In the economic sector, a lack of state economic regulation is viewed as a threat to economic growth and innovation. 36 The energy situation for Russia is not stable. Thomas Gustafson's analysis is that "Russia is not running out of oil, but it is running out of cheap oil." 37 Somewhat paradoxically, oil and energy resources are a force for political and economic stability in the Russian Federation but also a potential for unrest. 38 To avoid unrest, government policy must be modernized and updated but the oil industry is tempting the government to continue leveraging it for political gain while quashing investment and innovation incentives. 39 Ruchir Sharma points out that this has led to a weak market economy in the Russian Federation. "In recent years, Russia's economy and stock market have been among the weakest of the emerging markets, dominated by an oil-rich class of billionaires whose assets equal 20 percent of GDP, by far the largest share held by the superrich in any major economy" 40 Yet, the incentives for adaptation currently remain low due to high energy prices. 41 Under these circumstances, energy security may be one of the most volatile of the Russian Federation securitization moves. As the energy market develops, the Russian oil industry will have to search for new sources of oil, including the off-shore Arctic area, to prevent a production decline after 2020. 42 Based on this conclusion, the window to resolve security issues in the Arctic is closing fast. Further complications reside in the unwillingness of the Russian Federation to accept that other republics can trade energy resources according to their own desires and that the role of military forces in Russian energy security is increasing at rapid pace. penetration mechanisms in these RSCs, even in the environment of increased defense spending by the Russian Federation. One method for avoiding conflict during the period of military transformation is to develop military-to-military relations at an even deeper level. Currently, these relations are largely confined to the senior levels of leadership. However, anecdotal evidence indicates the potential for highly successful relations and policy dividends when military-to-military relations are conducted at lower levels. 46 Haas also concludes that there is great potential to foster cooperation in this manner. "Since the problems between Russia and the West at the higher political-strategic level are likely to continue, emphasis should be placed at cooperation at the lower, 'grassroots', level." 47 An expansion of military-to-military relations in this manner will create more robust and reliable links for cooperation. Such relations would also meet the NMS criteria that "military-to-military relationships must be reliable to be effective, and persevere through political upheavals or even disruption." 48 President of the United States of America and Secretary of Defense of the United States of America, "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense" (Department of Defense, January 2012), Secretary of Defense Introductory Note. 2 President of the United States of America and Secretary of Defense of the United States of America, "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense," 2. Emphasis in original. Richard L. Kugler, New Directions in U.S. National Security Strategy, Defense Plans, and Diplomacy: A Review of Official Strategic Documents (Washington, D.C.: NDU Press, 2011), 17. Marcel De Haas, Russia's Foreign Security Policy in the 21st Century: Putin, Medvedev and Beyond. (Routledge, 2011), 158. 5 Barry Buzan, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner Pub, 1998), 23. 6 Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, Regions and Powers : A Guide to the Global Security Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 3-4. Buzan, Security, 25.8 Buzan, Security, 23-24.9 Carl von Clausewitz et al., On War (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), 87. Buzan, Security, 26.11 Buzan and Waever, Regions and Powers, 73. Buzan and Waever, Regions and Powers, 55-62. Buzan and Waever, Regions and Powers, 45-47, 61-62.17 Buzan and Waever, Regions and Powers, 52, 81.18 Buzan and Waever, Regions and Powers, 46. 19 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 156-176; Buzan and Waever, Regions and Powers, 55, 265, 288.20 Buzan and Waever, Regions and Powers, 81. President of the United States of America and Secretary of Defense of the United States of America, "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense," 2-3.22 Buzan and Waever, Regions and Powers, 49.23 Buzan and Waever, Regions and Powers, 404.24 Haas, Russia's Foreign Security Policy in the 21st Century, 3.25 Buzan and Waever, Regions and Powers, 75. Lilia Shevtsova, "Russia's Choice: Change or Degradation?," in Can Russia Reform?Economic, Political, and Military Perspectives, ed.Stephen J. Blank, SSI Monograph (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2012), 6.27 Buzan and Waever, Regions and Powers, 398.Emphasis in original.28Buzan and Waever, Regions and Powers, 59.Shevtsova, "Russia's Choice: Change or Degradation?," 6; Robert Kagan, The Return of History and the End of Dreams (New York: Vintage, 2009), 61-62.34 Dmitriĭ Trenin, The End of Eurasia: Russia on the Border Between Geopolitics and Globalization (Washington, D.C: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002), 22.35 Haas, Russia's Foreign Security Policy in the 21st Century, 157.36 Buzan and Waever, Regions and Powers, 73.37 Buzan and Waever, Regions and Powers, 73.Shevtsova, "Russia's Choice: Change or Degradation?," 3.39 Buzan and Waever, Regions and Powers, 406.Shevtsova, "Russia's Choice: Change or Degradation?," 28.41 Buzan and Waever, Regions and Powers, 26.42 Buzan and Waever, Regions and Powers, 87.President of the Russian Federation, "The Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020".Articles 21, 24-25, 28-29, 53-65, and 112.4 President of the Russian Federation, "The Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020".Article 52.Sergei L. Tashlykov, "General and Particular Features of Present-day Conflicts Involving the U.S. and Its Allies," Military Thought 19, no. 3 (2010): 68-69.6 President of the United States of America, "National Security Strategy" (U.S. Government Printing Office, May 2010).Introductory Note.7 Everett C. Dolman, Astropolitik: Classical Geopolitics in the Space Age, Cass Series--Strategy and History (London ; Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2002), 6.This reference identifies the emphasis of socio-economic factors in democracy as a well-established principle in political science.8 Richard L. Kugler, New Directions in U.S. National Security Strategy, Defense Plans, and Diplomacy: A Review of Official Strategic Documents (Washington, D.C.: NDU Press, 2011), 18.9 President of the United States of America, "National Security Strategy", Introductory Note.President of the United States of America, "National Security Strategy," 22.11 Kugler, New Directions in U.S. National Security Strategy, Defense Plans, and Diplomacy, 14.12 President of the United States of America, "National Security Strategy," 12.13 President of the United States of America, "National Security Strategy," 1, 17.President of the Russian Federation, "The Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020".Article 21.15 Mark Galeotti, "Reform of the Russian Military and Security Apparatus: An Investigator's Perspective," in Can Russia Reform?Economic, Political, and Military Perspectives, ed.Stephen J. Blank, SSI Monograph (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2012), 66.16 Lilia Shevtsova, "Russia's Choice: Change or Degradation?," in Can Russia Reform?Economic, Political, and Military Perspectives, ed.Stephen J. Blank, SSI Monograph (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2012), 6-7.17 Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, Regions and Powers : A Guide to the Global Security Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 405.President of the Russian Federation, "The Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020".Article 8.Author's translation.19 President of the Russian Federation, "The Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020".Article 1.President of the United States of America, "National Security Strategy," 40-50.20 President of the United States of America, "National Security Strategy," 2, 12-13; President of the Russian Federation, "The Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020".Article 18.21 President of the United States of America, "National Security Strategy," 2, 22, 40-42, 48.22 President of the Russian Federation, "The Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020".Articles 8 and 17.President of the Russian Federation, "The Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020".Article 13.Author's translation.24 President of the United States of America, "National Security Strategy," 22.25 President of the Russian Federation, "The Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020".Article 9 and 10.Author's translation.26 Marcel De Haas, Russia's Foreign Security Policy in the 21st Century: Putin, Medvedev and Beyond.(Routledge, 2011), 17.27 President of the Russian Federation, "The Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020".Article 9.28 Buzan and Waever, Regions and Powers, 405.President of the United States of America, "National Security Strategy".Introductory note.30President of the Russian Federation, "The Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020".Article 24.31 President of the Russian Federation, "The Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020".Article 13.32 President of the United States of America, "National Security Strategy," 2, 48.President of the United States of America, "National Security Strategy," 23; President of the Russian Federation, "The Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020".Articles 30, 90, 92, and 94-95.34 President of the Russian Federation, "The Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020".Article 6.Author's translation.35 President of the Russian Federation, "The Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020", Article 112.President of the Russian Federation, "The Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020".Article 11.Author's translation.37 Steven Rosefielde, "The Impossibility of Russian Economic Reform: Waiting for Godot," in Can Russia Reform?Economic, Political, and Military Perspectives, ed.Stephen J. Blank, SSI Monograph (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2012), 37-59.Haas, Russia's Foreign Security Policy in the 21st Century, 15-82.This extensive discussion of Putin's security policies between the years 2000 and 2008 are nicely summarized by Table 1.2 on pages 25-29.39 Haas, Russia's Foreign Security Policy in the 21st Century, 159.40 President of the Russian Federation, "The Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020".Article 18.Author's translation.Kugler, New Directions in U.S. National Security Strategy, Defense Plans, and Diplomacy, 2.42 Kugler, New Directions in U.S. National Security Strategy, Defense Plans, and Diplomacy, 1.President of the United States of America, "National Security Strategy," 7, 17.44 President of the United States of America, "National Security Strategy," 18-28.45 President of the United States of America, "National Security Strategy," 44.46 President of the United States of America, "National Security Strategy," 44.President of the United States of America, "National Security Strategy," 44.48 See Appendix A for the author's comprehensive list of securitization moves in the two national security strategies.Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge [u.a.]: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2006), 96.50 President of the United States of America, "National Security Strategy," 5, 35.President of the United States of America, "National Security Strategy," 38.52 President of the Russian Federation, "The Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020".Articles 1, 80, and 81.53 President of the Russian Federation, "The Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020" Articles 52 and 82-84.Author's translation.President of the United States of America, "National Security Strategy," 44; President of the Russian Federation, "The Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020".Article 18.Beene, Kubiak, and Colton, "U.S., Russia and the Global War on Terror: 'Shoulder to Shoulder' into Battle?," 211-214.62 President of the Russian Federation, "The Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020".Articles 1, 10, 18, 36-38, 40, 41, 43, and 104.This analysis is based on translating the Russian words экстремизм and терроризм as extremism and terrorism respectively.The Russian words are cognates.63 President of the United States of America, "National Security Strategy," 3, 4, 8, 11-12, 15, 18, 20, 24, 26, 36-37, 42-44, 48.Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2011: Redefining America's Military Leadership" (Department of Defense, February 8, 2011), 10.2 President of the United States of America, "National Security Strategy" (U.S. Government Printing Office, May 2010), 7 These interests were listed previously in chapter two.3 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "National Military Strategy of the United States of America," 4.Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "National Military Strategy of the United States of America," 8.5 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "National Military Strategy of the United States of America," 13.6 President of the United States of America, "National Security Strategy," 31.President of the Russian Federation, "The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation" (Kremlin, February 5, 2010), http://news.kremlin.ru/ref_notes/461/print.Articles 6(a), 6(b), and 6(c).Author's translation.8 President of the Russian Federation, "The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation".Articles 17-18.Yevgeny S. Sirotinin, "Containing Aggression in the Context of the New Russian Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation," Military Thought 19, no. 2 (2010): 8.9 President of the Russian Federation, "The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation".Articles 9, 34(bc), 39-45.Sergei L. Tashlykov, "General and Particular Features of Present-day Conflicts Involving the U.S. and Its Allies," Military Thought 19, no. 3 (2010): 62, 66, and 68.18 Although the Maritime Doctrine is over a decade old, it is the governing policy document for naval forces as listed on the web page of the Security Council of the Russian Federation as of 27 May 2013.This web page is found at http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/sections/3/.President of the Russian Federation, "The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation".Articles 20 and 27(j).27President of the Russian Federation, "The Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020" (Security Council of the Russian Federation, May 12, 2009), http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/99.html.Article 38.28 "Russian Federation: Legal Aspects of War in Georgia," Research, Library of Congress, August 8, 2012, http://www.loc.gov/law/help/russian-georgia-war.php.29Buzan and Waever, Regions and Powers, 73.President of the United States of America, "National Security Strategy," 42.31 President of the Russian Federation, "The Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020".Article 42.Author's translation.32Buzan and Waever, Regions and Powers, 404, 408.President of the United States of America, "National Security Strategy," 50.34 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "National Military Strategy of the United States of America," 11.35 President of the United States of America, "NSPD-66/HSPD-25: Arctic Region Policy" (The White House, January 9, 2009).Vassily I. Sosnin, "The Arctic: A Complex Knot of Interstate Differences," Military Thought 19, no. 3 (2010): 3; Bert, "The Arctic Is Now," 5-6.41 A description of the British use of these two ports can be found in Clifford Kinvig, Churchill's Crusade: The British Invasion ofRussia, 1918-1920 New York: Hambledon Continuum, 2006).This account also provides information about operating around ice seasons at these ports.With ice receding, their ability to handle cargo and channel it south will only increase.42Bert, "The Arctic Is Now," 6.43 Bert, "The Arctic Is Now," 7, 13-14.President of the Russian Federation, "The Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020".Articles 11, 42, and 62.Sosnin, "The Arctic: A Complex Knot of Interstate Differences," 3.53 Haas, Russia's Foreign Security Policy in the 21st Century, 128.Haas, Russia's Foreign Security Policy in the 21st Century, 25-29.67 Shevtsova, "Russia's Choice: Change or Degradation?," 17.68 Anthony M. Kurta et al., "The Politics of Vulnerability: China, Russia and US Missile Defense" (Harvard University, 2001), 19; Pouliot, International Security in Practice, 174-182.69 Haas, Russia's Foreign Security Policy in the 21st Century, 25-27.Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "National Military Strategy of the United States of America," 12.74 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "National Military Strategy of the United States of America," 5.Jim Garamone, "Obama: Defense Strategy Will Maintain U.S. Military Pre-eminence," American Forces Press Service, January 5, 2012, http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=66683.President of the United States of America and Secretary of Defense of the United States of America, "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense" (Department of Defense, January 2012), Presidential Introductory Note.3 President of the United States of America and Secretary of Defense of the United States of America, "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense," 1, 3.4 President of the United States of America and Secretary of Defense of the United States of America, "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense," 2-3.President of the United States of America and Secretary of Defense of the United States of America, "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense," 3.6 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2011: Redefining America's Military Leadership" (Department of Defense, February 8, 2011), Introductory Note, 2-3, 13.7 The failure of the NSS to adequately address security concerns in Europe and Asia is pointed out in Richard L. Kugler, New Directions in U.S. National Security Strategy, Defense Plans, and Diplomacy: A Review of Official Strategic Documents (Washington, D.C.: NDU Press, 2011), 16..Author's translation.Putin, "Being Strong," February 20, 2012.14 Putin, "Being Strong," February 21, 2012.15 Putin, "Being Strong," February 20, 2012.Author's translation.Putin, "Being Strong," February 21, 2012.17 Putin, "Being Strong," February 21, 2012; Putin, "Being Strong," February 20, 2012.Author's translation.18Putin, "Being Strong," February 20, 2012.Author's translation.19Putin, "Being Strong," February 20, 2012.Author's translation.President of the United States of America and Secretary of Defense of the United States of America, "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense," Introductory Note, 1.Geoff Colvin, Admiral Mike Mullen: Debt is Still Biggest Threat to U.S. Security, Web Page, May 10, 2012, http://management.fortune.cnn.com/2012/05/10/admiral-mike-mullen/.22 President of the United States of America and Secretary of Defense of the United States of America, "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense," 3.Emphasis in original.23 President of the United States of America and Secretary of Defense of the United States of America, "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense," 6.24 President of the United States of America, "National Security Strategy" (U.S. Government Printing Office, May 2010), 17.President of the United States of America and Secretary of Defense of the United States of America, "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense," 2-5.Emphasis in original.26 President of the United States of America and Secretary of Defense of the United States of America, "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense," 4-5.Emphasis in original.27 President of the United States of America and Secretary of Defense of the United States of America, "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense," 6-9.28 Putin, "Being Strong," February 20, 2012.Author's translation.Thane Gustafson, "Putin's Petroleum Problem: How Oil Is Holding Russia Back -and How It Could Save It," Foreign Affairs 91, no. 6 (December 2012): 93.Lilia Shevtsova, "Russia's Choice: Change or Degradation?," in Can Russia Reform?Economic, Political, and Military Perspectives, ed.Stephen J. Blank, SSI Monograph (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2012), 19.2 Steven Rosefielde, "The Impossibility of Russian Economic Reform: Waiting for Godot," in Can Russia Reform?Economic, Political, and Military Perspectives, ed.Stephen J. Blank, SSI Monograph (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2012), 50.3 Robert Kagan, The Return of History and the End of Dreams (New York: Vintage, 2009), 61.President of the United States of America and Secretary of Defense of the United States of America, "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense" (Department of Defense, January 2012), 3, 5.5 Anthony M. Kurta et al., "The Politics of Vulnerability: China, Russia and US Missile Defense" (Harvard University, 2001), 60.Jacques Gansler, Ballistic Missile Defense: Past and Future (Charleston: CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2012), x.12 Lumpov and Karpov, "On the U.S. New Strategic Triad," 149.13 President of the United States of America and Secretary of Defense of the United States of America, "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense," 3.Haas, Russia's Foreign Security Policy in the 21st Century, 162, 180.24 Shevtsova, "Russia's Choice: Change or Degradation?," 31.25 As quoted in Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, Regions and Powers : A Guide to the Global Security Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 407.26 Buzan and Waever, Regions and Powers, 407.Bert, "The Arctic Is Now," 2-3, 15-16.35 William Edwards, "Our Arctic Strategy Deficit," Blog, The New Atlanticist, March 8, 2013, http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/our-arctic-strategy-deficit.Gustafson, "Putin's Petroleum Problem," 89.43 Haas, Russia's Foreign Security Policy in the 21st Century, 161.The author spent four months fostering lower level military-to-military relations in a nation that previously belonged to the Soviet Union.These relations proved to be of immense value to United States diplomats during subsequent diplomatic negotiations with this nation.47	out a "strategic turning point" that includes the intent for a "global presence emphasizing the Asia-Pacific and the Middle East while still ensuring our ability to maintain our defense commitments to Europe, and strengthening alliances and partnerships across all regions."1 While comprehensive in its scope, this statement does list three global regions specifically: the Asia-Pacific, the Middle East, and Europe.Naturally, with these regions explicitly mentioned, the attention of strategists has turned to the security dynamics of these areas.However, these three regions also describe an arc that revolves around one nationthe Russian Federation.From a geopolitical standpoint, the Russian Federation thus becomes the hinge of the United States' strategic turning point.As the United States pursues the intent that "we will of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region ," 2 US strategists must consider the changing strategic environment of the Russian Federation to avoid unhinging this strategic turning point.An absence of consideration for Russian security developments creates contextual gaps and increased risk for US security strategy and policy.3 Federation.At first glance, an analysis of security policy documents and statements from politicians would seem to be an exercise in exploring propaganda rather than identifying areas of potential cooperation or conflict.After all, these documents and statements are targeted messages for both domestic and international audiences and are authored to promote certain purposes.However, promotion of purpose is the value to be found in analyzing these documents.As Michael Haas puts it, "although security documents are highly declamatory and often propagandistic . . .they are of value in assessing Moscow's security policy of today and tomorrow ."4 Two theoretical tools created by Barry Buzan and Ole Waever provide a mechanism for exploring the ways in which security policy documents inform the identification of cooperation and conflict.The first of these tools is the concept of securitization or the process of migrating issues to the security sphere.5 Securitization moves provide the bridge between political rhetoric and potential for cooperation or conflict.The second tool is Regional Security Complex Theory or RSCT, a regional level of analysis in international relations between the domestic and global levels of analysis.6 RSCT provides the appropriate level of analysis based on the regional dynamics of the US turning point.Although reflective of the global nature of US strategic concern, the rebalance is among regional focus. "Sustaining Global Leadership" outlines general US policy intentions in the regions of Europe, the Middle East, and The Pacific.These regions surround the Russian Federation which suggests that regional analysis is the appropriate level for examining the dynamics between securitization moves by the Russian Federation and the United States.Analyzing the security documents of the Russian Federation and the United States through these two theoretical tools identify areas of potential security cooperation or potential security conflict between these two nations.The approach used here begins with a description of the theoretical tools used in the analysis.Following this explanation, subsequent chapters analyze the principal security documents of the United States and Russian Federation and the securitization moves found in these documents that are most closely linked to the regions involved in the US strategic shift.First, the two most recent national security strategies are examined as a baseline to determine the issues likely to be securitization moves by each nation.Next, the military doctrines of the two nations are examined to identify the ways in which these documents amplify or inform the securitization moves in the national security documents.Finally, recent security documents and policy papers from the two nations are examined to identify any new directions or securitization moves and any continuity of issues from previous documents.Following this analysis, a conclusion identifies some of the areas of potential conflict and cooperation, presents some observations and recommendations for US policy and indicates areas for further exploration as the United States executes the rebalance.Securitization is defined as "the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with a saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects."7 An issue becomes securitized when "the issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure."8 In a basic sense, securitization is taking politics to the next level or bridging the gap between war -"a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means" -and politics without violence.9 For securitization to be successful it must include: the perceived reality of existential threats, a call for emergency action or undertaking such action, and effect on relations by breaking free of norms or rules.From these three criteria, "the distinguishing feature of securitization is a specific rhetorical structure."10 The rhetorical nature of securitization is suggestive of security policy documents.Security policy documents cannot be viewed, however, as successful securitization in and of themselves.Successful securitization of an issue includes the following indicators: people killing each other in organized ways, the spending of large and/or escalating sums on armaments, populations being driven from homes in large numbers, or nations resorting to unilateral actions contrary in discernable ways to international undertakings.11 Obviously, these are not indicators from security policy documents.The feature of securitization in security policy documents then becomes securitization's antecedentthe securitizing move.A securitizing move is simply an attempt to securitize an issue.It is the discourse that presents an issue as an existential threat.It is the initial step in transitioning an issue from the realm of politics without violence towards securitization.The issue is securitized "when the audience accepts it as such" and begins to legitimize emergency measures to deal with it.The discussion of an issue in a security policy document can be interpreted as a securitization move.In security policy documents, issues are presented in a rhetorical and propagandistic context to indicate that they are not merely politics but issues of potential securitization.In subsequent chapters, an analysis of the security policy documents of the United States and the Russian Federation identifies the securitization moves of each country that interact in the regions of Europe, the Middle East, the Pacific, and the Arctic.The process of securitization moves presents a consideration in the second analytical tool used in the analysis of this paper, RSCT.Securitization moves "can easily upset orders of mutual accommodation among units."12 On the interregional level then, securitizing moves create imbalance among neighboring regions.These securitization moves need to be analyzed in relation to each other at the regional level as suggested by RSCT.global security concerns and domestic security concerns.Establishing this level of analysis seeks to distinguish between system interplay of global powers and subsystem interplay of lesser powers. "To paint a proper portrait of global security, one needs to understand both of these levels independently, as well as the interaction between them."RSCT paints its portion of the portrait by creating a blend between materialist and constructivist approaches.The materialist elements of the approach include the acceptance of bounded territoriality and the analysis of power distribution.The constructivist elements of the approach include consideration of the political process in security issues, or securitization.13 RSCT divides the globe into groups of Regional Security Complexes or RSCs.RSCs are defined as "a set of units whose major processes of securitisation, desecuritisation, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another."14 RSCs are categorized into four types: standard, centered, great power, and supercomplexes.The Russian Federation is located 12 Buzan, Security, 26.13 Buzan and Waever, Regions and Powers, 4, 27-30.14 Buzan and Waever, Regions and Powers, 44 .Several authors whose work is cited in this study are European and use British spelling conventions for the English language.In this work, these authors' spelling will be conserved in direct quotes but the American spelling convention will be used outside of these direct quotes.in the post-Soviet RSC, relabeled here as the Eurasian RSC, and the United States in the North American RSC.Both of these RSCs are classified as centered RSCs meaning that the RSC is unipolar in the security sense and dominated by either a superpower (North American RSC) or a great power (Eurasian RSC).The other three regions identified in "Sustaining Global Leadership" fall into the European centered RSC, the Middle Eastern standard RSC, and the Asian supercomplex RSC.These classifications provide the starting point for analyzing interregional and intraregional security dynamics.15 In analyzing these dynamics RSCT utilizes several variables.The first of these is the patterns of amity and enmity present within the region.These patterns reflect the influence of historical and cultural dynamics on security interdependence and are best understood by expanding analysis in both the global and domestic directions.Another variable is the interplay of the international anarchic structure with the regional balance of power pressures and geographic proximity pressures.This interplay is a dependent variable for RSC formation but also includes subordinate mechanisms of adjacency, penetration, and overlay.Adjacency is the concept that simple geographic proximity increases security interaction.Penetration is the condition of outside powers creating security alignments with nations within an RSC.Penetration is facilitated by regional balance of power dynamics that create the space for outside actors to influence security concerns.This then links the regional security patterns into global security concerns.Overlay is a mechanism that goes beyond penetration and occurs when outside security concerns are so pervasive and overwhelming that local or regional security patterns cease operating.Overlay usually results from great power rivalry alignments with the permanent presence of external great powers' armed forces as a symptom of this mechanism.16 These variables and mechanisms provide RSCT's tools for analysis.RSCT asserts that the regional level will always play a role in security analysis, occasionally a dominant one.As mentioned above, one of RSCT's central purposes is to separate global and regional security concerns for analysis of their interaction.17 This is of particular importance in a comparative analysis between US and Russian policies.The US rebalance involves regions that it is not a part of in RSCT.The United States lacks adjacency and, as an outside influence, has the ability to withdraw.However, "superpowers by definition largely transcend the logic of geography and adjacency in their security relationships."18 The United States, despite illustrating many of the symptoms of a declining superpower as identified by Robert Gilpin, is the only current superpower as defined by RSCT.19 This creates both challenges and advantages.At the RSCT level, US influence is largely confined to penetration and overlay attemptsthe mechanisms that compensate for its lack of adjacency.This also facilitates choice, "and this choice underpins a whole range of policy options not possessed by actors that are really 'in' their regions. "20 When viewed through the lens of RSCT, the January 2012 US strategic turning point represents an adjustment of penetration and overlay mechanisms in the RSCs where the United States is exerting external influence.The rebalance includes increased interregional dynamics.This increase is illustrated in the shifting levels of penetration in US security policy and the potential for rivalry between China and the United States to induce overlay in East Asia.21 RSCT indicates that "strong instances of interregional dynamics may be indicators of external transformation (merger) of RSCs."22 Thus, the dynamics introduced by the US turning point can transform all the RSCs surrounding the Eurasian RSC.Likewise, shifts in levels of penetration attempts from the Russian Federation can influence the dynamics for US attempts in these regions.In contrast to the United States, the Russian Federation is not a superpower.However, it is the great power of the centered Eurasian RSC.This has ramifications for the U.S. policy shift as, "in a centred region, the factors that drive the foreign policy of the dominant regional power are obviously of special importance."23 Since 1991 and the collapse of the Soviet Union, security policy development in the Russian Federation has displayed four general characteristics as identified by Michael Haas: a fear of the alien or being surrounded by enemies, a desire for security buffer zones, a feeling of superiority, and a tradition of servitude to the state with no heritage of democracy.24 The interregional dynamics between the Eurasian RSC and the neighboring RSCs will be strongly influenced by Russian security policy, even at the domestic level.As Buzan and Waever point out, "especially in centered RSCs, it will very often be the domestic struggle over security in the central state that determines major developments."25 However, within the Russian Federation, the domestic struggle for security is strongly tied to international relations.International recognition is key to the Russian Federation's identity and connects international and domestic roles.This is primarily through the leadership coterie of the Russian Federation that has maintained power for the last two decades.As Lilia Shevtsova points out, the Russian foreign policy "aim remains to keep in place a personalized power system."26 Thus, for the leadership of the Russian Federation "the global arena is today much more important than Europe for Russia's attempts both to secure a larger role outside its region and to legitimize its regional empire."27 The Russian Federation has a strong impetus to leverage interregional dynamics for advantage at both the global and domestic levels and motivation to find opportunities in shifting regional dynamics.Despite the importance of the Russian Federation's position as the central state in its RSC, there are limitations to how this position can be leveraged at other levels.Specifically, the Russian Federation faces a problem in that conflict within its own RSC can weaken its power in relation to other global powers.28 So, not only do shifting regional dynamics offer opportunities for advantage to the Russian Federation, they also pose threats to its regional dominance and power status.With the connection to domestic politics mentioned above, these threats can easily be perceived as existential.As a result, the United States must be careful to analyze how the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific shifts perceptions of threat.As the Congressional Strategic Posture Commission concludes, "Russian and the United States are certainly not enemies but neither are they allies.The two are strategic partners on some important international questions, but strategic competitors on others. "29 In Buzan and Waever's RSCT analysis, they characterize the Russian Federation as unlikely to reemerge as a major player in East Asia due to domestic challenges.30 They explain this conclusion by illustrating that since the Japanese defeat of Russia in 1904 Russia in -1905 , the Soviet Union and Russian Federation have not concentrated on Asia as a primary arena.They further use this reasoning to Russia from East Asia in RSCT terms.31 In their analysis then, the importance of the Russian Federation and the Eurasian RSCT is diminished in the analysis of the Asian supercomplex.In the context of the US strategic turning point, the Russian Federation would then occupy a place of minor importance for the target RSC of the rebalance.However, there are several developing conditions that can influence this analysis in a different direction.Buzan and Waever recognize the first of these conditions, the relationship between the Russian Federation and China.Their analysis recognizes the challenges importance of Russian and Chinese adjacency, demographics, trade, and regional security alliances.Nevertheless, they characterize the interregional relationship as weak.32 In the light of the US strategic turning point, this characterization must be reconsidered.Russian relations with China in the issues listed above can have significant impact if the US rebalance to the Asia-Pacific develops a condition of overlay within the East Asian RSC subcomplex.The Russian Federation would become a key consideration, especially in connection with its Chinese security alliances, if the United States and China entered into a rivalry condition of sufficient strength to induce overlay in the Asia-Pacific region.Another condition is the emergence of the Arctic as a strategic consideration.The Arctic will be discussed in greater detail in chapter three but is introduced here as one In addition to adjacency and the emerging Arctic, there is an institutional condition that suggests Russian involvement in any US strategic moves involving neighboring regions.Shevtsova points out there is an inclination for the Russian Federation to oppose US strategic initiatives from the constraints of international prestige mentioned above.The Russian personalized power system is inherently hostile to liberal democracies, especially neighboring democracies, regardless of whether cooperation or confrontation is pursued with western powers.33 This condition suggests Russian involvement of some kind in the neighboring regions will occur through either cooperation or conflict.Finally, "Russia is a geographical concept."34 As such, geopolitics is a condition that plays a large role in Russian foreign policy and increases sensitivity to interregional dynamics that influence the perceived sphere of influence. "A continuing line in Russian external policy has always been that Russia has a legitimate influence in the former Soviet area, in which other actors, such as the West, would not be tolerated."35 In essence, the Russian Federation considers its regional power and influence as more than simply politics but as a securitization move.These securitization moves become a central element in the analysis of these interregional dynamics.In RSCT, "it is really the relationships (the moves) that tie [securitization] together, not the particular referent objects."36 In this case, the rebalancing of strategic concerns currently underway in the United States and the strategic developments underway in the Russian Federation are relationship adjustments or the securitizing moves that really matter in RSCT securitization.In this case, RSCT suggests that security connectedness should be analyzed in three steps: successful securitization of the issue by an actor, identification of links and interactions from this securitization, collection of links and interactions into a set of interconnected security concerns.37 In the following chapters, the securitization moves rather than actual securitization are analyzed to identify the elements of these steps already apparent.As an analysis of security policy documents, the first step of the RSCT analytical approach will often not be present.The issues are still securitization moves and the focus will be on the second step, links and interactions within the securitization moves.In some cases, issues have already been successfully securitized in one region but remain as securitization moves in other regions.The modified purpose then becomes to identify collections of links and interactions into sets of interconnected securitization move concerns rather than purely security concerns.Prior to that analysis, some relevant, general parameters of Russian securitization moves are reviewed for context.There are two general aspects of Russian securitization moves that are born out in the following, more specific analysis.First, Russian securitization moves are rooted in a confrontational heritage.Shevtsova points out that "after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Kremlin abandoned the doctrine of total military confrontation with the West, but retained aspects and symbols of militarism, which still often impose their logic on the current system."38 This symbolic logic, inherited from the Cold War regime, lends a historical weight to Russian securitization moves that may not be fully appreciated in western circles.The second general aspect of Russian securitization moves is the nature of the current political leadership.As mentioned above, the ties between domestic and international issues run through the leadership coterie. "In a quasi-imperial structure like Russia's . . .one always has to give highest priority to the inner circles because their health is the precondition for that of the next circle outward."39 Basically, in Russia's structure, the domestic concern gains high priority because of the state power structure itself is securitized.This securitization is then projected outward to regional and global levels.There is high probability that Russian leadership would try to use foreign policy as a tool in a crisis or power struggle.For current conditions, Shevtsova warns that "in any case, the current 'reset' should not make either Russia or the outside world complacent . . .The honeymoon can continue only if the Western powers accept the Russian way of dealing with the world."40 These two general aspects of Russian securitization moves suggest a difficult environment to conduct a strategic rebalance.On the other hand, RSCT embraces that "leaders and peoples have considerable freedom to determine what they do and do not define as security threats."41 The material found in the following national security strategies and policy documents helps identify these definitions and lists those issues or concerns that national and military leadership are using as securitizing moves.Thus, while the ability of the United States or the Russian Federation to realize the ambitions declared in their security documents is certainly suspect, the existence of these topics in the security policy documents indicates a securitization move in that issue and the subsequent possibility of successful securitization.This analysis seeks to recognize the "patterns [that] emerge from the fact that different actors securitise differently" or rather create securitization moves differently.42 The United States and the Russian Federation use similar documents to outline their national security policy.Both nations produce a governing security document that is then further refined through military strategies, doctrine, and political statements.These documents as a whole can be viewed as part of the process of creating a securitization move and indicate the issues that a nation is more likely to securitize.Based on the policy document structure that both nations utilize, the governing security documents provide the analytical starting point for determining these securitization moves.This chapter examines the United States and Russian Federation national security strategies through comparative analysis to identify the securitization moves with links and interaction to the US strategic rebalance.The analysis of the Russian Federation national security policy is intentionally more in depth to provide context.Some of the securitization moves that are identified will be analyzed in this chapter to illustrate that the issue has relevant connection between these two nations in the current strategic environment.Other moves will be discussed in greater detail in subsequent chapters since the securitization moves for these issues are magnified by subordinate policy documents or recent political statements.focus, and the intended forums for international discourse highlight the differences between the two strategies.Conversely, a focus on domestic reform, the importance of international institutions and law, and the rhetorical attitudes towards weapons proliferation highlight similarities in strategic approaches to securitization moves.1 The SNSRF and NSS exhibit very different tones regarding the use of military force.The SNSRF is focused primarily on the military instrument of national power.This may merely reflect the fact that the Russian Federation also issues separate policy documents for foreign policy and socio-economic policy.1 These areas of similarity and difference help to establish categories for the securitization moves found within these documents.This classification structure is used in Appendix A to organize a more complete list of securitization moves found in the national security strategies.The conception of the military instrument of power as the primary means of security also finds voice in the Russian academic security policy community.In an article discussing present US conflicts, the United States is blamed for the emergence of unilateral use of force in international relations.The conclusion drawn mirrors the implicit tone of the SNSRF. "It can thus be stated that only real force is recognized in the world today, a force based on a vast economic potential and battle-worthy armed forces."5 In broad terms then, the SNSRF treats the armed forces as the solution to national security.In contrast, the NSS has a greater focus on the socio-economic instruments of national power. "Simply put, we must see American innovation as a foundation of American power."6 This is not a surprising point of view for a liberal democracy.7 Extensive discussion of economic, diplomatic, and information strategies dominate the NSS with comments about the need to maintain an effective military force filling an almost ancillary role.8 These ancillary statements about military force are also qualified when they appear. "Our Armed Forces will always be a cornerstone of our security, but they must be complimented."9 "Military force, at times, may be necessary to defend our country and allies . . .while the use of force is sometimes necessary, we will exhaust other options before war whenever we can."10 In tone, the NSS implies that, for the United States, military force is a reluctant necessity.Another major difference between these two security documents is in the regional and domestic focus of the SNSRF compared to the global focus of the NSS.The global focus of the NSS can be seen in the discussion of concerns throughout the globe and the US role at the international level.11 The NSS addresses concerns for over forty nations by name throughout the document.Seventeen regional and international organizations are also included by name with accompanying discussion of US intentions within their framework.In agreement with this global focus, the NSS identifies common challenges that require international cooperation.These include violent extremism, nuclear proliferation, climate change, and the global economy.12 In addition to the nations, multinational organizations, and international cooperation issues named in the document, the NSS lays out a clear intent for the United States to maintain global leadership.This intent is extended to the realm of international security.The NSS states that "the United States of America will continue to underwrite global security" and "we embrace America's unique responsibility to promote international security."13 In contrast, the SNSRF focuses more on the regional dynamics for Russian Federation security policy.The SNSRF does state the long term goal of establishing the Russian Federation as a world power; however, the document maintains a regional focus, rarely discussing concerns beyond immediate border areas.14 As Mark Galeotti observes "while on the one hand, the 2010 doctrine embodies a grudging retreat from claims to a truly global status, on the other, it articulates a much sharper and arguably more aggressive assertion of its regional power status and, indeed, its claims to hegemony in post-Soviet Eurasia."15 Shevtsova claims that this is a reflection of a longstanding trend in Russian politics.Foreign and security policies have to pursue contradictory paths.For the outside, these policies have to create the image of Russia as a modern and responsible European state.For the inside, foreign policy has to supply constant justification for the "Besieged Fortress" mentality and secure rejection of the Western standards by the Russian society.This "driving two horses in opposite directions" is actually the agenda of Russian foreign and security policies that the Kremlin has been pursuing with great skill during the last 10 years…One could risk the conclusion that the Kremlin foreign and security policies are more influenced by domestic needs than by the logic of international relations.16 Buzan and Waever also identify this phenomenon as a primary security threat at the domestic level.A lack of recognition or a lack of a respectable international role is a threat to state identity and, therefore, has significant play at the domestic level.17 This domestic influence is further shown by the content of the SNSRF.Where the NSS discusses over forty nations by name the SNSRF discusses only six: the United States of America, Ukraine, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and the European Union.Of these nations, all share a border with the Russian Federation except the United States.Additionally, the SNSRF discusses several domestic regions by name while the NSS does not list any domestic units.States.The last of these seven, the WTO, is an international organization that currently includes both nations although, at the time the NSS and SNSRF were authored, Russia was not a member.These differences in multinational organizations discussed in the documents reinforce the regional focus of the SNSRF.The SNSRF also specifically identifies a growing trend of regional influence in conflict resolution. "A tendency is developing to seek resolutions to existing problems and regulate crisis situations on a regular basis without the participation of non-regional powers."18 In other words, regions can handle conflict themselves without the intervention of global powers.In summary, the United States views globalization as an opportunity while the Russian Federation views globalization as a threat.19 There is also a noticeable difference in the international forums that the two nations intend to use in advancing national security.As discussed above, there is little overlap between the documents in named multinational organizations.Of the four overlapping organizations, two of them are economic forums.The UN then becomes the only international forum that both recognize as legitimate for tackling regional and international security concerns.20 Beyond the UN, there is sharp divergence in recognition by name of legitimate international forums.NATO is viewed as a forum for addressing international security concerns in the NSS.21 However, NATO expansion and its assumption of global roles are considered a threat in the SNSRF.22 This securitization move will be discussed in greater depth in chapter three but the divergence itself is an important difference between the two documents.The different organizations in the SNSRF discussed above indicate a further divergence.This divergence shows an intent on the part of the Russian Federation, in pursuit of its national security objectives, to use multinational forums that exclude the United States.Explicitly, "the Collective Security Treaty Organization is regarded in the capacity of the main intergovernmental instrument called to stand against regional challenges and threats of a military-political or military-strategic character."23 Based on this analysis, the stated intent of the two nations is to work mainly through multinational forums at the regional level that currently exclude the participation of the other nation.In addition to the differences in multinational organizations, the two documents also discuss unilateral and multilateral action.The NSS reserves the right of the United States to use unilateral force but uses language to frame this use of force within the norms of international law.24 The SNSRF, however, considers the unilateral use of force to have a negative influence on international relations and advocates the importance of multilateral institutions.25 Marcel Haas points out that this attitude is not new.Since for its use, have expanded the possibilities for the Russian Federation to reinforce its influence on the world stage."27 Buzan and Waever point out that Russian policy has consistently opposed US unilateral action and supported multilateral approaches.28 The NSS and SNSRF also display several similarities.The general similarities between the two documents include the importance of domestic reforms to national security, the importance of international law in government behavior, and the dangers of weapons proliferation.Both the NSS and the SNSRF recognize the importance of domestic reform efforts for national security.In the NSS, President Obama states that "our strategy starts by recognizing that our strength and influence abroad begins with the steps we take at home."29 Likewise, the SNSRF identifies the need to ensure national security through efforts to strengthen domestic institutions and capabilities.30 In addition to domestic reform, both documents claim international norms and law as the basis for legitimacy.The Russian Federation clearly states the intent to maintain its international relations and foreign policies within the bounds of international law.The UN Security Council is identified as a central element of this effort.31 The United States also states a commitment to the rule of law and the necessity of efforts for international justice.32 The third general similarity between the NSS and SNSRF is weapons proliferation.Both documents discuss the need to curtail the spread of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.Additionally, both the NSS and the SNSRF openly state the goal of a world free from nuclear weapons.The NSS goes even further and establishes a policy that no nuclear weapons will be used against non-nuclear nations in compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.This policy even extends to a pledge not to use even a threat of nuclear weapon use to nations compliant with the treaty.33 These similarities in addition to the differences identified above provide context for analysis of these security policy documents and the securitization moves found within.The Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020 defines national security as "a condition of individual, societal, and governmental security from interior and exterior threats which allows the provision of constitutional rights, freedoms, a suitable quality and standard of life for citizens, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the stable development of the Russian Federation; the defense and security of the state."34 Of note in that definition, is the inclusion of both interior and exterior threats to security.In addition to the definition and indicators of national security, the SNSRF includes a general identification of near and long term threats at the international level: The attention of international politics, from a long-term perspective, will be focused on ownership of energy resources, including in the Near East, the Barents Sea shelf and other Arctic regions, in the basin of the Caspian Sea, and in Central Asia.A negative influence on the international situation, from a medium-term perspective, will be rendered, as before, in the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as conflicts in the Near and Middle East, in a number of South Asian and African countries, and on the Korean peninsula.36 This list of threats shows three themes of importance that recur throughout the document: energy security, weapons proliferation, and violent extremism.Listing energy security at the top of the list is not a coincidence.Energy, as a securitization move, will be discussed in greater depth in chapter four but the SNSRF includes significant concern for the long and medium term security implications of the economic sector and its reliance on energy.Since Putin's first term, the Russian Federation has become increasingly reliant on the energy sector as the basis of its economy.The funds brought in from this sector form a large portion of the power base available for current leadership in Moscow to maintain their power.37 Energy security has featured prominently in Russian national security strategies since that time but it is not the only issue to enjoy continuity.40 Based on these statements, this article appears to serve dual purposes.The first purpose is the obvious identification of issues for cooperation with the United States and these issues line up nicely with a similar list in the NSS discussed below.The second purpose is to act as a securitization move to boost Russian legitimacy and influence at the global level.So, although the statement is framed to encourage cooperation, it also emphasizes some of the securitization moves pursued by the Russian Federation.An analysis of the US securitization moves in the NSS provides comparative material for exploration of links and interactions with the securitization moves in the SNSRF.One contrast between the two is that the NSS does not display the same consistency with previous versions that the SNSRF displays.A marked difference in the current NSS from previous versions is the transition away from a focus on the military instrument of power and defense preparedness.Two other departures from previous strategies include a reemphasized focus on a whole-of-government approach to security challenges and a greater emphasis on multilateral approaches to international relations.The emphasis on multilateral approaches is also reinforced by a reduced emphasis on the pursuit of global democratization.41 Thus, as is to be expected with a change of political party in the US administration, the current NSS represents changes to the securitization moves than those pursued by the previous administration.The new direction of the NSS has three general themes.These themes include economic renewal, comprehensive engagement, and global leadership.Together, these three themes are intended to strengthen collective action to meet security threats.42 Within these themes, the NSS identifies four strategic interests for the United States: security, domestic and international economic prosperity, respect for universal values, and the advancement of international order.43 The first issue to be analyzed between the NSS and SNSRF is the respective securitization moves regarding values.These securitization moves tie the cultural identity of the nations to their security concerns.Thus, it becomes a foundational consideration for any interactions between the two nations.As Alexander Wendt argues in Social Theory of International Politics "the fundamental factor in international politics is the 'distribution of ideas' in the system."49 In this light, values take on a fundamental importance as securitization moves since their influence can, to a greater or lesser extent, influence other securitization movements undertaken by the government.The NSS claims several values as universal and states the intent to promote these values internationally.These universal values include a human right to economic opportunity, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, freedom of worship, democratic election, dignity, tolerance, equality, and justice administered fairly and equitably.Additionally, the NSS states that "nations that embrace these values for their citizens are ultimately more successfuland friendly to the United States -than those that do not ."50 This last statement can be viewed to implicitly link the acceptance of these values to the capacity for cooperation or the level of threat that a nation presents to US interests.The SNSRF goes even further by tying the armed forces into this securitization move.One of the tasks assigned to security forces is to "provide for the preservation of a cultural and spiritual legacy."This dictum is reinforced with extensive recommendations of state action to influence culture and media.53 The state role looms large in the Russian Federation's view of protecting cultural values.In contrast to the US values listing freedoms, the Russian values are more focused on duties.This difference is not trivial.In fact the NSS offers a pointed, if implicit, observation to the Russian Federation. "Even where some governments have adopted democratic practices, authoritarian rulers have undermined electoral processes and restricted the space for opposition and civil society, imposing a growing number of legal restrictions so as to impede the rights of people to assemble and access information."54 While this observation is applicable to several regimes throughout the world, in light of recent events, the Russian Federation emerges as a prime example.One example of the interaction between these value securitization moves is the Russian Federation laws governing Non-governmental Organizations (NGO).These laws are not new to the Russian Federation but recent changes and clarifications to the law are indicative of a "growing number of legal restrictions so as to impede the rights of people to assemble and access information."The most recent changes to the law sharply increase the amount of information required for an organization to register with the government and operate legally.Funding from foreign sources is also prohibited unless the organization accepts classification as a "foreign agent," a term that carries negative connotations in Russian society and is an express concern of the SNSRF.55 In sum, these measures increase government control over the activities of non-governmental entities.54 President of the United States of America, "National Security Strategy," 35.55 An excellent summary of the provisions of this law can be found at "NCO Law Monitor: Russia," ICNL: The International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, February 20, 2013, http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/russia.html; The SNSRF concern for NGOs is expressed in President of the Russian Federation, "The Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020".Although some human rights advocates within Russia have condemned this action, the broader mood within the Russian Federation still runs counter to the United States.57 A January 2011 survey showed that seventy percent of the Russian population thinks that it has enemies.Forty percent name the United States as that enemy.Furthermore, "despite the reset, 65 percent consider the United States an aggressor that seeks to take control of the entire world."58 An "us" versus "them" mentality is very strong in the Russian Federation indicating that domestic perception of this behavior is within accepted norms.59 The securitization moves of values by these two nations are linked by their fundamental impact on other securitization moves.These securitization moves already show signs of successful securitization as shown above.While it is unlikely that these securitization moves will, of themselves, lead to other indicators of securitization (organized killing, population expulsion, or creation of an existential threat perception) they are likely to persist as an undercurrent to all other security concerns.More than just cultural differences, the national security policy documents indicate that these securitization moves are linked to perceptions of national security.The remaining two securitization moves analyzed in this chapter are both listed expressly as areas of cooperation that each nation desires with the other.On the surface, cooperation in the areas of nonproliferation and counterterrorism seem straightforward.Both nations state an intent to cooperate with the other in efforts against terrorism and extremism and in policies that oppose the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.60 These stated intents are suggestive that the links and interactions in a connectedness analysis have already been established and cooperation is possible.However, the manner in which these issues are being securitized may be eroding these links and connections.There is a latent or growing antagonism in the interaction of these security issues.As a result, cooperative links and connections stand the chance of eroding into interactions of conflict.Both nonproliferation and counterterrorism show symptoms of this scenario.Of the two securitization moves, the symptoms of cooperation erosion are weaker for terrorism and extremism, but they do exist.The principal difference between US and Russian securitization of terrorism and violent extremism reflects one of the general differences in tone identified above.The United States treats terrorism and violent extremism in an international context while the Russian Federation treats them in a domestic and regional context.61 A simple text analysis of the SNSRF and NSS also supports this observation.In the SNSRF, seven of the ten uses of the word terrorism and all six of the uses of the word extremism are used in a domestic or regional context.62 The NSS, in contrast, uses the word terrorism seven of eight times in an international context and the word extremism is placed in an international context ten of eleven times.63 The NSS paints terrorism and extremism as a global problem while the SNSRF suggests it is a domestic and regional problem.This divergence suggests that cooperation may not be as natural as expected at first glance.threatened regional security."67 Yet, as Haas observes, "the SCO states have claimed their primacy in Central Asian regional security, but so far action by the SCO of countering the threats from Afghanistan has not taken place."68 This reluctance in cooperation on the part of the Russian Federation is further illustrated at the international level.Cooperation with the efforts pursued by the United States has been confined largely to intelligence sharing, logistical support, and the land supply routes of the Northern Distribution Network.69 In this context, the successful securitization of this issue by each nation has not resulted in widespread cooperation.For the intended cooperation to be realized, the Russian Federation needs to pursue a securitization move of these issues at the international level or the United States needs to leverage Russian involvement at the regional level with the attendant danger of differences in the interpretation of terrorism.Otherwise, this area of cooperation can easily erode and, based on the underlying antagonism of the values securitization move, lead to an area of conflict.70 Working to strengthen the cooperation will facilitate the rebalance strategy currently being pursued by the US administration.Furthermore, the NSS identifies weapons of mass destruction, specifically a terrorist attack with a nuclear weapon, as the greatest security threat to the United States.73 On the surface this appears to be one of the strongest areas of cooperation suggested in the national security strategies.This perception is especially strong in light of the fact that both national security strategies claim to seek a world free from nuclear weapons.74 In apparent pursuit of this goal, the New START Treaty was completed within a year of the NSS being issued.75 This treaty includes further reductions in the nuclear stockpiles of the two nations and represents a significant step towards realization of the mutually stated goal.Unfortunately, other aspects of nonproliferation securitization are causing divergence on this issue.international and regional security, and shape the future force.3 The majority of the NMS is organized to discuss these four objectives and the supporting material for the securitization moves from the NSS is found within this framework.In addition to material that is related to the securitization moves of the NSS, the NMS introduces a concern that was not directly addressed previously.Principally, this is a concern about international access.This concern has become one of the fundamental strategic considerations among US military circles in their strategic approach to the Pacific rebalance.The NMS states that "anti-access strategies seek to prevent our Nation's ability to project and sustain combat power in a region, while area denial strategies seek to constrain our Nation's freedom of action within the region."4 This introduction of the anti-access and area denial concern is reflective of the international scope of the document and informs some of the securitization moves discussed below.The anti-access and area denial concept also has direct ties to the strategic shift currently underway and is discussed further in chapter four.Similar to the NSS, the NMS contains a short paragraph relating directly to the This anti-western attitude of the MDRF is muted in its companion security policy document.The current maritime doctrine for the Russian Federation is over a decade old.Published in 2001, the Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation for the Period to 2020 lays out a comprehensive approach to maritime development that both differs from and reflects aspects of the MDRF and the SNSRF.18 The principal difference in the Maritime Doctrine is a more socio-economic focus rather than a military focus.More specific attention is placed upon economic and infrastructure development than the SNSRF or the MDRF.Additionally, the Maritime Doctrine does not contain extensive discussion on military threats or dangers.However, the military aspects of the national security policy agenda that are prevalent in the SNSRF and MDRF are in no way absent from the Maritime Doctrine.In the Maritime Doctrine, the Russian Federation Navy is described as "the main component and basis of the maritime potential of the Russian Federation."19 intensification of the maritime activity of the Russian Federation."21 More than a decade ago, Russian rhetoric in security policy documents began to tie the Arctic and the Pacific regions together which serves as an indication that the Russian Federation may become a more significant player in the Pacific region over the next decades.The effectiveness of these regional policies in the Maritime Doctrine is to be measured by three general criteria: the realization of the policy goals, the realization of sovereignty rights and freedom of the seas, and the ability of the military maritime component to protect the interests and security of the Russian Federation.22 These three measures of effectiveness underscore the generation of securitization moves as a central purpose of this document.Russian Federation provide a foundation to explore specific securitization moves related to the current strategic shifts.As described earlier, the Russian Federation borders each of the regions involved in the US strategic shift.As a result, the border security securitization moves of the Russian Federation must be considered in US policy changes to avoid unintended conflict.21 President of the Russian Federation, "The Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation to 2020" Article III (2).Author's translation.22 President of the Russian Federation, "The Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation to 2020".Article V. Border security is one of the principal military threats outlined in the MDRF.23 The centrality of this concern can be found in the evolution of this securitization move over the past two decades and has led to a conception of the "near abroad" as a region of words, the border security securitization move is not restricted to the immediate border or internal concerns but extends to the near abroad.Border security for the Russian Federation involves nations beyond Russia's borders, namely those nations of the former Soviet Union and where the Russian Federation claims regional influence.The MDRF considers the use of armed force to protect its citizens outside of the borders of the Russian Federation in accordance with international law and international treaties as a legitimate use of the armed forces.26 These MDRF articles regarding the use of force to protect Russian citizens directly support the securitization move in the in the SNSRF.27 This securitization move was the very motive claimed by the Russian Federation for its invasion of Georgia in 2008.The Russian Federation had previously issued passports to the population of South Ossetia, a Georgian province, thereby making them citizens.When Georgia attempted to suppress dissidents in the region, the Russian Federation invaded Georgia, claiming the protection of Russian citizens as justification.28 This action met all four indicators of successful securitization for this particular move.These indicators include people killing each other in organized ways, the spending of large and/or escalating sums on armaments, populations being driven from homes in large numbers, or nations resorting to unilateral actions contrary in discernable ways to international undertakings.29 The international response has done little to effectively counter Russia's actions.For the United States, the NSS mentions conflict in the Caucasus but both the NSS and the NMS avoid mentioning the nation of Georgia by name.30 With the securitization of this move largely successful in Georgia, it is important to recognize that it is not confined to the Caucasus.The border securitization established in the Caucasus shows an example of how this securitization move may apply in other surrounding regions.The SNSRF offers the following as solutions to border security: The solution to the problems of security provision for the state border of the Russian Federation is achieved by creating high-technology and multifunctional border complexes, especially on the borders with the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Ukraine, Georgia, and the Azerbaijan Republic, and also by increasing the effectiveness of state border defense, particularly in the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation, the Far East, and in the Caspian sector.31 In other words, the securitization move of border security extends to all of the regions that surround the Russian Federation.This is also one of the more likely areas of action both in the recent past and the immediate future.Buzan and Waever conclude that "the near abroad is the most obvious arena in which Russia might define a mission."32 As the United States rebalances strategic emphasis in regions along the borders of the Russian Federation, US policy should seek to find cooperation in the definitions for these Russian missions in the "near abroad."In one of these areas US policy is clearly lacking.There is very little official US security policy in relation to the Arctic region.Both the NSS and the NMS only mention the Arctic once and only in single sentences.The NSS states that "the United States is an Arctic Nation with broad and fundamental interests in the Arctic region, where we seek to meet our national security needs, protect the environment, responsibly manage resources, account for indigenous communities, support scientific research, and strengthen international cooperation on a wide range of issues."33 This situation has led analysts to conclude that the current US strategic approach lacks focus.The security policy documents barely mention the region and the policy directive is amorphous and confusing.Melissa Bert points out that US policy does not provide guidance to enforce laws and treaties nor does it provide adequate security policy.36 William Edwards adds that "there is no question that the United States is behind."37 The United States has not developed any clear securitization moves in the State support for producing icebreakers and coastal infrastructure is also found in The Foundations of Russian Federation Policy in the Arctic until 2020.46 This policy document further outlines Russian securitization moves in the Arctic.This strategy states that the national interests of the Russian Federation in the Arctic include using the regions as a strategic resource base, preserving peace and cooperation in the Arctic, protecting the Arctic ecology, and guaranteeing the use of the Northern Sea Route.47 The Russian Federation has already claimed sovereignty over the Northern Sea Route and other areas of the Arctic.48 50 Bert, "The Arctic Is Now," 12.51 Bert, "The Arctic Is Now," 2.production is estimated to reach thirty million tons of oil and 130 billion cubic meters of natural gas per year by 2030.52 With the recognized importance of this region to the Russian Federation's strategic posture, Russia has taken an understandably proactive stance to get ahead of Western initiatives.53 Border issues and sovereignty rights take center stage as concerns in Russian Arctic policy and the policy clearly states the intent to maintain forces capable of conducting combat operations in the region.54 In support of this securitization move, the Russian Federation has already created a Spetsnaz brigade for Arctic operations.55 In the context of these securitization moves and the disparity between the maturation of US and Russian policy, several analysts foresee the Arctic as a region of conflict.Because of the amount of oil and gas in the region, Haas concludes that "the Arctic region is more likely a future area where a clash between Russia and the West might occur."56 This sentiment is echoed by Sosnin who states that "science in this region is giving way to force" and argues that the Russian Federation will be forced to undertake "moves of a military nature" to back up national interests in the Arctic.57 This observation may be a result of the condition recognized by Bert that "all of the Arctic coastal states seem to have some military presence there now, even without any real risk of terrorism or highjacking."58 The Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, does not share in these conclusions.He suggests that "all attempts to pump up emotions and make the arctic look like a conflict-ridden region are dishonest and counter-productive.59 The rhetoric in security policy documents certainly indicates the possibility of conflict.Since the focus of this paper is on securitization moves, it leans more towards that end of the spectrum.However, two very good arguments for why conflict is not likely can be found in Arvid Halvorsen, "When Is Russia Joining NATO?Russian Security Orientation in the Twenty-first Century" (Graduate, Air University, 2010); and Vincent Pouliot, International Security in Practice: The Politics of NATO-Russia Diplomacy, Cambridge Studies in International Relations 113 (Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 218-219, 240-241.62 Klein, "Russia's New Military Doctrine Until 2020: Indecisive Compromise between Traditionalists and Reformers," 4.63 The distinction between a military threat and a military danger were emphasized earlier in the chapter.The definitions are repeated here for convenience.A military danger is defined as a condition of interstate or intrastate relations that are characterized by an aggregation of factors capable in certain conditions of leading to the emergence of a military threat.A military threat is defined as a condition of interstate or intrastate relations that are characterized by the real possibility of an emergence of military conflict between opposing sides and by a high level of readiness of any state (group of states) or separatist (terrorist) organizations to apply military force (armed violence).This hostility towards NATO is certainly not new and seems natural from a historical context.Since the Kosovo crisis in 1999 there has been consistent rhetoric in Russian security policy documents against NATO.66 Shevtsova attributes this to the logic of the political system in the Russian Federation.One of Putin's rhetorical points to achieve power and win his first presidential election in the nineties relied on painting the West as a threat.Thus, Western alienation is necessary to keep the current Russian power system in place.67 Another perspective is offered by Anthony Kurta who argues that Russia does not feel its interests are given due respect in NATO forums.68 The resurgence of a claim on global influence in Russian security policy documents in the Putin and Medvedev eras likewise lends merit to this argument.69 Thus, the hostility of the Russian Federation towards NATO has both internal and external components.previously.This in turn ties the BMD securitization move by the United States to the strategic shifts currently underway.The statements of the NSS and NMS show two aspects to this move.First, the rhetorical intent is to strengthen regional defense.Second, the United States intends to lead the development of this capability.So far, these both of these aspects appear to be achieving success.A 2008 poll showed that 87 percent of Americans support a national missile defense system and 65 percent believe that it should extend to our allies.79 However, the Russian Federation has taken a completely opposite view of the development of BMD systems and has started securitization moves in opposition.President Putin's response to US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty was that "we consider this decision a mistake."80 The reasons for this opposition start with nuclear weapons and strategic deterrence.Russia has increased reliance on nuclear force for national security as a result of budget constraints.The deployment of missile defense systems by the United States exacerbates this situation.It is already financially difficult for the Russian Federation to sustain its nuclear force and American BMD systems deployed to regions bordering the Eurasian RSC would cause a significant increase in the cost to maintain this foundation of national security.81 As a result, the Russian Federation views BMD as a move by the 80 Moltz, The Politics of Space Security, 269.81 Kurta et al., "The Politics of Vulnerability: China, Russia and US Missile Defense, " 8, 19.defense system, no matter how limited, will give the U.S. and almost 30 percent advantage over the other party in terms of total nuclear potential."82 Yevgeny Sirotinin also weighs in.He states that nuclear forces "will only be able to act as an instrument of containment if they possess strategic stability . . .to be able to inflict the amount of damage unacceptable to the attacker, however difficult the circumstances."83 BMD removes that strategic stability from Russian nuclear forces and reduces their ability for containment.A disrupted balance in nuclear deterrence could also extend beyond US-Russian relations.In addition to the Russian belief that BMD would alter the strategic balance in US favor, BMD impact relations between Russia and China.Feasible Chinese responses to BMD could alter the strategic balance between Russia and China, probably in a negative way for Russia.84 This second order effect of BMD systems on Russian-Chinese relations could also have repercussions that extend to the Asia-Pacific region.Ultimately, the Russian Federation does not believe that BMD systems will reduce proliferation but, rather, support US efforts for a unipolar power structure.85 The MDRF expands on these securitization moves.BMD is labelled as a primary external military danger to the Russian Federation.87 The MDRF also emphasizes the importance of the nuclear deterrent to Russian Federation national security.Abandoning any mention of nuclear zero, this document emphasizes that "nuclear weapons will remain an important factor to prevent the outbreak of nuclear military conflicts and military conflicts applying conventional strike means."88 Furthermore, the MDRF reserves the right of the Russian Federation to use nuclear weapons to counter nuclear or conventional existential threats.89 One other aspect of the BMD securitization move is related to space weaponization.Joan Johnson-Freese indicates that BMD can easily be transferred into antisatellite capability.In fact, it is technologically easier to hit a satellite than another missile.90 The Russian security policy documents do not miss this connection.Both the SNSRF and the MDRF raise concern about BMD and space weaponization in the same sentence.91 This securitization move in the Russian Federation security policy documents reflects the Russian concern regarding shifts in the balance of nuclear weapons, conventional capabilities, and space weaponization.Federation with respect to BMD extend from Europe to Asia.They also link to areas of intended cooperation including nonproliferation and nuclear arms reduction.As a result, the strategic shifts of the United States and the Russian Federation will be impacted by this issue and the directions of these BMD securitization moves must be included in the context.Having discussed the security policy documents of these two nations and some additional securitization moves, it is time to turn to the most recent major security policy statements of the two nations and evaluate additional securitization moves that they develop.In the early months of 2012, the leaders of the Russian Federation and the United States released documents indicating updates to national security policies.In January As the title suggests, "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership" continues the theme in US security policy documents of the United States acting as a leader in the global arena.President Obama clearly states his determination that the United States will emerge from current challenges "even stronger in a manner that preserves American global leadership."2 The document also notes the leading role of the United States in the international system for the past sixty-five years and indicates a US desire to be "the security partner of choice" with nations throughout the world.3 In agreement with both the NSS and the NMS, "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership" continues to promote US leadership in international security.In addition to maintaining an international tone, "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership" also reemphasizes several securitization moves from the NSS and NMS.These include preventing nuclear proliferation, countering violent extremism, and the central importance of NATO to European and global security.4 The mention of these issues that appear as securitization moves in previous documents indicate a continuity for these moves in US security policy.Unfortunately, a negative continuity with security policy documents also exists in "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership."The Arctic is not mentioned in any way.Regarding the Russian Federation specifically, "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership" states that "our engagement with Russia remains important, and we will continue to build a closer relationship in areas of mutual interest and encourage it to be a contributor across a broad range of issues."5 While recognition of the Russian Federation in "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership" indicates at least a minimal level of consideration in the strategic shift, the guidance remains extremely amorphous and lacks cohesive direction.This ambiguous policy direction is highlighted in contrast with the other broad policy statements in the document for Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America.6 While these policy statements address an identified weakness in the NSS, which pays scant attention to Europe and Asia in security matters, it provides little guidance with regards to the Russian Federation.7 Based on the apparent security policies of the Russian Federation, more specific guidance is in order.With his subsequent victory, Putin ensured the opportunity for these objectives to enter the arena of securitization.In these articles Putin emphasizes the need for a strong military establishment, reinforcing the tone of the SNSRF and MDRF.Putin considers it a simple truth that "the Armed Forces must be valued . . .they must be strengthened, otherwise it will become necessary to 'feed a foreign army' or completely surrender to the servitude of bandits and international terrorists."8 He also argues that "in a world of upheaval there is always the temptation to resolve one's problems at another's expense, through pressure and force."9 Putin's reasoning reflects the propositions of two Russian military scholars.In 2010, Anatoly Shavayev claimed that "a state's military capacity is one of the most powerful means of attaining political goals."10 Additionally, Tashlykov indicated that military force is becoming the common method for diffusing crises.11 Putin's comments lend resonance to these ideas in security policy.Putin also continues the theme that, for the Russian Federation, military power is the solution. "Russia cannot rely on diplomatic and economic methods alone to resolve conflicts.Our country faces the task of sufficiently developing its military potential as part of a deterrence strategy. "12 In justifying this position, Putin lauds the efforts of the military during the decade of economic hardship at the close of the twentieth century.clearly by stating that the national debt is "the single biggest threat to our national security."21 In other words, the need to transform the military in a way that reduces costs is starting to display the characteristics of a securitization move.This theme of reduced spending and transforming the military into a less expensive force is laced throughout "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership."In discussing US military options for Africa and Latin America, the guidance emphasizes that "wherever possible, we will develop innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives."22 Additionally, there is a clear emphasis on using non-military means and reducing demand for US forces in stability operations. "U.S. forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations. "23 This appears to be at least a small step back from the assertion in the NSS that states "the United States remains the only nation able to project and sustain large-scale military operations over extended distances ."24 Despite this apparent small step back, force projection is still to be used for countering area denial and anti-access strategies.In the terms of RSCT, the United States intends to maintain the capability to use penetration and overlay mechanisms to secure its interests in the RSCs surrounding the Russian Federation.A concern with economic interests, growth, and commerce is mentioned several times throughout "Sustaining U.S. Additionally, naval modernization is to focus in part on the Pacific. "In this manner, the task of the next decade is inclusive of a new structure for the armed forces that can operate on the principles of new equipment.Equipment that can see farther, shoot more accurately, react quicker, than analogous systems of any potential adversary."32 Putin clearly raises the need for this military transformation to the level of a securitization move.In explaining the need for military transformation he warns that, without transformation, Russia will definitively lose its military potential. "There is only one exit -build a New Army."Additionally, Putin advocates for the resurrection of a 29 Putin, "Being Strong," February 20, 2012.Author's translation.30 Sergei G. Chekinov, "Predicting Trends in Military Art in the Initial Period of the 21st Century," Military Thought 19, no.3 (2010): 47-48.31 Tashlykov, "General and Particular Features of Present-day Conflicts Involving the U.S. and Its Allies," 67.32 Putin, "Being Strong," February 20, 2012.Author's translation.blue-water navy for the Russian Federation and more robust aerospace defenses.He asserts that "in this question, it is impossible to be too patriotic."In accordance with this conclusion, Putin states the intent to allocate twenty-three trillion rubles to defense spending over the next decade.33 The political history of Russia over the past fifteen years illustrates that the current leadership has consolidated its hold on power.Haas points out that the main power instruments for this current Russian leadership are the military and energy.36 Thus, it is not surprising that Putin securitization moves for both issues in his policy.33 Putin, "Being Strong," February 20, 2012.Author's translation.34 http://www.freecurrencyrates.com/exchange-rate-history/USD-RUB/2012.Accessed 5 January 2013.35 Thane Gustafson argues that in Putin's view "the state remains the engine for growth and progress; the job of the oil industry is simply to provide the fuel for it."The oil industry can play an indispensable role for decades to come as a source of revenue, regional development, and geopolitical influence.37 The United States and the Russian Federation both proclaim rhetorically the intent to cooperate with each other on the international level, particularly in security concerns.However, the securitization moves in the security policy documents of both nations do not support an unequivocal conclusion that such cooperation will actually take place.Some of these securitization moves have been considered in previous chapters.This chapter will consider the potential for cooperation or conflict for these securitization moves and offer some recommendations regarding these securitization moves in the context of the current strategic shift by the United States.However, this cooperation will not be automatic.One of the main obstacles to cooperation in nonproliferation is the issue of missile defense.The subject of missile defense sends cooperation on nonproliferation into a spin.The Russian Federation relies on its nuclear arsenal for strategic stability.Andy Butfoy concludes that, for the United States, Russia will be the yardstick for US nuclear force sizing.6 This creates a condition of mutual reliance on nuclear force sizing.However, as mentioned earlier, this stability is threatened by missile defense systems from the Russian point of view.As Lumpov and Karpov conclude, "the U.S. administration appears to be in no haste to make nuclear cuts that it is going to begin and proceed with only after it is certain that its global strike and global missile defense concepts are well underway."7 The Russian perception of missile defense systems creating a strategic imbalance will hamper efforts at nonproliferation.As a result of this situation, the United States must proceed carefully.US pursuit of missile defense strengthens the security of allies throughout the world, bolsters homeland defense, and counters anti-access and area denial strategies.8 These are necessary elements of the strategic shift, especially one intended to reduce the cost of defense commitments across multiple regions.But, as Kurta notes, the Russian Federation should be approached first.9 other interstate organizations (the European Union and NATO)."15 In turn, the NMS states that "we will actively support closer military-to-military relations between the Alliance and Europe's non-NATO nations, some of which have reliably contributed to trans-Atlantic security for decades.,"but leaves the non-NATO nations unnamed and does not explore the possibility of interaction between alliance blocks.16 Recognition of the SCO and CSTO in future US security policy documents would extend outreach that compliments the invitation in the MDRF and indicate a desire for interaction between NATO and "NATO of the East."17 These moves in security policy can be used to diffuse Russian rhetoric against NATO thereby removing the issue as a securitization move and returning it to the realm of politics.They can also provide a method to strengthen Afghan security in the long term and reinforce multinational efforts against terrorism and violent extremism.Joseph Collins suggest that the Russian Federation "can be helpful in a settlement or it can be a spoiler" with regards to peace in Afghanistan.18 The United States and NATO need to pursue the former option.NATO and CSTO already cooperate in anti-drug operations in Afghanistan.19 This effort should be expanded and include the SCO.For the Russian Federation, the CSTO and SCO are the priorities for military-political cooperation.20 However, expanded engagement of the SCO and CSTO in Afghanistan address specific statements from Russian security policy documents.The MDRF calls for the development of relationships with international organizations that will allow Russian peacekeeping in regions of conflict.21 Putin himself declared that "the CSTO is ready to fulfill its mission of guaranteeing stability in the Eurasian expanse."22 While military cooperation may be extremely difficult due to political sensitivities, it should not be dismissed out of hand as a viable option for finding cooperation in the strategic shifts.23 Involving the regional security alliances in the stabilization of Afghanistan will also relieve tensions in Russian Federation securitization moves regarding its borders.Russian sovereignty has become ingrained in the national psyche.As Shevtsova describes: Today Russia finds itself in a situation where Europe is not prepared to integrate it, and it is not prepared to give up even part of its sovereignty.On the contrary, retaining sovereignty has become the elite's most important tool for retaining power.Even Russian Westernizing liberals do not dare mention that the country might have to give up a portion of its sovereignty to supranational European structures.For the man in the street, the very idea is blasphemous, a betrayal of the Homeland.24 This view of a strong state is not necessarily viewed askance.As Putin explains, "for Russians a strong state is not an anomaly, which should be got rid of.Quite the contrary, they see it as a source and guarantor of order and the initiator and main driving force of any change."25 The perceived necessity of a sovereign state reinforces the need for strong border protection, including protection beyond the borders.Indeed, some scholars argue that a central part of the Russian conception of the country is its size.26 As a result of this conception of the state, the Russian security policy documents call for protecting the rights of Russian citizens abroad and stationing troops outside the borders of the Russian Federation.27 "Overall, Russia's military doctrine reflects the country's pretence towards acting as a hegemonial power in the post-Soviet region and indicates its readiness to use military power to achieve this goal if necessary. "28 Essentially, this extends into the other nations of the Eurasian RSC as well as the European, Middle Eastern, and Asian RSCs.Buzan and Waever point out that this is not merely expansionist tendency but a determination to play a dominant regional role. "It is unlikely that Russia even under pressure would retreat to a purely internal security agenda."29 They also conclude that a small, semi-permanent US presence is likely to stimulate formation of independent Central Asian RSC.30 31 As a result, "the bottom-line strategic threat is that, if Russia is to remain a great power able to both defend itself and to assert some influence globally, it needs to retain its sphere of influence in the CIS."32 Otherwise, the potential for conflict in this region increases in probability.Due to the emerging importance of the trade routes, such a conflict could quickly spread to the European and Asian RSCs.One of the central reasons for an increased probability of conflict in the Arctic is the rich energy resources in the region.As outlined previously, Russian Federation security policy documents have created a securitization move regarding energy and the exploitation of energy resources constitutes a principal source of power for the current regime.In the economic sector, a lack of state economic regulation is viewed as a threat to economic growth and innovation.36 The energy situation for Russia is not stable.Thomas Gustafson's analysis is that " Russia is not running out of oil, but it is running out of cheap oil."37 Somewhat paradoxically, oil and energy resources are a force for political and economic stability in the Russian Federation but also a potential for unrest.38 To avoid unrest, government policy must be modernized and updated but the oil industry is tempting the government to continue leveraging it for political gain while quashing investment and innovation incentives.39 Ruchir Sharma points out that this has led to a weak market economy in the Russian Federation. "In recent years, Russia's economy and stock market have been among the weakest of the emerging markets, dominated by an oil-rich class of billionaires whose assets equal 20 percent of GDP, by far the largest share held by the superrich in any major economy" 40 Yet, the incentives for adaptation currently remain low due to high energy prices.41 Under these circumstances, energy security may be one of the most volatile of the Russian Federation securitization moves.As the energy market develops, the Russian oil industry will have to search for new sources of oil, including the off-shore Arctic area, to prevent a production decline after 2020.42 Based on this conclusion, the window to resolve security issues in the Arctic is closing fast.Further complications reside in the unwillingness of the Russian Federation to accept that other republics can trade energy resources according to their own desires and that the role of military forces in Russian energy security is increasing at rapid pace.penetration mechanisms in these RSCs, even in the environment of increased defense spending by the Russian Federation.One method for avoiding conflict during the period of military transformation is to develop military-to-military relations at an even deeper level.Currently, these relations are largely confined to the senior levels of leadership.However, anecdotal evidence indicates the potential for highly successful relations and policy dividends when military-to-military relations are conducted at lower levels.46 Haas also concludes that there is great potential to foster cooperation in this manner. "Since the problems between Russia and the West at the higher political-strategic level are likely to continue, emphasis should be placed at cooperation at the lower, 'grassroots', level."47 An expansion of military-to-military relations in this manner will create more robust and reliable links for cooperation.Such relations would also meet the NMS criteria that "military-to-military relationships must be reliable to be effective, and persevere through political upheavals or even disruption."48 President of the United States of America and Secretary of Defense of the United States of America, "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense" (Department of Defense, January 2012), Secretary of Defense Introductory Note.2 President of the United States of America and Secretary of Defense of the United States of America, "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense," 2.Emphasis in original.Richard L. Kugler, New Directions in U.S. National Security Strategy, Defense Plans, and Diplomacy: A Review of Official Strategic Documents (Washington, D.C.: NDU Press, 2011), 17.Marcel De Haas, Russia's Foreign Security Policy in the 21st Century: Putin, Medvedev and Beyond. (Routledge, 2011), 158.5 Barry Buzan, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner Pub, 1998), 23.6 Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, Regions and Powers : A Guide to the Global Security Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 3-4.Buzan, Security, 25.8 Buzan, Security, 23-24.9 Carl von Clausewitz et al.,On War (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), 87.Buzan, Security, 26.11 Buzan and Waever, Regions and Powers, 73.Buzan and Waever, Regions and Powers, 55-62.Buzan and Waever, Regions and Powers, 45-47, 61-62.17 Buzan and Waever, Regions and Powers, 52, 81.18 Buzan and Waever, Regions and Powers, 46.19 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 156-176; Buzan and Waever, Regions and Powers, 55, 265, 288.20 Buzan and Waever, Regions and Powers, 81.President of the United States of America and Secretary of Defense of the United States of America, "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense," 2-3.22 Buzan and Waever, Regions and Powers, 49.23 Buzan and Waever, Regions and Powers, 404.24 Haas, Russia's Foreign Security Policy in the 21st Century, 3.25 Buzan and Waever, Regions and Powers, 75.Lilia Shevtsova, "Russia's Choice: Change or Degradation?,"in Can Russia Reform?Economic, Political, and Military Perspectives, ed.Stephen J. Blank, SSI Monograph (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2012), 6.27 Buzan and Waever, Regions and Powers, 398.Emphasis in original.28 Buzan and Waever, Regions and Powers, 59.Shevtsova, "Russia's Choice: Change or Degradation?,"6; Robert Kagan, The Return of History and the End of Dreams (New York: Vintage, 2009), 61-62.34 Dmitriĭ Trenin, The End of Eurasia: Russia on the Border Between Geopolitics and Globalization (Washington, D.C: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002), 22.35 Haas, Russia's Foreign Security Policy in the 21st Century, 157.36 Buzan and Waever, Regions and Powers, 73.37 Buzan and Waever, Regions and Powers, 73.Shevtsova, "Russia's Choice: Change or Degradation?,"3.39 Buzan and Waever, Regions and Powers, 406.Shevtsova, "Russia's Choice: Change or Degradation?,"28.41 Buzan and Waever, Regions and Powers, 26.42 Buzan and Waever, Regions and Powers, 87.President of the Russian Federation, "The Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020".Articles 21, 24-25, 28-29, 53-65, and 112.4 President of the Russian Federation, "The Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020".Article 52.Sergei L. Tashlykov, "General and Particular Features of Present-day Conflicts Involving the U.S. and Its Allies," Military Thought 19, no.3 (2010): 68-69.6 President of the United States of America, "National Security Strategy" (U.S. Government Printing Office, May 2010).Introductory Note.7 Everett C. Dolman, Astropolitik: Classical Geopolitics in the Space Age, Cass Series--Strategy and History (London ; Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2002), 6.This reference identifies the emphasis of socio-economic factors in democracy as a well-established principle in political science.8 Richard L. Kugler, New Directions in U.S. National Security Strategy, Defense Plans, and Diplomacy: A Review of Official Strategic Documents (Washington, D.C.: NDU Press, 2011), 18.9 President of the United States of America, "National Security Strategy", Introductory Note.President of the United States of America, "National Security Strategy," 22.11 Kugler, New Directions in U.S. National Security Strategy, Defense Plans, and Diplomacy, 14.12 President of the United States of America, "National Security Strategy," 12.13 President of the United States of America, "National Security Strategy," 1, 17.President of the Russian Federation, "The Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020".Article 21.15 Mark Galeotti, "Reform of the Russian Military and Security Apparatus: An Investigator's Perspective," in Can Russia Reform?Economic, Political, and Military Perspectives, ed.Stephen J. Blank, SSI Monograph (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2012), 66.16 Lilia Shevtsova, "Russia's Choice: Change or Degradation?,"in Can Russia Reform?Economic, Political, and Military Perspectives, ed.Stephen J. Blank, SSI Monograph (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2012), 6-7.17 Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, Regions and Powers : A Guide to the Global Security Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 405.President of the Russian Federation, "The Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020".Article 8.Author's translation.19 President of the Russian Federation, "The Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020".Article 1.President of the United States of America, "National Security Strategy," 40-50.20 President of the United States of America, "National Security Strategy," 2, 12-13; President of the Russian Federation, "The Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020".Article 18.21 President of the United States of America, "National Security Strategy," 2, 22, 40-42, 48.22 President of the Russian Federation, "The Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020".Articles 8 and 17.President of the Russian Federation, "The Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020".Article 13.Author's translation.24 President of the United States of America, "National Security Strategy," 22.25 President of the Russian Federation, "The Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020".Article 9 and 10.Author's translation.26 Marcel De Haas, Russia's Foreign Security Policy in the 21st Century: Putin, Medvedev and Beyond. (Routledge, 2011), 17.27 President of the Russian Federation, "The Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020".Article 9.28 Buzan and Waever, Regions and Powers, 405.President of the United States of America, "National Security Strategy".Introductory note.30 President of the Russian Federation, "The Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020".Article 24.31 President of the Russian Federation, "The Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020".Article 13.32 President of the United States of America, "National Security Strategy," 2, 48.President of the United States of America, "National Security Strategy," 23; President of the Russian Federation, "The Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020".Articles 30, 90, 92, and 94-95.34 President of the Russian Federation, "The Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020".Article 6.Author's translation.35 President of the Russian Federation, "The Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020", Article 112.President of the Russian Federation, "The Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020".Article 11.Author's translation.37 Steven Rosefielde, "The Impossibility of Russian Economic Reform: Waiting for Godot," in Can Russia Reform?Economic, Political, and Military Perspectives, ed.Stephen J. Blank, SSI Monograph (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2012), 37-59.Haas, Russia's Foreign Security Policy in the 21st Century, 15-82.This extensive discussion of Putin's security policies between the years 2000 and 2008 are nicely summarized by Table 1.2 on pages 25-29.39 Haas, Russia's Foreign Security Policy in the 21st Century, 159.40 President of the Russian Federation, "The Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020".Article 18.Author's translation.Kugler, New Directions in U.S. National Security Strategy, Defense Plans, and Diplomacy, 2.42 Kugler, New Directions in U.S. National Security Strategy, Defense Plans, and Diplomacy, 1.President of the United States of America, "National Security Strategy," 7, 17.44 President of the United States of America, "National Security Strategy," 18-28.45 President of the United States of America, "National Security Strategy," 44.46 President of the United States of America, "National Security Strategy," 44.President of the United States of America, "National Security Strategy," 44.48 See Appendix A for the author's comprehensive list of securitization moves in the two national security strategies.Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge [u.a.]:Cambridge Univ.Press, 2006), 96.50 President of the United States of America, "National Security Strategy," 5, 35.President of the United States of America, "National Security Strategy," 38.52 President of the Russian Federation, "The Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020".Articles 1, 80, and 81.53 President of the Russian Federation, "The Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020" Articles 52 and 82-84.Author's translation.President of the United States of America, "National Security Strategy," 44; President of the Russian Federation, "The Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020".Article 18.Beene, Kubiak, and Colton, "U.S., Russia and the Global War on Terror: 'Shoulder to Shoulder' into Battle?,"211-214.62 President of the Russian Federation, "The Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020".Articles 1, 10, 18, 36-38, 40, 41, 43, and 104.This analysis is based on translating the Russian words экстремизм and терроризм as extremism and terrorism respectively.The Russian words are cognates.63 President of the United States of America, "National Security Strategy," 3, 4, 8, 11-12, 15, 18, 20, 24, 26, 36-37, 42-44, 48.Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2011: Redefining America's Military Leadership" (Department of Defense, February 8, 2011), 10.2 President of the United States of America, "National Security Strategy" (U.S. Government Printing Office, May 2010), 7 These interests were listed previously in chapter two.3 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "National Military Strategy of the United States of America," 4.Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "National Military Strategy of the United States of America," 8.5 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "National Military Strategy of the United States of America," 13.6 President of the United States of America, "National Security Strategy," 31.President of the Russian Federation, "The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation" (Kremlin, February 5, 2010), http://news.kremlin.ru/ref_notes/461/print.Articles 6(a), 6(b), and 6(c).Author's translation.8 President of the Russian Federation, "The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation".Articles 17-18.Yevgeny S. Sirotinin, "Containing Aggression in the Context of the New Russian Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation," Military Thought 19, no.2 (2010): 8.9 President of the Russian Federation, "The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation".Articles 9, 34(bc), 39-45.Sergei L. Tashlykov, "General and Particular Features of Present-day Conflicts Involving the U.S. and Its Allies," Military Thought 19, no.3 (2010): 62, 66, and 68.18 Although the Maritime Doctrine is over a decade old, it is the governing policy document for naval forces as listed on the web page of the Security Council of the Russian Federation as of 27 May 2013.This web page is found at http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/sections/3/. President of the Russian Federation, "The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation".Articles 20 and 27(j).27 President of the Russian Federation, "The Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020" (Security Council of the Russian Federation, May 12, 2009), http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/99.html.Article 38.28 "Russian Federation: Legal Aspects of War in Georgia," Research, Library of Congress, August 8, 2012, http://www.loc.gov/law/help/russian-georgia-war.php.29 Buzan and Waever, Regions and Powers, 73.President of the United States of America, "National Security Strategy," 42.31 President of the Russian Federation, "The Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020".Article 42.Author's translation.32 Buzan and Waever, Regions and Powers, 404, 408.President of the United States of America, "National Security Strategy," 50.34 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "National Military Strategy of the United States of America," 11.35 President of the United States of America, "NSPD-66/HSPD-25: Arctic Region Policy" (The White House, January 9, 2009).Vassily I. Sosnin, "The Arctic: A Complex Knot of Interstate Differences," Military Thought 19, no.3 (2010): 3; Bert, "The Arctic Is Now," 5-6.41 A description of the British use of these two ports can be found in Clifford Kinvig, Churchill's Crusade: The British Invasion ofRussia, 1918-1920 New York: Hambledon Continuum, 2006).This account also provides information about operating around ice seasons at these ports.With ice receding, their ability to handle cargo and channel it south will only increase.42 Bert, "The Arctic Is Now," 6.43 Bert, "The Arctic Is Now," 7, 13-14.President of the Russian Federation, "The Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020".Articles 11, 42, and 62.Sosnin, "The Arctic: A Complex Knot of Interstate Differences," 3.53 Haas, Russia's Foreign Security Policy in the 21st Century, 128.Haas, Russia's Foreign Security Policy in the 21st Century, 25-29.67 Shevtsova, "Russia's Choice: Change or Degradation?,"17.68 Anthony M. Kurta et al., "The Politics of Vulnerability: China, Russia and US Missile Defense" (Harvard University, 2001), 19; Pouliot, International Security in Practice, 174-182.69 Haas, Russia's Foreign Security Policy in the 21st Century, 25-27.Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "National Military Strategy of the United States of America," 12.74 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "National Military Strategy of the United States of America," 5.Jim Garamone, "Obama: Defense Strategy Will Maintain U.S. Military Pre-eminence," American Forces Press Service, January 5, 2012, http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=66683.President of the United States of America and Secretary of Defense of the United States of America, "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense" (Department of Defense, January 2012), Presidential Introductory Note.3 President of the United States of America and Secretary of Defense of the United States of America, "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense," 1, 3.4 President of the United States of America and Secretary of Defense of the United States of America, "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense," 2-3.President of the United States of America and Secretary of Defense of the United States of America, "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense," 3.6 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2011: Redefining America's Military Leadership" (Department of Defense, February 8, 2011), Introductory Note, 2-3, 13.7 The failure of the NSS to adequately address security concerns in Europe and Asia is pointed out in Richard L. Kugler, New Directions in U.S. National Security Strategy, Defense Plans, and Diplomacy: A Review of Official Strategic Documents (Washington, D.C.: NDU Press, 2011), 16. .Author's translation.Putin, "Being Strong," February 20, 2012.14 Putin, "Being Strong," February 21, 2012.15 Putin, "Being Strong," February 20, 2012.Author's translation.Putin, "Being Strong," February 21, 2012.17 Putin, "Being Strong," February 21, 2012; Putin, "Being Strong," February 20, 2012.Author's translation.18 Putin, "Being Strong," February 20, 2012.Author's translation.19 Putin, "Being Strong," February 20, 2012.Author's translation.President of the United States of America and Secretary of Defense of the United States of America, "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense," Introductory Note, 1.Geoff Colvin, Admiral Mike Mullen: Debt is Still Biggest Threat to U.S. Security, Web Page, May 10, 2012, http://management.fortune.cnn.com/2012/05/10/admiral-mike-mullen/. 22 President of the United States of America and Secretary of Defense of the United States of America, "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense," 3.Emphasis in original.23 President of the United States of America and Secretary of Defense of the United States of America, "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense," 6.24 President of the United States of America, "National Security Strategy" (U.S. Government Printing Office, May 2010), 17.President of the United States of America and Secretary of Defense of the United States of America, "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense," 2-5.Emphasis in original.26 President of the United States of America and Secretary of Defense of the United States of America, "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense," 4-5.Emphasis in original.27 President of the United States of America and Secretary of Defense of the United States of America, "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense," 6-9.28 Putin, "Being Strong," February 20, 2012.Author's translation.Thane Gustafson, "Putin's Petroleum Problem: How Oil Is Holding Russia Back -and How It Could Save It," Foreign Affairs 91, no.6 (December 2012): 93.Lilia Shevtsova, "Russia's Choice: Change or Degradation?,"in Can Russia Reform?Economic, Political, and Military Perspectives, ed.Stephen J. Blank, SSI Monograph (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2012), 19.2 Steven Rosefielde, "The Impossibility of Russian Economic Reform: Waiting for Godot," in Can Russia Reform?Economic, Political, and Military Perspectives, ed.Stephen J. Blank, SSI Monograph (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2012), 50.3 Robert Kagan, The Return of History and the End of Dreams (New York: Vintage, 2009), 61.President of the United States of America and Secretary of Defense of the United States of America, "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense" (Department of Defense, January 2012), 3, 5.5 Anthony M. Kurta et al., "The Politics of Vulnerability: China, Russia and US Missile Defense" (Harvard University, 2001), 60.Jacques Gansler, Ballistic Missile Defense: Past and Future (Charleston: CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2012), x. 12 Lumpov and Karpov, "On the U.S. New Strategic Triad," 149.13 President of the United States of America and Secretary of Defense of the United States of America, "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense," 3.Haas, Russia's Foreign Security Policy in the 21st Century, 162, 180.24 Shevtsova, "Russia's Choice: Change or Degradation?,"31.25 As quoted in Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, Regions and Powers : A Guide to the Global Security Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 407.26 Buzan and Waever, Regions and Powers, 407.Bert, "The Arctic Is Now," 2-3, 15-16.35 William Edwards, "Our Arctic Strategy Deficit," Blog, The New Atlanticist, March 8, 2013, http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/our-arctic-strategy-deficit.Gustafson, "Putin's Petroleum Problem," 89.43 Haas, Russia's Foreign Security Policy in the 21st Century, 161.The author spent four months fostering lower level military-to-military relations in a nation that previously belonged to the Soviet Union.These relations proved to be of immense value to United States diplomats during subsequent diplomatic negotiations with this nation.47 Haas, Russia's Foreign Security Policy in the 21st Century, 163.48 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "National Military Strategy of the United States of America," 6.Haas, Russia's Foreign Security Policy in the 21st Century, 163.
5. GLOBAL SOIL MAPPING INITIATIVES ............................................................... 60 5.1 glObAlSOilmAp.NeT ................................................................................................ 60 5.2 glObAl SOil iNFORmATiON FACiliTieS ..................................................................... 60 5.3 hARmONized wORld SOil dATAbASe ........................................................................62 6. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .....................................................63 6.1 CONCluSiONS ...........................................................................................................63 6.1.1 Legacy data ..............................................................................................................63 6.1.2 Users needs..............................................................................................................63 (Zinke et al., 1986) .............................. 9 Figure 2.5: Global soil quality with respect to nutrient availability ................10 1. iNTROduCTiON Soil is a natural body consisting of layers (soil horizons) that are composed of weathered mineral materials, organic material, air and water (Bockheim et al., 2005) .It is the end product of the combined influence of the climate, relief (slope), organisms (flora and fauna), parent materials (original minerals), and time.The most widely recognized function of soil is its support for food production.Farmers who use soil in crop production know very well that it is the foundation for agricultural production.This is because it is the medium in which growth of food-producing plants occurs.It supplies the plants with nutrients, water, and support for their roots.The plants, in turn, support human and animal life with food and energy.Soil also acts as a repository for seeds, germplasm, and genes for flora and fauna.In general, soil is the medium for preservation and advancement of life on earth (Brady, 1984; Foth and Ellis, 1997) .Besides supplying water treatments to plants, soil also supports millions of organisms living in it.These organisms have proven useful in medicine, biodegradation and recycling of waste, as food, as well as being essential in the conversion of minerals and nutrients to readily useable formats for plants and in turn animal nutrition.In hydrology, soil interacts with the hydrosphere as a medium that absorbs, purifies, transports, and releases water.In the hydrological cycle, the water that passes through the soil accumulates temporarily in the form of rivers, lakes/oceans/dams, soil water, and groundwater.During the storage process, soil filters the water against pollutants including natural and synthetic compounds.It also acts as a buffer against natural phenomena such as floods and soil erosion.In hydrology, the interaction of soil with the atmosphere has numerous environmental benefits.It can absorb excess energy radiation from the sun and release it gradually.Soil's gaseous exchanges with the atmosphere involve carbon dioxide, nitrogen oxides and methane and are of a magnitude that has been reported to have profound effects on the global climate.In fact, soil has been recognized as the largest terrestrial sink for carbon dioxide and consequently has great importance in mitigating the impacts of climate change (FAO, 2004) .In engineering, soil is used both as a construction material and as a foundation to support building infrastructures.Numerous engineering structures are made with soil as a primary construction material.For example, it's used to make blocks for building or used directly in construction such as in dams, mud-houses, roads, etc (Graham, 1989; Indraratna and Nutalaya, 1991) .Soil importance as a foundation support cannot be overemphasized: Most structures have their foundations in the soil.Soil is a source of all life.Its interaction with various aspects of life is summarized in Figure 1 .1.Life support services  The soil renews, retains, delivers nutrients and provides physical support for plants;  It sustains biological activity, diversity, and productivity;  The soil ecosystem provides habitat for seeds dispersion and dissemination of the gene pool for continued evolution.Provisioning services  Soil is the basis for the provision of food, fibre, fuel and medicinal products to sustain life;  It holds and releases water for plant growth and water supply.Regulating services  The soil plays a central role in bu ering, filtering and moderation of the hydrological cycle;  It regulates the carbon, oxygen and plant nutrient cycles (such as N, P, K, Ca, Mg and S) a ecting the climate and plant production;  Soil biodiversity contributes to soil pest and disease regulation.Soil micro-organisms process and break-down wastes and dead organic matter (such as manure, remains of plants, fertilizers and pesticides), preventing them from building up to toxic levels, from entering water supply and becoming pollutants.Cultural services  Soil provides support for urban settlement and infrastructure;  In some cultures, soils may also be of specific spiritual or heritage value. Soils are the basis for landscapes that provide recreational value.Food production Soil is derived from weathering products of rocks and the decayed remains of plants and animals that once lived in or on the Earth.It is composed of four major components: minerals, organic matter, air, and water.The proportion of each of these components together with other factors such as climate, vegetation, time, topography, and, increasingly, human activities are important in determining the type of soil at any location in the landscape.For a long time, scientists have endeavoured to develop appropriate and efficient methods for predicting the spatial distribution of soils and their occurrence in the landscape.Soil mapping is the term often used to describe the process of understanding and predicting the spatial distribution of soils.It is a process that involves collecting field observations (including recording soil profile descriptions), analysing soil properties in the laboratory, describing landscape characteristics, and, ultimately, producing soil maps.Soil maps are the most widely used end-products of the soil mapping process since they illustrate the geographic distribution of soil types, soil properties (such as physical, chemical, and biological properties), and landscape characteristics.Data coming from a soil mapping exercise can be classified as either primary data or secondary data.Primary data are those that have been obtained directly from observations or measurements in the field or in a laboratory.Secondary data are data that have been inferred or derived from the primary data.Examples of secondary data are the soil maps themselves, soil quality ratings, degradation assessments, pedotransfer functions, suitability indices, hydrologic soil groups, textural classes, etc.Secondary and primary soil data together form Soil Information.Soil information has a variety of uses worldwide such as assessing soil for its adequacy for a variety of applications, assessing and monitoring natural phenomena, determining productivity, and planning.Some of the major categories of these uses include: ▸ Agronomic assessment: Soil information is used to develop recommendations for best management practices, including determining the need for, and amount of, fertilizers, or other inputs, improving soil productivity, assessing land suitability for crop production, estimating crop yields, determining irrigation needs and scheduling, selecting appropriate crop types, calculating productivity, etc.▸ Engineering applications: Soil information is used in urban planning, evaluation of construction materials, site selection, foundation design, design of water conveyance and flood control structures, etc.▸ Hydrology and Hydrogeologic assessments: Including groundwater prospecting, groundwater and surface flow characterization, water pollution, modelling floods and droughts, ▸ Environmental assessments: As assessment of natural phenomenon including climate modelling, land degradation assessment, sediment transport and deposit into water bodies, global circulation, vegetation dynamics, modelling heat and carbon sinks, pollution control, environmental impacts, reclamation, remediation, etc.▸ Policy decisions: Especially for national planning, resources allocation, economic development, when, where, and what crop or vegetation to promote, conservation of natural resources, formulation of laws and regulation of use of natural resources, preservation of environment, etc.These uses have various levels of data demand in terms of accuracy, scale/spatial extent, temporal resolution, and details in metadata.Soil information exists at various spatial scales.Users of this information need to know the potential and limitations of available soil data at the various scales, where soil data is archived and whether there are any access restrictions or information gaps, and opportunities for collaborative work to improve soil information.To this end, a workshop on soil information was organized under Pillar 4 of the Global Soil Partnership "Towards Global Soil Information: activities within the GeoTask Global Soil Data" (http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/gSp/downloads/gSp_Soilinformation_ workshopReport.pdf).A key outcome of this workshop was the recognition of a need for assessing the state of the art of global and regional information.The present document represents an attempt to assemble relevant information on existing soil data at various scales throughout the world and on-going regional and global soil mapping initiatives.It aims ata) increasing users' awareness on existing soil data and information,b) encouraging informed and accurate application of it,c) understanding user needs in terms of soil data and information andd) understanding demands on soil data and information under the challenges of food security and climate change.The document is organized into four broad sections: ▸ Existing soil legacy data and information Existing soil data is a key factor to build accurate soil information.There is a huge reservoir of existing legacy soil data in many countries in the form of soil maps, soil profile descriptions and analyses.Given the time and resources invested in gathering this soil information, it's important to acknowledge these existing datasets and exploit their potential.This document reviews legacy soil data and highlights how this data can be accessed.▸ Soil user needs Knowledge of soil data requirements of the soil user community and related stakeholder groups is important because soil information is generated to benefit the intended users.This document conducted an online survey on user requirements.Although the survey was not exhaustive, it gave highlights on the general nature of information expected from soil scientists and soil maps.▸ State of the art on methods and tools for digital soil mapping Digital soil mapping (DSM) is a new technological advancement that seeks to fulfil the increasing worldwide demand in spatial soil data through more rapid and accurate production and delivery of soil information and increased coverage and improved spatial resolution of mapped areas.New tools and methods are constantly being developed to support DSM.This document explores these tools to highlight their potential for improving user access to accurate soil information.▸ On-going global and regional soil mapping initiatives Several endeavours are being made globally, and in different regions, to coordinate soil information generation, share soil data and improve access to soil information.These endeavours need to be identified and catalogued, acknowledged, and, if possible, coordinated more effectively.2. Soil legacy data and information The term legacy soil information is used for all existing soil information collected to characterize or map soils.The majority of such information was collected by soil surveys that included landscape and site descriptions, soil profile morphological descriptions and laboratory analysis of the main chemical, physical and biological soil properties.This information has typically been synthesized in paper soil maps that consist of polygons (soil mapping units) containing a description of soil units named and characterized by a national or international soil classification.Detailed, sometimes georeferenced, information on the sampled soil profiles (point information) has been frequentlycollected and published in reports that accompany soil maps.In recent years there has been a considerable effort to capture this information in digital form (databases, digital maps) and some organizations have compiled and harmonized this local and national soil information at regional to global scales.In addition, for ease of combination with other kinds of information layers in GIS, some soil maps have been rasterized to a regular grid.Global soil maps and databases usually contain information on soil properties associated with the soil units described as being present in the polygons of the map, while global soil profile databases contain information on the soil classification unit they belong to.It is therefore somewhat arbitrary to subdivide the available soil information into categories of "mapped" and "point" information or in "global", "regional" or "national" information as these are often interrelated.We focus first on information presented at a global scale that is of particular interest to global policy makers and modellers.Next the availability of soil information, both in map and soil profile forms, at regional and at national scale is discussed.Detailed local soil surveys, which represent the bulk of soil information collected to date, are not discussed.One of the best general websites that lists the achievements of soil survey to date can be found at: http://www.itc.nl/~rossiter/research/ rsrch_ss.html The FAO-UNESCO Soil Map of the World (FAO-UNESCO, 1971 -1980 is presently the only, fully consistent, harmonized soil inventory at the global level which is readily available in digital format.It was published between 1974 and 1980 in 19 separate sheets at a mapping scale of 1:5 million.The map was based on information contained in some 11000 separate large-scale maps.Its development started as a project originated by a motion of the ISSS at the Wisconsin congress in 1960.It was first digitized by ESRI in vector format in 1984.The paper map contains 26 major soil groups, which are further subdivided into 106 individual soil units (FAO-UNESCO, 1974) .The map was later digitized by FAO (1995) with a grid resolution of 5' x 5' (or 9 km x 9 km at the equator) (Nachtergaele, 2003) .The digitized version, known as Digital Soil Map of the World (DSMW), contains a full database in terms of composition of the soil units, topsoil texture, slope class, and soil phase in each of its more than 5000 mapping units.The map is downloadable at: http://www.fao.org/geonetwork/srv/en/resources.get?id=14116&fname=dSmw.zip&access=private.Transformations of the DSMW to reflect other soil classification systems such as the USDA Soil Taxonomy (Eswaran and Reich, 2005) and the World Reference Base for Soil Resources (FAO/EC/ ISRIC, 2003) have also been published, but do not contain any additional information compared to the original map.The Harmonized World Soil Database (HWSD, FAO/IIASA/ISRIC/JRC/CAS, 2006), contains a digital soil map of the world, with soil units classified in the Revised FAO Legend (FAO 1990 ) at a fixed grid resolution of 1km by 1km, with associated soil properties and soil qualities.This digital global dataset is not fully harmonized, as it is based 40% on the original DSMW and 60% on regional and national updates undertaken after the DSMW was completed.(Figure 2 .1)It should be acknowledged that the 1km grid resolution used in the DSMW parts of the database is not fully justified given the lower resolution of the base material used in the DSMW part of the map.Presently, the HWSD contains over 16000 mapping units, which are used to link to a database of soil attribute data.The result is a 30 arc-second raster database consisting of 21600 rows and 43200 columns with each grid cell linked to the harmonized soil property data.This linkage of mapping units to the soil attribute data offers the opportunity to display or query the database in terms of soil units or in terms of selected soil parameters (such as Organic Carbon, pH, water storage capacity, soil depth, cation exchange capacity of the soil and the clay fraction, total exchangeable nutrients, lime and gypsum contents, sodium exchange percentage, salinity, textural class and granulometry both for topsoil as subsoil layers).Although not fully harmonized and consistent, the HWSD contains the most up-to-date and consistent global soil information that is currently available and continuously updated.The Harmonized World Soil Database v1.2, is downloadable at: http://webarchive.iiasa.ac.at/Research/luC/external-world-soil-database/hTml/.In addition, the website contains freely downloadable software for visualising, querying, and retrieving the data.Figure 2 .2 is an example of the database as visualized through the data viewer.The International Soil Reference and Information Centre (ISRIC) World Inventory of Soil Emission Potential (WISE) International soil profile database is presently the only freely available and comprehensive repository of global primary data on soil profiles.ISRIC was established in 1966 with a focus of serving the international community with information about the world's soils.Through its WISE project, ISRIC has consolidated select attribute data for over 10,250 soil profiles, with some 47,800 horizons, from 149 countries in the world.Profiles were selected from data holdings provided by the Natural Resources Conservation Service (USDA-NRCS), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO-SDB), and ISRIC itself (ISRIC-ISIS).Nachtergaele et al.,2012) 2. Soil legacy data and information The location of the WISE soil profiles worldwide is illustrated in Figure 2 .3.The data can be downloaded at http://www.isric.org/data/isric-wise-global-soil-profile-data-ver-31) .Individual profiles in the ISRIC-WISE database were sampled, described, and analyzed according to the methods and standards in use in the countries from where the data originated.The soil attribute data contained in the ISRIC-WISE database are given in Table 2 .1, but not all soil profiles in the database contain all these attributes.In order to harmonize the data, ISRIC developed criteria to streamline analytical methods, soil classification scheme, data formatting, and documentation (Batjes, 2008) .This harmonization was an important step towards achieving data quality control and building a relational database that can be linked with other secondary data attributes such as mapping units of derived soil maps.Apart from data quality control,ISRIC has also developed a metadata service that allows soil data users to search and retrieve on-line soil data from the depository (http://www.isric. org/data/metadata-service).This is a powerful soil information service tool that helps data users to quickly locate and retrieve the kind of data they need.The tool is also an efficient way of managing soil information for a large pool of data users.It is important to note that all the data at ISRIC are held under the General Public Licence (GPL) (http://www.isric.org/data/data-policy), to encourage wide application of soil information.This database contains worldwide soil carbon and nitrogen data for more than 3,500 soil profiles.It was started by Zinke et al. (1986) with the collection and analysis of soil samples from California.Afterwards, additional data came from soil surveys of California, Italy and Greece, Iran, Thailand, Vietnam, various tropical Amazonian areas, U.S. forest soils, and from other published soil surveys.The main samples for laboratory analyses were collected at uniform soil depth increments and included bulk density determinations, but samples reported in the literature did not always have this uniformity.For the latter group of samples, only profiles that were sampled to a meter depth or to actual depth were used.Where bulk densities were not reported estimates were made from regressions based on organic carbon content of the soil samples associated with the profile.The methods used for analytical carbon determinations were dry combustion, 'wet combustion', or loss on ignition with adjustments made to the values obtained with the last two methods.Nitrogen was determined by the Kjeldahl method on the soil fine earth fraction and reported as total organic nitrogen (Zinke et al., 1986) .Figure 2 .4 shows the distribution of the sample locations for the database.The data can be downloaded at http://daac.ornl.gov/SOilS/guides/zinke_soil.html The WISE database discussed in the section 2.1.3 contains measured soil properties associated with a geo-referenced soil profile.The HWSD contains derived soil properties obtained by taxo-transfer functions that estimate a value for a soil property from a soil's taxonomic soil unit name, its topsoil texture class and the depth at which it occurs.Pedo-transfer functions, more generally, estimate the value of a soil property using values of one or more other known soil properties and site characteristics.The spatial distribution of these measured or estimated properties is one subject of pedometrics and is the basis for Digital Soil (Property) Mapping discussed in Chapter 4. It is important to realize that there is a fundamental difference between describing soil as a natural body with a morphology and a range of properties and characteristics as done in WISE and mapped in DSMW and HWSD, and the measurement and mapping of the distribution of soil properties only, as is frequently done in Digital Soil Mapping.However, the main user community and policy makers are often more interested in the value (and the change) of specific soil properties than in the spatial distribution of soil units described as extensive natural bodies.Another issue in this respect is the accuracy of geo-referenced values associated with map polygons and point locations.In soil maps values are reported as a distribution within a mapping unit or in a regular raster grid cell, while in continuous DSM mapping of soil properties values concern unique points and the distribution of values between points.A number of soil property maps available for the whole world are discussed in the following sections.Apart from holding primary WISE datasets, ISRIC, in cooperation with FAO and IIASA, has also developed algorithms for deriving other secondary datasets.These datasets are available at http:// www.isric.org/data/data-download.The harmonized dataset of derived (or estimated) soil properties for the world was created using the soil distribution shown on the 1:5 million DSMW and soil parameter estimates derived from ISRIC's global soil profile database.(Batjes, 2002 , 2006 and Batjes et al. 1995 .This dataset considers 19 soil variables that are commonly required for agroecological zoning, land evaluation, crop growth simulation, modelling of soil gaseous emissions, and analyses of global environmental change.They include: soil drainage class, organic carbon content, total nitrogen, C/N ratio, pH (H2O), CECsoil, CECclay, effective CEC, base saturation, aluminium saturation, calcium carbonate content, gypsum content, exchangeable sodium percentage (ESP), electrical conductivity, particle size distribution (i.e. content of sand, silt and clay), content of coarse fragments (> 2 mm), bulk density, and available water capacity (-33 to -1500 kPa).These estimates are (zinke et al., 1986) (Zinke et al., 1986) presented as aggregated mean values by DSMW mapping unit for fixed depth intervals of 20 cm up to 100 cm (or less when appropriate).The associated soil property values were derived from analyses of some 10, 250 profiles held in ISRIC-WISE using a scheme of taxonomy-based taxo-transfer rules complemented with expert-rules.The type of rules used to derive the various soil property values have been flagged in the database to provide an indication of the possible confidence in the derived data.These can be downloaded at: http://www.isric.org/sites/default/files/private/datasets/ wise5by5min_v1b_0.zip.Soil quality is the capacity of a specific type of soil to function within natural or managed ecosystem boundaries, to sustain plant and animal productivity, maintain or enhance water and air quality, and support human health and habitation (Karlen et al., 1997) .On the basis of soil parameters provided by the HWSD global soil database, IIASA and FAO have calculated seven key soil qualities important for crop production at the global scale in the framework of the Global Agro-ecological Zoning project (GAEZ).They include soil quality with respect to: nutrient availability, nutrient retention capacity, rooting conditions, oxygen availability to roots, excess salts, toxicities, and workability.These soil qualities are considered to be related to the agricultural use of the soil and more specifically to maize crop requirements and tolerances .Figure 2 .5 is an example of one of the soil qualities with respect to nutrient availability, which is a deciding factor for successful low level input farming and to some extent also for intermediate input levels.In this example, the important soil characteristics used in estimating the soil quality of the topsoil (0-30 cm) are: Texture/Structure, Organic Carbon (OC), pH and Total Exchangeable Bases (TEB).For the subsoil (30-100 cm), the most important characteristics considered were: Texture/structure, pH and Total Exchangeable Bases (TEB) .Other soil quality indices are freely downloadable from the FAO GeoNetwork GAEZ website at: http://www.fao.org/nr/gaez/en/.The Distributed Active Centre (DAAC) for global soil, a repository maintained by the Oak Ridge National Library (ORNL) in Tennessee, U.S.A, contains derived data on a number of soil properties (http://daac.ornl.gov/cgi-bin/dataset_lister.pl?p=19).Although some of these are outdated, some such as the global annual soil respiration data are unique and therefore mentioned here.2. Soil legacy data and information This data set is a compilation of soil respiration rates (g C m -2 yr -1 ) from terrestrial and wetland ecosystems reported in the literature prior to 1992 Schelsinger, 1992, 2001) .The soil respiration rates are reported to have been measured in a variety of ecosystems to examine rates of microbial activity, nutrient turnover, carbon cycling, root dynamics, and a variety of other soil processes.The data can be freely downloaded from the following website: http://daac.ornl.gov/SOilS/guides/raich_respiration_guide.html.This dataset is also distributed by DAAC and gives the plant-extractable water capacity of soil, defined as the amount of water that can be extracted from the soil to fulfil evapotranspiration demands.Its derivation involved creation of a representative soil profile, characterized by horizon (layer) particle size data and thickness, from each soil unit of the DSMW.In this database, soil organic matter was estimated empirically from climate data while plant rooting depths and ground coverage were obtained from a vegetation characteristic dataset.At each 0.5-by 0.5-degree grid cell where vegetation is present, unit available water capacity (cm water per cm soil) was estimated from the sand, clay, and organic content of each idealised profile horizon, and integrated over horizon thickness.Summation of the integrated values over the lesser of profile depth and root depth produced an estimate of the plant-extractable water capacity of soil.The data can be downloaded at http://daac.ornl.gov/SOilS/guides/dunneSoil.html.This is a database of the inherent capacity of soils to retain phosphorus (P retention) in various forms.It was built by considering the main controlling factors of P retention processes such as pH, soil mineralogy, and clay content.First, estimated values for these properties were used to rate the inferred capacity for P retention of the component soil units of each DSMW map unit (or grid cell) using four classes (i.e., Low, Moderate, High, and Very High).Subsequently, the overall soil phosphorus retention potential was assessed for each mapping unit, taking into account the P-ratings and relative proportion of each component soil unit.Each P retention class was assigned to a likely fertilizer P recovery fraction, derived from the literature, thereby permitting spatially more detailed, integrated model-based studies of environmental sustainability and agricultural production at the global and continental level (< 1:5 million).Although the uncertainties still remain high, the analysis provides an approximation of world soil phosphorus retention potential.The data can be freely accessed at http://www.isric.org/sites/default/files/private/datasets/Soil_ phosphorus_Retention_potential_v1.zip The Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) of the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) has produced a number of soil maps and soil indices based on global climate, the FAO-UNESCO Digital Soil Map of the World and a number of modelling functions.The maps are: global soil groups, soil moisture regimes, soil temperature regimes, land quality, soil organic carbon, water holding capacity, etc.These maps are said to be drafts.They can be downloaded at http:// soils.usda.gov/use/worldsoils/mapindex/order.html.Figure 2 .6 portrays global soil regions as an example of the available maps.The soil map shows the distribution of the 12 soil orders according to US soil taxonomy.The advantage of having regional and continental soil information products is that they often provide a finer resolution than global soil maps and are, in principle, easier to harmonize because they use a single methodology (SOTER) and/or a single soil classification system which should, in principle, make border harmonization between countries easier.SOTER (an acronym for SOil and TERrain) is a methodology developed at ISRIC for storing and handling soils and terrain data.The methodology was initiated in 1986 by Wim Sombroek and taken up by the International Society of Soil Science (ISSS).At the time of its formulation, the long term aim of SOTER was to provide a global soil database at 1:1 million scale to replace the FAO/UNESCO Soil map of the World.The project was actively supported by FAO and UNEP.Underlying the SOTER methodology is the identification of areas of land with a distinctive, often repetitive, pattern of landform, lithology, surface form, slope, parent material, and soil.Tracts of land distinguished in this manner are named SOTER units.Each SOTER unit thus represents one unique combination of terrain and soil characteristics.The database is composed of sets of files for use in a Relational DataBase Management System (RDBMS) and in a Geographic Information System (GIS) (van Engelen and Wen, 1995) .The SOTER regional soil databases were assembled from national legacy data such as maps (e.g. national exploratory and/or reconnaissance soil maps, topographic maps, land cover maps, etc) and attribute soil data.Regional SOTER databases prepared to date consist of: These SOTER databases are available on CD-ROM from FAO and downloadable on-line from ISRIC at http://www.fao.org/nr/land/pubs/digital-media-series/en/ and http://www.isric.org/projects/ soil-and-terrain-database-soter-programme ▸ SOTER These regional soil databases have been developed at different scales ranging from 1:5 million to 1:500 000, largely related to the scale of the original national soil information.Although the information sources were assembled according to the same SOTER methodology, there were variations in specific level of soil map and soil profile information in each region, which resulted in variation in the scale and contents of the end products ( Figure 2 .7).These differences, as well as data gaps, the emergence of new information (digital elevation models) and development of new ways to process soil data (digital soil mapping) prompted the revision of the SOTER methodology in a project led by ESBN.The results of this revised methodology (referred to as e-SOTER) have been summarized by Van Engelen (2012).The regional SOTER databases were a major input in the Harmonized World Soil Database and, as such, have significantly contributed to the development of this global product.However, the long term future of SOTER is somewhat in doubt, as countries can provide direct inputs to upgrade HWSD without preparing first a SOTER database.At the time of writing ESBN is still considering preparing a new SOTER product for Europe.The regional SOTER databases are discussed in more detail at the national level (section 2.4) as they are often the most recent, most complete and/or largest scale soil product available for many countries.This data set consists of a circumpolar map of dominant soil characteristics, with a scale of 1:10,000,000, covering the United States, Canada, Greenland, Iceland, northern Europe, Russia, Mongolia, and Kazakhstan.The map was created using the Northern and Mid Latitude Soil Database.The map is in ESRI Shapefile format, consisting of 11 regional areas.Polygons have attributes that give the percentage polygon area that is a given soil type.(Tarnocai et al., 2002) .The map was used to prepare a Soil Atlas of the Northern Circumpolar Region (JRC, 2004) , available at http://eusoils.jrc.ec.europa.eu/library/maps/Circumpolar/index.html.This map and database are of great importance for climate change studies, but unfortunately are made at a very small scale.The soils in the northern latitudes store up to half of the Earth's soil carbon; about twice the amount of the carbon stored in the atmosphere.The importance of this carbon sink is immeasurable.Permanently frozen ground keeps this organic carbon locked in the soil and, together with extensive peat lands, ensures that northern circumpolar soils are a significant carbon sink.The impact of global warming on soil and the increased temperatures in the Arctic and boreal regions are causing permafrost-affected areas to thaw thus ensuring that the huge mass of poorly decomposed organic matter that is presently locked in the frozen soil will start to decompose.As a result of this decay, significant quantities of greenhouse gases (e.g. CO 2 , CH 4 , N 2 O) could be released into the atmosphere.These emissions can initiate a snow-ball effect that will increase greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at an accelerating rate and greatly intensify the processes driving climate change.The European Commission, through the Joint Research Centre and its European Soil Bureau Network (ESBN), has prepared a 1:1 Million soil map of Europe with associated databases and applications (Fig 2.9) .In addition, ESBN is currently storing over 560 measured soil profiles (Figure 2 .10) and soil attributes from over 2650 horizons from member states (soil profiles, soil particle-size fractions, pH in water, organic carbon content (%), and dry bulk density) (Hiederer et al., 2006) .It has also developed methods for deriving analytical soil profiles from the existing legacy soil data (Hollis et al., 2006) .In addition to this soil database, ESBN has also archived soil legacy maps and is producing new soil maps.The network is presently building a soil information system for archived database with links to the soil database at the respective soil institutions of the member states.ISRIC World Soil Information is compiling legacy soil profile data for Sub Saharan Africa, as a project activity of the AfSIS project (Globally integrated Africa Soil Information Service project).http://www.africasoils.net/data/legacyprofile Africa Soil Profiles database, v. 1.0 (January 2012) identifies > 15700 unique soil profiles inventoried from a wide variety of data sources.From the > 14600 profiles that are geo-referenced, soil layer attribute data are available for > 12500 and soil analytical data for > 10000 profiles.Soil attribute values are standardized according to e-SOTER conventions and validated according to basic rules.Odd values are flagged.The degree of validation, and associated reliability of the data, varies because reference soil profile data, that are previously and thoroughly validated, are compiled together with non-reference soil profile data of lesser inherent representativeness.Updated milestone versions of this dataset have been posted online and made available to the project.The continuously growing dataset will also be made available through the World Soil Information Service upon continuation of the project activity.The current version is released here http://www.isric.org/data/africa-soil-profiles-database-version-01-0 version 1.0..These datasets could not have been compiled without the support of countries in the region, some of which have soil databases superior to those available in many industrial countries.This is particularly the case for Botswana, Kenya, Rwanda and South Africa.A comprehensive discussion of soil maps and databases in the tropics is given by Nachtergaele and Van Ranst (2003) .More than 20 years of collaboration between European soil scientists has resulted in the publication by the European Commission of the first ever "Soil Atlas of Europe".Based on soil data and information collected within the European Soil Information System (EUSIS) developed by the Joint Research Centre, the atlas illustrates in 128 pages of maps, tables, figures and graphs, the richness of European soil resources and the need for their sustainable management.The Atlas compiles existing information on different soil types in easily understandable maps covering the entire European Union and bordering countries.The publication is intended for the general public, aiming to 'bridge the gap' between soil science and public knowledge.By addressing the non-specialized audience, the Atlas will increase public awareness and understanding of the diversity of soils and of the need to protect this precious resource.In addition to the maps, the "Soil Atlas of Europe" contains an introduction to soil that explains the role and importance of soil, how soil is created, how to identify the soil in your garden, soil as a source of raw materials and the relationship between soil, agriculture, our cultural heritage, forests.Soil mapping and classification are also explained together with an illustrative and informative guide to the major soil types of Europe.The Atlas is available for download at:http:// eusoils.jrc.ec.europa.eu/projects/soil_atlas/Atlas_Contents.html The publication of the first Soil Atlas of Latin America and the Caribbean aims at presenting the relevance of soils as a natural resource and particularly its role in climate change and the carbon cycle.It is expected that such a publication will increase the visibility of the environment and its key natural resources to decisionmakers, the Latin American public in general and particularly its education community.The Soil Atlas of Latin America and the Caribbean belongs to the series of Soil Atlases published by the JRC in recent years.Its publication is foreseen for 2013.The soil Atlas of Africa is being produced by the Institute of Environment and Sustainability (IES) of the JRC in collaboration with ESBN, ISRIC, FAO, African Soil Science Society (ASSS), and the African Union (http://eusoils.jrc.ec.europa.eu/library/ maps/africa_atlas/index.html).This atlas shows the distribution of the main soil types in Africa (Figure 2 .11).It also contains derived maps at continental scale with descriptive text (e.g. vulnerability to desertification, soil nutrient status, carbon stocks and sequestration potential, irrigable areas and water resources) and more detailed sources of soil information for Africa.Its publication is foreseen for 2012.Two major general sources of national soil information are the digital archive of soil maps maintained at the JRC and the world soil survey archive and catalogue maintained at Cranfield University, United Kingdom.The Joint Research Centre (JRC), ISRIC-World Soil Information and FAO jointly worked to scan national soil legacy maps existing in hard copies at their premises.This effort has converted more than 6,000 paper soil maps from 135 countries into scanned digital copies.EuDASM's objective is to transfer paper-based soil maps into a digital format with the maximum possible resolution to ensure their preservation and easy disclosure.This is a tremendous resource of historical data, even though the digital maps have not been georeferenced.However, most scanned maps have overprinted grids which allow users to geo-reference the maps in GIS software.The scanned maps cover most countries in Africa, Asia, Europe and Latin America.The maps can be freely downloaded from the website http:// eusoils.jrc.ec.europa.eu/eSdb_Archive/.More information about this database can be obtained from .FAO's GeoNetwork gives access to environmental and related spatial data and information in order to support decision making.A significant number of soil maps and derived soil information is available at this site http://www.fao.org/geonetwork/srv/en/main.home that also contains metadata.The WOSSAC Archive is based at Cranfield University, UK.The archive consists of a soil reports section, soil maps and albums section, soil books section, aerial photography section, and a satellite imagery section of images collected in the past 80 years in more than 250 territories, principally by British companies and soil survey staff.The aims of WOSSAC are: ▸ To establish an accessible archive of hard copies of endangered soil survey reports, maps and other relevant materials.▸ To establish an interactive online catalogue of all surveys known, including those in the Archive at Cranfield and those remaining in company and private hands elsewhere.▸ Although WOSSAC is concentrating on British-sourced materials, its aim is to link the WOSSAC catalogue with other major databases, to form a global network of information on soil surveys.ISRIC's repository http://library.wur.nl/isric/ contains a rich collection of books and reports on soils.Presently, the WOSSAC Archive holds materials for some 276 countries and territories worldwide, some of which enjoy a better depth of coverage and representation than others (http://www.wossac. com/archive/index.cfm).A number of soil data and derived soil products are available for many Sub-Saharan African countries as national archived data in individual countries.Many of those have been scanned by the EuDASM archive (section 4.1).There are SOTER databases for large parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, such as SOTER for Southern Africa (SOTERSAF), for Central Africa (SOTERCAF), and for North-Eastern Africa.(SOTERNE).SOTERSAF was compiled from the SOTER database for Southern Africa at a scale of 1:1 M. The initial dataset covered national soil maps from Angola, Mozambique Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, and Tanzania.The SOTER methodology was applied to these maps by national soil institutes and FAO consultants.The SOTER database was then restructured and the GIS files were slightly modified by ISRIC, using the 90 m digital elevation model (DEM) derived from Shuttle Radar Topographic Mission (SRTM).The database can be found at http://www.isric.org/projects/soter-south-africa or can be obtained on CD ROM from FAO.SOTERCAF The majority of countries in the MENA region have rich soil datasets housed at their national institutes.However, these datasets still exist as hard copy maps and often do not cover the whole country.In some countries, the hard copies are in the process of being converted into digital copies.Few on-line sources exist in this region, apart from those maps inventoried by EuDASM (section 3.1).Digital georeferenced soil profile information is scarce, apart from that stored in Jordan.Some of the information mentioned in Table 2 .3 is not in the public domain (for instance the Soil Map of Saudi Arabia).There is no SOTER product available in the region, except for a national SOTER in Syria and Tunisia and the Egypt part of the SOTER for Northern and eastern Africa.National geographic soil databases in Asia are summarized in Table 2 .4.Soil information availability appears to be extremely varied with a number of countries having -to our knowledge -no national soil maps better, or more recent than, the one contained in the Digital Soil Map of the World and HWSD.This appears to be the case for Afghanistan, Bhutan, Cambodia, Korea Democratic Republic, Laos, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Vietnam.In other countries such as India, more detailed national soil information exists, but is not in the public domain.Some countries have developed sophisticated soil information databases on-line.In this respect, attention is drawn to Korea (http://asis.rda.go.kr.), China (http:// www.geodata.cn.) illustrated in Figure 2 .12, and Nepal (http://www.isric.org/data/ soil-and-terrain-database-nepal) .The digital soil and physiographic database for northern and central Eurasia (SOTEREA) covers China, Mongolia and all countries of the former Soviet Union.The database was derived from several sources such as the 1:2.5 Million Soil Map of the Former Soviet Union prepared by Friedland in the Dokuchaiev Institute, Moscow; the soil map of China at 1:4 million scale prepared by the Institute of Soil Science Chinese Academy of Science in Nan-Jing; and the SOTER database for China.Apart from selected examples in the report on soils of China, the database contains neither soil profile descriptions or soil analysis results.Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) National soil databases for the different countries in the LAC region are illustrated in Table 2 .5.The SOTER database for Latin America and the Caribbean (SOTERLAC) was first published as a CDROM by FAO in 1998.An updated version is now available at ISRIC.The database contains over 1800 soil profiles, soil attribute data, and derived soil properties and can be downloaded from: (http://www. isric.org/sites/default/files/private/datasets/SOTeRlAC2.zip).The derived soil properties in this database are presented by soil unit for fixed depth intervals of 0.2 m to 1 m depth.In addition to the Geographic Databases a number of countries have developed on-line access to soil information.This is, for instance, the case for Argentina , Columbia, Guatemala, Mexico, Paraguay, República Dominica and Paraguay.These and some other countries in the LAC region have prepared digital soil profile databases as illustrated in The National Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) was originally established by US Congress in 1935 as the Soil Conservation Service (SCS) and later expanded to become the leader for all natural resources, ensuring private lands are conserved, restored, and made more resilient to environmental challenges such as climate change.NRCS works with landowners through conservation planning and assistance designed to benefit the soil, water, air, plants, and animals and also with consequences on productive lands and healthy ecosystems.It works with landowners because 70% of the land in the United States is privately owned (http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/main/national/about).The NRCS publishes standardized digital soil geographic databases of the USA at two scales: 1:63,360 to 1:12,000 (previously named SSURGO) and 1:250,000 (previously named STATSGO).In addition, soils data are included in the time-series point samples of the National Resources Inventory (NRI).The soil database currently archived by the Service contains more than 20,000 pedons of U. S. Soils (Figure 2 .13).The Canadian Soil Information Service (CanSIS) manages and provides access to soil and land resource information on behalf of the federal, provincial, and territorial governments of Canada (http://sis. agr.gc.ca/cansis/).It maintains the national repository of soil information such as soil data, maps, technical reports, and standards and procedures through its National Soil Database (NSDB) (http:// sis.agr.gc.ca/cansis/nsdb/intro.html).The NSDB includes GIS coverage at a variety of scales and the characteristics of each soil series.The principal types of NSDB data holdings are summarized at http:// sis.agr.gc.ca/cansis/nsdb/intro.html .often have highly detailed soil maps (Belgium for instance is completely covered at 1:10 000 scale).Most countries in Central and Eastern Europe (including the European part of Russia) are covered by a SOTER database at 1:2.5 M scale (FAO/ISRIC/, 2000) that incorporates soil profile information.Some soil profile information is contained in SGDBE (see below) and as previously illustrated (Figure 2 .10) is rather scarce compared to other continents.The main reason is that these profiles (and the more detailed soil maps) are not in the public domain in many European countries.Soil Geographical Database of Europe at scale 1:1.000.000 Version 1 of this database (SGDBE) was digitised by Platou et al. (1989) et al., 1995) , forms the core of version 1.0 of the European Soil Database.The aim of the database is to provide a harmonised set of soil parameters, covering Europe (the enlarged EU) and bordering Mediterranean countries, to be used in agro-meteorological and environmental modelling at regional, national, and/or continental levels.Recently the Soil Geographical Database of Europe (SGDBE) has been extended in version 4.0, to cover Albania, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, FYROM (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.The most recent extension covers Iceland and the New Independent States (NIS) of Belarus, Moldova, the Russian Federation and Ukraine.Work is ongoing to incorporate soil data for other Mediterranean countries: Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey.In addition to these geographical extensions, the database has also experienced important changes during its lifetime.The latest major changes include the introduction of a new extended list of parent materials and, for coding major soil types, the use of the new World Reference Base (WRB) for Soil Resources (FAO, 1998) .The database is currently managed using the ArcGIS® Geographical Information System (GIS) software system and associated relational databases.The database contains a list of Soil Typological Units (STU) characterizing distinct soil types that have been identified and described.The STU are described by attributes (variables) specifying the nature and properties of the soils, for example: texture, moisture regime, stoniness, etc.It is not appropriate to delineate each STU separately thus STUs are grouped into Soil Mapping Units (SMU) to form soil associations.The criteria for soil associations and SMU delineation have taken into account the functioning of pedological relationships within the landscape.A detailed instruction manual for the compilation of data for the Soil Geographical Database of Europe version 4.0 has been published by Lambert et al. (2003) .An overview per country is given in Table 2 .7.The wealth of soil profile information that is being collected in Europe is well illustrated by Bullock et al., (1999) in Table 2 .8.Its availability however is much more problematic.Soil geographic database (SGDB) of Russia is archived at the Department of Soil Science, Lomonosov Moscow State University in collaboration with the Soil Institute.The database consists of a soil map of Russia at a scale of 1:2.5 M, representative soil profiles, and soil attributes which are linked to the mapping units of the soil map of Russia.More information about the database can be found at http://db.soil.msu.ru.A national soil profile collection for Russia is kept at IIASA and consists of 234 soil profiles, which are complete with soil attribute data.The dataset is freely available online and can be accessed from the following website: http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/FOR/russia_cd/download.htm.It has two tables: the first provides measured soil data and the second table one provides default values where measured data are lacking in the first table.The reference soil profiles come from numerous literature sources.The extent and practical importance were major reasons for the profile selection.Therefore, agricultural soils received priority in the database elaboration.While the collection aimed to cover all soils of Russia, there were problems with analytical data for some poorly investigated soils in the north, Siberia, and the Far East.The geographical distribution of measured soil referenced profiles is shown in Figure 2 .14.Two SOTER products cover Russia: SOTER for Central and Eastern Europe which includes the European part of Russia at 1:2.5 Million scale, including soil profiles for the dominant soils; and SOTER for northern Eurasia which includes the Asian part of Russia at 1:5 M scale without soil profile information.In New Zealand, the S-Map project was created as part of the government-funded Spatial Information programme run by Landcare Research to provide digital soil spatial information system for New Zealand (http://www.landcareresearch.co.nz/).The S-map project houses the national soils database for New Zealand and has its work still in progress.When completed, it will provide seamless digital soil map coverage for the country and at any scale from farm to region to nation.The National Soil Database (NSD) it houses is a 'point' database containing descriptions of about 1,500 New Zealand soil profiles, together with their chemical, physical, and mineralogical characteristics ( Figure 2.16) .An enormous amount of soil data has been collected up to date.The bulk of this information was gathered at local scale for agricultural (and other) development and monitoring processes.As soil survey work was driven by local problems, there was initially little harmonization in soil description, soil classification and soil analytical methods used.In recent years there has been growing agreement on each of these issues.The FAO Guidelines for Soil Profile Description (FAO, 2006) and the Soil Survey Manual of the USDA (USDA, 1993) are very similar and are now recognized as international standards.In soil classification the development of the World Reference Base for Soil Resources, itself largely based on the USDA Soil Taxonomy and the related FAO Legend for the Soil Map of the World, has made many national classifications converge towards a common approach and terminology.Certainly there is still no universal agreement on a unique system, but the large differences that existed in the past are narrowing.Standardization of soil laboratory methods has also made good progress, although significant differences remain for such crucial characteristics as texture and organic carbon measurements.From a policy side, a major reduction in funding by central Governments in most countries of the industrial world starting in the 1980's, resulted in the transfer of responsibility from central soil survey and research organisations to regional groups and/or private sector organisations.This introduces a number of difficulties, particularly a lack of uniformity in approach and methodology used, proliferation of different soil classifications, a lack of availability of the information after surveys have been completed and difficulties in harmonising the information at national and continental levels.(Bullock et al., 1999) .Soil data have not been collected everywhere with the same intensity, sometimes for obvious reasons.For example, where the climate is too dry, too cold or the slope too steep to support human uses soil information often remains scarce as there is little incentive (apart from research) to increase soil knowledge in these areas.Most, but not all, industrial countries have reasonable to highly detailed soil information available, while the situation in the developing world is more varied, as illustrated by the scale of the national country soil maps.Soil profile information is also very variable from country to country; while even where it is collected it is not always available to researchers or the general public.At a regional level the SOTER initiative has collected legacy soil maps and legacy soil profiles and organized these with a standardized methodology and soil classification system.This has allowed a certain regional harmonization of information for large parts of Africa, Europe, South America and the Caribbean.Lack of ongoing funding, however, has put the future of the SOTER programme in doubt.At the global level, the Harmonized World Soil Database brings together the available information from different national and regional soil mapping programs such as DSMW, SOTER, the national soil map of China and the European Geographic Database and is, at present, the only digital global soil product available.However, it is fundamental to emphasize that the time of collection of most of global and regional soil legacy data available dates back to the 1960s to 1990s.Therefore, currently, the global soil science community is limited in its ability to provide up to date data on the actual status of global and regional soil resources.There has been a considerable gap between the production of the unique world soil map and now, as no alternative up-to date soil information is available at this moment.This review of existing and available soil maps and databases globally and regionally is as interesting for what is omitted as for what is included.It can be reasonably assumed that past soil investigations, in most countries, have almost certainly resulted in the collection of hundreds of thousands to perhaps millions of field observations and tens to hundreds of thousands of laboratory analysed soil samples per country.The vast majority of these observations and analyzed soil samples have clearly never been collated or made available for inclusion in publically available, open databases.The significant effort required to assemble data for the relatively small number of analysed soil profiles included in the few existing global databases of analysed soil profile information (e.g. ISRIC-WISE) is indicative of how difficult it can be to obtain and collate previously collected soil profile data.This begs the question as to why historical soil profile observations and associated analytical data are so difficult to locate, obtain and collate into open, shared, international databases.Perhaps the entities that originally collected the historical field observations and conducted the laboratory analyses lacked the resources or mandates to enter these data into digital databases.Perhaps concerns about data ownership and intellectual property rights discouraged organizations from compiling data to share widely.Perhaps the local nature of most previous soil investigations precluded considering how locally collected data could be of interest, and use, in a wider, global context.Perhaps the lack of an available, and easy to access and use, global repository for accepting and curating soil profile data was the reason so much data never got shared.Whatever the reasons, the fact remains that only a very tiny fraction of previously collected field soil observations or previously analysed soil samples have ever been preserved and found their way into open and available global data bases of soil information.Perhaps it is time to consider how this oversight might be corrected in the future.Perhaps all it might take to encourage the capture and sharing of information about soil field observations and laboratory analysed soil samples is to provide a suitable, open, and easy to use platform to enable entry and sharing of such data for any and all entities that which to contribute their data.Perhaps if the global soil science community were provided with an opportunity to contribute their data on field observations and laboratory analyses to a centralized global facility for holding, harmonizing, curating and sharing soil data globally.It is hoped that the survey of existing soil information sources contained in this document will stimulate discussion of possible mechanisms by which collation and sharing of soil observations and data can be improved in the future.Quite often, statements such as "...according to soil users' requirements..." or "...targeting soil users' needs..." are common in documents justifying the production of soil spatial information.However, very little information exists in the literature clearly showing what the users' needs are.Although it is generally known that users of soil information attach particular reasons explaining the importance of soil to their applications, their specific concerns are seldom included in the design of soil information systems.Assessment of users' needs should therefore be an integral part of any soil information system and soil mapping activities before their conception, planning and implementation.There are some attempts, though, in the literature of organizations which have evaluated soil information users' needs prior to launching their soil information systems.The present document reviewed this literature in an attempt to draw lessons for future soil mapping activities.In addition, targeted interviews were also conducted with users to establish their needs and levels of satisfaction with the current supply of soil information.A limited literature was found on organizations that had carried out users' needs assessment.They include a survey on users of soil maps from British Columbia (Valentine et al., 1981) , ASRIS user needs assessment (Wood and Auricht, 2011), and Soil Atlas of Africa users' requirements (http://eusoils.jrc. ec.europa.eu/library/maps/africa_atlas/survey.html).In the case of users of soil maps from British Columbia, a survey was carried out in 1981 to establish whether or not soil maps and reports for British Columbia were providing the information required in a form that was intelligible to users who were not soil specialists.The survey was conducted on potential users of soil maps identified from such sources as professional association membership lists and the distribution list of the Resource Analysis Branch, Ministry of the Environment, Victoria, British Columbia.Results of the survey showed that: ▸ Users need site-specific soil information for the areas of their concern and that texture, slope and soil water content were the properties of highest importance ▸ Users need meta-data and information about mapping procedures and reliability, and simple but standard symbology for maps and legends Twenty seven years later, the findings of the British Columbia users' needs survey were still echoed in a different setting.ESBN in collaboration with FAO and African Soil Science Society (ASSS) conducted a user needs assessment in 2007 to get insight into the needs and wishes of users about the content of the soil atlas of Africa that they proposed to produce.The respondents were from Africa, Europe, America, Asia and various International Organizations.Although the objectives for this survey were different from those of British Columbia, its assessment results had similar features.It showed that: ▸ Users want site-specific soil information (preferably given country-wise) ▸ The descriptions of the soil types must contain information on their attributes/properties and distribution ▸ Supporting information must be included and incorporate degradation/conservation issues, and information on critical soil parameters (soil depth, soil texture, water-holding capacity) Recently, ASRIS also carried out soil information users' needs assessment in order to provide direction for the future development of Australian national soil data products that meet specific user requirements and are applicable to a broad range of soil data users (Wood and Auricht, 2011).The results showed that: ▸ Soil users seemed to have preference for information on key soil attributes such as soil moisture, nutrition, toxicity, biology and carbon.▸ Users want an easily accessible source of nationally consistent, authoritative, trusted, and well documented soil attributes available as downloadable data sets.▸ Links to comprehensive meta-data, including method descriptions, error and uncertainty and input source data (especially as it relates to any derived data layers) should be provided alongside soil data information.This is important so that users can assess the fitness for purpose of national data and further refine data sets for their specific needs.The results of these surveys seem to have a clear message of what users of soil information want irrespective of their geographic locations: need for metadata, importance of certain soil attributes, and preference for site-specific soil information.As part of the GSP framework regarding pillar 4 on enhancing soil information, an online survey was conducted to assess various aspects of users needs with regards to the existing soil information in the public domain.The survey questionnaire (see appendix 1) was sent out to soil information users throughout the world using contacts at international organizations, FAO country networks, representatives, individuals, among others.Altogether, there were 144 respondents who were categorized as farmers, researchers, planners, extension workers, etc. (Figure 3.1) .Researchers were the majority of respondents (66%), followed by Policy makers (17%).It seems the survey did not adequately represent respondents who were farmers, extension workers, and students.Farmers and extension workers are important categories of soil users who are directly involved with soil in food production and environmental conservation.Nonetheless, they are also known to rely greatly on researchers for synthesised soil information.Some of their user needs may still be reflected by the needs expressed by researchers.A large proportion of the respondents (78.3%) said they worked in public organizations, NGOs (12%), and private (5.6%) or parastatal organizations (5.6%).Only a small proportion worked in commercial enterprises (2.1%).22% used soil information in Europe as the location for application of soil information, 14.7% in LAC, 14.2% in Sub-Saharan Africa, and 9.6% used soil information at a global scale.The majority of the soil information users said they were frequent users (75%), which implies that they gave a promising representation of how trends in soil information dissemination have been affecting them.When asked about the general areas for which they use soil information, the majority of respondents said they use the information for research (17.5%) and for land degradation assessment (16.7%) (Table 3 .1).Only 1.5% (named "others" in Table 3 .1) used soil information for generation of extrapolation domains of improved technologies, creation of the soil data centre infrastructure, economic aspects/ valuation, climate change emission factors, biodiversity assessment, digital soil mapping, natural hazards zonation, or assessment of ecosystem services (Table 3 .1).Generally, most people prefer geo-referenced data (72%) compared to non-georeferenced data (28%).Furthermore, the largest group of soil information users said they often use soil profile data (33%), 23% use measured soil attribute data, 22% use soil-class maps, 21% soil properties maps, and 3% use outputs from soil models (pedo/taxo-transfer functions).The small proportion of respondents (3% ± 2%) who said they use outputs from soil models has some bearing on the relevance and validity of outputs from soil inference systems, which base their outputs on rule-based models to infer soil properties from other soil properties.This survey results portray an image of the majority of soil users not placing a high regard on outputs from inference systems.Soil physical and soil chemical properties are still the most requested of all the soil attributes (Figure 3 .2).Other soil attributes which are needed by a small fraction of other soil users include soil erosion data, soil mineralogical data, and information on management/productivity.The results of this survey tend to mirror what others found in similar previous users' needs surveys (Valentine et al., 1981; Wood and Auricht, 2011) ; thus, strengthening the need for more emphasis on development of more information on soil physical and chemical properties.In terms of soil-data type demand, the policy makers and researchers seem to have high variance of the data type demand (Figure 3.3) .They equally want all data types.Farmers want more of chemical properties, engineers more on soil profile characteristics, and modellers want more of soil physical properties.What type of soil data is necessary for your application?Proportion of respondents (%) Most of the users surveyed seemed to prefer site-specific soil information.32% said they have been working at the national scale, 30% at district scale and 16% at the plot level.In general, more than three-quarters of the respondents are working at national and sub-national scales.Only 9% seem interested in global scales (Figure 3.4) .It is interesting to note how policy makers target mainly farmers (at district and national scales), engineers work mostly at district and national levels, and global issues were left for modellers, researchers and consultants (Figure 3.4) .Consultants, policy-makers, and researchers also seem to have interest in regional issues, going by the relative proportions of their scales of operation at this level.The latitude of operation seems wide for consultants; they have a thorough mix of scales of operation.These results also show that global soil information can also influence local and regional policies to some extent.Soil information access is one of the widely quoted problems among data users.In this survey, soil users were asked to name their preferred mode of accessing data.32% of the respondents chose online tabulated data as their preferred mode of accessing soil data, 29% preferred online GIS layers such as maps, and 19% preferred online reports.In general, data available online seems to be preferred to offline or hard copy data.Modellers are top the list of those who prefer online data followed by engineers and policy makers.Farmers and consultants seem to prefer data available in hard copies.When accessing data, the issues that are most important for soil information users include whether data is freely downloadable, availability of georeferenced data, and potential transmission of computer virus (Figure 3.5) .File sizes and language used in the websites seem not to concern soil information users very much.Although almost 30% of the users suppose that soil data information should be cost shared, a large proportion (43%) of soil users seem undecided as to whether the cost should be shared or not.There are also those who are willing to trade data detail/accuracy with cost.Over half of the respondents (53%) felt that they would be comfortable with less accurate but free soil data.Engineers and consultants are the only groups of soil users who would accept to pay for more accurate data (Table 3. 2).Policy makers and researchers, however, can make do with less accurate but free soil information.In fact, they are the majority of those who feel that soil data collected at public expense should be freely availed to the public.Apart from data access issues, there are various aspects of soil data that users of soil information tend to find inadequately addressed.Issues such as methodology of data generation, reliability of the methods, etc. have been shown to be critical for data users.This survey evaluated the level of importance data users attach to these issues.The results showed that accuracy/reliability, availability of soil attributes, GPS coordinates, methodology for data generation, and scale are the most important aspects that users would like to have (Figure 3 .6).These same issues have also been observed in the previous users' needs survey in the literature (Valentine et al., 1981) .Interestingly, copyright issues, classification scheme, number of publications, and whether soil maps are pixel-based or polygon-based do not appear as important to users of soil data.This result has implications on the clamour for pixel-based mapping that has been vigorously promoted in the past few years.The areas that users of soil information think should be strengthened in order to improve soil information use include online data dissemination, measured soil attributes, standardization, and acknowledgements of people involved in data generation (Table 3. 3).They also would wish to see charges on data acquisition eliminated or reduced.Can you rank the importance of the following aspects of soil data and information according to your application?The results of the online survey and the literature review show that the majority of soil information users are keen on georeferenced soil data.Since most users seem to be working at the national and sub-national levels, the soil mapping activities generating soil information should give priority to farm, district, and national scales.The details they would prefer to see included in the soil information database are: ▸ measured soil attributes (physical, chemical, and biological properties) ▸ georeferenced locations where the measurements were carried out, ▸ Metadata describing the methods used in data generation, accuracy/reliability, dates of measurements, etc Although users were divided on their preference for pixel-based or polygon-based soil maps, they are unanimous that the maps should be of fine resolution and relevant to their areas of interest.Furthermore, the maps should also be enriched with the following information: The concepts on which soil inference systems are based are still not well appreciated by many users.The majority of soil information users do not seem to prefer use of model outputs as substitutes Many soil users would like to have free access to soil information.They think that if soil information is generated at public expense, then the resulting generated information should be freely availed to the public.The preferred mode of disseminating the information is through the internet.Users would like to have the convenience of downloading relevant data rather than having to search widely for the information.This implies that the custodians of soil information systems tasked with data storage and dissemination should consider online repositories as much as is possible.In addition, the following suggestions were extracted from user suggestions with regard to data dissemination: ▸ Inclusion of versatile, user-friendly, web-based data storage and retrieval systems ▸ Acknowledgement of data sources and methodology for data generation ▸ Data legends, metadata, and relevant documentation of the data should be included in the dissemination approaches used ▸ Reduction or removal of data access restrictions ▸ Computer virus-free data access While it is evident that the number of respondents was not as large as hoped for this survey, bibliographic research and past experiences showed that this is a common trend.The main reasons behind low participation are as follows:a) accessibility to soil information users,b) limited access to internet in some countries,c) willingness to invest time in responding to another survey.However, this survey provides a very general overview of what is expected in terms of soil information.The main message from this exercise is that any soil mapping activity should target surveying their users before starting their activities, as soil mapping should be a demand-driven activity.ANd TOOlS FOR SOil mAppiNg Soil maps provide descriptions of spatial and temporal attributes of soil and landscape.Soil mapping has traditionally involved the development of an understanding of soil forming processes which is then applied to predict the location of classes of soil types and the likely range of within-class variation of soil properties.Recently, there has been a growing realisation among many soil scientists that spatially extensive and available environmental data layers can be effectively utilized to represent various components of soil forming factors and processes with a view to improving soil mapping.Digital Soil Mapping (DSM) is a new technology soil scientists are now using to map soil properties based on plausible relationships between sparsely available observations of soil properties and extensively available environmental data layers.DSM is the computer-assisted production of soil property maps or the creation and the population of a geographically referenced soil database generated using field and laboratory observation methods coupled with environmental data through quantitative relationships (Lagacherie et al. 2007) .DSM is a new approach for improving delivery of soil survey information.It was developed to address problems and limitations associated with traditional soil survey.Traditional soil survey has always had problems with the collection of representative soil data, cost implications in soil mapping, how to spatially represent soil properties in a soil map, and efficient delivery of accurate soil information, among others.These problems have hampered access to, and wide application of, accurate soil information.DSM is a technological advancement that seeks to improve the processing, accuracy, and delivery of soil information at various scales worldwide.These potentials are some of the aspects that users of soil information are seeking.Although DSM offers the promise of improved delivery of soil information and increased coverage of mapped areas, it also has its share of challenges just like any other technology.This document looked at the potential and challenges of DSM with regard to providing soil information that can satisfy soil user requirements.DSM evolved from the state-factor soil forming paradigm developed by Jenny (1941) for describing the relationship between soil formation and distribution.In this paradigm, the soil profile characteristics are governed by climate, organisms, relief, parent material, and time, which are known as soil forming factors.If the relationship between soil profile characteristics and soil forming factors is known, as well as the distribution of soil forming factors, then the distribution of soil profile characteristics can be inferred (or predicted) from the distribution of soil forming factors.In early soil mapping activities, the emperical relationship between soil profile characteristics and soil forming factors was related to Jenny's equation and was implemented by surveyors/pedologists using conceptual soil-landscape relation models (Hudson, 1992) .The soil surveyors/pedologist used this mental model to produce a soil map by relating field observations of classified soil profiles along with less detailed augered soil observations to local information on the spatial distribution of soil forming factors principally extracted from the interpretation of aerial photographs but supplemented with consideration of relevant maps of environmental factors.Some soil scientists later developed quantitative models to represent initial mental models for the sake of improving the soil mapping process.Equation 4.1 gives a general format for these models in which S p is the predicted soil property/type.= f ( cl, o, r, p, t et al., 1996; Zhu et al., 1997) .Further developments were made on the structure of Equation 4.1 by splitting it into two: deterministic and stochastic parts.The deterministic part modelled the soil-landscape relationship in a similar manner as Equation 4.1 while the stochastic part modelled the spatial variation of the soil attribute.Equation 4.2 gives the general structure of the improved model.S p = f ( cl, o, r, p, t ) + ε Equation 4.2 where ε is the stochastic component.Geostatistical methods such as kriging have been used to model the stochastic component (Burgess and Webster, 1980; Yasribi et al., 2009) .Improvements in technology for data capture (e.g. remote sensing and microwave, GPS, spectroscopy, etc.) coupled with computational advances have helped to improve predictive soil mapping.Soil maps and spatial soil information systems can now be created by mathematical models that account for the spatial and temporal variations of soil properties based on soil information and environmental surrogates of soil forming factors.This is the new paradigm in soil mapping (McBratney et al., 2003) .It relies on quantitative relationships between easily measured and extensive environmental covariates and more difficult to measure and less extensive observations of soil attributes to predict the soil attributes in locations for which direct measurements/observations were not made.The results of such quantitative prediction eventually help to populate the target geographic area (at a given spatial interval which is known as pixel size/resolution) with the soil information (Figure 4 .1).Soil mapping has traditionally involved the development of a conceptual understanding of soil forming processes which is applied to predict the spatial distribution of classes of soil.Often, descriptive and diagnostic soil profile characteristics are used to classify soil at sampled locations (Hole and Campbell, 1985; Boul et al., 1997) .For a long time, aerial photography and, to a limited extent, satellite imagery, provided the spatial context for predicting class-type soil maps.These class-type soil maps had artificial boundaries and divisions that were utilised to convey spatial and temporal variance in soil types and properties.Since the early 1990's, both the spatial and attribute data have been incorporated into computerised data bases and GIS to improve the utility and accessibility of soil data and information.Most traditional soil maps are still class-type with abrupt boundaries between soil types with the variation of soil properties mostly described as occurring across boundaries.Within the polygons of soil maps, internal variation may be inferred through reference to the presence of different classes of soil but the spatial pattern of this variation is not explicitly described or mapped.Recently, advances in DSM endeavour to produce an alternative means to map soil properties (and also sometimes soil classes), by correlating soil properties to ancillary information derived from digital environmental data layers, and by using spatial statistics to interpolate the soil properties (or classes) between pointobservations at known locations.So far DSM has been successful in producing soil property maps and representations of continuous variation of soil properties in the landscape while traditional soil mapping continues to be the more commonly used method for producing conventional class-type soil maps.In traditional soil mapping, relatively few sites are visited or sampled within the study area landscape, and predictions are made based on conceptual models that relate soil properties at the sampled sites to covariates as observed on aerial photographs or geology maps.The models and rules are often held tacitly in the minds of the soil surveyor and are rarely expressed in detail other than as soil mapping legends.In DSM, conceptual models of conventional soil survey are statistically translated into quantitative rules.At the core of DSM is soil (data from traditional soil mapping) and digital environmental data layers.These are used to construct the quantitative models for mapping.DSM is therefore not so much a replacement for traditional soil mapping, but rather a compliment that extends and qualtifies conventional soil mapping approaches.As with traditional soil survey and mapping, DSM relies on inputs of detailed field and laboratory based soil data, an understanding of soil formation and impact processes, and the availability of spatially explicit and relevant environmental covariate data.Although DSM aims at producing digital soil maps, it is also a process for producing geographically referenced databases at a given spatial resolution.The digital soil maps form a spatial database of soil attributes (properties), which together with the existing databases of samples of the landscape at known locations contribute to soil information.In addition to building soil database, digital soil maps should also describe the uncertainties associated with spatial predictions.DSM process characteristically involves three stages: stage I is concerned with development and assessment of inputs; stage II is where the choice of methods and tools is made; and stage III is where the spatial inference system is developed and applied (Figure 4.2) .In general, DSM can be said to have the following features: ▸ Use of soil survey outputs (field and profile observations and soil maps) as a key input ▸ It is oriented towards modelling and computer applications ▸ Its outputs go beyond the production of soil maps (mostly raster/pixel-based) 4. State of the art methods and tools for soil mapping 4.5 Input for DSM 4.5.1 Soil legacy data: meaning, characteristics, and types The term 'legacy data' has been mentioned in hundreds of journal articles and technical documents on soil mapping.In general, legacy data are those that have been stored in an old format or inherited from languages, platforms and techniques earlier than the current technology.They have the following characteristics: ▸ They were collected using the traditional/conventional technology ▸ Data documentation is not elaborate in most cases ▸ Older data may have missing author information or institutional knowledge ▸ They may require elaborate steps to access, process, and apply with the current technology ▸ They are very important/mandatory as they form the basis for the current advancements In soil, legacy data take the form of: Legacy data are the foundation (and sometimes building blocks) for DSM.They can be used as calibration/validation samples, as skeletons for developing DSM (where new samples fill the gaps), and for reducing the cost and difficulties in obtaining new samples for DSM.Legacy data are available in many national soil institutes, regional soil information systems, and global initiatives such as ISRIC and HWSD.The previous chapters of this document have described some of these sources of legacy data.Although legacy data have a key role in DSM, they are inherently problematic to use with the current technology.The following are the main areas where the legacy data pose difficulties for use in DSM: ▸ Data gaps with large regions lacking any available legacy data ▸ Inconsistent format/ measurement units or symbols between and sometimes within datasets ▸ Access and copyright issues ▸ Bulkiness/storage formats ▸ Challenges in dealing with the time gap and associated biophysical-geochemical changes that have occurred in representative areas since the collection of the legacy data.These changes are often ignored/over-looked when integrating legacy data with the current DSM data.The need to weight or transform the legacy data in order to conform with the current DSM data is a potential source of inaccuracy.▸ Coordination and structures for data sharing are still needed to improve access to the legacy data.More resources are needed to enrich the legacy data through: ▸ Additional soil survey/soil sampling ▸ Data recovery efforts for existing legacy data ▸ Conversion (digitization) of legacy data into user-friendly formats for the current technology.▸ Improved storage and access to legacy data The following steps are suggested when converting the legacy data into digital formats: ▸ Harvesting/collection of legacy data ▸ Extract possible information from the legacy data such as legends, symbols, units, etc ▸ Identify existing georeferenced points that can be pinned (e.g. hard targets, latitudes and longitude lines on maps, etc) ▸ Convert extracted information into a digital database ▸ Scan the hard copy maps and manually trace the maps.▸ Use software to clean and to re-assign colour codes on the scanned copies ▸ Georeference the cleaned outputs to a agreeable/standard projection Then, the final output can be easily integrated with the new datasets or new techniques in DSM.Environmental correlates represent the Jenny's soil forming factors given in Equation 4.1.They include climate, organisms, topographic relief, parent material, and space.Since they influence different aspects of the soil formation process, they often have some quantifiable relationship with the soil types/properties.Table 4 .1 gives a summary of the importance of the environmental correlates and their potential sources.4. State of the art methods and tools for soil mapping For environmental correlates to satisfy the needs of DSM, they need to have the following characteristics: ▸ They should be georeferenced so that their spatial coordinates contribute to the DSM model in Equation 4.1 ▸ They should be rasterized (or resolved) into pixels ▸ They should have uniform geographic projection and pixel resolution in order to be compatible with each other and with the soil legacy data ▸ They should be easily accessed/readily available ▸ They should be independent of each other (to avoid collinearity in DSM modelling) The most common sources of environmental correlates are: Digital Elevation Models (DEM), remote sensing images, land use and land cover maps, climate maps, and geology maps.Climate is the meteorological conditions, including temperature, precipitation, and wind, that characteristically prevail in a particular region.Climate data may exist as point data or as raster files.There are some websites which host such datasets at the global scale (see for example http:// www.worldclim.org/, http://data.giss.nasa.gov/gistemp/, http://precip.gsfc.nasa.gov/ or the FAOCLIM at http://www.fao.org/nr/climpag/pub/eN1102_en.asp).Individual countries, through the meteorological departments, also have their own climate data.Land surface elevation and the shape and features of the surface form topography.Landscape topography can be obtained from direct survey using levelling instruments or from remote sensing data (such as aerial photographs, LIDAR, radar, etc).Digital Elevation Model (DEM) is one of the forms et al., 2005) .DEM can be a raster-(a grid of pixels representing elevation) or vector-based dataset (e.g. Triangular Irregular Network, TIN).Freely downloadable DEM data for the whole world are available As GTOPO30 (http://eros.usgs.gov/#/Find_data/products_and_data_Available/gtopo30_info) which has 1 km pixel resolution, SRTM (http://dds.cr.usgs.gov/srtm/) which 90 m pixel resolution, or ASTER GDEM (http://asterweb.jpl.nasa.gov/gdem.asp) which has 30-m pixel resolution.High resolution DEM datasets may also freely available for some countries or sold per scene.DEM generated from remote sensing data often has problems which must be overcome before they are suitable for soil mapping.Many algorithms and software are available for correcting the DEMs (Lee et al., 2003; Xeujun et al., 2008) .Once corrected, DEMs can be used to derive terrain parameters needed for soil mapping (Table 4 .1).To this end, there are also many algorithms and software that have been developed for deriving different terrain parameters (see for example, http://www.sagagis.org; McMillan et al., 2003; Smith and Clark, 2005) .Remote sensing is the acquisition of information about an object or phenomenon, without making physical contact with the object.Different remote sensing techniques use different wavelengths of energy (as seen in the electromagnetic spectrum), such as visible, infrared, gamma rays, microwave, etc.Whichever the remote sensing technique, the general principle involves acquisition of the characteristic of an object (known as image of the object) through radiations which have been reflected or emitted by the object.The energy path for the radiations starts from the energy source to the object (which then reflects/emits the radiation) to the detector (or sensor) (Figure 4 .3).Examples of sensors include digital camera, satellite sensor, etc.Satellite sensors are onboard aircrafts/satellites which fly above the earth's surface, so that the earth's surface is the object that reflects the energy radiations.Remote sensing can be generally categorized into four broad groups for soil mapping: optical remote sensing (which relies on solar energy or artificial light (e.g. torch in diffuse reflectance, etc) as source of radiation), remote sensing due radiation from own body temperature (e.g. thermal radiation from the earth's surface), remote sensing using long waves (e.g. microwave, radio, NMR, etc), remote sensing using very short waves (e.g. gamma and x-rays) (Rees, 2001 ).Whichever the system used, the emitted or reflected energy in remote sensing is analyzed to produce information about the characteristics of the object.These characteristics include: Some sensors can only detect bands of wavelengths while other can distinguish small differences in wavelengths of reflected/emitted radiations.In the scientific field of remote sensing, this ability is known as spectral resolution.The higher the spectral resolution the more the sensor can detect many wavelengths of reflected radiations.Similarly, satellite sensors have different abilities to distinguish adjacent objects reflecting energy radiations.This ability is known as spatial resolution.Sensors with fine spatial resolution can distinguish objects which are separated by only a few metres (or centimetres) while those with coarse spatial resolution can only distinguish objects which are tens/ hundreds of metres (or kilometres) apart.Lastly, satellite sensors which go round the earth have the opportunity to take images of a particular spot on the earth's surface many times depending on 4. State of the art methods and tools for soil mapping how long they take to revisit the same spot during their revolution.This aspect of satellites is known as temporal resolution.All together, satellites' spectral, spatial and temporal resolutions enable detection of features and changes of the earth's surface with time and space.These features and changes are used by soil scientists to identify possible landscape patterns and associations, which can be related to different soil types/soil properties.Different remote sensing images (due to differences in sensors and satellite missions) such as Landsat, SRTM, MODIS, AVHRR, ASTER, etc have different resolutions which are exploitable in DSM to capture varied aspects of the landscape.Table 4 .2 gives examples of common remote sensing sensors which can be used in DSM.They can be grouped into three classes: satellite-based, airborne, and proximal sensors.Information about availability, cost, and acquisition dates of the remote sensing images can be readily obtained from the internet.Since remote sensing images can infer information about landscape characteristics, they have been used as proxy variables to assess relationships between the landscape characteristics they represent and soil legacy data.Furthermore, their spatially explicit nature (i.e. georeferenced pixels which cover the entire landscape of interest) is often used to support spatial mapping of soil in the landscape.Examples of the landscape characteristics commonly represented by remote sensing images in DSM are: Terrain attributes -from DEM; Land use/cover -using multispectral images such as Landsat, SPOT, Quickbird, etc.; Parent material -from gamma-ray spectrometry.There is plethora of literature on how these landscape characteristics can be obtained from the remote sensing data (see for example Cook et al., 1996; McMillan et al., 2005; Melesse et al., 2007; Xie et al., 2008) .▸ Parent material denotes the underlying geologic material, superficial or drift deposits from which soil is formed.DSM data on soil parent material can be obtained from existing geological maps or through the use of remote sensing data such as gamma rays.Freely downloadable geological map of the world at a scale of 1:35M is available at http://mrdata.usgs.gov/geology/world/.High resolution geological maps of other countries can also be found at http://geology.about.com/od/maps/geologic_maps.htm or from websites of individual countries.Parent material can also be obtained through the use of gamma-rays spectrometry, which is a technique for measuring the abundance of radio-nuclides in soils and parent materials (Cook et al., 1996; Wilford and Minty, 2007; Herrmann et al., 2010) .Technical support for DSM is perhaps the most under-developed compared to the other aspects of input process in DSM technology (Figure 4 .1).In order to encourage wide and accurate application of DSM technology, there is a need to improve the participation of all stakeholders by stimulating improved technical knowledge (such as training in modelling, pedology, database management, etc), standardization (of methods, tools, and input variables), validation, and sanctity of the user needs.In terms of technical knowledge, there is a big gap between those who have little knowledge and those who do not have any at all.There are very few scientists with adequate and complete knowledge of spatial modelling, pedology, and computer/software applications; all of which are equally needed in DSM.Academic training, hands-on practical training, publication of cook-books, and case-studies are still needed in order to increase the number of technical personnel necessary to propel DSM to the required levels.Presently, there are many publications touching on various aspects of the technical knowledge (such as geostatistics, pedology, etc).However, they need to be assembled into one (or two) volume(s) with specific examples for DSM in order to widen the latitude of DSM applications.Furthermore, standards of practice (for tools and methods) need development to enforce uniformity and professionalism in DSM technology.Coordination, support, and development of infrastructure for data generation, archiving, and exchange (sharing) are also needed.This is particularly important for global soil mapping initiatives.Spatial prediction methods provide the means for estimating the values of a variable (or class) at unsampled sites using data from point observations.There are two main categories of spatial prediction: interpolation and extrapolation.Interpolation estimates values of a variable at un-sampled sites using data from point observations within the same region while extrapolation predicts the values of a variable at points outside the region covered by existing observations (Burrough and McDonnell, 1998) .There are many spatial prediction methods in the literature.They can be categorized into three broad groups: non-geostatistical, geostatistical, and mixed methods.Geostatistical methods can be further divided into those that use many explanatory variables (known as multivariate) and univariate methods.Table 4 .3 gives a summary of these interpolation methods.There are three common characteristics often observed with spatial data:(i) slowly varying, largescale (global) variations in the measured values,(ii) irregular, small-scale variations, and(iii) similarity of measurements at locations close together.While characteristics(i) and(iii) are handled by smoothing methods such as in non-geostatistical methods in Table 4 .3, characteristic(ii), the smallscale residual variation in the concentration field, is accounted for by geostatistical methods (Nielsen and Wendroth, 2003) .Remote sensing and GIS remain the most exploited tools in DSM for deriving covariates for mapping soil, spatial statistics, and spatial data transfer.Remote sensing can capture soil cover, top soil properties, atmospheric conditions, land surface elevation (DEM), and trend changes.Georeferenced remote sensing images carry these attributes in a spatially explicit manner, which helps DSM to cover large areas efficiently.Furthermore, the increasing development in remote sensing technology and computing is widening the window for seeing various aspects of soil and soil cover, which hitherto was concealed from pedologists (Liang, 2004) .However several pre-processing of remote sensing images need to be performed in order to produce more sophisticated covariates that would represent more accurately the soil variations.Terrain is the vertical and horizontal dimension of the land surface.In DSM, terrain is represented in a digital model known as Digital Terrain Model (DTM) or Digital Elevation Model (DEM).The important landscape attributes for DSM are known as terrain attributes.They are normally calculated from DEMs.Terrain attributes can be separated into primary and secondary attributes.Primary terrain attributes are those that are directly calculated from elevation data and include first and second Table 4 .4 gives a summary of these attributes.Image indices are used in DSM to enhance remote sensing images with respect to soil forming factors.They include NDVI, Grain Size Index, Colouration Index, and Hue Index (Xiao et al., 2006; Luo et al., 2008) .Processing of DSM input data (e.g. legacy data, remote sensing images, etc.) requires requisite software and good computing abilities in terms of computer capacity and processing speed.As the scale of DSM increases from local to global level (and with increase of spatial resolution), the demand for computing abilities also increase.This implies that high-end computers may be needed for fine resolution (e.g. tens of metres) global mapping.In addition to computing abilities, DSM also needs software for various applications such as interpolation, processing and analysis of terrain attributes, digitizing legacy data, and statistical analysis of input data (e.g. spectral reflectance).There are many geostatistical and GIS software for interpolation.Some of them are commercial while others are freely downloadable.The majority of GIS software can handle geostatistical and non-geostatistical interpolation methods.GRASS (http://grass.fbk.eu/), ILWIS (http://52north.org/ Numerous freely-downloadable software for geostatistical analysis are also available from the internet.R (http://cran.r-project.org/), Gstat (http://www.gstat.org/) and GSLIB (http://www. gslib.com/), VESPER (http://sydney.edu.au/agriculture/pal/software/vesper.shtml), S-Plus, ISATIS, are some of the versatile software which can handle classical statistical and geostatistical analyses.It utilizes a number of packages to implement geostatistical and classical statistical analysis.These packages are also freely downloadable from R website.The majority of the software for non-geostatistical interpolation can also be used for deriving terrain attributes and remote sensing analysis.SAGA and ILWIS are some of the example which can be freely downloaded.Other freely downloadable software are: LandSerf, TAS, GRASS, TOPAZ, MICRODEM, etc.There are also commercial software available for these applications.A number of software exist (and are still being produced) for various aspects of soil mapping such as profile description, database management, soil classification, and production of soil maps.SDBm is one such software for storing primary soil information and summarizing soil profile data.It was developed by FAO.SoLIM (Soil Land Inference Model) is software for soil mapping based on recent developments in geographic information science (GISc), artificial intelligence (AI), and information representation theory.It is available at http://solim.geography.wisc.edu/about/index.htm.DSM technique is rapidly evolving throughout the world and maps, databases, and literature about DSM are increasingly being produced.It is important that a digital database of these pieces of information be constructed.The digital database, which is a seamless compilation of all DSM data and outputs, should have a way of storing the data, enabling query facilities on the data, and allowing for visualization of data and products.There are a number of existing organizations with such systems, which can provide technical support for the construction of DSM digital database (see for example http://www.add.scar.org/).The increasing development of spatial data infrastructures over the world can be utilized to improve dissemination of soil information.Online software (e.g. Google Earth, Aquila, etc.) can be exploited and linked to the digital database to enable worldwide visualization of the DSM database and products.These software can also be used to import the associated legends, generate 3D surfaces, contours from isometric maps, wind barbs and 3D vector objects in a user-friendly way.ISRIC and ESBN are already implementing similar versions of digital databases with opportunities for online access, web-map generation, data/map visualization etc. (http://library.wur.nl/isric/ for ISRIC and http://eusoils.jrc.ec.europa.eu/library/jrc_soil/index.html for ESBN).Other innovative applications with intended to reach soil information users have also been developed through the use of mobile phones (Beaudette and O'Geen, 2010) , ready-made maps for use in mobile phones, GPS receivers, etc. which have been developed by ESRI (http://www.arcgis.com/home/ group.html?owner=mdangermond&title=esri%20soil%20mobile%20and%20web%20maps).Collection of soil data is one of the age-old limiting factors in soil mapping because it involves timeconsuming, costly, cumbersome, and (sometimes) less accurate methods.The traditional methods that have been applied in soil data collection include: field methods (such as Munsell colour chart, soil texture by feel, visual inspection, samplers, direct measurement with field equipment such as infiltrometer, tensiometer, moisture probes, etc.); laboratory methods for tests on soil samples collected from the field (such as physical, chemical, and biological equipments and reagents); and archived soil data (maps, reports, and published articles).Soil scientists are now turning a new page in soil data collection.Technologies which were initially used in other disciplines are finding their way into soil science to improve data collection and analysis.Techniques such as infrared spectroscopy, x-ray diffraction, Global Position Recorder, mobile laboratories, Nuclear Magnetic Resonance, etc. are increasingly being used in-situ or in the field to collect soil data (Viscarra-Rossel et al., 2010) .Proximal soil sensing, a new word for static or mobile soil data collection, is gaining acceptance as the way to improve soil data collection.The principle of soil proximal sensing is much the same as remote sensing save for the proximity of the sensor to the object, relative position of sensor with respect to the object (invasive or intrusive), and whether the sensor is static (on a soil sample) or carried/dragged along in soil body (McBratney et al., 2010) .Equipment and sensors for proximal soil sensing are being tested in many places around the world.Some of them are given in Table 4 .5.DSM products cover the landscape at varying resolutions depending of the scale of maps produced.Therefore, it makes it possible to get soil information on every location in the landscape.Furthermore, given that soil properties often exhibit relationships between themselves, other soil properties/ characteristics not included in the DSM database can be inferred from properties in the database.All together, the mapped and inferred soil properties and soil database contribute to the DSM information system.The information system can be used to deduce/monitor varied aspects of soil such as soil functions (e.g. quality/health) and soil threats (e.g. degradation, pollution, etc.) as well as feed into policy-decisions for environmental sustainability.The demand for soil information over varying spatial and temporal extents differs with intended applications.Soil aspects needed for modelling are different from those needed for planning as well as for reporting.Although DSM is versatile for producing soil maps and soil formation at varying spatial scales, not all soil properties should/can be produced.The soil properties which have not been mapped by DSM can as well be inferred using knowledge based rules that can relate information from existing DSM database to other soil properties that have not been included in the DSM database (Minasny and Hartemink, 2011).A system that allows for these processes as well as for managing the evolution of digital soil mapping products including spatially continuous or classified soil properties in a logical and ordered manner is known as a soil inference system.The term "soil inference system" was first proposed by McBratney et al. (2002) as a knowledge base to infer soil properties and populate the digital soil databases.However, it is gaining much wider meaning among soil scientists than its prior meaning (Robinson et al., 2010) .It is now used to encompass GIS layers of DSM products and the development of knowledge rules (or functions) for inferring soil properties at all locations in the landscape.Soil has varied uses for which its ability (functions) needs to be periodically assessed at all locations in the landscape.Soil functions are general capabilities of soils that are important for various agricultural, environmental, nature protection, landscape architecture and urban applications.Digital soil maps can depict soil properties and functions in the context of specific soil functions such as agricultural food production, environmental protection, civil engineering, etc.These maps can be Omuto and Vargas, 2009) .This aspect of DSM is the most important for policy-decisions and land management (Carre et al., 2007) .DSM has the potential to generate and deliver much new and needed soil information.However, it suffers from a number of challenges which can hinder its total success.The technology has to overcome the scepticism associated with any new technology.Some proponents of the technology have suggested that it can totally replace traditional soil survey and that it can facilitate generation of soil maps/data without the need for field (or even laboratory) testing.These suggestions have greeted DSM with outright rejection from among many soil scientists.Furthermore, the potential tools used in DSM such as remote sensing have also added to the scepticism about DSM.Traditional soil scientists used remote sensing/aerial photographs to aid spatial understanding of soil distribution.They object the exclusive application of remote sensing to map soil properties, which they suppose is what DSM is promoting.This misunderstanding contributes to their apprehension about DSM.There is also a section of users of soil information who are deeply familiar with the traditional soil products (polygon maps, profile descriptions, and laboratory chemical and physical results).They are yet to be convinced of the relevance and applicability of DSM maps and data that appear different from the more familiar traditional products.Other than perception, DSM also faces challenges in use of its technologies.Many tools used in DSM were developed in other disciplines (such as mathematics, chemistry, geography, computing, remote sensing, etc) and soil scientists have yet to understand their potential and limitations.Some DSM applications with these technologies are bound to be abused and inaccurate soil mapping results disseminated.Training on the fundamentals of these tools is needed among soil scientists.Lack of coordination in DSM activities is also another challenge.Although there are many initiatives using DSM approaches to produce soil information, there are no standards for use.Traditional soil mapping had standards (manuals, nomenclature, etc) for use.Whether they were adhered to or not is something else, but at least there were standards.DSM is facing the challenge of producing standards and rules of thumb, producing quality control, and disseminating soil information to various users.The trans-boundary nature of the threats facing humanity today is increasingly forcing governments to come together to devise common and sustainable solutions.Hence, it is now possible to see various departments/divisions of neighbouring countries working together more than before to advice regional policy decisions on financial matters, security, trade, environment, food security, etc.On land and water matters, there are a number of regional and global groupings which have been formed to collect and organize existing relevant information, harmonize the data and methods, collect new information, produce new products, disseminate data/products, etc.The present document looks at soil mapping activities of these groups.Global soil mapping initiatives aim at developing soil maps, harmonizing and coordinating global soil information systems, and archiving and disseminating world soil databases.Globalsoilmap.net (www.globalsoilmap.net ) is a global consortium that has been formed to make a new digital soil map of the world using state-of-the-art and emerging technologies.This effort originated in 2006 (Sanchez et al, 2009) in response to policy-makers' frustrations at being unable to get quantitative answers to questions such as: How much carbon is sequestered or emitted by soils in a particular region?What is its impact on biomass production and human health?How do such estimates change over time?The GSM consortium's overall approach consists of three main components: digital soil mapping, soil management recommendations, and serving the end users-all of them backed by a robust cyber-infrastructure.A digital soil map is essentially a spatial database of soil properties, based on a statistical sample of landscapes.This new global soil map will predict soil properties at fine spatial resolution (~100 m).These maps will be supplemented by interpretation and functionality options to support improved decisions for a range of global issues such as food production and hunger eradication, climate change, and environmental degradation.This is an initiative of the Digital Soil Mapping Working Group of the International Union of Soil Sciences (IUSS).The Globalsoilmap.net consortium was granted funding from the Bill and Mellinda Gates foundation in order to establish this consortium and implement its soil mapping activities in Sub-Saharan Africa.The Africa Soil Information Service (AfSIS) is developing continent-wide digital soil maps for sub-Saharan Africa using new types of soil analysis and statistical methods, and conducting agronomic field trials in selected sentinel sites.These efforts include the compilation and rescue of legacy soil profile data, new data collection and analysis, and system development for large-scale soil mapping using remote sensing imagery and crowd sourced ground observations.(http://www.africasoils.net).The project area includes ~17.5 million km2 of continental sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).This area encompasses more than 90% of Africa's human population living in 42 countries.The project area excludes hot and cold desert regions based on the recently revised Köppen-Geiger climate classification, as well as the non-desert areas of Northern Africa.This project started in 2009 and is currently the main soil mapping funded regional activity that is under implementation.The Globalsoilmap.net consortium has developed technical specifications (http://www. globalsoilmap.net/system/files/globalSoilmap_net_specifications_v2_0_edited_draft_Sept_2011_ RAm_V12.pdf ) to guide their global and regional actions.Exact dates for the delivery of this revolutionary product is not specified, but it is presumed that will require major efforts for its implementation as it is very demanding in terms of financial resources as well as commitment by national institutions.ISRIC-World Soil Information is an independent foundation that was established in 1964 with the mandate of serving the international community with information about the world's soils resources to help addressing major global issues.GSIF (Global Soil Information Facilities) is ISRIC's framework for production of world soil data.It has been inspired by global environmental data initiatives such as Global Biodiversity Information Facilities, Global Land Cover mapping, OneGeology and similar.The main practical reason for GSIF is to build cyber-infrastructure to collate and use legacy (i.e., historic) soil data currently under threat of being lost forever.Seven key principles explain the design of GSIF: ▸ Data collection in GSIF is based on crowd-sourcing -everyone collecting soil data or working with soil information is invited to contribute to some of the databases via data portals and to GSIF tools via GSIF software development portals.As such, GSIF follows the Wikipedia approach to building information systems.▸ Data entered through GSIF data portals remain the property of the original contributors (copyright holders and/or authors).The original contributors have live access to their entries and full read/write rights.▸ GSIF is mainly based on Free and Open Source Software (Linux, PHP, LaTeX, R, GDAL, GRASS, SAGA GIS, PostgreSQL, PostGIS, Python, Google Earth and similar), but other software packages may also be used.▸ GSIF has been designed mainly to serve global soil mapping initiatives and not local, isolated (regional and national) projects.Internationally accepted standards (International System of Units, international soil classifications systems, FAO soil field description guides, World Geodetic System 1984, and similar) are recommended.National and local datasets in different languages are also supported, which requires further harmonization.▸ GSIF is based on automated procedures for mapping, pattern recognition and report/plots generation.All maps and reports produced as a part of GSIF are reproducible, i.e. they are based on compliable scripts that contain all processing steps.Derived maps can be updated by rerunning the scripts with no or little human intervention when new data sets become available.▸ All shared soil data used to generate maps will be made available in near real-time in accordance with ISRIC data policy.▸ GSIF data processing services and databases (maps and reports), produced as a part of GSIF, will constantly be adjusted based on usage statistics and web-traffic.Complexity (statistical data processing steps, coordinate systems, scale, uncertainty in the maps) is either hidden from the users or communicated using efficient solutions.This follows the Google approach to indexing and browsing geo-data.The GSIF structure is presented below under figure 5. 6.1 Conclusions 6.1.1 Legacy data 1. Under the current challenges of food security, climate change adaptation and mitigation, further provision of ecosystem services and sustainable intensification of agriculture, soil information becomes fundamental to guide wise policies and decisions.With the current global and regional soil information available, the soil science community is limited in its capacity to provide accurate and updated information to the different soil users.2. Soil legacy data and information are a crucial asset for future soil mapping activities and even more important for monitoring purposes.Although legacy data are important, the current available legacy data have a number of problems.The problems include data gaps, storage, compatibility with DSM technology, and copyright issues.3. HWSD is the most comprehensive global soil database with soil profile, attribute data, and soil map currently available.The database has direct website links and is freely downloadable in formats which are compatible with most software.4. Rich soil information is available in various national and regional soil mapping/information systems organizations.Some have their data freely accessible, while others impose copyright restrictions on their data.Coordination or understanding are the only ways to associate them with a global mapping initiative 5. Some global datasets/maps are derivations of derivations, yet they are widely used in various fields.This inadequacy is possibly due to lack of information about existing soil data or inadequate and accessible soil information.1. The needs of soil information users and present trends of soil information generation seem to be increasingly divergent.2. The majority of soil information users are keen on georeferenced soil data, and especially measured soil attributes.3. Since most direct users of soil information seem to be working at the national and sub-national levels, the soil mapping activities generating soil information should give priority to farm, district, and national scales.Policy making seems to be influenced by soil information at various scales: farm, national, regional, and global.5. The conceptual underpinnings of soil inference systems are still not well appreciated by many users.The majority of soil information users do not seem to prefer use of model outputs as substitutes for observed or conventionally produced soil information.6. Many soil users would like to have free access to soil information.They think that if the soil data collection is done at public expense, then the resultant generated information should be freely available to the public.7. The preferred mode of disseminating the information is through the internet.Users would like to have the convenience of downloading relevant data rather than moving around searching for the information.This implies that the areas of soil information systems tasked with data storage and dissemination should consider online repositories as much as is possible.1. There are many freely available DSM tools which can be harnessed to improve production of digital maps 2. DSM does not only produce maps, but it also produces methods for soil mapping, digital soil database/information system, and assessment of soil threats.It is a three-stage process, which can satisfy soil information users needs if well implemented 3. Most DSM processes are not very well implemented.There is still lack of standardization on input data and tools, expertise and training manuals, and coordination of many organizations involved in DSM 4. HWSD, GSIF, GSM, and GSP are some of the main active global soil mapping activities.They have varied strengths which when joined, can help improve global awareness, soil information generation and use, update existing soil information.▸ Considering the challenges of food security, climate change adaptation and mitigation, and further provision of ecosystem services, the soil science community should clearly respond to the natural needs for improved, up-to-date, quantitative and applied soil data and information.This global effort should take into account the ongoing developments in terms of methods and tools currently available, especially those related to Digital Soil Mapping and should not neglect the core of soil mapping that is based on understanding of soil-landscape relationships revealed through field studies undertaken by soil surveys.Ongoing efforts such as Globalsoilmap.net, GSFI, HWSD, etc, should be strengthened by making them part of a unified global effort in which all the global, regional and national institutions participate fully and together plan feasible activities in the short, medium and long-term, in order to respond to their needs in terms of global and regional soil information.▸ While it is common to hear that there is an increased need for detailed soil information, it is fundamental to develop a multi-scale / multi-resolution approach in which the global efforts could address the demands coming from the different users.It is true that global and regional information systems are intended to address global activities such as modelling scenarios, status assessment, trends, etc, however some concerns have been raised by users pointing out that soil information should be addressing the needs coming from the field.While this is a very valid request, the soil information community should develop a multiuser system in which the global soil information system could respond to the needs at all levels.This could be a challenging recommendation, but learning from the past it is wise to make soil information a positive cost/ benefit asset showing its value at all levels.This will promote its continuous self-development as its direct contribution to all the different fields will showcase a visible impact.This of course should be linked to a training program for soil information users in order to train different users on how soil data and information should be used and linking reliability or accuracy to their decisions.▸ There is a fundamental need that traditional soil survey/mapping and DSM communities join forces to fill in the evident gap in terms of soil information.This can be done by recognizing the value of both approaches, overcoming weaknesses through recognized strengths of both approaches and by an inclusive neutral framework that could have a neutral goal.On this, the Global Soil Partnership plays a crucial role as is linked to a UN organization with a global mandate on soils in which 193 countries are members and fight for common global mutual goals.▸ Soil legacy data and information constitutes a precious asset, not only for its potential use for soil mapping under DSM, but also for on-going monitoring purposes.Besides, it is the only plausible result of huge investments done by international and national organizations.Its collection, harmonization and storing in a common global database that is open to all the different communities under proper IP rights should be an immediate global effort and activity.4. State of the art methods and tools for soil mapping ▸ The copyrights and intellectual property rights are a sensitive issue that should be clearly studied and jointly defined by a global neutral institution or framework representing all possible interests and concerns.The collaborative example of the FAO-UNESCO World Soil Map should be used as a proper working example.▸ Capacity development in digital soil mapping should be the main vehicle for generation of up to date, demand driven soil information.A joint global capacity development program should be urgently developed to be implemented at regional level with different modalities.Short and medium term on-the job training programs and also long term BSc, MSc and PhD programs should be developed.This activity demands immediate implementation.▸ In an era of financial crisis and increasingly limited financial resources, it is of prime importance that the soil science community join together with a common voice and message in order to request donors to support an integrated plan of action in terms of soil data and information.In this regard, the Global Soil Partnership, through its pillar of action on soil information, is aiming to develop a joint plan of action that is very inclusive and represents all the region's interests and priorities for soil data and information.This indeed becomes a fundamental opportunity and challenge for including all the necessary elements for responding the needs of a growing population in terms of soil knowledge.This plan will then be presented to donors to fund a unique joint endeavour producing improved and much needed soil information.	5.GLOBAL SOIL MAPPING INITIATIVES ............................................................... 60 5.1 glObAlSOilmAp.NeT ................................................................................................ 60 5.2 glObAl SOil iNFORmATiON FACiliTieS ..................................................................... 60 5.3 hARmONized wORld SOil dATAbASe ........................................................................62 6.CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ..................................................... 63 6.1 CONCluSiONS ...........................................................................................................63 6.1.1 Legacy data ..............................................................................................................63 6.1.2 Users needs..............................................................................................................63 (Zinke et al.,1986) .............................. 9 Figure 2.5: Global soil quality with respect to nutrient availability ................10 1.iNTROduCTiON Soil is a natural body consisting of layers (soil horizons) that are composed of weathered mineral materials, organic material, air and water (Bockheim et al.,2005) .It is the end product of the combined influence of the climate, relief (slope), organisms (flora and fauna), parent materials (original minerals), and time.The most widely recognized function of soil is its support for food production.Farmers who use soil in crop production know very well that it is the foundation for agricultural production.This is because it is the medium in which growth of food-producing plants occurs.It supplies the plants with nutrients, water, and support for their roots.The plants, in turn, support human and animal life with food and energy.Soil also acts as a repository for seeds, germplasm, and genes for flora and fauna.In general, soil is the medium for preservation and advancement of life on earth (Brady, 1984; Foth and Ellis, 1997) .Besides supplying water treatments to plants, soil also supports millions of organisms living in it.These organisms have proven useful in medicine, biodegradation and recycling of waste, as food, as well as being essential in the conversion of minerals and nutrients to readily useable formats for plants and in turn animal nutrition.In hydrology, soil interacts with the hydrosphere as a medium that absorbs, purifies, transports, and releases water.In the hydrological cycle, the water that passes through the soil accumulates temporarily in the form of rivers, lakes/oceans/dams, soil water, and groundwater.During the storage process, soil filters the water against pollutants including natural and synthetic compounds.It also acts as a buffer against natural phenomena such as floods and soil erosion.In hydrology, the interaction of soil with the atmosphere has numerous environmental benefits.It can absorb excess energy radiation from the sun and release it gradually.Soil's gaseous exchanges with the atmosphere involve carbon dioxide, nitrogen oxides and methane and are of a magnitude that has been reported to have profound effects on the global climate.In fact, soil has been recognized as the largest terrestrial sink for carbon dioxide and consequently has great importance in mitigating the impacts of climate change (FAO, 2004) .In engineering, soil is used both as a construction material and as a foundation to support building infrastructures.Numerous engineering structures are made with soil as a primary construction material.For example, it's used to make blocks for building or used directly in construction such as in dams, mud-houses, roads, etc (Graham, 1989; Indraratna and Nutalaya, 1991) .Soil importance as a foundation support cannot be overemphasized: Most structures have their foundations in the soil.Soil is a source of all life.Its interaction with various aspects of life is summarized in Figure 1 .1.Life support services  The soil renews, retains, delivers nutrients and provides physical support for plants;  It sustains biological activity, diversity, and productivity;  The soil ecosystem provides habitat for seeds dispersion and dissemination of the gene pool for continued evolution.Provisioning services  Soil is the basis for the provision of food, fibre, fuel and medicinal products to sustain life;  It holds and releases water for plant growth and water supply.Regulating services  The soil plays a central role in bu ering, filtering and moderation of the hydrological cycle;  It regulates the carbon, oxygen and plant nutrient cycles (such as N, P, K, Ca, Mg and S) a ecting the climate and plant production;  Soil biodiversity contributes to soil pest and disease regulation.Soil micro-organisms process and break-down wastes and dead organic matter (such as manure, remains of plants, fertilizers and pesticides), preventing them from building up to toxic levels, from entering water supply and becoming pollutants.Cultural services  Soil provides support for urban settlement and infrastructure;  In some cultures, soils may also be of specific spiritual or heritage value. Soils are the basis for landscapes that provide recreational value.Food production Soil is derived from weathering products of rocks and the decayed remains of plants and animals that once lived in or on the Earth.It is composed of four major components: minerals, organic matter, air, and water.The proportion of each of these components together with other factors such as climate, vegetation, time, topography, and, increasingly, human activities are important in determining the type of soil at any location in the landscape.For a long time, scientists have endeavoured to develop appropriate and efficient methods for predicting the spatial distribution of soils and their occurrence in the landscape.Soil mapping is the term often used to describe the process of understanding and predicting the spatial distribution of soils.It is a process that involves collecting field observations (including recording soil profile descriptions), analysing soil properties in the laboratory, describing landscape characteristics, and, ultimately, producing soil maps.Soil maps are the most widely used end-products of the soil mapping process since they illustrate the geographic distribution of soil types, soil properties (such as physical, chemical, and biological properties), and landscape characteristics.Data coming from a soil mapping exercise can be classified as either primary data or secondary data.Primary data are those that have been obtained directly from observations or measurements in the field or in a laboratory.Secondary data are data that have been inferred or derived from the primary data.Examples of secondary data are the soil maps themselves, soil quality ratings, degradation assessments, pedotransfer functions, suitability indices, hydrologic soil groups, textural classes, etc.Secondary and primary soil data together form Soil Information.Soil information has a variety of uses worldwide such as assessing soil for its adequacy for a variety of applications, assessing and monitoring natural phenomena, determining productivity, and planning.Some of the major categories of these uses include: ▸ Agronomic assessment: Soil information is used to develop recommendations for best management practices, including determining the need for, and amount of, fertilizers, or other inputs, improving soil productivity, assessing land suitability for crop production, estimating crop yields, determining irrigation needs and scheduling, selecting appropriate crop types, calculating productivity, etc.▸ Engineering applications: Soil information is used in urban planning, evaluation of construction materials, site selection, foundation design, design of water conveyance and flood control structures, etc.▸ Hydrology and Hydrogeologic assessments: Including groundwater prospecting, groundwater and surface flow characterization, water pollution, modelling floods and droughts, ▸ Environmental assessments: As assessment of natural phenomenon including climate modelling, land degradation assessment, sediment transport and deposit into water bodies, global circulation, vegetation dynamics, modelling heat and carbon sinks, pollution control, environmental impacts, reclamation, remediation, etc.▸ Policy decisions: Especially for national planning, resources allocation, economic development, when, where, and what crop or vegetation to promote, conservation of natural resources, formulation of laws and regulation of use of natural resources, preservation of environment, etc.These uses have various levels of data demand in terms of accuracy, scale/spatial extent, temporal resolution, and details in metadata.Soil information exists at various spatial scales.Users of this information need to know the potential and limitations of available soil data at the various scales, where soil data is archived and whether there are any access restrictions or information gaps, and opportunities for collaborative work to improve soil information.To this end, a workshop on soil information was organized under Pillar 4 of the Global Soil Partnership "Towards Global Soil Information: activities within the GeoTask Global Soil Data" (http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/gSp/downloads/gSp_Soilinformation_ workshopReport.pdf).A key outcome of this workshop was the recognition of a need for assessing the state of the art of global and regional information.The present document represents an attempt to assemble relevant information on existing soil data at various scales throughout the world and on-going regional and global soil mapping initiatives.It aims at a) increasing users' awareness on existing soil data and information, b) encouraging informed and accurate application of it, c) understanding user needs in terms of soil data and information and d) understanding demands on soil data and information under the challenges of food security and climate change.The document is organized into four broad sections: ▸ Existing soil legacy data and information Existing soil data is a key factor to build accurate soil information.There is a huge reservoir of existing legacy soil data in many countries in the form of soil maps, soil profile descriptions and analyses.Given the time and resources invested in gathering this soil information, it's important to acknowledge these existing datasets and exploit their potential.This document reviews legacy soil data and highlights how this data can be accessed.▸ Soil user needs Knowledge of soil data requirements of the soil user community and related stakeholder groups is important because soil information is generated to benefit the intended users.This document conducted an online survey on user requirements.Although the survey was not exhaustive, it gave highlights on the general nature of information expected from soil scientists and soil maps.▸ State of the art on methods and tools for digital soil mapping Digital soil mapping (DSM) is a new technological advancement that seeks to fulfil the increasing worldwide demand in spatial soil data through more rapid and accurate production and delivery of soil information and increased coverage and improved spatial resolution of mapped areas.New tools and methods are constantly being developed to support DSM.This document explores these tools to highlight their potential for improving user access to accurate soil information.▸ On-going global and regional soil mapping initiatives Several endeavours are being made globally, and in different regions, to coordinate soil information generation, share soil data and improve access to soil information.These endeavours need to be identified and catalogued, acknowledged, and, if possible, coordinated more effectively.2.Soil legacy data and information The term legacy soil information is used for all existing soil information collected to characterize or map soils.The majority of such information was collected by soil surveys that included landscape and site descriptions, soil profile morphological descriptions and laboratory analysis of the main chemical, physical and biological soil properties.This information has typically been synthesized in paper soil maps that consist of polygons (soil mapping units) containing a description of soil units named and characterized by a national or international soil classification.Detailed, sometimes georeferenced, information on the sampled soil profiles (point information) has been frequentlycollected and published in reports that accompany soil maps.In recent years there has been a considerable effort to capture this information in digital form (databases, digital maps) and some organizations have compiled and harmonized this local and national soil information at regional to global scales.In addition, for ease of combination with other kinds of information layers in GIS, some soil maps have been rasterized to a regular grid.Global soil maps and databases usually contain information on soil properties associated with the soil units described as being present in the polygons of the map, while global soil profile databases contain information on the soil classification unit they belong to.It is therefore somewhat arbitrary to subdivide the available soil information into categories of "mapped" and "point" information or in "global", "regional" or "national" information as these are often interrelated.We focus first on information presented at a global scale that is of particular interest to global policy makers and modellers.Next the availability of soil information, both in map and soil profile forms, at regional and at national scale is discussed.Detailed local soil surveys, which represent the bulk of soil information collected to date, are not discussed.One of the best general websites that lists the achievements of soil survey to date can be found at: http://www.itc.nl/~rossiter/research/ rsrch_ss.html The FAO-UNESCO Soil Map of the World (FAO-UNESCO, 1971 -1980 is presently the only, fully consistent, harmonized soil inventory at the global level which is readily available in digital format.It was published between 1974 and 1980 in 19 separate sheets at a mapping scale of 1:5 million.The map was based on information contained in some 11000 separate large-scale maps.Its development started as a project originated by a motion of the ISSS at the Wisconsin congress in 1960.It was first digitized by ESRI in vector format in 1984.The paper map contains 26 major soil groups, which are further subdivided into 106 individual soil units (FAO-UNESCO, 1974) .The map was later digitized by FAO (1995) with a grid resolution of 5' x 5' (or 9 km x 9 km at the equator) (Nachtergaele, 2003) .The digitized version, known as Digital Soil Map of the World (DSMW), contains a full database in terms of composition of the soil units, topsoil texture, slope class, and soil phase in each of its more than 5000 mapping units.The map is downloadable at: http://www.fao.org/geonetwork/srv/en/resources.get?id=14116&fname=dSmw.zip&access=private.Transformations of the DSMW to reflect other soil classification systems such as the USDA Soil Taxonomy (Eswaran and Reich, 2005) and the World Reference Base for Soil Resources (FAO/EC/ ISRIC, 2003) have also been published, but do not contain any additional information compared to the original map.The Harmonized World Soil Database (HWSD, FAO/IIASA/ISRIC/JRC/CAS, 2006), contains a digital soil map of the world, with soil units classified in the Revised FAO Legend (FAO 1990 ) at a fixed grid resolution of 1km by 1km, with associated soil properties and soil qualities.This digital global dataset is not fully harmonized, as it is based 40% on the original DSMW and 60% on regional and national updates undertaken after the DSMW was completed. (Figure 2 .1) It should be acknowledged that the 1km grid resolution used in the DSMW parts of the database is not fully justified given the lower resolution of the base material used in the DSMW part of the map.Presently, the HWSD contains over 16000 mapping units, which are used to link to a database of soil attribute data.The result is a 30 arc-second raster database consisting of 21600 rows and 43200 columns with each grid cell linked to the harmonized soil property data.This linkage of mapping units to the soil attribute data offers the opportunity to display or query the database in terms of soil units or in terms of selected soil parameters (such as Organic Carbon, pH, water storage capacity, soil depth, cation exchange capacity of the soil and the clay fraction, total exchangeable nutrients, lime and gypsum contents, sodium exchange percentage, salinity, textural class and granulometry both for topsoil as subsoil layers).Although not fully harmonized and consistent, the HWSD contains the most up-to-date and consistent global soil information that is currently available and continuously updated.The Harmonized World Soil Database v1.2, is downloadable at: http://webarchive.iiasa.ac.at/Research/luC/external-world-soil-database/hTml/. In addition, the website contains freely downloadable software for visualising, querying, and retrieving the data.Figure 2 .2 is an example of the database as visualized through the data viewer.The International Soil Reference and Information Centre (ISRIC) World Inventory of Soil Emission Potential (WISE) International soil profile database is presently the only freely available and comprehensive repository of global primary data on soil profiles.ISRIC was established in 1966 with a focus of serving the international community with information about the world's soils.Through its WISE project, ISRIC has consolidated select attribute data for over 10,250 soil profiles, with some 47,800 horizons, from 149 countries in the world.Profiles were selected from data holdings provided by the Natural Resources Conservation Service (USDA-NRCS), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO-SDB), and ISRIC itself (ISRIC-ISIS).Nachtergaele et al.,2012) 2.Soil legacy data and information The location of the WISE soil profiles worldwide is illustrated in Figure 2 .3.The data can be downloaded at http://www.isric.org/data/isric-wise-global-soil-profile-data-ver-31) .Individual profiles in the ISRIC-WISE database were sampled, described, and analyzed according to the methods and standards in use in the countries from where the data originated.The soil attribute data contained in the ISRIC-WISE database are given in Table 2 .1, but not all soil profiles in the database contain all these attributes.In order to harmonize the data, ISRIC developed criteria to streamline analytical methods, soil classification scheme, data formatting, and documentation (Batjes, 2008) .This harmonization was an important step towards achieving data quality control and building a relational database that can be linked with other secondary data attributes such as mapping units of derived soil maps.Apart from data quality control,ISRIC has also developed a metadata service that allows soil data users to search and retrieve on-line soil data from the depository (http://www.isric.org/data/metadata-service).This is a powerful soil information service tool that helps data users to quickly locate and retrieve the kind of data they need.The tool is also an efficient way of managing soil information for a large pool of data users.It is important to note that all the data at ISRIC are held under the General Public Licence (GPL) (http://www.isric.org/data/data-policy), to encourage wide application of soil information.This database contains worldwide soil carbon and nitrogen data for more than 3,500 soil profiles.It was started by Zinke et al. (1986) with the collection and analysis of soil samples from California.Afterwards, additional data came from soil surveys of California, Italy and Greece, Iran, Thailand, Vietnam, various tropical Amazonian areas, U.S. forest soils, and from other published soil surveys.The main samples for laboratory analyses were collected at uniform soil depth increments and included bulk density determinations, but samples reported in the literature did not always have this uniformity.For the latter group of samples, only profiles that were sampled to a meter depth or to actual depth were used.Where bulk densities were not reported estimates were made from regressions based on organic carbon content of the soil samples associated with the profile.The methods used for analytical carbon determinations were dry combustion, 'wet combustion', or loss on ignition with adjustments made to the values obtained with the last two methods.Nitrogen was determined by the Kjeldahl method on the soil fine earth fraction and reported as total organic nitrogen (Zinke et al.,1986) .Figure 2 .4 shows the distribution of the sample locations for the database.The data can be downloaded at http://daac.ornl.gov/SOilS/guides/zinke_soil.html The WISE database discussed in the section 2.1.3 contains measured soil properties associated with a geo-referenced soil profile.The HWSD contains derived soil properties obtained by taxo-transfer functions that estimate a value for a soil property from a soil's taxonomic soil unit name, its topsoil texture class and the depth at which it occurs.Pedo-transfer functions, more generally, estimate the value of a soil property using values of one or more other known soil properties and site characteristics.The spatial distribution of these measured or estimated properties is one subject of pedometrics and is the basis for Digital Soil (Property) Mapping discussed in Chapter 4.It is important to realize that there is a fundamental difference between describing soil as a natural body with a morphology and a range of properties and characteristics as done in WISE and mapped in DSMW and HWSD, and the measurement and mapping of the distribution of soil properties only, as is frequently done in Digital Soil Mapping.However, the main user community and policy makers are often more interested in the value (and the change) of specific soil properties than in the spatial distribution of soil units described as extensive natural bodies.Another issue in this respect is the accuracy of geo-referenced values associated with map polygons and point locations.In soil maps values are reported as a distribution within a mapping unit or in a regular raster grid cell, while in continuous DSM mapping of soil properties values concern unique points and the distribution of values between points.A number of soil property maps available for the whole world are discussed in the following sections.Apart from holding primary WISE datasets, ISRIC, in cooperation with FAO and IIASA, has also developed algorithms for deriving other secondary datasets.These datasets are available at http:// www.isric.org/data/data-download.The harmonized dataset of derived (or estimated) soil properties for the world was created using the soil distribution shown on the 1:5 million DSMW and soil parameter estimates derived from ISRIC's global soil profile database. (Batjes, 2002 , 2006 and Batjes et al.1995 .This dataset considers 19 soil variables that are commonly required for agroecological zoning, land evaluation, crop growth simulation, modelling of soil gaseous emissions, and analyses of global environmental change.They include: soil drainage class, organic carbon content, total nitrogen, C/N ratio, pH (H2O), CECsoil, CECclay, effective CEC, base saturation, aluminium saturation, calcium carbonate content, gypsum content, exchangeable sodium percentage (ESP), electrical conductivity, particle size distribution (i.e. content of sand, silt and clay), content of coarse fragments (> 2 mm), bulk density, and available water capacity (-33 to -1500 kPa).These estimates are (zinke et al.,1986) (Zinke et al.,1986) presented as aggregated mean values by DSMW mapping unit for fixed depth intervals of 20 cm up to 100 cm (or less when appropriate).The associated soil property values were derived from analyses of some 10, 250 profiles held in ISRIC-WISE using a scheme of taxonomy-based taxo-transfer rules complemented with expert-rules.The type of rules used to derive the various soil property values have been flagged in the database to provide an indication of the possible confidence in the derived data.These can be downloaded at: http://www.isric.org/sites/default/files/private/datasets/ wise5by5min_v1b_0.zip.Soil quality is the capacity of a specific type of soil to function within natural or managed ecosystem boundaries, to sustain plant and animal productivity, maintain or enhance water and air quality, and support human health and habitation (Karlen et al.,1997) .On the basis of soil parameters provided by the HWSD global soil database, IIASA and FAO have calculated seven key soil qualities important for crop production at the global scale in the framework of the Global Agro-ecological Zoning project (GAEZ).They include soil quality with respect to: nutrient availability, nutrient retention capacity, rooting conditions, oxygen availability to roots, excess salts, toxicities, and workability.These soil qualities are considered to be related to the agricultural use of the soil and more specifically to maize crop requirements and tolerances .Figure 2 .5 is an example of one of the soil qualities with respect to nutrient availability, which is a deciding factor for successful low level input farming and to some extent also for intermediate input levels.In this example, the important soil characteristics used in estimating the soil quality of the topsoil (0-30 cm) are: Texture/Structure, Organic Carbon (OC), pH and Total Exchangeable Bases (TEB).For the subsoil (30-100 cm), the most important characteristics considered were: Texture/structure, pH and Total Exchangeable Bases (TEB) .Other soil quality indices are freely downloadable from the FAO GeoNetwork GAEZ website at: http://www.fao.org/nr/gaez/en/. The Distributed Active Centre (DAAC) for global soil, a repository maintained by the Oak Ridge National Library (ORNL) in Tennessee, U.S.A, contains derived data on a number of soil properties (http://daac.ornl.gov/cgi-bin/dataset_lister.pl?p=19).Although some of these are outdated, some such as the global annual soil respiration data are unique and therefore mentioned here.2.Soil legacy data and information This data set is a compilation of soil respiration rates (g C m -2 yr -1 ) from terrestrial and wetland ecosystems reported in the literature prior to 1992 Schelsinger, 1992, 2001) .The soil respiration rates are reported to have been measured in a variety of ecosystems to examine rates of microbial activity, nutrient turnover, carbon cycling, root dynamics, and a variety of other soil processes.The data can be freely downloaded from the following website: http://daac.ornl.gov/SOilS/guides/raich_respiration_guide.html.This dataset is also distributed by DAAC and gives the plant-extractable water capacity of soil, defined as the amount of water that can be extracted from the soil to fulfil evapotranspiration demands.Its derivation involved creation of a representative soil profile, characterized by horizon (layer) particle size data and thickness, from each soil unit of the DSMW.In this database, soil organic matter was estimated empirically from climate data while plant rooting depths and ground coverage were obtained from a vegetation characteristic dataset.At each 0.5-by 0.5-degree grid cell where vegetation is present, unit available water capacity (cm water per cm soil) was estimated from the sand, clay, and organic content of each idealised profile horizon, and integrated over horizon thickness.Summation of the integrated values over the lesser of profile depth and root depth produced an estimate of the plant-extractable water capacity of soil.The data can be downloaded at http://daac.ornl.gov/SOilS/guides/dunneSoil.html.This is a database of the inherent capacity of soils to retain phosphorus (P retention) in various forms.It was built by considering the main controlling factors of P retention processes such as pH, soil mineralogy, and clay content.First, estimated values for these properties were used to rate the inferred capacity for P retention of the component soil units of each DSMW map unit (or grid cell) using four classes (i.e., Low, Moderate, High, and Very High).Subsequently, the overall soil phosphorus retention potential was assessed for each mapping unit, taking into account the P-ratings and relative proportion of each component soil unit.Each P retention class was assigned to a likely fertilizer P recovery fraction, derived from the literature, thereby permitting spatially more detailed, integrated model-based studies of environmental sustainability and agricultural production at the global and continental level (< 1:5 million).Although the uncertainties still remain high, the analysis provides an approximation of world soil phosphorus retention potential.The data can be freely accessed at http://www.isric.org/sites/default/files/private/datasets/Soil_ phosphorus_Retention_potential_v1.zip The Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) of the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) has produced a number of soil maps and soil indices based on global climate, the FAO-UNESCO Digital Soil Map of the World and a number of modelling functions.The maps are: global soil groups, soil moisture regimes, soil temperature regimes, land quality, soil organic carbon, water holding capacity, etc.These maps are said to be drafts.They can be downloaded at http:// soils.usda.gov/use/worldsoils/mapindex/order.html.Figure 2 .6 portrays global soil regions as an example of the available maps.The soil map shows the distribution of the 12 soil orders according to US soil taxonomy.The advantage of having regional and continental soil information products is that they often provide a finer resolution than global soil maps and are, in principle, easier to harmonize because they use a single methodology (SOTER) and/or a single soil classification system which should, in principle, make border harmonization between countries easier.SOTER (an acronym for SOil and TERrain) is a methodology developed at ISRIC for storing and handling soils and terrain data.The methodology was initiated in 1986 by Wim Sombroek and taken up by the International Society of Soil Science (ISSS).At the time of its formulation, the long term aim of SOTER was to provide a global soil database at 1:1 million scale to replace the FAO/UNESCO Soil map of the World.The project was actively supported by FAO and UNEP.Underlying the SOTER methodology is the identification of areas of land with a distinctive, often repetitive, pattern of landform, lithology, surface form, slope, parent material, and soil.Tracts of land distinguished in this manner are named SOTER units.Each SOTER unit thus represents one unique combination of terrain and soil characteristics.The database is composed of sets of files for use in a Relational DataBase Management System (RDBMS) and in a Geographic Information System (GIS) (van Engelen and Wen, 1995) .The SOTER regional soil databases were assembled from national legacy data such as maps (e.g. national exploratory and/or reconnaissance soil maps, topographic maps, land cover maps, etc) and attribute soil data.Regional SOTER databases prepared to date consist of: These SOTER databases are available on CD-ROM from FAO and downloadable on-line from ISRIC at http://www.fao.org/nr/land/pubs/digital-media-series/en/ and http://www.isric.org/projects/ soil-and-terrain-database-soter-programme ▸ SOTER These regional soil databases have been developed at different scales ranging from 1:5 million to 1:500 000, largely related to the scale of the original national soil information.Although the information sources were assembled according to the same SOTER methodology, there were variations in specific level of soil map and soil profile information in each region, which resulted in variation in the scale and contents of the end products ( Figure 2 .7).These differences, as well as data gaps, the emergence of new information (digital elevation models) and development of new ways to process soil data (digital soil mapping) prompted the revision of the SOTER methodology in a project led by ESBN.The results of this revised methodology (referred to as e-SOTER) have been summarized by Van Engelen (2012).The regional SOTER databases were a major input in the Harmonized World Soil Database and, as such, have significantly contributed to the development of this global product.However, the long term future of SOTER is somewhat in doubt, as countries can provide direct inputs to upgrade HWSD without preparing first a SOTER database.At the time of writing ESBN is still considering preparing a new SOTER product for Europe.The regional SOTER databases are discussed in more detail at the national level (section 2.4) as they are often the most recent, most complete and/or largest scale soil product available for many countries.This data set consists of a circumpolar map of dominant soil characteristics, with a scale of 1:10,000,000, covering the United States, Canada, Greenland, Iceland, northern Europe, Russia, Mongolia, and Kazakhstan.The map was created using the Northern and Mid Latitude Soil Database.The map is in ESRI Shapefile format, consisting of 11 regional areas.Polygons have attributes that give the percentage polygon area that is a given soil type. (Tarnocai et al.,2002) .The map was used to prepare a Soil Atlas of the Northern Circumpolar Region (JRC, 2004) , available at http://eusoils.jrc.ec.europa.eu/library/maps/Circumpolar/index.html.This map and database are of great importance for climate change studies, but unfortunately are made at a very small scale.The soils in the northern latitudes store up to half of the Earth's soil carbon; about twice the amount of the carbon stored in the atmosphere.The importance of this carbon sink is immeasurable.Permanently frozen ground keeps this organic carbon locked in the soil and, together with extensive peat lands, ensures that northern circumpolar soils are a significant carbon sink.The impact of global warming on soil and the increased temperatures in the Arctic and boreal regions are causing permafrost-affected areas to thaw thus ensuring that the huge mass of poorly decomposed organic matter that is presently locked in the frozen soil will start to decompose.As a result of this decay, significant quantities of greenhouse gases (e.g. CO 2 , CH 4 , N 2 O) could be released into the atmosphere.These emissions can initiate a snow-ball effect that will increase greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at an accelerating rate and greatly intensify the processes driving climate change.The European Commission, through the Joint Research Centre and its European Soil Bureau Network (ESBN), has prepared a 1:1 Million soil map of Europe with associated databases and applications (Fig 2.9) .In addition, ESBN is currently storing over 560 measured soil profiles (Figure 2 .10) and soil attributes from over 2650 horizons from member states (soil profiles, soil particle-size fractions, pH in water, organic carbon content (%), and dry bulk density) (Hiederer et al.,2006) .It has also developed methods for deriving analytical soil profiles from the existing legacy soil data (Hollis et al.,2006) .In addition to this soil database, ESBN has also archived soil legacy maps and is producing new soil maps.The network is presently building a soil information system for archived database with links to the soil database at the respective soil institutions of the member states.ISRIC World Soil Information is compiling legacy soil profile data for Sub Saharan Africa, as a project activity of the AfSIS project (Globally integrated Africa Soil Information Service project).http://www.africasoils.net/data/legacyprofile Africa Soil Profiles database, v. 1.0 (January 2012) identifies > 15700 unique soil profiles inventoried from a wide variety of data sources.From the > 14600 profiles that are geo-referenced, soil layer attribute data are available for > 12500 and soil analytical data for > 10000 profiles.Soil attribute values are standardized according to e-SOTER conventions and validated according to basic rules.Odd values are flagged.The degree of validation, and associated reliability of the data, varies because reference soil profile data, that are previously and thoroughly validated, are compiled together with non-reference soil profile data of lesser inherent representativeness.Updated milestone versions of this dataset have been posted online and made available to the project.The continuously growing dataset will also be made available through the World Soil Information Service upon continuation of the project activity.The current version is released here http://www.isric.org/data/africa-soil-profiles-database-version-01-0 version 1.0. .These datasets could not have been compiled without the support of countries in the region, some of which have soil databases superior to those available in many industrial countries.This is particularly the case for Botswana, Kenya, Rwanda and South Africa.A comprehensive discussion of soil maps and databases in the tropics is given by Nachtergaele and Van Ranst (2003) .More than 20 years of collaboration between European soil scientists has resulted in the publication by the European Commission of the first ever "Soil Atlas of Europe".Based on soil data and information collected within the European Soil Information System (EUSIS) developed by the Joint Research Centre, the atlas illustrates in 128 pages of maps, tables, figures and graphs, the richness of European soil resources and the need for their sustainable management.The Atlas compiles existing information on different soil types in easily understandable maps covering the entire European Union and bordering countries.The publication is intended for the general public, aiming to 'bridge the gap' between soil science and public knowledge.By addressing the non-specialized audience, the Atlas will increase public awareness and understanding of the diversity of soils and of the need to protect this precious resource.In addition to the maps, the "Soil Atlas of Europe" contains an introduction to soil that explains the role and importance of soil, how soil is created, how to identify the soil in your garden, soil as a source of raw materials and the relationship between soil, agriculture, our cultural heritage, forests.Soil mapping and classification are also explained together with an illustrative and informative guide to the major soil types of Europe.The Atlas is available for download at:http:// eusoils.jrc.ec.europa.eu/projects/soil_atlas/Atlas_Contents.html The publication of the first Soil Atlas of Latin America and the Caribbean aims at presenting the relevance of soils as a natural resource and particularly its role in climate change and the carbon cycle.It is expected that such a publication will increase the visibility of the environment and its key natural resources to decisionmakers, the Latin American public in general and particularly its education community.The Soil Atlas of Latin America and the Caribbean belongs to the series of Soil Atlases published by the JRC in recent years.Its publication is foreseen for 2013.The soil Atlas of Africa is being produced by the Institute of Environment and Sustainability (IES) of the JRC in collaboration with ESBN, ISRIC, FAO, African Soil Science Society (ASSS), and the African Union (http://eusoils.jrc.ec.europa.eu/library/ maps/africa_atlas/index.html).This atlas shows the distribution of the main soil types in Africa (Figure 2 .11).It also contains derived maps at continental scale with descriptive text (e.g. vulnerability to desertification, soil nutrient status, carbon stocks and sequestration potential, irrigable areas and water resources) and more detailed sources of soil information for Africa.Its publication is foreseen for 2012.Two major general sources of national soil information are the digital archive of soil maps maintained at the JRC and the world soil survey archive and catalogue maintained at Cranfield University, United Kingdom.The Joint Research Centre (JRC), ISRIC-World Soil Information and FAO jointly worked to scan national soil legacy maps existing in hard copies at their premises.This effort has converted more than 6,000 paper soil maps from 135 countries into scanned digital copies.EuDASM's objective is to transfer paper-based soil maps into a digital format with the maximum possible resolution to ensure their preservation and easy disclosure.This is a tremendous resource of historical data, even though the digital maps have not been georeferenced.However, most scanned maps have overprinted grids which allow users to geo-reference the maps in GIS software.The scanned maps cover most countries in Africa, Asia, Europe and Latin America.The maps can be freely downloaded from the website http:// eusoils.jrc.ec.europa.eu/eSdb_Archive/. More information about this database can be obtained from .FAO's GeoNetwork gives access to environmental and related spatial data and information in order to support decision making.A significant number of soil maps and derived soil information is available at this site http://www.fao.org/geonetwork/srv/en/main.home that also contains metadata.The WOSSAC Archive is based at Cranfield University, UK.The archive consists of a soil reports section, soil maps and albums section, soil books section, aerial photography section, and a satellite imagery section of images collected in the past 80 years in more than 250 territories, principally by British companies and soil survey staff.The aims of WOSSAC are: ▸ To establish an accessible archive of hard copies of endangered soil survey reports, maps and other relevant materials.▸ To establish an interactive online catalogue of all surveys known, including those in the Archive at Cranfield and those remaining in company and private hands elsewhere.▸ Although WOSSAC is concentrating on British-sourced materials, its aim is to link the WOSSAC catalogue with other major databases, to form a global network of information on soil surveys.ISRIC's repository http://library.wur.nl/isric/ contains a rich collection of books and reports on soils.Presently, the WOSSAC Archive holds materials for some 276 countries and territories worldwide, some of which enjoy a better depth of coverage and representation than others (http://www.wossac.com/archive/index.cfm).A number of soil data and derived soil products are available for many Sub-Saharan African countries as national archived data in individual countries.Many of those have been scanned by the EuDASM archive (section 4.1).There are SOTER databases for large parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, such as SOTER for Southern Africa (SOTERSAF), for Central Africa (SOTERCAF), and for North-Eastern Africa.(SOTERNE).SOTERSAF was compiled from the SOTER database for Southern Africa at a scale of 1:1 M. The initial dataset covered national soil maps from Angola, Mozambique Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, and Tanzania.The SOTER methodology was applied to these maps by national soil institutes and FAO consultants.The SOTER database was then restructured and the GIS files were slightly modified by ISRIC, using the 90 m digital elevation model (DEM) derived from Shuttle Radar Topographic Mission (SRTM).The database can be found at http://www.isric.org/projects/soter-south-africa or can be obtained on CD ROM from FAO.SOTERCAF The majority of countries in the MENA region have rich soil datasets housed at their national institutes.However, these datasets still exist as hard copy maps and often do not cover the whole country.In some countries, the hard copies are in the process of being converted into digital copies.Few on-line sources exist in this region, apart from those maps inventoried by EuDASM (section 3.1).Digital georeferenced soil profile information is scarce, apart from that stored in Jordan.Some of the information mentioned in Table 2 .3 is not in the public domain (for instance the Soil Map of Saudi Arabia).There is no SOTER product available in the region, except for a national SOTER in Syria and Tunisia and the Egypt part of the SOTER for Northern and eastern Africa.National geographic soil databases in Asia are summarized in Table 2 .4.Soil information availability appears to be extremely varied with a number of countries having -to our knowledge -no national soil maps better, or more recent than, the one contained in the Digital Soil Map of the World and HWSD.This appears to be the case for Afghanistan, Bhutan, Cambodia, Korea Democratic Republic, Laos, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Vietnam.In other countries such as India, more detailed national soil information exists, but is not in the public domain.Some countries have developed sophisticated soil information databases on-line.In this respect, attention is drawn to Korea (http://asis.rda.go.kr.),China (http:// www.geodata.cn.)illustrated in Figure 2 .12, and Nepal (http://www.isric.org/data/ soil-and-terrain-database-nepal) .The digital soil and physiographic database for northern and central Eurasia (SOTEREA) covers China, Mongolia and all countries of the former Soviet Union.The database was derived from several sources such as the 1:2.5 Million Soil Map of the Former Soviet Union prepared by Friedland in the Dokuchaiev Institute, Moscow; the soil map of China at 1:4 million scale prepared by the Institute of Soil Science Chinese Academy of Science in Nan-Jing; and the SOTER database for China.Apart from selected examples in the report on soils of China, the database contains neither soil profile descriptions or soil analysis results.Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) National soil databases for the different countries in the LAC region are illustrated in Table 2 .5.The SOTER database for Latin America and the Caribbean (SOTERLAC) was first published as a CDROM by FAO in 1998.An updated version is now available at ISRIC.The database contains over 1800 soil profiles, soil attribute data, and derived soil properties and can be downloaded from: (http://www.isric.org/sites/default/files/private/datasets/SOTeRlAC2.zip).The derived soil properties in this database are presented by soil unit for fixed depth intervals of 0.2 m to 1 m depth.In addition to the Geographic Databases a number of countries have developed on-line access to soil information.This is, for instance, the case for Argentina , Columbia, Guatemala, Mexico, Paraguay, República Dominica and Paraguay.These and some other countries in the LAC region have prepared digital soil profile databases as illustrated in The National Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) was originally established by US Congress in 1935 as the Soil Conservation Service (SCS) and later expanded to become the leader for all natural resources, ensuring private lands are conserved, restored, and made more resilient to environmental challenges such as climate change.NRCS works with landowners through conservation planning and assistance designed to benefit the soil, water, air, plants, and animals and also with consequences on productive lands and healthy ecosystems.It works with landowners because 70% of the land in the United States is privately owned (http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/main/national/about).The NRCS publishes standardized digital soil geographic databases of the USA at two scales: 1:63,360 to 1:12,000 (previously named SSURGO) and 1:250,000 (previously named STATSGO).In addition, soils data are included in the time-series point samples of the National Resources Inventory (NRI).The soil database currently archived by the Service contains more than 20,000 pedons of U. S. Soils (Figure 2 .13).The Canadian Soil Information Service (CanSIS) manages and provides access to soil and land resource information on behalf of the federal, provincial, and territorial governments of Canada (http://sis.agr.gc.ca/cansis/).It maintains the national repository of soil information such as soil data, maps, technical reports, and standards and procedures through its National Soil Database (NSDB) (http:// sis.agr.gc.ca/cansis/nsdb/intro.html).The NSDB includes GIS coverage at a variety of scales and the characteristics of each soil series.The principal types of NSDB data holdings are summarized at http:// sis.agr.gc.ca/cansis/nsdb/intro.html .often have highly detailed soil maps (Belgium for instance is completely covered at 1:10 000 scale).Most countries in Central and Eastern Europe (including the European part of Russia) are covered by a SOTER database at 1:2.5 M scale (FAO/ISRIC/, 2000) that incorporates soil profile information.Some soil profile information is contained in SGDBE (see below) and as previously illustrated (Figure 2 .10) is rather scarce compared to other continents.The main reason is that these profiles (and the more detailed soil maps) are not in the public domain in many European countries.Soil Geographical Database of Europe at scale 1:1.000.000 Version 1 of this database (SGDBE) was digitised by Platou et al. (1989) et al.,1995) , forms the core of version 1.0 of the European Soil Database.The aim of the database is to provide a harmonised set of soil parameters, covering Europe (the enlarged EU) and bordering Mediterranean countries, to be used in agro-meteorological and environmental modelling at regional, national, and/or continental levels.Recently the Soil Geographical Database of Europe (SGDBE) has been extended in version 4.0, to cover Albania, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, FYROM (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.The most recent extension covers Iceland and the New Independent States (NIS) of Belarus, Moldova, the Russian Federation and Ukraine.Work is ongoing to incorporate soil data for other Mediterranean countries: Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey.In addition to these geographical extensions, the database has also experienced important changes during its lifetime.The latest major changes include the introduction of a new extended list of parent materials and, for coding major soil types, the use of the new World Reference Base (WRB) for Soil Resources (FAO, 1998) .The database is currently managed using the ArcGIS® Geographical Information System (GIS) software system and associated relational databases.The database contains a list of Soil Typological Units (STU) characterizing distinct soil types that have been identified and described.The STU are described by attributes (variables) specifying the nature and properties of the soils, for example: texture, moisture regime, stoniness, etc.It is not appropriate to delineate each STU separately thus STUs are grouped into Soil Mapping Units (SMU) to form soil associations.The criteria for soil associations and SMU delineation have taken into account the functioning of pedological relationships within the landscape.A detailed instruction manual for the compilation of data for the Soil Geographical Database of Europe version 4.0 has been published by Lambert et al. (2003) .An overview per country is given in Table 2 .7.The wealth of soil profile information that is being collected in Europe is well illustrated by Bullock et al., (1999) in Table 2 .8.Its availability however is much more problematic.Soil geographic database (SGDB) of Russia is archived at the Department of Soil Science, Lomonosov Moscow State University in collaboration with the Soil Institute.The database consists of a soil map of Russia at a scale of 1:2.5 M, representative soil profiles, and soil attributes which are linked to the mapping units of the soil map of Russia.More information about the database can be found at http://db.soil.msu.ru.A national soil profile collection for Russia is kept at IIASA and consists of 234 soil profiles, which are complete with soil attribute data.The dataset is freely available online and can be accessed from the following website: http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/FOR/russia_cd/download.htm.It has two tables: the first provides measured soil data and the second table one provides default values where measured data are lacking in the first table.The reference soil profiles come from numerous literature sources.The extent and practical importance were major reasons for the profile selection.Therefore, agricultural soils received priority in the database elaboration.While the collection aimed to cover all soils of Russia, there were problems with analytical data for some poorly investigated soils in the north, Siberia, and the Far East.The geographical distribution of measured soil referenced profiles is shown in Figure 2 .14.Two SOTER products cover Russia: SOTER for Central and Eastern Europe which includes the European part of Russia at 1:2.5 Million scale, including soil profiles for the dominant soils; and SOTER for northern Eurasia which includes the Asian part of Russia at 1:5 M scale without soil profile information.In New Zealand, the S-Map project was created as part of the government-funded Spatial Information programme run by Landcare Research to provide digital soil spatial information system for New Zealand (http://www.landcareresearch.co.nz/).The S-map project houses the national soils database for New Zealand and has its work still in progress.When completed, it will provide seamless digital soil map coverage for the country and at any scale from farm to region to nation.The National Soil Database (NSD) it houses is a 'point' database containing descriptions of about 1,500 New Zealand soil profiles, together with their chemical, physical, and mineralogical characteristics ( Figure 2.16) .An enormous amount of soil data has been collected up to date.The bulk of this information was gathered at local scale for agricultural (and other) development and monitoring processes.As soil survey work was driven by local problems, there was initially little harmonization in soil description, soil classification and soil analytical methods used.In recent years there has been growing agreement on each of these issues.The FAO Guidelines for Soil Profile Description (FAO, 2006) and the Soil Survey Manual of the USDA (USDA, 1993) are very similar and are now recognized as international standards.In soil classification the development of the World Reference Base for Soil Resources, itself largely based on the USDA Soil Taxonomy and the related FAO Legend for the Soil Map of the World, has made many national classifications converge towards a common approach and terminology.Certainly there is still no universal agreement on a unique system, but the large differences that existed in the past are narrowing.Standardization of soil laboratory methods has also made good progress, although significant differences remain for such crucial characteristics as texture and organic carbon measurements.From a policy side, a major reduction in funding by central Governments in most countries of the industrial world starting in the 1980's, resulted in the transfer of responsibility from central soil survey and research organisations to regional groups and/or private sector organisations.This introduces a number of difficulties, particularly a lack of uniformity in approach and methodology used, proliferation of different soil classifications, a lack of availability of the information after surveys have been completed and difficulties in harmonising the information at national and continental levels. (Bullock et al.,1999) .Soil data have not been collected everywhere with the same intensity, sometimes for obvious reasons.For example, where the climate is too dry, too cold or the slope too steep to support human uses soil information often remains scarce as there is little incentive (apart from research) to increase soil knowledge in these areas.Most, but not all, industrial countries have reasonable to highly detailed soil information available, while the situation in the developing world is more varied, as illustrated by the scale of the national country soil maps.Soil profile information is also very variable from country to country; while even where it is collected it is not always available to researchers or the general public.At a regional level the SOTER initiative has collected legacy soil maps and legacy soil profiles and organized these with a standardized methodology and soil classification system.This has allowed a certain regional harmonization of information for large parts of Africa, Europe, South America and the Caribbean.Lack of ongoing funding, however, has put the future of the SOTER programme in doubt.At the global level, the Harmonized World Soil Database brings together the available information from different national and regional soil mapping programs such as DSMW, SOTER, the national soil map of China and the European Geographic Database and is, at present, the only digital global soil product available.However, it is fundamental to emphasize that the time of collection of most of global and regional soil legacy data available dates back to the 1960s to 1990s.Therefore, currently, the global soil science community is limited in its ability to provide up to date data on the actual status of global and regional soil resources.There has been a considerable gap between the production of the unique world soil map and now, as no alternative up-to date soil information is available at this moment.This review of existing and available soil maps and databases globally and regionally is as interesting for what is omitted as for what is included.It can be reasonably assumed that past soil investigations, in most countries, have almost certainly resulted in the collection of hundreds of thousands to perhaps millions of field observations and tens to hundreds of thousands of laboratory analysed soil samples per country.The vast majority of these observations and analyzed soil samples have clearly never been collated or made available for inclusion in publically available, open databases.The significant effort required to assemble data for the relatively small number of analysed soil profiles included in the few existing global databases of analysed soil profile information (e.g. ISRIC-WISE) is indicative of how difficult it can be to obtain and collate previously collected soil profile data.This begs the question as to why historical soil profile observations and associated analytical data are so difficult to locate, obtain and collate into open, shared, international databases.Perhaps the entities that originally collected the historical field observations and conducted the laboratory analyses lacked the resources or mandates to enter these data into digital databases.Perhaps concerns about data ownership and intellectual property rights discouraged organizations from compiling data to share widely.Perhaps the local nature of most previous soil investigations precluded considering how locally collected data could be of interest, and use, in a wider, global context.Perhaps the lack of an available, and easy to access and use, global repository for accepting and curating soil profile data was the reason so much data never got shared.Whatever the reasons, the fact remains that only a very tiny fraction of previously collected field soil observations or previously analysed soil samples have ever been preserved and found their way into open and available global data bases of soil information.Perhaps it is time to consider how this oversight might be corrected in the future.Perhaps all it might take to encourage the capture and sharing of information about soil field observations and laboratory analysed soil samples is to provide a suitable, open, and easy to use platform to enable entry and sharing of such data for any and all entities that which to contribute their data.Perhaps if the global soil science community were provided with an opportunity to contribute their data on field observations and laboratory analyses to a centralized global facility for holding, harmonizing, curating and sharing soil data globally.It is hoped that the survey of existing soil information sources contained in this document will stimulate discussion of possible mechanisms by which collation and sharing of soil observations and data can be improved in the future.Quite often, statements such as "...according to soil users' requirements..." or "...targeting soil users' needs..." are common in documents justifying the production of soil spatial information.However, very little information exists in the literature clearly showing what the users' needs are.Although it is generally known that users of soil information attach particular reasons explaining the importance of soil to their applications, their specific concerns are seldom included in the design of soil information systems.Assessment of users' needs should therefore be an integral part of any soil information system and soil mapping activities before their conception, planning and implementation.There are some attempts, though, in the literature of organizations which have evaluated soil information users' needs prior to launching their soil information systems.The present document reviewed this literature in an attempt to draw lessons for future soil mapping activities.In addition, targeted interviews were also conducted with users to establish their needs and levels of satisfaction with the current supply of soil information.A limited literature was found on organizations that had carried out users' needs assessment.They include a survey on users of soil maps from British Columbia (Valentine et al.,1981) , ASRIS user needs assessment (Wood and Auricht, 2011), and Soil Atlas of Africa users' requirements (http://eusoils.jrc.ec.europa.eu/library/maps/africa_atlas/survey.html).In the case of users of soil maps from British Columbia, a survey was carried out in 1981 to establish whether or not soil maps and reports for British Columbia were providing the information required in a form that was intelligible to users who were not soil specialists.The survey was conducted on potential users of soil maps identified from such sources as professional association membership lists and the distribution list of the Resource Analysis Branch, Ministry of the Environment, Victoria, British Columbia.Results of the survey showed that: ▸ Users need site-specific soil information for the areas of their concern and that texture, slope and soil water content were the properties of highest importance ▸ Users need meta-data and information about mapping procedures and reliability, and simple but standard symbology for maps and legends Twenty seven years later, the findings of the British Columbia users' needs survey were still echoed in a different setting.ESBN in collaboration with FAO and African Soil Science Society (ASSS) conducted a user needs assessment in 2007 to get insight into the needs and wishes of users about the content of the soil atlas of Africa that they proposed to produce.The respondents were from Africa, Europe, America, Asia and various International Organizations.Although the objectives for this survey were different from those of British Columbia, its assessment results had similar features.It showed that: ▸ Users want site-specific soil information (preferably given country-wise) ▸ The descriptions of the soil types must contain information on their attributes/properties and distribution ▸ Supporting information must be included and incorporate degradation/conservation issues, and information on critical soil parameters (soil depth, soil texture, water-holding capacity) Recently, ASRIS also carried out soil information users' needs assessment in order to provide direction for the future development of Australian national soil data products that meet specific user requirements and are applicable to a broad range of soil data users (Wood and Auricht, 2011).The results showed that: ▸ Soil users seemed to have preference for information on key soil attributes such as soil moisture, nutrition, toxicity, biology and carbon.▸ Users want an easily accessible source of nationally consistent, authoritative, trusted, and well documented soil attributes available as downloadable data sets.▸ Links to comprehensive meta-data, including method descriptions, error and uncertainty and input source data (especially as it relates to any derived data layers) should be provided alongside soil data information.This is important so that users can assess the fitness for purpose of national data and further refine data sets for their specific needs.The results of these surveys seem to have a clear message of what users of soil information want irrespective of their geographic locations: need for metadata, importance of certain soil attributes, and preference for site-specific soil information.As part of the GSP framework regarding pillar 4 on enhancing soil information, an online survey was conducted to assess various aspects of users needs with regards to the existing soil information in the public domain.The survey questionnaire (see appendix 1) was sent out to soil information users throughout the world using contacts at international organizations, FAO country networks, representatives, individuals, among others.Altogether, there were 144 respondents who were categorized as farmers, researchers, planners, extension workers, etc. (Figure 3.1) .Researchers were the majority of respondents (66%), followed by Policy makers (17%).It seems the survey did not adequately represent respondents who were farmers, extension workers, and students.Farmers and extension workers are important categories of soil users who are directly involved with soil in food production and environmental conservation.Nonetheless, they are also known to rely greatly on researchers for synthesised soil information.Some of their user needs may still be reflected by the needs expressed by researchers.A large proportion of the respondents (78.3%) said they worked in public organizations, NGOs (12%), and private (5.6%) or parastatal organizations (5.6%).Only a small proportion worked in commercial enterprises (2.1%).22% used soil information in Europe as the location for application of soil information, 14.7% in LAC, 14.2% in Sub-Saharan Africa, and 9.6% used soil information at a global scale.The majority of the soil information users said they were frequent users (75%), which implies that they gave a promising representation of how trends in soil information dissemination have been affecting them.When asked about the general areas for which they use soil information, the majority of respondents said they use the information for research (17.5%) and for land degradation assessment (16.7%) (Table 3 .1).Only 1.5% (named "others" in Table 3 .1) used soil information for generation of extrapolation domains of improved technologies, creation of the soil data centre infrastructure, economic aspects/ valuation, climate change emission factors, biodiversity assessment, digital soil mapping, natural hazards zonation, or assessment of ecosystem services (Table 3 .1).Generally, most people prefer geo-referenced data (72%) compared to non-georeferenced data (28%).Furthermore, the largest group of soil information users said they often use soil profile data (33%), 23% use measured soil attribute data, 22% use soil-class maps, 21% soil properties maps, and 3% use outputs from soil models (pedo/taxo-transfer functions).The small proportion of respondents (3% ± 2%) who said they use outputs from soil models has some bearing on the relevance and validity of outputs from soil inference systems, which base their outputs on rule-based models to infer soil properties from other soil properties.This survey results portray an image of the majority of soil users not placing a high regard on outputs from inference systems.Soil physical and soil chemical properties are still the most requested of all the soil attributes (Figure 3 .2).Other soil attributes which are needed by a small fraction of other soil users include soil erosion data, soil mineralogical data, and information on management/productivity.The results of this survey tend to mirror what others found in similar previous users' needs surveys (Valentine et al.,1981; Wood and Auricht, 2011) ; thus, strengthening the need for more emphasis on development of more information on soil physical and chemical properties.In terms of soil-data type demand, the policy makers and researchers seem to have high variance of the data type demand (Figure 3.3) .They equally want all data types.Farmers want more of chemical properties, engineers more on soil profile characteristics, and modellers want more of soil physical properties.What type of soil data is necessary for your application?Proportion of respondents (%) Most of the users surveyed seemed to prefer site-specific soil information.32% said they have been working at the national scale, 30% at district scale and 16% at the plot level.In general, more than three-quarters of the respondents are working at national and sub-national scales.Only 9% seem interested in global scales (Figure 3.4) .It is interesting to note how policy makers target mainly farmers (at district and national scales), engineers work mostly at district and national levels, and global issues were left for modellers, researchers and consultants (Figure 3.4) .Consultants, policy-makers, and researchers also seem to have interest in regional issues, going by the relative proportions of their scales of operation at this level.The latitude of operation seems wide for consultants; they have a thorough mix of scales of operation.These results also show that global soil information can also influence local and regional policies to some extent.Soil information access is one of the widely quoted problems among data users.In this survey, soil users were asked to name their preferred mode of accessing data.32% of the respondents chose online tabulated data as their preferred mode of accessing soil data, 29% preferred online GIS layers such as maps, and 19% preferred online reports.In general, data available online seems to be preferred to offline or hard copy data.Modellers are top the list of those who prefer online data followed by engineers and policy makers.Farmers and consultants seem to prefer data available in hard copies.When accessing data, the issues that are most important for soil information users include whether data is freely downloadable, availability of georeferenced data, and potential transmission of computer virus (Figure 3.5) .File sizes and language used in the websites seem not to concern soil information users very much.Although almost 30% of the users suppose that soil data information should be cost shared, a large proportion (43%) of soil users seem undecided as to whether the cost should be shared or not.There are also those who are willing to trade data detail/accuracy with cost.Over half of the respondents (53%) felt that they would be comfortable with less accurate but free soil data.Engineers and consultants are the only groups of soil users who would accept to pay for more accurate data (Table 3.2).Policy makers and researchers, however, can make do with less accurate but free soil information.In fact, they are the majority of those who feel that soil data collected at public expense should be freely availed to the public.Apart from data access issues, there are various aspects of soil data that users of soil information tend to find inadequately addressed.Issues such as methodology of data generation, reliability of the methods, etc.have been shown to be critical for data users.This survey evaluated the level of importance data users attach to these issues.The results showed that accuracy/reliability, availability of soil attributes, GPS coordinates, methodology for data generation, and scale are the most important aspects that users would like to have (Figure 3 .6).These same issues have also been observed in the previous users' needs survey in the literature (Valentine et al.,1981) .Interestingly, copyright issues, classification scheme, number of publications, and whether soil maps are pixel-based or polygon-based do not appear as important to users of soil data.This result has implications on the clamour for pixel-based mapping that has been vigorously promoted in the past few years.The areas that users of soil information think should be strengthened in order to improve soil information use include online data dissemination, measured soil attributes, standardization, and acknowledgements of people involved in data generation (Table 3.3).They also would wish to see charges on data acquisition eliminated or reduced.Can you rank the importance of the following aspects of soil data and information according to your application?The results of the online survey and the literature review show that the majority of soil information users are keen on georeferenced soil data.Since most users seem to be working at the national and sub-national levels, the soil mapping activities generating soil information should give priority to farm, district, and national scales.The details they would prefer to see included in the soil information database are: ▸ measured soil attributes (physical, chemical, and biological properties) ▸ georeferenced locations where the measurements were carried out, ▸ Metadata describing the methods used in data generation, accuracy/reliability, dates of measurements, etc Although users were divided on their preference for pixel-based or polygon-based soil maps, they are unanimous that the maps should be of fine resolution and relevant to their areas of interest.Furthermore, the maps should also be enriched with the following information: The concepts on which soil inference systems are based are still not well appreciated by many users.The majority of soil information users do not seem to prefer use of model outputs as substitutes Many soil users would like to have free access to soil information.They think that if soil information is generated at public expense, then the resulting generated information should be freely availed to the public.The preferred mode of disseminating the information is through the internet.Users would like to have the convenience of downloading relevant data rather than having to search widely for the information.This implies that the custodians of soil information systems tasked with data storage and dissemination should consider online repositories as much as is possible.In addition, the following suggestions were extracted from user suggestions with regard to data dissemination: ▸ Inclusion of versatile, user-friendly, web-based data storage and retrieval systems ▸ Acknowledgement of data sources and methodology for data generation ▸ Data legends, metadata, and relevant documentation of the data should be included in the dissemination approaches used ▸ Reduction or removal of data access restrictions ▸ Computer virus-free data access While it is evident that the number of respondents was not as large as hoped for this survey, bibliographic research and past experiences showed that this is a common trend.The main reasons behind low participation are as follows: a) accessibility to soil information users, b) limited access to internet in some countries, c) willingness to invest time in responding to another survey.However, this survey provides a very general overview of what is expected in terms of soil information.The main message from this exercise is that any soil mapping activity should target surveying their users before starting their activities, as soil mapping should be a demand-driven activity.ANd TOOlS FOR SOil mAppiNg Soil maps provide descriptions of spatial and temporal attributes of soil and landscape.Soil mapping has traditionally involved the development of an understanding of soil forming processes which is then applied to predict the location of classes of soil types and the likely range of within-class variation of soil properties.Recently, there has been a growing realisation among many soil scientists that spatially extensive and available environmental data layers can be effectively utilized to represent various components of soil forming factors and processes with a view to improving soil mapping.Digital Soil Mapping (DSM) is a new technology soil scientists are now using to map soil properties based on plausible relationships between sparsely available observations of soil properties and extensively available environmental data layers.DSM is the computer-assisted production of soil property maps or the creation and the population of a geographically referenced soil database generated using field and laboratory observation methods coupled with environmental data through quantitative relationships (Lagacherie et al.2007) .DSM is a new approach for improving delivery of soil survey information.It was developed to address problems and limitations associated with traditional soil survey.Traditional soil survey has always had problems with the collection of representative soil data, cost implications in soil mapping, how to spatially represent soil properties in a soil map, and efficient delivery of accurate soil information, among others.These problems have hampered access to, and wide application of, accurate soil information.DSM is a technological advancement that seeks to improve the processing, accuracy, and delivery of soil information at various scales worldwide.These potentials are some of the aspects that users of soil information are seeking.Although DSM offers the promise of improved delivery of soil information and increased coverage of mapped areas, it also has its share of challenges just like any other technology.This document looked at the potential and challenges of DSM with regard to providing soil information that can satisfy soil user requirements.DSM evolved from the state-factor soil forming paradigm developed by Jenny (1941) for describing the relationship between soil formation and distribution.In this paradigm, the soil profile characteristics are governed by climate, organisms, relief, parent material, and time, which are known as soil forming factors.If the relationship between soil profile characteristics and soil forming factors is known, as well as the distribution of soil forming factors, then the distribution of soil profile characteristics can be inferred (or predicted) from the distribution of soil forming factors.In early soil mapping activities, the emperical relationship between soil profile characteristics and soil forming factors was related to Jenny's equation and was implemented by surveyors/pedologists using conceptual soil-landscape relation models (Hudson, 1992) .The soil surveyors/pedologist used this mental model to produce a soil map by relating field observations of classified soil profiles along with less detailed augered soil observations to local information on the spatial distribution of soil forming factors principally extracted from the interpretation of aerial photographs but supplemented with consideration of relevant maps of environmental factors.Some soil scientists later developed quantitative models to represent initial mental models for the sake of improving the soil mapping process.Equation 4.1 gives a general format for these models in which S p is the predicted soil property/type.= f ( cl, o, r, p, t et al.,1996; Zhu et al.,1997) .Further developments were made on the structure of Equation 4.1 by splitting it into two: deterministic and stochastic parts.The deterministic part modelled the soil-landscape relationship in a similar manner as Equation 4.1 while the stochastic part modelled the spatial variation of the soil attribute.Equation 4.2 gives the general structure of the improved model.S p = f ( cl, o, r, p, t ) + ε Equation 4.2 where ε is the stochastic component.Geostatistical methods such as kriging have been used to model the stochastic component (Burgess and Webster, 1980; Yasribi et al.,2009) .Improvements in technology for data capture (e.g. remote sensing and microwave, GPS, spectroscopy, etc.)coupled with computational advances have helped to improve predictive soil mapping.Soil maps and spatial soil information systems can now be created by mathematical models that account for the spatial and temporal variations of soil properties based on soil information and environmental surrogates of soil forming factors.This is the new paradigm in soil mapping (McBratney et al.,2003) .It relies on quantitative relationships between easily measured and extensive environmental covariates and more difficult to measure and less extensive observations of soil attributes to predict the soil attributes in locations for which direct measurements/observations were not made.The results of such quantitative prediction eventually help to populate the target geographic area (at a given spatial interval which is known as pixel size/resolution) with the soil information (Figure 4 .1).Soil mapping has traditionally involved the development of a conceptual understanding of soil forming processes which is applied to predict the spatial distribution of classes of soil.Often, descriptive and diagnostic soil profile characteristics are used to classify soil at sampled locations (Hole and Campbell, 1985; Boul et al.,1997) .For a long time, aerial photography and, to a limited extent, satellite imagery, provided the spatial context for predicting class-type soil maps.These class-type soil maps had artificial boundaries and divisions that were utilised to convey spatial and temporal variance in soil types and properties.Since the early 1990's, both the spatial and attribute data have been incorporated into computerised data bases and GIS to improve the utility and accessibility of soil data and information.Most traditional soil maps are still class-type with abrupt boundaries between soil types with the variation of soil properties mostly described as occurring across boundaries.Within the polygons of soil maps, internal variation may be inferred through reference to the presence of different classes of soil but the spatial pattern of this variation is not explicitly described or mapped.Recently, advances in DSM endeavour to produce an alternative means to map soil properties (and also sometimes soil classes), by correlating soil properties to ancillary information derived from digital environmental data layers, and by using spatial statistics to interpolate the soil properties (or classes) between pointobservations at known locations.So far DSM has been successful in producing soil property maps and representations of continuous variation of soil properties in the landscape while traditional soil mapping continues to be the more commonly used method for producing conventional class-type soil maps.In traditional soil mapping, relatively few sites are visited or sampled within the study area landscape, and predictions are made based on conceptual models that relate soil properties at the sampled sites to covariates as observed on aerial photographs or geology maps.The models and rules are often held tacitly in the minds of the soil surveyor and are rarely expressed in detail other than as soil mapping legends.In DSM, conceptual models of conventional soil survey are statistically translated into quantitative rules.At the core of DSM is soil (data from traditional soil mapping) and digital environmental data layers.These are used to construct the quantitative models for mapping.DSM is therefore not so much a replacement for traditional soil mapping, but rather a compliment that extends and qualtifies conventional soil mapping approaches.As with traditional soil survey and mapping, DSM relies on inputs of detailed field and laboratory based soil data, an understanding of soil formation and impact processes, and the availability of spatially explicit and relevant environmental covariate data.Although DSM aims at producing digital soil maps, it is also a process for producing geographically referenced databases at a given spatial resolution.The digital soil maps form a spatial database of soil attributes (properties), which together with the existing databases of samples of the landscape at known locations contribute to soil information.In addition to building soil database, digital soil maps should also describe the uncertainties associated with spatial predictions.DSM process characteristically involves three stages: stage I is concerned with development and assessment of inputs; stage II is where the choice of methods and tools is made; and stage III is where the spatial inference system is developed and applied (Figure 4.2) .In general, DSM can be said to have the following features: ▸ Use of soil survey outputs (field and profile observations and soil maps) as a key input ▸ It is oriented towards modelling and computer applications ▸ Its outputs go beyond the production of soil maps (mostly raster/pixel-based) 4.State of the art methods and tools for soil mapping 4.5 Input for DSM 4.5.1 Soil legacy data: meaning, characteristics, and types The term 'legacy data' has been mentioned in hundreds of journal articles and technical documents on soil mapping.In general, legacy data are those that have been stored in an old format or inherited from languages, platforms and techniques earlier than the current technology.They have the following characteristics: ▸ They were collected using the traditional/conventional technology ▸ Data documentation is not elaborate in most cases ▸ Older data may have missing author information or institutional knowledge ▸ They may require elaborate steps to access, process, and apply with the current technology ▸ They are very important/mandatory as they form the basis for the current advancements In soil, legacy data take the form of: Legacy data are the foundation (and sometimes building blocks) for DSM.They can be used as calibration/validation samples, as skeletons for developing DSM (where new samples fill the gaps), and for reducing the cost and difficulties in obtaining new samples for DSM.Legacy data are available in many national soil institutes, regional soil information systems, and global initiatives such as ISRIC and HWSD.The previous chapters of this document have described some of these sources of legacy data.Although legacy data have a key role in DSM, they are inherently problematic to use with the current technology.The following are the main areas where the legacy data pose difficulties for use in DSM: ▸ Data gaps with large regions lacking any available legacy data ▸ Inconsistent format/ measurement units or symbols between and sometimes within datasets ▸ Access and copyright issues ▸ Bulkiness/storage formats ▸ Challenges in dealing with the time gap and associated biophysical-geochemical changes that have occurred in representative areas since the collection of the legacy data.These changes are often ignored/over-looked when integrating legacy data with the current DSM data.The need to weight or transform the legacy data in order to conform with the current DSM data is a potential source of inaccuracy.▸ Coordination and structures for data sharing are still needed to improve access to the legacy data.More resources are needed to enrich the legacy data through: ▸ Additional soil survey/soil sampling ▸ Data recovery efforts for existing legacy data ▸ Conversion (digitization) of legacy data into user-friendly formats for the current technology.▸ Improved storage and access to legacy data The following steps are suggested when converting the legacy data into digital formats: ▸ Harvesting/collection of legacy data ▸ Extract possible information from the legacy data such as legends, symbols, units, etc ▸ Identify existing georeferenced points that can be pinned (e.g. hard targets, latitudes and longitude lines on maps, etc) ▸ Convert extracted information into a digital database ▸ Scan the hard copy maps and manually trace the maps.▸ Use software to clean and to re-assign colour codes on the scanned copies ▸ Georeference the cleaned outputs to a agreeable/standard projection Then, the final output can be easily integrated with the new datasets or new techniques in DSM.Environmental correlates represent the Jenny's soil forming factors given in Equation 4.1.They include climate, organisms, topographic relief, parent material, and space.Since they influence different aspects of the soil formation process, they often have some quantifiable relationship with the soil types/properties.Table 4 .1 gives a summary of the importance of the environmental correlates and their potential sources.4.State of the art methods and tools for soil mapping For environmental correlates to satisfy the needs of DSM, they need to have the following characteristics: ▸ They should be georeferenced so that their spatial coordinates contribute to the DSM model in Equation 4.1 ▸ They should be rasterized (or resolved) into pixels ▸ They should have uniform geographic projection and pixel resolution in order to be compatible with each other and with the soil legacy data ▸ They should be easily accessed/readily available ▸ They should be independent of each other (to avoid collinearity in DSM modelling) The most common sources of environmental correlates are: Digital Elevation Models (DEM), remote sensing images, land use and land cover maps, climate maps, and geology maps.Climate is the meteorological conditions, including temperature, precipitation, and wind, that characteristically prevail in a particular region.Climate data may exist as point data or as raster files.There are some websites which host such datasets at the global scale (see for example http:// www.worldclim.org/, http://data.giss.nasa.gov/gistemp/, http://precip.gsfc.nasa.gov/ or the FAOCLIM at http://www.fao.org/nr/climpag/pub/eN1102_en.asp).Individual countries, through the meteorological departments, also have their own climate data.Land surface elevation and the shape and features of the surface form topography.Landscape topography can be obtained from direct survey using levelling instruments or from remote sensing data (such as aerial photographs, LIDAR, radar, etc).Digital Elevation Model (DEM) is one of the forms et al.,2005) .DEM can be a raster-(a grid of pixels representing elevation) or vector-based dataset (e.g. Triangular Irregular Network, TIN).Freely downloadable DEM data for the whole world are available As GTOPO30 (http://eros.usgs.gov/#/Find_data/products_and_data_Available/gtopo30_info) which has 1 km pixel resolution, SRTM (http://dds.cr.usgs.gov/srtm/) which 90 m pixel resolution, or ASTER GDEM (http://asterweb.jpl.nasa.gov/gdem.asp) which has 30-m pixel resolution.High resolution DEM datasets may also freely available for some countries or sold per scene.DEM generated from remote sensing data often has problems which must be overcome before they are suitable for soil mapping.Many algorithms and software are available for correcting the DEMs (Lee et al.,2003; Xeujun et al.,2008) .Once corrected, DEMs can be used to derive terrain parameters needed for soil mapping (Table 4 .1).To this end, there are also many algorithms and software that have been developed for deriving different terrain parameters (see for example, http://www.sagagis.org; McMillan et al.,2003; Smith and Clark, 2005) .Remote sensing is the acquisition of information about an object or phenomenon, without making physical contact with the object.Different remote sensing techniques use different wavelengths of energy (as seen in the electromagnetic spectrum), such as visible, infrared, gamma rays, microwave, etc.Whichever the remote sensing technique, the general principle involves acquisition of the characteristic of an object (known as image of the object) through radiations which have been reflected or emitted by the object.The energy path for the radiations starts from the energy source to the object (which then reflects/emits the radiation) to the detector (or sensor) (Figure 4 .3).Examples of sensors include digital camera, satellite sensor, etc.Satellite sensors are onboard aircrafts/satellites which fly above the earth's surface, so that the earth's surface is the object that reflects the energy radiations.Remote sensing can be generally categorized into four broad groups for soil mapping: optical remote sensing (which relies on solar energy or artificial light (e.g. torch in diffuse reflectance, etc) as source of radiation), remote sensing due radiation from own body temperature (e.g. thermal radiation from the earth's surface), remote sensing using long waves (e.g. microwave, radio, NMR, etc), remote sensing using very short waves (e.g. gamma and x-rays) (Rees, 2001 ).Whichever the system used, the emitted or reflected energy in remote sensing is analyzed to produce information about the characteristics of the object.These characteristics include: Some sensors can only detect bands of wavelengths while other can distinguish small differences in wavelengths of reflected/emitted radiations.In the scientific field of remote sensing, this ability is known as spectral resolution.The higher the spectral resolution the more the sensor can detect many wavelengths of reflected radiations.Similarly, satellite sensors have different abilities to distinguish adjacent objects reflecting energy radiations.This ability is known as spatial resolution.Sensors with fine spatial resolution can distinguish objects which are separated by only a few metres (or centimetres) while those with coarse spatial resolution can only distinguish objects which are tens/ hundreds of metres (or kilometres) apart.Lastly, satellite sensors which go round the earth have the opportunity to take images of a particular spot on the earth's surface many times depending on 4.State of the art methods and tools for soil mapping how long they take to revisit the same spot during their revolution.This aspect of satellites is known as temporal resolution.All together, satellites' spectral, spatial and temporal resolutions enable detection of features and changes of the earth's surface with time and space.These features and changes are used by soil scientists to identify possible landscape patterns and associations, which can be related to different soil types/soil properties.Different remote sensing images (due to differences in sensors and satellite missions) such as Landsat, SRTM, MODIS, AVHRR, ASTER, etc have different resolutions which are exploitable in DSM to capture varied aspects of the landscape.Table 4 .2 gives examples of common remote sensing sensors which can be used in DSM.They can be grouped into three classes: satellite-based, airborne, and proximal sensors.Information about availability, cost, and acquisition dates of the remote sensing images can be readily obtained from the internet.Since remote sensing images can infer information about landscape characteristics, they have been used as proxy variables to assess relationships between the landscape characteristics they represent and soil legacy data.Furthermore, their spatially explicit nature (i.e. georeferenced pixels which cover the entire landscape of interest) is often used to support spatial mapping of soil in the landscape.Examples of the landscape characteristics commonly represented by remote sensing images in DSM are: Terrain attributes -from DEM; Land use/cover -using multispectral images such as Landsat, SPOT, Quickbird, etc.;Parent material -from gamma-ray spectrometry.There is plethora of literature on how these landscape characteristics can be obtained from the remote sensing data (see for example Cook et al.,1996; McMillan et al.,2005; Melesse et al.,2007; Xie et al.,2008) .▸ Parent material denotes the underlying geologic material, superficial or drift deposits from which soil is formed.DSM data on soil parent material can be obtained from existing geological maps or through the use of remote sensing data such as gamma rays.Freely downloadable geological map of the world at a scale of 1:35M is available at http://mrdata.usgs.gov/geology/world/. High resolution geological maps of other countries can also be found at http://geology.about.com/od/maps/geologic_maps.htm or from websites of individual countries.Parent material can also be obtained through the use of gamma-rays spectrometry, which is a technique for measuring the abundance of radio-nuclides in soils and parent materials (Cook et al.,1996; Wilford and Minty, 2007; Herrmann et al.,2010) .Technical support for DSM is perhaps the most under-developed compared to the other aspects of input process in DSM technology (Figure 4 .1).In order to encourage wide and accurate application of DSM technology, there is a need to improve the participation of all stakeholders by stimulating improved technical knowledge (such as training in modelling, pedology, database management, etc), standardization (of methods, tools, and input variables), validation, and sanctity of the user needs.In terms of technical knowledge, there is a big gap between those who have little knowledge and those who do not have any at all.There are very few scientists with adequate and complete knowledge of spatial modelling, pedology, and computer/software applications; all of which are equally needed in DSM.Academic training, hands-on practical training, publication of cook-books, and case-studies are still needed in order to increase the number of technical personnel necessary to propel DSM to the required levels.Presently, there are many publications touching on various aspects of the technical knowledge (such as geostatistics, pedology, etc).However, they need to be assembled into one (or two) volume(s) with specific examples for DSM in order to widen the latitude of DSM applications.Furthermore, standards of practice (for tools and methods) need development to enforce uniformity and professionalism in DSM technology.Coordination, support, and development of infrastructure for data generation, archiving, and exchange (sharing) are also needed.This is particularly important for global soil mapping initiatives.Spatial prediction methods provide the means for estimating the values of a variable (or class) at unsampled sites using data from point observations.There are two main categories of spatial prediction: interpolation and extrapolation.Interpolation estimates values of a variable at un-sampled sites using data from point observations within the same region while extrapolation predicts the values of a variable at points outside the region covered by existing observations (Burrough and McDonnell, 1998) .There are many spatial prediction methods in the literature.They can be categorized into three broad groups: non-geostatistical, geostatistical, and mixed methods.Geostatistical methods can be further divided into those that use many explanatory variables (known as multivariate) and univariate methods.Table 4 .3 gives a summary of these interpolation methods.There are three common characteristics often observed with spatial data: (i) slowly varying, largescale (global) variations in the measured values, (ii) irregular, small-scale variations, and (iii) similarity of measurements at locations close together.While characteristics (i) and (iii) are handled by smoothing methods such as in non-geostatistical methods in Table 4 .3, characteristic (ii), the smallscale residual variation in the concentration field, is accounted for by geostatistical methods (Nielsen and Wendroth, 2003) .Remote sensing and GIS remain the most exploited tools in DSM for deriving covariates for mapping soil, spatial statistics, and spatial data transfer.Remote sensing can capture soil cover, top soil properties, atmospheric conditions, land surface elevation (DEM), and trend changes.Georeferenced remote sensing images carry these attributes in a spatially explicit manner, which helps DSM to cover large areas efficiently.Furthermore, the increasing development in remote sensing technology and computing is widening the window for seeing various aspects of soil and soil cover, which hitherto was concealed from pedologists (Liang, 2004) .However several pre-processing of remote sensing images need to be performed in order to produce more sophisticated covariates that would represent more accurately the soil variations.Terrain is the vertical and horizontal dimension of the land surface.In DSM, terrain is represented in a digital model known as Digital Terrain Model (DTM) or Digital Elevation Model (DEM).The important landscape attributes for DSM are known as terrain attributes.They are normally calculated from DEMs.Terrain attributes can be separated into primary and secondary attributes.Primary terrain attributes are those that are directly calculated from elevation data and include first and second Table 4 .4 gives a summary of these attributes.Image indices are used in DSM to enhance remote sensing images with respect to soil forming factors.They include NDVI, Grain Size Index, Colouration Index, and Hue Index (Xiao et al.,2006; Luo et al.,2008) .Processing of DSM input data (e.g. legacy data, remote sensing images, etc.)requires requisite software and good computing abilities in terms of computer capacity and processing speed.As the scale of DSM increases from local to global level (and with increase of spatial resolution), the demand for computing abilities also increase.This implies that high-end computers may be needed for fine resolution (e.g. tens of metres) global mapping.In addition to computing abilities, DSM also needs software for various applications such as interpolation, processing and analysis of terrain attributes, digitizing legacy data, and statistical analysis of input data (e.g. spectral reflectance).There are many geostatistical and GIS software for interpolation.Some of them are commercial while others are freely downloadable.The majority of GIS software can handle geostatistical and non-geostatistical interpolation methods.GRASS (http://grass.fbk.eu/), ILWIS (http://52north.org/ Numerous freely-downloadable software for geostatistical analysis are also available from the internet.R (http://cran.r-project.org/), Gstat (http://www.gstat.org/) and GSLIB (http://www.gslib.com/), VESPER (http://sydney.edu.au/agriculture/pal/software/vesper.shtml), S-Plus, ISATIS, are some of the versatile software which can handle classical statistical and geostatistical analyses.It utilizes a number of packages to implement geostatistical and classical statistical analysis.These packages are also freely downloadable from R website.The majority of the software for non-geostatistical interpolation can also be used for deriving terrain attributes and remote sensing analysis.SAGA and ILWIS are some of the example which can be freely downloaded.Other freely downloadable software are: LandSerf, TAS, GRASS, TOPAZ, MICRODEM, etc.There are also commercial software available for these applications.A number of software exist (and are still being produced) for various aspects of soil mapping such as profile description, database management, soil classification, and production of soil maps.SDBm is one such software for storing primary soil information and summarizing soil profile data.It was developed by FAO.SoLIM (Soil Land Inference Model) is software for soil mapping based on recent developments in geographic information science (GISc), artificial intelligence (AI), and information representation theory.It is available at http://solim.geography.wisc.edu/about/index.htm.DSM technique is rapidly evolving throughout the world and maps, databases, and literature about DSM are increasingly being produced.It is important that a digital database of these pieces of information be constructed.The digital database, which is a seamless compilation of all DSM data and outputs, should have a way of storing the data, enabling query facilities on the data, and allowing for visualization of data and products.There are a number of existing organizations with such systems, which can provide technical support for the construction of DSM digital database (see for example http://www.add.scar.org/).The increasing development of spatial data infrastructures over the world can be utilized to improve dissemination of soil information.Online software (e.g. Google Earth, Aquila, etc.)can be exploited and linked to the digital database to enable worldwide visualization of the DSM database and products.These software can also be used to import the associated legends, generate 3D surfaces, contours from isometric maps, wind barbs and 3D vector objects in a user-friendly way.ISRIC and ESBN are already implementing similar versions of digital databases with opportunities for online access, web-map generation, data/map visualization etc. (http://library.wur.nl/isric/ for ISRIC and http://eusoils.jrc.ec.europa.eu/library/jrc_soil/index.html for ESBN).Other innovative applications with intended to reach soil information users have also been developed through the use of mobile phones (Beaudette and O'Geen, 2010) , ready-made maps for use in mobile phones, GPS receivers, etc.which have been developed by ESRI (http://www.arcgis.com/home/ group.html?owner=mdangermond&title=esri%20soil%20mobile%20and%20web%20maps).Collection of soil data is one of the age-old limiting factors in soil mapping because it involves timeconsuming, costly, cumbersome, and (sometimes) less accurate methods.The traditional methods that have been applied in soil data collection include: field methods (such as Munsell colour chart, soil texture by feel, visual inspection, samplers, direct measurement with field equipment such as infiltrometer, tensiometer, moisture probes, etc.);laboratory methods for tests on soil samples collected from the field (such as physical, chemical, and biological equipments and reagents); and archived soil data (maps, reports, and published articles).Soil scientists are now turning a new page in soil data collection.Technologies which were initially used in other disciplines are finding their way into soil science to improve data collection and analysis.Techniques such as infrared spectroscopy, x-ray diffraction, Global Position Recorder, mobile laboratories, Nuclear Magnetic Resonance, etc.are increasingly being used in-situ or in the field to collect soil data (Viscarra-Rossel et al.,2010) .Proximal soil sensing, a new word for static or mobile soil data collection, is gaining acceptance as the way to improve soil data collection.The principle of soil proximal sensing is much the same as remote sensing save for the proximity of the sensor to the object, relative position of sensor with respect to the object (invasive or intrusive), and whether the sensor is static (on a soil sample) or carried/dragged along in soil body (McBratney et al.,2010) .Equipment and sensors for proximal soil sensing are being tested in many places around the world.Some of them are given in Table 4 .5.DSM products cover the landscape at varying resolutions depending of the scale of maps produced.Therefore, it makes it possible to get soil information on every location in the landscape.Furthermore, given that soil properties often exhibit relationships between themselves, other soil properties/ characteristics not included in the DSM database can be inferred from properties in the database.All together, the mapped and inferred soil properties and soil database contribute to the DSM information system.The information system can be used to deduce/monitor varied aspects of soil such as soil functions (e.g. quality/health) and soil threats (e.g. degradation, pollution, etc.)as well as feed into policy-decisions for environmental sustainability.The demand for soil information over varying spatial and temporal extents differs with intended applications.Soil aspects needed for modelling are different from those needed for planning as well as for reporting.Although DSM is versatile for producing soil maps and soil formation at varying spatial scales, not all soil properties should/can be produced.The soil properties which have not been mapped by DSM can as well be inferred using knowledge based rules that can relate information from existing DSM database to other soil properties that have not been included in the DSM database (Minasny and Hartemink, 2011).A system that allows for these processes as well as for managing the evolution of digital soil mapping products including spatially continuous or classified soil properties in a logical and ordered manner is known as a soil inference system.The term "soil inference system" was first proposed by McBratney et al. (2002) as a knowledge base to infer soil properties and populate the digital soil databases.However, it is gaining much wider meaning among soil scientists than its prior meaning (Robinson et al.,2010) .It is now used to encompass GIS layers of DSM products and the development of knowledge rules (or functions) for inferring soil properties at all locations in the landscape.Soil has varied uses for which its ability (functions) needs to be periodically assessed at all locations in the landscape.Soil functions are general capabilities of soils that are important for various agricultural, environmental, nature protection, landscape architecture and urban applications.Digital soil maps can depict soil properties and functions in the context of specific soil functions such as agricultural food production, environmental protection, civil engineering, etc.These maps can be Omuto and Vargas, 2009) .This aspect of DSM is the most important for policy-decisions and land management (Carre et al.,2007) .DSM has the potential to generate and deliver much new and needed soil information.However, it suffers from a number of challenges which can hinder its total success.The technology has to overcome the scepticism associated with any new technology.Some proponents of the technology have suggested that it can totally replace traditional soil survey and that it can facilitate generation of soil maps/data without the need for field (or even laboratory) testing.These suggestions have greeted DSM with outright rejection from among many soil scientists.Furthermore, the potential tools used in DSM such as remote sensing have also added to the scepticism about DSM.Traditional soil scientists used remote sensing/aerial photographs to aid spatial understanding of soil distribution.They object the exclusive application of remote sensing to map soil properties, which they suppose is what DSM is promoting.This misunderstanding contributes to their apprehension about DSM.There is also a section of users of soil information who are deeply familiar with the traditional soil products (polygon maps, profile descriptions, and laboratory chemical and physical results).They are yet to be convinced of the relevance and applicability of DSM maps and data that appear different from the more familiar traditional products.Other than perception, DSM also faces challenges in use of its technologies.Many tools used in DSM were developed in other disciplines (such as mathematics, chemistry, geography, computing, remote sensing, etc) and soil scientists have yet to understand their potential and limitations.Some DSM applications with these technologies are bound to be abused and inaccurate soil mapping results disseminated.Training on the fundamentals of these tools is needed among soil scientists.Lack of coordination in DSM activities is also another challenge.Although there are many initiatives using DSM approaches to produce soil information, there are no standards for use.Traditional soil mapping had standards (manuals, nomenclature, etc) for use.Whether they were adhered to or not is something else, but at least there were standards.DSM is facing the challenge of producing standards and rules of thumb, producing quality control, and disseminating soil information to various users.The trans-boundary nature of the threats facing humanity today is increasingly forcing governments to come together to devise common and sustainable solutions.Hence, it is now possible to see various departments/divisions of neighbouring countries working together more than before to advice regional policy decisions on financial matters, security, trade, environment, food security, etc.On land and water matters, there are a number of regional and global groupings which have been formed to collect and organize existing relevant information, harmonize the data and methods, collect new information, produce new products, disseminate data/products, etc.The present document looks at soil mapping activities of these groups.Global soil mapping initiatives aim at developing soil maps, harmonizing and coordinating global soil information systems, and archiving and disseminating world soil databases.Globalsoilmap.net (www.globalsoilmap.net ) is a global consortium that has been formed to make a new digital soil map of the world using state-of-the-art and emerging technologies.This effort originated in 2006 (Sanchez et al, 2009) in response to policy-makers' frustrations at being unable to get quantitative answers to questions such as: How much carbon is sequestered or emitted by soils in a particular region?What is its impact on biomass production and human health?How do such estimates change over time?The GSM consortium's overall approach consists of three main components: digital soil mapping, soil management recommendations, and serving the end users-all of them backed by a robust cyber-infrastructure.A digital soil map is essentially a spatial database of soil properties, based on a statistical sample of landscapes.This new global soil map will predict soil properties at fine spatial resolution (~100 m).These maps will be supplemented by interpretation and functionality options to support improved decisions for a range of global issues such as food production and hunger eradication, climate change, and environmental degradation.This is an initiative of the Digital Soil Mapping Working Group of the International Union of Soil Sciences (IUSS).The Globalsoilmap.net consortium was granted funding from the Bill and Mellinda Gates foundation in order to establish this consortium and implement its soil mapping activities in Sub-Saharan Africa.The Africa Soil Information Service (AfSIS) is developing continent-wide digital soil maps for sub-Saharan Africa using new types of soil analysis and statistical methods, and conducting agronomic field trials in selected sentinel sites.These efforts include the compilation and rescue of legacy soil profile data, new data collection and analysis, and system development for large-scale soil mapping using remote sensing imagery and crowd sourced ground observations. (http://www.africasoils.net).The project area includes ~17.5 million km2 of continental sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).This area encompasses more than 90% of Africa's human population living in 42 countries.The project area excludes hot and cold desert regions based on the recently revised Köppen-Geiger climate classification, as well as the non-desert areas of Northern Africa.This project started in 2009 and is currently the main soil mapping funded regional activity that is under implementation.The Globalsoilmap.net consortium has developed technical specifications (http://www.globalsoilmap.net/system/files/globalSoilmap_net_specifications_v2_0_edited_draft_Sept_2011_ RAm_V12.pdf ) to guide their global and regional actions.Exact dates for the delivery of this revolutionary product is not specified, but it is presumed that will require major efforts for its implementation as it is very demanding in terms of financial resources as well as commitment by national institutions.ISRIC-World Soil Information is an independent foundation that was established in 1964 with the mandate of serving the international community with information about the world's soils resources to help addressing major global issues.GSIF (Global Soil Information Facilities) is ISRIC's framework for production of world soil data.It has been inspired by global environmental data initiatives such as Global Biodiversity Information Facilities, Global Land Cover mapping, OneGeology and similar.The main practical reason for GSIF is to build cyber-infrastructure to collate and use legacy (i.e., historic) soil data currently under threat of being lost forever.Seven key principles explain the design of GSIF: ▸ Data collection in GSIF is based on crowd-sourcing -everyone collecting soil data or working with soil information is invited to contribute to some of the databases via data portals and to GSIF tools via GSIF software development portals.As such, GSIF follows the Wikipedia approach to building information systems.▸ Data entered through GSIF data portals remain the property of the original contributors (copyright holders and/or authors).The original contributors have live access to their entries and full read/write rights.▸ GSIF is mainly based on Free and Open Source Software (Linux, PHP, LaTeX, R, GDAL, GRASS, SAGA GIS, PostgreSQL, PostGIS, Python, Google Earth and similar), but other software packages may also be used.▸ GSIF has been designed mainly to serve global soil mapping initiatives and not local, isolated (regional and national) projects.Internationally accepted standards (International System of Units, international soil classifications systems, FAO soil field description guides, World Geodetic System 1984, and similar) are recommended.National and local datasets in different languages are also supported, which requires further harmonization.▸ GSIF is based on automated procedures for mapping, pattern recognition and report/plots generation.All maps and reports produced as a part of GSIF are reproducible, i.e. they are based on compliable scripts that contain all processing steps.Derived maps can be updated by rerunning the scripts with no or little human intervention when new data sets become available.▸ All shared soil data used to generate maps will be made available in near real-time in accordance with ISRIC data policy.▸ GSIF data processing services and databases (maps and reports), produced as a part of GSIF, will constantly be adjusted based on usage statistics and web-traffic.Complexity (statistical data processing steps, coordinate systems, scale, uncertainty in the maps) is either hidden from the users or communicated using efficient solutions.This follows the Google approach to indexing and browsing geo-data.The GSIF structure is presented below under figure 5.6.1 Conclusions 6.1.1 Legacy data 1.Under the current challenges of food security, climate change adaptation and mitigation, further provision of ecosystem services and sustainable intensification of agriculture, soil information becomes fundamental to guide wise policies and decisions.With the current global and regional soil information available, the soil science community is limited in its capacity to provide accurate and updated information to the different soil users.2.Soil legacy data and information are a crucial asset for future soil mapping activities and even more important for monitoring purposes.Although legacy data are important, the current available legacy data have a number of problems.The problems include data gaps, storage, compatibility with DSM technology, and copyright issues.3.HWSD is the most comprehensive global soil database with soil profile, attribute data, and soil map currently available.The database has direct website links and is freely downloadable in formats which are compatible with most software.4.Rich soil information is available in various national and regional soil mapping/information systems organizations.Some have their data freely accessible, while others impose copyright restrictions on their data.Coordination or understanding are the only ways to associate them with a global mapping initiative 5.Some global datasets/maps are derivations of derivations, yet they are widely used in various fields.This inadequacy is possibly due to lack of information about existing soil data or inadequate and accessible soil information.1.The needs of soil information users and present trends of soil information generation seem to be increasingly divergent.2.The majority of soil information users are keen on georeferenced soil data, and especially measured soil attributes.3.Since most direct users of soil information seem to be working at the national and sub-national levels, the soil mapping activities generating soil information should give priority to farm, district, and national scales.Policy making seems to be influenced by soil information at various scales: farm, national, regional, and global.5.The conceptual underpinnings of soil inference systems are still not well appreciated by many users.The majority of soil information users do not seem to prefer use of model outputs as substitutes for observed or conventionally produced soil information.6.Many soil users would like to have free access to soil information.They think that if the soil data collection is done at public expense, then the resultant generated information should be freely available to the public.7.The preferred mode of disseminating the information is through the internet.Users would like to have the convenience of downloading relevant data rather than moving around searching for the information.This implies that the areas of soil information systems tasked with data storage and dissemination should consider online repositories as much as is possible.1.There are many freely available DSM tools which can be harnessed to improve production of digital maps 2.DSM does not only produce maps, but it also produces methods for soil mapping, digital soil database/information system, and assessment of soil threats.It is a three-stage process, which can satisfy soil information users needs if well implemented 3.Most DSM processes are not very well implemented.There is still lack of standardization on input data and tools, expertise and training manuals, and coordination of many organizations involved in DSM 4.HWSD, GSIF, GSM, and GSP are some of the main active global soil mapping activities.They have varied strengths which when joined, can help improve global awareness, soil information generation and use, update existing soil information.▸ Considering the challenges of food security, climate change adaptation and mitigation, and further provision of ecosystem services, the soil science community should clearly respond to the natural needs for improved, up-to-date, quantitative and applied soil data and information.This global effort should take into account the ongoing developments in terms of methods and tools currently available, especially those related to Digital Soil Mapping and should not neglect the core of soil mapping that is based on understanding of soil-landscape relationships revealed through field studies undertaken by soil surveys.Ongoing efforts such as Globalsoilmap.net, GSFI, HWSD, etc, should be strengthened by making them part of a unified global effort in which all the global, regional and national institutions participate fully and together plan feasible activities in the short, medium and long-term, in order to respond to their needs in terms of global and regional soil information.▸ While it is common to hear that there is an increased need for detailed soil information, it is fundamental to develop a multi-scale / multi-resolution approach in which the global efforts could address the demands coming from the different users.It is true that global and regional information systems are intended to address global activities such as modelling scenarios, status assessment, trends, etc, however some concerns have been raised by users pointing out that soil information should be addressing the needs coming from the field.While this is a very valid request, the soil information community should develop a multiuser system in which the global soil information system could respond to the needs at all levels.This could be a challenging recommendation, but learning from the past it is wise to make soil information a positive cost/ benefit asset showing its value at all levels.This will promote its continuous self-development as its direct contribution to all the different fields will showcase a visible impact.This of course should be linked to a training program for soil information users in order to train different users on how soil data and information should be used and linking reliability or accuracy to their decisions.▸ There is a fundamental need that traditional soil survey/mapping and DSM communities join forces to fill in the evident gap in terms of soil information.This can be done by recognizing the value of both approaches, overcoming weaknesses through recognized strengths of both approaches and by an inclusive neutral framework that could have a neutral goal.On this, the Global Soil Partnership plays a crucial role as is linked to a UN organization with a global mandate on soils in which 193 countries are members and fight for common global mutual goals.▸ Soil legacy data and information constitutes a precious asset, not only for its potential use for soil mapping under DSM, but also for on-going monitoring purposes.Besides, it is the only plausible result of huge investments done by international and national organizations.Its collection, harmonization and storing in a common global database that is open to all the different communities under proper IP rights should be an immediate global effort and activity.4.State of the art methods and tools for soil mapping ▸ The copyrights and intellectual property rights are a sensitive issue that should be clearly studied and jointly defined by a global neutral institution or framework representing all possible interests and concerns.The collaborative example of the FAO-UNESCO World Soil Map should be used as a proper working example.▸ Capacity development in digital soil mapping should be the main vehicle for generation of up to date, demand driven soil information.A joint global capacity development program should be urgently developed to be implemented at regional level with different modalities.Short and medium term on-the job training programs and also long term BSc, MSc and PhD programs should be developed.This activity demands immediate implementation.▸ In an era of financial crisis and increasingly limited financial resources, it is of prime importance that the soil science community join together with a common voice and message in order to request donors to support an integrated plan of action in terms of soil data and information.In this regard, the Global Soil Partnership, through its pillar of action on soil information, is aiming to develop a joint plan of action that is very inclusive and represents all the region's interests and priorities for soil data and information.This indeed becomes a fundamental opportunity and challenge for including all the necessary elements for responding the needs of a growing population in terms of soil knowledge.This plan will then be presented to donors to fund a unique joint endeavour producing improved and much needed soil information.
The introduction of mathematics constituted a turning point in the history of economics in the middle of the 20 th century.1 Mathematical modeling as the main tool for theory building profoundly changed the nature of economics, separated it from other social sciences and crowded out more discursive and empirical traditions.In the United States and, with some lag, in the Western European countries mathematical economics 2 quickly became the mainstream of the discipline, and transformed the academic curricula and the way of practicing economics.3 The axiomatization and formalization of the General Equilibrium Theory (along with the introduction of game theory, operations research and activity analysis) were the core elements in the formation of modern mathematical economics.The history of the Western developments in this discipline has largely been written.4 However, the historians and sociologists of economics have only recently started to consider the respective developments on the Soviet side.The mathematical economics was often presented, at least in the West, as universally relevant and neutral with respect to ideological differences and economies'designs.The radical version of this claim would imply that mathematization may actually overcome the dependence of economists on their ideological milieu and provide the pure and universal language to deal with such issues as the logic of choice and theory of rational behavior.Since Pareto and the socialist calculation debate, the general equilibrium analysis was considered to be applicable to market as well as to planned economies.More recently it was claimed that both Western and Eastern European mathematical economists were working on similar problems and had an interest in each others'work contributing to the common endeavor of mathematical (neoclassical) economics.5 A universalistic rhetoric of the Cold War mathematical economics relying on the use of presumably neutral mathematical language could have been a strategy to assert scientific autonomy against the ideological pressure and thus to overcome the cleavage normally present in the other fields of social sciences.Mathematics would then be the way to escape the ideological biases and cultural differences between nations.Nonetheless, a tentative comparative analysis of the development of mathematical economics in the West and in Soviet Union brings up a question of intellectual and institutional particularities of the national disciplinary fields.In other words, was mathematical economics the same discipline on both sides of the Iron Curtain?Did the local contexts matter and if yes, then how and to what extent?In order to answer these questions, we explore the problem of disciplinary identity and culture of the Soviet mathematical economics which emerged and developed mostly during the Brezhnev era.Indeed, mathematical economics was one the most successful of the social sciences in the USSR, especially given the traditionally high level of mathematical training and ingenuity for which the Soviet scholars were quite well-known.But many of the general features of this discipline still remain unclear, and in order to produce a balanced judgment one needs a more differentiated view than we have to date.Was the Soviet mathematical economics a marginal sub-discipline or a part of mainstream of the Soviet economic science?Was it "only"a domain of applied mathematics?What were the theoretical and ideological backgrounds of the Soviet mathematical economics?These questions lead us to consider the institutional development of mathematical economics, but also the epistemic culture 6 and disciplinary identity 7 of the Soviet mathematical economists.The first term, epistemic culture, refers to representations of goals, premises, rationality and "truth"-finding devices such as analytical tools, theories, etc., while the second one brings into light the issues of disciplinary self-identification and borders constructed and maintained by members of an academic community vis-à-vis other scholarly domains, and within broader academic and political cultures.Based on interviews with Soviet mathematical economists and their published work, we try to reconstruct a disciplinary history of this community characterized by rigorous mathematical foundations, innovative research methods and objects, and (sometimes) opaque political position.A comparison of Soviet mathemat-ical economics with the neoclassical economics in the West is insightful as far as it allows attributing some specific features to the local contexts in a more distinct way.In the United States, which have been the leading country in mathematical economics after the WWII, as well as in the Soviet Union, the development of this field was a part of the larger planning and "cybernetics movement".8 It represented a quite heterogeneous field at the intersection of operations research, game theory, decision theory, theories of optimal control, etc.The development of these methods was boosted during and after the WWII, first and foremost, by the needs of the military-industrial complex and strategic considerations of the Cold War.The crucial role of the military and public funding has been stressed by Philip Mirowski.9 The RAND Corporation in the United States is a particularly salient example of this nexus of military and research.Similarly, in the Soviet Union applied mathematics was heavily used for the military and strategic purposes (from army logistics to calculation of the missiles flight paths), and was mostly developed in closed spaces of classified research.Even if we do not currently possess enough evidence to assert the institutional dependence of the Soviet mathematical economics on the military funding, it seems quite reasonable to conjecture that the very possibility of using the relevant models for the military planning may have motivated the Party officials to tolerate mathematical methods in economics despite their being politically suspect.Both in the US and in the USSR, the development of mathematical economics produced strong tensions, at least during its constitutive period, within the economics discipline.In the United States, it was an object of the heated critique and sometimes rejection on the part of the institutionalists and, notably, the Chicago school.10 In the Soviet case, many political economists persistently suspected mathematical economists as being in opposition to the Marxist-Leninist dogma, though the latter were most often trying to legitimize their work as fully compatible with the principles of socialism.11 Both cultures also shared a systemic academic anti-Semitism which was an important, although often omitted/suppressed, part of the institutional and human histories of applied mathematics and economics.For instance, the anti-Semitism of the most prestigious ivy-league universities might in part explain the rise of the MIT in the American economics.12 Similarly, in the Soviet Union mathematicians of Jewish origin most of the time could not be either enrolled or hired by the most prestigious mathematical departments such as the Mechanics and Mathematics department of the Moscow State University.13 Consequently, a lot of talented mathematicians, among which Jews were over-represented, were coming, during the sixties, into various fields of applied mathematics, including mathematical economics.Newly created institutions in both countries proposed a lot of new jobs which required advanced technical expertise and were less sensible to the racial or religious origins of their employees.However, apart from these contextual similarities, the fields of mathematical economics in the Soviet Union and in the leading Western countries had followed quite different paths.Let us elaborate on some most obvious differences.Firstly, in the United States mathematical economics came to be viewed as a part of mainstream economics as early as in the end of the 1950s after the publication of seminal works by Paul Samuelson, Kenneth Arrow, Gérard Debreu, Lionel McKenzie, Leonid Hurwicz, David Gale, Tjalling Koopmans, Wassily Leontief and others.In the Soviet Union, the "economic-mathematical methods" were to develop and institutionalize with a considerable delay as compared to the United States and other leading Western countries.This delay was to a less extent due to the initial theoretical or methodological backwardness, but mostly to ideological reasons.Applying mathematics to economic problems was officially prohibited in the Soviet Union until the late 1950s.This situation may be perfectly illustrated by the history of the pioneering work done by Leonid Kantorovich on linear programming realized in the Solow, Dorfman, Koopmans and, finally, Samuelson in the same issue of the Review of Economics and Statistics.late 1930s.While the first results were published in 1939 ("Mathematical Methods of Organizing and Planning Production"), a book "The Economic Calculation of the Best Use of Resources" appeared only twenty years later.By that time Kantorovich's work was no more "the last word" in optimization theory and mathematical economics, as the linear programming techniques were independently discovered and developed, as "activity analysis", in the West (by Koopmans, Dantzig et al.) .Secondly, while in the Western academia mathematical economics (general equilibrium theory, social choice, game theory, etc.) became the core of the economic mainstream, "mathematical methods in economics" were considered in the Soviet Union as a domain on the margin of general economic science (a "circum-economic domain").And it had only a limited influence at the economic departments and in the main academic institutions in economics.Thirdly, and most importantly, unlike in the West, we find very few theoretical developments in the Soviet mathematical economics.Although Soviet mathematical economists often had very advanced mathematical skills, they generally abstained from economic interpretation.As we argue elsewhere, 14 the Soviet mathematical economics, even in its "purest" form (such as developments in general equilibrium modeling and related domains), was practically and technically oriented.A few attempts to create a comprehensive theory of the socialist economy (theory of optimal planning, system of optimal functioning of the economy known as SOFE) were after all quite disappointing.In other words, the Soviet mathematical economics didn't succeed to develop a legitimate autonomous theoretical discourse that would be both a starting point and the interpretive goal of the mathematical modeling per se which does not possess a transparent normative meaning.According to our hypothesis, two series of factors are accountable for this theoretical void: institutional (development on the margin or outside of the "official" institutions of economic science) and ideological (the unshakable authority of Marxism-Leninism and socialist political economy).Crucial in this context is that the Soviet mathematical economics was far from being homogenous.Its institutional and intellectual organization can be represented as a continuum between the two poles, with the more official "economic cybernetics", on the one side, and a more Western-style mathematical economics, on the other.These two poles correlate with two quite differ-ent epistemic cultures and professional identities that will be analyzed in the following sections.The "economic cybernetics": an attempt to create a national school of mathematical economics The economic cybernetics emerges as an academic discipline during the sixties.The term is putatively introduced in the early 1960s by Vassily Nemchinov, one of the pioneering figures of the application of mathematics in economics in the Soviet Union, but was also used by Oscar Lange and some other Eastern European economists.The institutionalization of this concept is not ideologically neutral; according to our hypothesis, it reflects an aspiration of the Soviet officials to demarcate the socialist mathematical economics from the ideologically dubious, "bourgeois" marginalism and neoclassicism.What were the institutional and conceptual particularities of this discipline vis-à-vis its Western counterpart?In the Western terminology, research carried out in the Soviet Union and the satellite countries under the label of "economic cybernetics" would be most commonly referred to in the context of systems analysis, operations research, activity analysis, and management science (decision theory).15 Soviet scholars engaged in these various fields drew heavily on the Western research (though Soviet mathematicians had priority in some domains of applied and theoretical mathematics).First translations of Western works on these topics clearly met the demands of the military (for instance, series of books edited by the publisher of technical literature "Soviet radio", etc.).By the middle of the 1960s, translations of some Western seminal works followed applying these analytical tools to economic issues.16 During the 1960s, departments of economic cybernetics were established at the key state universities of the Soviet Union (Leningrad, Moscow, Kazan, Kiev, Kharkov and others), and in some engineering and technical institutes.Along with the departments of economic cybernetics, this domain included laboratories of the Central Institute of Mathematics and Economics of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR (CEMI), the Institute of the Economics and Organization of Industrial Production of the Siberian Division of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, the Institute of Cybernetics of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, and the Economic Research Institute of the State Planning Committee of the USSR.By the 1970s, the curriculum of economic cybernetics typically included some basic econometrics, models of optimization and of optimal growth, input-output models (including quite complex interregional and intersectoral models), forecasting of the social and economic development, theory of socialist management and decision-making, and automated systems of control (ASUs).17 With a slight variation, the curricula could be more focused on transportation optimization problems or game theoretic modeling.18 In general the mathematical apparatus taught to the students of these departments was mostly limited to the methods of linear programming.While in technical terms economic cybernetics was similar to what was going on at the same period in the West, the ideological frame was very different.Viktor Novozhilov and Leonid Kantorovich, who were the leading figures of the Soviet "mathematical-economic movement", made efforts to legitimize their work as an integral part of the political economy of socialism.In their writings they consciously used the conventional concept of "socially necessary costs" which would be compatible with the Marxist understanding of value.Both Novozhilov and Kantorovich recognized the regulatory role of prices in balancing supply and demand.But at the same time they did not share the premises and terminology of neoclassical economics because they were deemed incompatible with the labour theory of value: "Marginal concepts of mathematics [italic in the original text] are not to be confused with 'marginalism'as a particular current in the economic science". 19 Novozhilov criticizes the systems of general economic equilibriumfor the all-too "narrow" 17 [Kobrinski, Maiminas, Smirnov, 1975] . This is a handbook recommended by the Ministry of Education of the USSR for the students of "economic cybernetics". 18 For instance, such was the orientation of the economic cybernetics department of the Leningrad Economics and FinanceInstitute (founded by I. Syroezhin, a disciple of Kantorovich) . See the handbook of Economic cybernetics edited by this institution in 1974: Ekonomicheskaya kibernetika. 19 [Novozhilov, 1967: 427] . formulation of the problem of economic optimum, in "isolation from the analysis of labour", and therefore from the "reality" of economic relations. The critique of general equilibrium theory demonstrates some important ideological limitations of the Soviet "economic cybernetics". The concept of general equilibrium is considered as a part of a "bourgeois", and consequently erroneous, economic theory which has to be refuted in relation not only to socialist, but also to "real capitalist" economies. We find no echo of earlier debates about the general equilibrium and economic planning (going back to Pareto and Walras) in the literature under consideration. The most common argument against general equilibrium models, mentioned in the Soviet literature, posits that these models are only relevant for analyzing markets with perfect competition, and hence unrealistic. 20 They are, of course, not suitable for the socialist economy best described by "proportionality" (proportsional'nost') and "balancedness" (sbalansirovannost').The difference of meaning might seem tiny, but it has tremendous, both practical and methodological, consequences.Applying mathematics in economics was justified only insofar as it could help solve problems of planning and management of the national economy.As one of the leading mathematical economists of the 1960s put it: "In the Soviet Union mathematical modeling [of the economy] was considered in view of its practical use, otherwise it was dismissed as an anti-Soviet activity".21 In this context a quite specific culture of modeling emerged, as described by some Western mathematical economists who had a chance to have exchanges with Soviet colleagues.As rightly noticed by Robert Dorfman upon contacting a group of Soviet mathematical economists at a joint Moscow seminar, there was a clear conceptual difference in modeling practices.22 Soviet economists developed their planning models building mainly upon the notions of balance, technology and production sector without any considerations of demand and incentives structures.This technocratic orientation was crucial for the general development of Soviet mathematical economics, based on the engineering background of its protagonists, but also on general ideological underpinnings of input-output analysis, optimal growth theory, and mathematical programming.The supply side was always considered as primary, and the general aim of economic analysis was to provide optimal decisions for the design of production sector compatible with the state interest and usually with some vague notion of the consumer sector and its planned needs.Thus, the great majority of Soviet mathematical economists were dealing almost solely with practical problems (input-output tables, solution of linear optimization problems for single shop floors or plants, solution of transportation problems, calculations and computation algorithms).Nonetheless, some theoretical ambitions of the economic cybernetics can be found in the attemptsto create the "theory of optimal planning" (a term by Kantorovich) which was very broadly defined as an application of economic-mathematical modeling (mostly linear programming) to the economy "taken as a complex system".23 In particular, the theory of optimal planning was, during the 1960s, the central project of the newly created (in 1963) Central Economic-Mathematical Institute (CEMI) of the Academy of Sciences.24 Ambitious as it might have been, this domain of research had major conceptual and practical difficulties.One of the most important conceptual difficulties for designing one integrated model of the national economy was to identify a unique optimization criterion for the whole Soviet economy.In its most conventional form, it was supposed to have an hierarchical, multiple-stage structure: planning problems had to be approached on the level of an enterprise, then of an an industry, a region, and finally a coordination of different industries and regions, at least in theory, could be achieved.There were also attempts to elaborate theories of optimal planning and of optimal functioning of the Soviet economy using some elements of neoclassical economics.For instance, in the CEMI a group coordinated by Aron Katzenelinboigen was working on the system of optimal functioning of the economy (SOFE) based on some axiomatics and using a language of neoclassical economics (scarce resources, individual preferences, marginal utility, and so on).25 The normative idea behind this work was to take into account interests of different agents, to foster the development of "horizontal" or "market" relations in the national economy (a relative decentralization), in accordance with the spirit of the Kosygin reform announced in 1965.26 Another example of a "reformist" approach to the Soviet economy could be found in the work of the laboratory at the Institute of the Economy and Organization of Industrial Production in Novosibirsk directed by Alexander Granberg and working on inter-regional models of the Soviet, and even global, economy.These models considered different regions as autonomous entitie shaving their interests, and the planning as a process of coordination (balancing) of these interests, and used some elements of the general equilibrium theory and cooperative game theory.However, many mathematical economists and other critical voices were skeptical even about the possibility of optimization on a level higher than an enterprise.The tenants of the theory of the optimal planning were, in particular, confronted with antagonism of the planning authorities.27 Another major problem was a lack of reliable statistical data on the whole industries and sectors of the national economy (especially related to the military-industrial complex and foreign trade) which made irrelevant the calculations of an optimal plan for branches or for the whole economy.All these difficulties made the project to create a general mathematical model (and a comprehensive theory) of the Soviet centralized economy illusory.To sum it up, though the Soviet "economic cybernetics" had some obvious overlaps with the Western mathematical economics (optimal allocation of resources), yet there were important differences of goals (centralized planning and management of the national economy), and of the underlying ideology (Marxist-Leninist doctrine, in the Soviet case).The handbooks and published works in economic cybernetics could contain references to relevant Western literature, but they were fragmentary and superficial, 28 and they were always evaluated in the light of the Soviet political-economic orthodoxy.Mathematical economics thus constituted a curious hybrid type of knowledge, combin- 27 The State Planning Commission, Gosplan, was more or less overtly opposed to the idea of optimal planning, as far as the planning routines at work since the 1930s had a rationality of their own not always compatible with mathematical optimization ("rational economic thinking").In practice, the process of planning in the Soviet Union resembled negotiations between different actors including Gosplan, ministries, and large industrial units competing for rare resources.Representatives of different branches and state enterprises could make use of mathematical models and calculations for justification of their claims fore more resources (Interview with Emil' Ershov, Moscow, 12.04.2013.).But no single mathematical model was ever used for planning the whole of the Soviet economy.28 For instance, Kobrinski et al., authors of the handbook "Vvedenie v ekonomicheskuyu kibernetiku", briefly describe what they refer to as the Condorcet-Arrow "voting paradox" [Kobrinski et al., 1975: 258) , but they do not mention the impossibility theorem at all. ing optimization techniques, applied computation methods, input-output models, elements of neoclassical doctrine and a heterogeneous, often self-contradictory planning ideology. An important difference in the development of mathematical economics on both sides of the Iron Curtain was also due to a lag in timing: in the USSR, the economic cybernetics was in its peak in the 1970s, while in the West there was a decline of interest in this type of analytical and practical tools, and the ideas of planning and cybernetics, with their overt interdisciplinary, ran definitely out of fashion as the profession was moving away from the theoretical pluralism towards the new syntheses. By the end of the 1960s, along with the more conventional economic cybernetics, a few sites of a more "Western style" research in mathematical economics appeared in the Soviet Union that we identify as "latent neoclassics". This work was done mainly in the fields of general equilibrium theory and related domains (Arrow-Debreu classical models of GE, models of equilibrium growth, disequilibrium models, computable GE models) and in game theory. This research was mostly practiced in liminal spaces outside of the universities. Among these "alternative" institutions were: Economic-mathematical Section at the Institute of Mathematics of the Siberian branch of the Academy of Sciences (founded in 1960), Department of Mathematical Economics at the CEMI (created in 1967); Institute of Control Sciences (founded in 1939, first work in mathematical economics appeared circa 1968); Department of mathematical economics at the Chief Computer Center of the Academy of Sciences (founded in 1968). As the dates of the creation of these subdivisions suggest, the mathematical modeling of economic processes was established as a legitimate domain of research among mathematicians in the Soviet Union in the late 1960s. It was stimulated by a practical interest in social matters stemming from the spirit of cybernetics. Nonetheless it remained quite marginal 29 and attracted only a minority of scholars in mathematical and physical sciences, not least because economics was considered as a much less prestigious (and less advanced) discipline. Why was this "Western style" mathematical economics practiced in institutions specialized in mathematics and engineering, rather than in economics? Apparently, they were less exposed to ideological constraints (as compared to social science institutions). But most importantly mathematicians and engineers employed by these institutions possessed advanced mathematical skills that conventional practitioners of economic cybernetics and economics in the Soviet Union generally did not have. Convex analysis, topology, functional analysis and other advanced mathematics were commonly used by leading mathematical economists in the West, but were not familiar to most Soviet economists. Another reason why mathematical economics developed mostly outside of the prestigious university departments comes from the organization of the Soviet science. The basic research and the higher education (universities) were most often disjointed, and had little links (with exception of the so called base subdepartments which provided graduates to their partner research institutions 30 ). Unlike in the US, where a typical career of a leading mathematical economist would lead him from a (relatively marginal for the profession, at least immediately after the war) research center (Cowles commission, RAND) to a prestigious economics department, in the Soviet Union scholars specialized in this field of applied mathematics stayed most of the time at their research institution of origin. A generation of mathematicians who entered the field during the second half of the 1960s and in the 1970s and their students who started to publish of these papers in the overall flow of the economic-mathematical literature never surpassed 4%. See [Malkov, forthcoming] .30 One of a few, but very successful, examples of the teaching/research symbiosis is represented by the mathematical department at the Novosibirsk State University and the Laboratory of mathematical economics of the Institute of mathematics of the Siberian branch of the Academy of Science; the close collaboration between the two gave rise to a Novosibirsk school of mathematical economics, one of the leading in the Soviet Union.For instance, Valery Makarov, a younger collaborator of Kantorovich, was dean of the subdepartment of theoretical cybernetics at the University and director of the Laboratory of mathematical economics at the Institute of mathematics (after Kantorovich moved to Moscow)."[In the end of the 1950s] the University was conceived especially to produce scientific personnel [for the research institutes of Akademgorodok] … graduates almost immediately became researchers […]" (Interview with Valery Marakulin, 10.04.2012, CEMI, Moscow).in the 1980s were less ideologically constrained than their older colleagues like Kantorovich, Nemchinov, and others.While the research in mathematical economics was motivated by practical considerations, the scholars employed in these institutions had more theoretical ambitions and interests, and most of them were aware of research conducted in the West.Within this professional culture we can roughly distinguish two main epistemic identities: a "pure mathematician" and a "social engineer".The first profile, that of a "pure mathematician", can be characterized by small preoccupation with any ideological or pragmatic considerations of economic modeling.As a good example we can consider a cohort of bright mathematicians who entered the Department of mathematical economics at the Central Institute of Economics and Mathematics during the second half of the 1960s 31 .In particular, some of them (Danilov, Movshovich, Polterovich, Zak, and more recently Koshevoy) made some work on classical general equilibrium models, as well as on disequilibrium and optimal growth, which had an extremely technical character and was primarily aimed at resolving a mathematical problem, while bearing a very limited (if any) economic interpretation.32 Mathematicians employed at the Novosibirsk Institute of Mathematics (Makarov, Marakulin, Vasil'ev and others) had a very similar professional identity and culture.Being employed at mathematical-economic departments for years or decades, most of them still continue to identify themselves as mathematicians (publishing in both mathematical and economic-mathematical journals, belonging to mathematical learned societies, dealing with purely mathematical problems, and so on).The examples of mathematicians-cumeconomists or of effective conversions into mathematical economics, especially during the Soviet period, are scarce and far between.33 31 The department's head, Aron Katsenelinboigen, was not himself a mathematician, but was a strong proponent of mathematical methods in economics and an excellent administrator who mastered well the complex power relations of the Soviet academia.He emigrated in the early 1970s, as well as a big part of the Department's employees (Mityagin, Dynkin, Katok, Moishesonand others), the Department was reorganized, but research in mathematical economics did not stop [Katsenelinboigen, 1980] .32 A shift from linear optimization models to the models of general equilibrium had an implicit normative interpretation as an argument for a decentralization of the Soviet economy and a socialist market.But these claims could not be openly discussed until the later Soviet period [Boldyrev and Kirtchik, 2013] .33 We study in detail a case of Viktor Polterovich who gives an example of such a successful conversion in: [Boldyrev and Kirtchik, 2013] .Some other cases might be mentioned as, for The identity of a "social engineer", more concerned with the economic meaning of the models, can be found in engineering and technical institutions.It can be exemplified by the Department of mathematical economics at the Chief Computer Center of the Academy of Sciences founded in 1968 on the initiative of Nikita Moiseev, a powerful member of the Academy of sciences and the dean of the department of control and applied mathematics at the Moscow Physical and Technical Institute.This department recruited graduates of this department, and developed a quite different culture of modeling.Moiseev and his colleagues were not satisfied with classical GE models, but not for ideological reasons.Scholars employed in this Department aimed at elaborating models which would more "realistically" describe the functioning of the economy.34 The first works were dealing with dynamic productive models, and later with models similar to those known in the West as Computable general equilibrium (CGE) models.In the 1990s, they built computable general equilibrium models describing the transition economy (commanded by the Central Bank and regional authorities) 35 .Another example is a group of scholars at the Institute of Control Sciences led by Emmanuil Braverman, a recognized specialist in image recognition algorithms and machine learning.In the late 1960s he got interested in mathematical modeling of economy, first drawing on classical equilibrium models and later developing disequilibrium models of productive systems with fixed prices.In the following decades, an important work on disequilibrium modeling was done by other Soviet mathematical economists, notably by Viktor Polterovich, during the 1970s and 1980s.Nonetheless, this work was not considered at the Institute as the principal preoccupation of Braverman and his colleagues, but rather as a "hobby".36 The research in mathematical economics conducted by these mathematicians and engineers had a certain relevance for the international community example, Valery Makarov (the actual president of the CEMI), economist by his first training who also studied mathematics.Both are members of the Econometric society since the Soviet period.34 Interview with Alexander Shananin, 18.07.2012, the A.A. Dorodnitsyn Computer Center of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow.35 However, at that time, according to the interviews, members of these departments were not aware of the work done by [Herbert Scarf, 1973] and other developments of computable equilibrium modeling in the West.36 Oral communication by Marc Levin at the seminar of the Research and educational group for social studies of economic knowledge, National Research University Higher School of Economics, 23.03.2012.and was occasionally recognized in the West (as testified by a few publications of Soviet scholars in leading American journals, international collaborations, and memberships in Econometric society during the Soviet time).But most of the time Soviet scholars worked in institutional and intellectual isolation from the Western academia (they had very little, or often no, opportunity to meet foreign colleagues, to publish in American journals, attend the conferences, etc.).The doors for a greater cooperation and integration into the international community were finally open just before the fall of the Soviet Union.For many Soviet specialists in mathematical economics the invitation to the International congress of the Econometric society in Barcelona in 1990, partly financially supported by the Soviet state, was the first possibility to present their work and to communicate with peers from outside of the socialist bloc.37 But even today, many specialists in mathematical economics have difficulties in publishing abroad.Papers co-authored with Western colleagues have much better chances to be published.We could suggest that these difficulties are due to a specific epistemic culture acquired during the education and socialization in the Soviet academia.In the hostile environment in which mathematical language was an intellectual refuge and a self-defense from ideological assaults, being unable to find any practical application of their theoretical work, mathematical economists developed a very abstract and technical style, which was much closer to mathematics tout court rather than economics.Even the most "realistic" and "reformist", by their intention, pieces are written in a very abstract mathematical language free of any interpretation.This is a direct consequence of the theoretical void we referred to above.Without a general framework and systematic training in (contemporary or even classical) economics even the brightest minds had either to delve into technical problems taking the "Western" theoretical framework as given or to abandon theory.In this sense, specialists in the "economic-mathematical modeling" in the Soviet Union were not (mathematical) economists in the "Western" sense of the term.As one of the interviewees (born in 1956) told us: "Only during the second half of the 1990s did I begin to consider myself more like an economist than a mathematician… It was important to understand that economics is a worthy thing… that it is a complex field, and not only in terms of mathematical analysis… but also in terms of its economic content… It does not immediately come to one's head, and no one taught us this. I believe it's one of the most important problems… That's why you had to learn all this by yourself".38 A very similar account on his experience of "becoming an economist" was given to us by Sergei Guriev, one of the most internationally recognized contemporary Russian economists.He began his career at the department of mathematical economics in the Chief Computer Center of the Academy of Sciences where he worked on theory of optimization and later on the models of general equilibrium.As he sees it today, the articles he published at that time (in the 1980s and in the beginning of the 1990s) belonged to the realm of applied mathematics, and not economics.A turning point in his career was a fellowship at the MIT in the mid-nineties where it occurred to him that "economics is a science where complex equations are not the most important thing".39 The early development of the mathematical economics in the USSR and in the US shares a number of common features: internal tensions within economics profession, Cold War sources (state funding, role of the military), and anti-Semitism as an external factor determining the institutional configuration of the discipline.The Cold War political climate was relatively favorable to planning, mathematization, and general rationalization of the social sciences on both sides of the iron curtain.However, compared to the US, the Soviet mathematical economics was developing with a certain delay which can be explained by the absolute monopoly of the Marxist-Leninist political economy and a general mistrust towards "cybernetic" ideas.At the same time, the presence in the Soviet academia of extremely strong mathematical schools and bright personalities having a national and international recognition, such as Kantorovich or Pontryagin, paved the way to the Golden era of Soviet cybernetics and optimization theory.40 The interest in applying mathematics to economics often revealed a technocratic and reformist stance at the same time.Stabilization of a bomb's trajectory, image recognition and optimal planning of the economy were considered by these scholars as problems of similar nature.The Soviet mathematical economics was undeniably a part of a broader international trend, shared some intellectual references, subjects and tools with its Western counterpart.Yet, the analysis of its disciplinary status and culture suggests that specific institutional and cultural features were also at play.For various institutional and conceptual reasons discussed in this paper Soviet specialists in "economic-mathematical modeling" (on both poles identified as "economic cybernetics" and "latent neoclassics") didn't form a well articulated and unified disciplinary space.Disciplinary identities were fuzzy and disciplinary borders blurred.Most importantly, in contrast to the US and Western Europe, the Soviet mathematical economics did not create its own theoretical discourse different from the languages of political economy, on the one hand, and mathematics, on the other hand.The orthodox political economy could not give the grounds to such a language, while references to the Western neoclassical economics were not politically acceptable (and could be even dangerous).For these reasons mathematical economics was mostly reduced to applied mathematics, while applied economists did not dare theoretical generalizations.As a consequence, economic interpretation of mathematical formalisms was rarely done, for it demanded an "economic imagination" and "vision" inextricably linked to the theoretical culture of economics as autonomous academic enterprise.41 The problems addressed here do not concern solely the history of Soviet mathematical economics.In fact, the roots of a relative theoretical backwardness of contemporary Russian economics are to be found in this story as well.A representative mathematical economist in the USSR, however smart he or she could be in mathematics, 42 still lacked the appropriate theoretical framework and could hardly make any significant economic contribution.This backwardness resulted in the "catching-up" strategy of the 1990s.In this situation, the most productive economists either moved to the West or began to exploit the local context and to make use of their modeling abilities to analyse the Russian reforms, transition problems etc.Important as they were, these problems rarely led to the interesting theoretical results, and while the new generation of Russian economists is trained in the contact with the older one 43 the new academic culture in economic theory 44 is still to come.See[Weintraub, 2002;Yonay, 1998].2 By "mathematical economics" we mean a plethora of approaches in the postwar economic theory that were characterized by relying on formal models.In contemporary economics this characterization looks a bit outdated since the meaning of the term is much more narrow nowadays.However, this term is relevant for the postwar context when describing the mathematically oriented approaches to economic theorizing.3See, e.g.,[Duarte, 2013].4 See[Weintraub, 1983[Weintraub, , 1991[Weintraub, , 2002Mirowski, 2002Mirowski, , 2004Giocoli, 2003;Rizvi, 2003; Hands, 1994;Leonard, 2010].5This view is expressed in[Bockman, 2007].The term is coined by [Knorr Cetina, 1991].7 See the discussion of this term in:[Lamont and Molnar, 2002].See[Gerovitch, 2002].9[Mirowski 2002].10 See[Yonay, 2003]; cf.one of the first postwar controversies in[Clark, 1947];[Novick, 1954] and the contributions of Klein, Duesenberry, Chipman, Tinbergen, Champernowne, This tension was important, for example, in the debates and intrigues around the Lenin prize awarded to Kantorovich along withNovozhilov and Nemchinov in 1965.12[Weintraub, 2012].13See, e.g.,[Frenkel, 2012].[Boldyrev, Kirtchik, 2013].[The Great Soviet Encyclopedia, 1979] gives two definitions to the economic cybernetics, a "narrow" and "extended" one: "A scientific field concerned with the application of cybernetic ideas and methods to economic systems. In an expanded and not entirely accurate sense, economic cybernetics is often taken to mean the field of science that has developed at the junction of mathematics and cybernetics with economics, including mathematical programming, operations research, mathematical economic models, econometrics, and mathematical economics."16 E.g.[Karlin, 1964], etc.[Kobrinski et al., 1975: 151-152].21Interview with Emil' Ershov, Moscow, 12.04.2013.22[Dorfman, 1976].[Kobrinsky et al., 1975: 3-5].24In the 1960s, the Sectors of optimal planning and of economic planning along with the Sector of economic forecasting composed the most important Department of the CEMI.25In the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s the SOFE project was supported by the director of the CEMI, N. Fedorenko, and some other prominent personalities.It was associated with a reformist movement stemmed from the discussions preceding Kosygin reforms.26See also:[Fursov, 2013].The bibliographical analysis of the literature on the GET and related fields in the Soviet Union shows that although the first works using the GET appeared in the 1960s, their number grew more significantly during the 1970s and attained its peak by the mid-1980s, but the share Interview with Valery Marakulin, 10.04.2012, CEMI, Moscow.Interview with Valery Marakulin, 10.04.2012, CEMI, Moscow.39 Oral communication by Sergei Guriev at the seminar of the Research and educational group for social studies of economic knowledge, National Research University Higher School of Economics, 23.03.2012.See[Gerovitch, 2002].41 [Schumpeter, 1954].42See, for example, some interesting results in cooperative game theory[Bondareva 1963], demand theory[Mitjushin, Polterovich 1978], and the theory of optimal growth[Makarov, Rubinov 1977].This is the case for the New Economic School and Higher School of Economics, the most significant academic institutions in Russian economics that emerged in the post-Soviet period.44By no means we suggest that mathematical economics is the whole of economics.But other fields of economic research, including more discursive and applied ones, face similar problems.	The introduction of mathematics constituted a turning point in the history of economics in the middle of the 20 th century.1 Mathematical modeling as the main tool for theory building profoundly changed the nature of economics, separated it from other social sciences and crowded out more discursive and empirical traditions.In the United States and, with some lag, in the Western European countries mathematical economics 2 quickly became the mainstream of the discipline, and transformed the academic curricula and the way of practicing economics.3 The axiomatization and formalization of the General Equilibrium Theory (along with the introduction of game theory, operations research and activity analysis) were the core elements in the formation of modern mathematical economics.The history of the Western developments in this discipline has largely been written.4 However, the historians and sociologists of economics have only recently started to consider the respective developments on the Soviet side.The mathematical economics was often presented, at least in the West, as universally relevant and neutral with respect to ideological differences and economies'designs.The radical version of this claim would imply that mathematization may actually overcome the dependence of economists on their ideological milieu and provide the pure and universal language to deal with such issues as the logic of choice and theory of rational behavior.Since Pareto and the socialist calculation debate, the general equilibrium analysis was considered to be applicable to market as well as to planned economies.More recently it was claimed that both Western and Eastern European mathematical economists were working on similar problems and had an interest in each others'work contributing to the common endeavor of mathematical (neoclassical) economics.5 A universalistic rhetoric of the Cold War mathematical economics relying on the use of presumably neutral mathematical language could have been a strategy to assert scientific autonomy against the ideological pressure and thus to overcome the cleavage normally present in the other fields of social sciences.Mathematics would then be the way to escape the ideological biases and cultural differences between nations.Nonetheless, a tentative comparative analysis of the development of mathematical economics in the West and in Soviet Union brings up a question of intellectual and institutional particularities of the national disciplinary fields.In other words, was mathematical economics the same discipline on both sides of the Iron Curtain?Did the local contexts matter and if yes, then how and to what extent?In order to answer these questions, we explore the problem of disciplinary identity and culture of the Soviet mathematical economics which emerged and developed mostly during the Brezhnev era.Indeed, mathematical economics was one the most successful of the social sciences in the USSR, especially given the traditionally high level of mathematical training and ingenuity for which the Soviet scholars were quite well-known.But many of the general features of this discipline still remain unclear, and in order to produce a balanced judgment one needs a more differentiated view than we have to date.Was the Soviet mathematical economics a marginal sub-discipline or a part of mainstream of the Soviet economic science?Was it "only"a domain of applied mathematics?What were the theoretical and ideological backgrounds of the Soviet mathematical economics?These questions lead us to consider the institutional development of mathematical economics, but also the epistemic culture 6 and disciplinary identity 7 of the Soviet mathematical economists.The first term, epistemic culture, refers to representations of goals, premises, rationality and "truth"-finding devices such as analytical tools, theories, etc.,while the second one brings into light the issues of disciplinary self-identification and borders constructed and maintained by members of an academic community vis-à-vis other scholarly domains, and within broader academic and political cultures.Based on interviews with Soviet mathematical economists and their published work, we try to reconstruct a disciplinary history of this community characterized by rigorous mathematical foundations, innovative research methods and objects, and (sometimes) opaque political position.A comparison of Soviet mathemat-ical economics with the neoclassical economics in the West is insightful as far as it allows attributing some specific features to the local contexts in a more distinct way.In the United States, which have been the leading country in mathematical economics after the WWII, as well as in the Soviet Union, the development of this field was a part of the larger planning and "cybernetics movement".8 It represented a quite heterogeneous field at the intersection of operations research, game theory, decision theory, theories of optimal control, etc.The development of these methods was boosted during and after the WWII, first and foremost, by the needs of the military-industrial complex and strategic considerations of the Cold War.The crucial role of the military and public funding has been stressed by Philip Mirowski.9 The RAND Corporation in the United States is a particularly salient example of this nexus of military and research.Similarly, in the Soviet Union applied mathematics was heavily used for the military and strategic purposes (from army logistics to calculation of the missiles flight paths), and was mostly developed in closed spaces of classified research.Even if we do not currently possess enough evidence to assert the institutional dependence of the Soviet mathematical economics on the military funding, it seems quite reasonable to conjecture that the very possibility of using the relevant models for the military planning may have motivated the Party officials to tolerate mathematical methods in economics despite their being politically suspect.Both in the US and in the USSR, the development of mathematical economics produced strong tensions, at least during its constitutive period, within the economics discipline.In the United States, it was an object of the heated critique and sometimes rejection on the part of the institutionalists and, notably, the Chicago school.10 In the Soviet case, many political economists persistently suspected mathematical economists as being in opposition to the Marxist-Leninist dogma, though the latter were most often trying to legitimize their work as fully compatible with the principles of socialism.11 Both cultures also shared a systemic academic anti-Semitism which was an important, although often omitted/suppressed, part of the institutional and human histories of applied mathematics and economics.For instance, the anti-Semitism of the most prestigious ivy-league universities might in part explain the rise of the MIT in the American economics.12 Similarly, in the Soviet Union mathematicians of Jewish origin most of the time could not be either enrolled or hired by the most prestigious mathematical departments such as the Mechanics and Mathematics department of the Moscow State University.13 Consequently, a lot of talented mathematicians, among which Jews were over-represented, were coming, during the sixties, into various fields of applied mathematics, including mathematical economics.Newly created institutions in both countries proposed a lot of new jobs which required advanced technical expertise and were less sensible to the racial or religious origins of their employees.However, apart from these contextual similarities, the fields of mathematical economics in the Soviet Union and in the leading Western countries had followed quite different paths.Let us elaborate on some most obvious differences.Firstly, in the United States mathematical economics came to be viewed as a part of mainstream economics as early as in the end of the 1950s after the publication of seminal works by Paul Samuelson, Kenneth Arrow, Gérard Debreu, Lionel McKenzie, Leonid Hurwicz, David Gale, Tjalling Koopmans, Wassily Leontief and others.In the Soviet Union, the "economic-mathematical methods" were to develop and institutionalize with a considerable delay as compared to the United States and other leading Western countries.This delay was to a less extent due to the initial theoretical or methodological backwardness, but mostly to ideological reasons.Applying mathematics to economic problems was officially prohibited in the Soviet Union until the late 1950s.This situation may be perfectly illustrated by the history of the pioneering work done by Leonid Kantorovich on linear programming realized in the Solow, Dorfman, Koopmans and, finally, Samuelson in the same issue of the Review of Economics and Statistics.late 1930s.While the first results were published in 1939 ("Mathematical Methods of Organizing and Planning Production"), a book "The Economic Calculation of the Best Use of Resources" appeared only twenty years later.By that time Kantorovich's work was no more "the last word" in optimization theory and mathematical economics, as the linear programming techniques were independently discovered and developed, as "activity analysis", in the West (by Koopmans, Dantzig et al.) .Secondly, while in the Western academia mathematical economics (general equilibrium theory, social choice, game theory, etc.)became the core of the economic mainstream, "mathematical methods in economics" were considered in the Soviet Union as a domain on the margin of general economic science (a "circum-economic domain").And it had only a limited influence at the economic departments and in the main academic institutions in economics.Thirdly, and most importantly, unlike in the West, we find very few theoretical developments in the Soviet mathematical economics.Although Soviet mathematical economists often had very advanced mathematical skills, they generally abstained from economic interpretation.As we argue elsewhere, 14 the Soviet mathematical economics, even in its "purest" form (such as developments in general equilibrium modeling and related domains), was practically and technically oriented.A few attempts to create a comprehensive theory of the socialist economy (theory of optimal planning, system of optimal functioning of the economy known as SOFE) were after all quite disappointing.In other words, the Soviet mathematical economics didn't succeed to develop a legitimate autonomous theoretical discourse that would be both a starting point and the interpretive goal of the mathematical modeling per se which does not possess a transparent normative meaning.According to our hypothesis, two series of factors are accountable for this theoretical void: institutional (development on the margin or outside of the "official" institutions of economic science) and ideological (the unshakable authority of Marxism-Leninism and socialist political economy).Crucial in this context is that the Soviet mathematical economics was far from being homogenous.Its institutional and intellectual organization can be represented as a continuum between the two poles, with the more official "economic cybernetics", on the one side, and a more Western-style mathematical economics, on the other.These two poles correlate with two quite differ-ent epistemic cultures and professional identities that will be analyzed in the following sections.The "economic cybernetics": an attempt to create a national school of mathematical economics The economic cybernetics emerges as an academic discipline during the sixties.The term is putatively introduced in the early 1960s by Vassily Nemchinov, one of the pioneering figures of the application of mathematics in economics in the Soviet Union, but was also used by Oscar Lange and some other Eastern European economists.The institutionalization of this concept is not ideologically neutral; according to our hypothesis, it reflects an aspiration of the Soviet officials to demarcate the socialist mathematical economics from the ideologically dubious, "bourgeois" marginalism and neoclassicism.What were the institutional and conceptual particularities of this discipline vis-à-vis its Western counterpart?In the Western terminology, research carried out in the Soviet Union and the satellite countries under the label of "economic cybernetics" would be most commonly referred to in the context of systems analysis, operations research, activity analysis, and management science (decision theory).15 Soviet scholars engaged in these various fields drew heavily on the Western research (though Soviet mathematicians had priority in some domains of applied and theoretical mathematics).First translations of Western works on these topics clearly met the demands of the military (for instance, series of books edited by the publisher of technical literature "Soviet radio", etc.).By the middle of the 1960s, translations of some Western seminal works followed applying these analytical tools to economic issues.16 During the 1960s, departments of economic cybernetics were established at the key state universities of the Soviet Union (Leningrad, Moscow, Kazan, Kiev, Kharkov and others), and in some engineering and technical institutes.Along with the departments of economic cybernetics, this domain included laboratories of the Central Institute of Mathematics and Economics of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR (CEMI), the Institute of the Economics and Organization of Industrial Production of the Siberian Division of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, the Institute of Cybernetics of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, and the Economic Research Institute of the State Planning Committee of the USSR.By the 1970s, the curriculum of economic cybernetics typically included some basic econometrics, models of optimization and of optimal growth, input-output models (including quite complex interregional and intersectoral models), forecasting of the social and economic development, theory of socialist management and decision-making, and automated systems of control (ASUs).17 With a slight variation, the curricula could be more focused on transportation optimization problems or game theoretic modeling.18 In general the mathematical apparatus taught to the students of these departments was mostly limited to the methods of linear programming.While in technical terms economic cybernetics was similar to what was going on at the same period in the West, the ideological frame was very different.Viktor Novozhilov and Leonid Kantorovich, who were the leading figures of the Soviet "mathematical-economic movement", made efforts to legitimize their work as an integral part of the political economy of socialism.In their writings they consciously used the conventional concept of "socially necessary costs" which would be compatible with the Marxist understanding of value.Both Novozhilov and Kantorovich recognized the regulatory role of prices in balancing supply and demand.But at the same time they did not share the premises and terminology of neoclassical economics because they were deemed incompatible with the labour theory of value: "Marginal concepts of mathematics [italic in the original text] are not to be confused with 'marginalism'as a particular current in the economic science".19 Novozhilov criticizes the systems of general economic equilibriumfor the all-too "narrow" 17 [Kobrinski, Maiminas, Smirnov, 1975] .This is a handbook recommended by the Ministry of Education of the USSR for the students of "economic cybernetics".18 For instance, such was the orientation of the economic cybernetics department of the Leningrad Economics and FinanceInstitute (founded by I. Syroezhin, a disciple of Kantorovich) .See the handbook of Economic cybernetics edited by this institution in 1974: Ekonomicheskaya kibernetika.19 [Novozhilov, 1967: 427] .formulation of the problem of economic optimum, in "isolation from the analysis of labour", and therefore from the "reality" of economic relations.The critique of general equilibrium theory demonstrates some important ideological limitations of the Soviet "economic cybernetics".The concept of general equilibrium is considered as a part of a "bourgeois", and consequently erroneous, economic theory which has to be refuted in relation not only to socialist, but also to "real capitalist" economies.We find no echo of earlier debates about the general equilibrium and economic planning (going back to Pareto and Walras) in the literature under consideration.The most common argument against general equilibrium models, mentioned in the Soviet literature, posits that these models are only relevant for analyzing markets with perfect competition, and hence unrealistic.20 They are, of course, not suitable for the socialist economy best described by "proportionality" (proportsional'nost') and "balancedness" (sbalansirovannost').The difference of meaning might seem tiny, but it has tremendous, both practical and methodological, consequences.Applying mathematics in economics was justified only insofar as it could help solve problems of planning and management of the national economy.As one of the leading mathematical economists of the 1960s put it: "In the Soviet Union mathematical modeling [of the economy] was considered in view of its practical use, otherwise it was dismissed as an anti-Soviet activity".21 In this context a quite specific culture of modeling emerged, as described by some Western mathematical economists who had a chance to have exchanges with Soviet colleagues.As rightly noticed by Robert Dorfman upon contacting a group of Soviet mathematical economists at a joint Moscow seminar, there was a clear conceptual difference in modeling practices.22 Soviet economists developed their planning models building mainly upon the notions of balance, technology and production sector without any considerations of demand and incentives structures.This technocratic orientation was crucial for the general development of Soviet mathematical economics, based on the engineering background of its protagonists, but also on general ideological underpinnings of input-output analysis, optimal growth theory, and mathematical programming.The supply side was always considered as primary, and the general aim of economic analysis was to provide optimal decisions for the design of production sector compatible with the state interest and usually with some vague notion of the consumer sector and its planned needs.Thus, the great majority of Soviet mathematical economists were dealing almost solely with practical problems (input-output tables, solution of linear optimization problems for single shop floors or plants, solution of transportation problems, calculations and computation algorithms).Nonetheless, some theoretical ambitions of the economic cybernetics can be found in the attemptsto create the "theory of optimal planning" (a term by Kantorovich) which was very broadly defined as an application of economic-mathematical modeling (mostly linear programming) to the economy "taken as a complex system".23 In particular, the theory of optimal planning was, during the 1960s, the central project of the newly created (in 1963) Central Economic-Mathematical Institute (CEMI) of the Academy of Sciences.24 Ambitious as it might have been, this domain of research had major conceptual and practical difficulties.One of the most important conceptual difficulties for designing one integrated model of the national economy was to identify a unique optimization criterion for the whole Soviet economy.In its most conventional form, it was supposed to have an hierarchical, multiple-stage structure: planning problems had to be approached on the level of an enterprise, then of an an industry, a region, and finally a coordination of different industries and regions, at least in theory, could be achieved.There were also attempts to elaborate theories of optimal planning and of optimal functioning of the Soviet economy using some elements of neoclassical economics.For instance, in the CEMI a group coordinated by Aron Katzenelinboigen was working on the system of optimal functioning of the economy (SOFE) based on some axiomatics and using a language of neoclassical economics (scarce resources, individual preferences, marginal utility, and so on).25 The normative idea behind this work was to take into account interests of different agents, to foster the development of "horizontal" or "market" relations in the national economy (a relative decentralization), in accordance with the spirit of the Kosygin reform announced in 1965.26 Another example of a "reformist" approach to the Soviet economy could be found in the work of the laboratory at the Institute of the Economy and Organization of Industrial Production in Novosibirsk directed by Alexander Granberg and working on inter-regional models of the Soviet, and even global, economy.These models considered different regions as autonomous entitie shaving their interests, and the planning as a process of coordination (balancing) of these interests, and used some elements of the general equilibrium theory and cooperative game theory.However, many mathematical economists and other critical voices were skeptical even about the possibility of optimization on a level higher than an enterprise.The tenants of the theory of the optimal planning were, in particular, confronted with antagonism of the planning authorities.27 Another major problem was a lack of reliable statistical data on the whole industries and sectors of the national economy (especially related to the military-industrial complex and foreign trade) which made irrelevant the calculations of an optimal plan for branches or for the whole economy.All these difficulties made the project to create a general mathematical model (and a comprehensive theory) of the Soviet centralized economy illusory.To sum it up, though the Soviet "economic cybernetics" had some obvious overlaps with the Western mathematical economics (optimal allocation of resources), yet there were important differences of goals (centralized planning and management of the national economy), and of the underlying ideology (Marxist-Leninist doctrine, in the Soviet case).The handbooks and published works in economic cybernetics could contain references to relevant Western literature, but they were fragmentary and superficial, 28 and they were always evaluated in the light of the Soviet political-economic orthodoxy.Mathematical economics thus constituted a curious hybrid type of knowledge, combin- 27 The State Planning Commission, Gosplan, was more or less overtly opposed to the idea of optimal planning, as far as the planning routines at work since the 1930s had a rationality of their own not always compatible with mathematical optimization ("rational economic thinking").In practice, the process of planning in the Soviet Union resembled negotiations between different actors including Gosplan, ministries, and large industrial units competing for rare resources.Representatives of different branches and state enterprises could make use of mathematical models and calculations for justification of their claims fore more resources (Interview with Emil' Ershov, Moscow, 12.04.2013.).But no single mathematical model was ever used for planning the whole of the Soviet economy.28 For instance, Kobrinski et al.,authors of the handbook "Vvedenie v ekonomicheskuyu kibernetiku", briefly describe what they refer to as the Condorcet-Arrow "voting paradox" [Kobrinski et al.,1975: 258) , but they do not mention the impossibility theorem at all.ing optimization techniques, applied computation methods, input-output models, elements of neoclassical doctrine and a heterogeneous, often self-contradictory planning ideology.An important difference in the development of mathematical economics on both sides of the Iron Curtain was also due to a lag in timing: in the USSR, the economic cybernetics was in its peak in the 1970s, while in the West there was a decline of interest in this type of analytical and practical tools, and the ideas of planning and cybernetics, with their overt interdisciplinary, ran definitely out of fashion as the profession was moving away from the theoretical pluralism towards the new syntheses.By the end of the 1960s, along with the more conventional economic cybernetics, a few sites of a more "Western style" research in mathematical economics appeared in the Soviet Union that we identify as "latent neoclassics".This work was done mainly in the fields of general equilibrium theory and related domains (Arrow-Debreu classical models of GE, models of equilibrium growth, disequilibrium models, computable GE models) and in game theory.This research was mostly practiced in liminal spaces outside of the universities.Among these "alternative" institutions were: Economic-mathematical Section at the Institute of Mathematics of the Siberian branch of the Academy of Sciences (founded in 1960), Department of Mathematical Economics at the CEMI (created in 1967); Institute of Control Sciences (founded in 1939, first work in mathematical economics appeared circa 1968); Department of mathematical economics at the Chief Computer Center of the Academy of Sciences (founded in 1968).As the dates of the creation of these subdivisions suggest, the mathematical modeling of economic processes was established as a legitimate domain of research among mathematicians in the Soviet Union in the late 1960s.It was stimulated by a practical interest in social matters stemming from the spirit of cybernetics.Nonetheless it remained quite marginal 29 and attracted only a minority of scholars in mathematical and physical sciences, not least because economics was considered as a much less prestigious (and less advanced) discipline.Why was this "Western style" mathematical economics practiced in institutions specialized in mathematics and engineering, rather than in economics?Apparently, they were less exposed to ideological constraints (as compared to social science institutions).But most importantly mathematicians and engineers employed by these institutions possessed advanced mathematical skills that conventional practitioners of economic cybernetics and economics in the Soviet Union generally did not have.Convex analysis, topology, functional analysis and other advanced mathematics were commonly used by leading mathematical economists in the West, but were not familiar to most Soviet economists.Another reason why mathematical economics developed mostly outside of the prestigious university departments comes from the organization of the Soviet science.The basic research and the higher education (universities) were most often disjointed, and had little links (with exception of the so called base subdepartments which provided graduates to their partner research institutions 30 ).Unlike in the US, where a typical career of a leading mathematical economist would lead him from a (relatively marginal for the profession, at least immediately after the war) research center (Cowles commission, RAND) to a prestigious economics department, in the Soviet Union scholars specialized in this field of applied mathematics stayed most of the time at their research institution of origin.A generation of mathematicians who entered the field during the second half of the 1960s and in the 1970s and their students who started to publish of these papers in the overall flow of the economic-mathematical literature never surpassed 4%.See [Malkov, forthcoming] .30 One of a few, but very successful, examples of the teaching/research symbiosis is represented by the mathematical department at the Novosibirsk State University and the Laboratory of mathematical economics of the Institute of mathematics of the Siberian branch of the Academy of Science; the close collaboration between the two gave rise to a Novosibirsk school of mathematical economics, one of the leading in the Soviet Union.For instance, Valery Makarov, a younger collaborator of Kantorovich, was dean of the subdepartment of theoretical cybernetics at the University and director of the Laboratory of mathematical economics at the Institute of mathematics (after Kantorovich moved to Moscow). "[In the end of the 1950s] the University was conceived especially to produce scientific personnel [for the research institutes of Akademgorodok] … graduates almost immediately became researchers […]" (Interview with Valery Marakulin, 10.04.2012, CEMI, Moscow).in the 1980s were less ideologically constrained than their older colleagues like Kantorovich, Nemchinov, and others.While the research in mathematical economics was motivated by practical considerations, the scholars employed in these institutions had more theoretical ambitions and interests, and most of them were aware of research conducted in the West.Within this professional culture we can roughly distinguish two main epistemic identities: a "pure mathematician" and a "social engineer".The first profile, that of a "pure mathematician", can be characterized by small preoccupation with any ideological or pragmatic considerations of economic modeling.As a good example we can consider a cohort of bright mathematicians who entered the Department of mathematical economics at the Central Institute of Economics and Mathematics during the second half of the 1960s 31 .In particular, some of them (Danilov, Movshovich, Polterovich, Zak, and more recently Koshevoy) made some work on classical general equilibrium models, as well as on disequilibrium and optimal growth, which had an extremely technical character and was primarily aimed at resolving a mathematical problem, while bearing a very limited (if any) economic interpretation.32 Mathematicians employed at the Novosibirsk Institute of Mathematics (Makarov, Marakulin, Vasil'ev and others) had a very similar professional identity and culture.Being employed at mathematical-economic departments for years or decades, most of them still continue to identify themselves as mathematicians (publishing in both mathematical and economic-mathematical journals, belonging to mathematical learned societies, dealing with purely mathematical problems, and so on).The examples of mathematicians-cumeconomists or of effective conversions into mathematical economics, especially during the Soviet period, are scarce and far between.33 31 The department's head, Aron Katsenelinboigen, was not himself a mathematician, but was a strong proponent of mathematical methods in economics and an excellent administrator who mastered well the complex power relations of the Soviet academia.He emigrated in the early 1970s, as well as a big part of the Department's employees (Mityagin, Dynkin, Katok, Moishesonand others), the Department was reorganized, but research in mathematical economics did not stop [Katsenelinboigen, 1980] .32 A shift from linear optimization models to the models of general equilibrium had an implicit normative interpretation as an argument for a decentralization of the Soviet economy and a socialist market.But these claims could not be openly discussed until the later Soviet period [Boldyrev and Kirtchik, 2013] .33 We study in detail a case of Viktor Polterovich who gives an example of such a successful conversion in: [Boldyrev and Kirtchik, 2013] .Some other cases might be mentioned as, for The identity of a "social engineer", more concerned with the economic meaning of the models, can be found in engineering and technical institutions.It can be exemplified by the Department of mathematical economics at the Chief Computer Center of the Academy of Sciences founded in 1968 on the initiative of Nikita Moiseev, a powerful member of the Academy of sciences and the dean of the department of control and applied mathematics at the Moscow Physical and Technical Institute.This department recruited graduates of this department, and developed a quite different culture of modeling.Moiseev and his colleagues were not satisfied with classical GE models, but not for ideological reasons.Scholars employed in this Department aimed at elaborating models which would more "realistically" describe the functioning of the economy.34 The first works were dealing with dynamic productive models, and later with models similar to those known in the West as Computable general equilibrium (CGE) models.In the 1990s, they built computable general equilibrium models describing the transition economy (commanded by the Central Bank and regional authorities) 35 .Another example is a group of scholars at the Institute of Control Sciences led by Emmanuil Braverman, a recognized specialist in image recognition algorithms and machine learning.In the late 1960s he got interested in mathematical modeling of economy, first drawing on classical equilibrium models and later developing disequilibrium models of productive systems with fixed prices.In the following decades, an important work on disequilibrium modeling was done by other Soviet mathematical economists, notably by Viktor Polterovich, during the 1970s and 1980s.Nonetheless, this work was not considered at the Institute as the principal preoccupation of Braverman and his colleagues, but rather as a "hobby".36 The research in mathematical economics conducted by these mathematicians and engineers had a certain relevance for the international community example, Valery Makarov (the actual president of the CEMI), economist by his first training who also studied mathematics.Both are members of the Econometric society since the Soviet period.34 Interview with Alexander Shananin, 18.07.2012, the A.A. Dorodnitsyn Computer Center of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow.35 However, at that time, according to the interviews, members of these departments were not aware of the work done by [Herbert Scarf, 1973] and other developments of computable equilibrium modeling in the West.36 Oral communication by Marc Levin at the seminar of the Research and educational group for social studies of economic knowledge, National Research University Higher School of Economics, 23.03.2012.and was occasionally recognized in the West (as testified by a few publications of Soviet scholars in leading American journals, international collaborations, and memberships in Econometric society during the Soviet time).But most of the time Soviet scholars worked in institutional and intellectual isolation from the Western academia (they had very little, or often no, opportunity to meet foreign colleagues, to publish in American journals, attend the conferences, etc.).The doors for a greater cooperation and integration into the international community were finally open just before the fall of the Soviet Union.For many Soviet specialists in mathematical economics the invitation to the International congress of the Econometric society in Barcelona in 1990, partly financially supported by the Soviet state, was the first possibility to present their work and to communicate with peers from outside of the socialist bloc.37 But even today, many specialists in mathematical economics have difficulties in publishing abroad.Papers co-authored with Western colleagues have much better chances to be published.We could suggest that these difficulties are due to a specific epistemic culture acquired during the education and socialization in the Soviet academia.In the hostile environment in which mathematical language was an intellectual refuge and a self-defense from ideological assaults, being unable to find any practical application of their theoretical work, mathematical economists developed a very abstract and technical style, which was much closer to mathematics tout court rather than economics.Even the most "realistic" and "reformist", by their intention, pieces are written in a very abstract mathematical language free of any interpretation.This is a direct consequence of the theoretical void we referred to above.Without a general framework and systematic training in (contemporary or even classical) economics even the brightest minds had either to delve into technical problems taking the "Western" theoretical framework as given or to abandon theory.In this sense, specialists in the "economic-mathematical modeling" in the Soviet Union were not (mathematical) economists in the "Western" sense of the term.As one of the interviewees (born in 1956) told us: "Only during the second half of the 1990s did I begin to consider myself more like an economist than a mathematician… It was important to understand that economics is a worthy thing… that it is a complex field, and not only in terms of mathematical analysis… but also in terms of its economic content… It does not immediately come to one's head, and no one taught us this.I believe it's one of the most important problems… That's why you had to learn all this by yourself".38 A very similar account on his experience of "becoming an economist" was given to us by Sergei Guriev, one of the most internationally recognized contemporary Russian economists.He began his career at the department of mathematical economics in the Chief Computer Center of the Academy of Sciences where he worked on theory of optimization and later on the models of general equilibrium.As he sees it today, the articles he published at that time (in the 1980s and in the beginning of the 1990s) belonged to the realm of applied mathematics, and not economics.A turning point in his career was a fellowship at the MIT in the mid-nineties where it occurred to him that "economics is a science where complex equations are not the most important thing".39 The early development of the mathematical economics in the USSR and in the US shares a number of common features: internal tensions within economics profession, Cold War sources (state funding, role of the military), and anti-Semitism as an external factor determining the institutional configuration of the discipline.The Cold War political climate was relatively favorable to planning, mathematization, and general rationalization of the social sciences on both sides of the iron curtain.However, compared to the US, the Soviet mathematical economics was developing with a certain delay which can be explained by the absolute monopoly of the Marxist-Leninist political economy and a general mistrust towards "cybernetic" ideas.At the same time, the presence in the Soviet academia of extremely strong mathematical schools and bright personalities having a national and international recognition, such as Kantorovich or Pontryagin, paved the way to the Golden era of Soviet cybernetics and optimization theory.40 The interest in applying mathematics to economics often revealed a technocratic and reformist stance at the same time.Stabilization of a bomb's trajectory, image recognition and optimal planning of the economy were considered by these scholars as problems of similar nature.The Soviet mathematical economics was undeniably a part of a broader international trend, shared some intellectual references, subjects and tools with its Western counterpart.Yet, the analysis of its disciplinary status and culture suggests that specific institutional and cultural features were also at play.For various institutional and conceptual reasons discussed in this paper Soviet specialists in "economic-mathematical modeling" (on both poles identified as "economic cybernetics" and "latent neoclassics") didn't form a well articulated and unified disciplinary space.Disciplinary identities were fuzzy and disciplinary borders blurred.Most importantly, in contrast to the US and Western Europe, the Soviet mathematical economics did not create its own theoretical discourse different from the languages of political economy, on the one hand, and mathematics, on the other hand.The orthodox political economy could not give the grounds to such a language, while references to the Western neoclassical economics were not politically acceptable (and could be even dangerous).For these reasons mathematical economics was mostly reduced to applied mathematics, while applied economists did not dare theoretical generalizations.As a consequence, economic interpretation of mathematical formalisms was rarely done, for it demanded an "economic imagination" and "vision" inextricably linked to the theoretical culture of economics as autonomous academic enterprise.41 The problems addressed here do not concern solely the history of Soviet mathematical economics.In fact, the roots of a relative theoretical backwardness of contemporary Russian economics are to be found in this story as well.A representative mathematical economist in the USSR, however smart he or she could be in mathematics, 42 still lacked the appropriate theoretical framework and could hardly make any significant economic contribution.This backwardness resulted in the "catching-up" strategy of the 1990s.In this situation, the most productive economists either moved to the West or began to exploit the local context and to make use of their modeling abilities to analyse the Russian reforms, transition problems etc.Important as they were, these problems rarely led to the interesting theoretical results, and while the new generation of Russian economists is trained in the contact with the older one 43 the new academic culture in economic theory 44 is still to come.See[Weintraub, 2002;Yonay, 1998].2 By "mathematical economics" we mean a plethora of approaches in the postwar economic theory that were characterized by relying on formal models.In contemporary economics this characterization looks a bit outdated since the meaning of the term is much more narrow nowadays.However, this term is relevant for the postwar context when describing the mathematically oriented approaches to economic theorizing.3 See, e.g.,[Duarte, 2013].4 See[Weintraub, 1983[Weintraub, , 1991[Weintraub, , 2002Mirowski, 2002Mirowski, , 2004Giocoli, 2003;Rizvi, 2003; Hands, 1994;Leonard, 2010].5 This view is expressed in[Bockman, 2007].The term is coined by [Knorr Cetina, 1991].7 See the discussion of this term in:[Lamont and Molnar, 2002].See[Gerovitch, 2002].9[Mirowski 2002].10 See[Yonay, 2003]; cf.one of the first postwar controversies in[Clark, 1947];[Novick, 1954] and the contributions of Klein, Duesenberry, Chipman, Tinbergen, Champernowne, This tension was important, for example, in the debates and intrigues around the Lenin prize awarded to Kantorovich along withNovozhilov and Nemchinov in 1965.12[Weintraub, 2012].13 See, e.g.,[Frenkel, 2012]. [Boldyrev, Kirtchik, 2013]. [The Great Soviet Encyclopedia, 1979] gives two definitions to the economic cybernetics, a "narrow" and "extended" one: "A scientific field concerned with the application of cybernetic ideas and methods to economic systems.In an expanded and not entirely accurate sense, economic cybernetics is often taken to mean the field of science that has developed at the junction of mathematics and cybernetics with economics, including mathematical programming, operations research, mathematical economic models, econometrics, and mathematical economics."16 E.g.[Karlin, 1964], etc. [Kobrinski et al.,1975: 151-152].21 Interview with Emil' Ershov, Moscow, 12.04.2013.22[Dorfman, 1976]. [Kobrinsky et al.,1975: 3-5].24 In the 1960s, the Sectors of optimal planning and of economic planning along with the Sector of economic forecasting composed the most important Department of the CEMI.25 In the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s the SOFE project was supported by the director of the CEMI, N. Fedorenko, and some other prominent personalities.It was associated with a reformist movement stemmed from the discussions preceding Kosygin reforms.26 See also:[Fursov, 2013].The bibliographical analysis of the literature on the GET and related fields in the Soviet Union shows that although the first works using the GET appeared in the 1960s, their number grew more significantly during the 1970s and attained its peak by the mid-1980s, but the share Interview with Valery Marakulin, 10.04.2012, CEMI, Moscow.Interview with Valery Marakulin, 10.04.2012, CEMI, Moscow.39 Oral communication by Sergei Guriev at the seminar of the Research and educational group for social studies of economic knowledge, National Research University Higher School of Economics, 23.03.2012.See[Gerovitch, 2002].41 [Schumpeter, 1954].42 See, for example, some interesting results in cooperative game theory[Bondareva 1963], demand theory[Mitjushin, Polterovich 1978], and the theory of optimal growth[Makarov, Rubinov 1977].This is the case for the New Economic School and Higher School of Economics, the most significant academic institutions in Russian economics that emerged in the post-Soviet period.44 By no means we suggest that mathematical economics is the whole of economics.But other fields of economic research, including more discursive and applied ones, face similar problems.Cf.[Libman, Zweynert, forthcoming].
motivated the Department-and the Public Affairs Bureau in particularto be at the forefront of the new digital age.The results have been tangible: our website is consistently rated among the top in the federal government, we have over 175,000 Facebook fans, we have over 390,000 followers on Twitter, and we now tweet in 11 languages including Arabic, Chinese, English, Farsi, French, Hindi, Portuguese, Russian, Spanish, Turkish, and Urdu.Moreover, our counterparts in foreign ministries around the world recognize our efforts and seek our advice on effective public diplomacy and best practices on social media.Much has been written, spoken, and even tweeted about the State Department's innovative communications approach.Brookings scholar Fergus Hanson recently published a study about how the adaptation to the new media environment is one the greatest challenges facing public and private sector entities.In his analysis he wrote, "at the vanguard of this adaptation is the U.S. State Department."These accomplishments should be understood within the context of the State Department's wider objectives, however.We are not employing digital technology because it is the latest media fad; instead, we are pursuing Twenty-First Century Statecraft because it advances U.S. policies and highlights American efforts to tackle today's tough national security issues.Social media not only expands our reach to new, broader, and younger audiences, but it also enables us to rapidly gauge reactions to policy pronouncements.The immediate feedback is valuable because it can be fed into the policy-making process to validate, fine-tune, or even change the approach.We compare notes with gurus in the digital field at places like Stanford and MIT, as well as with innovators at Facebook, Google, and Twitter, in order to keep apace of developments in the field.And, as we learn and master these communications tools, they are becoming among the most versatile in our diplomatic toolbox.Communicating in the digital realm is only one component of the work we do as the State Department's face to the public and press.We also continue to aggressively engage mainstream news organizations to get the message out.Yet, adopting a fresh communications strategy is not just about innovation; it is about integrating the practices that have worked over time with new methods and approaches-platforms that present a real challenge in our traditionally risk-averse world of diplomacy.As the Secretary delivers speeches, conducts press conferences, or participates in town hall meetings, and as our spokesperson takes questions from a cadre of seasoned journalists at our daily press briefing, their words are now disseminated through every conceivable media platform, both traditional and digital, exponentially increasing our reach across the globe.In fact, now everyone with a Twitter account has the opportunity to probe highranking State Department officials by tweeting questions to #AskState during our Twitter Q&A sessions, which we are also doing in Spanish as well as other languages.This work must be done in all spaces, at all times, and without erring.But how is it being done in practice?Secretary Clinton, in a seminal speech to commemorate Human Rights Day in December 2011, declared, "human rights are gay rights, and gay rights are human rights."This simple but poignant message lit up the Internet.To date, the video of the Secretary's consequential remarks is the highest performing live video since the State Department began publishing video products, and it has been viewed through the State Department's properties in over 100 countries.To further amplify her remarks, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor Dan Baer used our new online press conference platform "LiveAtState" to engage journalists from such diverse locations as Argentina, Ireland, Suriname, and Ukraine.When a journalist from Kosovo asked how to bring Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (LGBT) reforms into a conservative society, Baer localized the Secretary's words and discussed how Americans and Kosovars could enter a dialogue to work towards policies tailored to the Kosovar context.From a studio on the second floor of our Foggy Bottom headquarters in Washington, Baer, like dozens of other senior Department officials, connects with journalists and bloggers from Bujumbura to Beijing and Doha to Delhi, who ask real-time, on-therecord questions regarding pressing foreign policy issues.We have addressed U.S. priorities ranging from strengthening our core NATO alliance to our ongoing engagement in Africa to our intensified focus on Asia.We conduct "LiveAtState" conferences in other languages, including recently in Spanish and Chinese.Through this and other platforms, the scribes of the digital age-in addition to traditional journalists-have a chance to interact directly with senior U.S. government officials more than ever before and, as a result, their stories grace the covers of major newspapers.This enhanced coverage better informs the public about our efforts to tackle climate change, promote food security, combat terrorism, and advance American economic interests.My own experience in the communications cybersphere has validated its intrinsic value.For example, while hosting an hour-long global Q&A session on the State Department's Facebook page, I assured a Shi'ite Syrian Facebook user that the United States supports a post-Assad Syria that is a multi-ethnic democracy that protects minorities, reaffirmed to a Venezuelan student the U.S. commitment to fostering partnerships in our hemisphere to address common challenges such as achieving economic prosperity and social inclusion, and helped a young man in Tajikistan collect the proper documents for his visa interview.The response to these types of engagements has been overwhelmingly positive even when those we connect with may disagree with our policies.The old axiom that you get points just for showing up proves true, even in the virtual world.The Bureau of Public Affairs also has satellite offices around the world connecting with international media outlets in foreign languages.Our regional media hubs in Brussels, Dubai, Johannesburg, London, Miami, and Tokyo are extensions of the State Department's briefing room, broadcast service, and digital strategy center.These hubs are nimble and aware of each region's characteristics and interests.Our spokespeople in Dubai are at the ready to go into the studios of Al-Jazeera, Al-Arabiya, or Al-Hurra to echo in Arabic the Secretary's words, making U.S. policies accessible to millions of viewers who belong to important demographics.On the other side of the camera, our "hubsters" in Brussels and Tokyo focus on production.When Secretary Clinton traveled to Burma on her historic visit in November 2011, our Tokyo Hub Director captured footage that was picked up by stations throughout Asia, including remarkably on Burmese state television.When USAID Administrator Raj Shah visited thousands of displaced Syrians in a Turkish refugee camp in November 2012, our Brussels team gathered images that Syrian opposition networks beamed back into Syria, a country blocked from receiving most outside media.Furthermore, our hub in Miami takes advantage of the city's location as a gateway to Latin America to communicate our policies not only abroad, but also to the growing Spanish-speaking community in the United States.For example, we now participate in a monthly call-in show on a Spanishlanguage radio station during which Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs Jose Fernandez takes questions from listeners in Latin America the United States on topics related to American economic policy.In addition, our Miami "Hub of the Americas" establishes linkages with the American business community and advances the Department's "jobs diplomacy" by connecting those interested in trade and investment in Latin America with our embassies in the region.And when Under Secretary for Political Affairs Wendy Sherman did a multi-country swing through Africa, our Johannesburg hub, tapping into the massive popularity of radio journalism in Africa, made sure the Under Secretary's remarks about supporting government formation in Somalia and the President's recent Sub-Saharan Policy Directive were heard on AM, FM, and even satellite networks.We also deploy foreign language spokespeople to reach critical audiences in strategic locations.As the international community placed the toughest sanctions to date on Iran in response to its continued failure to abide by its international obligations with respect to its nuclear program, our Persian-language spokesperson took to cyberspace, hosting a Google+ "hangout" with prominent Iranian journalists.He made clear that sanctions are not directed at the Iranian people, but rather intended to motivate the Iranian regime to demonstrate to the world that its nuclear program is for peaceful, civilian use.That "hangout" reached potentially more than seven million people through online news articles in the United States, Azerbaijan and Iran, as well as a global audience of more than 500,000 people on social media.These efforts, coupled with our Virtual Embassy Tehran website, aim to circumvent Iran's electronic curtain and communicate directly with Iranians.Similarly, when protests erupted outside the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad in reaction to a video that was insulting to Islam, our Urdu language spokeswoman immediately did interviews with BBC Urdu, the Urdu Times, and ARY (a major Pakistani outlet) to explain to Pakistanis that the United States is committed to freedom of religion and tolerance, as well as freedom of expression.And, our Dari spokesman went on Kabul's main morning show to tout women's rights and discuss America's long-term commitment to Afghanistan's future.Furthermore, after we had to close the U.S. Embassy in Damascus, Ambassador Robert Ford returned to Washington determined to stay in touch with the Syrian people.Embassy Damascus' Facebook page was the answer.We used the page to share public, declassified satellite images taken by the U.S. military showing the ongoing battle and reinforcements of the Assad regime, and the page became one of the few trusted sources about actual events on the ground.Our virtual platforms are also used to engage students here in the United States.Recently, a European Bureau economic desk officer addressed fifty-five students from University of Texas at Austin via a digital videoconference on U.S. policy regarding the Eurozone crisis through our Foreign Policy Classroom program.Initially, our "classrooms" were only accessible to students to who could come in and talk with us.But now that the program has gone digital, we are able to connect with students nationwide.The Department also hosts foreign journalists on tours of the United States to ensure they have a solid context for writing high-quality, accurate reporting on U.S. policy for international audiences.For example, in June 2012 we hosted a group of thirty-two journalists from countries as diverse as Liberia, Oman, and Bulgaria to report on the role of youth in politics, with the aim of building upon a speech given by Secretary Clinton that touted the U.S. commitment to promoting youth activism and political involvement.The group traveled to Washington, DC and Houston to interact with a range of experts.The result?Over fifty articles published on the power of youth in America and abroad.In addition to our strategic communications efforts aimed at maximizing and choreographing messaging, crisis communications remains a key component of our work.In response to the March 2011 earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear incident in Japan, the Public Affairs Bureau deployed crisis communications specialists to the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo and to the Department's task force to assist with the public response.Ambassador John Roos used his Twitter feed to inform Americans in Japan seeking assistance, as well as those in the United States concerned about their friends and relatives in the devastated areas.Effective communication was essential for coordinating the response and for conveying to the Japanese people that we would stand with them in their hour of need.More recently, in the wake of Superstorm Sandy our crisis communications respondersthe State Department's Fly Away Communication Team (FACT)-traveled to New York and Connecticut to work with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) as part of the Administration's whole-ofgovernment response.Our team found it gratifying to serve our fellow citizens directly here at home.While our tools and methods of communicating U.S. policy both domestically and internationally are rapidly evolving, our basic principles remain unchanged.As we promote our national security interests, we are committed to telling the truth, being as transparent as possible, and In public diplomacy, as in any field, being a leader means openness to change, fostering a corporate environment that encourages and rewards innovation, and constantly striving to do better.supporting freedom of the press and Internet.In public diplomacy, as in any field, being a leader means openness to change, fostering a corporate environment that encourages and rewards innovation, and constantly striving to do better.We work to be at the forefront of effective communication, recognizing that it is critical for us to present and explain our views and values, not letting others define our narrative.As part of this effort, we are providing social media training to our communicators in the field, including sessions over the past year in Bangkok, Panama City, and Moscow.We have also empowered more officers at all levels to engage with the press, and have made participation in public diplomacy a criterion for professional advancement.Despite the fact that views, hits, and "impressions" make media reach more quantifiable than ever before, measuring the impact of our efforts remains difficult.Ultimately, we strive to shape a narrative and persuade global audiences.To do so, we need to be part of the conversation, wherever it is taking place, from Twitter to Weibo, from university campuses to town squares.And, while we indeed struggle to determine how many minds we are changing, we do know that if we do not engage in the spaces where people are getting their news and having their chats, we will have no impact and will lose relevancy.Our goal of effectively engaging domestic and international audiences to advance our foreign policy objectives drives all of our efforts as we navigate the ever-changing international media landscape.Yet, while we can't predict the next development in media technology, we must continue to strive to be a leader, constantly looking to further U.S. foreign policy and tell America's compelling story to the world through whatever platforms provide the greatest reach.n twenty-first century statecraft in action	motivated the Department-and the Public Affairs Bureau in particularto be at the forefront of the new digital age.The results have been tangible: our website is consistently rated among the top in the federal government, we have over 175,000 Facebook fans, we have over 390,000 followers on Twitter, and we now tweet in 11 languages including Arabic, Chinese, English, Farsi, French, Hindi, Portuguese, Russian, Spanish, Turkish, and Urdu.Moreover, our counterparts in foreign ministries around the world recognize our efforts and seek our advice on effective public diplomacy and best practices on social media.Much has been written, spoken, and even tweeted about the State Department's innovative communications approach.Brookings scholar Fergus Hanson recently published a study about how the adaptation to the new media environment is one the greatest challenges facing public and private sector entities.In his analysis he wrote, "at the vanguard of this adaptation is the U.S. State Department."These accomplishments should be understood within the context of the State Department's wider objectives, however.We are not employing digital technology because it is the latest media fad; instead, we are pursuing Twenty-First Century Statecraft because it advances U.S. policies and highlights American efforts to tackle today's tough national security issues.Social media not only expands our reach to new, broader, and younger audiences, but it also enables us to rapidly gauge reactions to policy pronouncements.The immediate feedback is valuable because it can be fed into the policy-making process to validate, fine-tune, or even change the approach.We compare notes with gurus in the digital field at places like Stanford and MIT, as well as with innovators at Facebook, Google, and Twitter, in order to keep apace of developments in the field.And, as we learn and master these communications tools, they are becoming among the most versatile in our diplomatic toolbox.Communicating in the digital realm is only one component of the work we do as the State Department's face to the public and press.We also continue to aggressively engage mainstream news organizations to get the message out.Yet, adopting a fresh communications strategy is not just about innovation; it is about integrating the practices that have worked over time with new methods and approaches-platforms that present a real challenge in our traditionally risk-averse world of diplomacy.As the Secretary delivers speeches, conducts press conferences, or participates in town hall meetings, and as our spokesperson takes questions from a cadre of seasoned journalists at our daily press briefing, their words are now disseminated through every conceivable media platform, both traditional and digital, exponentially increasing our reach across the globe.In fact, now everyone with a Twitter account has the opportunity to probe highranking State Department officials by tweeting questions to #AskState during our Twitter Q&A sessions, which we are also doing in Spanish as well as other languages.This work must be done in all spaces, at all times, and without erring.But how is it being done in practice?Secretary Clinton, in a seminal speech to commemorate Human Rights Day in December 2011, declared, "human rights are gay rights, and gay rights are human rights."This simple but poignant message lit up the Internet.To date, the video of the Secretary's consequential remarks is the highest performing live video since the State Department began publishing video products, and it has been viewed through the State Department's properties in over 100 countries.To further amplify her remarks, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor Dan Baer used our new online press conference platform "LiveAtState" to engage journalists from such diverse locations as Argentina, Ireland, Suriname, and Ukraine.When a journalist from Kosovo asked how to bring Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (LGBT) reforms into a conservative society, Baer localized the Secretary's words and discussed how Americans and Kosovars could enter a dialogue to work towards policies tailored to the Kosovar context.From a studio on the second floor of our Foggy Bottom headquarters in Washington, Baer, like dozens of other senior Department officials, connects with journalists and bloggers from Bujumbura to Beijing and Doha to Delhi, who ask real-time, on-therecord questions regarding pressing foreign policy issues.We have addressed U.S. priorities ranging from strengthening our core NATO alliance to our ongoing engagement in Africa to our intensified focus on Asia.We conduct "LiveAtState" conferences in other languages, including recently in Spanish and Chinese.Through this and other platforms, the scribes of the digital age-in addition to traditional journalists-have a chance to interact directly with senior U.S. government officials more than ever before and, as a result, their stories grace the covers of major newspapers.This enhanced coverage better informs the public about our efforts to tackle climate change, promote food security, combat terrorism, and advance American economic interests.My own experience in the communications cybersphere has validated its intrinsic value.For example, while hosting an hour-long global Q&A session on the State Department's Facebook page, I assured a Shi'ite Syrian Facebook user that the United States supports a post-Assad Syria that is a multi-ethnic democracy that protects minorities, reaffirmed to a Venezuelan student the U.S. commitment to fostering partnerships in our hemisphere to address common challenges such as achieving economic prosperity and social inclusion, and helped a young man in Tajikistan collect the proper documents for his visa interview.The response to these types of engagements has been overwhelmingly positive even when those we connect with may disagree with our policies.The old axiom that you get points just for showing up proves true, even in the virtual world.The Bureau of Public Affairs also has satellite offices around the world connecting with international media outlets in foreign languages.Our regional media hubs in Brussels, Dubai, Johannesburg, London, Miami, and Tokyo are extensions of the State Department's briefing room, broadcast service, and digital strategy center.These hubs are nimble and aware of each region's characteristics and interests.Our spokespeople in Dubai are at the ready to go into the studios of Al-Jazeera, Al-Arabiya, or Al-Hurra to echo in Arabic the Secretary's words, making U.S. policies accessible to millions of viewers who belong to important demographics.On the other side of the camera, our "hubsters" in Brussels and Tokyo focus on production.When Secretary Clinton traveled to Burma on her historic visit in November 2011, our Tokyo Hub Director captured footage that was picked up by stations throughout Asia, including remarkably on Burmese state television.When USAID Administrator Raj Shah visited thousands of displaced Syrians in a Turkish refugee camp in November 2012, our Brussels team gathered images that Syrian opposition networks beamed back into Syria, a country blocked from receiving most outside media.Furthermore, our hub in Miami takes advantage of the city's location as a gateway to Latin America to communicate our policies not only abroad, but also to the growing Spanish-speaking community in the United States.For example, we now participate in a monthly call-in show on a Spanishlanguage radio station during which Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs Jose Fernandez takes questions from listeners in Latin America the United States on topics related to American economic policy.In addition, our Miami "Hub of the Americas" establishes linkages with the American business community and advances the Department's "jobs diplomacy" by connecting those interested in trade and investment in Latin America with our embassies in the region.And when Under Secretary for Political Affairs Wendy Sherman did a multi-country swing through Africa, our Johannesburg hub, tapping into the massive popularity of radio journalism in Africa, made sure the Under Secretary's remarks about supporting government formation in Somalia and the President's recent Sub-Saharan Policy Directive were heard on AM, FM, and even satellite networks.We also deploy foreign language spokespeople to reach critical audiences in strategic locations.As the international community placed the toughest sanctions to date on Iran in response to its continued failure to abide by its international obligations with respect to its nuclear program, our Persian-language spokesperson took to cyberspace, hosting a Google+ "hangout" with prominent Iranian journalists.He made clear that sanctions are not directed at the Iranian people, but rather intended to motivate the Iranian regime to demonstrate to the world that its nuclear program is for peaceful, civilian use.That "hangout" reached potentially more than seven million people through online news articles in the United States, Azerbaijan and Iran, as well as a global audience of more than 500,000 people on social media.These efforts, coupled with our Virtual Embassy Tehran website, aim to circumvent Iran's electronic curtain and communicate directly with Iranians.Similarly, when protests erupted outside the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad in reaction to a video that was insulting to Islam, our Urdu language spokeswoman immediately did interviews with BBC Urdu, the Urdu Times, and ARY (a major Pakistani outlet) to explain to Pakistanis that the United States is committed to freedom of religion and tolerance, as well as freedom of expression.And, our Dari spokesman went on Kabul's main morning show to tout women's rights and discuss America's long-term commitment to Afghanistan's future.Furthermore, after we had to close the U.S. Embassy in Damascus, Ambassador Robert Ford returned to Washington determined to stay in touch with the Syrian people.Embassy Damascus' Facebook page was the answer.We used the page to share public, declassified satellite images taken by the U.S. military showing the ongoing battle and reinforcements of the Assad regime, and the page became one of the few trusted sources about actual events on the ground.Our virtual platforms are also used to engage students here in the United States.Recently, a European Bureau economic desk officer addressed fifty-five students from University of Texas at Austin via a digital videoconference on U.S. policy regarding the Eurozone crisis through our Foreign Policy Classroom program.Initially, our "classrooms" were only accessible to students to who could come in and talk with us.But now that the program has gone digital, we are able to connect with students nationwide.The Department also hosts foreign journalists on tours of the United States to ensure they have a solid context for writing high-quality, accurate reporting on U.S. policy for international audiences.For example, in June 2012 we hosted a group of thirty-two journalists from countries as diverse as Liberia, Oman, and Bulgaria to report on the role of youth in politics, with the aim of building upon a speech given by Secretary Clinton that touted the U.S. commitment to promoting youth activism and political involvement.The group traveled to Washington, DC and Houston to interact with a range of experts.The result?Over fifty articles published on the power of youth in America and abroad.In addition to our strategic communications efforts aimed at maximizing and choreographing messaging, crisis communications remains a key component of our work.In response to the March 2011 earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear incident in Japan, the Public Affairs Bureau deployed crisis communications specialists to the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo and to the Department's task force to assist with the public response.Ambassador John Roos used his Twitter feed to inform Americans in Japan seeking assistance, as well as those in the United States concerned about their friends and relatives in the devastated areas.Effective communication was essential for coordinating the response and for conveying to the Japanese people that we would stand with them in their hour of need.More recently, in the wake of Superstorm Sandy our crisis communications respondersthe State Department's Fly Away Communication Team (FACT)-traveled to New York and Connecticut to work with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) as part of the Administration's whole-ofgovernment response.Our team found it gratifying to serve our fellow citizens directly here at home.While our tools and methods of communicating U.S. policy both domestically and internationally are rapidly evolving, our basic principles remain unchanged.As we promote our national security interests, we are committed to telling the truth, being as transparent as possible, and In public diplomacy, as in any field, being a leader means openness to change, fostering a corporate environment that encourages and rewards innovation, and constantly striving to do better.supporting freedom of the press and Internet.In public diplomacy, as in any field, being a leader means openness to change, fostering a corporate environment that encourages and rewards innovation, and constantly striving to do better.We work to be at the forefront of effective communication, recognizing that it is critical for us to present and explain our views and values, not letting others define our narrative.As part of this effort, we are providing social media training to our communicators in the field, including sessions over the past year in Bangkok, Panama City, and Moscow.We have also empowered more officers at all levels to engage with the press, and have made participation in public diplomacy a criterion for professional advancement.Despite the fact that views, hits, and "impressions" make media reach more quantifiable than ever before, measuring the impact of our efforts remains difficult.Ultimately, we strive to shape a narrative and persuade global audiences.To do so, we need to be part of the conversation, wherever it is taking place, from Twitter to Weibo, from university campuses to town squares.And, while we indeed struggle to determine how many minds we are changing, we do know that if we do not engage in the spaces where people are getting their news and having their chats, we will have no impact and will lose relevancy.Our goal of effectively engaging domestic and international audiences to advance our foreign policy objectives drives all of our efforts as we navigate the ever-changing international media landscape.Yet, while we can't predict the next development in media technology, we must continue to strive to be a leader, constantly looking to further U.S. foreign policy and tell America's compelling story to the world through whatever platforms provide the greatest reach.n twenty-first century statecraft in action